



# MIDDLE EAST RECORD

1960

THE ISRAEL ORIENTAL SOCIETY / THE  
REUVEN SHILOAH RESEARCH CENTER







**MIDDLE EAST RECORD**  
**VOLUME ONE • 1960**

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1960

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## PREFACE

MIDDLE EAST RECORD (MER) is an annual account of the politics and international relations of the countries of the Middle East. It is a development of the survey that has appeared during the past 13 years in *Hamizrah Hehadash* (*The New East*), the Hebrew quarterly of the Israel Oriental Society.

There is now an extensive and ever-growing coverage of Middle East affairs. In addition to the numerous books, there are specialized periodical and other factual surveys—particularly on economic affairs, oil and education. In the field of politics, however, systematically presented factual information is not easily obtainable. The student of Middle East politics has at his disposal a wealth of analysis, comment and judgement, but singularly little sober fact is readily available by which to check them. In order to construct even a skeleton framework for research, the analyst or historian has to conduct a preliminary survey of numerous and varied sources which are not always easy to come by.

It was this state of affairs that prompted the Israel Oriental Society to enlarge the political section of *Hamizrah Hehadash* and make it available in English.

The aim of this work is to present the facts in full detail and from the widest possible variety of sources. Where the facts are disputed—and that happens frequently enough in the Middle East—all available versions are quoted, precedence being given to official statements. When it is a matter of underlying motives and causes, or the significance and consequences of events, both official statements and unofficial comment are treated as facts to be recorded.

In compiling MER, over 200 newspapers, periodicals and official publications have been regularly scanned and many additional publications consulted. As far as possible, official publications have been used, but the overwhelming majority of items included are Press reports and monitored broadcasts. For maximum accuracy, these have been cross-checked as far as possible and early reports have been corrected by later, more accurate ones.

MER comprises three categories of material: a general record; views and policies on internal affairs and international relations, as formulated by government leaders; synopses and economic surveys.

The general record is arranged according to topics, with extensive cross-references. Dates are prefixed to headings to establish the chronological sequence. The record consists of quotations from, or summaries of, specified sources. Where background notes have been found necessary, they are indicated by square brackets. Sources are as a rule quoted for each item separately. In translated material the original terms for institutions, parties, etc., are generally added in parentheses.

"Views and Policies" have been compiled on the basis of all published pronouncements of government leaders during the year. Care has been taken not only to present all relevant views but also to present them in proper balance. To avoid the risk of quoting out of context, passages have often been given at considerable length. As far as possible, English translations issued in the country concerned have been used. These have generally been compared with the text in the original language, but so long as they convey the general meaning they have been left unchanged. Where exact terms might be of importance or interest, the words concerned have been given in the original, in brackets.



The synopses are based solely on the source material given, to which they serve as a guide.

The economic surveys are intended to provide the necessary background for the understanding of political developments.

The area covered extends from Turkey in the north and Cyprus and Libya in the west to Iran in the east and Ethiopia, Somalia and Sudan in the south. It has not been possible to include special sections on Ethiopia, Iran, Libya and Somalia, which are treated only in connection with certain aspects of international relations. In the case of Turkey, international relations have been only partially covered, and internal affairs have not been dealt with in the section on Israel. It is hoped to correct this in future volumes. Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia are included in the survey of inter-Arab relations.

MER, though continuing a well-established tradition, is a new venture, and as such can no doubt be improved upon. Criticisms and suggestions will be most welcome. The lessons learned in editing this first volume will be applied in the next one, now in an advanced stage of preparation. In particular, the publication date will be progressively advanced.

A major test of a work of this kind is its objectivity. The editor hopes that MER reflects the efforts made in this respect.

Although MER is the work of many hands, the responsibility for its contents rests entirely with the editor.

## EXPLANATORY NOTES

Synopses, background notes and all items indicated by square brackets have been provided by the editor.

Where no year is specified, the date is always 1960.

References in the synopses are generally given only to sections other than the one prefaced by the synopsis in question.

The spelling of place names is that of generally accepted English maps.

In quotations the spelling of Arabic, Hebrew and Turkish names has been changed, where necessary, to comply with the system adopted by MER. Likewise, in some cases terms have been abbreviated.

The section on Cyprus deviates from the general pre-

sentation of material in that it is, in the main, a summary.

In deviation from MER's general practice of dealing with each country's foreign relations under the heading of that country, relations between Middle East and Communist bloc countries have been included, for editorial reasons, under the heading "The Communist bloc and the Middle East."

For the tables on trade, figures for 1960 were generally not available, and the majority are therefore for 1959. Because of the sometimes contradictory and fragmentary information available on trade and economic aid, complete accuracy cannot be guaranteed.

## NOTES ON TRANSLITERATION

*Arabic:* The transliteration is meant to aid the reader who has no knowledge of Arabic to arrive at comprehensible pronunciation. Currently used names have been rendered in the form generally accepted, e.g. Gamāl Abdel-Nasser. For the pronunciation of other names some simple rules should be observed:

1. A vowel above which the sign <sup>˘</sup> appears is pronounced long, e.g. Rafiq = Rafeeq.
2. In the case of a double consonant both consonants are pronounced, e.g. Muhammad = Muham-mad.
3. The sign ' preceding a consonant and the sign ' preceding a vowel are pronounced like a catch in the throat.

4. Pronounce *dh* as th in 'father'  
*gh* as the French 'r'  
*kh* as the Scottish 'ch' in 'loch'

(In indicating the sources the long vowel is not marked.)

*Hebrew:* There is no accepted transliteration; we have adopted the one used by *The Jerusalem Post* daily. Generally, the last syllable is stressed.

*Turkish:* The Turkish standard spelling has been adopted; it should be noted that *ş* is pronounced as *ch* in English, *c* as *j*, *ğ* as *sh*.

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Where there are several Arabic newspapers with the same name, the place of publication is not indicated when the paper is quoted in the section dealing with its country of origin; in other sections it is indicated only where doubt might arise.

Aden Chronicle	Aden	Weekly	Representing the pro-British "Aden for the Adenis" circles
The Aeroplane and Astronautics	Weekly	London	
Al-Ahālī	Daily	Baghdad	Organ of National Democratic Party
Al-Ahrām	Daily	Cairo	Nationalized May 1960, and taken over by National Union (NU)
Al-Ahrār	Daily	Beirut	Organ of National Liberal Party (pro-Western)
Al-Akhhbār	Daily	Baghdad	Pro-government, anti-UAR
Al-Akhhbār	Daily	Cairo	Nationalized May 1960, and taken over by NU
Al-Akhhbār	Weekly	Beirut	Organ of Communist Party
Akhhbār al-Usbū'	Weekly	Amman	Independent—but subject to political censorship
Akhhbār al-Yawm	Weekly	Cairo	Nationalized May 1960, and taken over by NU
Akhir Sā'ah	Weekly	Cairo	Nationalized May 1960, and taken over by NU
Akşam	Daily	Istanbul	Independent
Al-Amal	Daily	Beirut	Organ of Les Phalanges Libanaises
Al-Amil as-Sudani	Weekly	Khartoum	Workers' Union Organ
Al-Anbā'	Weekly	Beirut	Organ of Progressive Socialist Party (pro-UAR)
Anbā' as-Sudān	Daily	Khartoum	Independent; concentrates mainly on cultural subjects
Al-Anwār	Daily	Beirut	Pro-UAR, anti-Communist
Army	Monthly	Washington	Published by the Association of the US Army
The Army Quarterly and Defence Journal	Quarterly	London	
Al-Ayyām	Daily	Khartoum	Independent; leftist
Al-Ayyām	Daily	Damascus	
Baghdād	Daily	Baghdad	Nationalist
Bamahaneh	Weekly	Tel Aviv	Illustrated paper of Israel Defence Forces
Al-Bayān	Daily	Baghdad	Organ of National Progressive Party (Hadid group)
Bayram Gazetesi			Appears only during Kurban Bayramı and Şeker Bayramı holidays; joint issue of Istanbul Press
Beirut al-Masā'	Evening	Beirut	Pro-UAR
Al-Bilād	Daily	Jedda	Supports King Saud
Al-Bilād	Daily	Baghdad	Pro-government; leftist
Al-Bilād	Weekly	Old City of Jerusalem (Jordan)	Independent, but subject to political censorship
Al-Binā'	Daily	Beirut	National Social Party (NSP) Organ
Bureau Arabe de Presse et de Publications (BAPP)	Weekly	Paris	
The Christian Science Monitor	Daily	Boston and London	
Le Commerce du Levant	Three times a week and monthly	Beirut	Pro-French
Cumhuriyet	Daily	Istanbul	Independent



# SOURCES

Daily Express	Daily	London	
Daily Star	Daily	Beirut	Published by al-Hayāt publishing house (see below)
Daily Telegraph	Daily	London	
Davar	Daily	Tel Aviv	Official organ of General Federation of Labour (Histadrut), Mapai influence
Department of State Bulletin	Weekly	Washington	
Ad-Difa'	Daily	Old City of Jerusalem (Jordan)	Independent—but subject to political censorship
Divrei Haknesset		Jerusalem (Israel)	Records of Knesset (Parliament) proceedings
Dünya	Daily	Istanbul	Independent
Echo Reports	Weekly	Tehran	Same ownership as Kayhan (see below)
L'Economie et les Finances de la Syrie et des Pays Arabes	Monthly	Damascus	Published by Centre d'Etudes et de Documentations Economiques, Financières et Sociales
L'Economie Libanaise et Arabe	Monthly	Beirut	Organ of the Chambers of Commerce and Industry, Beirut
Economic Bulletin, National Bank of Egypt	Quarterly	Cairo	
The Economist	Weekly	London	
Egyptian Economic and Political Review	Monthly	Cairo	Nationalized May 1960, and taken over by NU
The Egyptian Gazette	Daily	Cairo	Nationalized May 1960, and taken over by NU
Egyptian Mail	Daily	Cairo	Nationalized May 1960, and taken over by NU
Eleftheria	Daily	Nicosia	Independent, National Liberal (Greek)
Ethniki	Daily	Nicosia	Organ of Democratic Union (Greek)
Ethnos	Daily	Nicosia	Right-wing, pro-Makarios (Greek)
Ettela'at	Evening	Tehran	Pro-government
Eurafor Press	Weekly	Paris	
Export-Import Bank, Press Release		Washington	
Al-Fajr al-Jadid	Evening	Baghdad	Nationalist, anti-Communist, criticizes government but praises Qassim
Falastin	Daily	Old City of Jerusalem (Jordan)	Independent—but subject to political censorship
Fatāt al-Jazīrah	Daily	Aden	Representing the pro-British "Aden for the Adenis" circles
Le Figaro	Daily	Paris	
Fileleftheros	Daily	Nicosia	Right-wing pro-government (Greek)
The Financial Times	Daily	London	
The Glasgow Herald	Daily	Glasgow	
The Guardian	Daily	Manchester & London	
Al-Gumhuriyah	Daily	Cairo	Semi-official—nationalized May 1960 and taken over by NU
Ha'aretz	Daily	Tel Aviv	Independent, Liberal
Haboker	Daily	Tel Aviv	Organ of General Zionist Party
Halkin Sesi	Daily	Nicosia	Organ of Dr Küçük (Turkish)
Al-Hamishmar	Daily	Tel Aviv	Organ of United Workers' Party (Mapam)
Haravghi	Daily	Nicosia	Left-wing (Greek)
Hatzofeh	Daily	Tel Aviv	Organ of National Religious Party
Havadis	Daily	Istanbul	Organ of Democratic Party
Al-Hawādith	Weekly	Beirut	Pro-UAR
Hawl al-Alam	Weekly	Amman	Extremist anti-UAR
Al-Hayāt	Daily	Beirut	Independent; Western leanings
Hedim Uteguvot	Sporadic	Tel Aviv	Itim Mizrahi News Agency, summary of trends and angles on the news in Arab broadcasts and Press
Herut	Daily	Tel Aviv	Organ of Herut Party

# SOURCES

Al-Hurriyah	Daily	Baghdad	Nationalist, Anti-Communist, pro-Qassim
Hürriyet	Daily	Istanbul	Independent
The Illustrated London News	Weekly	London	
International Affairs	Monthly	Moscow	Published by the Soviet Society for the Popularization of Political and Scientific Knowledge.
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 15th Annual Report 1959/1960		Washington	
International, Financial News Survey	Weekly	Washington	Published by International Monetary Fund
International Monetary Fund, Press Release		Washington	
Al-Insaniyah	Daily	Baghdad	Pro-Communist
Iraq News Agency (INA) Bulletin	Daily	Baghdad	Semi-official
Iraq Times	Daily	Baghdad	Pro-government
The Israel Digest	Fortnightly	Jerusalem (Israel)	Published by Israel Digest—the Jewish Agency
Israel Government Year Book, 1959/1960		Jerusalem (Israel)	Published by Government Printer for Central Office of Information, PM's Office
Istanbul (in French)	Daily	Istanbul	Political and literary
Al-Istiqlāl	Daily	Baghdad	
Ittihad ash-Sha'ab	Daily	Baghdad	Organ of Ittihad ash-Sha'ab (Communist) Party
Izvestia	Evening	Moscow	Organ of Soviet Government
Al-Jaridah	Daily	Beirut	Independent; Western leanings
Al-Jaridah ar-Rasmiyah (Official Gazette)	Weekly	Amman	
The Jerusalem Post	Daily	Jerusalem (Israel)	Independent; Mapai influence
The Jerusalem Times	Daily	Old City of Jerusalem (Jordan)	Same ownership as Al-Jihad (see below)
Jewish Observer & Middle East Review	Weekly	London	
Al-Jihad	Daily	Old City of Jerusalem (Jordan)	Generally considered as the Court Organ
Le Journal de Téhéran	Daily	Tehran	Pro-government
Journal du Commerce et de la Marine	Daily	Cairo & Alexandria	
Journal of the Royal United Service Institution	Quarterly	London	
Kayhan	Daily	Tehran	Independent
Keesings Contemporary Archives	Weekly	Bristol	
Khandaniha	Bi-weekly	Tehran	Independent
Al-Kifah	Daily	Beirut	Pro-UAR
Kim	Weekly	Istanbul	Independent
Krasnaya Zvezda (Red Star)	Daily	Moscow	Organ of Soviet Forces
Kul-Shay'	Weekly	Beirut	Pro-UAR
Kypros	Weekly	Nicosia	Independent (Greek)
Lamerhav	Daily	Tel Aviv	Organ of Achdut Ha'avoda-Poalei Zion Party
Ma'ariv	Evening	Tel Aviv	Independent
Al-Mabdh'	Daily	Baghdad	Organ of Iraqi Communist Party (led by Da'ud as-Sā'igh)
Al-Manār	Daily	Old City of Jerusalem (Jordan)	Unofficial organ of Muslim Brotherhood

# SOURCES

Al-Masā'	Evening	Old City of Jerusalem (Jordan)	Close to the Court
Al-Masā'	Evening	Cairo	Nationalized May 1960, and taken over by NU
Mid-East Commerce	Monthly	Beirut	Independent
Mideast Mirror	Weekly	Beirut	Review of ME news prepared by Arab News Agency (ANA); Western leanings
Middle Eastern Affairs	Monthly	New York	
Middle East Economic Digest	Weekly	London	
The Middle East Economist	Monthly	Cairo	Nationalized May 1960, and taken over by NU
The Middle East Journal	Quarterly	Washington	
Military Review	Monthly	Kansas	Published by US Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
Milliyet	Daily	Istanbul	Independent
Mizan Newsletter	Monthly	Oxford	A review of Soviet writing on the ME and Africa, issued by the Central Asian Research Centre in Association with St. Antony's College (Oxford). Soviet Affairs Study Group
Le Monde	Daily	Paris	
Morning News	Daily	Khartoum	Same ownership as Al-Ayyām
Al-Musawwar	Weekly	Cairo	Nationalized, and taken over by NU
Nacak	Weekly	Nicosia	Organ of the Denktāş (Turkish)
An-Nahār	Daily	Beirut	Western leanings
An-Nasr	Daily	Damascus	
An-Nasr	Fortnightly	Ta'izz	Published by the Government
Near East Report	Fortnightly	Washington	A Washington letter on American policy in the Near East
New Times	Weekly	Moscow	Published by Trud (see below)
New York Herald Tribune	Daily	New York	
		Paris	
An-Nīl	Daily	Khartoum	Organ of Ansār Sect (Ummah Party)
An-Nidā'	Daily	Beirut	Organ of Communist Party
The New York Times	Daily	New York	NYT Amsterdam appeared until 15 Oct 1960 one day after NY edition, from 16 Oct NYT Paris appeared on same day as in NY
		Amsterdam	
		Paris	
Observer	Daily	London	
L'Orient	Daily	Beirut	Published by al-Jarīdah publishing house (see above)
Parliamentary Debates (Hansard)		London	
The Petroleum Times	Fortnightly	London	
Pravda	Daily	Moscow	Organ of Soviet Communist Party
Press Bulletin		Jerusalem (Israel)	Published by State of Israel Government Press Office
Problemni Sovetskoye Vostokovedeniye (Soviet Oriental Studies)	6 issues per year	Moscow	Published by Academy of Sciences
Publications of the Foreign Ministry		Jerusalem (Israel)	Published by Foreign Ministry Information Division
Al-Qalam al-Adani	Weekly	Aden	Representing the pro-British "Aden for the Adenis" circles
Al-Quwwāt al-Musallahah	Weekly	Cairo	Organ of Armed Forces
Ar-Ra'y al-Amm	Daily	Baghdad	Pro-government, leftist
Ar-Ra'y al-Amm	Daily	Khartoum	Independent
The Recorder	Weekly	Aden	Independent
La Revue du Liban	Weekly	Beirut	Supports Phalanges and National Liberals; Western leanings
Revue Militaire d'Information	Monthly	Paris	Published under auspices of Ministère des Armées
Ar-Risālah	Monthly	Khartoum	Islamic paper

# SOURCES

Rūz al-Yūsuf	Weekly	Cairo	Nationalized May 1960, and taken over by NU
Saba	Weekly	Ta'izz	Pro-government
As-Sahāfah	Weekly	Beirut	Organ of Ba'ath Party pro-UAR
As-Sarābah	Daily	Khartoum	Nationalist, leftist, pro-UAR
Sawt al-Ahrār	Daily	Baghdad	Communist
Sawt as-Sudān	Daily	Khartoum	Organ of Khatmiyah sect
As-Sayyād	Weekly	Beirut	Pro-UAR
The Scotsman	Daily	Edinburgh	
The Scribe	Monthly	Cairo	Published by the ME Research Centre, nationalized May 1960, and taken over by NU
Ash-Sha'ab	Daily	Cairo	Nationalized May 1960, and taken over by NU
Ash-Sha'ab	Daily	Baghdad	
Ash-Sha'ab	Evening	Old City of Jerusalem, (Jordan)	Same ownership as Falastin
Ash-Sharq	Weekly	Baghdad	Nationalist
As-Siyāsah	Daily	Beirut	Pro-UAR, presents opinions of Sunni Muslims of Beirut
Soldier	Monthly	London	British Army Magazine
Sovremenniy Vostok (Modern East)	Monthly	Moscow	Published by Institute of Oriental Studies of the USSR Academy of Sciences
The Spectator	Weekly	London	
Sudan (Bulletin)	Monthly	Khartoum	Governmental; published by Central Office of Information
As-Sudān al-Jadīd	Daily	Khartoum	Formerly organ of National Unionist Party, pro-UAR
The Sudan Daily	Daily	Khartoum	Government organ
Sunday Times	Weekly	London	
Summary of Arab Broadcasts	Daily Review	Tel Aviv	Published by Itim Mizrah News Agency, Independent, monitors Arabic broadcasts from Arab countries, the BBC and Moscow Radio
Summary of World Broadcasts, part IV: the Arab World, Israel, Greece, Turkey, Iran	Daily	London	Published by the Monitoring Service of the BBC. Political Subjects
Weekly Supplement of above			As above, Economic, cultural and military subjects as above.
Soviet Union, Eastern Europe and Far East broadcasts, Supplements on ME	Sporadic		
At-Tali'ah	Sporadic	Yemen	Pro-Communist
At-Taquaddum	Daily	Baghdad	Pro-Communist
Ath-Thawrah	Daily	Khartoum	Organ of military ruling group; published by Ministry of Information
Ath-Thawrah	Daily	Baghdad	Nationalist, anti-Communist, pro-government
Time	Weekly	Washington	
The Times	Daily	London	
Trud	Daily	Moscow	Organ of Soviet Trade Unions
Ulus	Daily	Ankara	Organ of Republican People's Party
Umm al-Qura	Weekly	Mecca	Government organ
United Nations, Records of Debates, 15th Session: General Assembly, First Committee and Special Political Committee		New York	
United Nations Review	Monthly	New York	
UN Special Fund, 1960 Report		New York	
US Information Service Publications		Tel Aviv	Published by US embassy
Vatan	Daily	Istanbul	Independent

## SOURCES

La Vie Economique et Financière de la RAU et des Pays Arabes	Monthly	Damascus	Published by Bureau des Documentations Arabes
Al-Wahdah	Daily	Damascus	
Al-Waḡā'i' al-Falastiniyah		Gaza	Official Gazette for the Gaza Strip
Washington Post	Daily	Washington	
Al-Watani	Weekly	Cairo	Nationalized, and taken over by NU
World Marxist Review	Monthly	Toronto Canada	Theoretical and informational journal of Communist and workers' parties—the Canadian edition of the Prague publication, problems of Peace and Socialism
World Today	Monthly	Oxford	Issued under the auspices of the Royal Institute of International Affairs
Al-Yaqzah	Weekly	Aden	Pro-British
Yediot Aharonot	Evening	Tel Aviv	Independent
Yeni Sabah	Daily	Istanbul	Independent, Conservative
The Yorkshire Post	Daily	Leeds	
Zafer	Daily	Ankara	Organ of Democratic Party
Az-Zamān	Daily	Baghdad	Independent, pro-Qassim
Az-Zamān	Daily	Khartoum	Pro-UAR
25th Zionist Congress; Bulletin of the Press Bureau during the 25th Congress		Jerusalem (Israel)	Published by Information Department of Jewish Agency

## ABBREVIATIONS OF SOURCES

NOTE: (1) The definite article—"the," "le" and "al"—has been omitted in sources given in brackets.  
(2) When no year is mentioned, dates refer to the year 1960.

A/CI/PV	United Nations General Assembly, First Committee proceedings, Provisional Edition
Aden Chr	Aden Chronicle (Aden)
ADN	Allgemeine Deutsche Nachrichtenagentur (East Berlin)
ANA	Arab News Agency (Beirut)
AP	Associated Press
A/PV	United Nations General Assembly, General Debate proceedings, Provisional Edition
A/SPC/SR	United Nations General Assembly, Special Political Committee proceedings, Final Edition
BAPP	Bureau Arabe de Presse et de Publications (Paris)
BBC	British Broadcasting Corporation Summary of World Broadcasts, Part IV (The ME)
BBC EE	BBC, Summary of World Broadcasts, Supplements to Eastern Europe, Far East and Soviet Union Broadcasts on the ME
BBC FE	
BBC SU	
BBC/W	BBC, Summary of World Broadcasts, Part IV, Weekly Supplement
CDL	Le Commerce du Levant (Beirut)
Cmnd 1093	Cyprus, (The Constitution) Presented to Parliament, July 1960, Her Majesty's Stationery Office, Cmnd 1093, London
CTK	Ceskoslovenska Tiskova Kancelar (Czechoslovak Press Bureau) (Prague)
Dept. of State Bulletin	Department of State Bulletin (US)
EEPR	Egyptian Economic and Political Review (Cairo)
EFSPA	L'Economie et les Finances de la Syrie et des Pays Arabes (Damascus)
Eg. Gaz.	The Egyptian Gazette (Cairo)
Eg. Mail	Egyptian Mail (Cairo)
Hansard	UK Parliamentary Debates Record
HMSO	Her Majesty's Stationery Office, London
IBRD	International Bank for Reconstruction and Development 15th Annual Report, 1959/60 (Washington)
IFNS	International Financial News Survey (Washington)
IGPB	Israel Government Press Bulletin
IGPO	Israel Government Press Office
Ill. London News	The Illustrated London News
IMB	Itim Mizrah News Agency Summary of Arab Broadcasts (Tel Aviv)
IMF	International Monetary Fund, Press Release (Washington)

## ABBREVIATIONS

IMH	Itim Mizrah News Agency, Hedim Utguvot (Tel Aviv)
INA	Iraq News Agency Bulletin
INASS	Iraq News Agency Bulletin, Special Supplement
Jer. Post	The Jerusalem Post (Israel)
Jer. Times	The Jerusalem Times (Jordan)
Jew. Obs.	Jewish Observer and ME Review (London)
Journal of RUSI	Journal of the Royal United Service Institution (London)
LLA	L'Economie Libanaise et Arabe (Beirut)
MEA	Middle Eastern Affairs (New York)
MEC	Mid-East Commerce (Beirut)
MEE	The Middle East Economist (Cairo)
MEED	Middle East Economic Digest (London)
The ME, Europa	The Middle East 1961, Europa Publications Limited, London, 1961
MEJ	The Middle East Journal (Washington)
MENA	Middle East News Agency (Cairo)
Mid. Mirror	Mideast Mirror (Beirut)
MTI	Magyar Tavisirati Iroda (Hungarian News Agency)
NCNA	New China News Agency (Peking)
NE Report	Near East Report (Washington)
NYHT	New York Herald Tribune (European Edition)
NYT	The New York Times (European Edition)
NYT, NY	The New York Times (New York)
PAP	Polska Agentura Prasowa (Polish Press Agency)
PPS	Petroleum Press Service (UK)
R.	Radio Station
USIS	United States Information Service Publications (Tel Aviv editions)
VEFRPA	La Vie Economique de la RAU et des Pays Arabes (Damascus)

## ABBREVIATIONS

AA	Aden Association	ECOSOC	Economic and Social Council (UN)
AAPC	All African Peoples' Conference	EDMA	Enieon Dimokratikon Metopon Anadimiourgias (United Democratic Reform Front) (Cyprus)
AAPSC	Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Conference		
AAPSO	Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Organization	EDO	Economic Development Organization (UAR)
AATUF	All African Trade Union Federation	EDON	Eniaia Demokratiki Organosis Heolaiais (United Democratic Youth Organization) (Cyprus)
ADC	Aide-de-camp	EEC	European Economic Community
AEC	Atomic Energy Commission (Israel)	EOKA	Ethniki Organosis Kyprion Agoniston (National Organization of Cypriot Combatants)
AFL-CIO	American Federation of Labour—Congress of Industrial Organizations	EPB	Economic Planning Board (Iraq)
AG	Attorney General	Exec Com	Executive Committee (NU, UAR)
AGP	Algerian Provisional Government (Gouvernement Provisoire de la République Algérienne)	FLN	Front Libération Nationale (Algeria)
AKEL	Anorthotou Komma Ergazomanou Laou (Reform Party of the Working People—Communist Party of Cyprus)	GA	General Assembly (UN)
ARAMCO	Arabian American Oil Company	GDR	German Democratic Republic
BOC	Basra Oil Company	Gen Com	General Committee (NU, UAR)
CAR	Central African Republic	GFR	German Federal Republic
CGS	Chief of the General Staff	GMT	Greenwich Mean Time
CIF	Cost, insurance and freight included	GOC	General Officer Commanding
C.-in-C.	Commander in Chief	GZ	General Zionist Party (Israel)
Congo (B)	Congo, Brazzaville	HQ	Headquarters
Congo (L)	Congo, Leopoldville	IBRD	International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (USA)
CPSU	Communist Party of the Soviet Union	ICBM	Intercontinental ballistic missile
DLF	Development Loan Fund (US)	ICFTU	International Confederation of Free Trade Unions
DP	Democratic Party (Turkey)	ICP	Iraqi Communist Party
DPK	Democratic Party of Iraqi Kurdistan		
DZ	Demilitarized Zone		
EC	Economic Council (Arab League)		
ECAFE	Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (UN)		

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# ABBREVIATIONS

ID	Iraqi Dinar	OPEC	Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
IDF	Israel Defence Forces		
IFATU	International Federation of Arab Trade Unions	para	Paragraph
IL	Israel Pound	PCC	Palestine Conciliation Commission
ILA	International Longshoremen's Association (US)	PDP	People's Democratic Party (Sudan)
ILO	International Labour Organization	PE	Palestinian Entity
IMF	International Monetary Fund	PEO	Panycyprian Federation of Labour
IP	Islamic Party	PL 480	Public Law 480 (US)
IPC	Iraq Petroleum Company	PM	Prime Minister
IR	Iranian Riyal	PNU	Palestinian National Union (UAR)
IRBM	Intermediate-range ballistic missile	Prep Com	Preparatory Committee (NU, UAR)
ITF	International Transport Workers' Federation	PSO	Progressive Socialist Party (Lebanon)
Iv. Coast	Ivory Coast		
JD	Jordanian Dinar	RAF	Royal Air Force (Britain)
KADU	Kenya African Democratic Union	RP	Republican Party (Iraq)
KANU	Kenya African National Union	RPP	Republican People's Party (Turkey)
KEM	Kypriakon Eriekon Metopan (Cyprus United Front)	RSHA	Reichs-Sicherheits-Hauptamt (Reich Security Head Office) (Nazi Germany)
LE	Egyptian Pound	SAC	Strategic Air Command
LG	Local Government (UAR)	SAL	South Arabian League (Aden)
LL	Lebanese Pound	SC	Security Council (UN)
LP	Liberation Party (Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon)	SEK	Trade Union Federation (Cyprus)
LS	Sudanese Pound	SG	Secretary-General
LS	Syrian Pound	SI	Supreme Investigation Committee (Turkey)
LT	Turkish Pound	SIU	Seafarers' International Union
MAC	Mixed Armistice Commission (Arab-Israeli borders)	SJ Council	Supreme Judicial Council (Turkey)
Mapai	Israel Labour Party	Southern R	Southern Region of UAR (Egypt)
Mapam	United Workers' Party (Israel)	SR	Saudi Arabian Riyal
MATS	Military Air Transport Service (US)	SD	Sicherheitsdienst (Nazi Germany)
ME	Middle East	SS	Sturm-Staffel (Nazi Germany)
MK	Member of Knesset (Israel Parliament)	STRAC	Strategic Army Corps (US)
MNC	Mouvement National Congolais (Lumumbist)	SW Africa	South West Africa
NA	National Assembly (UAR)	SWTUF	Sudan Workers' Trade Union Federation
NCO	Non-commissioned officer		
NDP	National Democratic Party (Iraq)	TD	Tripartite Declaration
Northern R	Northern Region of UAR (Syria)	TU	Trade Union
NPC	Northern People's Congress (Nigeria)	TUC	Trade Union Congress (Aden)
NPP	National Progressive Party (Iraq)	TVA	Tennessee Valley Authority (US)
NRP	National Religious Party (Israel)	UNC	Uganda National Congress Party)
NSP	National Social Party (Lebanon, Syria)	Union of SA	Union of South Africa
NU	National Union (UAR)	UNRWA	United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East
NUC	National Unity Committee (Turkey)	UNTSO	United Nations Truce Supervision Organization
NUP	National Unionist Party (Sudan)	UPC	Union des Populations Camerounaises
NYU	National Youth Union (UAR)	USAF	United States Air Force
OEEC	Organization for European Economic Cooperation	WFTU	World Federation of Trade Unions (includes Communist TUs)
		WIZO	Women's International Zionist Organization
		WZO	World Zionist Organization
		ZNP	Zanzibar National Party
		ZOA	Zionist Organization of America



PART ONE

THE MIDDLE EAST  
IN  
WORLD AFFAIRS



# THE MIDDLE EAST IN WORLD AFFAIRS

## GENERAL

[For views and policies of ME countries on world affairs, see under the international relations of each country.]

### APR-MAY: THE ME AND THE SUMMIT CONFERENCE

#### SYNOPSIS

Both in the West and in the ME, ME affairs were expected to figure at the Summit Conference, which was scheduled to open in Paris on 16 May but did not hold any working meetings owing to the US-USSR controversy over the U-2 incident. Some of the reactions to the conference and the lessons drawn from its failure reflected ME politics.

Western commentators generally advocated the inclusion of ME affairs in the agenda in order to lessen tension in the area. However, they were sceptical of the possibility of an East-West agreement, as the West could not give up its positions in the area, especially its oil interests and CENTO, while the East was not expected to give up the advantages it enjoyed through the supply of arms to Arab countries.

The Arab and CENTO countries were believed to be suspicious of any understanding between the powers in the area, fearing that it would be achieved at their expense. PM Ben-Gurion of Israel, on the other hand, was reported to have advocated the inclusion of the ME in the agenda at his meetings with Western statesmen, but his proposals met with a cool reception.

The Summit failure was most extensively commented on in the UAR. One of the lessons drawn was that the USSR was now the leading world power, but the main consequence stressed in the UAR, and to some extent also in Sudan, was that responsibility for world peace now rested largely with the neutralist states. This remained a constant theme and was followed up by the UAR's activities at the UN General Assembly.

In Israel, commentators expressed deep regret at the Summit failure and fear lest the UAR should "black-mail" both blocs.

#### DISCUSSIONS ON ME EXPECTED AT THE SUMMIT

**Speculations on Attitude of Powers.** *The Economist* was of the opinion that the Summit Conference would not get far in working for peace if it did not seek a great-power accord on the ME. It thought a "modest amelioration" could be brought about by the powers agreeing not to interfere by force in local conflicts. An acceptance of political and strategical limits would, however, constitute a tougher sacrifice for the West, which might find existing positions crumbling, than for the Russians, who "would probably only be called upon to postpone opportunities." In any "Summit horsetrading" in ME positions, the Americans and British were therefore bound to be on the defensive. The writer regarded an East-West agreement for "cooling" the Arab-Israeli conflict as unlikely, but hoped that an agreement not to allow one of the sides to the conflict to gain a provocative military advantage through arms purchases should prove possible. (*Economist*, 16 Apr)

An American commentator expected that "Mr Khrushchev would reply to the proposal for an Israeli-Arab arms embargo with a demand that it be extended to include Turkey and Iran as well. In the case of Iran, her shaky internal position might make such a proposal worth discussing. But of course no restrictions on arms for Turkey, which holds the eastern flank of the North Atlantic Alliance, could be considered. But even if a general arms embargo were not possible, any agreement at the Summit that would reduce great power interference in Middle Eastern affairs would be welcome." (*NYT*, 8 May)

Another correspondent, writing after the failure of the conference had become apparent, said that in any case an East-West bargain was not possible: the West could not now abandon CENTO, and for the Russians the political returns of arms supply were too valuable to be forgone. (*Spectator*, 20 May)

**Comment on Attitude of ME Countries.** The same correspondent commented that the ME countries had been "preparing suspiciously" to dispute the Summit decisions. Turkey, Iran and Pakistan were afraid of losing some of their Western support, while the Arabs feared a decline in arms shipments from the Soviet Union. There was general hostility to the conference for fear the powers might try to satisfy their own interests in the area, while ignoring those of the peoples of the ME. (*Spectator*, 20 May)

**Apr-May: Ben-Gurion's Initiative.** In his discussions with Eisenhower, Nixon, Herter and Dillon, during his visit to the US, PM Ben-Gurion reportedly proposed a four-power declaration guaranteeing the independence and territorial integrity of the ME countries, but the US did not seem to favour the idea. (*Ha'aretz*, 3 Apr) According to another report, he suggested that an agreement to reduce great-power interference in the ME be placed on the agenda of the Summit Conference. (*NYT*, 8 May)

It was also reported that in reply to Ben-Gurion's proposal, PM Macmillan stated that there would be no time to discuss the ME at the Summit owing to more pressing problems. (*Scotsman*, 23 Mar)

**Arab Attitude.** A British paper characterized the Arab attitude during the weeks preceding the Conference as being "conditioned by two contradictory feelings": (a) apprehension at the continuation of unrestrained international tension; (b) fear that agreement would mean coercion of the Arabs by the common action of East and West. (*Guardian*, 20 May)

[This approach is apparent in a statement published by Abd al-Khāliq Hasūnah, SG of the Arab League, shortly before the Summit.] Hasūnah said: "All Arabs believe it is in their and the world's interest that international cooperation should prosper—the Arabs wish the Sum-

mit Conference success. The Arabs declare that any foreign interference in ME affairs, and particularly in connection with the Palestine Problem, will aggravate and complicate the situation." (*R. Cairo, 12 May-BBC, 14 May*)

UAR Press comment was in a similar vein: *Al-Gumhuriyah* stated that decisions at the Summit could not change the policy of the UAR or influence its efforts for a just solution of the Palestine problem. (*Gumhuriyah, 14 May*) And again: "The Arabs will not heed resolutions arrived at without their participation." (*Gumhuriyah, 17 May*)

On the other hand, the benefits for the world of reduced tension were stressed. (*Akhbar al-Yawm, 14 May*)

#### FAILURE OF THE SUMMIT CONFERENCE

**UAR: Criticism of US, Superiority of USSR Claimed.** [There was a tendency in the UAR to blame the US and CENTO for the Summit crisis in connection with the U-2 incident; at the same time the "superior power" of the USSR was stressed.] A Damascus paper elaborated on the shift in the balance of power in favour of the USSR. America now "stands before a superior power which challenges it and warns it that it should respect others... [It] is no longer the master of international society." It cannot any longer "map spheres of influence and plan borders for others." It should not be surprised at being asked to apologize for its mistakes, and should remember that American territory will be the first battlefield in a future war. The U-2 incident served as a warning to the USSR that it was "at the mercy" of American bases on its borders [in the CENTO countries], and it refused to confer in the shadow of this threat, which made the conference abortive. (*Nasr, 18 May, acc. to BBC, 19 May*)

A Cairo paper wrote: "Khrushchev... cannot pass over in silence [the U-2 incident]... and then sit down at the same table with the aggressor while he feels that it is within his power to return every blow twofold..." (*Gumhuriyah, 21 May*)

Cairo Radio attributed the failure of the conference to the policy of military pacts and foreign bases, without which the U-2 incident would not have happened. (*R. Cairo, 23 May-IMB, 24 May*)

**UAR: Summit Failure Imposes New Responsibilities on Small Nations.** [The main theme in UAR reactions to the Summit failure was, however, the responsibility for world peace resting on all nations, great and small, and especially the neutralist ones.] This was the exclusive theme of a joint communiqué issued by Abdel-Nasser and Nehru after the latter's visit to Cairo on 20 May. After expressing "profound grief" at the Summit failure, the communiqué added: "While we consider that responsibility for keeping the peace... falls in particular upon... the big states... this responsibility is equally shared by all peoples and states." (*BBC, 23 May*) This theme also

appeared in the joint communiqué of Abdel-Nasser and Abbud of Sudan. (*BBC, 30 July*)

In a statement after his return from Yugoslavia, Abdel-Nasser said: "Following the failure of the Paris conference it became abundantly clear that those countries that pursue a policy of neutrality and non-alignment must face their full responsibility... Peace is not the concern of the great powers alone... On the small countries, unattached to any of the world blocs, now lies the responsibility to relieve world tension." It was their duty to initiate plans at the UN and not to serve any longer as mere voting pawns for the West. (*Ahram, 25 June*) [This theme was widely elaborated on in the UAR Press and broadcasts. See, e.g., *IMH, 24 May*.]

**Other Arab Comment.** In other Arab countries there was less comment; the Summit failure was deplored and generally there was neutrality in the apportionment of blame. (*IMH, 24 May*) A Jordanian paper blamed Khrushchev for the failure. (*Difa', 18 May*)

A Beirut paper summed up as follows: The prospects for an agreed solution of ME problems by the big powers had faded. More than ever before the Arabs were masters of their own destiny. The role of the UN in general, and of its non-committed member states in particular, would be much enhanced. The "aid without strings" provided by the Eastern bloc would remain of importance, while the West, "riddled with the State of Israel," would strive mainly to preserve the status quo. (*Orient, 20 May*)

President Abbud of Sudan, in a speech in Belgrade, stressed the increasing burden of responsibility upon the non-aligned nations, in the wake of the Summit failure. (*Sudan Daily, 11 July*) The theme was also mentioned later, in his joint communiqué with Abdel-Nasser (see p 155).

**Israel: Jewish People and Israel Need Peace.** The Israeli Foreign Minister said in the Knesset on 23 May: "Although the world did not have exaggerated hopes for the solution at this one meeting of the grave problems and differences separating the world blocs, there was some hope that the very meeting itself would create contacts which would eventually lead to some lessening of tension and that the terrible danger of war might recede. The participants were the great powers, but it was the small countries in many parts of the world which were vitally concerned with the success of the conference."

"Because of the dispersion of the Jewish people among all the nations, because its scattered communities are to be found in both East and West, and because of the particular position of the State of Israel, our need for world peace and a reduction of inter-bloc tension is perhaps greater than that of any other people..."

"Moreover, inter-bloc tension enables Egypt to engage in blackmailing manoeuvres in both blocs. To the extent that Egypt succeeds in exploiting this tension, the day of peace is put off." (*Budget Speech, IGPO, no date*)

## SEPT-DEC: THE ME COUNTRIES AND THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY 1960

**NOTE:** The following record covers the first part of the plenary meetings of the General Assembly's 15th session, in which many heads of government took part. The discussion in the Assembly on the Arab-Israeli conflict

will be found on p 177; on the Arab refugees on p 210 ff. On the Emergency Special Session of the General Assembly on Congo, which took place on the eve of the ordinary session (17-20 Sept), see pp 37-8. The accom-



panying table of the voting record covers all voting by roll call in the plenary, the First Committee and the Special Political Committee.

### SYNOPSIS

The first part of the 15th session of the UN General Assembly lasted from 20 Sept to 20 Dec.

Several factors made this session especially important: the world crisis which had developed in the wake of the failure of the Summit conference and the Congo conflict; the involvement of the UN in Congo; the admission to the UN of 17 new states, 16 of them African, and, lastly, PM Khrushchev's call to heads of government to attend the session in person.

ME problems, like those of other regions, did not figure at the Assembly, which concerned itself mainly with the major world questions. In the general debate, ME questions were brought up mainly by ME representatives, and only in rare instances by delegates of other states; they were not mentioned at all by the big power representatives. The question of the Arab refugees was the only ME problem which was discussed in detail (in the Special Political Committee).

The special interest of the Assembly in regard to the ME therefore lies in the attitude of the ME countries to world affairs as reflected at the "Summit Assembly."

These attitudes were brought out in the response to PM Khrushchev's initiative; in direct references to the major subjects discussed, such as disarmament, the status of the SG and colonialism; in the voting; in the general content of the speeches and the relative prominence accorded to each subject, and in the diplomatic activity which took place on the occasion.

An attempt has been made to record below the relevant information on these points. The UAR's activities have taken up a major part of the space as she was the most conspicuously involved of all ME countries.

### BACKGROUND

On 1 Aug the USSR proposed in a letter to the UN Disarmament Commission that heads of government should participate personally in the discussion on disarmament during the forthcoming UN General Assembly (GA). On 1 Sept the USSR announced that Khrushchev would attend the GA, and on the same day the heads of governments of all UN member states belonging to the Soviet bloc stated that they would do likewise. On 2 Sept Khrushchev called on all heads of governments to attend the GA, and on 7 Sept Eisenhower announced that he would address the Assembly. On the following day the US Secretary of State referred to the idea of an "82-man summit" as "ludicrous." On 10 Sept Tito announced his intention to attend and on 13 Sept Castro did likewise. The next day it was reported that PM Macmillan might attend. Other heads of governments (apart from the Arab states, for which see immediately below) who announced their intention of being present were Nkrumah, Sukarno, Nehru, Sekou Touré, Diefenbaker and Menzies.

### ABDEL-NASSER'S DECISION TO ATTEND ASSEMBLY

8-10 Sept: Consultation with Fellow-Neutralists. The first intimation that Abdel-Nasser might attend the GA came on 8 Sept in *al-Ahrām*, which said that he had received communications favouring participation from Nkrumah and Tito. The UAR believed that the neutralist countries had an important role to play in the UN, the paper said. (*Ahrām*, 8 Sept)

The UAR was in touch with India over the matter (*Ahrām*, 9 Sept), and Abdel-Nasser sent a note to President Sukarno on the subject. (*R. Cairo*, 10 Sept-IMB, 11 Sept)

**UAR Initiative in Neutralist Camp?** While the *al-Ahrām* report referred to Ghanaian and Yugoslav initiative, Abdel-Nasser took credit, after his return from New York, for taking the initiative himself. He said that the failure of the Summit had brought things to such a pass that those who believed in peace were compelled to muster all their strength to save peace and themselves. "This precisely was the idea existing in our mind when we received that proposal from Mr. Khrushchev," he said.

"In these circumstances, I wrote to a number of friends among the heads of the Afro-Asian states and those states which believe in the policy of positive neutrality explaining to them my feelings and presenting them with my views... This is how we all decided to proceed to New York, spurred by the hope that the neutral states... could bridge the deep... gap between the East and West, stand between them as a barrier to prevent a clash, and work, in participation with the other countries of the world, to strengthen the possibilities of peace based on justice... Soon afterwards, events in the Congo... gave new impetus to our trip to the UN." (*Eg. Gaz*, 13 Oct)

**10 Sept: UAR's Decision Announced.** On 10 Sept it was officially announced that Abdel-Nasser would take part in the GA. (*R. Cairo*, 10 Sept-IMB, 11 Sept) An official statement gave the following reasons for the decision: (1) It was considered to be in the interest of peace for heads of neutralist governments to renew their personal contacts, in view of the long lapse of time since the Bandung Conference; (2) Attendance at the GA would provide an opportunity for the heads of independent African governments to meet; (3) In view of the UN's failure to solve many international problems, high-level contacts were to be welcomed; (4) Following the failure of the Summit Conference it was inevitable that neutral states should seek to find means to further understanding among the big powers and to ease tension; (5) The visit would enable Abdel-Nasser to accept invitations from Arab immigrants in the US and from American clerical circles. (*Eg. Gaz*, 19 Sept)

**Abdel-Nasser: Duty of UAR to Act on World Scene.** Abdel-Nasser explained his decision on his return from New York as follows: "Why did we go to the GA? Because, having freed ourselves from imperialism..., having decided upon our policy of positive neutralism, and having proclaimed Arab nationalism..., it had become our duty to act on the international scene, and not to leave it to the great powers who own the atomic bombs and the rockets... For there are forces which compete with these: the moral forces represented by you [the people of the UAR] and by the free nations." (*R. Cairo*, 5 Oct-IMB, 7 Oct)

**Cairo Press on Leading Position of UAR in the World.** The Egyptian Press devoted much space to Abdel-Nasser's decision, interpreting it as a new stage in the UAR's policy of positive neutralism. The following are typical views:

"Our republic has won the confidence of hundreds of millions thanks to its outspoken policy. It has proved that positive neutrality does not mean escape but positive participation in the leadership of the world." (*Gumhuriyah*, 11 Sept)

"Abdel-Nasser will have the support of the neutralists of the Afro-Asians, of several Latin American states and of the Soviet Bloc, in fact the support of a majority of UN members." (*Ahram*, 19 Sept)

"Abdel-Nasser, Nehru, Sukarno, Tito, Nkrumah and Sekou Touré are the custodians of a trust on behalf of no less than a quarter of the inhabitants of the world." They serve as examples to others how to maintain peace and national sovereignty. (*Gumhuriyah*, 12 Sept)

Instead of the great powers organizing their camps of satellites, the neutralists, strengthened by the new states, will now impose discipline on the great powers. (*Akhbar*, 13 Sept)

**Cairo Press on Abdel-Nasser as World Leader.** Other comments stressed Abdel-Nasser's personal stature: "Abdel-Nasser's personality has caught the imagination of millions and millions in East and West." In Africa and Asia he had brought about a new and irresistible wave in favour of liberation against military blocs. (*Akhbar*, 12 Sept)

"Abdel-Nasser goes to speak... in the name of the small nations and to speak for the states which have just achieved independence as well as the nations still struggling for it... If we take into consideration the population figures of Asia, Africa and Latin America, we will see that Abdel-Nasser represents the majority of the world's inhabitants... Abdel-Nasser figures at the UN not just as an Arab leader but as a representative of the world's majority." (*Ruz al-Yusuf*, 18 Sept)

**A Western View on Abdel-Nasser's Decision.** *The Economist* wrote: "The general purpose of President Nasser's mission is (to) assert his position as a leading figure of the Afro-Asian bloc... At the same time he will be backing up his claim to be the only Arab ruler with a world-wide reputation, thus strengthening his repute in the Arab world and establishing himself more firmly as the sole valid spokesman for Arab aspirations..."

"Obviously, it was Mr Khrushchev who made up President Nasser's mind for him by deciding to go to New York himself." (*Economist*, 17 Sept)

#### ATTENDANCE OF OTHER ARAB LEADERS

**King Hussein Decides to Go to New York.** Originally it had been announced that Jordan's delegation was to be headed by her Foreign Minister, Mūsa Nāsir. (*Falastin*, 6 Sept) Little prominence was given at the time by the Jordanian Press to the forthcoming GA and the question of high-level participation. (*Falastin*, 20 Sept; *Difa'*, 21 Sept)

It was Cairo Radio which on 21 Sept gave the first report on King Hussein's intention to attend. (*IMB*, 21 Sept) Only on 24 Sept, when the General Debate was already well under way, was it officially announced that the King had decided to personally head his country's delegation, "because of Jordan's deep concern over Arab issues in particular and international issues in general." (*Difa'*, 25 Sept)

*Sawt al-Arab* commented on 26 Sept that Hussein had decided to go to New York at the bidding of his imperialist masters. What influence would "the dwarf from Amman" be able to exert in the highest forum of the UN? (*IMB*, 27 Sept)

**Iraq: Qassim's Participation not Discussed.** [The possibility of General Qassim's personal participation in the GA was not mentioned in the Iraqi Press.] At a Press conference the Iraqi Foreign Minister said that the future of international relations might well depend on the coming session. Small states, like Iraq, felt stronger than

before, since their number was increasing. Iraq would cooperate with the states working for peace: in the first place with the Arab countries and next with the Afro-Asian states. He elaborated on some of the questions to be discussed at the UN: Algeria, the Palestine question, Oman and Southern Arabia. (*Iraq News Agency*, 10 Sept)

**Lebanon: Personal Rivalry.** The personal rivalry between PM Sa'ib Slām and the Foreign Minister, Philippe Taqla, over the leadership of the delegation to the UN occupied the Lebanese Press more than any other aspect of the question in the period immediately preceding the GA. After a personal effort by the Lebanese President to reach a compromise, it was agreed that the PM should attend the opening session only and should then hand over the leadership of the delegation to Taqla (see *Lebanon Press* 10-18 Sept). Eventually, however, it was Slām who spoke for Lebanon in the General Debate (see below).

#### ISRAEL REPRESENTATION

A Foreign Ministry spokesman said on 8 Sept that PM Ben-Gurion had received no proposal from the Soviet PM that he should personally participate in the GA. (*Davar*, 9 Sept)

Press opinion was divided. It was argued that the PM's tactical position in New York might prove difficult, especially in diplomatic activities outside the Assembly, because of the diplomatic advantages enjoyed by Abdel-Nasser and the Arabs in their relations with the Communist, the Islamic, and certain Afro-Asian, countries. On the other hand, it was said, Ben-Gurion should go to counteract the expected large-scale Arab propaganda effort, to demonstrate that Israel was with the newly independent countries and to voice Israel's demand for peace with the Arabs. (*Hatzofeh*, 11 Sept; *Ha'aretz*; *Al Hamishmar*; *Ma'ariv*, 12 Sept) However, a government spokesman announced on 11 Sept that the question of Ben-Gurion's participation in the GA had not been considered by the government. Israel's UN Delegation would be headed by her Foreign Minister. (*Ha'aretz*, 12 Sept)

#### OTHER ME COUNTRIES

**Iran.** On the whole, the Persian Press did not devote much space to the preparation for the GA. *Payghame Emruz* expected Persia to take a line somewhat closer to the Afro-Asian bloc than hitherto. (*Payghame Emruz*, 11 Sept)

*Ittila'at* described the Soviet appeal for heads of governments to take part in the GA as a mere tactical move to win over the new member states. (*Ittila'at*, 20 Sept)

The Iranian delegation was headed by the Foreign Minister.

**Other Countries.** Other ME countries were represented at the GA by their Foreign Ministers or permanent representatives at the UN.

#### 20-21 SEPT: OPENING OF SESSION

[The regular session of the GA was preceded by an Emergency Session devoted to the Congo situation, which lasted from 17-19 Sept (see pp 37-8). Most of the heads of government participating, including Khrushchev and other Soviet bloc leaders, Castro and Tito, arrived in time for the opening of the regular session on 20 Sept. Abdel-Nasser arrived on 23 Sept, Nehru and Macmillan on 25 Sept, and Hussein on 28 Sept.]

**21 Sept: Two Arab Vice-Presidents.** Following the election of Boland of Ireland as President of the GA, 13

Vice-Presidents were elected on 21 Sept, including the heads of the Libyan and Sudanese delegations, each of whom received 91 votes. (*A/PV, 867, 21 Sept*)

**20-21 Sept: Admission of New Members.** The first act of the GA after electing its officers was the admission of 14 new members, without debate. With the exception of Cyprus, all were African states. Following their admission, most ME delegations made congratulatory statements, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia and Libya using the occasion to call for the end of colonialism in Africa. The Federation of Nigeria and the Republics of Mali and Senegal were admitted later.

**21 Sept: The Somali-Ethiopian Frontier Problem.** The Somali delegate, Hagi Farah, when thanking the UN for the admission of his country, deviated from the formal character of the other acceptance speeches and brought up the question of the Somali-Ethiopian frontier, fixed by Britain in 1950 in agreement with Ethiopia and disputed by Somalia. He said his country relied on the UN to reach a settlement as soon as possible, but while waiting for a just solution Somalia would respect the 1950 line. (*A/PV, 866, 21 Sept*)

#### 21 SEPT-17 OCT: MIDDLE EASTERN SPEAKERS IN GENERAL DEBATE

**22-23 Sept: Background Note.** The following are major points in President Eisenhower's speech on 22 Sept and PM Khrushchev's on 23 Sept, to which ME representatives reacted, either directly or indirectly.

President Eisenhower emphatically endorsed the UN as an instrument for peace and aid to underdeveloped countries, laying particular stress on a plan for aid to Africa. Speaking on Congo and generally, he voiced strong support for the SG. He demanded the resumption of negotiations on disarmament guaranteed by international inspection.

PM Khrushchev issued a call for the immediate independence of all colonial territories accompanied by an attack on imperialism. He reiterated an appeal for "general and complete" disarmament with discussions on controls to follow later. He launched an attack on Hammarskjöld linked to the Congo question where "he is pursuing the line of the colonialists" and demanded the replacement of the office of SG by a body of three, comprising one representative each of the Western, Eastern and neutralist groups. He also proposed the moving of UN Headquarters from the US.

On disarmament the major difference was the question of inspection. Regarding newly independent or still dependent countries, both speakers spoke of the need for aid, but while Eisenhower laid his main emphasis on this point Khrushchev attacked colonialism.

**23 Sept: Iran.** The first speaker from the ME was Vakir, the Iranian delegate, who spoke on 23 Sept. He noted with satisfaction the growth of UN membership and stressed the importance of the UN as a stabilizing force, saying that it "has grown in stature as an instrument of peace by grappling with critical and in some cases explosive situations."

He praised the work of the SG, touched on the question of disarmament, and declared that the end of colonialism was now a fact, as shown by the admission to the UN of the new independent states, which had much to contribute to its work. The problem of the difference in living standards between developed and underdeveloped states was urgent, and ECOSOC should be enlarged for this purpose.

Having stabilized the political and economic situation at home, Iran had become a stabilizing factor for the region as a whole, as was shown by her good relations with her neighbours Turkey, Pakistan and Afghanistan. (For reference to this by the Afghan delegate, see *A/PV, 876, 28 Sept*). Vakir also stressed Iran's increasingly close relations with Iraq. Relations with Russia had also improved and there was hope for good neighbourly relations in the future. (*A/PV, 870, 23 Sept*)

**23 Sept: Turkey.** The leader of the Turkish delegation, the Foreign Minister, Sarper, began his speech by explaining the nature of the Turkish revolution of May 1960. The present regime was a transitional one, designed to govern until elections were held, when it would relinquish power voluntarily. Sarper emphasized the new regime's faithfulness to the principles of the UN, to Turkey's international obligations and to her allies.

Congratulating the new member states, of which he singled out Cyprus for special mention, Sarper expressed the hope that they would help to "disperse the clouds of distrust and bitterness" which had accumulated at the UN. Let all member states remember that violence and the threat of violence were outlawed by the Charter. After touching on the problem of disarmament and expressing his government's support for the SG, Sarper went on to say that Algeria presented a dilemma to his country: "My countrymen are imbued with fraternal sentiments for the gallant people of Algeria... On the other hand my country is also an ally of France." In view of the acceptance of the principle of self-determination, however, he said, there was hope of an improvement. In conclusion, he appealed for greater efforts to eliminate economic and social inequality between UN member states. (*A/PV, 870, 23 Sept*)

**27 Sept: UAR.** Abdel-Nasser opened his speech by setting out the reasons which, in his opinion, made the present GA particularly important: (1) the growth of the UN's membership; (2) the grave dangers threatening its foundations; (3) the intensification of the cold war, which made it a moral duty to work for peace. He welcomed the new member states and said that the UN should provide "the real echo of the aspirations of the peoples and an accurate balance for their responsibilities as members of the community of nations." From this he drew the conclusion that Communist China ought to be admitted. He went on to proclaim that "there is no such problem for whose solution we are not ready to accept the Charter of the UN and its principles, the resolutions of the UN and its recommendations."

Abdel-Nasser continued with an exposé of the stages of colonialism: the first stage, that of direct colonialist action, lasted until the Suez campaign, and ended with it. "The aggression on Suez was the end of unmasked imperialism and its graveyard." It had proved that the victims had their armies too. The next stage was one of uncertainty when the imperialists did not know whether to use force or not. Typical of this was their reaction at the time of the overthrow of the old regime in Iraq. The third stage began with the events in Congo, when the colonialists again found a mode of action: "Today we find the Congo presenting us with masked imperialism, which does not shrink from exploiting the UN itself."

He then dealt more specifically with the Congo question (see p 25 ff), demanding the restoration of the situation when the legitimate Leopoldville Government had first requested UN aid. Next, he went on to deal with the Palestine problem, treating it, too, as part of the development of imperialism. (For details see p 172.) He favoured a plebiscite in Algeria under UN super-



vision. The UN should also intervene in the struggle of the Arab people in Oman and Southern Arabia.

Abdel-Nasser went on to criticize those great powers which tried to use the UN as an instrument in the cold war and mentioned the restrictions placed by the US Government on the freedom of movement of some delegations. [He was referring to the fact that the US had restricted the heads of the Soviet, Hungarian, Albanian and Cuban delegations to Manhattan. Later, the restrictions placed on Khrushchev were relaxed to allow him to move to Long Island as well.]

On East-West relations, Abdel-Nasser said that first of all a better political climate had to be created. It was his own aim, and that of other leaders, to help in achieving this. An important contribution towards this aim was the policy of non-alignment. "This policy is based on the belief that peace prevails only when there is more understanding among people and when fruitful contacts and a creative interrelationship exist on the largest scale possible." It was his striving for peace which had caused him to support the Summit Conference, although he believed that "the era where the big powers alone had the power of shaping the future has gone," and its failure had made the task of the UN even more important. Yet the big powers still had their special position: "If we all hold an equal share of the hope for peace, the big powers hold the major keys... If the peace-loving peoples can be the echo of the conscience of our world, the big powers may be considered as the nerves of this world, and on the soundness of these nerves depends the safety of the entire universe." He called for a direct meeting between the US and Russia.

Turning to the question of aid to underdeveloped countries, he stressed that economic independence was a condition of political independence. The new nations had no time to spare: "They will accept every assistance given to them through the UN and they will not hesitate to accept any unconditional aid offered to them outside the UN."

In the last part of his speech, Abdel-Nasser touched on the problems of the UAR and Arab nationalism. His country, he said, had experienced three revolutions: the first political, directed against imperialism; the second social, directed against feudalism; and the third, the Arab revolution, directed against the artificial divisions of the Arab world and towards Arab unity. Today, "the UAR is the biggest symbol of the faith of the Arab peoples in Arab nationalism and in Arab unity." Opposition to her in the Arab world "emanates not from the flowing tide of Arab nationalism but from those who oppose this tide or try to change its course."

In conclusion, Abdel-Nasser recommended that the UN adopt the Bandung resolutions. (A/PV, 873, 27 Sept)

**Reactions to Abdel-Nasser's Speech.** The Egyptian Press and radio declared the speech to be of central importance to the GA, saying that it had brought a Khrushchev-Eisenhower meeting nearer (*Akhbar*, 29 Sept), and that Abdel-Nasser united the aspirations of the Afro-Asians, the neutralists and other nations. (*Gumhuriyah*, 29 Sept)

Other UAR comments stressed the all-Arab significance of the speech and Abdel-Nasser's proposals, which had raised the prestige of the Arabs as a whole. "For the first time the UN has listened to an Arab voice representing not a single Arab country but the Arabs as a whole." (*Gumhuriyah*, 1 Oct)

King Hussein said on his arrival in New York on 28 Sept that Abdel-Nasser had spoken neither in the name

of the Arab League nor of all Arabs. (*R. Amman*, 28 Sept-*IMB*, 29 Sept)

A typical Israeli comment was: "Peace to the world and war to Israel—that is the essence of Abdel-Nasser's speech." (*Davar*, 2 Oct) (See also speech of the Israeli Foreign Minister, p 177.)

A Western comment said that Abdel-Nasser "has shown himself relaxed, friendly and constructive. His speech... was wholly moderate and mainly sensible. By criticizing UN policy in the Congo but, at the same time, avoiding any criticism of Mr Hammarskjöld, he managed slightly to annoy both the US and the Soviet Union. And this, after all, is one of the functions of neutrals." (*Economist*, 8 Oct)

**29 Sept: Libya.** Fekini, the Libyan delegate, appealed to the great powers to resume summit talks in the interest of peace. The small nations should give their moral backing to such a course. He reaffirmed his country's faith in the UN and its full support and appreciation for the SG.

The speaker said that his country held a special position in the Arab world, as a bridge between the Arab East and the Arab West. Accordingly, Libya devoted herself to maintaining the best relations with all Arab countries. The Arab League was the instrument of Arab cooperation and should be recognized by the UN as a regional organization.

After referring to the Palestine refugee problem, he dealt at greater length with the Algerian question, for which only a plebiscite organized and supervised by the UN could provide a solution.

He pledged his country's full support for any UN resolution "designed definitely to abolish colonialism." After mentioning the disarmament question, he concluded by saying that it would be better to devote the sums earmarked for armaments to the fight against poverty, ignorance and disease. (A/PV, 878, 29 Sept)

**30 Sept: Ethiopia.** The Ethiopian representative, Aklilou Abte Wold, after stressing the exceptional importance of the present session, recalled his own country's struggles against colonialism and then referred to the admission of the new African member states: "If these countries have been able to take their places here without the shedding of blood, it is due in part—let us be frank and admit this—to the moderation and statesmanship of France, which saw in time the irresistible force of the concepts of independence and territorial integrity."

He called for the liberation of the areas in Africa still under colonial rule, the ending of the bloodshed in Algeria, and the solution of the problem by negotiation between France and the Algerian Provisional Government on the basis of the right of self-determination. Next he appealed for an end to racial discrimination in South Africa, adding that the UN could not afford to ignore its own recommendations.

The speaker declared that since the African members already constituted the largest group within the UN, it was essential that African representation on the Security Council, the Trusteeship Council and the Economic and Social Council, be changed accordingly. He stressed the need for aid to the African countries, adding that so far UN assistance had proved insufficient. "We must now contemplate the establishment of a special fund for Africa."

In conclusion, the speaker turned to the subject of disarmament, criticizing the UN for not having done more on this subject (see below p 11). (A/PV, 879, 30 Sept)

**30 Sept: Saudi Arabia.** Speaking for Saudi Arabia, Ahmad Shukairy singled out Eisenhower, Tito, Khrushchev, Nkrumah and Castro for laudatory mention (saying that the UN ought to meet Khrushchev's demands halfway) and called Abdel-Nasser "a great national hero and a great international figure," whose speech had represented Arab nationalism in its true light.

Shukairy criticized the City of New York for the way it had received the delegations; should this continue, the UN ought to look elsewhere for "a sanctuary that can afford to be free and fair." He added that he was not identifying himself with the Soviet demand to move UN headquarters; Russia's views and his own sprang from different motives.

One reason for the special importance of the present session was the fact that it was "Africa's session." The speaker welcomed Eisenhower's plans for aid to Africa, but expressed fears that it might be misused for imperialistic aims. It could succeed only if it was made "all-African in planning, direction and execution." Aid must not lead to interference. He went on to criticize interference in the Congo, proposing that only African member states be charged with UN responsibilities there.

Shukairy dealt at length with the Algerian problem, expressing scepticism as to the genuineness of de Gaulle's acceptance of the principle of self-determination, and recommended a plebiscite under UN supervision. This, he knew, was supported by the Eastern bloc, but, the speaker said, he was less certain whether the West supported it as well.

Next he mentioned Mauritania and Oman. The former, he said, was part of Morocco. In connection with the latter, he derided Macmillan's appeal for freedom and self-determination: "Shall we believe Mr Macmillan here on this rostrum or shall we believe the thunder of British guns" in Oman?

Shukairy then devoted a long section of his speech (longer than that of any other delegate) to the Palestine question. (For details, see p 177.)

Turning to East-West relations, he said that a new summit meeting was necessary, but should be restricted to Eisenhower and Khrushchev. If this was not practicable, neutralist leaders should take part as well. He argued for the exclusion of Britain and France: "With all due respect, the UK and France have little to say when the US is in the Summit Conference." (A/PV, 879, 30 Sept)

**3 Oct: Jordan.** King Hussein of Jordan opened by emphasizing that he wished to be regarded as the spokesman not only for Jordan, but for the Arab people.

He attributed the present deterioration in the international situation to Soviet action, and particularly to the fact that "almost from birth, the Soviet Union has sought to destroy the UN." He contrasted this with the praiseworthy actions of the UN and the SG in the Congo. He appealed to the great powers to find a formula for disarmament, and went on to define his country's position in relation to the two blocs. The choice before all nations, he said, was "between becoming part of the Soviet Empire... or standing as a free nation... We reject Communism" because "Arab nationalism is too deeply rooted in the love of God, the love of freedom, to ever be supplanted by a system which denies the importance of these ideas." Calling to the free nations to unite against Communism, he added that in this "great struggle... there can be no neutrality."

Neutrality as a policy raised two doubts in his mind: first, whether it was not simply exploitation of the existing world situation; second, whether Communism was not spreading under the cover of neutrality.

Hussein devoted the central part of his speech to the question of his country's relations with the UAR, against which he made two accusations: (1) She had interfered in Jordan against the Jordanian Government: "Traitors were encouraged, or at least permitted, to engage in subversive acts against us." (2) She followed the Soviet line: the "troubles with the UAR date from the time that I denounced the growing menace of Communism in the Arab world... The UAR, in seeking to dominate our part of the world, has adopted, as part of its policy of neutralism, some of the methods of the country of which it is most fondly neutral." He hoped that his exposé would help to strengthen the security of small states.

The King then expressed the hope that France would grant the right of self-determination to Algeria. In conclusion he turned to the Palestine problem (see p 177). (A/PV, 882, 3 Oct)

**UAR Reactions to Hussein's Speech.** Asha of the UAR delegation replied next day to what he termed Hussein's "unwarranted, uncorroborated and fantastic wholesale accusations" against his country. (A/PV, 885, 4 Oct)

On his return to Cairo (5 Oct), Abdel-Nasser said: "It is a sorry fact that an Arab, an Arab King, even though a traitorous one, should strive to destroy all the achievements of the Arab nation and of Arab nationalism... But did he succeed?... I met a large number of leaders of delegations and everyone... regretted that a person like Hussein should exist in the Arab world... They pointed out that Hussein was going the way of his grandfather Abdullah." (R. Cairo, 5 Oct-IMB, 7 Oct)

**4 Oct: Lebanon.** The Lebanese PM, Sa'ib Slām, said that "in the new equilibrium of power [arising out of the "nuclear stalemate"] the small and uncommitted nations occupy a potentially determining position."

African and Asian members ought therefore to have wider representation on the Security Council and the Economic and Social Council. He went on to express his country's support for the UN's role in the Congo and for the SG.

The speaker next recalled UN aid in Lebanon during the 1958 crisis, but added that his country's independence would be ensured "by the united will of its people." Furthermore, "Lebanon could always count on the solidarity and help of other Arab countries."

On Palestine, Sa'ib Slām demanded the implementation of the UN resolutions (see p 177). As for Algeria the Provisional Government alone was "capable of ordering the cessation of hostilities." The Algerian people should be assured that they would be able to decide upon their future by a free vote, i.e. under UN supervision. Turning to Oman and South Arabia, he hoped their peoples' "struggle for freedom will soon be rewarded."

Demanding action to close the ever widening gap between the developed and the under-developed countries, he said that "those devoting vast resources to armaments can surely afford to give greater aid" to the latter.

In conclusion, he appealed to the great powers to agree on disarmament (see below, p 11). (A/PV, 855, 4 Oct)

**5 Oct: Sudan.** Ahmad Khayr, head of the Sudanese delegation, began by expressing his faith in the UN and the hope that disarmament negotiations would be resumed (see also below, p 11).

Turning to African affairs, he spoke out against "unjust and outmoded philosophies" no longer compatible with "the new consciousness and political awaken-



ing of the African people." An end must be put to apartheid and SW Africa must be placed under the UN for a transitional period leading to independence. He expressed support for UN action in the Congo and for the SG.

In Algeria, the UN bore an unavoidable responsibility and a plebiscite should be held under UN supervision.

(For his reference to the Palestine problem see p 177.)

In Oman and Mauritania the right to self-determination ought to be respected.

Much could be done to help the under-developed countries by making them partners in multilateral trade and payment schemes, Khayr said. A greater share of international funds should be made available to Africa. (A/PV, 887, 5 Oct)

6 Oct: Iraq. In the opinion of Jawād, the Iraqi Foreign Minister, the roots of the present international tension lay in the fact that there were still "non-independent nations in the world today, and (in) the efforts to perpetuate such a state by the use of force... This situation derives from the contradictions inherent in a world which refuses to admit the growing forces of a revolution covering most phases of the material and cultural life of society, both in its national and international aspects." The body to deal with and settle the conflicts thus arising should be the UN. The small and non-committed nations should bridge the gap between East and West.

Jawād expressed support for Morocco over the Mauritania issue, and severely criticized France in connection with the Algerian question, saying: "Contacts and meetings have shown beyond any doubt that General de Gaulle did not mean what he said regarding self-determination for Algeria." An improved Arab attitude towards the West in general and France in particular was conditional on peace in Algeria.

He devoted a considerable part of his speech to Palestine (see p 177).

Regarding Oman, he recalled that a year before he had demanded the despatch of a UN enquiry commission. The people of Oman had been conducting their struggle for five years, and the British had been unable to force them into submission.

On the Congo question, Jawād expressed support for the SG and his actions.

Touching on the problem of the under-developed countries, the speaker said that political independence was worthless so long as economic relations between the new states and the former colonialist powers continued as before. Economic independence meant "the freedom to terminate the colonial pillage of the economic resources of the new states and the freedom of the new states to choose their own ways and methods of economic development." Capital as well as technical assistance should be channelled to them through the UN. Jawād appreciated what the US President had said on this subject.

Iraq was worried about the price fluctuations of certain primary goods, including oil, and hoped the UN would intervene to stabilize them.

In conclusion, he expressed support for the Soviet disarmament proposals and appealed to the powers to follow a policy of peaceful co-existence. "Our foreign policy of neutrality is in essence a policy of peaceful co-existence." (A/PV, 890, 6 Oct)

7 Oct: Yemen. The head of the Yemenite delegation, Zabarah, after touching briefly on disarmament, the role of the SG, and the Palestine problem, complained that the southern regions belonging to his country had been formed into a so-called federation by the British. He

expressed the hope that a solution would be found for this problem by negotiations.

The speaker condemned the operations in Oman as a violation of the UN Charter and of international law. He praised the SG's action in sending a representative to Buraimi and hoped he would also look into the Oman situation. Zabarah ended by appealing to the UN to "assume its responsibility" in the Algerian question. (A/PV, 892, 7 Oct)

10 Oct: Israel. The Israeli Foreign Minister, Golda Meir, opened her speech by stressing the revolutionary significance of the admission of 16 new members, representing millions who had now achieved independence. "No nation has been ordained to rule over others or has been fated to be ruled by others," she declared.

Two dangers beset the new nations: one was to linger in the past; the other to believe that political independence meant the solution of all their problems. She pointed to the "paradox" of the existence of poor states rich in natural resources. However, there was no point in complaining about the wrongs of the past: all energies ought to be devoted to building a better future. This was what the Jewish people and the State of Israel were trying to do. What had been done for the under-developed countries so far was in the nature of "first-aid" only. Africa and Asia needed not only food shipments but also the know-how to produce more food themselves. Greater resources ought to be devoted by the UN to educational assistance. In this sphere, Israel had her own contribution to make, as one of the states that had become independent since the foundation of the UN and had certain, though modest, scientific achievements to its credit.

Lack of capital was another problem besetting the under-developed nations, Mrs Meir said, recalling a suggestion that the industrial countries should set aside two per cent of their national product as capital aid for the new nations.

The speaker then went on to discuss the Congo situation, commended the SG for his action there, and opposed the Soviet proposal to change the composition of the UN Secretariat. She supported the British suggestion for expert examination of the different proposals on disarmament (see below p 11) and appealed for a "complete moratorium in the cold war" in the meantime.

Mrs Meir then turned to Arab-Israeli relations (see p 177).

She concluded by appealing to the great powers to reach a *modus vivendi* and to remove from the world the threat of war. (A/PV, 897, 10 Oct)

17 Oct: Cyprus. The leader of the Cypriot delegation, Rossides, expressed his gratitude to all who had supported Cyprus in her struggle for independence. He declared that his country would not align herself with any power bloc, but follow an independent line for the common good, and expressed sympathy for the nations still struggling for independence. Cyprus supported the cause of self-determination in Algeria and hoped for a solution by mutual understanding. He expressed confidence in the SG, and appealed to the powers to overcome suspicion and distrust over disarmament (see below). (A/PV, 906, 17 Oct)

#### SUMMARY OF ATTITUDE OF ME SPEAKERS TO CRITICAL SUBJECTS DISCUSSED IN GENERAL DEBATE

The following are the main points of the attitude expressed on: disarmament, the SG, and the admission of

the Chinese People's Republic to the UN. On the Arab-Israeli conflict, see p 177 ff. Speakers' names are given in parentheses.

**Disarmament.** *Iran* (Vakil). Agreement on disarmament and on control and inspection was being prevented by mutual distrust. Disarmament without control was an impossibility. The exploration of outer space should be subject to international law, not to national rivalry. (A/PV, 870, 23 Sept)

*Turkey* (Sarper). Success in the quest for disarmament would come "through a sincere determination on the part of all nations." The great powers must first decrease tension and then strive for practical results. Both atomic and conventional armaments should be dealt with, and effective international control was necessary. (A/PV, 870, 23 Sept)

*UAR* (Abdel-Nasser). Stockpiles of atomic weapons must be eliminated, atomic tests stopped, and suitable controls worked out. Russia and the US ought to meet directly under UN auspices to discuss disarmament, either in bilateral talks or with others. (A/PV, 873, 27 Sept)

*Libya* (Fekini). Libya supported general disarmament under effective international control exercised by the UN and hoped that space research would be devoted solely to peaceful objectives. (A/PV, 878, 29 Sept)

*Ethiopia* (Aklilou Abte Wold). The UN had "not adequately fulfilled its responsibility to mankind, as regards disarmament. It had been turned into a forum of propaganda. "Why is it not possible in the UN to accept a declaration renouncing the use of atomic weapons while awaiting the settlement of the disarmament question?" (A/PV, 879, 30 Sept)

*Jordan* (Husseini). The great powers should "find a formula, or, better perhaps, a way of thought that will not only save them but save all." (A/PV, 882, 3 Oct)

*Lebanon* (Slām). The Lebanese PM appealed to the powers to agree on complete disarmament subject to inspection. (A/PV, 885, 4 Oct)

*Sudan* (Khayr). Sudan hoped that negotiations would be renewed with a view to achieving complete and general disarmament subject to effective international control. (A/PV, 887, 5 Oct)

*Iraq* (Jawād). Iraq supported "the Soviet proposal for general and complete disarmament." (A/PV, 890, 6 Oct)

*Yemen* (Zabarah). To begin with, the powers should aim at partial disarmament with some measures of control. (A/PV, 892, 7 Oct)

*Israel* (Meir). Israel supported the British suggestion that the various disarmament proposals be re-examined by experts. However, a time-limit should be set for their work and in the meantime the powers should agree upon a "complete moratorium in the cold war in words and in deeds." (A/PV, 897, 10 Oct)

*Cyprus* (Rossides). Suspicion and mistrust were the main obstacles to disarmament. Inspection and controls were important because they could "help towards creating confidence by unsealing the doors of secrecy." (A/PV, 906, 17 Oct)

**Attitude to Secretary-General.** [See also UN GA. Emergency Session on Congo, p 37 ff.]

*Iran* (Vakil). The delegate commended the SG for his "able and effective" handling of delicate situations, which had "added a new dimension to his office." (A/PV, 870, 23 Sept)

*Turkey* (Sarper). The Turkish Government supported the SG, who had contributed much to the cause of peace and international understanding. (A/PV, 870, 23 Sept)

*UAR:* Abdel-Nasser did not mention the SG.

*Libya* (Fekini). The delegate expressed full support and appreciation for the SG. (A/PV, 878, 29 Sept)

*Jordan* (Husseini). The speaker praised the SG for his action in the Congo, contrasting his role with Soviet attempts to "destroy the UN." (A/PV, 882, 3 Oct)

*Lebanon* (Slām). The Lebanese Government supported the SG. (A/PV, 885, 5 Oct)

*Sudan* (Khayr). The delegate expressed support for the SG. (A/PV, 887, 5 Oct)

*Iraq* (Jawād). Iraq fully supported the SG and his actions. (A/PV, 890, 6 Oct)

*Yemen* (Zabarah). The good work done in the Congo would not have been possible without the SG and his assistants. (A/PV, 892, 7 Oct)

*Israel* (Meir). Israel had not always seen eye to eye with the SG in the past, but supported him now. The Soviet proposals concerning the SG's post would paralyse the UN Secretariat. (A/PV, 897, 10 Oct)

*Cyprus* (Rossides). The delegate expressed his confidence in the SG's loyalty to the Charter, skill and impartiality. (A/PV, 906, 17 Oct)

**Representation of People's China.** *UAR* (Abdel-Nasser). The speaker recalled the principle of universality of UN membership and drew the conclusion that China ought to be admitted. (A/PV, 873, 27 Sept)

*Sudan* (Khayr). Sudan supported the admission of China. (A/PV, 887, 5 Oct)

*Iraq* (Jawād). The delegate expressed his support for the admission of China. (A/PV, 890, 6 Oct)

Other ME speakers did not refer to the question.

**Inter-Arab Relations.** See above in the speeches of Abdel-Nasser and Hussein and reactions to their speeches, pp 8-9 and p 153 ff. See below for delegates' activities outside the Assembly hall.

## SEPT-OCT: THE NEUTRALIST BLOC AND THE FIVE-NATION RESOLUTION

**Sept-Oct: Neutralist Leaders Consult.** A series of meetings between neutralist delegations, in which Arab leaders took a prominent part, started almost immediately on the arrival of the heads of governments in New York.

First Abdel-Nasser met Nkrumah and Sa'ib Slām separately on 24 Sept. (R. Cairo, 25 Sept-IMB, 25 Sept)

At a subsequent meeting between Abdel-Nasser and Castro the former was reported to have invited Cuba to join a neutralist bloc. (NYT, 27 Sept) (For other aspects of this meeting, see below, p 13.)

**Sept: Abdel-Nasser-Tito-Nehru: Question of Neutralist Bloc.** Later, on 25 Sept, Abdel-Nasser met President Tito. A communiqué issued after the meeting only said that they had agreed on the need for improving international relations, but correspondents reported that the talks had aimed at forming a neutralist bloc at the UN. Both leaders, though critical of some aspects of the SG's actions in the Congo, believed that Khrushchev's proposal to abolish the office of SG would provoke a major split in the UN. The uncommitted nations must therefore defend the SG and mediate between East and West. They did not wish to announce their intention, however, until the arrival in New York of PM Nehru, whom they hoped to persuade to lead the new bloc. (Daily Telegraph, 26 Sept)

It was reported, however, that Nehru, when consulted after his arrival in New York on 26 Sept, did not support the idea of a formally constituted neutral bloc, which he believed, would solidify the existing divisions within the UN. (NYT Weekly, 10 Oct)

When Abdel-Nasser learned of this refusal, it was reported, he made known that the UAR had not intended to form such a bloc. (*Ma'ariv*, 30 Sept)

**Submission of the Five-Nation Resolution.** On 29 Sept Tito conferred at his residence with Abdel-Nasser, Nehru, Sukarno and Nkrumah. The following day they announced their intention of submitting a joint resolution urging Eisenhower and Khrushchev to resume their contacts. (*NYT Weekly*, 3 Oct) PM Nehru suggested in the General Debate (on 3 Oct) that the Assembly should deal with the resolution as soon as possible. The Argentine representative proposed the adjournment of the debate for two days, as the delegations had not considered the draft resolution. This was agreed to by 45 votes to eight, with 20 abstentions. (*A/PV*, 883, 3 Oct)

**Oct: Terms of the Resolution.** The operative clause of the resolution read: "The GA requests, as a first urgent step, that the President of the US and the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR renew their contacts." The resolution was explained in a speech made by Nehru on 3 Oct. (*A/PV*, 882, 3 Oct) The following day, three of the sponsors, Abdel-Nasser, Nkrumah and Nehru, addressed a meeting of 44 African and Asian delegations on the resolution. (*Jer. Post*, 5 Oct)

**Oct: Australian Amendment.** The Australian delegation submitted an amendment calling for a Big Four meeting instead of Big Two contacts. This was rejected on 5 Oct, by 45 votes against, only five votes (by Western states) in favour, and 43 abstentions. (*A/PV*, 889, 5 Oct)

**Oct: Argentine Amendment.** Argentina then proposed an amendment deleting reference to the US President and the Soviet PM, thus changing the resolution into a general appeal for renewed contacts between the US and Russia. This amendment was adopted by 37 votes against 36, with 22 abstentions. (*A/PV*, 889, 5 Oct) Nehru thereupon withdrew the Five-Power Resolution altogether, saying that after the adoption of the amendment it had "lost its moral approach." (*NYT Weekly*, 10 Oct)

In the voting on the Australian and Argentinian amendments the Eastern Bloc abstained, the Western powers voted in favour. (*A/PV*, 889, 5 Oct)

**Abdel-Nasser on Significance of Resolution.** Abdel-Nasser said, after his return to Egypt but before the voting on the Australian amendment: "Our resolution produced a strong reaction, for all the world wants peace... Of course there was some manoeuvring. For instance, the Australian PM, Mr Menzies, whom we all remember from 1956, presented an amendment..." [In 1956, Menzies came to Cairo as head of a delegation from the Suez Canal Users' Association.] The Australian amendment was motivated by the cold war and intended to "destroy" the original resolution. He did not think these manoeuvres would succeed. But in any case, "we have done our duty." The UAR had sent notes to Eisenhower and Khrushchev, explaining the neutralist views on the cold war. (*R. Cairo*, 5 Oct-*IMB*, 7 Oct)

Later, Abdel-Nasser said that even though the resolution had not been adopted the majority of UN members "supported the resolution and regarded it as a practical attempt pointing to the right direction." (*R. Cairo*, 12 Oct-*IMB*, 14 Oct)

#### SEPT-OCT: DIPLOMATIC ACTIVITY OUTSIDE THE GA

The presence of heads of state and of government in New York led to a series of private meetings. The following

were the main activities of this kind involving ME leaders. (Abdel-Nasser's meetings with fellow-neutrals in connection with the plan for a neutral bloc and the submission of the Five-Power draft resolution have already been mentioned.)

**Sept: Abdel-Nasser and Eisenhower.** Abdel-Nasser conferred with President Eisenhower on 26 Sept in New York. Eisenhower was interested in obtaining UAR support for the opposition to the Soviet proposal to change the UN Secretariat and expressed the hope that Abdel-Nasser would speak against it at the GA. (*Ha'aretz* 28 Sept) The UAR delegation later published a denial of reports that the UAR had decided to oppose the Russian proposal. (*NYT*, 29 Sept) Abdel-Nasser himself told the UAR National Assembly that Eisenhower had explained the views of the US on international problems before the GA and that he (Abdel-Nasser) had clarified the UAR's view. Eisenhower had stressed "his country's wish to strengthen the UN. I expressed the faith of the UAR in the UN Charter and its principles and explained to him what we regarded as the mistakes in the conduct of the UN in the Congo. I took the opportunity to talk to him on our favourable experience with the UN at the time of the aggression against Egypt and I thanked him in the name of our people for his and his government's attitude at the time... He expressed his country's wish for friendship with our country. I told him that we shared this wish but, unfortunately, Israel always forms an obstacle in the path of close relations. I also hinted at the arms supplied to Israel by the West." When the US Secretary of State, who was present, said that the US had only supplied a small quantity of defensive weapons, Abdel-Nasser had appealed to Eisenhower as one soldier to another, saying that there were no defensive or offensive weapons, but only destructive weapons. While President Eisenhower had stressed US support for UN in Congo, "I explained to him... that Africa must be kept out of the cold war and that we would resist any imperialist influence in the continent." Abdel-Nasser concluded his report: "My meeting with the US President was held in a friendly atmosphere of sincerity and frankness with the aim of finding a genuine base for understanding between our peoples. I regard this meeting as a constructive step... to enable the Arab and the American people to form friendly and stable relations." (*R. Cairo*, 12 Oct-*IMB*, 14 Oct)

**Sept-Oct: Abdel-Nasser and Khrushchev.** Abdel-Nasser met the Soviet Premier twice, on 24 Sept and on 2 Oct. (*Jer. Post*, 25 Sept, 3 Oct)

He reported on the meetings as follows: "We were able to refresh and renew our old friendship, which is built on mutual respect for the other's views and principles." The first meeting had been devoted to the international situation. "I discerned Khrushchev's strong will to find a base for peaceful co-existence and his grief at the failure of the Summit Conference." Disarmament and the question of political and economic freedom in Africa and Asia had been discussed.

The second meeting had been devoted mainly to UAR-Soviet relations. "We tried—as was our duty—to review with the frankness which is the foundation of our international relations the crisis which had beset the relations between our countries in 1959—a crisis which had ended in an attempt by either side to understand the other's position. There was no getting away from reviewing this crisis in open language in order to strengthen the basis of our friendship, a basis which we are trying hard to strengthen. We believe that the friendly ties between us,



apart from being a noble example of good relations between countries so vastly different in power and in their social regime, are also one of the most conspicuous manifestations of the UAR's independent policies." (*R. Cairo, 12 Oct-IMB; BBC, 14 Oct.*)

**Sept-Oct: Abdel-Nasser and Macmillan.** Abdel-Nasser met PM Macmillan twice, on 29 Sept and on 3 Oct. (*Sunday Times, 23 Oct*) According to Abdel-Nasser's report, international, ME affairs and direct relations between the UAR and Britain were discussed. "I did not conceal anything... for the policy of the UAR can be summed up in one word: liberty; and UAR diplomacy can also be summed up in one word: justice." (*R. Cairo, 12 Oct-IMB, 14 Oct.*)

[For the role played by these meetings in the re-establishment of full diplomatic relations between the UK and the UAR, see p 535 ff.]

**Sept: Abdel-Nasser and Castro** (see above). Abdel-Nasser reported: "Our conversation [with Castro] was devoted to our revolutionary experiences... and to the ties linking us to all revolutionaries... The problem of freedom is indivisible... We are a revolutionary people which is still living its revolution." (*R. Cairo, 12 Oct-IMB, 14 Oct*)

**Oct: With the Turkish Foreign Minister.** On 1 Oct, the President of the UAR met the Turkish Foreign Minister for a review of ME developments and UAR-Turkish relations. (*R. Cairo, 1 Oct-IMB, 2 Oct*)

**Oct: With the SG.** On 3 Oct Abdel-Nasser met Mr Hammarskjöld. *Ha'aretz* reported that freedom of passage for Israel through the Suez Canal was discussed. (*Ha'aretz, 4 Oct*)

**Sept-Oct: King Hussein's Activities.** King Hussein's meetings included a conference with the SG and a conversation with Macmillan (both on 29 Sept) to "line up support for the Arab problems before the UN." (*Jer. Times, 1 Oct*)

Sa'ib Slām met King Hussein twice, on 28 and 30 Sept. His object was reported to be to mediate between Hussein and Abdel-Nasser and to prevent the former from doing anything to aggravate the existing tension. Slām intended to arrange for a meeting between the two. (*Hayat, 1 Oct*) [Hussein did not meet Abdel-Nasser during the GA.] After Hussein's speech at the GA, Slām declared that he was continuing in his efforts to mediate between the UAR and Jordan. (*Jihad, 8 Oct*)

On 30 Sept Hussein met Jawād, the Iraqi Foreign Minister. (*Hayat, 4 Oct*) This meeting was instrumental in bringing about the recognition of Qassim's regime by Jordan (see p 159 ff.).

On 7 Oct Hussein met Eisenhower in Washington for a short talk. The White House spokesman later released an announcement expressing the President's appreciation for Hussein's speech in the GA. (*Davar, 9 Oct*)

**Lebanon.** For Sa'ib Slām's meetings with Abdel-Nasser and Hussein, see above. On 22 Sept he met with President Eisenhower (see p 367).

**Arab League Activities During GA.** The SG of the Arab League, Abd al-Khāliq Hasūnah, was present in New York during the GA. He headed four joint meetings of Arab delegations at which Arab problems before the GA and the various committees were discussed, and arrangements made to coordinate the efforts of the various delegations. Hasūnah also called a meeting of experts on 30 Sept to discuss the diversion of the Jordan waters by Israel. Arab Ministers for Economic Affairs who were present in New York met to discuss the formation of an Arab bloc in the International Bank of Reconstruction and Development. Arab representatives also discussed oil problems, and military equipment and training. (*Akhbar al-Yawm, 1 Oct*)

**Sept-Oct: Activities of Israeli Foreign Minister.** On 27 Sept Mrs Meir met President Nkrumah. Their conversation touched on the Congo situation, the cold war, the UN Secretariat, and on Nkrumah's speech before the GA in so far as it concerned Israeli-Arab relations. She had talks of a general nature with Herter, the US Secretary of State, and Luns, the Dutch Foreign Minister, the same day. (*Ha'aretz, 28 Sept, 2 Oct*)

On 2 Oct Mrs Meir met with a group of African leaders. (*Ma'ariv, 3 Oct*)

#### DEC: ELECTIONS OF TURKEY AND UAR TO SECURITY COUNCIL; ELECTIONS TO ECOSOC

**Election of Turkey.** [At the GA of 1959, when a deadlock developed in the voting between Poland and Turkey, it was eventually agreed that Poland should be a member of the SC for one year only, instead of the usual two, and that Turkey should take her place from 1 Jan 1961.]

In accordance with the agreement, Turkey was elected on 9 Dec as a non-permanent member of the SC for the year 1961. She received 74 votes. (*A/PV, 941, 9 Dec*)

**Election of UAR.** In the elections for the replacement of Argentina, Italy and Tunisia, whose regular terms were to expire at the end of 1960, the UAR obtained 74 votes and was elected. (*A/PV, 941, 9 Dec*)

**Press Comment.** Commenting editorially on the UAR's candidature, *The New York Times* recalled the UAR's ban on Israeli ships and goods in the Suez Canal "in disregard of specific UN recommendations," and argued that the UAR had thus "disqualified itself" from membership in the SC. (*NYT, 1 Oct*)

After the election, the same paper commented that Abdel-Nasser "is supposed to represent the ME. He doesn't. He is at odds with Jordan and Iraq and he considers himself still at war with Israel." He had agreed to maintain the Suez Canal as an international waterway and had not kept this agreement. The paper indicated surprise that the US had not protested against UAR membership in the SC. (*NYT, 12 Dec*)

ME countries newly elected for membership in the ECOSOC were Jordan (with 68 votes) and Ethiopia (with 62 votes). The election of an additional member was postponed. Sudan terminated her membership on 31 Dec 1960. (*A/PV, 942, 9 Dec; A/PV, 959, 20 Dec*)

# UN VOTING RECORD OF MIDDLE EAST COUNTRIES

## KEY TO SIGNS:

+ in favour; — against; 0 abstaining; A absent

## NOTES

1. Voting results are given in parentheses in this order: (.. in favour, .. against, .. abstaining)
2. NOT ADOPTED means: did not receive the necessary two-thirds majority required in Plenary Sessions of the Assembly
3. Where sponsors are not given, the resolution was submitted by the General Committee
4. Congo (B)—Congo (capital: Brazzaville); Congo (L)—Congo (capital: Leopoldville); Dominican R.—Dominican Republic; Iv. Coast—Ivory Coast; Up. Volta—Upper Volta.

Date and Source	Subject and Proposal	Western Powers			Other Nato, Pro-Western and European Countries	Eastern Bloc	Afro-Asian Countries	Latin American Countries	ME AND NORTH AFRICAN COUNTRIES													Result				
		US	UK	France					Cyprus	Ethiopia	Iran	Iraq	Israel	Jordan	Lebanon	Libya	Morocco	Saudi Arabia	Somalia	Sudan	Tunisia		Turkey	UAR	Yemen	
5 Oct. A/PV 889	Five-Nation Resolution Sponsored by UAR, India, Yugoslavia, Ghana and Indonesia; calling for renewed contacts between US President and USSR PM. Australian amendment calling for Big Four (rather than Big Two) meeting	+	+	+	All 0, except: Australia, Canada +; Finland, Yugoslavia —	0	All —, except: Cambodia, Japan, Laos, Philippines 0	All 0, except: Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Honduras, Paraguay —	—	—	—	A	—	—	—	A	—	—	0	—	—	—	—	—	Rejected (5, 45, 43)	
	Argentinian proposal to vote separately on the words "the President of USA" and the "PM of USSR"	+	+	+	All +, except: Yugoslavia, Sweden, Finland —; Austria Greece 0	0	Majority —; Japan, Pakistan, Thailand, China +; Laos, Liberia, Madagascar, Afghanistan 0	Majority +; Bolivia, Cuba, Venezuela —; Mexico, Panama, Ecuador, Salvador 0	+	—	—	A	—	—	—	0	—	—	0	+	—	—	—	—	Adopted (37, 36, 22)	
	Retention of above words, proposed by Argentina (when retention was not adopted, the sponsors withdrew the resolution).	—	—	—	All —, except: Finland, Sweden, Yugoslavia +; Austria, Greece 0	0	All +, except: China, Japan, Pakistan, Philippines, Thailand —	Majority —; Bolivia, Cuba, Venezuela +; Mexico, Panama, Dominican R., Ecuador 0	—	0	+	A	+	A	+	+	+	+	0	—	+	—	+	+	Not adopted (41, 37, 17)	
8 Oct. A/PV 895	Representation of China (1) No inclusion of this item in agenda; (2) No consideration of proposal to seat representatives of People's Rep. of China or to exclude present Chinese representation; (The two parts were first voted on separately, all ME countries voting as in the final vote, shown here. Three amendments calling for consideration of the item were rejected, ME votes being opposite to those shown here. Those abstaining in the final vote abstained on the amendments.)	+	+	+	Majority +; Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Norway, Sweden, Yugoslavia —; Austria, Iceland, Portugal 0	—	Majority 0; Afghanistan, Burma, Cambodia, Ceylon, Ghana, Guinea, India, Indonesia, Mali, Nepal, Nigeria, Senegal —; China, Japan, Liberia, Pakistan, Philippines, Thailand +	All +, except: Cuba —	0	—	+	0	+	+	0	—	0	0	—	—	—	—	—	—	Adopted (42, 34, 22)	
10 Oct. A/PV 898	Tibet Inclusion in agenda	+	+	0	All +, except: Finland, Portugal, Union of SA, Spain 0; Yugoslavia —	—	Majority 0; China, Malaya, Japan, Liberia, Pakistan, Philippines, Thailand +; Guinea, Indonesia, Mali —	All +, except: Cuba 0	+	0	+	0	+	+	0	0	0	0	+	+	0	0	0	0	0	Adopted (49, 13, 35)
10 Oct. A/PV 898	Hungary Inclusion in agenda	+	+	+	All +, except: Finland 0; Yugoslavia —	—	Majority 0; Burma, Cambodia, China, Malaya, Japan, Liberia, Nepal, Pakistan, Philippines, Thailand +; Indonesia, Mali —	All +, except: Cuba 0	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	Adopted (54, 12, 31)
11 Oct. A/PV 900	Disarmament Assignment to First Committee	+	+	+	All +, except: Finland, Yugoslavia 0	—	Majority +; Guinea, Mali —; Afghanistan, Cambodia, Ghana, India, Indonesia, Liberia, Nigeria, Senegal, —	All +, except: Cuba —; Dominican R., Mexico, Venezuela 0	+	0	+	0	+	0	0	0	0	0	+	+	0	0	0	0	0	Adopted



[illegible]

Date and Source	Subject and Proposal	Western Powers			Other Nato, Pro-Western and European Countries	Eastern Bloc	Afro-Asian Countries	Latin-American Countries	ME AND NORTH AFRICAN COUNTRIES												Result
		US	UK	France																	
14 Dec A/PV 974	Independence of Colonial Countries and Peoples Declaration calling for immediate and complete independence of all non-self-governing territories and abolition of all forms of colonialism, including leasing of areas in territories of other states — submitted by USSR (vote on operative part)	—	—	—	All —, except: Yugoslavia +; Austria, Finland, Yugoslavia 0	+	Majority 0: Afghanistan, Ceylon, Chad, Ghana, Guinea, India, Indonesia, Liberia, Mali, Nepal, Togo +; China, Japan, Niger, Philippines, Thailand —	Majority 0: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, Uruguay —; Cuba +	0	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	(32, 35, 30)
		—	—	—	All —, except: Austria, Finland, Yugoslavia 0	+	Majority 0: Afghanistan, Ceylon, Ghana, Guinea, Iv. Coast, Liberia, Madagascar, Mali, Niger +; China, Malaya, Japan, Pakistan, Philippines, Thailand —	All —, except: Cuba +; Dominican R., Haiti 0	0	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	Rejected (25, 43, 29)
		—	—	—	All —, except: Yugoslavia +; Finland 0	+	Majority 0: Afghanistan, Guinea, Liberia, Mali, Togo +; China, Congo (B), Gabon, Iv. Coast, Japan, Laos, Madagascar, Malaya, Niger, Pakistan, Philippines, Thailand —	Majority —: Cuba, Mexico +; Dominican R., Ecuador, Haiti, Paraguay, Uruguay, Venezuela 0	0	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	Not adopted (29, 47, 22)
		—	—	—	All —, except: Yugoslavia +; Austria 0	+	Majority +: China, Malaya, Iv. Coast, Japan, Madagascar, Niger, Pakistan, Thailand —; Cambodia, CAR, Congo (B), Gabon, Indonesia, Laos, Philippines, Senegal, Up. Volta 0	Majority 0: Cuba, Mexico, Uruguay, Venezuela +; Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Honduras, Nicaragua —	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	Rejected (41, 35, 22)
		—	—	—	All +, except: Australia, Belgium, Portugal, Spain, Union of SA 0	+	All +	All +, except: Dominican R. 0	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	Adopted (89, 0, 9)
		0	0	0	All +, except: Australia 0	+	All +	All +	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	Adopted
		—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	Adopted
		—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	Adopted
		—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	Adopted
		—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	Adopted
		—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	Adopted
		—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	Adopted
15 Dec A/PV 948	Racial Discrimination Resolution sponsored by several Afro-Asian states (including Sudan, UAR and Iraq), Bolivia and Canada, calling on member states administering non-self-governing territories to discourage all racial discrimination and give effect to measures aiming at equality of all races	—	—	—	All +, except: Australia 0	+	All +	All +	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	Adopted
		—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	Adopted





Date and Source	Subject and Proposal	Western Powers			Other Nato, Pro-Western and European Countries	Eastern Bloc	Afro-Asian Countries	Latin-American Countries	ME AND NORTH AFRICAN COUNTRIES													Result			
		US	UK	France					Cyprus	Ethiopia	Iran	Iraq	Israel	Jordan	Lebanon	Libya	Morocco	Saudi Arabia	Somalia	Sudan	Tunisia		Turkey	UAR	Yemen
	Para 1: recognizing Algerian people's right to "self-determination and independence"	0	0	A	Majority +: Australia, Belgium, Luxembourg, Portugal, Spain 0	+	All +, except: Thailand 0	All +, except: Dominican R., Salvador 0	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
	Para 2: calling for "effective guarantees" for "just implementation" of right to self-determination on the basis of respect for unity and territorial integrity of Algeria	0	0	A	Majority 0: Austria, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Norway, Sweden, Yugoslavia +	+	All +, except: Cambodia, China, Laos, Thailand 0	All +, except: Brazil, Colombia, Dominican R., Salvador 0	+	+	+	+	0	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
	Para 3: recognizing that UN has a responsibility to contribute to implementation	0	—	A	Majority +: Australia, Belgium, Italy, Luxembourg, Portugal, Spain—; Netherlands, New Zealand 0	+	All +, except: Cambodia, China, Congo (B), Congo (L), Japan, Laos, Thailand 0	Majority +: Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Dominican R., Ecuador, Salvador 0	+	+	+	+	—	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
	Para 4: Calling for referendum in Algeria on future of country, to be organized and supervised by UN	—	—	0	All —, except: Yugoslavia +; Greece 0	+	Majority +: CAR, China, Congo (B), Congo (L), Gabon, Iv. Coast, Niger, Senegal —; Cambodia, Cameroon, Chad, Dahomey, Japan, Laos, Madagascar, Philippines, Thailand, Up. Volta 0	Majority 0: Cuba +; Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Salvador, Peru —	+	+	0	+	—	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	0	+	+	+
	The whole of the above resolution	—	—	A	Majority —: Austria, Finland, Ireland, Sweden, Yugoslavia +; Denmark, Greece, Iceland, Norway 0	+	Majority +: China—; Cambodia, Cameroon, CAR, Chad, Congo (B), Congo (L), Dahomey, Gabon, Iv. Coast, Japan, Laos, Madagascar, Niger, Philippines, Senegal, Thailand, Up. Volta 0	Part —: Bolivia, Cuba, Haiti, Mexico, Panama, Venezuela +; Costa Rica, Dominican R., Ecuador, Guatemala, Uruguay 0	+	+	0	+	—	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	0	+	+	+
	(Plenary) Algeria Amendment replacing above para 4 by call for immediate negotiations between sides for a cease-fire, and organization of referendum with mutual and international guarantees — sponsored by a group of African states (formerly French)	+	0	A	Majority +: Yugoslavia —; Australia, Belgium, Finland, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain 0	—	Majority —; the 11 sponsors, Cambodia, Thailand +; China, Japan, Laos, Philippines 0	Majority 0: Brazil, Colombia, Haiti, Nicaragua, Peru +; Cuba, Venezuela —	—	—	—	—	+	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
	Amendment to add para 5, recommending establishment of international commission to facilitate negotiation — sponsored by same group as above	—	—	—	Majority 0: Austria, Canada, Denmark, Iceland, Ireland, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden +; Yugoslavia —	—	Majority —; the 11 sponsors, Thailand +; Cambodia, China, Japan, Laos, Philippines 0	All 0, except: Colombia +; Cuba, Venezuela —	—	—	0	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—





Date and Source	Subject and Proposal	Western Powers			Other Nato, Pro-Western and European Countries	Eastern Bloc	Afro-Asian Countries	Latin-American Countries	ME AND NORTH AFRICAN COUNTRIES													Result																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																
		US	UK	France					Cyprus	Ethiopia	Iran	Iraq	Israel	Jordan	Lebanon	Libya	Morocco	Saudi Arabia	Somalia	Sudan	Tunisia		Turkey	UAR	Yemen																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																													
	(Plenary) Resolution adopted by First Committee on the suspension of nuclear tests, urging early agreement at Geneva talks; calling on states taking part to continue voluntary suspension of tests, and asking them to report to UN on results — sponsored by Austria, India and Sweden	0	+	0	All +, except: Belgium, Spain 0	+	All +	All +																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																														





## AFRO-ASIAN AND AFRICAN CONFERENCES

(NOTES: For background and for synopsis, see under headings of individual conferences. For the Arab-Israel conflict at these conferences, see p 186.)

## AFRO-ASIAN PEOPLES' SOLIDARITY ORGANIZATION (AAPSO)

**Background Note.** This organization was established in 1958, at the initiative of Asian Communist front organizations, with the cooperation of the UAR, with its permanent secretariat in Cairo. The President, Anwar as-Saadat, and the SG, Yūsuf as-Sibā'i, are Egyptians, as are the holders of the principal posts in the Secretariat. The organization is used mainly for propaganda against the Western colonial powers in Africa and elsewhere. It is jointly run by the UAR and representatives from Communist countries, and the extent of the control exercised by each side has been a constant issue.

**Activities of Secretariat.** [The principal activities of the Secretariat were the publication of statements on a variety of subjects, mostly concerned with the struggle against colonialism. Several examples are given.]

In Jan the Secretariat published a statement in support of African nationalists in the Federation of Central Africa (*Ayyam, Damascus, 5 Jan*), and expressed its support for the independence of Mali. (*Ahram, 8 Jan*) The SG requested AA Solidarity Committees throughout the world to press their governments to act against French nuclear tests in the Sahara. (*NYHT, 17 Feb*) In preparation for the anniversary of the Bandung Conference a statement was published calling for the continuation of the struggle for the fulfilment of its resolutions. (*Ahram, 24 Mar*)

In a statement published in Mar the Secretariat warned the Western powers that "if they continue to encourage this support of the State of Israel, the Arab states and all Afro-Asian peoples will launch a great campaign forthwith for the elimination of this state." (*NYHT, 25 Mar*)

In Apr the Secretariat condemned the boycott of the UAR Ship *Cleopatra* in New York harbour (*Sawt al-Ahram, Baghdad, 28 Apr*) [see p 39 ff], and condemned racial discrimination in South Africa, calling for an economic and political boycott of that country. (*Ahram, 14, 19 Apr*) In May it condemned the defence treaty between the US and Japan. (*Bilad, 27 May*)

In June the SG called for the holding of a second Bandung Conference (*Ahram, 3 June*), and in July several statements were issued supporting Congolese independence. (*Ahram, 2, 18 July*) On the anniversary of the Hiroshima bombing, the Secretariat called for disarmament and the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons. (*Hayat, 7 Aug*)

In Oct it called for the "democratization of the UN Secretariat." (*Gumhuriyah, 3 Oct*) In preparation for Kenya Day (20 Oct), the Secretariat called upon all AA Solidarity Committees to protest to Britain against the persecution of African nationalists in Kenya. (*Ahram, 17 Oct*) In the same month it condemned American "imperialist intervention" in Laos. (*Ahram, 17 Oct*)

MENA reported that two weeks of campaigning, organized by the AAPSO Secretariat, against foreign alliances and military bases in Africa and Asia were to begin on 25 Nov. (*MENA, 25 Nov-BBC, 26 Nov*) An African Solidarity Day was organized in Dec, with mass rallies. (*Hayat, 9 Dec*) A further statement on Laos, issued in

Dec, called for the cessation of American and CENTO "aggression" in that country. (*NCNA, 21 Dec-BBC, 23 Dec*)

In Nov the Malta Labour Party was admitted to the AAPSO. (*R. Baghdad, 20 Nov-BBC, 22 Nov*) In applying for membership, the leader of the Malta Labour Party, Mr Dom Mintoff [a former PM of Malta], reportedly said that Malta was an important base for British imperialism, from which it could attack the UAR and African countries. (*Ahram, 28 Apr*)

**Apr: Second AAPSO Conference at Conakry.** The Second Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Conference was held at Conakry, Guinea, on 11-15 Apr, with about 300 delegates from some 50 countries. The Arab countries represented were Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, the UAR, Sudan, Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq, Yemen, Oman; there was a delegation representing "Palestine." (*NCNA, 15 Apr-BBC, 19 Apr; Times, 11 Apr; R. Cairo, 10 Apr-BBC, 13 Apr*) Many of the participants were political exiles and representatives of opposition movements in their countries. (*R. Brazzaville, 30 Mar-BBC 1 Apr; Times, 11 Apr*) The UAR delegation, headed by Anwar as-Saadat, was one of the largest. (*Ahram, 15 Mar; Ruz al-Yusuf, 8 Apr*)

Before the Conference began the SG of the AAPSO stated that it would work for the elimination of imperialism. (*Masa', Cairo, 9 Feb*)

Anti-Western sentiment was conspicuously reflected in the speeches and the final resolutions, which denounced imperialism, the colonial powers, and French nuclear tests in the Sahara, supported Algerian independence, and called for the economic boycott of South Africa. There was also a series of resolutions on economic, social and cultural matters, the principal one calling for the establishment of an Afro-Asian common market. (*NCNA, 17 Apr-BBC, 20 Apr; Eg. Gaz.; Ghana Times; Ahram, 16 Apr; NYT, 17 Apr*)

[For resolution on Palestine—see p 186.]

**Changes in Structure of AAPSO.** [At the Conakry Conference the delegations from the Communist countries tried to change the structure of the AAPSO, so as to limit UAR control. Ultimately, a compromise was reached, providing for the following structure:]

1. *The AAPSO General Conference* will convene once every two years.
2. *The AAPSO Council* [a new body], composed of heads of delegations, will convene once a year.
3. *The AAPSO Executive Committee* [a new body], consisting of 27 members, is to be elected by the Council and will meet every six months. It will fulfil the duties formerly carried out by the President, Anwar as-Saadat.
4. *The Permanent Secretariat*, comprising 12 members, will be elected and controlled by the Executive Committee. Its seat will remain in Cairo and Yūsuf as-Sibā'i remains the SG. (*NCNA, 15-17 Apr-BBC, 19, 20 Apr*)

**Nov: Executive Council Meeting in Beirut.** The Executive Council held its first meeting in Beirut on 10-14 Nov, with the Lebanese Socialist leader, Kamāl Junbalāt, as chairman. (*Hayat, 10, 11 Nov*)

**Communist Differences with UAR and Neutralists over Control.** During the conference, differences of opinion



reportedly arose between Communist and neutralist delegates over the following points:

1. The Communists attacked the SG, Sibā'i, for being absent from many meetings, and wished to curtail his authority. Most delegates opposed the Communist view and a compromise was reached, according to which a deputy SG would exercise the SG's authority in his absence. It was decided to elect three deputy SGs.

2. The Communists wished to transfer the seat of the Secretariat to another country. A compromise was reached according to which the Secretariat would move to a different country each year but the Executive Council was empowered to extend the period.

3. The UAR and other delegations "realized" that the resolutions "bore a Marxist imprint" and objected to their publication. The Communists nevertheless persuaded the Secretariat to publish the resolutions.

4. The Communists accused the UAR of controlling the Secretariat and attempting to belittle it by giving it inadequate publicity. (*Hayat*, 12, 14, 15 Nov)

It was resolved to hold the second meeting of the Executive Council at Bandung on 10-14 Apr 1961, when [Communist] proposals for limiting the SG's powers would be discussed. (*Hayat*, 15 Nov; *Ahram*, 26 Dec)

The political resolutions called for: condemnation of US and NATO intervention in Algeria; material aid to liberation movements in Asia and Africa; contact with Latin American political parties in order to establish a common front against imperialism; the cancellation of all treaties between Britain and the principalities of the "Arab Gulf" [the Persian Gulf]; the elimination of foreign military bases in Africa; the holding of a General Afro-Asian Conference in 1961; condemnation of UN activities in the Congo and support for Lumumba's government; support for Indonesia's claim to Western New Guinea; support of the APG (Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic); the expulsion of South Africa from the UN; condemnation of racial discrimination in Southern Rhodesia and "US intervention in Zanzibar"; support for the admission of China to the UN; condemnation of "British aggression" in "Southern Yemen"; condemnation of Israel. (*Hayat*, 14 Nov)

The *Jewish Observer* commented: "Outwardly the Egyptians will continue to appear as the popular leaders of a movement supposedly dedicated to the independence of the African peoples and the eradication of imperialism. In fact, the Egyptians have accepted the role of fronting for the Russians and the Chinese." (*Jew. Ob.* 9 Dec)

#### JAN: ALL AFRICAN PEOPLES' CONFERENCE AT TUNIS

[The Second All African Peoples' Conference was held in Tunis on 25-30 Jan. This was a non-governmental conference of African political movements, with its headquarters in Accra, with delegations from 28 countries. The Arab delegations represented the UAR, Tunisia, Morocco and the APG. Libya and the Sudan did not send delegations to either the first or the second conference.

The principal subjects discussed were: the independence of Africa; neo-colonialism and decolonization; economic and social development; African unity; Algeria.]

AAPC and AAPSO. Before the Conference, the SG of the AAPC, Abdoulaye Diallo [of Guinea], met Abdel-Nasser in Cairo and discussed with him the agenda of the conference. According to Diallo, the question of co-ordination between the AAPC and the AAPSO was

discussed. Diallo said there was no conflict between the two organizations, but outside elements were trying to spread the view that advanced Asia was trying to dominate backward Africa. (*Ahram*, 20, 28 Dec 1959)

UAR Supports Disaffiliation from ICFTU and WFTU. The UAR, together with Morocco, Guinea and Ghana, supported a proposal that the members of the All-African Trade Union Federation, to be established, should disaffiliate from the ICFTU and the WFTU, but a decision was deferred until the first AATUF conference. (*All African Peoples' Conference, Tunis, 25-30 Jan 1960*, published by the Permanent Secretariat of the AAPC, Accra). [At the first Conference of the AATUF, held in Casablanca in May 1961, the resolution on disaffiliation was passed.]

#### APR: "POSITIVE ACTION" CONFERENCE AT ACCRA

[An All African Conference on Positive Action for Peace and Security in Africa was held in Accra on 7-9 Apr at the initiative of President Nkrumah. It included official delegations from independent African states and delegations from African political movements.]

UAR and Palestinian Participation. President Nkrumah personally requested President Abdel-Nasser to send a delegation to the Conference. Abdel-Nasser replied in a cable "full of praise" for Nkrumah, wishing the Conference success. (*Ahram*, 15 Mar) The UAR delegation to the conference was joined by a Palestinian mission, whose purpose was to convince the participants of the danger with which they were confronted by Israel "which had stolen Palestine." (*R. Cairo*, 6 Apr-IMB, 7 Apr)

There were no reports of the part played by the UAR delegation at the Conference. UAR broadcasts to West Africa explained that its aim was to demonstrate opposition to France and South Africa. (*R. Cairo*, 7 Apr-BBC, 9 Apr)

#### MAY: ALL-AFRICAN RADIO CONFERENCE AT RABAT

[The Conference was held in Rabat, on the initiative of Morocco, on 23-26 May. Morocco, the UAR, Tunisia, Libya, Ghana and Guinea took part.

The Conference decided to establish an African Broadcasting Union, with its centre in Rabat. Three committees were set up: Administrative and Legal—located in Tunis; Technical—in Cairo; and a Committee for the Exchange of Broadcasts—in Accra.]

UAR and the Conference. Prior to the Conference, *al-Ahrām* reported that Morocco had consulted the UAR about it and requested its assistance. (*Ahrām*, 30 Mar) *Al-Ahrām* reported that the Conference would discuss measures against "imperialist broadcasts" and the infiltration of Israel into Africa. (*Ahram*, 22 May) UAR broadcasts reported that it discussed ways and means of checking "the propaganda of imperialist broadcasts." (*R. Cairo*, 25 May-BBC, 27 May)

It was decided that Arabic would be the official language of the organization. (*Ahram*, 2 June) Rabat Radio subsequently reported that, in addition, French and English would also serve as "working languages." (*R. Rabat*, 22 Oct-BBC, 24 Oct) According to *al-Ahrām*, it was also decided that radio announcers in the African countries would terminate their studies in Western countries and would complete them instead in the UAR. They were due to arrive in Cairo in July. (*Ahram*, 2 June)

In Oct the Administrative and Legal Committee of

the Union held its first meeting in Tunis. Ten African countries participated, but the UAR was absent. (*Dé-pêche Tunisienne*, 22 Oct; *Monde*, 18 Oct) At the meeting the Tunisian Information Minister, Masmoudi, said that broadcasting in Black Africa should spread peace and not hatred. (*R. Tunis*, 18 Oct-BBC, 20 Oct)

#### JUNE: CONFERENCE OF INDEPENDENT AFRICAN STATES IN ADDIS ABABA

[The Second Conference of Independent African States, held in Addis Ababa on 14-26 June, was a conference of governments, and most of the delegations were led by Foreign Ministers. Thirteen African states participated as full members; six were Arab countries: the UAR, Sudan, Libya, Tunisia, Morocco and the GPRA.]

The principal problems discussed were: Algeria, racial discrimination in South Africa, French nuclear tests in the Sahara, and African unity.

The UAR delegation secured the passing of a resolution on the Palestine issue, condemning Israel, by threatening to leave the Conference if the resolution were not accepted.]

**Arab League Initiative.** Two months previously the Secretariat of the Arab League had called on its African members to participate as a united group. (*Zaman*, Baghdad, 30 Apr)

**Arab Attitude on African Unity.** During the Conference differences of opinion developed between the Ghanaian and Nigerian delegations. The former advocated a union of African states, while the latter supported a looser union, based on cooperation in the political, economic and cultural fields.

The Arab delegations supported the Nigerian view. (*Second Conference of Independent African States, Addis Ababa, 14-16 June 1960*, No date of Publication [this source will be referred to as "Second Conference"]). (*NYT*, 21 June)

**The Palestine issue.** See p 186.

**UAR and South Africa.** The UAR was requested by the other delegations to break off diplomatic relations with South Africa and deny her ships passage through the Suez Canal. [The UAR was the only country represented having diplomatic relations with South Africa.] The UAR delegate replied that in regard to passage through the Suez Canal, his country was bound by the Constantinople Convention. When asked why Israeli ships were not allowed through the Canal, he said a state of war existed between the UAR and Israel. He did not state whether his country would break off relations with South Africa. (*NYT*, 22 June; *Ghana Times*, 24 June; *R. Cairo*, 1 July-IMB, 1 July) (See also p 186.)

[The UAR broke off diplomatic relations with South Africa in May 1961.]

**Differences Regarding Location of Next Conference.** There were differences among the Arab delegations as to the location of the next Conference. The Tunisian, Moroccan and Sudanese delegations each demanded that the Conference be held in its country. It was finally agreed to leave the decision to the Arab League. (*Ahram*, 16 June, 2 July; *R. Amman*, 18 June-IMB, 19 June [The Third Conference was held in Cairo in Apr 1961.]

**Aug: Conference of African Ministers—Leopoldville.** See pp 25, 28, 37.

#### APR-MAY: AFRO-ASIAN ECONOMIC CONFERENCE IN CAIRO

[The first Afro-Asian Economic Conference was held in Cairo in Dec 1958. It was organized by the Egyptian Chamber of Commerce and Industry with the backing of the UAR Government, which financed it. About 450 delegates (360 of whom were Arabs) from some 40 countries took part. It was decided to establish a permanent AA Economic Centre in Cairo with an Egyptian as SG.]

**Composition of Second Conference.** The Second Afro-Asian Economic Conference was held in Cairo, in Apr-May 1960. One hundred and two economic organizations from 89 countries had been invited to send representatives. (*Ahram*, 16 Feb; *Times*, 5 May) One hundred and thirty-five representatives from chambers of commerce and non-governmental economic organizations actually participated, half coming from the Arab countries. The largest delegations were from the UAR, the USSR and India. (*Ahram*, 23, 29, 30 Apr; *MENA*, 5 Apr-BBC, 7 Apr)

The Conference was opened by Abdel-Nasser. (Text of speech—*R. Cairo*, 30 Apr-BBC, 3 May.)

Muhammad Rushdi, President of the Egyptian Chambers of Commerce, was chairman. Muhammad Ali Rif'at, the SG of the permanent AA Economic Centre, presented a report on the activities of the organization. (*R. Cairo*, 30 Apr-BBC, 3 May; *Ahram*, 1 May)

**Opposition to Soviet Participation.** As in the first AA Economic Conference, opposition was expressed by several delegations to the participation of the Soviet Union. This opposition was based on a decision of the organization's Advisory Committee at Bandung in Apr 1959, to the effect that participation would be limited to those countries that had participated in the 1955 Bandung Conference [where the USSR was not represented] and whose centre of government was either in Asia or in Africa and to new states in Africa or Asia which had been established since the Bandung Conference. In order to circumvent this decision, the Soviet Union sent to the Second Conference eight delegations each representing one of the Soviet republics in Central Asia and the Caucasus. (*Times*, 5 May) Nevertheless, several delegations, including those of Indonesia, Japan, the Philippines and South Korea, threatened to leave the Conference if the Soviet delegation was accepted as a full member. Under their pressure it was decided that the Soviet delegation should not be considered as a full member and should not have the right to vote. (*Hayat*; *Times*, 5 May)

**Resolutions.** The resolutions of the Second Conference were mainly a repetition of those adopted by the first. They include:

(1) Support for the establishment of an Afro-Asian Common Market in order to combat "the harmful influence" of the European Common Market; (2) The establishment of an Afro-Asian Research Group, to examine the possibilities of establishing an Afro-Asian Investment Agency; (3) Coordination of import and export policies of Afro-Asian countries, in order to prevent competition between them; (4) Approval for the constitution and budget of an Afro-Asian Organization for Economic Cooperation, based on the Chambers of Commerce, to coordinate the economies of the Afro-Asian countries and foster cooperation between them. Its initial capital would be £E1 million. The President and the SG are Egyptians; (5) The AA Economic Confe-

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rence would convene every two years, and Cairo would be its permanent centre. (*Ahram*, 4 May; *Times*, 5 May; *BBC*, 5 May; *Zaman*, 10 May)

The *Burman* commented that the fact that during the two years since the first Conference none of its resolutions had been carried out showed that they were impractical and are only of propaganda value. (*Burman*, *Burma*, 5 May)

Anti-Israeli Activity. See p 186.

### NOV-DEC: THE AFRICAN HIGH COMMAND

[In Nov President Nkrumah of Ghana approached the heads of the UAR, Sudan, Tunisia, Morocco, Libya, Ethiopia, Liberia, Guinea and Mali with a proposal to establish an African High Command. The idea arose out of the Congo situation.]

**UAR Reservations.** The UAR Press revealed that the government had several reservations about Nkrumah's proposal. According to *Rūz al-Yūsuf*, the UAR proposed that an "advisory coordinating committee" be established instead. This committee would not be able to limit one African country's right to render separate assistance to another African country.

The UAR's objection was directed against the presence of foreign officers in several African armies, and she demanded their removal as a condition of agreement to join. (*Rūz al-Yūsuf*, 12, 26 Dec; *Ahram*, 13, 20 Dec)

[This demand principally concerned Ghana, whose army was staffed by British officers and commanded by a British general. No progress was made over this proposal in 1960, but a decision to establish an African High Command was taken at the Casablanca Conference, in Jan 1961.]

## THE MIDDLE EAST COUNTRIES AND THE CONGO

### BACKGROUND NOTE AND SYNOPSIS

The history of the Congolese nationalist movement is a brief one. It first came to notice in the Leopoldville riots in Jan 1959. A year later, at the Brussels Conference, Belgium agreed that the Congo should become independent in June 1960, and elections were held in May.

No party gained a clear majority, although Patrice Lumumba's Mouvement National Congolais (MNC) won the largest number of seats. Difficulties arose in establishing a government originating in the opposed concepts of the two prominent national leaders—Lumumba and Kasavubu: the former advocated a strong centralized administration, while the latter was in favour of a loose federation of provinces. The difficulties were temporarily resolved when it was agreed that Kasavubu should become President and Lumumba Prime Minister. On 30 June the Congo became independent.

Shortly afterwards, deep rifts appeared. In addition to the initial opposition between Lumumba and Kasavubu, there came in quick succession the mutiny of the Force Publique, attended by acts of violence against Belgians; the intervention of Belgian forces; the secession of the Katanga Province, led by Moïse Tshombe; and that of Kasai, led by Albert Kalonji.

Lumumba first asked for US assistance, and when this was not forthcoming, turned to the UN. The Security Council authorized the SG to provide the Congo Government with military assistance as required. By the end of July, a UN Force, consisting of contingents from several countries, principally African, was established in the Congo.

The UAR ultimately became more involved in Congolese affairs than any other Middle East country. It was in sympathy with the Congolese nationalist movement from its inception, and from the beginning of the troubles in mid-July, identified itself increasingly with the cause of Lumumba. Its Press and radio attacked Belgium for its "imperialist intervention"; it supported the UN action in the Congo; it refused recognition to Tshombe; and it called upon Congolese leaders to preserve the unity of their country.

It was not until six weeks after the country became independent, however, that the UAR opened its embassy in Leopoldville. Several days later, in the second half of Aug, a UAR parachute battalion arrived to form part of the UN Force. During Aug several messages were exchanged between Lumumba and Abdel-Nasser about the situation in Congo, thus initiating a contact that grew closer in subsequent months.

During Aug divergences arose between Lumumba and the UN SG over the employment of the UN Force. The SG remained opposed to Lumumba's demand that the Force be employed to establish the Central Government's authority over Katanga. Lumumba then turned to the USSR, which provided him with 20 transport aircraft, complete with crews, for the movement of his forces. It was also alleged that Soviet arms were arriving for Lumumba's supporters during the month with the connivance of the UAR. Later in Aug, a conference of African Foreign Ministers was held at Leopoldville, at Lumumba's initiative. While supporting the Congo's independence and integrity, it failed to back Lumumba against the UN SG, and supported the UN action in Congo.

On 4 Sept, the final split took place between Lumumba and Kasavubu, when the two dismissed each other from office. To preserve order, the UN Force took over the Congo airfields and the Leopoldville radio station. On 12 Sept, a UAR contingent, in charge of the Leopoldville airfield, allowed Lumumba's forces to occupy it, disobeying the order of the UN Command to oppose them. This incident led, on the same day, to a UAR announcement that it was withdrawing its contingent from the UN Force on the ground that the UN had acted beyond its authority. The withdrawal was delayed, however, at the request of the UN SG.

On 14 Sept a coup d'état was carried out by Colonel Mobutu, backed by Kasavubu. One of their first acts was to expel the Soviet and Czech embassies, and all Communist staff and advisors who had arrived at Lumumba's request. For the next month neither Mobutu



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nor Lumumba were ever in complete control of the situation, but Lumumba's power at Leopoldville gradually declined.

On 17-18 Sept, an Emergency Special Session of the UN took place, at which the main issue was the SG's policy in the Congo. The USSR criticized him severely, but was not supported by the Afro-Asian countries, which submitted a draft resolution authorizing the SG to continue, and establishing a Conciliation Commission for the Congo. The UAR, though critical of the SG and his policy in the Congo, supported this resolution, which was adopted by a considerable majority.

UAR criticism of the UN action in the Congo subsequently intensified, as shown in Abdel-Nasser's speech at the General Assembly, on 27 Sept, accusing imperialism of exploiting the UN "in order to realize its hidden designs and aims."

In Oct, Lumumba, deprived of his power, was confined to his residence in Leopoldville under the simultaneous guard of Mobutu's troops and the UN Force. The UAR and Ghana embassies maintained regular contact between him and his supporters, and gave him advice on how to regain power. At his request, three of his children were smuggled to Cairo, with the help of the UAR embassy.

In the meantime, Antoine Gizenga, Lumumba's Deputy Prime Minister, escaped to Stanleyville, capital of the Orientale Province, the stronghold of Lumumba's supporters. He established himself at the head of a pro-Lumumba administration.

On 22 Nov, the Ghanaian Chargé d'Affaires and his assistants were expelled from the Congo. On 23 Nov the UN General Assembly resolved to recognize President Kasavubu's delegation as representing Congo, denying recognition to a rival delegation of Lumumba's supporters. The Communist countries, the UAR, India, Yugoslavia, Ghana, Guinea and several other Afro-Asian countries voted against the resolution.

On 28 Nov Lumumba escaped from Leopoldville, reportedly with the help of the UAR embassy, in an attempt to reach Stanleyville. He was captured five days later and never regained his freedom.

On 1 Dec Kasavubu demanded that the entire UAR embassy staff should leave the Congo and not be replaced, accusing them of "supporting rebel elements to overthrow the established government." On 1 Dec the UAR, in retaliation, nationalized Belgian companies in Egypt and withdrew its representatives from the UN Conciliation Commission for the Congo.

Through the developments in the Congo, the UAR, Morocco, Ghana, Guinea, Yugoslavia and Ceylon—all of which had contingents in Congo and supported Lumumba—were brought closer together. On 6 Dec the UAR,

Ceylon, and Yugoslavia announced the withdrawal of their contingents from the UN Force, and Morocco joined them a few days later. The UAR accused the UN of acting beyond its authority in the Congo and serving the ends of imperialism. Its policy now came closer to identifying itself with that of the USSR, which had been critical of the UN's action in Congo almost from the start. Both the USSR and the UAR now collaborated in supporting the Stanleyville administration.

Meantime, Gizenga had proclaimed his government in Stanleyville as the legitimate Central Government, and his contacts with the UAR and the USSR developed during Dec. Several envoys from Stanleyville arrived in Cairo, as well as urgent demands for arms and troops. At the end of Dec, the Stanleyville Government opened a Congo office in Cairo.

Gizenga's government could be supplied only through Sudanese territory or airspace, but Sudan continued to support the UN in Congo and did not withdraw from the UN Force the contingent it had sent in Aug. The Sudanese Government therefore came under pressure from the USSR, the UAR and other countries to permit the passage of supplies to Stanleyville, but withstood the pressure and refused.

The French-speaking African states (except for Guinea and Mali) did not support Lumumba. In mid-Dec they held a conference at Brazzaville on the Congo problem, attended by representatives of several Congolese political groups. The conference expressed its support for the UN and the SG, and called for the holding of a round-table conference of representatives of all Congo parties.

The UAR had originally envisaged the extension of technical aid to Congo, but little was realized of its numerous projects, apart from the dispatch of a medical team in Aug.

Except for the UAR and Sudan, other Middle East countries were hardly involved in Congolese affairs. At first they all supported the UN action. Later, Iraq became critical of the UN along lines very similar to those of the UAR; criticism in other Arab countries was more subdued. Turkey, Iran and Israel supported the UN throughout.

Israel had established contacts with the Congo several months before independence, when several Congolese leaders visited Israel. On the achievement of independence, Israel offered the Congo 100 scholarships and opened an embassy at Leopoldville.

An Israeli medical team was the first to arrive in the Congo in July in response to the request of the International Red Cross. During the rest of the year, no further events of significance took place in Israel's relations with the Congo.

## THE UAR AND THE CONGO

### 1959-1960: BEFORE CONGOLESE INDEPENDENCE

**1959: Support of Nationalist Movement.** The UAR attitude towards the Congo nationalist movement was in line with its general support of African nationalist movements and its anti-imperialist policy. When nationalist disturbances broke out, in Jan 1959, the UAR Press and radio attacked Belgian colonial rule and demanded im-

mediate independence for the Congo. (*Akhbar*, 9, 31 Jan 1959; *Sha'ab, Gumhuriyah* 9 Jan) They renewed the attack when fresh disturbances broke out in Oct 1959, and accused the Belgians of atrocities against the Congo population. (*Gumhuriyah*, 16, 24 Oct, 2 Nov 1959; *Ahram*, 1 Nov 1959)

**June 1960: Support of Congolese Unity.** During the elections to the Congo Parliament, in May 1960, and the

subsequent negotiations for the establishment of a government, the UAR Press and radio urged the leaders to maintain the country's unity, and acclaimed Patrice Lumumba as the "leader of the national liberation parties in the Congo." They warned against imperialist-secessionist parties in the Congo which, with the advice and aid of the imperialists—especially Britain and Rhodesia—were trying to destroy the Congo's unity. British troop movements along the Congo-Rhodesian borders "unmask the direction of the plan." (*R. Cairo in English to W. Africa*, 8 June-BBC, 10 June; *R. Cairo*, 17 June-BBC, 20 June) Reporting on Central African Federation troop concentrations on the Congo border, the "Voice of Free Africa" from Cairo said that the "imperialists" in Katanga Province had induced a few "stooges" to make statements about joining Rhodesia. "Those who associated with imperialism were either mad or stooges." (*Voice of Free Africa*, 19 June-BBC, 21 June)

**June: UAR Recognition.** On 26 June, the UAR announced its recognition of the Congo Government and requested its agreement for the opening of an embassy in Leopoldville. (*Ahram*, 26, 27 June)

Nagīb as-Sadr, the UAR Ambassador in Guinea, represented the UAR at the Congo's independence celebrations on 30 June. He met Lumumba, who told him that "he awaited the day when the two countries would exchange diplomatic missions." (*Ahram*, 6 July) On his return to Cairo, as-Sadr said that he was the first diplomat who had been invited by Lumumba to his private residence. (*Ahram*, 9 July)

**Aug-Sept: Opening of Embassy Delayed.** Six weeks passed, however, before the UAR opened its embassy in Leopoldville. The first officials of the projected embassy left Cairo on 12 Aug. These were a Chargé d'Affaires, Ra'uf Fahmi, and two secretaries. (*Ahram*, 13 Aug) Dr Murād Ghālib, who had been Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, was appointed Ambassador and left to take up his post on 12 Sept. (*R. Cairo*, 12 Sept-BBC, 14 Sept)

#### JULY-AUG: UAR AND BELGIAN INTERVENTION

**July: First Reaction to Belgian Intervention.** On the arrival of reports of the intervention of Belgian troops in the Congo, the UAR Government immediately cabled encouragement to Lumumba, assuring him of full support "in the struggle against imperialist plots." The Foreign Affairs Committee of the National Union cabled Lumumba in similar terms. (*Ahram*, 13 July)

**July: Abdel-Nasser on UAR's Position.** In the course of an address to the National Union Congress on 16 July, the UAR President said: "There has been a rabid campaign of lies, . . . expressing the views of imperialism and Zionism, trying to make us believe that independent African countries cannot bear their responsibilities. They want world public opinion to feel the existence of an aggression against the whites in Congo . . . Free world public opinion discovered this plot and rushed to the aid and support of the Congo in the belief that it was supporting the cause of freedom and justice . . . We support the cause of freedom in the Congo, because we consider it a cause bearing relation to us . . . As an Afro-Asian state, we declare that we are ready to help the newly independent Republic of the Congo with all our strength and capacity. We are ready to help the Congo Republic keep its independence. If the Congolese Government re-

quests us to supply it with arms, we shall supply it with arms. . ." (BBC, 19 July)

Similar statements appeared in the UAR Press and radio. (*Ahram*, 15 July; *R. Cairo in Swahili*, 20 July-BBC, 22 July)

**July-Aug: Demonstrations in Cairo.** Anti-Belgian and pro-Lumumba demonstrations and meetings were held in Cairo.

On 16 July a meeting was held at the Liaison Office with Muslim countries, attended by representatives of "72 Muslim nations." A resolution was adopted to cable congratulations to Abdel-Nasser on his attitude to the Congo question. (*Ahram*, 19 July) On 1 Aug, Congo Day was celebrated in Cairo. It was organized by the National Union and the African League, with the participation of African exiles living in Cairo. (*Ahram*, 2 Aug; *Anwar*, 3 Aug)

On 2 Aug a large demonstration was organized in Cairo by the National Union and the Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Conference. Among those who spoke against the intervention of Belgian imperialism in the Congo were Yūsuf as-Sibā'i, SG of the AAPSC (an Egyptian); Osendi Afana, the Cameroun's representative on the AAPSC, and Abd el-Ghafar Rachaiyeff, the USSR representative. (*Anwar*, 3 Aug) A delegation of the demonstrators unsuccessfully tried to enter the Belgian embassy to present a protest against "the imperialist designs of Belgium in the Congo." (*Ahram*, 3 Aug)

#### JULY-AUG: UAR AND KATANGA'S SECESSION

**July-Aug: Tshombe Attacked.** On 11 July, immediately after Tshombe had announced the secession of Katanga, the UAR Press and radio denounced him as "a traitor, an idiot and an instrument of white imperialism."

The Congolese nation was called upon to eliminate Tshombe, "the hireling of imperialism." (*Akhbar*, 20 July; *Gumhuriya*, 9 Aug; *R. Cairo*, 15 July-BBC, 18 July)

On 9 Aug President Abdel-Nasser received a cable from Tshombe, requesting recognition of the independence of Katanga. He cabled his reply on 11 Aug, stating that the UAR supported the establishment of one state for the Congo Republic; that the splitting up of the Congo would only benefit imperialism; that personal disputes could be solved without endangering the integrity of the Congo; "persons pass, but the Congo Republic must remain solidly united"; there was still time "to close the ranks and save the innocent Congolese people from the devastation of civil war and bloodshed." (*R. Cairo*, 11 Aug-BBC, 13 Aug; *Ahram*, 12 Aug)

On the same day, two UAR journalists were expelled from Katanga by order of Munungo, the province's Minister of the Interior. (*R. Brussels*, 11 Aug-BBC, 13 Aug)

**July-Aug: Other Western Countries Also Attacked.** The secession of Katanga was followed by an intensification of UAR Press and radio attacks against Belgium and other Western countries:

"The armed intervention was carefully prepared by the Belgians with the assistance of the British, French, Portuguese and American imperialists, who supplied the Belgians with NATO arms." (*R. Cairo in Swahili*, 15 July-BBC, 19 July)

"The British and the Belgians supported Tshombe so that they could exploit the wealth of Katanga. They even conspired to murder Lumumba and Kasavubu." (*Ibid*, 21 July-BBC, 23 July)

The "Voice of Free Africa" [broadcasting from Cairo]

went further: "The Italians, French, Jews, and British want Congo partition so that the imperialists may exploit this great African country... As to the Jews, they are wicked people, turning from one side to another... The Italians are also known as Europeans undeserving of a higher standard of living. They are bastards and thieves and absolutely filthy... The French imperialists... are quite worthless, capable of selling their colleagues for money. Thus we have French imperialists, Italians and Jews opposing the rights of the government of the Congo people and supporting the illegitimate government of Katanga." (*Voice of Free Africa*, 10 Aug-BBC, 12 Aug)

#### AUG: UAR BATTALION JOINS UN FORCE IN CONGO

**July: UN Asks UAR for Assistance.** The UAR welcomed the Security Council Resolution of 13 July, which authorized the Secretary General to provide the Congo Government with military assistance.

Following the resolution, the UN SG requested Abdel-Nasser to send assistance to the Congo. He replied that "the UAR was prepared to render any help which would enable the UN to fulfil its role in the Congo. The UAR was prepared to put at the disposal of the SG any aid required by him." (*Ahram*, 16 July)

**Aug: Decision to Send Troops.** [While other countries sent military contingents to Congo in July, the UAR appeared to delay its decision.]

On 9 Aug, the Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Murād Ghālīb (later appointed Ambassador to the Congo), announced that the UAR was ready to send a military unit "to assist in the implementation of the Security Council resolution on the withdrawal of Belgian forces from Katanga." (*Times*, 10 Aug)

On 14 Aug Field-Marshal Amer published an order for a UAR parachute battalion to be sent to the Congo. Colonel Sa'ad ad-Dīn ash-Shādhili, an Egyptian, was appointed to command the battalion, which consisted of 350 Egyptian soldiers and 150 Syrians (later Press figures gave its establishment as 550), all speaking either French or English. (*Ahram*, 15 Aug; *Times*, 16 Aug)

**Aug: Battalion Delayed.** The battalion was scheduled to leave Cairo for the Congo on 16 Aug, but did not leave on that day, for what Cairo officials described as "certain reasons." According to *The Times* correspondent in Cairo, this led to some speculation that the delay "might perhaps be due to a decision to avoid the risk of UAR troops being caught up in any complications that might arise if Mr Lumumba suddenly renounced UN assistance and tried to give his own orders to African troops in the Congo." (*Times*, 22 Aug)

**Aug: Battalion Leaves.** However, on 20 Aug the first party of the battalion left in US Air Force transports on loan to the UN. (*Times*, 22 Aug) The rest followed within a few days.

Officials in Cairo said the battalion would be stationed "for the time being" at Coquilhatville, capital of Equator Province. (*Times*, 22 Aug) According to the UAR Press and radio, UN personnel were full of praise for the bearing of the UAR troops, and described them as having attained a very high military standard. The journal of the Egyptian armed forces, described the battalion as "the strongest among the UN forces in Congo." (*R. Cairo*, 23 Aug-IMB, 24 Aug; *Al-Quwwat al-Musallahah*, 1 Sept)

#### JULY-AUG: CONTACTS BETWEEN ABDEL-NASSER AND LUMUMBA

**July: Lumumba's Return From USA.** When Lumumba visited the United States and Canada during the second half of July, the Egyptian weekly *Rūz al-Yūsuf* speculated that he would visit the UAR on his return. (*Ruz al-Yusuf*, 8 Aug) Lumumba left the USA on 2 Aug, and visited Tunis, Rabat, Guinea, Ghana and Togo before his return to Leopoldville on 8 Aug. He did not, however, pass through the UAR.

**Aug: Exchange of Messages.** In Aug, as Lumumba's relations with the UN SG grew more strained over the employment of UN troops in Katanga, he exchanged messages with the UAR President.

Shortly before his return to Congo, Lumumba sent Abdel-Nasser a cable informing him of the situation in the Congo. (*R. Cairo*, 7 Aug-IMB, 8 Aug) Lumumba was also reported as having agreed to visit the UAR before the end of the year. (*Ruz al-Yusuf*, 8 Aug) According to *al-Ahrām*, contact between Abdel-Nasser and Lumumba had grown closer and the two had exchanged cables discussing the Congo's problems. (*Ahram*, 7, 28 Aug)

The UAR Deputy Foreign Minister, who arrived at Leopoldville for the African Foreign Ministers' Conference, handed Lumumba a letter from Abdel-Nasser on 23 Aug. According to Reuters, this was "Abdel-Nasser's third message to Lumumba." (*R. Cairo in Hebrew*, 22 Aug-IMB 22, 23 Aug; *Reuters*, Cairo, 24 Aug) A UAR mission which arrived in Leopoldville on 24 Aug brought Abdel-Nasser's proposals on the Congo situation, to all of which Lumumba agreed. (*Ahram*, 25 Aug)

**Lumumba on his Relations with UAR.** According to an *al-Gumhuriyah* correspondent, Lumumba said that he was fully confident that President Abdel-Nasser would send his army to the Congo to liberate Katanga if he asked for his aid. Lumumba also stated that Abdel-Nasser had sent him Tshombe's letter to the UAR President and the latter's reply. He expressed his closeness to the UAR, declaring that he preferred UAR experts to any others and that he was certain he would receive from Abdel-Nasser any aid he might request. (*Gumhuriyah*, 21 Aug; *R. Cairo*, 21 Aug-IMB, 21 Aug)

**Aug: USSR-UAR Supply Arms.** According to a report in two German newspapers, the UAR cooperated with the USSR during this period in supplying arms to Lumumba. Soviet aircraft, destined for the Congo, were checked in Aug at Athens Airport and found to contain food and medical supplies. On arrival at Cairo Airport, this freight was exchanged for arms of Soviet manufacture. Two Greek nationals employed at the airport had observed and photographed this transaction and were subsequently arrested by the UAR authorities. In Dec 1960 trial was still pending. (*Stuttgarter Zeitung*, 12 Dec; *Der Spiegel*, 21 Dec)

#### SEPT: UAR CONTINGENT REFUSES UN ORDER

**Sept: Support of Lumumba.** [On 4 Sept the final split took place between Lumumba and Kasavubu, the two having dismissed each other from office. The UAR gave its unqualified support to Lumumba on the grounds that he was the legitimate Prime Minister, that he had won the confidence of the Parliament, and that only Parliament—not the President—could dismiss him. (*Ahram*, 13 Sept; *Akhbar*, 25 Sept—see below)]



**Sept: UAR Contingent Refuses UN Orders.** [The UN Force took over the Leopoldville airfields and radio station, control of which would have given either party in the Congo a considerable advantage. A Ghanaian unit prevented Lumumba entering the radio station.] Meantime a UAR unit was guarding the Leopoldville airfield.

The commander of the UAR contingent instructed his troops not to obey the order of the UN Command to open fire on Congolese soldiers. They cheered Lumumba's forces when they arrived at the airfield and allowed them to occupy it. (*Ahram*, 13 Sept; *Ruz al-Yusuf*, 3 Oct)

**Sept: UAR Statement.** A statement explaining the UAR's attitude was issued on 12 Sept by Abd al-Qādir Hātim, Deputy Minister for Presidential Affairs. He said that the UN forces were in Congo at the Congo Government's request. Their duty was to ensure the evacuation of the Belgians and to assist Congo in the preservation of its independence, but the UN forces had acted outside this role. The UAR regarded the UN Command's order as a clear infringement of the Congo's sovereignty.

"The Liaison Officer of the UAR contingent in Congo has informed General Von Horn, the Commander of the UN forces, that the UAR contingent will not open fire on Congolese forces. He demanded that the contingent be withdrawn from the Leopoldville airfield, but General Von Horn refused," Hātim said. The UN action constituted a serious danger to Congo's independence and unity, the statement continued. It enabled imperialist countries to carry out their design to split up the Congo and put an end to its independence.

"The occupation of the radio station, its closure and the prevention of the Congo Government from using it, only create an opportunity for the forces of imperialism to incite civil war and spread lies by means of their broadcasting stations," it said. (*R. Cairo*, 12 Sept-*IMB*, 13 Sept; *Ahram*, 13 Sept)

**Sept: Contingent Withdrawn from UN Command.** "The UAR regards the Congo Government as the only authority possessing the right to control its country. It has therefore decided to withdraw its contingent in Congo from the UN Command." (*Ahram*, 13 Sept)

A "responsible source in Cairo" added, that "the UAR would withdraw its contingent from Congo if the Congo Government would so demand." (*R. Cairo*, 12 Sept-*IMB*, 13 Sept)

**Sept: Contingent Remains in Congo.** The UAR contingent nevertheless remained in Congo. It was subsequently explained that the UAR had agreed to the UN SG's request to postpone the withdrawal. (*Akhbar*, 20 Sept; *Hayat*, 21 Sept)

**Sept: UAR Statement at UN.** [At the emergency session of the UN General Assembly the UAR delegate said he hoped that further misunderstandings between the UN and the Congo Government would be avoided, and expressed confidence in the SG. (For this and the UAR's attitude at the Assembly General Debate on the Congo, see pp 37-8.)]

#### SEPT-NOV: UAR MOBILIZES SUPPORT FOR LUMUMBA

[During the period Sept-Nov, as Lumumba's position in Leopoldville declined, he came to rely increasingly upon the aid and advice of Ghana and subsequently of the UAR. Both countries attempted to mobilize world support for him, and the latter supplied his supporters in

Stanleyville with material aid. The UAR also joined in the USSR's campaign for Lumumba's reinstatement and against the West, and its attacks on the UN grew more severe.]

**Sept-Nov: Mobutu and Kasavubu Attacked.** When Mobutu seized power in Sept, the UAR Press and radio began attacking him and President Kasavubu, accusing them of dividing the Congolese nation and bringing back the Belgians. Imperialism was blamed; it was maintained that Mobutu had obeyed Belgian orders and had received five million Belgian francs in return. There were many allegations of cruelty and disorderly conduct against Mobutu's soldiers. (*R. Cairo*, 15 Sept-*IMB*, 16 Sept; *Ahram*, 24, 29 Oct, 6, 8, 24 Nov; *Ruz al-Yusuf*, 28 Nov)

According to Cairo Radio, "among Africans there are a few who work for the colonialists: these are the stooges, people like Tshombe, Kasavubu, Kalonji and Mobutu, who are the enemies of freedom, of unity and of Africa... Mr Patrice Lumumba and his people, who fought for and won complete freedom after much difficulty and bloodshed, should follow the Algerian example." (*R. Cairo in Swahili*, 28 Nov-BBC, 30 Nov)

**Oct-Nov: UAR Embassy Maintains Contact with Lumumba.** When Lumumba was confined to his residence, contact was maintained between him and the UAR embassy, the UAR Ambassador and his staff visiting him regularly. (*Ahram*, 12 Oct)

Other sources maintained that the Ambassador acted as an advisor to Lumumba, and that the Egyptians were active in the Orientale Province and distributed propaganda material calling for his return to power. (*R. Usumbura in French*, 4 Nov-BBC, 7 Nov) Albert Kalonji, leader of the seceding Kasai Province, accused the UAR embassy of paying members of the Congo Parliament to vote for Lumumba. (*Reuters*, Leopoldville, 15 Nov)

**Oct-Dec: Lumumba's Children Sent to Cairo.** On 31 Oct three of Lumumba's children arrived in Cairo. According to the UAR Press, Lumumba had asked Abdel-Nasser through the UAR Ambassador in Congo, to look after their studies. Before their departure, Lumumba told his children that "Abdel-Nasser was their father." UAR periodicals described in detail how the Ambassador, Dr Murād Ghālib, and the Counsellor, Dr Abd al-Azīz Is-hak, had used stratagems to spirit the children away. (*Ahram*, 24 Oct, 1, 3, 26 Nov; *Musawwar*, 11 Nov; *Akhbar Sa'ah*, 21 Dec)

**Nov: UAR Opposes Kasavubu Delegation to UN.** On 18 Nov, the UAR voted against UN General Assembly resolution confirming Kasavubu's delegation as representing the Congo Republic. (See also p 38.)

**Oct-Nov: Reported UAR's Support for Gizenga.** [In Oct, Lumumba's Deputy PM, Antoine Gizenga, established an administration of Lumumba's supporters in Stanleyville.] The Leopoldville correspondent of *La Libre Belgique*, writing in Dec on the expulsion of the UAR Ambassador, Ghālib (see below), said that, according to a Congolese Security Service report to the Congo Government, Ghālib had suggested to Lumumba that Stanleyville, and later the other provinces, should be occupied. Lumumba's escape [he fled towards Stanleyville] had been carried out with UAR assistance.

Gizenga had been in contact with Ghālib, the correspondent said, and had asked him for arms and in-

structors in order to establish a national liberation army. He had also invited him to come to Stanleyville in order to study the situation there. Ghālib had replied that he could not come, but would send one of his assistants instead. The UAR had offered Gizenga financial aid, and its Ambassador had pressed the Sudan to allow UAR supplies to be transported to Stanleyville through its airspace. Ghālib had also informed Lumumba that before the UAR contingent left the Congo, it would transfer its arms to his supporters. Lumumba, for his part, had asked the UAR for 300 million Congolese francs, to enable him to consolidate his position at Stanleyville and later occupy the rest of Congo. (*La Libre Belgique, Brussels, 8 Dec*). The UAR also invited Lumumba's followers to establish a united "national front" of all anti-imperialists. (*Monde, 2 Dec*, quoting the *Leopoldville Courrier de l'Afrique*)

**Nov: AAPSC Supports Lumumba.** Lumumba was invited to the session of the Executive Committee of the Afro-Asian Peoples' Conference, which was due to be held in Beirut, in Nov. [The SG of the AAPSC is an Egyptian.] As he was unable to come, it was decided that two of his supporters would represent him. (*Ahram, 5 Nov*)

On 11 Nov, Mobutu's troops surrounded the UAR embassy in search of the two delegates, who had been seen at the airfield in the company of UAR officials, and had fled on the arrival of the troops. (*Ahram, 11 Nov*) In the end, Congo was not represented at the Committee's session.

When the Committee met, the SG, Yūsuf as-Sibā'i, announced that the Secretariat intended to send delegates to various countries to obtain support and help for "Lumumba's legitimate government." (*Ahram, 27 Nov*)

**Nov: Sudan Meetings.** When Abdel-Nasser visited the Sudan in Nov, he met a delegation of three Lumumba supporters from Stanleyville, as well as Colonel ash-Shād-hili, commander of the UAR contingent in the UN Congo Force. The problem of aid to the Congo was one of the subjects discussed in Abdel-Nasser's talks with General Abbud. (*Hayat, 22 Nov; Ahram, 24 Nov*)

**Sept-Nov: UN Attacked.** After Mobutu's coup, the UAR Press and radio campaign against the UN SG and the UN Command in Congo was renewed. They were accused of failing to carry out the resolutions which required, in the UAR's view, support for "Lumumba's legitimate government" and the eviction of the Belgians from the Congo. (*Gumhuriya, 16 Sept, 7 Nov; Ahram, 29 Oct; MENA, 7 Nov-BBC, 9 Nov*)

The attacks against the UN continued after the General Assembly had admitted Kasavubu's delegation. Cairo Radio described the UN as impotent and as "colonialism in disguise." (*R. Cairo-BBC, 25, 28, 29 Nov*)

**Sept-Nov: The West Attacked.** The West generally and Belgium, Britain, France and USA in particular, came under attack for their support of Mobutu:

"The Belgian dogs are returning to seize power. They are creating disorder, and by their evil methods are causing Africans to kill each other... The French, British and Belgian dogs are supporting this manoeuvre for the restoration of Belgian rule in the Congo." (*Voice of Free Africa, 31 Oct-BBC, 4 Nov; R. Cairo in Swahili, 8 Sept-BBC, 10 Sept*)

It was stated that the Belgians and the Americans had supplied Mobutu's forces with arms and ammunition, that "the imperialist West" had counselled Mobutu to

close down the Congolese Senate and Parliament, that the Americans had persuaded Kasavubu and Mobutu to boycott the UN Conciliation Commission, and that Mobutu received his orders from the French, British and American military attachés. (*Ahram 6, 20 Nov, 1 Dec*)

**Cooperation with Afro-Asian Countries.** In its policy of restoring Lumumba to power, the UAR cooperated mainly with Ghana and Guinea. (*Economist, 5 Nov*) When the Ghanaian embassy in the Congo was closed down, the UAR announced that it would look after Ghana's interests. (*Ahram, 24 Nov*) The UAR Ambassador also met the UN SG's Special Representative in the Congo and warned him that the expulsion of the Ghanaian embassy staff might create a serious situation. He laid the responsibility for this action upon the UN, and demanded that Mobutu's forces be curbed. (*Ahram, 1 Dec*)

The UAR also consulted with New Delhi, Khartoum, Rabat and Addis Ababa about the Congo problem. (*Ahram, 20, 30 Nov*)

**Sept-Nov: Cooperation with the USSR.** In its pro-Lumumba propaganda, the UAR was supported by all the countries of the Soviet bloc, which followed the same line. (*Economist, 5 Nov*) (See also pp 33, 82.) Consultations on the Congo problem took place in Cairo, between the Minister for Presidential Affairs, Ali Sabri, and the Soviet Ambassador. (*R. Cairo, 13 Nov-IMB, 13 Nov*) In its broadcasts to Africans, the UAR emphasized that the Soviet Union and China were supporting them:

"This is the time to teach these pigs a proper lesson. We have friends to give us arms, money, morale, everything. China is now doing all it can and so is Russia." (*Voice of Free Africa, 2 Nov-BBC, 4 Nov*)

#### DEC: EXPULSION OF UAR EMBASSY FROM CONGO

**Kasavubu Asks for Recall of UAR Embassy Staff.** On 1 Dec President Kasavubu informed President Abdel-Nasser, in a letter, that he had come to the conclusion that certain diplomats were acting as if they were in conquered territory and were supporting rebel elements to overthrow the established authority. Certain representatives of the UAR too had been guilty of this type of misbehaviour. (*R. Brussels, 1 Dec-BBC, 3 Dec*)

Kasavubu added: "In the interest of future relations between our two countries I ask you for the immediate recall of Ghālib and all his collaborators, whom I declare this day *persona non grata* in the territory of the Republic. I would be grateful, besides, if for the moment you would not proceed to replace them." (*Ahram, 2 Dec; NYT, 3 Dec*)

**UAR Diplomatic Reaction.** Replying to these accusations, Ghālib, the Ambassador, declared to the Press, in Leopoldville, that he had never intervened in the country's internal affairs, and that his mission had been inspired by the principles of African solidarity. (*Monde, 3 Dec*)

The UAR Foreign Ministry instructed all the embassy staff in Congo to fly back to Cairo immediately. (*Ahram, 2 Dec*) The Ambassador left Leopoldville on 4 Dec. (*Reuters, Leopoldville, 4 Dec*)

**Dec: Ghālib on Congo Situation.** When Ambassador Ghālib returned to Cairo, he said that UN policy was mistaken, attacked Mobutu, and described his army as a rabble of thieves and brigands. It was Mobutu who

had ordered the Congolese Army to rape white women, he declared. He was "a legend like Syngman Rhee and Menderes, who were created by imperialism to achieve its objectives. Mobutu's fate will be similar to theirs." (*Akhbar Sa'ah*, 14 Dec; *R. Cairo*, 11 Dec-BBC, 13 Dec)

**Dec: Mobutu Threatens to Block Nile.** Reacting to the UAR's support of Lumumba's followers at Stanleyville, Colonel Mobutu announced on 5 Dec that he was prepared to block two important tributaries of the Nile if Egypt and Sudan supplied aid to a separate regime in Stanleyville. (*Times*, 6 Dec)

[Congo's contribution to the Nile consists only of some minor tributaries.] UAR sources belittled Mobutu's threat because of the tremendous technical and financial difficulties involved in such an undertaking. (*Ahram*; *Monde*, 6 Dec; *Hayat*, 7 Dec)

#### DEC: UAR NATIONALIZES BELGIAN COMPANIES

**Dec: Nationalization Decrees:** On 1 Dec, President Abdel-Nasser published decrees nationalizing Belgian enterprises in Egypt, including the Electric Railways Company (Heliopolis), the Banque Belge et Internationale en Egypte, the Compagnie d'Electricité du Caire and the Service des Tramways du Caire. (See also p 464.)

This decision, according to *Le Monde*, did not surprise the companies involved. Since the Suez affair, all great industrial and financial enterprises had been aware that their activities in the UAR were temporary, as the UAR Government never hid its intention to eliminate foreign capital. The Belgian companies involved had been warned a few months earlier that their concession would not be renewed and that they would have to become Egyptianized. (*Monde*, 3 Dec; Text of decrees, *Ahram*, 2 Dec)

**UAR Reasons for Nationalization.** In explaining this act, the UAR Press maintained that Belgium was the real cause of the expulsion of the Ambassador, and that Kasavubu and Mobutu were only puppets, "moving at Belgium's finger play." (*Ahram*, 4 Dec; *NYT*, 5 Dec) UAR sources said that Belgian initiative was proved by a Brussels Radio broadcast, three days before the expulsion, announcing "that a decision in this regard had been prepared in order that Kasavubu might sign it upon his arrival from the USA." *Al-Ahrām* also sought to explain the Ambassador's expulsion by the UAR's vote in the UN against Kasavubu, and "Israel's behind-the-curtain activities." (*Ahram*, 2 Dec)

**Dec: Belgian Protest Rejected.** The Belgian Ambassador in Cairo was instructed on 2 Dec by the Belgian Government to lodge a strong protest. If no satisfaction was obtained, the Belgian Government would submit the matter to the international authorities. According to *The Times* correspondent in Brussels "Belgium is not responsible for what happens in Leopoldville and has no diplomatic relations with the Congo Republic." (*Times*, 3 Dec)

On 6 Dec, Hussein Dhu-al-Fiqār Sabri, Dep. Foreign Minister of the UAR, rejected an oral protest against nationalization of Belgian assets, delivered by the Belgian Ambassador, which he had been trying for three days to deliver.

Sabri terminated the meeting after seven minutes. Officials described it as "tense"; according to one account Sabri told the Ambassador that he would never have received him if he had known the purpose of the meeting. (*Times*, 6 Dec) The UAR also denied Belgium's

right to summon the UAR before the International Court of Justice at The Hague on this matter. (*R. Cairo*, 6 Dec-*IMB*, 6 Dec)

[On 5 Dec Ghana broke off diplomatic relations with Belgium.]

#### DEC: UAR SUPPORTS STANLEYVILLE GOVERNMENT

**Dec: Support For Lumumba Emphasized.** Lumumba's capture, after he had escaped from house arrest, was received with regret by the UAR Press, which declared that it was not the end of the struggle in Congo, but only the beginning. (*Akhbar al-Yawm*, 3 Dec; *Akhbar*, 4 Dec)

Haykal, the editor of *al-Ahrām*, wrote in a leading article that Lumumba had been tortured and humiliated by Mobutu's troops. This must not go without an answer, otherwise imperialism would be strengthened. (*Ahram*, 7 Dec)

**Dec: Lumumba's Envoy in Cairo.** On 5 Dec Antoine Oasi, President of the MNC branch at Stanleyville, arrived in Cairo as an envoy of Lumumba, to meet Abdel-Nasser and hand him a personal message from Lumumba. He had left Congo before Lumumba's capture to establish contact with the African countries and request aid for the continuation of the struggle, since he stated, he needed arms to fight Mobutu's soldiers. (*Ahram*, 6 Dec) Oasi broadcast over Cairo Radio and attacked the Kasavubu-Mobutu regime. (*R. Cairo in Swahili*, 9 Dec-BBC, 12 Dec) (Oasi's visit to Sudan—see p 35.)

**Cuban Parallel.** A Cairo Radio commentary remarked that "the Orientale Province movement was a movement to liberate the Congo, reminiscent of Fidel Castro's revolution." (*R. Cairo*, 11 Dec-BBC, 13 Dec)

**Dec: Stanleyville Requests Assistance.** On 14 Dec Abdel-Nasser received three cables from Gizenga's government in Stanleyville.

The first, from Gizenga himself, urgently requested foodstuffs and war materials, stating that the Stanleyville area was seriously endangered by Mobutu. It concluded: "Reply to Stanleyville within two days or we shall be arrested."

A cable from General Lundula, who commanded Gizenga's forces, requested "the despatch of arms and troops by air today."

The third cable informed the UAR Government of "the Congolese Government's decision to establish the headquarters of the Central Government in Stanleyville" and asked it "to take the necessary measures regarding the new situation." (*MENA*, 15 Dec-BBC, 16 Dec; *Ahram*, 15 Dec)

Later it was reported that the UAR authorities were discussing a request from the Stanleyville Government to put the UAR contingent in Congo at its disposal. (*Ruz al-Yusuf*, 26 Dec) [Note: the UAR contingent was repatriated to Egypt in Jan 1961.]

**Dec: Salumu in Cairo.** On 17 Dec, Bernard Salumu, formerly Secretary to Lumumba, and now District Commissioner of Stanleyville, arrived in Cairo, and immediately met Ali Sabri, Minister of Presidential Affairs. At a Press conference, he explained that he was going to visit several countries in order to obtain assistance. According to the Press, all cables addressed to him were being received through the UAR Foreign Ministry. (*R.*



Cairo, 18, 19, Dec—BBC, 20 Dec; *Ahram*, 20 Dec; *Ruz al-Yusuf*, 26 Dec)

Dec 1960–Jan 1961: Alleged Supply of Arms to Stanleyville. According to *The New York Times*, several members of the UN Conciliation Commission for Congo reported that consignments of arms from the Eastern Bloc and the UAR had arrived at Stanleyville. (NYT, 30 Dec)

*The New York Times* reported later that "the UAR, possibly with the aid of the Soviet Union, is now reported to be sending military supply by air to the Lumumba forces in the Eastern Province. This could become even more serious if the Sudanese Government yielded to alleged pressure from these two countries and permitted supply planes from Egypt to refuel in Khartoum. The exact nature of the reported airlift from the United Arab Republic has not been established. The Egyptians have a number of Soviet four-engine planes that could be used to drop arms in Stanleyville. To do this on any large scale, they would apparently have to refuel in Khartoum." (NYT, 18, 19 Jan 1961)

Dec: Congo Office in Cairo. On 31 Dec Field-Marshal Amer received Pierre Mulele, Minister of Education in the "Central Government of Congo" [Stanleyville]. (*Ahram*, 1 Jan 1961; *R. Cairo*, 31 Dec 1960–BBC, 3 Jan 1961)

Later, a *Daily Telegraph* reporter wrote from Cairo that Mulele had asked Amer for military and financial assistance. He also opened an office in Cairo, named the "Middle East Bureau of Congo," with a staff of six, which issued entry visas to Stanleyville. (*Ma'ariv*, 5 Jan 1961)

#### DEC: UAR CONTINGENT WITHDRAWN FROM CONGO

Following the expulsion of the UAR Ambassador, UAR official spokesmen and the Press and radio intensified their attacks upon the UN SG and the UN Command in Congo. (*R. Cairo*, 1, 2 Dec–BBC, 2, 3 Dec; *Ahram*, 2 Dec)

On 6 Dec, the UAR, Ceylon and Yugoslavia announced their decision to withdraw their contingents from the UN force in Congo. The announcement was coupled with attacks in the Cairo Press on the UN SG and, in one case, on President Eisenhower. (*Ahram*; *Gumhuriyah*, 7 Dec; NYT, 8 Dec)

On the same day, the UAR also announced its withdrawal from the UN Conciliation Commission for the Congo on the ground that President Kasavubu had not yet fixed a date for a meeting with the Commission in the Congo, although it was to have taken place at the end of Nov. (*Ahram*; *Hayat*, 7 Dec)

Dec: UAR Statement on Withdrawal. On 8 Dec, the UAR Government published a statement explaining the reasons for the withdrawal of its contingent from the UN Force and of its representative from the UN Conciliation Commission: The UAR had supported the request of the legitimate Congo Government to the Security Council to come to its aid when its independence was in danger, the statement said. When the UN SG began to carry out the role assigned to him by the Security Council, the UAR had given him its fullest support, because it believed that his success would not only guarantee Congo's freedom, but would also open a new chapter in the struggle for the liberation of African nations.

The UN SG had—according to the statement—two

principal missions: first—the evacuation of the Belgian forces from the Congo, "the elimination of Belgian imperialism," the strengthening of the Congo's national independence and the rendering of assistance to the country; second—the safeguarding of the national unity of Congo against the attempt of imperialism to divide it into small parts, over which it could then easily establish its mastery. This was the basis on which the UAR had agreed to the participation of a UAR battalion in the UN Force.

The statement recounted the events leading to the decision of 12 Sept to withdraw the UAR contingent after the Leopoldville airfield incident. It explained that the UAR had subsequently agreed to the UN SG's request to delay the withdrawal "in order to enable the SG to attempt to ameliorate the situation."

The statement dwelt on "imperialist provocations" and "the torturing of Lumumba," and pointed out that all this had been carried out "while the UN flag flew over Congo."

In this situation, the UAR had arrived at the conclusion that it must withdraw from the Conciliation Commission, as there were no persons between whom to conciliate. Nor could the UAR in this situation continue to maintain its battalion in Congo under UN control.

Support for "UN Principles." The statement ended in expressing "the UAR's regret that the UN Command was under the influence of imperialist forces, to a degree that constituted a threat to the peace, for whose consolidation and preservation the UN had been created. This does not signify that the UAR abandons the cause of freedom and peace in the Congo. The UAR finds that it must participate with other countries which pursue freedom and peace in their efforts to ensure that the original principles of the UN should remain everlasting." (*Ahram*, 9 Dec)

Dec: Cairo Attacks "UN Betrayal." Press and radio attacks against the UN and the SG continued, along the lines mentioned above. (See BBC; IMB; UAR Press, Dec to end of year.)

The UN also came under attack from President Abdel-Nasser in his speech at Port Said, on 23 Dec. "The UN has become a stooge for the imperialists..." he said. "This is the imperialism which wants to destroy the nationalist government and make of Patrice Lumumba an example for all Africa, so that everyone in Africa should fear his fate due to his stand against imperialism... The UN in the Congo betrayed its principles on human rights, it betrayed and disavowed the UN itself. I hold the imperialist states and also the UN Secretariat responsible... If the UN Secretariat submits to imperialism, imperialism will become the driving power of the UN and the latter will then be on the way to its own downfall..." (BBC, 28 Dec)

Dec: USA Comes Under Attack. [Until Dec UAR Press and radio attacks were directed mainly against Belgium, Britain and France, while the USA was less frequently mentioned. After the expulsion of the UAR Ambassador from the Congo, attacks against the USA increased.] The UAR Press maintained that the American Ambassador in Congo was behind the moves of Kasavubu and Mobutu. (*Ruz al-Yusuf*, 5 Dec) "The British dogs and the American pigs" were blamed for the arrest of Lumumba. (*R. Cairo*, 6 Dec–BBC, 9 Dec)

Hassanein Haykal wrote that the USA had not come to the UN's assistance when Hammarskjöld had warned

of the danger of the Belgians' return. The USA had been the first to object to the SG's report on this matter and it had buried it so that the world would not hear the truth about the Congo. The UN had become a toy in the hands of the USA. (*Ahram*, 7 Dec)

*Al-Gumhuriyah* described a report that the USA intended to send troops to the Congo, as proof of its intention to incite a civil war in the Congo, which might spread into a world war. (*Gumhuriyah*, 13 Dec)

UAR broadcasts maintained that the USA was playing the main role in the imperialist plots against the Congo. (*R. Cairo*; *R. Damascus*, 13 Dec-*IMB*, 13 Dec)

**Dec: Incitement Against the West.** The Voice of Free Africa said: "The stooges in Congo are getting weapons from the Americans. These stooges under Mobutu plus the Americans and Belgians have destroyed Lumumba's government, because it refused to be under the colonialist dogs. The British, the French, the Americans and the Portuguese—we shall destroy them all and their laws." (*Voice of Free Africa*, 15 Dec-*BBC*, 17 Dec; for similar attacks see also *Voice of Free Africa*, 5 Dec-*BBC* 7 Dec; *Ruz al-Yusuf*, 12 Dec)

#### DEC: UAR APPROACHES TO AFRO-ASIAN STATES

[Following the expulsion of its Ambassador from the Congo, the UAR tried to persuade several Afro-Asian states to withdraw their contingents from the UN Force.]

**Dec: Consultations with Ghana.** Immediately after the expulsion of the UAR Ambassador from the Congo, the UAR Foreign Minister met the Ghanaian Ambassador in Cairo to discuss with him the situation in the Congo and the attitude of both countries. (*R. Cairo*, 1 Dec-*IMB*, 2 Dec)

**Dec: Messages to Afro-Asian Leaders.** Before the announcement of the withdrawal of the UAR contingent, Abdel-Nasser sent personal messages on the Congo to the leaders of Afro-Asian countries which had contingents in the UN force in Congo: Prime Minister Nehru of India, the Presidents of Ghana, Guinea, Indonesia and Sudan, the Emperor of Ethiopia and the Prime Minister of Mali. (*Ahram*, 5 Dec)

Subsequently the Foreign Minister approached the Ambassadors of Ghana and Guinea, in order to discuss the situation in Congo and decide upon a common policy. (*Ahram*, 6 Dec)

**Dec: Other Countries Withdraw Contingents.** On 10 Dec, Indonesia announced a decision to withdraw its contingent, and Morocco followed suit on 11 Dec. (*Ahram*, 11, 12 Dec) [For Nkrumah's plea to Ceylon and Sudan not to withdraw their contingents—see p 35.]

**Dec: Joint UAR-Indonesia Statement.** Presidents Abdel-Nasser and Sukarno consulted through their respective Ambassadors. A joint statement was published on 12 Dec, accusing Belgium of causing chaos in the Congo and dividing the country, and criticizing the UN for failing to unite the country under its legitimate government. The Asian and African countries were called upon to act in the UN for the restoration of the situation in the Congo to normal, so that the Central Government, headed by Lumumba, could fulfil its role. (*Ahram*, 13 Dec)

**Dec: Joint UAR-Ghana-Guinea Statement.** On 21 Dec, a joint statement was published simultaneously in Cairo, Accra and Conakry, in which the leaders of the UAR,

Ghana and Guinea demanded that the UN should free Lumumba and reinstate the legitimate government. (*Ahram*; *Monde*; *Hayat*, 23 Dec)

**Dec: Joint Abdel-Nasser-Abbud Statement.** On 25 Dec, at the end of discussions between President Abdel-Nasser and General Abbud in the Sudan, a joint statement was published condemning "imperialist attempts to partition the Congolese Republic." They appealed to the Congolese leaders "to mobilize their efforts in order that their country might overcome its present crisis, to thwart all means of imperialist infiltration, to end the penetration of foreign influence and to protect their country from the pitfalls of alignment and the winds of cold war." (*NYT*, 26 Dec)

**Dec: Contacts with Yugoslavia.** Abdel-Nasser maintained personal contact with Tito on the Congo problem. (*Ahram*, 12 Dec) The Yugoslav Deputy PM, Edward Kardelj, arrived in Cairo on 19 Dec and discussed the problem with the President. (*Ahram*, 20 Dec)

**Dec: African Supreme Command.** [In connection with the events in the Congo, Nkrumah proposed to nine other African countries the establishment of an African Supreme Command, which would function at the request of African countries requiring military assistance. The UAR agreed to the proposal, although with some reservations. (A decision on this matter was reached at the Casablanca Conference in Jan 1961.) (See p 25.)]

**Dec: "Quit Africa" Day.** On 10 Dec, Quit Africa Day was organized and celebrated in Cairo by the National Union and the AAPSC. A mass rally of "thousands of the sons of Asia and Africa" was presided over by Anwar as-Saadat, who attacked "the Western hypocrites," led by the USA, for their support of Kasavubu against Lumumba. Other speakers were Antoine Oasi, Lumumba's special envoy, and the USSR representative on the AAPSC.

Resolutions were passed demanding the return of Lumumba to power and the elimination of "Mobutu's gangs," condemning "American and Belgian imperialism" and supporting the USSR's moves to eliminate imperialism from Africa. (*Ahram*, 11 Dec)

**Mobilization of Public Opinion.** The Permanent Secretariat of the AAPSC called on its branches throughout the world to organize demonstrations in support of Lumumba. (*Ahram*, 17 Dec)

Shaykh al-Azhar, Mahmūd Shaltūt, appealed to "all humanity" on 16 Dec to stop "the corruption and plots of imperialism" in the Congo. (*Ahram*, 17 Dec)

Anwar as-Saadat, Chairman of the National Union, sent cables "to all parliaments in the world" explaining the UAR's stand on the Congo question and its reasons for supporting Lumumba. (*Ahram*, 19 Dec)

#### THE UAR AND THE COMMUNIST BLOC

Moscow Radio welcomed the nationalization of Belgian companies as an act of solidarity with the Congolese nation "against the plots of Belgian imperialism," which had taught all imperialists "a bitter lesson." (*Ahram*, 9 Dec)

The Minister for Presidential Affairs, Ali Sabri, met the Soviet Ambassador and discussed the Congo problem with him. (*Ahram*, 16 Dec)

During his visit to Moscow, Field Marshal Amer dis-

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cussed the problems of the Congo and Africa. (See pp 82-3.)

Bernard Salummu, one of the leaders of the Stanleyville Government, met the Soviet Ambassador in Cairo. (*Ahram*, 20 Dec)

(For UAR-Soviet cooperation in aiding Gizenga's government, see p 32.)

### JULY-DEC: UAR AID TO CONGO

**July: UAR Embassy's Role.** In July, *al-Ahrām* defined the principal role of the UAR embassy to be established in the Congo as one of providing political, economic, cultural and technical aid. (*Ahram*, 16 July) UAR broadcasts also said that the UAR was the only African country capable of supplying experts. (*R. Cairo*, 16 July-*IMB*, 17 July)

On 17 July, however, *al-Gumhuriyah* wrote: "The UAR did not offer the Congo scholarships or millions of dollars as some other countries have done. The UAR refused to have the system of bribery as the basis of its policy... No nationalist in Africa or Asia doubted that in times of stress the UAR would be at the top of the list of those rushing to help." (*Gumhuriyah*, 17 July)

**Aug-Oct: Projects to Send Experts.** During the months of Aug-Oct, various projects to send experts to Congo were mentioned in the UAR Press and radio. These

included: (1) a group of civilian pilots; (2) naval and flying experts; (3) technicians for the running of Congo's airfields; (4) a medical mission; (5) agricultural experts, agricultural engineers, veterinary surgeons and experts in soil improvement (all at the request of the Congo Government); (6) police experts; (7) three telephone experts; (8) eight administrative experts; (9) "ninety experts" in law, health and economics; (10) a financial expert, Dr Abd al-Galil al-Umari, to serve as Financial Advisor to the Congo Government. (*R. Cairo*, 9 Aug-*IMB*, 15 Aug; *Anwar*, 17 Aug; *Ahram*, 9, 26 Aug, 10 Sept, 23 Oct, 18 Nov; *Musawwar*, 9 Sept)

**July-Sept: Actual Aid.** [The fact that only a small part of these projects was implemented was probably due in some measure to the deterioration from Oct onwards in the UAR's relations with the UN and the Leopoldville Government.]

Actual UAR aid to Congo (apart from its assistance to Lumumba's supporters) consisted of:

Two UAR aircraft carrying medicines, which arrived in July, a few UAR civil aviation experts, who arrived in Aug, a UAR medical team, consisting of three doctors, several nurses and medical equipment, which arrived on 21 Aug. (*R. Cairo*, 28 July-*IMB*, 29 July; *R. Cairo*, 21 Aug-*IMB*, 22 Aug; *Ahram*, 11 Aug, 11, 17 Sept; *Anwar*, 12 Aug)

## OTHER ARAB COUNTRIES AND THE CONGO

### SUDAN'S ATTITUDE

[Sudan gave consistent support to the UN action in the Congo. It withstood UAR and USSR pressure in Dec to allow passage of supplies to Gizenga's Stanleyville Government.]

**July: Sudan Ready to Send Contingent to UN Force.** In mid-July, the Sudan Government informed the UN SG that it was prepared to send a military contingent to the Congo. Hammarskjöld replied that technical assistance would suffice for the time being. (*MENA*, 19 July-*BBC*, 21 July)

**Aug: Engineers Sent.** In Aug, Sudan sent several engineers and technicians to the Congo. (*R. London*, 7 Aug-*IMB*, 8 Aug)

**Aug: Abbud Proposes Conference.** Early in Aug, General Abbud sent a note to all Ambassadors of African states in Khartoum, calling for a conference of Foreign Ministers to discuss ways to settle the Congo crisis. (*R. Cairo*, 8 Aug-*IMB*, 8 Aug) [A conference of African Foreign Ministers was held later in the month in Leopoldville, at Lumumba's initiative.]

**Aug: Chargé d'Affaires Appointed.** Muhammad Ahmad Yāji was appointed Chargé d'Affaires at the Sudanese embassy and left for the Congo on 9 Aug. (*Sudan Daily*, 9 Aug)

**Aug: Contingent Sent.** On 11 Aug, General Abbud received a request from the UN SG for the despatch of a Sudanese contingent to the Congo. The contingent, consisting of one battalion, was flown from Khartoum on 16 Aug and the following days. (*Sudan Daily*, 12, 16, 17 Aug)

On 5 Sept it was reported that the UN had applied for more Sudanese forces. Major-General Muhammad Tal'at Farid, Minister of Information and Labour, commented that this was "a clear indication of the UN confidence in our forces, and appreciation of their ability, efficiency and discipline; qualities which won them admiration and respect." (*Sudan Daily*, 5 Sept)

[It appears, however, that Sudan did not send more troops to the Congo.]

In Sept, the day after the UAR announcement of the withdrawal of its contingent, the Sudanese Minister of Information announced that his country's contingent would remain under the orders of the UN Command. (*R. London*, 14 Sept-*IMB*, 15 Sept)

**Nov: Sudanese-Ethiopian Statement on Support of UN.** A joint statement published by the Emperor Haile Selassie and General Abbud at the end of the latter's visit to Ethiopia included a reference to their support of UN policy in the Congo. (*R. Cairo*, 5 Nov-*IMB*, 6 Nov)

**Dec: Reaction to Mobutu's Nile Threat.** In reaction to Mobutu's threat to block the Nile, (see p 31) the Sudanese Foreign Minister, Ahmad Khayr, stated: "I need not mention here that only a glance at the map of Africa will suffice to prove that Colonel Mobutu's threat is negligible. Large projects involving diversions of rivers require time, efforts and stability... One wonders, however, why our brothers in the Congo continue to use threatening words, at a time when they are most in need of sympathetic public opinion. It is disheartening to hear such words voiced against other African countries, especially those which are now making great efforts to preserve stability in the Congo." (*Sudan Daily*, 7 Dec)

**Dec: Abdel-Nasser—Abbud Talks on Congo.** See p 33.



**Dec: Nkrumah's Message.** On 13 Dec, following the decisions by the UAR, Yugoslavia and Ceylon to withdraw their contingents from the Congo, the President of Ghana cabled to General Abbud for his information a copy of a message sent to the Prime Minister of Ceylon appealing for reconsideration of the decision to withdraw the Ceylonese contingent. (*BBC, 16 Dec*)

**Dec: Stanleyville Envoy in Sudan.** In Dec, Antoine Oasi, one of the leaders of the Stanleyville Government, visited Sudan and discussed Congo problems with the Sudanese Foreign Minister. (*MENA, 13 Dec-BBC, 15 Dec*) (For Oasi's visit to Cairo, see p 31.)

**Dec: Pressure on Sudan.** For alleged UAR and USSR pressure on Sudan to permit passage of arms to Stanleyville, see p 32.

In Dec, the Yugoslav and Chinese Ambassadors in Khartoum addressed notes to General Abbud on Congo affairs. (*R. Baghdad, 12 Dec-IMB, 13 Dec*)

### JORDAN

[For Jordan, the Congo issue served mainly as an item in its propaganda contest with the UAR (see p 150.) Jordanian statements generally supported Kasavubu-Mobutu.]

**Aug-Dec: Red Crescent Asks for Volunteers.** In Aug, the Chairman of the Red Crescent Association in Jordan asked Jordanian doctors to volunteer for duty in Congo (*Jihad, 16 Aug*), and the request was repeated in Dec. (*Falastin, 7 Dec*) [No reports were received on aid supplied by Jordan.]

**Sept-Dec: UAR Criticized.** UAR policy in Congo was subject to continuous Press and radio attacks in Jordan, and the announcement, in Sept, of the withdrawal of the UAR contingent from the UN Command was criticized. (*Manar, 13 Sept*)

The UAR was attacked for interference in the Congo's internal affairs; the expulsion of its Ambassador, the Jordanian Press said, would only hurt the good name of the Arabs. "There was no need to ride only one horse and put all eggs in one basket." It was necessary to improve relations with Mobutu. (*Manar, 30 Nov*) Cairo's campaign in Congo was stigmatized as mainly a Communist campaign. (*R. Amman, 3 Dec-IMB, 4 Dec*)

The UAR's attacks on the UN also came under criticism. If Abdel-Nasser thought the UN incapable of safeguarding Congolese independence, why did he not order the evacuation of the UN forces from Gaza. (*R. Amman, 3 Dec-IMB 4 Dec*)

**Dec: Support for Kasavubu.** Amman Radio described Kasavubu as the true fighter against the Belgians, who had been elected President by the nation. (*R. Amman, 3 Dec-BBC, 6 Dec*)

### IRAQ

[Iraq was not active in the Congo. It became increasingly critical of the West and the UN and expressed support for Lumumba and Gizenga.]

**July: Support for UN—and Lumumba.** Initially, Iraq supported UN measures in Congo. This support was affirmed in July by the Iraqi Foreign Minister, Hāshim

Jawād, who also condemned imperialism and any attempt to infringe on the Congo's independence. (*Iraq Times; Zaman, 20 July*)

At the same time the Iraqi Press voiced support for Lumumba against Tshombe. (*Zaman, 24 July*)

**Sept-Dec: Iraq and the UN.** On 13 Sept Baghdad Radio accused the UN of supporting "the traitors in the Congo." (*R. Baghdad, 13 Sept-BBC, 15 Sept*)

In a speech on 6 Oct at the general debate in the UN Assembly, the Iraqi Foreign Minister attacked Belgian imperialism, but expressed support for the SG. (Iraqi voting on Congo at UN see pp 37-8.)

During Dec further criticism of the UN was voiced by the Iraqi Press and radio. *Al-Istiqlāl* wrote that high hopes in the UN had been disappointed; the UN had failed. The paper described Lumumba as the legitimate leader, expressed support for Gizenga's Stanleyville Government and denounced Kasavubu and Mobutu. (*Istiqlāl, 7 Dec*)

**Nov: Qassim Attacks Imperialism in the Congo.** At the Iraqi Oil Industry Workers' conference at Baghdad in Nov, Qassim attacked "imperialism" for opposing the Congolese nation and preventing it from choosing its leader. (*Hayat, 13 Nov*)

### LEBANON

**July: Concern for Emigrés.** When the disorders broke out in the Congo in July, the Lebanese Government's prime concern was for the protection of its emigrés there. (*Hayat, 24 July*)

**Aug: Medical Mission Cancelled.** In response to the UN's request for medical assistance, four Lebanese doctors and four nurses were chosen to serve in the Congo, but their departure was cancelled. The Lebanese Government stated that the UN had demanded that the mission should stay in the Congo three months, while Lebanon could not forgo their services for more than two or three weeks. (*Hayat, 3 Aug*)

**Press Comment on Congo.** [The pro-UAR Press generally followed the UAR line. The independent Press supported the UN action and criticized Lumumba for being too hasty and not sufficiently moderate. It also criticized the UAR for the withdrawal of its contingent from the UN Force and the Conciliation Committee, and supported conciliation measures.]

**Dec: Congo as an Internal Lebanese Issue.** In the Lebanese Foreign Affairs Committee Karami, [Muslim, one of the leaders of the uprising in 1958] and Adnān al-Hakīm [Muslim, leader of the pro-UAR "Najjādah" movement] proposed an expression of support for the release of Lumumba. Raymond Edde and Albert Mukhaybar [both Maronites] opposed this proposal, asking why there should be support for Lumumba alone and not for Kasavubu and Mobutu. Edde proposed not to discuss the matter at all. A resolution was finally adopted expressing support for the efforts of the UN in the Congo and asking the government to follow events in the Congo closely. (*Hayat, 20 Dec*)

**Lebanese Voting on Congo at UN.** See pp 37-8.

## ISRAEL AND THE CONGO

[Israel established contacts with Congolese leaders before independence, participated in the mediation efforts that led to the formation of the first government, sent medical personnel to the Congo, and offered technical aid. Israel did not take sides in the internal struggle, but it supported the UN action.]

## BEFORE INDEPENDENCE

**Mar-Apr: Israeli Fact-Finding Mission in Congo.** Israel's official contacts with the emerging Congo Republic preceded the grant of independence by several months. At the end of Mar, an Israeli diplomat, Ephraim Eilon, was sent to the Belgian Congo on a fact-finding mission, but according to the Israeli Press his appointment was regarded as a "quasi-diplomatic recognition even before independence, intended to prepare for the establishment of proper diplomatic relations as soon as the Congo becomes independent." (*IGYb*, 1960/61; *Jer. Post*, 15 Apr)

**Apr-June: Congolese on Study Tours in Israel.** Several groups of visitors from the Belgian Congo toured Israel in Apr, studying problems of interest for the nascent republic. One group consisted of the Secretary-General and a member of the Executive of Joseph Kasavubu's Abako movement, who were mainly interested in agricultural development, production and cooperative marketing. (*Davar*, 15 Apr) Another visitor was Alphonse Sita, Commissioner-General for Social Work and Youth, accompanied by Viscount Julien d'Avignon, representative of the Congo branch of the Belgian Youth project. Sita expressed the view that the Israel Nahal military units could be used as a model in the Congo when it becomes independent. (*Jer. Post*, 15 Apr) [Nahal units are organized as agricultural settlements.]

Congolese visitors in June included Joseph Ileo, later President of the Senate and Prime Minister, as well as two trade union secretaries: Adula [formerly member of Lumumba's MNC and later Minister of the Interior in Ileo's Government] and Binto, who came as guests of the Histadrut [Israel's General Federation of Labour]. (*Davar*, 17 June)

At the beginning of June, Ehud Avriel was appointed Ambassador-Designate to the Congo. (*Jer. Post*, 17 June) [Avriel was formerly Director General of the Finance Ministry and of the PM office, and Israel's first Ambassador to Ghana.]

**June: Ghana-Israeli Mediation Effort.** The Israeli Press reported that on 20 June, Eilon, Israel's diplomatic representative in Leopoldville, together with the Ghanaian representative, Andrew Djinn, arranged a meeting between Lumumba and Kasavubu in an effort to mediate. Agreement was not reached at this meeting (*Jer. Post*, 21 June), [but was attained after subsequent mediation].

**June: Talks in Belgium on Consortium for Development.** On 21 June, Gaston Eyskens, the Belgian Premier, declared at a dinner in honour of David Ben-Gurion, Prime Minister of Israel, then on an official visit to Brussels: "I am certain that productive cooperation, the foundations of which have already been laid, will be maintained between Israel and the young State of Congo, which will be able to see in you an example and will accept your advice, particularly in rural economics and

cooperative and collective farm organization." (*Ha'aretz*, 22 June)

On the same day, a ten-man Belgian Socialist delegation submitted to Ben-Gurion a plan for a "consortium of small nations for the development of the Congo." The delegation, led by Leo Collard and including Achille van Acker, a former Premier, and Victor Larock, former Foreign Minister, expressed the hope that the Israeli Premier would encourage talks on their plan on a governmental level. Later, Ben-Gurion had a 30-minute talk with Auguste de Schryver, Minister for the Belgian Congo and the mandated territories of Ruanda-Urundi, at which it was reported, he broached the plan. The countries suggested for the consortium, besides Belgium and Israel, were Sweden, Denmark, Norway, Finland, Austria and perhaps others. (*Jer. Post*, 22 June) [Nothing came of this suggestion.]

## JUNE-DEC: INDEPENDENCE AND AFTER

**June: Official Relations Established.** On 26 June, Ambassador-Designate Ehud Avriel left Israel for Leopoldville, and was followed on 27 June by an official delegation to the independence celebrations headed by Levi Eshkol, the Israeli Finance Minister.

The Director of the Development Department of the Solel-Boneh [the Histadrut's] construction company also flew to the Congo to represent the Histadrut at the celebrations, at the invitation of the Congolese trade unions. (*Ha'aretz*, 29 June)

**July: 100 Scholarships Offered.** On the eve of the declaration of independence, congratulations were sent to President Kasavubu by President Ben-Zvi, and to Premier Lumumba by Prime Minister Ben-Gurion. The latter's message and Eshkol's message to Kasavubu included the offer of 100 scholarships to the Congo Republic as a token of friendship. The Congolese leaders were also invited to visit Israel. (*Davar*, 4 July)

On 7 July, André René Lokamba, Treasurer of the Congolese National Movement [Lumumba's Party], discussed with the Israeli authorities the appropriate use of these scholarships. (*Jer. Post*, 9 July)

**July: Israeli Views on Congo Situation.** When the disorders started in the Congo in July, Israeli Press comment generally deplored them without taking sides. Typical comments were: "It is useless to blame the Congolese for their lack of restraint when they never had an opportunity to practise it in the past. It is as useless to blame the Belgians now for their 'paternalistic' policy, if we did not so blame them in the past." (*Jer. Post*, 10 July)

Finance Minister Eshkol said on his return from Leopoldville that the situation could eventually be righted "provided the newly independent state is not transformed into a cockpit by the rival great powers of East and West." He added that both President Kasavubu and Premier Lumumba had conveyed their "very warm feelings for Israel." (*Ha'aretz*, 17 July)

**July: Medical Volunteers for Congo.** On 24 July, a 16-member Israeli medical team of volunteers, who had responded to a special emergency appeal by the Foreign Ministry, left for the Congo. In addition, the chairman of the Israeli Medical Association was appointed adviser

## THE CONGO PROBLEM AT THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY

to the Congolese authorities on general medical matters and health organization in the emergency. (*Davar*, 25 July)

While nine countries responded to an International Red Cross appeal to send medical teams to the Congo, the Israeli team was the first to arrive on the scene and to go into action on the instructions of the Congolese authorities. (*Jer. Post*, 28 July)

At the end of July, Dr Shimon Btsh, former Director-General of the Israel Ministry of Health, was appointed by the World Health Organization to head medical and health services in the Congo. (*Ha'aretz*, 29 July)

On 31 July, the Congolese Minister of Health, G. Kamanga, met Avriel, the Israel Ambassador, to express gratitude for the work of the Israeli medical team, which had been instrumental in the resumption of work at the 650-bed Kitambo hospital in Leopoldville, the largest in the capital. Relations between the team and the Congolese were described as "most cordial." (*Ha'aretz*, *Jer. Post*, 1-3 Aug)

**July: Katanga Visitor.** Early in July, before the secession of Katanga, Thomas Tshombe, brother of the Premier of the province, arrived in Israel for a 20-day visit sponsored by the Elisabethville Jewish community, as guest of the Foreign Ministry. He said he had discussed recognition of independent Katanga with the Foreign Ministry, but would not disclose the Ministry's reaction.

(*Jer. Post*, 28 July) [Israel did not accord recognition to Katanga.]

**Aug: Discrimination Against Israeli Observer Avoided.** The African Foreign Ministers' conference, which convened in Leopoldville in the last week of Aug, decided to meet in closed sessions without observers from any non-African country, including China and Japan, to avoid discrimination against the Israeli observer. This decision was taken despite strong demands by the UAR delegation to ban only the Israeli observer, and was regarded by diplomatic observers in Jerusalem as an expression of goodwill towards Israel on the part of the Congo Government. The Israeli observer participated in the opening reception given by Premier Patrice Lumumba. (*Ha'aretz*; *Ma'ariv*, 29 Aug)

**Sept-Oct: Israel Backs UN.** On 19 Sept, Foreign Minister Golda Meir said at London Airport, while on her way to the UN Assembly:

"I hope the troubles in the Congo will be solved soon wisely and well. Any action the UN may take must have our support." (*Davar*, 20 Sept)

On 10 Oct, Mrs Meir defended the SG in the UN General Assembly, saying that he had most conscientiously carried out his task in the Congo. (*Ha'aretz*, 11 Oct)

**Nov: Israel's Abstention on Vote on UN to Recognize President Kasavubu's Delegation.** See p 38.

[No more significant developments were reported until the end of the year.]

## MIDDLE EAST COUNTRIES AND THE CONGO PROBLEM AT THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY

### AT THE EMERGENCY SPECIAL SESSION

**Afro-Asian Draft Resolution.** The Session was convened on 17-20 Sept, following a Soviet veto at the Security Council on 17 Sept. A draft resolution, sponsored by seventeen nations—Ceylon, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, Indonesia, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Morocco, Nepal, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Tunisia, UAR and Yemen—was presented on 18 Sept. Its principal points called upon the SG to take "vigorous action" to assist the central government of the Congo in the restoration and maintenance of law and order and the safeguarding of the unity and integrity of the country, decided that a Conciliation Commission of Asians and Africans should be appointed by the Advisory Committee on the Congo and called upon all states to refrain from direct and indirect provision of military aid to the Congo, except upon request by the UN.

**Soviet Draft Resolution.** On 19 Sept the Soviet Union presented another draft resolution, which condemned "the armed aggression of the Belgians," noted "the failure of the SG and the UN Command to implement a number of very important provisions of the Security Council resolutions" and called upon all states to refrain from any actions which might be detrimental to the integrity and independence of the Congo.

(The Soviet Union later agreed not to press for a vote on its draft resolution.)

**Main Issue.** The main issue was whether Soviet condemnation of the SG should be confirmed, or whether

support should be given to a continuation of UN action in Congo.

**Attitude of Middle East Countries.** All Middle East countries supported the Afro-Asian resolution. Most of their representatives praised the SG in their speeches and dissociated themselves expressly from Soviet criticism. The Sudanese delegate was typical, saying on 19 Sept:

"We should like most emphatically to say that we do not subscribe to the unfavourable remarks voiced from this rostrum against the UN, its SG and his colleagues. In my country, Mr. Hammarskjöld is held in the highest esteem for his integrity, his ability and his sincerity of purpose."

The Israel delegate spoke of "the vigour, the dedication and the honesty of purpose brought to bear by the SG and his aides in a gigantic task." (*A/OR*, 862, 863, 19 Sept).

The UAR representative, Asha, was somewhat cooler. [A week before the UAR had clashed with the UN Command over policy in the Congo and announced the withdrawal of its contingent—see pp 28-9.] On 18 Sept he expressed the hope "that cooperation between the central government of the Congo and the UN should be such as to avoid any recurrence of misunderstanding in the future... We are confident that the SG, who has laboured so hard in carrying out the mandate entrusted to him by the Security Council, will continue to discharge his task as defined in the resolutions of the Security Council." (*A/OR*, 860, 18 Sept)

**The Vote.** The draft resolution of the seventeen nations



was adopted by 70 votes to none, with 11 abstentions (Albania, Bulgaria, Byelorussian SSR, Czechoslovakia, France, Hungary, Poland, Rumania, Ukrainian SSR, Union of South Africa, USSR). (*A/OR, 863, 19 Sept*)

#### AT THE ORDINARY SESSION

**Sept-Oct: General Debate.** In their speeches in the general debate, all delegates of Middle East countries dwelled on the Congo situation.

President Abdel-Nasser, in a speech on 27 Sept, described events in the Congo as "presenting us with masked imperialism, which does not shrink from exploiting the UN itself to realize its hidden design and aims." He advocated the restoration of the situation prevalent when the legitimate government in Leopoldville requested the aid of the UN.

Other Middle East delegates refrained from criticizing the UN and had praise for the SG. (*A/PV, Sept-Oct*)

**Nov: Resolution on Representation of the Congo.** On 18 Nov the General Assembly considered a draft resolution to accept the credentials issued by President Kasavubu to the representatives of the Congo Republic (thereby denying recognition to Lumumba's representatives), as recommended by the Credentials Committee. A Ghanaian proposal to adjourn the debate was defeated by 51 votes to 36, with 11 abstentions.

Of the Middle East countries Iraq, Libya, Saudi Arabia, the UAR and Yemen voted for the adjournment, Cyprus, Israel and Turkey voted against, and Iran, Jordan and Lebanon abstained from voting. (*A/PV, 917, 18 Nov*)

**Vote on Representation.** After further attempts by several delegations to delay a decision had been defeated, a vote was taken on 22 Nov. The resolution to accredit Kasavubu's delegation was adopted by 53 votes to 24, with 19 abstentions.

Of the Middle East countries, Cyprus, Jordan and Turkey voted for the resolution, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, the UAR and Yemen voted against, and Iran, Israel, Lebanon, Libya and Sudan abstained. (*A/PV, 924, 22 Nov*)

**UAR Attitude.** The UAR representative, Asha, stated on 22 Nov:

"My delegation is of the opinion that this question should be postponed until the Conciliation Commission has had the opportunity to help to reconcile the various political factions, as has already been decided by the Assembly . . .

We are not taking any stand for or against anyone. We are in no way contesting the status of Mr Kasavubu as Head of the State and President of the Republic of Congo, and we hold him in high esteem and respect. But we honestly believe that the time is not opportune for the Assembly to decide on such an important issue." (*A/PV, 924, 22 Nov*) (For the UAR's relations with President Kasavubu see p 29 ff.)

**Saudi Arabian Attitude.** The Saudi Arabian delegate, Shukairy, spoke on 22 Nov in terms similar to those of the UAR delegate. (*A/PV, 924, 22 Nov*)

**Iraqi Attitude.** The Iraqi delegate, Sulaymān, speaking on 22 Nov, also opposed an immediate decision. (*A/PV, 923, 22 Nov*)

**Dec: Afro-Asian Resolution.** On 20 Dec a vote was taken on a draft resolution sponsored by Ceylon, Ghana, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Morocco, the UAR and Yugoslavia. The main points of the resolution were that "the UN must henceforth implement its mandate fully"; political prisoners in the Congo must be immediately released; the Congo Parliament must be immediately convened; and measures must be taken to prevent armed units in Congo from interference in political life. The draft resolution was rejected by 42 votes to 28 with 27 abstentions.

Of the Middle East countries, Iraq, Libya, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, the UAR and Yemen voted for the resolution, Israel and Turkey voted against and Cyprus, Iran, Jordan and Lebanon abstained. (The Western powers voted against; the Communist bloc for.) (*A/PV, 958, 20 Dec*)

**US-UK Draft Resolution.** On 20 Dec a vote was taken on a US-UK draft resolution, opposed by the Soviet bloc, which requested the SG "to assist the chief of the Congo Republic in establishing conditions in which Parliament can meet and function in security and freedom from outside interference," and expressed the hope that a round table conference would be convened by the Chief of State and the Advisory Committee. Forty-three delegates voted for the resolution; 22 against and 32 abstained. The resolution was not adopted, having failed to obtain the required two-thirds majority.

Of the Middle East countries Iran, Israel and Turkey voted for the resolution; Iraq, Saudi Arabia and the UAR voted against it; Cyprus, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Sudan and Yemen abstained. (*A/PV, 958, 20 Dec*)

# FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION IN THE SUEZ CANAL

## BACKGROUND AND SYNOPSIS

The boycott of Israeli shipping and trade in the Suez Canal broke into the news in 1960 mainly in connection with three ships: the *Inge Toft*, the *Astypalea* and the *Cleopatra*. The underlying situation, however, was the outcome of developments since the establishment of the State of Israel. An increasingly rigorous policy of barring both Israeli ships and goods from passage through the Suez Canal had been followed by Egypt in the period between the conclusion of the Armistice Agreement with Israel in 1949 and the Suez campaign in 1956.

While the policy regarding Israel-flag ships did not change even after the Suez campaign, Israeli goods in non-Israeli ships were mostly allowed to pass unhindered during 1957 and 1958. From the beginning of 1959 onwards, however, a policy of confiscation of Israeli goods was again followed, though not altogether consistently. This led the UN Secretary-General to take up the matter with a view to achieving a *modus vivendi* on the passage of Israeli goods through the Canal.

The year 1960 opened with two ships, the Danish *Inge Toft* and the Greek *Astypalea*, in detention at Port Said, their captains refusing to unload their Israeli cargo, as demanded by the UAR. In Jan, the UN SG visited Cairo and discussed his scheme for a *modus vivendi* (which the *Astypalea* had been intended to test). His visit did not bring about a change in the UAR attitude. The following months witnessed the unloading of the Israeli cargo of the two ships and their return to the Mediterranean.

In Apr, members of the Seafarers' International Union picketed the UAR vessel *Cleopatra* at New York Port, preventing the unloading of her cargo. They declared that their action was the outcome of a labour grievance, many US seamen having lost their jobs as the result of the UAR boycott and blacklist. An attempt to boycott another UAR ship in a Canadian port failed.

The UAR tried unsuccessfully to obtain a court injunction against the picketing; the New York courts accepted the union's argument that its action stemmed from a genuine labour dispute.

The International Federation of Arab Trade Unions decided to declare a counter-boycott against US ships in Arab ports, coming into force at the end of Apr. Owing to a general policy of re-directing all US vessels to non-Arab ports, the counter-boycott was hardly put to a practical test. All the same, the affair provided an issue on which all Arab states could agree, and Arab solidarity over the issue was largely achieved, thus mitigating the inter-Arab tension existing at the time. The Jordan Prime Minister and an official Iraqi spokesman made statements supporting the UAR.

The US Government, while expressing disapproval of the UAR's boycott policy, objected to the union's methods and tried to make them stop the picketing. In this it was supported by an important part of the US Press, as well as by a section of congressional opinion. In spite of this attitude, the *Cleopatra* incident was followed by an anti-American line in the UAR and Iraqi Press and radio. The US administration was accused of failing to use its authority to stop the picketing, which was ascribed to a new "Zionist plot."

Eventually, after more than three weeks, the State Department prevailed on the unions to end the picketing, assuring them that it would take all appropriate action to prevent discriminatory practices affecting US citizens, reemphasize its opposition to the Arab boycott, and promising—for the first time—to consult with the AFL-CIO on future developments in this connection. At the same time the Department officially confirmed—also for the first time—that US seamen had experienced "difficulties" in UAR ports.

Thereupon, the Arab unions called off the counter-boycott. President Abdel-Nasser and the Press and radio of most Arab countries described the outcome of the affair as a triumphant victory for joint Arab counter-measures.

The International Transport Workers' Federation dealt with the issue of free passage through the Suez Canal on several occasions during the rest of the year.

## JAN-FEB: UN EFFORTS FAIL

### JAN-FEB: UN SECRETARY-GENERAL DISCUSSES "MODUS VIVENDI" WITH UAR

[During the summer of 1959, the UN Secretary-General had made efforts to arrive at a *modus vivendi* which would allow Israeli goods to pass through the Canal. Towards the end of 1959, he informed Israel that he had reason to expect Israeli goods to be allowed to pass unhindered, provided Israeli imports were, at the time

of passage, still owned by the sellers, and Israeli exports already owned by the buyers. Though Israel objected to such conditions, she agreed to test the proposed method. The Greek freighter *Astypalea*, sent from Haifa in conformity with these terms, was nevertheless detained by the UAR at Port Said in Dec 1959.

The UN SG thereupon, while on a tour to a number of African states, took the opportunity to visit Cairo and

## FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION IN THE SUEZ CANAL

discuss the question of the transit of Israeli goods once more with the UAR leaders.]

**Jan: Meeting with Abdel-Nasser.** On 21 Jan the UN SG arrived in Cairo and had a meeting with President Abdel-Nasser and two talks with Fawzi, the Foreign Minister. Among other things, the question of the passage of Israeli goods through the Suez Canal was discussed. (*Jer. Post*, 22 Jan) Following the meetings, Fawzi said with reference to the Security Council resolutions on the use of the Suez Canal that the UN resolutions on Palestine were one whole and that it was impossible to observe some while disregarding others. (*MENA*, 22 Jan; *Jer. Post*, 22-23 Jan)

The fact that the SG had not given Israel any information on his Cairo talks was considered by Israeli political circles as a sign that he had failed to obtain assurances that the UAR would keep to the terms of the *modus vivendi*. (*Jer. Post*, 25 Jan)

**Agreement Denied.** In reply to journalists' questions President Abdel-Nasser stated that the *Inge Toft* and the *Astypalea* would be allowed to sail only after their cargoes had been unloaded. He denied the existence of any agreement on the passage of Israeli goods through the Suez Canal. (*Jer. Post*, 26 Jan)

**Feb: Herter: UNSG "Not Too Successful."** On 8 Feb, Christian Herter, the US Secretary of State, said, referring to Mr Hammarskjöld's efforts to secure the passage of Israeli goods through the Canal: "The SG of the UN undertook to try to adjust this matter between Israel and Egypt. His efforts are still continuing. As of now they do not appear to be too successful. But how they will turn out I cannot say at this time. He may still succeed in working out the *modus vivendi* which will take care of that problem. Until we know the degree of success or failure which he has achieved, I feel that working through that channel, to which we have given full support, is the best way of handling the matter." (*Dep. of St. Bull.*, 29 Feb)

### FEB: INGE TOFT UNLOADS CARGO, RETURNS TO HAIFA

[The Danish freighter *Inge Toft* had sailed from Haifa in May 1959 with a cargo of Israeli cement and potash for Far Eastern ports. She was stopped at Port Said on 21 May 1959 and her captain was requested to unload the cargo. When he refused, the ship was detained.]

On 4 Feb 1960, the owners of the *Inge Toft* decided to instruct her captain to unload her Israeli cargo.]

The owners explained that the reason for their decision was the deteriorating state of the vessel and their obligations towards the crew and their families. (*Jer. Post*, 4, 5 Feb) The beginning of the unloading was delayed by the UAR authorities' demand that the owners should pay for it. They at first objected but eventually accepted the UAR's terms. (*NYT*, 10 Feb)

Unloading started on 9 Feb, and the *Inge Toft* left Port Said on 15 Feb, after having been detained there for almost nine months. While the ship was on her way from Port Said to Haifa, Mrs G. Meir, the Israel Foreign Minister, cabled her captain expressing her own and her government's admiration for the courage and perseverance of the captain and crew. (*Jer. Post*, 10, 16, 17 Feb)

On 18 Feb, the *Inge Toft* arrived in Haifa and was given an extremely cordial welcome by government representatives and the local and port authorities. (*Jer. Post*, 19 Feb)

**Feb: Israel, Abdel-Nasser and SG Redefine Positions.** The

next day, the Israel Foreign Minister declared: "The day will come when ships sailing under the Israel flag, carrying Israeli cargoes, will pass through the Suez Canal like those of all other nations." (*Jer. Post*, 19, 20 Feb)

Speaking at a mass rally at Aleppo on 17 Feb, Abdel-Nasser said that the UAR would never allow Israeli ships or goods to go through the Suez Canal; any Israeli goods confiscated would be used for the welfare of the Palestine refugees. (*Ahram*, 18 Feb; *NYT*, 19 Feb)

The UN SG, answering questions about the Suez Canal situation at a news conference on 18 Feb, said: "We are falling back to a position where we have been before and from which I thought and hoped we had departed forward." He said that some people expected from the SG "action which rightly belongs to the Security Council." (*NYT*, 20 Feb)

### US NOT TO FORCE ISSUE

US policy on Israel's transit rights in the Suez Canal was outlined in a statement to Congress by Asst. Secretary of State G. Lewis Jones. He said that the US strongly opposed the UAR over the Canal issue, but a headlong American move would not achieve the desired ends. Any attempt to force the UAR over this matter would upset the stability of the entire area; it would allow local leaders to accuse the US of imperialist policies and of action outside the UN. (*NYHT*, 4 Apr)

### FEB-NOV: THE "ASTYPALEA"

[The voyage of the Greek freighter *Astypalea* had been in the nature of a test case meant to probe the validity of the *modus vivendi* proposed by the UN SG (see above).]

She had been sent from Haifa to Djibouti carrying a cargo of Israeli cement sold on CIF terms, i.e. owned by the buyers from the time it was put on board in Haifa. The UN SG was notified in advance. The *Astypalea* was detained in Port Said on 17 Dec 1959.]

**Feb: Cargo Owned by Buyers.** Israel submitted documents to the UN SG supporting her claim that at the time the *Astypalea* was stopped at Port Said, her cargo had been the property of the buyers in Eritrea. (*NYT*, 20 Feb)

**Apr: Cargo Removed.** Removal of the *Astypalea's* cargo started on 7 Apr, 400 tons of Israel-made cement being unloaded by the UAR authorities. The vessel returned to the Mediterranean. (*NYT*, 10 Apr)

**Apr-May: "Against UN Principles."** The UN SG stated that the confiscation of the *Astypalea's* cargo "goes against UN principles." He added that there had been "setbacks" in his personal diplomatic efforts to stop interference with Israeli shipping, but he was not discouraged and would renew his quest for "workable practices." (*NYT*, 10 Apr)

The SG denied that he had reached any agreement with the UAR to allow Israeli cargoes to pass through the Suez Canal. (*NYT*, 7 May)

Commenting on this statement, the spokesman of the Israel Foreign Ministry repeated that Israel had been led to believe that an arrangement had been found and that the *Astypalea* had been sent on her way on this understanding. (*Ha'aretz*, 6 May)

**Nov: Israel Protests to Security Council.** The cargo of the *Astypalea* was officially declared confiscated by the UAR authorities. Israel sent a note to the President of the Security Council, stressing that the confiscating violated Council decisions and that the UAR's continued "illegal and provocative" acts were a source of tension and a danger to peace in the ME. (*Ha'aretz*, 11 Nov)



## APR-MAY: THE "CLEOPATRA" INCIDENT

## APR: UNIONS DECLARE BOYCOTT

[During 1959, trade unions in a number of countries started taking an active interest in the Canal situation. Trade union organizations which adopted resolutions protesting against Egypt's boycott policy and the blacklisting of ships included: The National Maritime Union of America (June 1959), the AFL-CIO, the Norwegian Seamen's Federation and the Finnish Seamen's Union (all in Sept 1959). In Dec 1959 the Finnish Seamen's Union declared its intention to boycott UAR ships.]

**Apr: "Cleopatra" Picketed.** The UAR vessel *Cleopatra*, owned by the Khedivial Mail Lines, arrived in New York from the Mediterranean in Apr (a week after the unloading of the *Astypalea* at Port Said). On the same day, the Seafarers' International Union (SIU) placed pickets at the pier where she was to unload. The International Longshoremen's Association (ILA) thereupon declined to cross the SIU's picket lines, and, while not interfering with the disembarkation of passengers, refused to unload the cargo.

The pickets carried signs and distributed leaflets saying that the UAR boycott was a threat to US seamen's jobs and demanding that the US Government should use all its resources to restore freedom of navigation, that the US Navy should stop buying oil in ports where blacklisting was practised, and that boycotting countries should be denied US farm surplus aid.

P. Hall, President of the SIU, said that US seamen had a genuine labour grievance, since many lost their jobs as a result of the boycott. The purpose of the picketing was to point out that the US Government was only paying lip-service to the principles of the freedom of the seas. (*Jer. Post*, 14 Apr; *NYT*, 23 Apr)

The Secretary-General of the Histadrut (General Federation of Labour in Israel) cabled the President of the SIU to express Israeli workers' appreciation for its action. (*Jer. Post*, 15 Apr)

The Executive of the AFL-CIO commended the SIU for its action in the *Cleopatra* case. (*Jer. Post*, 26 Apr)

## TRADE UNION ACTIVITIES OUTSIDE US

**Apr: Sweden.** Shortly before the beginning of the *Cleopatra* incident, the Union of Swedish Transport Workers decided on 7 Apr to boycott UAR vessels in Swedish ports. Before the boycott could be implemented, however, the Union decided on 20 Apr to call it off. The Scandinavian Transport Workers' Federation explained that, as there had been no further boycott incidents involving Scandinavian ships since the return of the *Inge Toft*, it had recommended that the Swedish Union end the ban. (*Jer. Post*, 8, 21, 22 Apr; *NYT*, 22 Apr)

A report that the UN SG had personally intervened with the unions of his home country to persuade them to end the boycott was strongly denied by Mr Hammarhjöld. (*Jer. Post*, 22, 23 Apr)

**Apr: Canada.** SIU members started picketing the UAR vessel *Star of Aswan* in Montreal on 27 Apr, after her passengers had disembarked but before work had started on unloading her cargo. The Canadian Labour Federation announced its support for the SIU's action. However, the Canadian Longshoremen crossed the SIU picket line and began unloading the vessel. Their spokesman said that the union sympathized with Israel but had its contracts to honour. (*Jer. Post*, 28, 29 Apr, 3 May)

## APR-MAY: ARAB REACTION: A ZIONIST PLOT, CONDONED BY US

**UAR.** A double theme ran through the UAR comments:

1. That the unions were acting on Zionist instigation: "Today, a new Zionist plot is being carried out. Behind the refusal to unload the *Cleopatra* are under-cover organizations spreading corruption and destruction." (*Sawt al-Arab*, 18 Apr-IMB, 19 Apr) The "plot" was ascribed to Ben-Gurion's personal intervention during his visit to the US. It was part of an Israeli plan to smash the siege to which the Arab boycott subjected her. (*Ahram*, 27 Apr) The Zionists had given money bribes to the union leaders for their action. (*Gumhuriyah*, 5 May)

2. The American Government was in complicity with Zionism: The US Government pretended to have acted against the unions; in reality it was well known that the entire administration, from the President down, supported Israel's stand on the Suez Canal issue. (*R. Cairo*, 10 May-IMB, 11 May)

*Sawt al-Arab* used President Eisenhower's statement of 27 Apr that nothing short of force could be done regarding the Suez Canal, and that the US was not going to use force (see below), in order to represent him as having threatened forcible action, adding: "All Asia and Africa will regard the US as they did Britain and France at the time of the Suez campaign." (*Sawt al-Arab*, 6 May-IMB, 8 May)

"Many US politicians try to convince us that the picketing of the *Cleopatra* does not reflect US Government policy. They point to the State Department declarations condemning it... It is difficult to believe these explanations when we suddenly learn of a US-Israel arms deal and when US made recoilless anti-tank guns take part in the Israeli Independence parade." (*Ahram*, 6 May)

"*Cleopatra* will return to her home port to discharge into every Arab heart a load of hatred and fury towards the US and of love for her enemies and those of Israel." (*Gumhuriya*, 30 Apr)

**Iraq.** For the first ten days after the beginning of the picketing, the Iraqi Press and radio gave little prominence to the *Cleopatra* story and generally refrained from comment. On 24 Apr, the Iraqi Foreign Office spokesman called the picketing a Zionist plot and appealed for a united Arab stand against it. Israel, he added, was carrying the war against the Arabs to a new arena; in the face of this danger, the Arabs must show the world that they were united. (*R. Baghdad*, 24 Apr-IMB, 25 Apr) This official comment (coming two days after an Iraqi delegate in Cairo had reportedly agreed to the Arab counter-boycott—see below) was then taken up by the Iraqi Press and radio in terms similar to those of the UAR. The attitude towards the US, however, was less militant. (See e.g. *R. Baghdad* 27, 29 Apr-IMB, 28, 30 Apr; *Akhbar* 26 Apr.)

**Jordan.** The Jordan Press and radio gave still less prominence to the *Cleopatra* affair. On 25 Apr, however, Prime Minister al-Majali said that there was no doubt that Israeli propaganda and Zionist activities had instigated the US workers to take this action. Israel's object was to obstruct Arab-American relations. He added that he had expressed his anxiety to the US Ambassador. Jordan was in touch with the Arab League and other Arab governments over this matter. (*R. Amman*, 25 Apr-IMB, 26 Apr)

**Lebanon.** While the pro-Egyptian section of the Lebanese Press echoed UAR publications, Beirut Radio took a more moderate line. Instead of accusing, it appealed to the US; reminding America that Israel was the stumbling block in Arab relations with the West, the commentator said that the decision lay in the hands of the US Government. (*R. Beirut, 23 Apr-IMB, 24 Apr*) Beirut Radio was the only Arab station to give credit to the US Government for working to end the picketing, saying that the government had dissociated itself from the union's action. (*R. Beirut, 28 Apr-IMB, 29 Apr*)

#### APR-MAY: COURT ACTION

The first practical step taken by the UAR to stop the action against the *Cleopatra* was an application to the US law courts.

The agents for the *Cleopatra's* owners applied to a Federal Court on 14 Apr for a Court injunction ordering the SIU to stop picketing the ship. They argued that the picketing was not caused by a genuine labour grievance but had political aims. The union's lawyers, in reply, mentioned the case of the US tanker *Kern Hills*, the first vessel to carry oil to Eilat, which had been forced out of business by Arab boycott measures, so that her crew had lost their jobs. (*Jer. Post, 15 Apr*)

On 16 Apr, the US Federal Court declined to issue the injunction. On 19 Apr, a US District Court in New York likewise refused to issue an immediate injunction against the picketing, maintaining that it was legal as long as no violent means were employed. (*Jer. Post, 17, 20 Apr*) On 23 Apr, the District Court accepted the union's argument that the dispute stemmed from a genuine labour grievance. The owners' agent appealed against the decision. (*Jer. Post, 24, 26 Apr*)

On 4 May the Court of Appeal, though differing from the lower court on points of law, upheld the latter's decision. (For a full report on the legal aspects of the case and for the texts of the Court decisions see: *The Egyptian Economic Political Review, June-July 1960.*)

#### APR-MAY: THE ARAB COUNTER-BOYCOTT

Even before the failure to obtain redress in court, Arab sources began mentioning counter-measures against US ships in Arab ports.

**Apr: Arab TU Federation Convened.** On 18 Apr, Cairo Radio announced that the Executive Committee of the International Federation of Arab Trade Unions (IFATU) had been summoned to discuss counter-measures against the *Cleopatra* boycott. (*R. Cairo, 18 Apr-IMB, 19 Apr*)

The Council of the Workers' Unions in the Syrian Region of the UAR resolved not to load or unload US vessels so long as the *Cleopatra* was being picketed. (*R. Beirut, 19 Apr-IMB, 20 Apr*)

**Apr: "Boycott Within a Week."** On 22 Apr, the Executive Council of the IFATU meeting in Cairo, adopted a resolution describing the picketing of the *Cleopatra* as a provocative, hostile action serving international Zionism, aimed against Arab nationalism and revealing political partisanship by the US labour unions. The latter were warned that unless they changed their hostile attitude within a week, Arab workers in all Arab ports would refuse to serve American vessels, as regards loading, unloading, repairs and supplies. (*R. Cairo, 23 Apr-IMB, 24 Apr*)

**Apr: The Counter-Boycott in Effect.** In spite of a US appeal to all Arab League member states to refrain from

counter-measures so long as the *Cleopatra* issue was still before the courts (*Reuter, 21 Apr, acc. to Ha'aretz, 22 Apr*), the Arab counter-boycott was proclaimed to go into effect at the end of the time limit, i.e. from midnight 29/30 Apr. (*R. Cairo, 30 Apr-IMB, 1 May*)

President Abdel-Nasser approved the enforcement of the counter-boycott at Alexandria, Port Said and Suez. (*NYT, 2 May*)

**Apr-May: Arab Solidarity Achieved.** The IFATU resolution of 22 Apr (see above) was approved by delegates from both regions of the UAR, as well as from Iraq, Libya and Aden. (*R. Cairo, 23 Apr-IMB, 24 Apr*)

The Tunisian Labour Federation announced that Tunisian workers had decided to join the boycott. (*R. Cairo, 29 Apr-IMB, 1 May*)

Jordan announced on 30 Apr that she would make the counter-boycott effective at Aqaba port. (*NYT, 2 May*)

Lebanese dockers joined the boycott at midnight on 30 Apr. (*R. Cairo, 2 May-IMB, 3 May*)

Saudi Arabian and Kuwait port workers joined the boycott in "a manifestation of Arab solidarity." (*R. Cairo and R. Baghdad, 2 May-IMB, 3 May*)

Both Arab and foreign Press comment stressed the unifying effect of the boycott in inter-Arab affairs: Typical radio comments were:

"The Arab counter-boycott was designed to serve as an ingredient cementing the solidarity of the Arab masses everywhere, as far as Basra, Aden, Benghazi and Tunis." (*R. Cairo, 17 Apr-IMB, 18 Apr*)

Just as the plot of US imperialism and World Zionism was directed against the Arab nations in its entirety, so it was Arab solidarity which defeated it. (*R. Baghdad, 7 May-IMB, 8 May*)

"It is the uniformity of the Arab reaction which will convince some nations that befriending Israel is a losing proposition." (*R. Beirut, 28 Apr-IMB, 29 Apr*)

The *Economist* stressed the "genuinely popular" nature of the counter-boycott and its effect in providing an issue on which Abdel-Nasser, King Hussein and General Qassim could unite. (*Economist, 7 May*)

Another British paper reported that dockers in Morocco, Jordan, Tunisia, Libya, Lebanon, Syria, Yemen and Aden had responded to the appeal and only at Kuwait and Bahrain had the workers remained uncertain. "Arab workers are always readier to cooperate than their governments, but this solidarity is still remarkable. The crisis has overcome strong Jordanian, Iraqi and Tunisian hostility to Cairo." (*Financial Times, 2 May*)

**May: US Diverts Ships.** The US Government expressed its concern over the boycott and pointed out to the UAR that it was likely to disrupt the entire programme of US aid to Arab states. (*Observer, 1 May*)

Six US ships carrying wheat and flour from US agricultural surplus stocks to Alexandria and Latakia were rerouted to Italian ports, where their cargoes were to be reloaded onto Egyptian ships. This was at the request of the US Department of Commerce, which had stated that the UAR was in need of the wheat, but was unable to control the workers who were boycotting US ships. (*NYT, 3 May; BBC in Arabic, 4 May-IMB, 5 May*)

[No reports on the reloading of US ships in Italian ports were apparently published.]

The American Export Lines cancelled all calls of their ships at Arab ports until further notice. (*Financial Times, 6 May*)

The US ship *Mollen Victory* cancelled its planned call at Beirut because of the boycott, and the US vessel *Mountbatten*, due at Latakia with a cargo of wheat,

## THE "CLEOPATRA" INCIDENT

was redirected to Italy. (*R. Cairo*, 30 Apr, 1 May-*IMB*, 2, 3 May)

US ships in the Suez Canal were met by anti-American demonstrators in launches, but there was no interference with their passage through the Canal. (*Financial Times*, 6 May; *NYT*, 7 May)

[The policy of redirecting US ships prevented the boycott from being put to the test in most ports.]

The only reports of actual interference with US vessels were the following:

The *Mount Evans* was at Latakia when the boycott came into force and failed to unload all her cargo. (*R. Cairo*, 1 May-*IMB*, 2 May)

Libyan pilots refused to assist a US warship in entering the port of Tripoli. On the other hand, the US liner *Brazil* picked up 25 passengers at Aden in spite of the boycott. (*Times*, 3 May)

Following a knifing incident in New York, in which a member of the *Cleopatra's* crew was injured, US consulates in a number of Arab ports reported that it might be unsafe for US seamen to go ashore. (*NYT*, 7 May)

**May: Ban to be Widened.** IFATU officials met in Cairo on 5 May to decide on the "second stage" of the counter-boycott. This was expected to include a ban on all oil shipments from any Arab port to the US (*NYT*, 6 May), on US aircraft and on exports to the US. (*Financial Times*, 6 May)

(These plans did not reach the stage of action because the picketing of the *Cleopatra* was lifted soon afterwards.)

### THE US ATTITUDE

The first governmental reaction to the *Cleopatra* issue came in a State Department statement issued on 21 Apr, shortly after the UAR Ambassador had called at the Department with a note urging the US Government to act immediately "to resolve the situation." The statement opened by expressing the Department's understanding for the Union's position and recognition of labour rights. But, it went on, the picketing was interpreted abroad as a political demonstration. While the US Government did not condone the Arab boycott, "an effort by a private group to apply pressure publicly with a view of bringing about shifts in the policies of foreign governments is, of course, embarrassing to the conduct of our government's foreign relations and may have unfortunate consequences."

In reply, the President of the SIU said: "With the US flag being affronted, US ships being harassed and US seamen being mistreated, the source of the State Department's embarrassment should be its failure... to have prevented this." (*NYT*, 22, 23 Apr)

**Apr: US "Not to Use Force."** The next clarification of the administration's attitude came at the President's Press conference on 27 Apr. Mr Eisenhower said: "... I don't know what you can do unless you want to resort to force in such affairs (the free use of the Suez Canal) and I'm certain that we're not trying to settle international problems with force. We have done everything we could to make it clear that we stand by our commitments and we think that other nations should do the same. Particularly when it comes to the free use of the Suez Canal. But, I don't know that there is any idea whatsoever of making a new step in this direction or new argument because I think it's all been said." (*NYT*, 29 Apr)

**US Officials Help Prepare UAR Brief.** While the action of the *Cleopatra's* owners was before the New York

courts (see above), US embassy officials in Cairo were reported to have pointed out to the UAR Foreign Ministry that the agents' brief was inadequately drafted, and to have worked out better legal grounds for them. (*Observer*, 1 May)

**2 May: Dillon Tells Senate: Arab Counter-measures "Not Unnatural."** At the time of the *Cleopatra* incident, the Senate was discussing the Douglas amendment to the Annual Foreign Aid bill, which would give the President powers to stop aid to countries obstructing free navigation or waging economic warfare against another recipient nation. (For fuller details, see pp 106-7.) The fact that this amendment came up at the time of the *Cleopatra* affair lent added point to the debate. Senator Fulbright, opposing the amendment, referred to the picketing as having been organized "by an irresponsible maritime union." (*NYT*, 1 May).

In an unsuccessful attempt to prevent the adoption of the amendment, Acting Secretary of State Douglas Dillon sent a letter to the Senate setting out the State Department's objections (see also pp 104-5). Referring directly to the *Cleopatra*, Dillon pointed out that in a reaction against coercion, which was "not unnatural," the Arabs were establishing a counter-boycott which was bound to harm some 30 US ships for every Arab ship boycotted in the US. (*USIS*, 3 May)

The Senate's decision to adopt the amendment over the Administration's objections was interpreted as a challenge to President Eisenhower's view that the US was powerless to do anything, short of force, about the UAR boycott (see above) and a rejection of the State Department view, as set out in Dillon's letter. (*Times*, 4 May)

**May: US Press Supports Administration.** The US Press, though condemning the UAR's boycott of Israel, generally supported the Administration in objecting to the pickets' methods.

*The Washington Post*, while calling the protest against the UAR blacklist and boycott "altogether justified," wrote: "American policy was, in effect, being framed by the grievances of seamen and longshoremen on an essentially narrow issue... The AFL-CIO acted responsibly in requesting a halt to the picketing." (*Washington Post*, 7 May)

*The New York Times*, while describing the Arab boycott as "an indefensible act of politico-economic blackmail," stated: "The dangers and futility of private citizens taking foreign policy into their own hands have been illustrated once again... The US Government has been put into a needlessly awkward position." (*NYT*, 8 May)

Other papers stressed the damage to US-Arab relations; *Time*, for instance, wrote: "The pickets were needlessly jeopardizing the small store of goodwill that the US had painstakingly worked to accumulate with the touchy Arab world." (*Time*, 9 May)

**May: Government Contact with Trade Unions.** On 4 May the US Secretary of Labour asked the AFL-CIO to intervene with the SIU to end the picketing. The AFL-CIO Executive Council refused, stating that it fully supported its maritime affiliates in their action and demanding that the US take appropriate steps to protect US ships and seamen from discrimination. The Council also rejected the implication that the unions had acted irresponsibly. (*Jer. Post*, 5 May; *NYT*, 7 May)

The following day, Acting Secretary of State Dillon conferred with an AFL-CIO representative on ways of ending the boycott. There was growing concern among



State Department officials about the damage to US relations with the Arab states and some other Asian countries. "Diplomatic efforts of years are being upset by this affair," one of them commented. (NYT, 7 May)

Agreement was eventually reached at a further meeting on 6 May between Dillon and G. Meany, President of the AFL-CIO. Following the meeting, Meany cabled P. Hall, SIU President: "I have today received... the good-faith assurance of the government... that it will fully investigate the grievances of United States seamen and renew its diplomatic efforts to protect American seamen and shipping against future indignities and discrimination. I firmly believe that the good trade union purposes for which the Seafarers' International Union established the picket line at the *Cleopatra* have been served and I suggest the picket line be withdrawn." (NYT, 8 May)

#### 6-9 MAY: "CLEOPATRA" AFFAIR WOUND UP

**6 May: Picketing Lifted.** Complying with Meany's request, Hall instructed his union on 6 May to end the picketing. The pickets were withdrawn the same day.

**May: Dillon's Assurances.** The assurances mentioned by Meany were contained in a message to him from the Acting Secretary of State published later that day. It began by reiterating US support for the "principles of freedom of the sea" and went on:

"The United States Government protests as a matter of policy discriminatory actions or practices with respect to international trade which adversely affect United States firms, vessels and citizens. The department will continue to pursue by all appropriate and effective means every avenue whereby private American interests in international trade may be fully safeguarded and restored.

"With respect to Arab trade restrictions arising out of the Arab-Israel conflict, the Department of State re-emphasizes that our government neither recognizes nor condones the Arab boycott.

"Every appropriate opportunity will be utilized, on a continuing basis, to re-emphasize this fundamental position to the governments concerned. At the same time, every suitable occasion will be employed both within and outside the United Nations to facilitate progress towards a solution of the basic Arab-Israel conflict from which the Arab boycott arises."

The statement then declared that the US Navy had discontinued the oil clause, which had been misconstrued as acquiescence in the Arab boycott, and denied that any US Government agency was a party to discriminatory contracts regarding the shipment of US agricultural surpluses (see p 188).

The statement continued: "In several instances American seamen experienced difficulties at ports in the United Arab Republic. Our consular officers made every effort to assist the crews of these vessels, and were in fact able to be of material help. The department has renewed its standing instruction to its consular officers to be on the alert to assist in settling grievances regarding treatment abroad of American seamen or other American citizens which are brought to their attention.

"The Department will consult with the AFL-CIO... on future developments... it will undertake to investigate fully the grievances of the SIU... and to renew its efforts to assure freedom of the seas." (NYT, 8 May)

**Unions May Picket Again.** When instructing the SIU to end the boycott, P. Hall emphasized that, should the State Department "fail to give practical implementation" to its assurances, the union would have to resort to picketing again. (NYT, 8 May)

**9 May: Counter-Boycott Called Off.** An extraordinary session of the IFATU Council in Beirut on 9 May called off the Arab counter-boycott against American ships. (R. Cairo, 9 May-IMB, 10 May)

In a special statement, the Council thanked trade unions in Asia and Africa for their support, concluding: "We should remain cautious lest we forget in the sensation of victory the plots and intrigues which our enemies must yet hatch." (Mid. Mirror (ANA), 15 May)

**May: UAR: End of Affair "Resounding Triumph."** Cairo Radio and *al-Gumhuriyah* compared "the defeat of the Zionist plot" concerning the *Cleopatra* with the defeat of the Crusaders at Mansura (the 800th anniversary of which was then being celebrated). (R. Cairo, 7 May-IMB, 8 May; *Gumhuriyah*, 9 May)

President Abdel-Nasser also referred to the *Cleopatra* at the Mansura ceremony on 7 May. He said: "The unity of the Arab workers brought us victory... Zionism and imperialism had to recoil... In the name of the UAR, I salute the Arab workers from the [Persian] Gulf to the Atlantic for having earned complete victory for the Arab nation by standing united. In your name I award the UAR's highest decoration to the IFATU."

He continued: "We are now facing the alliance of imperialism and Zionism and we have to defend ourselves." He went on to mention the supply of US arms to Israel, asserting that a secret pact had existed between the two since 1952. (R. Cairo, 7 May-BBC, 10 May; excerpts from this speech see pp 514-5, 517.)

Cairo Radio said that the calling off of the picketing was not an act of good will on the part of the State Department; the real reason was that the summit conference was approaching and the US wanted to avoid a struggle on two fronts. (R. Cairo, 11 May-IMB, 13 May)

**Iraq Stresses Value and Limits of Arab Unity.** Iraqi comments also stressed the value of the united stand. Baghdad Radio said the incident had turned into a demonstration of Arab solidarity, but went on at once to point to the limits of united Arab action: "The joint struggle against imperialism and Zionism is the proper field for Arab solidarity, which is conditional upon recognition of the *status quo* in all Arab countries and on mutual non-interference in their internal affairs." (R. Baghdad, 7 May-IMB, 8 May)

**Beirut: Justice Defeats Plots.** Beirut Radio concluded that the Arabs possessed all the factors making for victory in the international arena despite the fact that Israel had its agents abroad. The Arab victory proved that righteousness could defeat plots and machinations. (R. Beirut, 7 May-IMB, 8 May)

#### APR-MAY: ISRAELI ATTITUDE

Official Israeli spokesmen refrained from commenting on the *Cleopatra* issue. The Israel Press expressed its satisfaction at the action of the US unions. The following are some of the views expressed:

The New York dockside was a "second front" opened after the struggle in the Canal itself and in the UN, which, however, had no result. (Ma'ariv, 14 Apr)

Abdel-Nasser's self-confidence had sustained a blow and Israel must now exploit the advantage she had gained. The boycott, however, had proved a double-edged weapon. (Haboker, 14, 18 Apr)

The stand of the *Inge Toft* and the *Astypalea* was now vindicated. (Al Hamishmar, 15 Apr)

## THE "CLEOPATRA" INCIDENT

Israel had been right when she had claimed all along that the Suez struggle would eventually affect the rest of the world; Israel's fight had now proved to be the fight of all law-abiding nations. (*Lamerhav*, 15 Apr)

As the State Department's attitude towards the unions became clearer there was mounting criticism in the Israel Press. *Davar* said that the stevedores had healthier instincts than the State Department when they refused to have Abdel-Nasser dictate to them where US ships should sail or anchor; if the Department's officials were a little less expert but had a little more of such healthy instincts, it would be better for everyone. (*Davar*, 26 Apr)

When the picketing ended, opinion was divided as to the practical effect of Dillon's assurances to the union: *Ha'aretz* called them "an achievement" (*Ha'aretz*, 8 May); *Davar* was more sceptical, but thought that, in the long run, the State Department would be unable to ignore public opinion aroused by the unions (*Davar*, 8 May); while *Haboker* felt there was now a danger of the US buying off Israel by enlarged aid so as to be able to go on appeasing Abdel-Nasser undisturbed. (*Haboker*, 8 May)

### JUNE-NOV: TRADE UNION AFTERMATH

The end of the *Cleopatra* picketing did not mean the end of trade union activities in connection with the shipping issues.

**ITF Conferences.** On 4 June, at a conference in London, the International Transport Workers' Federation (ITF) Seafarers' Section, adopted a resolution noting "with grave concern the Egyptian Government's con-

tinued violation" of the freedom of navigation through the Suez Canal. (*Shipping, Liverpool*, 27 July)

On 31 July, the biennial congress of the ITF meeting, at Berne, adopted resolutions condemning the UAR boycott of Israeli shipping and the blacklist policy.

UAR commentators interpreted this as a sign of a new "plot" and predicted that it would fail as the *Cleopatra* plot had failed. (*Ahram*, 31 July; *R. Cairo*, 31 July-*IMB*, 1 Aug)

ITF member unions were preparing papers for submission to the next meeting of the Executive to report on measures taken by them to ensure free navigation through the Suez Canal. (*Ha'aretz*, 17 Nov)

**Nov: Abdel-Nasser's Attempt to Link Canal with Refugee Question Rejected by ITF.** When the ITF Executive met in London during the last week of Nov, President Abdel-Nasser sent it a personal message linking the question of transit through the Suez Canal with the Arab refugee problem. The Executive decided to reject this approach and to reply that in its opinion limitations on the freedom of navigation and the policy of the blacklist were economic measures harmful to seamen's chances of employment and working conditions, and that these matters should not be linked with political questions. The ITF's reply warned that unless a favourable answer was received from the UAR by the next meeting of the Executive, a plan for counter-measures would be worked out. The Executive also appealed to all member unions to continue pressing for free navigation and the end of blacklisting.

It was further decided to hold the next meeting of the Executive, scheduled for Apr or May 1961, in Tel Aviv. (*Ha'aretz*, 30 Nov)

# FOREIGN ECONOMIC AID TO ME COUNTRIES

(See also table p 55, notes and sources p 56)

Donor	Amount (million)	Date	Details	Source
ETHIOPIA				
USSR	400.0 Rubles (\$100.0)	27 Mar	The USSR signed an economic credit protocol with Ethiopia under which Russia undertook to conduct a geological survey, to install gold mining and processing plants, and to build a large new refinery at Assab (Red Sea). <sup>1,6</sup>	MEED, 1 Apr. Politique Etrangère No. 4, 1960
UN (Special Fund)	\$0.9	May	The UN Special Fund allocated \$0.9 million to make a survey of water resources for the development of hydro-electric power and irrigation in the Awash River Valley. The Fund will provide experts and equipment and will assist in the necessary surveys. The Ethiopian Government's contribution amounted to \$0.3m.	UN Special Fund, 1960 Report
US	\$0.8	Sept	An American loan was made available to finance the installation of a network of radio transmitters by the Radio Corporation of America. The agreement signed by RCA representatives in Addis Ababa provided for the installation of a 100-Kw medium wave transmitter at Addis Ababa and smaller ones at eight other towns. The total cost is approximately \$0.8 million (about 2 million Ethiopian dollars). <sup>1</sup>	MEED 23 Sept
US (Export- Import- Bank)	\$9.9	13 Sept	The US Export-Import Bank approved a loan of \$9.9 million to Ethiopian Airlines for the purchase of two Boeing 720B commercial jet aircraft for its trans-African and European routes, opening in 1963. <sup>1,3</sup>	Export-Import Bank, Press release 13 Sept MEED, 23 Sept IFNS, 28 Oct
US (DLF)	\$2.0	28 Nov	The DLF approved a loan of \$2 million to the government-owned Development Bank of Ethiopia to provide it with funds for credit for private agricultural and industrial projects. <sup>1,3</sup>	MEE, Dec
UN (Special Fund)	\$0.4	Dec	The UN Special Fund approved an allocation of \$0.4 million for the construction of a school for Veterinary Assistants.	MEED, 6 Jan 1961
IRAN				
World Bank (IBRD)	\$42.0	20 Feb	An agreement was signed between the World Bank and Iran's government for a loan of \$42 million to support a multipurpose project for generating electric, irrigation and flood control in Khuzistan, in southeastern Iran. The loan is for a term of 25 years and bears interest of 6¼ per cent; amortization will begin on 1 Aug 1964.	IBRD Annual Report 1959/60 MEJ, summer 1960 IFNS, 26 Feb



FOREIGN ECONOMIC AID TO ME COUNTRIES

<i>Donor</i>	<i>Amount (million)</i>	<i>Date</i>	<i>Details</i>	<i>Source</i>
UN (Special Fund)	\$0.5	May	The UN Special Fund approved a grant of \$0.5 million for soil fertility surveys in various parts of Iran; for the training of Iranian personnel in such surveying and for the establishment of a Soil Fertility Unit under the Ministry of Agriculture.	UN Special Fund, Report, 1960
IMF	\$17.0	July	The Governor of the Bank Melli announced that the IMF agreed to permit Iran to draw \$17 million, payable in sterling, to meet the current deterioration of its payments position. <sup>1, 7</sup>	MEED, 29 July
US (Bank of America)	\$10.0	July	Dr Kashani, Governor of the Bank Melli, announced that he had obtained a short-term loan of \$10 million from the Bank of America, to meet the country's current deterioration of its payments position. <sup>1</sup>	MEED, 29 July
US (PL 480)	\$50.0	Aug	The US approved a loan of \$50 million in the form of surplus wheat; 40 per cent as a long-term loan, 25.6 per cent as free aid and the remainder to cover US diplomatic expenditure in Iran. <sup>1, 5</sup>	MEED 12 Aug
IMF	\$35.0	10 Oct	The IMF authorized Iran to draw about \$35 million during the next 12 months. The aim of this loan is to support the stabilization programme designed to overcome its balance of payments difficulties. <sup>1, 7</sup>	IMF, 10 Oct Exec. board decision CDL, 15 Oct
US (Import- Export- Bank)	\$ 4.3	11 Oct	An agreement signed between Iran and the Export-Import Bank provided for a Bank credit of \$4.3 million for the purchase of cotton processing equipment and grain silos of US manufacture. <sup>1, 2</sup>	Export-Import Bank, Press release, 11 Oct IFNS, 28 Oct
UN (Special Fund)	\$ 2.4	Dec	The UN Special Fund approved a grant of \$2.4 million for two projects, the establishment of a Geological Survey Institute and of an Animal Health Institute.	MEED, 6 Jan 1961

IRAQ

USSR	ID 16.0 (\$45.0)	May	The credit line made available to Iraq under the Iraq-USSR agreement of 16 Mar 1959 was increased by about ID16 million, to ID65 million (about \$182 million). Projects to be financed by the Russian loan under the 1959 agreement included 13 industrial plants, four tractor stations, one broadcasting station, two grain silos, five experimental farms and a geological survey. Most of the industrial plants had been the subject of detailed studies and at least seven had reached the contract stage. <sup>1, 6</sup>	Iraq Times, 27 May MEED, 3 June Politique Etrangère No. 4, 1960
UN (Special Fund)	\$0.9	May	The UN Special Fund approved an allocation of \$0.9 million to train technicians for industry and government services at the post-secondary school level as well as teachers for vocational and technical schools.	UN Special Fund, 1960, Annual report

FOREIGN ECONOMIC AID TO ME COUNTRIES

<i>Donor</i>	<i>Amount (million)</i>	<i>Date</i>	<i>Details</i>	<i>Source</i>
Czecho- slovakia	ID12.0 (\$33.6)	23 Oct	After three weeks of negotiations, an agreement was signed in Baghdad between a Czech mission and the Iraqi authorities. A credit equivalent to ID12 million will be given by Czechoslovakia to be used on projects related to oil refining, petro-chemical industries, thermal and hydroelectric power stations and other industries. Czech technicians will submit detailed studies at the request of the Iraqi authorities; the credit will be drawn on for the supply of equipment and services when each project is finally approved. The credits will be refundable in eight equal instalments, starting a year after the completion of the particular project. The entire credit will be available until the end of 1965, on condition that the final contracts are concluded before the end of 1962. <sup>1</sup>	MEED, 18 Nov, 28 Dec
UN (Special Fund)	\$0.5	Dec	The Governing Council of the UN Special Fund approved a grant of \$0.5 million for an Animal Health Institute.	CDL, 24 Dec MEED, 6 Jan 1961
ISRAEL				
US (PL 480)	\$30.2	7 Jan	An agreement was signed on 7 Jan for the sale of \$30.2 million worth of US surplus farm products to Israel. This agreement was made under the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954. <sup>1, 2</sup> [The proceeds, in local currency, of this loan, together with that of \$7.4 million signed in June—see below—were to be utilized as follows: 20 per cent for US Government uses in Israel (educational grants, libraries, etc...) 15.9 per cent to be put at the disposal of the Export-Import Bank, for granting loans to private companies in Israel; 11.2 per cent to be given as a grant to the Israeli Government and 52.9 per cent to be given as a loan to the Israeli Government to finance development projects.]	MEED, 12 Feb MEJ, spring 1960
UN (Special Fund)	\$0.3	May	The UN Special Fund approved a grant of \$0.3 million for the construction of a series of experimental ground water collectors to intercept a portion of the fresh water escaping into the sea.	UN (Special Fund) 1960
US (DLF)	\$5.0	9 May	An agreement was signed on 9 May providing for a US DLF loan of \$5 million to the Industrial Development Bank of Israel, to finance new industries and expand existing plants. This loan is similar to the one granted in 1959. The Fund has so far approved a total of \$25 million for investment in Israel. <sup>1, 2</sup> The DLF mission also discussed the possibility of two new loans of \$8 million and \$2 million respectively to finance the purchase of new telephone equipment for the Israeli network and new electronic equipment for Lydda airport.	MEJ, summer 1960 MEED, 13 May

## FOREIGN ECONOMIC AID TO ME COUNTRIES

<i>Donor</i>	<i>Amount (million)</i>	<i>Date</i>	<i>Details</i>	<i>Source</i>
US (PL 480)	\$7.4	June	Under an agreement signed in Washington, Israel would receive \$7.4 million worth of surplus farm supply. This agreement made under public Law 480 is to run during the American fiscal year 1960. <sup>1, 2</sup> [For the utilization of the proceeds—see above—the loan of \$30.2 million of 7 Jan.]	MEED, 15 June
World Bank (IBRD)	\$27.5	9 Sept	The World Bank signed a loan equivalent to \$27.5 million to finance the construction of the port of Ashdod. The loan will cover the foreign exchange requirements and part of the local currency outlays in the first stage of the project estimated to cost a total of \$54.7 million. <sup>1, 4</sup>	IBRD Press release, 9 Sept MEED, 16 Sept MEA, Nov IFNS, 16 Sept
US (Export-Import Bank)	\$8.9	9 Sept	The Export-Import Bank agreed to participate with the Boeing aircraft company in financing the sale of two 707 commercial jet airliners to El Al Israel Airlines. The Bank's loan is of \$8.9 million and repayment is scheduled over a seven-year period. <sup>1, 2</sup>	Export-Import Bank, Press release, 9 Sept IFNS, 16 Sept MEED, 16 Sept
US (PL 480)	\$7.5	Oct	The US Government approved a grant of \$7.5 million to Israel in the form of grain supplies. <sup>1, 2</sup>	MEED, 21 Oct
US (Technical Assistance)	\$1.0	29 Nov	In the 1960/61 American fiscal year, Israel would receive \$1 million within the framework of America's Technical Assistance Programme. This sum would be used for the payment of expenses and salaries of American advisers in specialized subjects in Israel and for the training of Israeli technicians abroad. The US and Israeli Governments jointly announced on 29 Nov that America's Technical Assistance Programme to Israel would come to an end on 30 June 1962. <sup>1</sup>	MEED, 2 Dec
UN (Special Fund)	\$0.8	Dec	The UN Special Fund approved a grant of \$800,000 to Israel for the construction and equipment of a training centre for vocational instructors, technicians and foremen.	Ha'aretz, 22 Dec MEED, 6 Jan 1961

## JORDAN

UK	£2.0	May	Britain's grant-in-aid to Jordan for the 1960/61 fiscal year (beginning on 1 Apr) would amount to £2 million as in previous years.	MEED, 20 May Falastin, 30 Nov
UK	£0.5 (\$ 2.8)	May	The UK extended an interest-free loan of £0.5 million towards the cost of the Amman-Aqaba Road.	MEED, 20 May
KUWAIT	JD1.0 (\$2.8)	June	Kuwait approved a loan of JD 1 million at 4 per cent interest to finance development projects and improve water resources, to be repaid over the next ten years.	MEED, 8 June LFSPA, July



## FOREIGN ECONOMIC AID TO ME COUNTRIES

<i>Donor</i>	<i>Amount (million)</i>	<i>Date</i>	<i>Details</i>	<i>Source</i>
US	\$56.5	20 Aug	The US was to provide \$56.5 million during Jordan's fiscal year 1960/61 (from 1 Apr). Of this, about \$16 million was in the form of economic aid, technical aid, and \$40.5 million in the form of a subsidiary to the regular budget.	Radio-Beirut, 20 Aug MEA No. 9, 1960 Jerusalem Times, 1 Oct Jihad, 1 Oct MEED, 26 Aug-9 Sept
IMF	\$13.0	Oct	The IMF agreed that Jordan draw \$13 million to finance the foreign currency costs of its development projects. <sup>1, 7</sup>	MEED, 14 Oct MEC, 31 Oct

## LEBANON

US (DLF)	\$0.5	12 Feb	The DLF signed an agreement with the Lebanon to provide a loan to Soc. d'Electricité d'el-BARED SA, to help it to rebuild the plant which had been damaged during the disturbances of 1958. The loan would be used to import power plant equipment not manufactured in the Lebanon. <sup>1, 2</sup>	IFNS, 19 Feb
US	LL5.0 (\$1.5)	23 Mar	The US decided to make available to the Lebanon 20,000 tons of surplus wheat under PL 480. The LL5 million which this should bring in would be used to finance some important development schemes.	Hayat, 23 Mar CDL, 26 Mar
UN (Special Fund)	\$0.7	May	The UN Special Fund approved an allocation of \$0.7 million to help the Lebanon to develop small industries which suffered from a relative lack of technical and other advanced skills. The loan would be used to expand Lebanese technical schools and to introduce other forms of industrial training.	UN (Special Fund), 1960
US (DLF)	\$5.0	4 May	After negotiations lasting over a year, a loan agreement between the US-DLF and the Banque de Crédit Agricole Industriel et Foncier was signed in Washington 4 May. The Lebanese Bank would receive \$5 million to provide long-term loans for new industrial projects and the expansion of existing factories. <sup>1, 2</sup>	MEED, 13 May DLF, Press release, 4 May
US (Export-Import Bank)	\$3.1	19 May	The Export-Import Bank approved its agreement with the Société des Grands Hôtels du Liban to aid it in the construction of a hotel in Beirut. This credit would be used to purchase equipment and materials from the US. <sup>1, 2</sup>	Export-Import Bank, Press release, 19 May IFNS, 27 May
US (DLF)	\$0.4	8 Nov	The DLF approved a loan of \$0.4 million to the Société pour l'Industrie des Métaux for the expansion of its aluminium plant in Beirut. <sup>1, 2</sup>	MEED, 2 Sept MEE, Dec
UN (Special Fund)	\$0.6	Dec	The UN Special Fund approved a grant of \$0.6 million to the Lebanon for the construction of an Animal Health Institute.	CDL, 24 Dec MEED, 6 Jan 1961

## FOREIGN ECONOMIC AID TO ME COUNTRIES

<i>Donor</i>	<i>Amount (million)</i>	<i>Date</i>	<i>Details</i>	<i>Source</i>
LIBYA				
UK	£L3.25 (\$9.1)	1960/61	The Libyan budget for 1960/61 beginning on 1 Apr included a UK grant-in-aid of 3.25 million Libyan pounds.	IFNS, 22 Apr
US	\$10.0	1960/61	After two years of negotiations, the Libyan-US agreement of 1954 (under which Libya has received \$4 million annually from the US, in addition to grants and loans amounting to about \$10 million in 1959/60) was revised. During the five years beginning in 1960/61 Libya would receive for the use of the Wheelus base by US forces, \$10 million annually in addition to economic aid and gifts of grain and fodder. In the past the fixed payment was allocated entirely to a joint development agency, the Libyan-American Reconstruction Commission; under the new agreement, however, the Libyan Government was free to allocate these funds for any purpose it deems fit.	MEED, 30 Sept IFNS, 14 Oct
UN (Special Fund)	\$0.5	Dec	The UN Special Fund approved a grant of \$0.5 million to Libya for the establishment of a Radio and Telecommunications school.	CDL, 24 Dec MEED, 6 Jan 1961
SOMALIA				
UAR-Egypt	LE5.0 (\$14.0)	Dec 3	Egypt granted a credit of LE5 million, at 2.5 per cent interest, to the Somali Republic, to finance the purchase of Egyptian products over the next seven years. Under the trade and payments agreement concluded, Egypt's exports would consist chiefly of textiles, clothing and cement. 35 per cent of her imports from Somalia (bananas, cattle, animal skins) would be paid for in hard currency and the remainder in services and goods.	LFSPA, Dec MEED, 23 Dec MEE, Jan 1961
SUDAN				
World Bank (IBRD)	\$15.5	17 June	The World Bank agreed to lend \$15.5 million to help the Sudan in financing the completion of the Managil Irrigation scheme. When the scheme will be completed in 1962, it will comprise some 830,000 acres of irrigated land between the Blue and White Nile, permitting a 10 per cent annual increase in agricultural production. The loan is for 20 years at 6 per cent interest. Amortization will begin in June 1963.	MEED, 24 June IFNS, 24 June
US	LS4.6 (\$12.0)	Sept	The US economic aid programme to Sudan for the 1960/61 fiscal year amounted to the equivalent of 4.6 million Sudanese pounds in dollars, to finance various development projects. The first US aid programme in 1959 amounted to \$30.5 million and financed the construction of a textile mill, selected government projects and imports of equipment from the US. <sup>1</sup>	MEED, 9 Sept

**FOREIGN ECONOMIC AID TO ME COUNTRIES**

<i>Donor</i>	<i>Amount (million)</i>	<i>Date</i>	<i>Details</i>	<i>Source</i>
UN (Special Fund)	\$0.8	Dec	The UN Special Fund approved a \$0.8 million grant to the Sudan for the establishment of an Animal Health Institute and a development and training project of hides and leather industry.	CDL, 24 Dec MEED, 6 Jan 1961
German Federal Republic	\$23.0	Dec	An agreement was signed in Khartoum between West Germany and the Sudanese Government providing for a German loan of \$23 million for the development of the Sudanese economy. <sup>1</sup>	CDL, 4 Jan 1961
<b>TURKEY</b>				
US (DLF)	\$105.0	Jan	The DLF approved a \$105 million loan for the construction of a second steel plant at Ereğli in Western Anatolia. The total cost of the plant was estimated at \$245 million. <sup>1,8</sup>	MEED, 29 Jan
US (DLF)	\$7.0	3 Feb	The DLF signed an agreement with Etibank, a public agency, for a \$7 million loan, for extending and improving the electric power distribution networks of some 15 Turkish municipal utility systems. <sup>1, 3</sup>	IFNS, 19 Feb MEA, Mar
German Federal Republic	\$50.0	Apr	The West German Government agreed to extend a new credit line of \$50 million; \$35 million of which would be made available in convertible currencies and \$15 million in Deutsche Mark. <sup>1</sup>	MEED, 15 Apr
UN (Special Fund)	\$0.3	May	The UN Special Fund decided to allocate \$0.3 million to assist in the preparation of a long-term development plan for the Anatolia Region. The Special Fund would provide foreign experts in agriculture, forestry, economics, water resources, geology and industrial development.	UN Special Fund, 1960 Report
US (DLF)	\$6.0	13 Dec	The US DLF signed a \$6 million loan agreement with the Government of Turkey for financing the construction of a 64 mile single-track railway between the towns of Mees and Tat in south-eastern Turkey. <sup>1, 8</sup>	MEED, 22 July MEA, Aug-Sept, Feb 1961
OEEC	\$50.0	Dec	Under an agreement between the OEEC and the Turkish Government, the latter was granted \$50 million credit to meet its foreign payments difficulties. <sup>1</sup>	MEED, 6 Jan 1961 CDL monthly, 15 Jan 1961
IMF	\$37.5	30 Dec	The Turkish Government concluded an agreement with the IMF which authorized Turkey to draw \$37.5 million during a period of one year. <sup>1, 7</sup>	CDL monthly, edition 15 Jan 1961 MEA, Mar 1961
<b>UAR-EGYPT</b>				
US (PL 480)	\$15.0	26 Mar	The US and Egypt signed an agreement for the supply of \$15 million worth of US tobacco, cotton, seed oil and corn payable in local currency. <sup>1,8</sup>	MEED, 1 Apr IFNS, 8 Apr
IMF	\$7.5	17 May	The IMF agreed to the UAR-Egypt drawing \$7.5 million to meet its balance of payments problems. <sup>1,7</sup>	IMF Press release, 9 Dec
UN (Special Fund)	\$1.0	May	The UN Special Fund approved an allocation to Egypt for the training of civil aviation personnel.	MEE, June UN Special Fund, 1960



## FOREIGN ECONOMIC AID TO ME COUNTRIES

Donor	Amount (million)	Date	Details	Source
Czechoslovakia	\$7.5 \$21.0	17 June	Czechoslovakia agreed to export to Egypt on credit engineering products to the value of £7.5 million, ten per cent to be paid within four months of signature, a further 10 per cent at each delivery and the remainder in four equal annual instalments starting a year after delivery with 3 per cent interest. The main items included drainage equipment, water pumping stations, generating sets, vehicles and bridges.	Economic Bulletin, National Bank of Egypt No. 3-4, 1960 JCM 12 Dec
US	\$7.0	2 Aug	The DLF agreed to lend \$7 million to the Industrial Bank of Egypt. The funds would be used to provide medium and long-term loans for financing development projects undertaken by private industries. The loan was for ten years at 5 per cent interest.	IFNS, 9 Sept EEPR, Jan 1961
USSR	LE81.0 (\$231.4)	27 Aug	It was announced in Cairo that an agreement had been reached between the governments of the UAR and the USSR whereby the latter agreed to finance all the stages involved in the construction of the Aswan High Dam in addition to the first stage as previously agreed. The second line of credit, amounting to LE 81 million, will be repayable in 12 yearly instalments after the completion of the dam at an annual interest of 2½ per cent. [The principal agreement to this effect was announced in Jan.] (See also p 1000 5247.)	MEED, 2 Sept IFNS, 5 Feb
US (PL 480)	\$58.2	1 Aug	Under an agreement concluded between Egypt and the US, Egypt would receive \$58.2 million worth of American surplus agricultural products during 1960/61. <sup>1, 3</sup>	MEED, 26 Aug MEJ, spring 1960 EEPR, Jan 1961
US (Export-Import Bank)	\$22.5	10 Sept	The Export-Import Bank approved a \$22.5 million eight-year credit, to finance the purchase of 100 General Motors diesel locomotives with spare parts and tools from the US repayable from May 1962. The agreement was signed in Washington. <sup>1, 2</sup>	MEA, Nov MEED, 16 Sept, 28 Oct MEE, Sept-Oct
US (DLF)	\$0.2	24 Oct	The DLF approved a loan of \$0.2 million to the privately-owned Edfina Company of Alexandria, to help expand its vegetable and fruit canning and shrimp freezing plant. The new equipment would be bought in the US. It is a ten year loan, at 5.75 per cent interest.	MEE, Nov MEED, 11 Nov EEPR, Jan 1961
German Democratic Republic	LE7.5 (\$21.0)	7 Nov	Under an agreement reached between Egypt and the GDR, Egypt obtained a long-term credit of LE7.5 million, to be used to import equipment for new textile mills. <sup>1</sup>	MEED, 18 Nov MEE, Dec
US (DLF)	\$6.7	22 Nov	The DLF approved a loan of \$6.7 million to finance the construction of a paper mill at Edfu, in Upper Egypt. This loan would cover the costs of US equipment, engineering services and a one-year management contract. The plant was a state enterprise but it was to be turned over to private ownership under a formula to be agreed on by the DLF. <sup>1, 3</sup>	MEED, 9 Dec MEE, Dec
IMF	\$27.3	9 Dec	The IMF approved the UAR-Egyptian request for permission to draw \$27.3 million to meet its present payments problems. <sup>1, 7</sup>	IMF, Press release, 9 Dec

## FOREIGN ECONOMIC AID TO ME COUNTRIES

<i>Donor</i>	<i>Amount (million)</i>	<i>Date</i>	<i>Details</i>	<i>Source</i>
UN (Special Fund)	\$2.6	21 Dec	The UN Special Fund approved a grant of \$2.6 million programme of assistance for the UAR-Egypt for four projects: a food processing plant, a cotton research laboratory, a Vocational Instructor Training Institute and an Animal Health Institute.	CDL, 24 Dec MEED, 6 Jan 1961 MEE, Jan 1961
Hungary	£6.0 (\$16.8)	22 Dec	Under an agreement signed in Cairo, Hungary would extend credit facilities totalling £6.0 million to the two regions of the UAR for the supply of capital goods and other commodities. The loan would be repaid over five years. <sup>1</sup>	MEED, 6 Jan 1961
UAR-SYRIA				
IMF	\$7.5	17 May	The IMF announced that it had authorized the UAR-Syrian Region, to draw up to the equivalent of \$7.5 million, to ease foreign exchange difficulties resulting from a prolonged drought. <sup>1, 7</sup>	MEJ, summer 1960 MEED, 20 May
US (DLF)	\$5.0	15 Aug	The DLF agreed to provide a \$5.0 million loan to the Industrial Bank of Syria to finance private industry projects. The loan is repayable over ten years, at 5 per cent interest.	VEFRPA, Aug MEED, 26 Aug EEPR, Jan 1961
US (PL 480)	\$18.6	17 Sept	America agreed to supply Syria with \$18.6 million worth of American wheat and wheat flour during the 1960/61 season. The purchase was to be paid for in local currency over a period of 30 years, at an interest rate of 4 per cent. Of the counterpart funds to be thus accumulated, 80 per cent would be made available for loans to the government and to private concerns for economic development projects. <sup>1, 8</sup>	MEED, 26 Aug VEFRPA, Sept EEPR, Jan 1961
US (DLF)	\$2.5	12 Oct	The DLF approved a \$2.5 million loan to Syria for financing the purchase of equipment for a telephone and telegraph system. <sup>1, 8</sup>	MEED, 21 Oct
UN (Special Fund)	LS4.0 (\$1.1)	Oct	The UN Special Fund granted LS 4 million under its programme of assistance for the UAR-Syrian Region. This was to be used to finance water research projects in the Jezirah region.	VEFRPA, Oct
IMF	\$5.0	17 Nov	Syria obtained a loan of \$5 million from the IMF to relieve its foreign payments difficulties, resulting from the decline in its exports in the last two years. <sup>1, 7</sup>	MEED, 4 Nov MEE, Dec
Czecho- slovakia	LS10.0 (\$2.8)	15 Dec	Czechoslovakia granted the Syrian Ministry of Municipal and Village Affairs a credit equivalent to LS10 million (approximately \$2.8 million) to purchase materials and equipment for water and electricity projects, road-construction and other projects. The credit was for five years with interest at 3 per cent per annum.	MEED, 23 Dec

INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE TO MIDDLE-EAST COUNTRIES IN 1960

(in millions of dollars)

Recipient Countries	CONTRIBUTING COUNTRY OR AGENCY													
	Soviet Bloc		Western Countries and Agencies				ME Countries		UN Special Fund	Total Foreign Aid	Total Soviet Aid	Total Western Aid		
	USSR	Czechoslovakia	East Germany	US	United Kingdom	West Germany	OECD	World Bank (IBRD)					IMF	UAR-Egypt
Ethiopia	100.0	—	—	12.7	—	—	—	—	—	—	1.3	114.0	100.0	12.7
Iran	—	—	—	64.3	—	—	—	42.0	52.0	—	2.9	161.2	—	158.3
Iraq	45.0	33.6	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1.4	80.0	78.6	—
Israel	—	—	—	60.0	—	—	—	27.5	—	—	1.1	88.6	—	87.5
Jordan	—	—	—	56.5	7.0	—	—	—	13.0	—	2.8	79.3	—	76.5
Lebanon	—	—	—	10.5	—	—	—	—	—	—	1.3	11.8	—	10.5
Libya	—	—	—	10.0	9.1	—	—	—	—	—	0.5	19.6	—	19.1
Somalia	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	14.0	—	14.0	—	—
Sudan	—	—	—	12.0	—	23.0	—	15.5	—	—	0.8	51.3	—	50.5
Turkey	—	—	—	118.0	—	50.0	50.0	—	37.5	—	0.3	255.8	—	255.5
UAR-Egypt	231.4	21.0	16.8	109.6	—	—	—	—	34.8	—	3.6	438.2	290.2	144.4
UAR-Syria	—	2.8	—	26.1	—	—	—	—	12.5	—	1.1	42.5	2.8	38.6
UAR-Total	(231.4)	(23.8)	(16.8)	(21.0)	(135.7)	—	—	—	(47.3)	—	(4.7)	(480.7)	(293.0)	(183.0)
Total	376.4	57.4	16.8	21.0	479.7	16.1	73.0	50.0	85.0	149.8	14.0	1,356.3	471.6	853.6



## FOREIGN ECONOMIC AID TO ME COUNTRIES

### NOTES ON US ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE

- (a) In order to avoid double counting, agreements on the use of counterpart funds accruing from the domestic sale of US surplus agricultural commodities are not included as part of the US economic assistance. The figures given for US economic assistance do include the original surplus food agreements signed during 1960.
- (b) Economic assistance includes the new agreements concluded throughout the 1960 calendar year. It should be noted that these data:
  1. include only governmental loans and grants;
  2. exclude private donations, and commercial loans by private institutions;
  3. exclude all military assistance. There is no data about the Soviet Military Assistance. The US Military Assistance Programme for the American fiscal year 1960 (July 1959–June 1960) is as follows:  
Ethiopia—\$8,301,000; Iran—\$51,328,000; Israel—\$35,000 (as credit); Jordan—\$5,163,000; Libya—\$678,000; Sudan—\$7,000 and Turkey—\$104,463,000.
- (c) Western countries and agencies include:
  1. IBRD and IMF because the Soviet Bloc does not participate in these agencies.
  2. The US holds about 33 per cent of IBRD shares and about 29 per cent of the IMF's total subscriptions; because of this the US has an important influence in these agencies.

(NE Report, 1 Mar)

### GENERAL NOTES

- <sup>1</sup> Maturity of loan and/or interest rate not specified.
- <sup>2</sup> *Export-Import Bank*: Maturity of loans up to ten years. Interest rate 5¼–6 per cent.
- <sup>3</sup> *Development Loan Fund*: Maturity of loans up to 30 years. Interest rate 3.5 per cent for basic government projects; 5¼ per cent for profit-earning projects.
- <sup>4</sup> *International Bank for Reconstruction and Development*: Generally maturity of loans 15–25 years. Its current interest rate 6 per cent.
- <sup>5</sup> *Public Law 480*: Loans under this law are given through Export-Import Bank or DLF.
- <sup>6</sup> Usually credits are extended for 12 years and bear 2.5 per cent interest a year (according to the USSR Mission to the UN, Press release No. 6/60).
- <sup>7</sup> Maturity of loans not exceeding three–five years; interest rate 2.5 per cent per annum.
- <sup>8</sup> Including about 90,000 tons of American agricultural surplus wheat worth \$5 million.

### SOURCES

IBRD	International Bank For Reconstruction And Development (World Bank), Fifteenth Annual Report, 1959/60.
IFNS	International Financial News Survey, published by the Secretary of the International Monetary Fund, US.
CDL	Le Commerce du Levant.
VEFRPA	Etude mensuelle sur la Vie Economique et Financière de la RAU et des Pays Arabes, Bureau des documentations arabes, Damas.
LFSPA	Etude mensuelle sur l'Economie et les Finances de la RAU et des Pays Arabes—Centre d'études et de documentations économiques, financières et sociales, Damas (Syrie) RAU.
EEPR	The Egyptian Economic & Political Review, a monthly review of politics and economics in the Middle East, Cairo, UAR.
MEJ	Middle East Journal.
MEA	Middle Eastern Affairs.
MEE	The Middle East Economist, a monthly report to management on business conditions in the Middle East, Cairo, South UAR.
MEC	Mid-East Commerce, a non-political magazine published in the Middle East, Beirut, Lebanon.
MEED	Middle East Economic Digest, a weekly of analyses and forecasts.
Politique Etrangère:	Centre d'études politiques, Paris.
Economic Bulletin,	National Bank of Egypt, published by the Research Department of the Bank, Cairo.
IMF	International Monetary Fund, Press release.
UN	Special Fund, 1960 Report.

**THE FOREIGN TRADE OF THE ME COUNTRIES**  
**IMPORTS ACCORDING TO THE IMPORTING COUNTRIES**  
(in millions of \$)

IMPORTS TO														
	Cyprus 1958	Ethiopia 1958	Iran 1958	Iraq 1959	Israel 1959	Jordan 1959	Kuwait 1959	Lebanon 1959	Libya 1958	Saudi Arabia 1958	Sudan 1958	Turkey 1959	UAR- Egypt 1959	UAR- Syria 1959
<i>Imports from</i>														
Bulgaria	—	—	—	—	1.5	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	3.6	0.9
China	—	—	—	—	—	1.2	—	—	—	—	1.5	—	23.1	1.7
Czechoslovakia	1.3	1.2	8.2	5.0	0.2	1.1	—	2.7	0.8	—	2.8	—	22.6	3.5
German Democratic Republic	—	—	—	—	—	2.2	—	1.3	—	—	0.1	3.5	24.9	1.8
Hungary	—	—	—	—	0.4	0.4	—	—	—	—	0.4	—	9.4	1.8
Poland	—	—	—	—	1.4	1.3	—	0.8	—	—	2.3	1.9	7.5	7.0
Rumania	1.2	—	—	—	2.4	0.7	—	2.0	—	—	—	—	12.5	3.3
USSR	—	0.4	24.8	3.9	0.3	—	—	2.5	—	—	0.5	—	75.0	5.9
Austria	1.6	—	—	—	2.4	1.3	—	3.3	0.7	—	0.8	—	5.2	3.8
Belgium	2.6 <sup>2</sup>	1.7	—	15.7 <sup>2</sup>	9.0	2.3	—	7.0	0.9	—	6.2	2.6	8.8	8.1
France	5.4	2.1	14.4	0.8	22.7	2.1	—	23.3	7.3	—	4.2	5.4	16.5	16.4
German Federal Republic	9.0	7.4	97.6	27.9	49.9	13.7	23.0	25.6	7.7	—	10.8	26.0	78.1	23.4
Greece	2.1	0.2	—	—	1.1	—	—	0.8	0.3	—	0.3	—	3.8	0.3
India	1.0	7.6	2.8	5.3	0.1	0.3	—	0.7	0.9	—	20.3	—	15.4	2.0
Iran	—	0.3	—	—	0.3	2.2	—	1.1	—	—	8.9	—	0.3	1.0
Israel	1.4	0.2	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Italy	7.5	11.7	13.8	4.2	11.6	9.3	—	17.3	21.5	—	4.5	10.4	30.4	11.3
Japan	0.6	8.4	46.0	23.8	7.2	4.9	30.0	4.6	—	15.4	7.3	—	8.3	5.5
Netherlands	4.2	1.8	—	10.6	20.9	3.6	—	6.7	3.7	—	5.7	—	11.6	7.3
Switzerland	0.8	0.5	—	—	17.6	0.7	—	5.8	—	—	1.5	2.1	14.5	4.1
Turkey	0.3	—	—	—	8.2	2.1	—	9.0	—	—	—	—	43.4	4.4
United Kingdom	39.4	7.8	65.4	100.8	48.8	13.4	51.0	73.6	21.4	—	56.9	12.7	43.3	15.0
United States	3.9	11.7	75.5	33.0	126.3	10.5	60.0	34.8	20.7	60.6 <sup>7</sup>	5.1	29.9	83.9	13.6
Yugoslavia	0.4	0.6	—	—	4.2	0.9	—	1.7	0.5	—	—	—	14.6	1.7
Total all countries (including those not specified)	102.9	77.9	446.6	326.2	428.5	112.9	164.0 <sup>5</sup>	319.6	96.6	217.3 <sup>8</sup>	178.2	137.7	600.3	176.9
<i>Eastern bloc</i>														
Total	2.5	1.6	33.0	8.9	6.2	6.9	—	9.3	0.8	—	7.6	5.4	48.6	25.9
Per cent	2.4	2.05	7.4	2.11	1.4	6.1	—	2.9	0.828	—	4.2	3.9	24.7	14.6
<i>Western bloc and other countries</i>														
Total	80.2	62.0	295.5	222.2	330.3	66.3	164.0	215.3	85.6	76.0	132.5	89.1	378.1	117.5
Per cent	78.0	78.1	66.1	61.3	77.07	58.7	100	67.3	88.6	34.9	74.3	64.7	61.3	66.3

**THE FOREIGN TRADE OF THE ME COUNTRIES**  
**EXPORTS ACCORDING TO THE EXPORTING COUNTRIES**  
*(in millions of dollars)*

EXPORTS FROM														
	Cyprus 1958	Ethiopia 1958	Iran 1958	Iraq 1959	Israel 1959	Jordan 1959	Kuwait 1959	Lebanon 1959	Libya 1958	Saudi Arabia 1958	Sudan 1958	Turkey 1959	UAR- Egypt 1959	UAR- Syria 1959
Exports to														
Bulgaria	—	—	—	—	1.1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	3.8	1.3
China	—	—	—	2.2	—	—	—	—	—	—	2.0	—	32.9	0.1
Czechoslovakia	0.3	0.3	3.3	—	—	0.5	—	0.2	—	—	3.4	3.6	45.4	3.4
German Democratic Republic	—	—	—	—	0.2	—	—	0.2	—	—	0.9	2.7	29.3	0.4
Hungary	—	—	—	—	0.6	—	—	—	—	—	0.7	—	7.0	0.6
Poland	—	—	—	—	1.2	—	—	0.1	—	—	1.8	2.3	16.1	1.3
Rumania	0.1	—	—	—	1.9	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	8.1	0.8
USSR	0.3	0.1	23.1	2.5	—	—	—	2.9	—	—	—	—	79.3	4.3
Austria	0.1	—	—	—	0.9	—	—	0.1	—	—	0.2	—	7.6	0.1
Belgium	0.8 <sup>2</sup>	0.7	—	0.6 <sup>2</sup>	9.3	—	—	0.4	—	—	2.6	2.3	4.0	1.2
France	2.9	1.2	8.4	—	4.2	—	—	1.5	—	—	7.5	5.1	8.8	15.9
German Federal Republic	12.8	1.3	16.3	0.8	17.1	—	—	1.3	0.9	—	12.0	24.8	19.8	2.5
Greece	—	0.7	—	—	1.9	—	—	1.3	0.4	—	0.7	—	2.9	—
India	—	—	2.5	2.4	—	—	0.2	0.2	—	—	14.1	—	19.0	—
Iran	0.2	—	—	—	1.3	—	—	1.3	—	—	—	—	—	0.7
Israel	0.2	1.7	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Italy	2.3	7.3	3.6	—	4.4	—	—	2.0	4.5	—	7.4	9.1	20.4	5.8
Japan	—	0.3	2.0	—	1.6	—	—	0.2	—	144.8	3.4	—	13.2	4.1
Netherlands	3.8	1.8	—	0.1	8.0	—	—	—	0.5	—	3.2	—	8.6	0.2
Switzerland	0.1	0.4	—	—	9.7	—	—	1.0	—	—	0.8	2.7	10.6	0.1
Turkey	—	—	—	—	9.0	—	—	0.2	—	—	—	—	11.3	0.5
United Kingdom	14.4	2.8	11.3	4.2	33.8	—	—	2.0	1.8	—	36.5	10.6	0.5	4.2
United States	13.0	18.8	14.4	3.0	27.5	—	—	4.2	—	142.9 <sup>1</sup>	3.9	19.6	5.7	7.2
Yugoslavia	—	1.8	—	—	5.4	1.7	—	0.4	—	—	—	—	9.9	0.5
Total all countries (including those not specified)	51.1	68.0	106.0 <sup>2</sup>	32.2 <sup>4</sup>	172.0	9.5	—	63.2	12.1	1067.5 <sup>2,3</sup>	129.6	110.5	431.9	100.0
Eastern bloc														
Total	0.7	0.4	26.4	4.7	5.0	0.5	—	3.4	—	—	8.8	8.6	221.9	12.1
Per cent Western bloc and other countries	1.3	5.8	24.9	14.5	2.9	5.26	—	5.3	—	—	5.01	7.7	51.4	12.1
Total	50.4	38.6	58.5	11.1	134.3	1.9	—	16.1	8.1	287.7	92.3	74.2	112.3	43.0
Per cent	98.7	56.7	55.1	34.4	78.0	20.0	—	25.4	66.9	33.1	71.2	67.1	26.0	43.0

**FOREIGN TRADE OF ME COUNTRIES**

## FOREIGN TRADE OF ME COUNTRIES

### FOREIGN TRADE

#### NOTES AND SOURCES

- <sup>1</sup> All the sums have been computed at the official rate of currency exchange.
- <sup>2</sup> Including trade with Luxembourg.
- <sup>3</sup> Excluding oil exports. During 1958, total crude exports were 23.8 million long tons and total exports of refined products were 15.6 million long tons.
- <sup>4</sup> Excluding export of crude oil—which amounted to \$564.7 million.
- <sup>5</sup> This is the total of the imports from the four mentioned countries. No data were available concerning the imports from other countries, which are of minor importance.
- <sup>6</sup> Exports from Kuwait other than oil are only of very minor importance. In 1959, Kuwait was one of the largest exporters of crude oil, supplying about 59 million tons.
- <sup>7</sup> Including trade with Canada.
- <sup>8</sup> There are no detailed data concerning the trade with the different countries.
- <sup>9</sup> Export of crude oil included.

**SOURCES:** Cyprus, Ethiopia, Libya, Sudan: Yearbook of International Trade Statistics 1958, Volume I, Department of Economic and Social Affairs.

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## MIDDLE EAST OIL CONFERENCES

## ORGANIZATION OF PETROLEUM EXPORTING COUNTRIES (OPEC)

**Background.** On 9 Aug Esso Export, the marketing subsidiary of Standard Oil of New Jersey, announced that official posted prices of its crude oil in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf would be cut with immediate effect by 4 to 14 cents a barrel, i.e. by 2½-6 per cent. (These were the first cuts in posted prices since Feb 1959, when the overtaking and surpassing of pre-Suez oil output level figures led to reductions of some 10 per cent and a return to earlier price levels.) Similar announcements were made within the week by all the other major oil companies operating in the ME. (*MEED*, 12, 26 Aug)

The action of the companies was explained by the need to bring posted prices into line with actual selling prices, in view of rapidly expanding crude oil production and increasing competition. Esso specifically mentioned Russia, which was rapidly intensifying her penetration into several oil markets. (*PPS*, Sept)

Repercussions from the oil-exporting countries were considerable. Iran, which was attempting to regain the position she had held prior to the Mousadeq nationalization and was suffering from financial difficulties, was seriously upset: the Shah felt that, although the cuts might have been unavoidable, the companies should have consulted the government in advance. The Kuwait Government's Oil Affairs Bureau publicly stated that it was "dissatisfied" and "unhappy" at the unilateral decisions. Shaykh Abdullah Tariqi of Saudi Arabia declared at the 1959 Arab Oil Congress that oil prices should not be modified without prior consultation with the producing countries. (*MEED*, 26 Aug, 2 Sept; *MEA*, June-July 1961, Article by Benjamin Shwadran)

**OPEC Established.** On 25 Aug the Iraqi Oil Ministry invited representatives of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar and Venezuela to meet in Baghdad to adopt a "unified attitude" against oil companies that reduced prices "unilaterally and without consultations." The conference opened on 10 Sept and lasted until 14 Sept, with official delegations from Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iran and Venezuela. Muhammad Salmān, Director of the Arab League's Oil Bureau, and Dr Hasan Kāmil of Qatar attended as observers. The conference decided, subject to the approval of the governments: to try to have the price cuts rescinded; that companies must consult with governments concerned before any price change, should this again become necessary to devise a method, with proper safeguards, for controlling production to maintain prices; to stand united against any efforts by the companies to divide the producing countries; to establish, with the participating countries as founding members, the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), a permanent organization with a secretariat; to unify the oil policies of member-countries and work out the best means for safeguarding the specific interests of each member. (*Iraq Times*, 11 Sept, 25 Sept; *Mid. Mirror*, 1 Oct; *MEA* June-July 1961)

By the beginning of Oct the five governments had ratified the conference decisions, and the OPEC was formally constituted. (*Financial Times*; *Iraq Times*, 6 Oct)

**Differences Over Pro-rationing.** The inherent difficulties

of converting into an operative organization the objectives of the resolutions adopted were not overcome. The main problem was how to control production in order to maintain prices. The Saudi Arabian and Venezuelan delegates, who had maintained contact with each other since the first Arab Oil Congress and had a similar basic approach, regarded oil as a wasting asset, which ought to be protected by international pro-rationing. Iraq, which in Oct 1959 had rejected the idea as harmful to her own needs, gradually accepted the view that a method could be worked out to enable production to be expanded within the framework of pro-rationing. Kuwait objected, but indicated her readiness to share out any increase in future demand. Iran remained non-committal during the conference. (*MEED*, 30 Sept; *Petroleum Times*, 7 Oct; *PPS*, Oct) At the beginning of Dec, in an interview with the American Oil journal *Petroleum Week*, the Shah said, while acknowledging the usefulness of OPEC, that international pro-rationing was "a nice theory but unrealistic in practice." (*Petroleum Week*, Dec)

**Member-Governments Protest to Companies.** Following up the first resolution of the OPEC founding conference, each member-government submitted a formal protest against the price reductions to each company and demanded the restoration of the previous prices. (*MEED*, 11 Nov)

**Qatar Requests Membership.** Shortly after the Baghdad conference, Qatar applied for membership in OPEC. (*Iraq Times*, 6 Oct)

**OPEC Sub-Committee Meeting.** A sub-committee of the organization met in Baghdad between 30 Nov and 5 Dec. It drew up rules and regulations and convoked the second plenary meeting to take place in Caracas on 15 Jan 1961. (*MEED*, 9 Dec)

## SECOND ARAB PETROLEUM CONGRESS

The second Arab Petroleum Congress, organized by the Arab League Petroleum Department, was held in Beirut from 17-23 Oct, with over 500 delegates and observers. The latter represented oil companies, interested institutions, and countries outside the Arab League, including Brazil, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Rumania, the Provisional Algerian Government, the USSR and Venezuela. Tunisia, Iran and Qatar were not represented. (*CDL Mensuelle*, 15 Oct, 15 Nov; *Petroleum Times*, 4 Nov)

In his opening speech, Muhammad Salmān, the chairman, sharply criticized the companies for not having consulted the governments before reducing posted prices, but was otherwise conciliatory and sought their cooperation. (*PPS*, Nov)

**Saudi Arabian Views.** The three papers which aroused most discussion were all contributed by members of the Saudi Arabian delegation: Matthew Sladik on pro-rationing to deal with oil surpluses; Shaykh Tariqi, Director-General of Petroleum Affairs, on oil prices; and Frank Hendryx, an American, the Saudi Arabian legal advisor on oil, on the government's rights to abrogate contracts unilaterally. In varying terms the companies' spokesmen all repudiated Tariqi's contention that they were making enormous unshared profits outside those

declared. Critics and admirers agreed that Tariqi was the conference "star." (*Financial Times*, 24 Oct)

Saudi Arabia, through Tariqi and Hendryx, lashed out against the companies, the former pressing for the integrated company, and the latter repeating his doctrine of the governments' right to modify concession terms unilaterally. Company representatives objected vigorously, while the Arab delegates were divided, some maintaining that Islamic law forbade breach of contract, and others arguing that since the doctrine was based on considerations of public interest, it was within Islamic law. (*MEA June-July 1961*, see also *Petroleum Times*, 4 Nov; *CDL, Mensuelle*, 15 Nov)

**Soviet Policy.** E.P. Gurov, head of the Soviet Oil Export Organization and leader of the Soviet delegation, rebutting a charge that the USSR was dumping oil on Western markets, stated that Russia's oil exports to Western Europe in 1956-1959 totalled only 24 million tons, about 4 per cent of that region's imports. The USSR was determined to recapture its pre-war place among the oil-exporting nations; it would compete in the ME's traditional oil markets in Western Europe, and would not help to maintain artificially high prices. Gurov's statement was said to have been as much a shock to the Arab oil-producing countries as it was a threat to the Western companies. (*PPS, Nov*; *Petroleum Times*, 2 Dec; *MEA, June-July 1961*)

**Resolutions.** Four resolutions were adopted by the congress, though they were not binding on anyone. The first upheld the efforts of the Arab countries to improve the terms of the concessions. "The members of the congress express their hope that the companies will respond favourably to such equitable demands to ensure continuation of the fruitful cooperation between them and the governments to the common interests of the governments and companies as well as the consumers." In the second resolution, the congress disavowed "the resort of the petroleum companies to a reduction of prices of crude oil and its products without the consent of the Arab producing countries." The congress also upheld the repudiation of such reductions by the governments. The third resolution recommended that the Arab governments redouble their efforts for greater Arab participation in the activities of the Petroleum Congress. The fourth resolution proposed that the congress be convened "every year on Monday of the third week of October" and that the third congress be held in Cairo.

(*CDL*, 26 Oct; *MEA, June-July 1961*; see also *Mid. Mirror* 22, 29 Oct for summary of conference proceedings and resolutions.)

**Foreign Press Comment.** Western petroleum trade journals generally commented favourably. *The Petroleum Times* stated "In that the congress allowed for the exchange of ideas in its formal session, and even more outside the congress building, it can be considered both successful and useful." (*Petroleum Times*, 4 Nov) *The Petroleum Press Service*, while pointing out a sense of "latent uneasiness and strain which it will take more than a conference of this kind to dissolve," summed up: "Between the Arab oil-producing countries and the companies working in the ME there exist differences which call for much more understanding if fruitful cooperation is to be maintained. The friendly desire to achieve this, but the distance still to go before comprehension clears away misconceptions, were the dominant first-hand impressions at the Congress." The producing countries, pre-occupied with their problems, and particularly with the pricing of oil, tend to overlook the interests of the consumer, and there is obviously need for much more enlightenment on the complexities of world-wide competitive marketing." (*PPS, Nov*)

#### NOV: ARAB OIL EXPERTS MEETING

A meeting of Arab oil experts opened in Baghdad on 12 Nov and continued until 24 Nov. It was opened by Muhammad Salmān, Director of the Arab League's Oil Bureau, and attended by representatives from Kuwait, UAR, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, Iraq, Qatar, Bahrain. Delegations from Jordan, Sudan, Libya, Yemen, Morocco and Algeria were invited to be present, but did not respond.

The conference was to prepare recommendations for the Dec session of the Arab League Economic Council. Its agenda included the formation of an Arab pipeline company, the establishment of an Arab tanker fleet and matters relating to Israel. The conference decided to recommend the establishment of an Arab tanker company with an initial capital of £35 million, 51 per cent of the shares to be taken up by the governments and 49 per cent to be offered to the public in the countries concerned. (*Mid. Mirror*, 26 Nov)

The Arab League Economic Council postponed the issue of the Arab pipeline to 1961. (*Hayat*, 16 Dec; *BBC*, 20 Dec)

# THE COMMUNIST BLOC AND THE MIDDLE EAST

## THE COMMUNIST BLOC AND THE MIDDLE EAST IN GENERAL

NOTES: 1. This chapter surveys in detail only the relations between the Communist countries and those ME countries whose foreign relations are otherwise fully covered, namely the Arab countries and Israel. To fill out the rest of the picture, relations with Cyprus, Iran and Turkey have been reviewed in the form of summaries.

2. Factual relations between the Chinese People's Republic and ME countries have been covered, but not views, comments and propaganda. For Peking Radio broadcasts in Arabic, Persian and Turkish, see BBC FE.

3. For relations between Communist and ME countries see the surveys below; for the relations with the Omani insurgents, Saudi Arabia and Yemen—see under the foreign relations of these countries. The synopsis below sets out only the general trend of current Communist-ME relations, with emphasis on the political aspects. See in addition the synopses of the foreign relations of the individual countries. Soviet writing on the ME is thoroughly covered in *The Mizan Newsletter*.

### SYNOPSIS

The primary aims of the Communist bloc in the ME in 1960 remained the elimination of Western positions, the prevention of a return of Western influence where it had been eliminated, and its replacement by Soviet positions. The Soviet approach thus continued to be determined by the attitude of the ME countries to the East-West conflict, the nature of their internal regimes being of secondary importance.

The methods employed included threats and subversive propaganda, diplomatic activity, economic, technical and military aid, and cultural cooperation. In the case of the UAR, there was also cooperation in the world arena based on coinciding interests.

There was direct Soviet criticism of internal affairs only when political relations were strained in any case, and it was discontinued when relations improved. Communist comment and propaganda, however, was disseminated not only at the official Soviet level but also through clandestine broadcasts and international Communist publications. There were three clandestine radio stations broadcasting to the ME: "Our Radio" in Turkish, "The National Voice of Iran" in Persian, and "The Voice of Truth" in Greek (broadcasting also to Cyprus); these continued their attacks even after the Moscow sources had changed their tone in accordance with efforts to improve relations. In several instances, this was also the case with the Berlin (GDR) station and the *World Marxist Review*, both of which, e.g., published reports and Communist statements attacking the UAR in the sharpest of terms, even calling for revolt. Soviet periodicals were generally more critical than broadcasts and the daily Press.

The general line of Soviet argument for the adoption of a neutral policy by ME countries was as follows:

Western policy in the area was imperialistic, i.e. de-

signed to exploit it for Western economic interests and aggressive purposes;

Governments collaborating with the West were therefore its puppets and traitors to their peoples, ignoring the genuine interests of their countries;

Western military alliances and Western bases not only did not serve the security of the ME countries, but actually endangered them, as they might become involved in armed conflicts and risk Soviet retaliation;

These alliances endangered world peace, which was not only in the vital interests of mankind, but was also a prerequisite for the peaceful development of the countries concerned;

Military spending in the interests of the Western alliances constituted a crushing financial burden, retarding economic and social development;

Western economic and technical aid was in reality a form of neo-imperialism, intended to bring these countries under renewed imperialist tutelage where the old imperialistic system had failed or might be failing.

On the other hand, the argument went, a neutral policy and friendship with the socialist camp would do away with all these dangers and disadvantages and secure true independence and peaceful development, which was the Soviet Union's only aim in the area.

In addition, the ME countries were invited to enjoy the advantages of unconditional Soviet economic and technical aid, and trade with the Communist countries.

It was emphasized, however, especially in regard to Iran and Turkey, that the abandonment of commitments to the West was not a prerequisite for the initiation of friendly relations with the Soviet Union.

The general framework for these arguments was identification with Afro-Asian solidarity and with all the oppressed, underdeveloped and poor, opposition to the encroachment of political, military and economic imperialism, and support for progress.

Much emphasis was laid on Soviet trade and economic aid, while cooperation in the military field—the supply of arms to the UAR, Iraq and Yemen—was never mentioned of their own volition by Communist sources. When asked, PM Khrushchev stated that the West had started arming the ME countries and that the Soviet Union had proposed a general embargo in 1954 (i.e. before the Soviet-Egyptian arms deal), but that if the West continued to deliver arms to certain countries in the area the USSR would supply arms to the neutralist countries.

In addition to the existing Communist aid agreements with Iraq, both regions of the UAR and Yemen, new agreements were concluded with ME countries during the year to the value of \$468.8 million (as compared with \$948.6 million of Western aid). \$231.4 million of this total was a Soviet loan for the second stage of the Aswan High Dam; Egypt also received long-term credits from Czechoslovakia, the GDR and Hungary. Soviet and Cze-

choslovak credits of \$78.6 million were granted to Iraq, and a Soviet credit of \$100 million to Ethiopia. All Soviet aid continued to be in the form of long-term credits for development projects, usually at 2½ per cent interest, with repayment, generally in exports, to be started after the completion of the project.

Soviet declarations, writing and propaganda stressed both that the aim of the Soviet aid was altruistic, intended to promote human welfare and world peace, and that it was a basically economic proposition. The unconditional nature of Soviet aid was especially emphasized; it was often repeated, for instance, that assistance to the UAR continued in spite of the ideological divergencies that had come to the fore in 1959. Soviet aid undertakings, it was stated, were always speedily, completely and scrupulously fulfilled. In contrast, Western aid was disparaged, as mentioned above.

The political importance of Soviet aid to the ME, not only in Asia but also in Africa, was brought out in a statement by Deputy PM Mikoyan, who described the Aswan High Dam as a symbol, "a shining beacon showing the way out of poverty, backwardness and calamity" to the peoples of Africa. (See tables of foreign aid, p 46 ff and under individual countries.)

The USSR's practical involvement in ME oil questions found expression in Soviet sales of oil in the ME's traditional European oil market at lower prices. There was Arab criticism that this policy would inflict losses on the Arab oil-producing countries. The Russians insisted, however, that they were right in selling oil at normal and equitable prices instead of the artificially high prices maintained by the Western oil monopolies. Losses incurred by the ME countries were ascribed to the manipulations of the oil companies. (See pp 60-61 and a review on Soviet writing on ME oil in *Mizan*, Oct)

The Soviet approach to Iran and Turkey, the CENTO countries, in 1960 was marked by attempts to bring about their neutralization by warnings, threats and subversive propaganda, which reached a climax in May, following the downing of the American U-2 aircraft, on an intelligence mission over Russia (the U-2 started the first leg of its flight in Turkey), and by efforts at a rapprochement.

Attempts to improve relations with Turkey started under the Menderes government and were renewed after the coup d'état. An exploration of the possibility of improving relations with Iran started in Aug. The Soviet approach was that the Western alliances of the two countries did not preclude the initiation of close relations and economic cooperation with the Communist bloc, but that they would best serve their security and interests by becoming neutral. Iran and Turkey, while striving for better relations with the Communist countries, especially with the USSR, made it clear that they stood by their Western alliances. By the end of the year an improvement in the atmosphere could be noted (though Communist attacks over the clandestine radio stations continued), but no real beginning of a rapprochement was yet in sight.

The USSR and other Communist countries established diplomatic relations with the newly independent Republic of Cyprus. The retention of British military bases on the island was severely criticized, and the Cypriots were exhorted to continue their struggle for the elimination of the bases and "complete independence."

Israel was the only country in the area whose efforts to improve relations with the Soviet Union were rejected. Israel was depicted as an imperialist base used by the West against the Arab countries; the Communist coun-

tries backed the Arab case in every aspect of the Arab-Israel conflict.

The Soviet approach to Arab nationalism equated it with a national liberation movement of the individual Arab countries, struggling against the domination of Western imperialism. Communist support was expressed for this struggle; the concept of Arab nationalism as a movement for political union, however, was ignored, and Soviet support for the continued existence of independent Arab states was—at least indirectly—made clear.

In Soviet-UAR relations, 1960 was marked by a further growth of cooperation, following upon the 1959 crisis over President Abdel-Nasser's anti-Communist drive. This issue remained latent in so far as direct relations were concerned, but found expression in UAR attacks on the Syrian Communists, while the latter called on the Syrians to revolt against the "Egyptian dictatorship." The two countries continued, each for its own reasons, to pursue similar and in general coinciding anti-Western or—in their own terms—anti-imperialist policies. This was most pronounced in Africa, especially in the Congo crisis; but also found expression in regard to the Arab countries (although the two countries were opposed on the question of Arab union), other ME countries and even Latin America.

Militarily, the UAR continued to rely exclusively on Soviet arms and doctrine. An agreement was signed for Soviet financial and technical aid for the second stage of the Aswan High Dam. Thus the main pillar of Egypt's economic development plans was now based entirely on Soviet aid, just as the mainstay of the UAR's political regime and security system—the armed forces—was founded on Soviet equipment and training.

In regard to Iraq, there was a Soviet accommodation to the suppression of the Iraqi Communists—though this was criticized by Communist sources—and to an independent Iraqi foreign policy, including improved relations with the West. Soviet economic aid and military supplies continued, and an additional Soviet loan was agreed on.

Jordan was the most outspokenly pro-Western and anti-Communist of all the ME states, and had no diplomatic relations with any Communist country. Communist sources attacked Jordan's "reactionary regime" and called for its overthrow, but did not voice support for UAR pan-Arab aspirations in regard to the country.

The Communist countries' relations with Sudan, which professed a policy of positive neutralism, grew somewhat closer in the political, economic and cultural fields, and Soviet military equipment appeared for the first time in the country. President Abbud was scheduled to visit the USSR in 1961.

The Soviet attitude to Lebanon was one of approval of its professed policy of neutrality, together with criticism of instances which were interpreted as a deviation from this policy.

There were no diplomatic relations between Communist countries and Saudi Arabia. The USSR in general viewed the Saudi Arabian Government with sympathy, as a victim, rather than an executant, of American designs. Large-scale Russian and Communist Chinese aid continued in Yemen; there were a considerable number of Communist experts in Yemen and Yemenis training in the Communist countries.

The Communist countries expressed their support for the struggle against imperialism in Aden Colony and Protectorates and the principalities of Southern Arabia and the Persian Gulf. A propaganda campaign was kept up throughout the year. Leaders of the Omani insur-



gents paid prolonged visits to the Communist countries, including People's China.

By the end of the year, no major change in the position of the Communist countries in the ME was to be registered.

### THE COMMUNIST BLOC AND CYPRUS:

#### SUMMARY

There was comparatively little Communist comment on Cyprus and propaganda directed at it. The latter was disseminated mainly over "The Voice of Truth," a clandestine Communist station broadcasting in Greek.

The general line of comment and propaganda, both before and after Cyprus gained its independence, was that the island had remained a basis of Western aggression, that the retention of British bases in the island was a flagrant violation of the rights of the Cypriots, and that therefore their struggle for complete independence would continue. In this connection, the "Voice of Truth" criticized Archbishop Makarios for "capitulating" to British demands and the Greek Government for having "brought Turkish troops back to Cyprus." Though neutrality was the declared policy of the new republic, this was completely overshadowed, in Communist comment, by the fact of the British bases in the island.

A main plank in the AKEL (Cyprus Communist Party) programme was the unity between the Greek and Turkish communities as a prerequisite for the continuation of the struggle. The ultimate aim of the party, the programme said, was the establishment of the socialist society; this could only be achieved, however, after genuine independence had been secured and both the Greek and the Turkish communities won over. The intermediate programme included the "demilitarization" and "democratization" of the country, agrarian and social reforms, and the development of the economy.

Before independence Mikoyan mentioned the possibility of Soviet aid to independent Cyprus; later the "Voice of Truth" accused President Makarios of feigning ignorance of Soviet offers of aid.

In Aug, when Cyprus achieved independence, messages were exchanged between Presidents Brezhnev and Makarios, the former expressing the Soviet Union's desire to establish diplomatic relations. A Soviet Ambassador was accredited to Cyprus; Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Rumania accredited non-resident Ambassadors. By the end of the year, Cyprus had not yet opened an embassy in a Communist country. (Based on *BBC/W, SU; International Affairs, Moscow; Mizan; World Marxist Review—1960 issues.*)

### THE COMMUNIST BLOC AND IRAN:

#### SUMMARY

Extremely hostile Communist criticism of the Shah and the Iranian Government continued in 1960. It had started at the beginning of 1959, when Iran rejected a proposed treaty of friendship and non-aggression with the USSR and a bilateral defence agreement between Iran and the US was concluded immediately afterwards. Official sources were as vehement as the clandestine "National Voice of Iran." After reaching new heights following the U-2 incident, this criticism abated when Sharim Emami succeeded Eghbal as PM, and both sides began to explore the possibility of improving relations.

The main grounds of criticism were the Iran-US agreement and Iran's participation in CENTO, but internal affairs also came under heavy attack. Moscow Radio declared that it was the Iranian Government's policy to

put the country at the disposal of the US armed forces; this was an indication of a "conscious intention to drive the country into war and an attempt to make the Iranian people pay for the aggressive acts of the US."

The Shah himself was a major object of attack. He was accused of dragging Iran "down the road into the abyss," turning the country into an American dependency, and endangering its security, since the Soviet Union might be forced to strike at the imperialistic bases. The Shah was described as the "oil monopolist's lackey," a "loathed puppet" and a "traitor to Islam." The National Voice of Iran called on the "true Muslims" to follow in the steps of the sons of Ali and "remove the rotten regime of oppression and injustice." The Islamic angle was especially pronounced in Aug, when the Shah was attacked by the UAR on similar lines, as well as for subservience to imperialism on the issue of Iran's recognition of Israel.

In May, following the downing of the American U-2 aircraft, Iran was presented with a Soviet note warning against violation of Soviet airspace in connection with the CENTO manoeuvres of 14-18 May. The note said that to allow the US, which had proclaimed as its policy "the infringement of the sovereignty and inviolability of the frontiers of the other states," to make use of Iranian airspace was a hostile act against the USSR and a contravention of Soviet-Iranian treaties, especially that of 26 Feb 1921. Soviet broadcasts to Iran quoted Marshal Malinovsky's warning of retaliation by rockets against the take-off bases of aircraft violating the airspace of the socialist countries.

Iran's adherence to its Western alliances was denounced by Moscow as "anti-national," and "the Shah and his clique" were described as "playthings of the American aggressive forces, divorced from the country's national interests."

Moscow Radio in Persian also dwelt on the economic advantages which would accrue to Iran from disarmament and the discontinuation of military expenditure.

Another topic of criticism, which was, however, less emphasized, was the internal political and economic situation. There was a concentrated attack in May, following the execution of five Azerbaijan Communists and the imprisonment of 17 for treason.

Iranian leaders and the Iranian Press and radio (in Persian) countered the Communist attacks both by rebutting specific accusations and by criticizing the Soviet regime.

Appeals by the Tudeh [Iranian Communist] Party were broadcast over East Berlin Radio. In Apr, in a broadcast message to its members in Iran, the party admitted that it had been defeated and its organization scattered because of its members' "weakness, apostasy and cooperation with the enemy." In this and other messages, the party called on its members to participate in the social struggle and to establish contact with its Central Committee; a congress was to be convened [at an unspecified date] to deal with reorganization.

In appeals broadcast throughout the year—and especially before the Iranian general elections in July—the Tudeh Party called on the Iranians to set up a united front for the "salvation and liberation" of the country; the motto of the struggle should be the "overthrow of the anti-national coup d'état regime" and its replacement by a government that would grant democratic freedoms, implement social reforms, adopt a neutral policy, etc. There were, however, some inconsistencies as to the tactics to be employed. While R. Damanesh, the First Secretary of the party, advocated in an article in *Pravda*

(22 June) the establishment of a single workers' party in Iran, a party message broadcast over Berlin (GDR) Radio on 16 June, said that the impression which had been created that "comrades in Iran" should unite into a single group was incorrect. This was to be avoided; all groups were to pursue their activities independently. The most important duty at present was to establish cells in labour units and endeavour to contact the Central Committee. Comrades who did not work in specific establishments were to gather trusted individuals around them.

In Sept it was announced that the Tudeh and the Democratic Party of Azerbaijan had united under a name to be decided later; the latter was to act as a provincial branch of the united party.

In Nov, in connection with the second Iranian general elections during the year, members were urged to widen the scope of their activities among the proletariat and the urban population generally, but not to draw the ideological line too carefully or let questions of principle prevent wide participation.

Towards the end of Aug, there were indications of efforts to clear the atmosphere between the two countries. It was reported that messages had been exchanged between PM Khrushchev and the Shah. These efforts gained impetus when Eghbal was succeeded as PM by Sharif Emami on 31 Aug; it had been generally assumed that the USSR would refuse to treat with Iran so long as Eghbal, who had signed the Iran-US bilateral defence agreement, was in power. At the same time Teheran Radio considerably lowered the tone of its broadcasting war with the Communist stations. Moscow Radio did the same, but sharp attacks continued to be broadcast from Berlin (GDR) (see above—the Tudeh messages) and the clandestine National Voice of Iran.

High-level contacts continued until the end of the year in Moscow, Teheran and New York (at the UN). In Jan 1961 it was reported that six messages had been exchanged between PM Khrushchev and the Shah.

The latter said in his public statements that Iran wanted friendly relations with its mighty northern neighbour but the desire must be mutual. Iran must not be made to pay for such friendship by infringements of her sovereignty; relations must be based on mutual respect and the past should be forgotten. In Oct the Shah denied that in a message to Khrushchev he had proposed the conclusion of a treaty of friendship. In Nov he stated that Iran had proved her goodwill in several ways.

Moscow Radio replied at the end of Sept that in its relations with Iran the USSR was "completely free from all selfish or ulterior motives"; what darkened Soviet-Iranian relations was the US-Iranian bilateral treaty, which had thrown Iran "into the camp opposing the Soviet Union." "The Soviet people expect Iran to take the necessary steps to improve its relations," Moscow Radio concluded, and "abstention from allowing foreign military bases to be set up in Iran would be an important contribution in this direction."

Towards the end of the year Moscow Radio reiterated that it was the duty of the Iranian leaders to find ways to improve relations; the Soviet Union was always ready for such an improvement on the basis of peaceful co-existence if Iran ceased to be a military springboard for the "US and other imperialist governments." The Shah and the Iranian Government were still criticized for an ambivalent attitude and conflicting statements on this issue. However, in Jan 1961 Soviet sources stated that a rapprochement was possible, even without the abandonment of Iran's Western alliances, if serious efforts were made in this direction.

While by the end of the year some improvement could be noted in the atmosphere between the Soviet Union and Iran, there was no real beginning of a rapprochement. (Based on *BBC EE SU*; *Mizan*; *Pravda*; *Izvestia*; *International Affairs*, Moscow; *New Times*; *World Marxist Review*; *Iran Press*; *Ettela'at*, *Kayhan*;—1960 issues.)

## THE COMMUNIST BLOC AND TURKEY:

### SUMMARY

The year 1960 was marked by attempts to improve Soviet-Turkish relations, both before and after the Turkish coup d'état and the U-2 incident, both of which took place in May.

The general Soviet approach was that Turkey's Western alliances did not preclude the initiation of close relations with the Communist bloc, but that Turkey could best serve her security and other interests, as well as world peace, by becoming neutral and—above all—by eliminating the US bases on its territory. Soviet statements and propaganda were sometimes threatening, especially after the U-2 incident, but mostly adopted the method of persuasion, setting out the advantages that would accrue to Turkey from a policy of neutrality and cooperation with the East.

The Turkish approach was based on adherence to its ties with the US, CENTO and NATO and the wish to improve relations with the Communist countries on this basis.

The main result during the year of these policies—which coincided in their initial approach but were basically divergent—was a certain improvement in the atmosphere and some expansion of economic relations.

Almost no direct criticism of the Gürsel regime came from official Communist sources; however, a clandestine "Turkish" station broadcasting from the Eastern bloc, which initially approved of the coup d'état, later attacked the Gürsel government in no less extreme terms than it had done in the case of the Menderes government.

At the end of 1959 and the beginning of 1960 there were some indications of a wish on Turkey's part to improve relations with the USSR, such as the Turkish Minister of Health's visit to Moscow in Dec 1959. Soviet sources continued to denounce the Turkish leaders as committed to a militarist policy and thus unable to accommodate themselves to the recent relaxation of international tension.

On 11 Apr a forthcoming exchange of visits between PM Menderes and PM Khrushchev, which had been discussed in Ankara, was officially announced; the former's visit was to take place in July. Eastern bloc comment welcomed the announcement as a demonstration of Turkey's "realistic approach" to international relations and expressed the hope that the traditional friendship between the two countries would be restored.

The downing on 1 May of the American U-2 aircraft, which had started out from a base in Turkey, on an intelligence mission over Russian territory, brought about a reversal in the Soviet attitude. In an official note (similar to those sent to Norway and Pakistan), the USSR protested against the Turkish Government permitting foreign military aircraft to use Turkish airspace for the preparation and execution of violations of Soviet airspace, and warned that the USSR would be compelled to take retaliatory measures if such provocations were repeated. This was followed by a warning by Marshal Malinovsky—in which Turkey, however, was not specifically mentioned—who said that he had ordered

rockets to strike at the take-off bases of aircraft violating the airspace of the Socialist countries.

Throughout May, specific warnings to Turkey were repeatedly voiced in Communist broadcasts, and it was emphasized that the elimination of foreign bases would free the country from the fear of dangerous consequences.

Following the Turkish coup d'état, Soviet criticism gave way to expressions of hope that relations would now improve, special emphasis being placed on the declared policy of the National Union Committee to follow in the steps of Atatürk: "Peace at Home, Peace in the World." PM Khrushchev expressed the hope that the new government would try to improve relations with the USSR, which had been striving for this for a long time.

On 28 June, following a talk between General Gürsel and the Soviet Ambassador, Khrushchev sent a message to the General, who replied on 8 July; the messages were published on 1 Sept. Khrushchev expressed the Soviet Union's desire for close cooperation with Turkey and made the following points:

The policy of participation in war blocs with the Western powers during the past ten years had "egged Turkey on to steps which were in no way compatible with the good-neighbourly relations between Turkey and the Soviet Union." "Most sincere relations" between the two countries would develop if "Turkey embarked upon the road of neutrality," which would also relieve Turkey of the burden of military spending and so help her economy. "This, of course, is not a condition for beginning the improvement of our relations." Any step in this direction would be welcomed by the USSR. The Soviet Union was not trying to "cause a deterioration in Turkey's relations with America or the other Western powers"; the USSR itself was striving for good relations with the West. As a beginning, actions which might lead to a further deterioration, like those of the former Turkish Government, should at least be avoided. Khrushchev stressed Moscow's satisfaction at the Turkish Government's statement that it intended to abide by the foreign policy principles of Atatürk, "with whose name friendly and even fraternal relations" between the two countries were associated. The Soviet Government, on its part, reaffirmed its statement of 30 May, 1953, that its policy was based on "complete respect for the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of the Turkish State." The USSR wanted to see its neighbours "prosper and pursue an independent foreign policy." "The main thing now is not to search for questions on which we disagree; on the contrary, we must search for points on which our views coincide."

In his reply, Gürsel stated that Turkey would remain faithful to her alliances, such as NATO and CENTO, which were concluded in conformity with the UN Charter, were purely defensive and could not be abandoned lest Turkey should prejudice her independence and security. There was nothing incompatible, Gürsel said, between this policy and good-neighbour relations between Turkey and the USSR. In reply to Khrushchev's observation on military spending, Gürsel said that a neutral policy alone did not make such expenditure unnecessary; only general and effectively controlled disarmament could do so. Gürsel reaffirmed his government's adherence to Atatürk's principles, noted with satisfaction the Soviet reaffirmation of the 1953 policy statement, and stated that a genuine improvement of relations was possible in the framework of the principles enunciated in this statement.

The arguments advanced in the Khrushchev message constitute the gist of Soviet writing and propaganda di-

rected at Turkey. Criticism of Turkey's military ties with the West and arguments on the advantages of neutralism continued throughout the year. At the same time, however, there was qualified praise for every step that lent itself to interpretation as decreasing or qualifying Turkey's commitments to the West, e.g. the Gürsel government's decision to ask for control of flights from US bases in Turkey or the replacement of the Turkish brigade in Korea by a token company.

This line was amplified by special references to the situation in the Balkans (emanating from Bulgaria and Rumania): the area was said to be threatened by US atomic rocket bases on Turkish territory; on the other hand informal proposals were made for a Balkan agreement. Georghiu-Dej, the Rumanian Communist Party Secretary, stated in a Press interview that a Balkan agreement against aggression was not incompatible with other military alliances. Greece and Turkey seemed to think that peace depended exclusively on the big powers, he said, but he did not agree. Proposals were voiced in Moscow and Bulgaria for the creation in the Balkans of a "nuclear-free zone."

Communist wooing of Turkey found expression especially in the economic field. In Bulgaria proposals were voiced for joint projects in the utilization of water resources, tourism and technical cooperation. Moscow Radio dwelt at length on the benefits that would accrue to Turkey from increased trade with the East and Soviet economic and technical aid. In Oct General Gürsel said that Soviet offers of aid were under consideration. A Turkish trade delegation visited the USSR in Nov; the Russians offered long-term credits for exports to Turkey, and the volume of trade envisaged for 1961 was \$4-4.5 million. An increased volume of trade with Eastern bloc countries was envisaged in the trade agreements renewed during the year.

Criticism of the new regime's internal policies was mainly confined to "Our Radio," a clandestine station purporting to speak in the name of the Turkish people and broadcasting on a GDR Berlin station wave-length. The station welcomed the coup d'état, praising the army for its action, but demanded a new approach to external and internal affairs. In foreign relations, it demanded that Turkey abandon NATO; embark on a neutralist policy and sign a non-aggression agreement with the USSR; cancel the aid agreements with the US, which endangered Turkey's independence; nationalize "everything," beginning with "monopolies set up in association with Americans and foreigners"; and accept Soviet proposals for loans on easy terms. On internal affairs, the station demanded the trial of the leaders of the former regime, the legalization of the Communist and socialist parties, and the introduction of agrarian reform.

At the end of June the station began to appeal to the Turkish people to beware of continued ties with the US and foreign investment, and called on the peasants to organize to safeguard their rights. In mid-July it openly criticized the regime on these issues, and in Aug it called on peasants and workers not to give up to the authorities the arms in their possession, since the people would one day "overthrow the administration of terror supported by America."

Following the ousting of the 14 "radical officers" from the NUC in Nov, the station said that though some of the 14 had been "arch-fascists" others were "progressive young people" who advocated social reforms, especially land reform, and were opposed to imperialism—especially American—in Turkey. The remaining officers of the NUC were reactionaries, and General Gürsel, who en-



joyed their support, had become a "self-styled dictator," a "third Abdul Hamid."

(Based on *BBC EE ME SU W*; *Mizan*; *Pravda*; *Izvestia*; *International Affairs, Moscow*; *New Times*; *World Marxist Review*; *Cumhuriyet*; *Ulus*—1960 issues)

### ISLAM IN THE ME

NOTE: For a survey of Soviet studies on Islam see *The Soviet Approach to Islam in Mizan*, Sept 1960.

**An Attack on Islam.** In an article in *Bukinskiy Rabochiy*, of 18 Dec 1959, published in Azerbaijan Rauf Seidov denounced in violent terms a book called *Muslims Under Communist Oppression*, by the UAR writer Muhammad Sami Ashūr. Seidov expressed indignation at Ashūr's contention that Communism in Arab countries opposes Islam because it is antagonistic to tyranny and aggression, to which Communism leads.

The article quoted reports of the torture of Communists and others in Mezze prison, near Damascus, and asked how what went on in the UAR could be reconciled with the humane injunctions of the Shari'ah. As for resistance to aggression, it was the USSR that came to the support of the UAR in Nov 1956, he declared.

In reply to other charges made by Ashūr, Seidov stated that the introduction of the Cyrillic alphabet in the Muslim Soviet republics had been necessary for practical reasons, and said that the Arabs themselves might also find such a change advisable. The closure of mosques and other religious establishments in the USSR was not an act of the government but "the result of the enormous reduction in the number of believers since the Soviet regime was established." Soviet people, including former Muslims, preferred cultural and educational establishments to mosques. At the same time, all believers in the USSR enjoyed freedom of worship, as Abdel-Nasser himself had seen when he visited a mosque while in Baku.

Seidov went on to claim that "the Muslim people of the Soviet Union, shattering the grim fetters of religion, have come forward on to the road of the development of their national culture."

*Mizan*, quoting this article, noted the fact that the official Soviet attitude to Islam should be so blatantly expressed in an article referring to Soviet-UAR relations, and commented that this was perhaps a symptom of Soviet impatience with the anti-Communist campaign in the UAR. (*Mizan*, Jan 1960)

**Moscow Arabic Broadcasts: Religious Freedom in the USSR.** [In contrast to the article quoted above, Moscow Radio broadcasts in Arabic conveyed the impression that there was much Islamic activity in the USSR.]

In reply to listeners' questions on the absence of religious programmes and on freedom of religious life in the USSR, an Arabic talk from Moscow referred to visits by a UAR Islamic delegation, including the Shaykh al-Azhar and the Grand Mufti of the Syrian R, to the USSR, and said that thousands of Soviet Muslims made the pilgrimage every year. (This point was frequently made by Moscow Radio.) Moscow Radio broadcast Muslim religious services on many occasions. It reported that in Tashkent the Qur'ān had been published twice during the past year alone, as the first impression had been quickly sold out. (*R. Moscow in Arabic*, 12 Apr—*BBC SU*, 14 Apr)

Another broadcast said, in answer to listeners' questions, the number of Muslims in the USSR was not known because religion was the personal affair of every Soviet citizen, and he was not compelled to report it.

Nevertheless, there was freedom of worship, and the number of Muslims was large. There was a Muslim Directorate for Central Asia and Kazakhstan in Tashkent, as well as two Shari'ah schools, which trained ulama' and imams, some of whom completed their studies at al-Azhar. (*R. Moscow in Arabic*, 25 May—*BBC SU*, 27 May)

Muslim functionaries in the USSR were called in on several occasions to give greater substance to claims of Soviet friendship for Arabs and Muslims in the ME. Thus, on the occasion of Id-al-Adhah, the Mufti Babakhanov, chairman of the Muslim Board of Central Asia, greeted the Muslim world and said that Muslims in Central Asia were observing the festival like their co-religionists the world over. (*R. Moscow in Arabic*, 4 June—*BBC SU*, 8 June) Moscow Radio carried a 24-minute account of the Id-al-Adhah celebrations at the Moscow mosque and a celebration of the feast by the League of Iraqi students in Moscow.

A Moscow meeting devoted to the second anniversary of the Iraqi revolution was attended by Arab, Pakistani, Indian and Indonesian students, and by Soviet Muslim functionaries. (*R. Moscow in Arabic*, 14 July—*BBC SU*, 16 July)

**Muslim Support for USSR Quoted.** Muslim support for USSR policies was often quoted in Moscow Radio's Arabic broadcasts; e.g. a report from Stalinabad quoted Tajikistan Muslim leaders in support of Khrushchev's peace efforts. (*R. Moscow in Arabic*, 4 June—*BBC SU*, 8 June)

Moscow Radio in Arabic carried a recorded interview with Hasan Ma'mūn, the Mufti of the Egyptian R of the UAR. He welcomed the cooperation on equal terms, without interference in each other's affairs, between the UAR and the USSR, and said that the difference in faith between the two countries was no barrier to friendly relations. He also welcomed personal contact between religious leaders of both countries. "Muslims are one family," he said, and concluded: "I am glad to send this message from the USSR, the friend of the UAR." (*R. Moscow in Arabic*, 17 June—*BBC*, 20 June)

**Islam Used in Propaganda Against Iran and the West.** In a "National Voice of Iran" broadcast in Azerbaijani on 28 July, it was stated that the Shah's "recognition" of Israel (see p 216 ff) had caused great indignation in Iran and other Muslim countries. The Shah and Eghbal were accused of shameless hypocrisy in paying lip service to Islam when in fact they were currying favour with the Americans and siding with the imperialists who oppressed the Muslims in Algeria and elsewhere. (*National Voice of Iran in Azerbaijani*, 28 July; *BBC*, ME, 30 July; there were more talks on this theme.)

### ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE ARAB-ISRAEL CONFLICT

"Israel a Western Anti-Arab Military Bastion" [Comments and the slanting of the news on the Arab-Israeli conflict were mainly concerned with Western involvement in the issue, especially the alleged Western inspiration of Israel's Arab policy.] A Moscow Radio commentary said: "The cause of the dispute between Israel and Arab countries lies in the policy of the imperialists . . . who bear responsibility for the non-implementation of the UN resolutions on Palestine—which is the basis of the dispute between the Arabs and Israel." (*R. Moscow in Arabic*, 17 May—*BBC SU*, 19 May) [Israel's policy was persistently described as belligerent and provocative,



while Arab policies were praised and defended. This alleged Israel policy was said to be of her own choosing.]

An exception to this line was an article in the Polish (Catholic) paper *Slowo Powszechne*, which, according to an Israeli source, criticized Abdel-Nasser's belligerent declarations on Israel. In a leading article on the occasion of Israel's Independence Day, the paper said that this line, also followed by other Arab leaders, compelled Israel to adopt a policy of defence and reliance on the US and even on West Germany; it stressed the necessity for a relaxation of tension between the Arabs, who had large territories, and the Jews, who merited a national home. (*Ha'aretz*, 29 Apr)

Radio Berlin (GDR) said that the relations between the German Federal Republic and Israel, especially rumoured negotiations for a \$500 million loan to Israel, were inspired by anti-Arab imperialism, especially in view of Bonn's indifference to the "Arabs of Palestine who were expelled from their homes by imperialist Zionism." (*R. Berlin (GDR) in Arabic*, 6 May-BBC EE, 9 May)

Israel was also portrayed as being closely connected with the furtherance of American oil interests by fighting Arab nationalism. Western millionaires, who were "seeking to set up a petrol kingdom in the independent Arab World" and had failed owing to the Arab peoples' opposition, had begun to exploit Zionism in order to achieve their aims. (*R. Moscow in Arabic*, 3 June-BBC SU, 4 June) (See also p 89.)

**Israel Blamed for Tawafiq Incident, but UAR Also Criticized.** The Soviet *Red Star* said, that the incidents on the Israel-Syrian frontier were not accidental, but a "pre-meditated provocation on the part of Israel!" (*AP*, 6 Feb) An *Izvestia* article spoke of the "swashbuckling character of Israeli military circles." (*Izvestia*, 7 Feb) *New Times* ascribed the Tawafiq incident to Israel's wish to frustrate the "general relaxation of international tension," which, it said, came as "a serious blow to Israel's plans," for Israel served Western interests in the ME as a highly armed military outpost, and a termination of the cold war would deprive it of this status. The writer noted, however, that the UAR Press had "struck a bellicose note too," and concluded that "the tension on the frontier was definitely not in the interest of peace in the ME, and more and more countries are inclined to the view that disputes must be settled peacefully." (*New Times*, No. 10, Mar) The Moscow correspondent of *The New York Times* reported (6 Mar) that *Izvestia*, commenting on the incident, had cited, for the first time since the Sinai campaign, the arguments of both sides in the Israel-Arab dispute, in "marked contrast" to the usual Moscow practice of only accepting the Arab view. (*NYT*, NY, 7 Mar) [This coincided with criticism of UAR Press views on the then impending Summit conference, see p 82.]

**The Arab Boycott and the Suez Canal.** Soviet comment on issues connected with the Arab boycott and the closure of the Suez Canal to Israeli shipping and trade, which came up during the year in the US (the *Cleopatra* incident and the Douglas Amendment, pp 39 ff, 106), compared US aid "with strings" to unconditional USSR aid. (See e.g. *R. Moscow in Arabic* 3, 8 May, 4 June-BBC SU, 5, 10 May, 8 June) [There was no comment, however, on the closure of the Suez Canal itself.]

**Opposition to Johnston Plan for Utilization of Jordan Waters.** In a talk on Western policy in the ME, Moscow

Radio in Arabic described the Johnston plan for the utilization of the Jordan waters on a regional basis (see p 206) as an American plan to gain new footholds in the ME. The Arabs had rightly rejected the plan, which favoured Israel. The "Israeli-American allies" were now unilaterally diverting the Jordan to the Negev. This threatened the livelihood of Arab villages and Arab anxiety was justified. The US had not given up its plan to strengthen Israel and secure new positions in the Arab East, and was resorting to various expedients to carry it out. (*BBC SU*, 16 June)

**Arms Supplies.** See p 70.

#### ATTITUDE TOWARDS ARAB NATIONALISM

**Soviet Suspicion of Arab Nationalism.** The *Mizan Newsletter* of Mar 1960 gave a short survey and sources on "the traditional Soviet hostility to pan-Arab movements," and went on to say: "The ideological limitations of the rapprochement between the Soviet Union and Arab nationalism began to appear more sharply after the establishment of the UAR in February 1958," which was not given an unqualified Soviet welcome. In an article quoted from *International Affairs* of Mar 1958, K. Ivanov had said that the trends within the Arab unity movement which would "triumph in the long run" would be those "which are most closely connected with the people." The Soviet attitude to Arab unity was a realistic one, said Ivanov: "Being Marxists we are by no means inclined to make a fetish of Arab unity as such and to ignore the fact that the idea may, in certain circumstances, be used for some time also by reactionaries, who seek to arrest the progressive development of the Arab peoples. The possibility of zigzags and backtracking, to say nothing of play-acting, is not to be excluded in the Eastern national movements of our day." Abdel-Nasser's campaign against Communism and his attitude to Iraq were decisive for the Soviet attitude to Arab nationalism. The basic document in this connection was Khrushchev's address to the Iraqi economic delegation on 16 Mar, 1959. Khrushchev said that Abdel-Nasser's ambition to make Iraq a part of the UAR was not realized in the face of the opposition of the peoples of the countries concerned, and denounced the "measures to suppress freedom-loving aspirations in the UAR." (*Mizan*, Mar 1960)

**Arab Nationalism Equated with National Liberation Struggle.** [In many broadcasts and articles throughout the year, Moscow expressed its support for Arab nationalism in the past and present, but it always equated it with the "national liberation movement" and/or with the "birth of independent Arab states." Soviet support was expressed for the liberation struggle against the West, and not for Arab nationalism as a movement for political union.] (See e.g. *R. Moscow in Arabic* 17, 29 May-BBC SU 19, 31 May; *Pravda* 23 Aug; there were many other instances of the same line.)

**Support for Separate Independence of Iraq.** The Soviet viewpoint was amply illustrated in a Moscow Arabic broadcast on the anniversary of the Iraqi revolution: "The Iraqi revolution... was a great victory for all the Arabs," and with it "a complete phase in the Arab nationalist movement had ended... Baghdad, like Cairo, has become an important fountain from which fighters for freedom seek material and moral aid." But, "naturally, the struggle of the Arabs is not yet at an end; they have yet to achieve their political independence.

They are fighting against the West's continuous endeavours to bring back imperialism to the Arab world." (*R. Moscow in Arabic*, 14 July-BBC SU 16 July)

**Attack on Ba'ath: Arab Nationalism Versus Democracy, Socialism and Communism.** *Mizan* summarized an article on the Ba'ath party by Viktorov in *Sovremenniy Vostok* of Jan 1960. He attacked the party for its anti-Communist attitude and its "ultra-nationalist" and pan-Arab policies and, *Mizan* said, must have been aware that he was at the same time attacking the policies of President Abdel-Nasser himself. "Viktorov," *Mizan* said, "accused the Ba'ath leaders of depriving the people of their democratic freedom in the name of Arab unity—that is to say, suppressing Communism—and of interpreting Arab nationalism in such a way as to create tension between Arab countries—that is, between the UAR and Iraq." The Ba'ath leaders were further described as "enemies of social change and reform... [their] slogans... express the aim and objectives of the reactionary elements in the Arab countries and their foreign inspirers... Their hatred for the socialist cause and for everything forward looking and progressive betrays them."

*Mizan* remarked that whereas in 1955 Vatolina wrote an article on "the growth of national consciousness of the Arab peoples," Viktorov now spoke of "the national and class consciousness of the Arab peoples." "The addition is significant," *Mizan* commented; "Soviet pronouncements on Eastern national movements increasingly emphasize the role of the working class in them, and disparage nationalism." (*Mizan*, Mar)

**West Responsible for Inter-Arab Tension.** The line of Moscow Radio on inter-Arab tensions was that they were "directly or indirectly linked with Western policy in the Arab world... The imperialists are sowing the seeds of anarchy in this area. Their aim is to prolong conditions that are suitable for their direct interference in Arab international affairs... to restore their lost position... and to consolidate their domination over the Arab world for ever." "The Soviet Union," Moscow Radio said, "is supporting the peoples' struggle against imperialism in accordance with the principles of its foreign policy, and was frequently compelled to address decisive warnings to the aggressors." (*R. Moscow in Arabic*, 17 May-BBC, SU, 19 May)

**Attitude to the UAR.** [On the hostile Communist attitude to the Egyptian-Syrian union see pp 80-81.]

#### ATTITUDE TOWARDS ARAB-WESTERN RELATIONS

**Western "Economic Offensive" Against Arabs.** In June Moscow Radio in Arabic featured a series of talks on "Western Policy in the Arab World Since World War II." "The growing friendship between the independent Arab states and the socialist countries" was said to be instrumental in the discontinuation of armed suppression by the West. The West, however, had evolved a "new tactic in fighting the Arabs": the substitution of an "economic offensive" for the "bankrupt policy of military pressure." But the West was trying to confine its aid to the minimum, mainly to promises. To remove the obstacles which had blocked anti-Arab schemes in the past, the US had been striving to "isolate the Arab world from the support of socialist countries." (*R. Moscow in Arabic*, 9 June-BBC SU, 11 June)

**Warning to UAR.** At the same time, there were criticisms of the UAR's favourable response to US offers

of aid. Even after the conclusion of the High Dam agreement in 1959, it was stated, "certain journalistic circles in Cairo" continued to be deceived by renewed offers of US aid. They failed to see that this change in Western policy was "only a manoeuvre to weaken the vigilance of the Arab world and isolate it from the support of socialist countries"; US monopolies "connected with international Zionism cannot ever afford to become friendly with the Arabs." (*R. Moscow in Arabic*, 10 June-BBC, 13 June. See also p 80.)

**International Aid Mask for US Monopolies.** The West's economic activities in the ME were described as the result of its failure to "drag the Arab peoples into political-military alliances with imperialism." The most significant aspects of this economic penetration were "the efforts which were being exerted 'by the monopolistic circles in the US to stimulate their expansionist activities under the guise of individual projects,' which, for concealment, were given an 'international character.' Examples were the activities of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the International Monetary Fund and the recently established Arab Chamber of Commerce in the US. In all of these, American capital 'plays the dominant role.'" (*R. Sofia in Arabic*, 3 July-BBC EE, 6 July)

**"Western Tactics."** The wooing of certain Arab leaders (Sham'un, Malik, Shishakli) was said to be a US tactic to further its aims. Also singled out was "an Armenian friend of Eisenhower, George Marbikian, who represented the reactionary Tashnak Armenian Party" [in Syria and Lebanon]. (11th Talk, *R. Moscow in Arabic*, 11 June-BBC SU, 15 June)

Moscow Radio dwelt at length on US support for France in the Algerian question, as a further demonstration of America's anti-Arab policies. (12th Talk, *R. Moscow in Arabic*, 12 June-BBC SU, 15 June)

As to Western cultural relations with the Arab world, the "nature of US films and the limited opportunities of Arab students to study in America" were given as proof that "the Western countries made use of their cultural relations with the Arab countries for their own selfish interests." (16th Talk, *R. Moscow in Arabic*, 16 June-BBC SU, 18 June)

Alleged Western intelligence activities against the Arabs were given as additional proof of Western methods. In this connection, the Cairo spy trials [in June, see p 197] were said to have revealed US-Israeli intelligence cooperation.

Britain was said to be trying to "form a hireling federation of Arab Amirates in the South of the Arabian peninsula." "The British imperialists are now trying to annex some of Yemeni lands, with their inhabitants of the Yafi and Rabiz tribes, into this federation," Moscow Radio said. (*R. Moscow in Arabic*, 4 Dec-BBC SU, 6 Dec; for background, see pp 382-4.)

#### SOVIET LITERATURE IN ARABIC

(NOTE: On cultural relations, see under Eastern bloc relations with individual countries.)

In June it was announced that the Foreign Language House in Moscow was preparing for publication Arabic translations of a series of books on the Soviet Union, including: *The Soviet Union Today and Tomorrow*, a "beautifully illustrated guide" written in simple language giving information about the geography of the country, the political regime, the economy, culture, foreign policy, and living conditions; a revised and enlarged edition of *The Economic Geography of the Soviet Union*; a book

by a French journalist entitled *The Soviet Union is an Open Heart*; a work by a Soviet economist on *Peaceful Economic Competition Between the Soviet Union and the USA*; *Memoirs of Soviet Architects*, by the Secretary of the Union of Soviet Architects; a book by Professor Kuzin, *What are the Dangers Threatening Mankind as a Result of Nuclear Explosions?*; *Volokolamskiy Road*, a book on the heroic battles between Soviet and German forces. The publishing house was to issue about 30 books in Arabic during the year. (*R. Moscow in Arabic*, 29 June-BBC SU, 1 July)

#### ARMS SUPPLIES TO THE ME

[Western arms supplies to the ME, especially to Israel, were a constant topic in Soviet broadcasts. Soviet arms supplies were not mentioned. Even when Abd al-Hakim Amer, the UAR Vice-President, praised in Moscow Russia's "historic decision" to supply the UAR with arms,

his hosts did not comment (p 83). Two statements by PM Khrushchev on arms supplies were reported during the year, in both of which he presented Soviet arms supplies as a consequence of Western supplies.]

In Mar, at a Press conference in Paris, PM Khrushchev stated, in answer to a question, that it was not Russia that had started giving arms to the ME countries, but France, Britain and the US. Russia had maintained as early as 1954 that no arms should be supplied to anyone, and if an agreement to that effect were reached, Russia would be the first to join it. (*Times*, 26 Mar)

In Vienna, on 8 July, Khrushchev stated, again in answer to a question: "I want to say that if the Western powers continue to deliver arms to certain countries in this area, we shall be forced to sell weapons to those countries who take up an attitude of neutrality, as they need those weapons to defend their independence." (*Reuter; Jer. Post*, 10 July)

### THE COMMUNIST BLOC AND IRAQ

NOTE: For Synopsis see pp 63, 258; for Iraqi views and policies on relations with Communist countries, see p 261.

#### COMMUNIST VIEWS ON INTERNAL DEVELOPMENTS IN IRAQ

Party Law Welcomed. (See Iraq, Internal Affairs, p 237-8.)

The promulgation of the Association Law [which was ostensibly designed to permit the resumption of party life, but was in fact used by PM Qassim to manipulate the political situation] was at first welcomed by the Communist *New Times*. The paper assumed that "patriotic parties and organizations" would be allowed and that the first to receive permits would be the NDP, the Democratic Party of Iraqi Kurdistan and the Communist Party. (*New Times*, No. 2, Jan)

[Criticism was voiced later, however, when Qassim's policy in applying the law became clear.]

Support for Chadirchi's Anti-Qassim Group. [As in the case of the UAR, the most direct and frank assessment of the Iraqi political situation came from East Berlin's Arabic broadcasts]: "In Iraq the dust of a political battle is apparent in the stages of the republic's political development. One of the aspects of the battle is the refusal to license the Communist Party and the Republican Party, and the [government's] objection to the election of the Central Committee of the National Democratic Party after the return of Kamil al-Chadirchi to its leadership" [in May, when Muhammad Hadid's faction, which advocated continued cooperation with Qassim, was defeated at the party convention].

The broadcast justified Chadirchi's policy [opposition to further collaboration with Qassim and the demand for democratic government], by saying he was defending "real democratic life."

The broadcast called Hadid "a well-known wealthy industrialist," and his group "people with large interests and companies, parasites and place seekers" who wanted to set up a party to serve their purposes." (*R. Berlin (GDR) in Arabic*, 12 June-BBC EE, 14 June; see also BBC EE, 30 June)

The Split in the Iraqi Communist Party. [Following the enactment of the Association Law, the Iraqi Minister

of the Interior licensed a Communist splinter group, headed by Da'ud as-Sa'igh, as the Iraqi Communist Party, withholding recognition from the ICP proper, led by Zaki Khayri.]

*New Times* denounced the as-Sa'igh group as a "rightist opportunist clique" and described the Khayri Communists as the defenders of the Iraqi revolution; the government was criticised by implication, but not directly. At the same time it was stressed that the true Communist Party, which "heads the struggle for the national and social interests of the working class and other sections of the working people," would "staunchly continue to champion the liberty and the rights of the broad masses." (*New Times*, No. 9, Feb 1960)

Another Communist publication quoted in detail Iraqi Communist comment, especially statements by Khayri, who said that "mere legality was never a condition for the formation and existence of our party," which would, however, help "to defend the republic, the revolutionary gains and the right of the people with ever more energy." The denial of this right, Khayri declared, had created "favourable conditions... for the forces of reaction and imperialism. None of the supporters of the new national system can possibly be interested in the prohibition of the legal political activities of the biggest national party in defending the freedom of the country." The legalization of the party was a question of democracy; "mere words about democracy will not convince anyone unless they are backed by the right of the working class and the working people in general to legal political organization." (*World Marxist Review*, Apr; see also BBC ME, 1 Mar; SU, 2 Mar; EE, 21 May, 14 June; *Prawda*, 4 Oct; *Mizan*, Mar, Oct, Dec 1960)

Attitude Towards Suppression of Communist-led Trade Unions. [The Iraqi Government took measures, mostly through the local authorities, to eliminate Communist influence from the trade union movement, led by Ali Shukur, a Communist. Again, there was no direct Soviet criticism of the government, but Iraqi criticism was quoted.]

In Apr *Trud* published a letter from a Basra trade unionist, complaining in detail of repressive activities against TUs, but adding: "We regard these actions as intrigues of the oil company, of foreign agents and of enemies of the republic." His object, he said, was to



expose "the bitter character of the struggle against reactionary forces in our country." (*Mizan*, May)

On 27 Oct *Trud* published extracts from an open letter to Qassim from Ali Shukur, complaining of the persecution of the TUs and especially of the authorities' unlawful intervention in TU elections. Introducing the extracts, *Trud* said: "In a number of cases the local authorities have had recourse to falsification of the results of these elections... The activities of the authorities have aroused the discontent and protest of local progressive circles." (*Mizan*, Nov)

**Aziz Sharif Awarded Lenin Peace Prize.** In May the Lenin Peace Prize was awarded to Aziz Sharif [a prominent Communist sympathizer and SG of the Iraqi Partisans of Peace movement]. Moscow Radio said in its Arabic service that Aziz Sharif had worked for the formation of a National Front to liberate Iraq from imperialism and to gain national independence. He and other non-Communist nationalist Arabs were seeking to know where the Soviet Union stood in the struggle of war v. peace, liberation v. imperialism, progress v. backwardness and forces of the people v. forces of colonialism. The USSR's attitude was shown by Soviet support of the Arabs, supply of arms and unconditional aid. Aziz Sharif had been awarded the prize for his consistent struggle for peace, in which he represents the Iraqi citizens who knew that the fate of freedom in their country and of peace and progress was ultimately connected with the victories of the peoples in their efforts to consolidate peace and demolish the front of imperialism and war. (*R. Moscow*, 4 May-BBC SU, 7 May) In July Sharif toured Eastern Europe. (*R. Berlin (GDR) in Arabic*, 14 July-BBC EE, 18 July)

**The Iraqi Revolution Praised.** While Soviet criticism of the Qassim regime for its anti-Communist policy was only implied, the Iraqi revolution was praised as a liberation movement and Baghdad hailed as an independent [of Cairo] centre of the Arab anti-imperialist struggle. A commentary on the anniversary of the revolution said that it "was distinguished not only by its local importance; it was also a great victory for all the Arabs. With the completion of the victory of the Iraqi people, a complete phase in the Arab nationalist movement has ended. The major Arab countries have achieved their political independence. The overthrow of the pro-Western regime in Iraq has strengthened the liberation struggle in those parts of the Arab world hitherto held in the grip of imperialism, such as Algeria and Oman. Baghdad, like Cairo, has become an important fountain from which fighters for freedom seek material and moral aid. Naturally, the struggle of the Arabs is not yet at an end; they have yet to achieve their political independence. They are fighting against the West's continuous endeavours to bring back imperialism to the Arab world." (*R. Moscow in Arabic*, 14 July-BBC SU, 16 July) [The 14th of July celebrations were attended by delegations from most of the Eastern bloc countries.]

#### USSR-IRAQ POLITICAL AND MILITARY RELATIONS

**Jan: Iraqi Trade Union Delegation in Moscow.** On 2 Jan a 15-member Iraqi trade union delegation arrived in Moscow as guests of the Soviet Trade Union Association. (*R. Baghdad*, 3 Jan-IMB, 4 Jan)

**Apr: The Mikoyan Visit.** Anastas I. Mikoyan, First Deputy Premier of the USSR, visited Iraq between 8-16

Apr, accompanied by the USSR Minister of External Trade and others. His official purpose was to open the country's first Soviet Industrial Exhibition. (*Pravda*, 9 Apr)

World Press comment assumed, however, that his object was to examine the political situation following the refusal to license the Iraqi Communist Party, so that the Soviet Government could decide on its policy, especially whether to support the Iraqi Communists and whether to continue aid to Qassim. (*NYHT*, 19 Apr; *Times*, 20 Apr)

Mikoyan had a series of meetings, with PM Qassim—lasting ten hours altogether—and several Ministers. Discussions on economic relations took up much of the time. [There were indications that Qassim was critical of the implementation of the Soviet aid agreement, see below—USSR Economic Aid.] Mikoyan denied Press reports that he would offer a new loan in addition to the Mar 1959 loan of about \$140 million, which was still largely unspent. [However, in May a new loan of 180 million rubles was agreed upon—see below.] (*BBC* 12 Apr; *NYHT*, 19 Apr)

At the opening of the exhibition Mikoyan spoke briefly of Arab-Soviet friendship, and then dwelt on Soviet progress. He said the socialist system had surpassed the capitalist, and the Soviet Union was now superior to the West in many fields. But though the USSR also had military superiority she worked for peace, he declared. The USSR was ready to share her achievements with Iraq, Mikoyan said, comparing what he described as selfless USSR aid with the egoistic American approach.

The Soviet Press described Mikoyan's activities at length, and complained of "undue efforts" of the Iraqi police to prevent him from mingling with the crowds, especially at the port of Basra. (*Pravda*, 9-15 Apr; *Izvestia*, 16 Apr; *R. Baghdad-IMB*, 10-20 Apr; *The Iraqi Press*, 10-20 Apr; *INA*, 10 Apr; *Mizan*, May)

**Iraq's Independence Stressed In Connection with Mikoyan's Visit.** [Both before and during Mikoyan's visit the government and PM Qassim personally repeatedly stressed Iraq's independence and neutrality.]

On 31 Mar Qassim said: "We are no Communist country...; we are a free democracy, friends of the Communist world as well as the non-Communist... We take nobody's directives, but we co-operate with those who are our true friends." (*Bilad*, 1 Apr)

Speaking after Mikoyan at the opening of the Soviet Industrial Exhibition, Qassim said that the Soviet Union appreciated the Iraqi people's principle of resisting "the covetous" and "the imperialists." Therefore, he said, he could assure the Iraqi people that the Iraqi leadership was independent; friendship with the Soviet Union was based on mutual benefit. Baghdad Radio broadcast this speech again the next day. (*R. Baghdad*, 10, 11 Apr-IMB, 11-12 Apr; *INA*, 10 Apr)

There was a pointed difference between Baghdad Radio and Tass reports on what was said on various occasions. Tass reported only the Iraqi spokesmen's praise for Soviet aid, while Baghdad Radio quoted them as mentioning both Western and Communist aid. (*BBC*, 19 Apr)

Iraqi security forces prevented Mikoyan from mingling with the crowds, and of all his public functions in Iraq only his departure was televised. (*NYHT*, 19 Apr)

**Nationalist Press Taunts Mikoyan.** Mikoyan was taunted by the nationalist Press. *Al-Hurriyah*, Baghdad, which resumed publication on 7 Apr, asked whether Mikoyan



supported the violence and brutality of the Iraqi Communists, even towards women and children. The paper said that thousands of imperialist agents could not have aroused the feelings of Iraqis against Mikoyan as the barbaric acts of the Iraqi Communists had done. (Quoted by *Palastin, Jordan*, 13 Apr)

*Al-Hurriyah* also criticized the organizers of the Soviet exhibition for placing a "huge statue" of Lenin at the entrance. The paper wrote: "We understood that the Iraqi Government, by permitting the exhibition, did not authorize its organizers to use it to spread Communist doctrine." (*Hurriyah*, 14 Apr)

Mikoyan's Press conference, before his departure, was marked by probing questions on the Soviet stand on the Palestine and Algerian issues. Mikoyan denied that the Soviet Union had helped in the establishment of Israel or had influence there; the Soviet Union recognized the "rights of the Arab people in Palestine" and supported them in the UN. Asked why the USSR did not recognize the Provisional Algerian Government, Mikoyan said this had not been proposed in the UN or any other international forum. He expressed doubts whether Soviet recognition would help the Algerians, but said that the USSR was offering them more aid than the governments that had recognized them. (*INA*, 16 Apr)

**Mikoyan: "We Have Understood Iraq's Policy."** On 13 Apr Mikoyan stated that Qassim had told him that he wanted to apply the best form of democracy in Iraq. "We on our part have understood this policy and we will co-operate with the Iraqi Republic," he added. *INA* used this sentence as a headline to its report. (*INA*, 13 Apr)

*The New York Herald Tribune* correspondent in Baghdad, reporting the Iraqi attitude as given above and stating that Mikoyan had not succeeded in persuading Iraq to break her commercial ties with the West, concluded that his visit was "considerably less than a triumph." (*NYHT*, 19 Apr)

**June: Baghdad Paper Criticized:** Moscow Radio's Arabic service took issue with *al-Hurriyah* of Baghdad (see above) for enthusiastically reporting the same "silly fabrications" about the Soviet Union as the "reactionary Press in the West," which tried to make it appear that people in the Soviet Union were "robots rather than human beings." *Al-Hurriyah* must have an unclear object, the commentator said, namely to slander the Soviet Union, which had proved by deeds its friendship for the Arabs. (*R. Moscow in Arabic*, 26 June—*BBC SU*, 28 June)

**Sept: General Abdi's Visit to USSR.** An 11-man Iraqi military mission, headed by General Abdi, Military Governor-General and Chief of Staff of the Iraqi Army, visited the USSR for four weeks during Sept, at the invitation of Marshal Malinovsky, USSR Minister of Defence. General Abdi met the Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR A.N. Kossigin. (*Pravda*, 13, 27 Sept)

According to Arab sources, the delegation was to attend the yearly manoeuvres of the Red Army and study Soviet training and mobilization methods. (*R. Baghdad*, 1, 28 Sept; *R. Beirut*, 3 Sept—*IMB*, 2, 4, 29 Sept)

**Sept: Mahdāwi's Visit.** *Pravda* reported on 25 Sept the arrival in Moscow of Fāḍil Abbās al-Mahdāwi, President of the Iraqi Special High Military Court, at the invitation of the Soviet Supreme Court. (*Mizan*, Oct) (Mahdāwi had left Baghdad on 11 Aug on a tour of Communist countries.—*R. Baghdad*, 11 Aug—*IMB*, 12 Aug)

An article by Mahdāwi was published in *Sovremenniy Vostok* of Nov, giving impressions of his USSR visit and information on Iraq.

**Nov: Iraqi Delegation to October Revolution Celebrations.** An Iraqi delegation of 20 officers, headed by Brigadier Isma'īl Ibrahim Arif, Minister of Education, arrived in the USSR at the beginning of Nov for the 43rd anniversary celebrations of the October Revolution. They were received by Mikoyan and other Ministers, and also visited the Academy of Armoured Troops. (*Pravda*, 10, 16 Nov; *R. Baghdad*, 5, 9, 16, 22 Nov—*IMB*, 6, 10, 17, 23 Nov)

**Nov: Mustafa Barazāni's Visit.** On 6 Nov, it was reported that Mulla Mustafa Barazāni [the Iraqi Kurdish leader] had arrived in Moscow at the invitation of the Red Cross and Crescent. (*Pravda*, 7 Nov) [His name was not mentioned among the members of the official Iraqi delegation above.] *Pravda* reported an interview granted by N.A. Muhitdinoff, Secretary of the Central Committee of CPSU, at Barazāni's request. (*Pravda*, 27 Nov)

**Soviet Military Aid.** According to *The New York Times*, Eastern bloc military aid to Iraq stood at \$120 million by mid-Apr 1960. (*NYT, Weekly*, 8 May)

#### USSR ECONOMIC AID

**Implementation of Mar 1959 Aid Agreement.** On the anniversary of the economic and technical aid agreement concluded between the Iraqi Republic and the Soviet Union in Moscow on 16 Mar 1959, Grishin, the economic adviser of the Soviet embassy in Baghdad, surveyed its implementation at a Press conference.

The Soviet Union had granted Iraq a loan of 500 million rubles, for a period of 12 years, to develop the Iraqi economy, he said. This would help to train experts and skilled workers in Iraq and the Soviet Union, and to equip and operate 14 large, heavy and light industrial undertakings. These included a steel mill, factories for fertilizers, sulphur oxide, agricultural machinery, electrical appliances, glassware, electric bulbs, "sewing," cotton and woollen textiles, preserves and drugs, and a shipbuilding yard.

Soviet establishments were making extensive studies to improve navigation on the Euphrates and Tigris and utilize them for hydroelectric power and irrigation, to improve lands in southern Iraq and to prospect for minerals. They would also carry out other large-scale research projects at the request of the Iraqi Government.

Soviet agriculture experts had completed the preparatory work for the establishment of four agricultural machinery stations, two government sugar-beet and cotton farms, and a farm for medical herbs. A number of Soviet experts were working in Iraqi establishments, institutes of higher learning, construction projects, the communications network, medical schools and government departments.

The following benefits would result, Grishin continued: (1) The irrigated area would be increased by 2 million hectares. (2) The area of cultivated land in southern Iraq would be increased by 1.5 million hectares, after the completion of a marsh-draining project. (3) More than half the iron ingots now imported would be made in Iraq. (4) Iraq would be able to supply home demand for fertilizers, textiles, agriculture machinery, glassware, electric bulbs and medicines. (5) River and railway transport capacity would be increased many times. (6) An atomic reactor would be built and used on a large

scale for peaceful purposes. (7) Radio and television transmission would be immensely improved. (8) Employment opportunities would be greatly increased.

Grishin said that there were 300 Soviet experts working in Iraq. Preliminary surveys and designs had been completed for a number of projects, including the Baghdad-Basra standard-gauge railway. A hundred tractors had been supplied for an agricultural machinery station. Nine projects would be completed in 1960, and all of them would be finished ahead of schedule.

Soviet doctors were cooperating in the anti-smallpox vaccination campaign, working in hospitals and helping to organize the Mosul medical college.

Of 40 Soviet experts at the Dawra refinery, only ten remained; the others had been replaced by Iraqis trained by the Soviet experts.

In conclusion, he referred to a project for digging a canal between the two rivers, which would facilitate the reclamation and exploitation of untilled lands. (*R. Baghdad, 14 Mar-BBC, 16 Mar; INA, 14 Mar*)

*Al-Ahali* commented that the agreement had been concluded on the basis of positive neutralism and full co-operation with all countries without any political or military conditions. (*Ahali, 16 Mar*)

**Iraq Reported Critical of Soviet Terms.** In Apr a Lebanese daily reported that the Iraqi Government had approached Mikoyan for a modification of the terms of the loan. The paper said that Iraqi economic circles were enraged at the rate of exchange of 12 rubles to the dinar fixed by the Russians for the loans, when the free rate of exchange was 42 rubles to the dinar. Mikoyan had rejected the Iraqi request, stating that the agreement had been signed long ago and there was no room for reconsideration. (*Hawadith, Lebanon, 22 Apr*)

On 25 May the Soviet Ambassador conveyed to PM Qassim the USSR's agreement to extend the Soviet credit by R180 million "and to act in accordance with the observations" made during Mikoyan's visit by Qassim, who had "expressed the hope that the Soviet Union would provide constant and effectual facilities to implement the projects agreed upon and that it would do so at a minimum economic cost and at an early date and offering more advantages than any similar agreement concluded in the ME." (*R. Baghdad, 25 May; BBC, 27 May; INA, 31 May*)

**Aug: 180-Million-Ruble Loan For Baghdad Basra Railway.** The Iraqi-Soviet Economic and Technical Cooperation Agreement [on the new R180 million loan] was signed in Baghdad on 18 Aug. (*INA, 20 Aug*) On 23 Aug an agreement was signed providing for 48 Soviet experts to work on the Baghdad-Basra standard-gauge railway, which was to be constructed under this agreement within four years. (*INA, 27 Aug*) The Soviets would build the railway and supply engines, rolling stock, repair facilities, etc. (*INA, 24 Sept*)

[Reports on progress in the implementation of projects provided by the Iraqi-Soviet aid agreements are given below. Iraqi economic development is coordinated by the Economic Planning Board (EPB).]

**Atomic Reactor.** In Jan six Soviet atomic energy experts arrived in Baghdad for talks on the implementation of the Iraq-USSR Agreement for Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy. (*INA, 27 Jan*) In Mar the EPB approved a site at Tawaitha, chosen by the Soviet experts, for the atomic reactor and the attached isotopes laboratory. (*INA, 20*

*Mar*) In Oct the EPB authorized the signature of the contracts for building the reactor, which was to have a capacity of 2,000 kws. (*INA, 30 Oct*) Construction was expected to start before July 1961 and to be completed late in 1963. The reactor was to be called the July 14 Project. (*INA, 6 Nov*)

**Factories.** In Jan the EPB approved the construction of a sock and knitting factory at Kut Liwa, at a site chosen by Soviet experts, to produce six million pairs of socks, 3.8 million pieces of underwear and a million outer garments annually. (*INA, 3, 16 Jan*)

In May the EPB allocated ID1.5 million to install power lines from the Baghdad power station to the above factory and a cotton textile factory in Kut, which, it was expected, would be completed in 1962. (*INA, 17 May*)

In May it was reported that the EPB had authorized the signing of contracts for the construction of seven factories under the Soviet aid agreement, including a steel mill in Kadhimiya and factories for drugs at Samarra, cotton textiles at Kut, electrical equipment at Baghdad, weaving and hosiery at Kut, sewing at Baghdad and preserves at Karbala. According to the reports, sites had been chosen, and designs and specifications for the contracts laid down. (*INA, 7 May*)

[According to the report below, however, this stage had not been reached even in Oct, at least in respect of one factory.]

In Oct the EPB approved the Soviet experts' report on the Karbala canning factory and authorized the signature of contracts with the Soviet side for the supply of the machinery. Final details and designs had not yet been submitted. (*INA, 26 Oct*)

In Nov the EPB approved the technical specifications submitted by the Soviet side for the factories to be established under the Soviet aid agreement and "confirmed the necessity of rapidity in work in addition to very careful study." (*INA, 1 Dec*)

**Steel Plant.** At the beginning of Jan, the EPB approved the site for the steel mill, chosen by Soviet experts, north of Kadhimiya on the right bank of the Tigris. Annual production envisaged was 75,000 tons, which would cover about 20 per cent of Iraq's annual consumption of steel. (*INA, 3 Jan; R. Baghdad, 23 Jan-IMB, 24 Jan; Pravda, 26 Jan*)

**Broadcasting and Television Stations.** In Feb three Soviet engineers arrived in Baghdad to help build a broadcasting centre at Salman Pak. In Mar it was reported that the designs and specifications had been completed and the EPB had authorized the necessary allocation from the Soviet loan. (*INA, 28 Feb, 15, 25 May*) In Dec it was officially stated that the *al-Hurriyah* broadcasting station [Salman Pak?], which was being constructed under schedule I of the Soviet aid agreement, would be completed in mid-1961. (*INA, 7 Dec*)

In May the EPB authorized the signing of a special agreement with a Soviet organization to carry out studies and prepare designs for broadcasting stations in Kirkuk and Basra, and television stations in Mosul, Diwaniya, Amara, Kirkuk and Basra. (*INA, 31 May*)

**Railway.** (See also above: R180 million loan for Baghdad-Basra railway.) In Jan *al-Hayat*, quoting the Iraqi Director-General of Railroads, reported that 18 Soviet engineers had arrived in Baghdad to assist in renovating, strengthening and widening the Baghdad-Basra railroad. (*Hayat, 6 Jan*)

## THE COMMUNIST BLOC AND IRAQ

Moscow Radio was quoted as saying that 36 experts had gone to Iraq to help build a rail link with Europe via Turkey, and 34 more would soon join them. (*NYHT*, 20 Jan)

**Silos.** In Jan it was reported that the EPB had approved the "preliminary basis" for the construction of silos in Baghdad and Kut with an initial capacity of 12,000 tons each under the Soviet aid agreement. (*INA*, 21, 22 Jan)

**Government Farms.** In Oct the EPB approved the contract for the establishment of five government pilot farms under the agreement as follows: a sugar beet farm up to 2,500 hectares, a cotton farm up to 3,000 hectares, a grain farm up to 10,000 hectares, a rice farm up to 3,000 hectares, and a medical herbs farm up to 200 hectares. (*INA*, 17 Oct) [However, work on these projects had apparently started earlier.]

**Agricultural Machinery Stations.** In Feb the Higher Committee for Agrarian Reform approved the construction of three stations for renting farm machinery in Kirkuk, Mosul and Abu Ghraib. They were to cost ID318,000, ID387,000 and ID298,000 respectively of which about 40 to 50 per cent would be covered from the Soviet loan. They would plough from 80,000 to 150,000 dunams, in addition to other work. (*INA*, 24, 25 Feb)

A Soviet source in Baghdad said on 14 Mar that 100 tractors and a large number of agricultural machines had already been delivered to the Abu Ghraib station. (*INA*, 14 Mar)

In June the signature of a contract with the USSR was authorized for the establishment of a station at Latifiyah. (*R. Baghdad*, 31 May-BBC/W, 9 June)

**Basra Shipyard.** Tass reported the signature of the Basra shipyard contract between a Soviet firm and the Iraqi Government. (*R. Moscow*, Tass, 19 Apr-BBC SU, 21 Apr)

In Iraq it was officially stated that the Soviet experts had completed the designs for the construction of the shipyard, which would carry out repairs and have the capacity to build ten 400-tons vessels annually, in addition to river barges. (*INA*, 27 Apr)

In Nov it was reported in Moscow that the Soviet experts were continuing work on the plans. (*Pravda*, 17 Nov)

**Oil Prospecting; Mineral Survey.** The Iraqi Government allocated ID150,000 for Soviet-Iraqi oil prospecting near Khanaqin. The EPB approved a contract for oil prospecting with a Soviet establishment. (*ANA*, 2 Apr-BBC ME, 5 Apr; *R. Berlin (GDR) in Arabic*, 5 Apr-BBC EE, 14 Apr; *Ittihad ash-Sha'ab*; *R. Baghdad*, 26 Apr)

In Sept it was reported that a Soviet team had arrived in Baghdad to conduct a two-year survey of metallic ores, sulphur, phosphates and other minerals. (*Mid. Mirror*, 5, 17 Sept)

**River Navigation.** Thirty-six Soviet experts arrived in Iraq in May-June for detailed study of the ID11 million project for improving navigation in the Euphrates, Tigris and Shatt al-Arab; a preliminary survey had been carried out earlier by Soviet experts. The cost of the detailed study was estimated at ID676,000, of which ID510,000 were to come from the Soviet loan. (*INA*, 11 Apr, 17 May; *Mid. Mirror*, 25 June)

**Dams, Irrigation, Drainage.** Soviet experts were carrying out preliminary surveys for water storage and irrigation

projects. In May it was reported that the EPB had allocated ID400,000 for detailed surveys for the construction of two dams: at Al-Fatha [near the crossing of the IPC pipeline] on the Tigris, and north of Hit on the Euphrates [to the west of the Thartar basin]. (*INA*, 7 Jan, 13 Feb, 10 May)

In May it was reported that R1.5 million worth of equipment had arrived from the USSR for water storage, irrigation and drainage projects. The latter covered 1.5 million hectares in southern Iraq. (*INA*, 24 Nov)

### USSR-IRAQ COMMERCIAL RELATIONS

In Apr the USSR Government offered to supply Iraq with Illushin 18 airliners. The Iraqi Government was reported to be studying British and American proposals for Comet, and Boeing 707 planes. (*BBC in Arabic*, 11 Apr-IMB, 13 Apr)

On 26 Mar a Soviet exhibition of medical supplies and drugs was opened in Baghdad in the presence of a number of Ministers. (*INA*, 26 Mar)

A Soviet industrial exhibition was opened by Qassim and Mikoyan in Baghdad in Apr (see: Political Relations, above). Tass said that over ID1 million worth of Soviet goods, including motorcars, timber, bakery products and chemicals, were sold. (*Tass*, 1 May-BBC, 3 May)

In May Abd al-Latif ash-Shawwaf, Minister of Commerce, held trade talks in Moscow. The USSR agreed to buy 25,000 tons of Iraqi dates. (*ADN in German*, 31 May-BBC EE, 2 June; *INA*, 21 June)

On 6 Dec Brigadier Isma'il al-Arif, Acting Minister of Trade, opened a permanent USSR exhibition of machinery and agricultural equipment in Baghdad. (*Iraq Times*, 7 Dec)

On 19 Dec a nine-man delegation representing the Baghdad Chamber of Commerce left for trade negotiations in Moscow at a Soviet invitation. (*Iraq Times*, 21 Dec)

### USSR-IRAQ CULTURAL AND TECHNICAL COOPERATION

**Apr: 1960 Working Plan of Cultural Agreement.** On 20 Apr the 1960 working plan of the Iraqi-Soviet cultural agreement was signed in Moscow. Earlier, a member of the Iraqi delegation said that they intended to increase the number of Iraqi students in the USSR from 300 to 400. The agreement provided for expanding the exchange of scientists, artists, students, athletes and tourists, and for an exchange of TV and radio programmes, films and books. Ten Soviet students were to be sent to Iraq for philological studies. (*INA*, 31 Mar, 21 Apr; *Sovremenniy Vostok*, July)

**Apr: Dissatisfaction of Iraqi Students in Socialist Countries Denied.** On 23 Apr Iraqi students in the USSR denied at a meeting in Moscow Iraqi Press reports that they were suffering from difficulties and bad treatment.

Later in the month, a spokesman of the Iraqi Ministry of Education said that "some newspapers" had given an untruthful picture of the conditions of the Iraqi students in the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. There had been no complaints, he said. He stated that Iraq was sending students to these countries because of her policy of positive neutralism and the excellence of their educational system. The Soviet system, whereby the student came under complete university supervision, covering boarding and entertainment, made sure of the students' "intellectual, moral and material development." Besides, he added, it cost the Iraqi Government much



less to maintain students in the East than in the West. (*INA*, 28 Apr)

**Sept: Technical Cooperation Agreement.** In Sept the Iraqi Government ratified the Technical Assistance Agreement signed with the Soviet Union on 27 Dec 1959, with effect from that date. The agreement provided for Soviet assistance in vocational training; 4,600 Iraqi students were to be trained in various branches of technology by Soviet-assisted Iraqi institutions within a period of 15–24 months. (*INA*, 26 Sept)

**Miscellaneous.** In Aug a delegation of 40 Iraqi teachers visited the USSR. (*R. Moscow in Arabic*, 20 Aug–*IMB*, 21 Aug)

On 4 Dec a Soviet Film Week was inaugurated in Baghdad in the presence of Cabinet members. (*INA*, 4 Dec)

**Students in East and West.** In Aug the Director of Missions at the Ministry of Education said that Iraqi secondary school graduates would study [in the 1960 school year?] in the following countries:

Soviet Union 400; Czechoslovakia 100; China 5; UK 200; German Federal Republic 50; Italy 27; Belgium 20; Yugoslavia 10. In addition, 200 college graduates would go to the US and 100 to the UK. (*INA*, 13 Aug)

### CZECHOSLOVAKIA

**Political Relations.** On 9 May PM Qassim was present at the reception at the Czechoslovak embassy on the Czechoslovakian national holiday. (*R. Baghdad*, 9 May–*IMB*, 10 May)

Dr Nazihah ad-Dulaymi, Minister of Municipalities, visited Czechoslovakia in Apr. (*INA*, 28 Apr)

In July a Czechoslovak delegation, headed by the Deputy Foreign Minister, attended the anniversary celebrations of the Iraqi revolution and were received by PM Qassim. (*R. Baghdad*, 17 July–*IMB*, 18 July)

On 21 Oct Colonel Mahdāwi, President of the People's Court, arrived in Czechoslovakia on a tour of Communist countries. (*BBC in Arabic*, 21 Oct–*IMB*, 22 Oct)

In Nov a delegation headed by Brigadier Isma'il Arif, Minister of Education, visited Czechoslovakia on an official invitation after attending the October revolution anniversary in Moscow. On his return to Baghdad he stated that the visit had contributed to the strengthening of friendship between the two countries. (*R. Baghdad*, 22 Nov–*IMB*, 23 Nov)

**Cultural Relations.** Twenty-four Czechoslovak teachers visited Iraq in Mar–Apr and a further delegation was expected in Apr under the cultural agreement between the two countries. Fifty Iraqi teachers visited Czechoslovakia in 1959. (*INA*, 9 Mar, 3 Apr)

On 19 July the working plan for 1960 under the cultural and scientific agreement between Czechoslovakia and Iraq was signed in Baghdad. (*INA*, 19 July)

In July a Czech source said that 17 Czechoslovak professors were lecturing at Iraqi universities. Other experts were advising on power stations, printing works, schools and institutions. A delegation of Czechoslovak teachers, returning a visit by Iraqi teachers, had recently returned from Iraq. There would be exchanges of cultural workers, trade unionists, peace defenders, youth, sportsmen, etc. (*R. Prague, Home service*, 13 July–*BBC EE*, 18 July)

**Economic and Technical Cooperation.** On 11 Feb Hasan at-Talabāni, Minister of Transport, concluded a civil

agreement in Prague. (*INA*, 10 Feb, 13 Mar) A Czechoslovak airliner taking off from Baghdad on 28 June, inaugurated a Prague–Damascus–Baghdad service. (*INA*, 28 June)

A Czechoslovak planning expert arrived in Baghdad in Feb to take up work with the Ministry of Planning. (*INA*, 21 Feb)

A Czechoslovak expert submitted recommendations for a [card?] board factory, using palm leaves as raw material. (*INA*, 3 Apr)

In May Abd al-Latif ash-Shawwāf, Minister of Trade, concluded a special trade protocol in Prague, providing, according to Baghdad, for an increase of Czech imports to 50 per cent of exports to Iraq. Czechoslovakia agreed to buy ID250,000 worth of Iraqi dates. (*BBC in Arabic*, 7 June, *R. Baghdad*, 21, 26 June–*IMB*, 8, 22 June–*BBC*, 30 June; *INA*, 14 May, 21 June)

In Aug a contract was signed with a Czechoslovak firm for the construction of a factory at Dawra to provide spare parts and gas cylinders for the Dawra refinery. (*INA*, 10 Aug)

In Sept it was officially stated that the Czechoslovak organization Kovo was supplying the machinery for a footwear factory in Kufa, to be completed in Feb 1962. Sixteen Czech experts would help to install the machinery, and another 80 would later put it into operation. Iraqis had been going to Czechoslovakia for training. (*INA*, 14 Sept)

On 23 Oct, after negotiations opening on 3 Oct, a Czechoslovak–Iraqi technical and economic cooperation agreement was signed in Baghdad by the Czechoslovak and Iraqi Ministers of Trade. The agreement provided for a Czech credit of £S12 million, to be open until 31 Dec 1965, and Czech cooperation in the erection, equipment and operation of oil and chemical industries, power plants and other industrial undertakings. The credit for each project would be repaid in eight yearly instalments, starting a year after its completion. (*R. Baghdad*, 1, 23 Oct–*IMB*, 2, 24 Oct; *INA*, 9 Nov)

### OTHER EASTERN BLOC COUNTRIES IN EUROPE

**Albania.** On 6 July the instruments of ratification of a cultural and trade agreement between Albania and Iraq were exchanged in Baghdad. (*INA*, 6 July)

**Bulgaria.** In Mar it was reported that four officials of the Ministry of Planning would be sent to Bulgaria for a month's study tour. (*INA*, 22 Mar)

On 9 Apr PM Qassim opened a Bulgarian technical exhibition in Baghdad, praising the friendship between the two countries. (*R. Baghdad*, 9 Apr–*IMB*, 10 Apr)

On 27 June a cultural agreement, and on 25 July a working plan under the agreement, were signed between Bulgaria and Iraq in Baghdad. (*R. Baghdad*, 27 June–*IMB*, 28 June; *INA*, 25 July)

In July a Bulgarian delegation attended the anniversary celebrations of the Iraqi revolution. (*R. Baghdad*, 13 July–*IMB*, 14 July)

On 11 Aug Colonel Mahdāwi, President of the People's Court, left for Bulgaria on the invitation of the Bulgarian Supreme Court. (He also visited other Communist countries.) (*R. Baghdad*, 11 Aug–*IMB*, 12 Aug)

**German Democratic Republic.** In Jan it was reported that an Iraqi cultural delegation would attend the Iraqi exhibition in East Berlin, opening on 15 Feb, to tell the public about Iraq. (*Zaman*, 6 Jan; *INA*, 5, 30 Jan)

A delegation from the Arabic section of the GDR



broadcasting service and the Arab-German Friendship Society in [East] Berlin visited Iraq in Jan. (*INA*, 23 Jan)

The GDR trade unions assigned 26 union scholarships to Iraqi workers. The Iraqi Federation of TUs asked the government to approve the sending of the workers. (*INA*, 26 Apr)

The GDR Educational Workers' Trade Union and the Iraqi Ministry of Education agreed that 50 Iraqi teachers should spend their summer holidays in the GDR in 1960. The two countries were also to cooperate in the preparation of history books. (*R. Berlin (GDR) in Arabic*, 27 May—*BBC EE*, 31 May)

In June the Minister of Commerce stated that the GDR intended to buy from Iraq dates to the value of ID400,000 as well as cement, oil and oil products, and would export presses for dates. (*R. Baghdad*, 26 June—*BBC ME*, 30 June)

A cultural agreement between Iraq and the GDR was negotiated in Baghdad in May. (*R. Baghdad*, 4 May—*IMB*, 5 May) On 18 July a working plan for 1960/61 under the agreement, was concluded in Baghdad. (*R. Baghdad*, 18 July—*BBC/W*, 28 July)

The Iraqi Ministry of Oil Affairs announced on 20 July that Iraq had sold quantities of crude oil to People's China and the GDR at 4 per cent above the "world price." (*BBC in Arabic*, 20 July—*IMB*, 21 July)

On 6 Oct the first industrial exhibition of the GDR was opened in Baghdad; PM Qassim said in his speech, *inter alia*, that sooner or later Germany would be united. (*R. Baghdad*, 6 Oct—*IMB*, 7 Oct)

On 12 Oct Colonel Mahdāwi, President of the People's Court, arrived in East Berlin at the invitation of the President of the GDR Supreme Court. (*R. Amman*, 14 Oct—*IMB*, 14 Oct)

**Hungary.** On 2 Mar a Hungarian-Iraqi air agreement was signed in Budapest. Iraq was represented by Hasan at-Talabāni, Minister of Communications. (*INA*, 1, 3, 9 Mar) The agreement became effective on 28 June. (For its terms, see *INA*, 28 June.)

In Mar it was reported that a Hungarian-Iraqi draft agreement had been prepared for cooperation in broadcasting, television, and the exchange of technical know-how. (*Zaman*, 10 Mar)

In Mar it was reported that four officials of the Ministry of Planning would be sent to Hungary for a month's study tour. (*INA*, 22 Mar)

In May Dr Nazihah ad-Dulaymi, Minister of State, visited Budapest at the invitation of the Hungarian Government. (*INA*, 4, 10 May)

A permanent Hungarian trade exhibition was inaugurated in Baghdad in Oct and an exhibition of electrical equipment was opened on 17 Nov. (*INA*, 27 Sept, 29 Dec; *Iraq Times*, 18 Nov)

**Poland.** A Polish expert advised on the Baghdad international Fair to be held in 1962 or 1963. (*INA*, 30 Jan)

In Feb Poland presented Iraq with an ambulance car; the Iraqi Minister of Health and the Polish Ambassador spoke at the presentation. (*INA*, 11 Feb)

A Polish economic expert arrived in Baghdad in Feb to take up work with the Ministry of Planning. (*INA*, 21 Feb)

In Mar a Polish professor was invited to serve as an expert with the Iraqi Fairs administration. (*INA*, 10 Mar)

On 19 June it was reported that the Economic Attaché of the Polish embassy in Baghdad had asked for political

asylum for himself and his family; his request was under consideration. (*R. Amman*, 19 June, quoting *Fajr al-Jadid*, *Baghdad*, 18 June—*IMB*, 19 June)

On 24 June it was reported that an Iraqi delegation in Poland had concluded an agreement for two Polish institutions to undertake an irrigation project in Amara province at a cost of \$900,000. (*BBC in Arabic*, 24 June—*IMB*, 24 June)

In July a Polish delegation attended the anniversary celebrations of the Iraqi revolution. On 16 July PM Qassim received the Polish Deputy Minister of Trade and the members of the delegation. (*R. Baghdad*, 13, 17 July—*IMB*, 14, 18 July)

**Rumania.** A Rumanian exhibition of hygiene was opened in Baghdad on 4 Feb by Muhammad ash-Shawwāf, Minister of Health. (*INA*, 4 Feb)

The instruments of ratification of a cultural agreement between Iraq and Rumania were exchanged in Baghdad on 17 Aug. (*INA*, 17 Aug)

#### PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, MONGOLIA, NORTH VIETNAM

**Diplomatic, Military and Cultural Relations; Visits.** In Feb the "last batch" of a Chinese gift of vehicles and other equipment for Civil Defence purposes was officially delivered to the Iraqi authorities. (*INA*, 18 Feb) On 20 Feb Baghdad Radio commented that, whatever the value of the gifts, it was an expression of People's China's high regard for Iraq. The commentator added that the US had granted Iraq aid on an unprecedented scale and a US-Iraqi cultural agreement would be shortly concluded; such agreements existed with both Socialist and Western countries. (*IMB*, 21 Feb)

In Apr the first Iraqi Ambassador to People's China presented his credentials in Peking. (*INA*, 28 Apr)

On 15 Apr Ali Shukur, SG of the Iraqi Federation of Trade Unions, arrived in Peking at the head of a workers' delegation of ten to participate in the May Day celebrations, at the invitation of the Chinese TU Federation. (*R. Baghdad*, 9 Apr; *R. Beirut*, 19 Apr—*IMB*, 10, 19 Apr) Shukur returned to Iraq in Aug, after a three-month stay in China and the Soviet Union. (*INA*, 11 Aug)

On 15 May a cultural agreement was signed in Peking. (*R. Baghdad*, 15 May—*IMB*, 16 May; *Mabda*, 17 May)

An exhibition of Chinese paintings was opened by the Iraqi Minister of Education in Baghdad on 25 Sept. (*INA*, 25 Sept)

A ten-man Iraqi military delegation visited People's China in Sept-Oct to participate in China's national holiday, meeting high-ranking officers and visiting military installations. It left on 10 Oct. (*R. Baghdad*, 22, 26 Sept, 4, 10 Oct—*IMB*, 25, 27 Sept, 5, 11 Oct)

Dr Faisal as-Sāmīr, Iraqi Minister of Guidance, visited People's China in Oct and was received by PM Chou-En-Lai. (*R. Baghdad*, 8 Oct—*IMB*, 9 Oct)

An Iraqi cultural (teachers) delegation visited China from 30 Oct to 23 Nov under the Chinese-Iraqi cultural agreement. (*INA*, 4 Oct; *R. Baghdad*, 30 Oct, 23 Nov—*IMB* 31 Oct, 24 Nov)

On 10 Dec ten Iraqi engineers left for six weeks in China at the expense of the Chinese Government under the cultural agreement. (*R. Baghdad*, 20 Nov, 10, 18 Dec—*IMB*, 21 Nov, 11, 19 Dec)

**Commercial Relations.** On 9 Jan it was reported that People's China intended to buy 50,000 tons of crude oil out of the estimated 5.5 million tons at the disposal of

the Iraqi Government in 1960. (*Zaman*, 6 Jan) In July the Iraqi Minister of Oil Affairs said that Iraq had sold [unspecified] quantities of crude oil to People's China and the GDR at 4 per cent above the "world price." (*BBC in Arabic*, 20 July-IMB, 21 July)

On 25 May trade and payments agreements were signed in Peking. Iraq was represented by Abd al-Latif ash-Shawwāf, Minister of Trade. People's China undertook to import 65,000 tons of dates. Iraq ratified the agreements in Aug (For details of the agreements see *INA*, 26 June, 8, 16 Aug.)

On 5 Nov a Chinese economic exhibition was opened at Baghdad in the presence of PM Qassim, who praised Chinese-Iraqi friendship, Chinese aid to the FLN, and

Chinese progress. (*R. Baghdad*, 1, 5 Nov-IMB, 2, 6 Nov; *Mabda'*, 6 Nov)

**Mongolia.** A Mongolian cultural delegation arrived in Baghdad in Apr to negotiate a cultural agreement, containing the usual provisions, which was signed on 5 May together with a working plan for 1960. It left on 10 May. (*INA*, 30 Apr, 2, 5, 7, 10 May)

**North Vietnam.** A cultural agreement between North Vietnam and Iraq was signed in Moscow in May. (*INA*, 8 May)

A North Vietnam trade delegation visited Iraq in Dec. It also discussed political questions. (*INA*, 24 Dec)

## THE COMMUNIST BLOC AND JORDAN, LEBANON AND SUDAN

### SOVIET VIEWS ON JORDAN

NOTE: There are no diplomatic relations between Jordan and the Communist countries. For current relations, see p 340.

**Jordan's Foreign Policy.** King Hussein's visit to Iran in Apr was represented as evidence that Jordan intended to join CENTO. Moscow Radio commented: "The alliance of Jordan's reactionary forces with the aggressive CENTO Bloc is a new threat to the peoples of the East." (*R. Moscow in Arabic*, 7 Apr-BBC SU, 9 Apr; also: *Mizan*, May) [The CENTO theme also appeared in many other comments.]

Berlin (GDR) Radio, speaking of "King Hussein and his gang," accused the King of having accepted, during his "recent visit" to West Germany [Nov 1959], the "Bonn rulers'" demand that Jordan become an imperialistic base for combating the Arab liberation movement in return for money which he needed for his "extravagance" and his "police system." (*R. Berlin (GDR) in Arabic*, 24 May-BBC EE, 26 May)

**Hussein as Enemy of Communism.** [King Hussein presents himself as the foremost fighter against Communism in the Arab world; see Views and Policies, p 334 and the King's speech at the UN, p 9.] The following is a typical Soviet comment:

"Reuter reports that King Hussein, speaking in Parliament, attacked Communism... Hussein is well known in the Arab East. All are aware of his dwarfish appearance. Even the Field Marshal's uniform which he put on just before delivering his speech could not increase his stature. It seems that Hussein has forgotten that hatred of Communism does not give anyone the stamp of victory. The poor among the so-called great, such as Hussein, usually come to an ignoble end in such a field...

"King Hussein has lost the confidence and trust of the people. Jordan has lost her independence under his rule. The foreigners dominate this Arab country and dictate the policy which Hussein must pursue... In the Arab East Hussein is being called 'the traitor and the agent of colonialism.' Hussein's activities have clearly shown who is the actual enemy of Communism in the Arab East... It has become known recently that the US has given Hussein another morsel—about 4 million dollars... That is why the King is repeating the words of the US propaganda machine." (*R. Moscow in Arabic*, 3 Nov-BBC SU, 5 Nov)

**The Internal Situation.** The Soviet Press and radio frequently attacked Jordan on account of her internal regime. An article in *Trud*, e.g., said: "Three years ago a reactionary coup d'état deprived the Jordanian people of their national independence and democratic freedoms." Ever since then the Jordanian people had lived under the "fatal terrorism of the police," and the "progressive and democratic elements" had been intimidated. But despite the policy of "severe torture"—details of which were given in the article—the "brave Jordanian people" were continuing their struggle for peace, independence and democracy. (*R. Moscow in Arabic*, 7 Apr-BBC SU, 11 Apr)

**Assassination of al-Majāli.** There seemed to have been no direct comment in the Soviet Press on the assassination of PM Hazzā' al-Majāli on 29 Aug. *Mizan* cited some "oblique comments" from a dispatch of *Izvestia's* London correspondent on 31 Aug. He said that British Press comment was directed towards diverting attention from the "delicate question" of Jordanian popular dissatisfaction with the rule of King Hussein; certainly the Jordanians had sufficient reason to resent the fact that their country remained in effect a British protectorate. Hazzā' al-Majāli had been an active advocate of Jordanian adherence to the Baghdad Pact and a violent opponent of the UAR and the Iraqi Republic. (*Mizan*, Sept)

Berlin (GDR) in Arabic was more specific: "It is not surprising that Premier Majāli should have been assassinated by an individual or an organization recruited from among the sons of the people, irrespective of the tendency of the individual or organization concerned and of whether or not this individual or organization concerned was in touch with somebody outside the country. The Jordanian people had their fill and their patience was exhausted." However, the station added, "individual acts of terrorism cannot provide a sound solution of any of the outstanding problems" but might even "lead to an intensification of oppression by the tyrannical rulers... Such a solution must be the outcome of a popular, general and spontaneous movement capable of demolishing the edifice of corruption from its very foundations and tearing out the roots of imperialist influence." (*R. Berlin (GDR)* 31 Aug-BBC EE, 3 Sept)

### THE COMMUNIST BLOC AND LEBANON

**Soviet Approval of Lebanon's Neutralist Policy.** A review of Soviet writing on Lebanon in the *Mizan Newsletter* emphasizes the "historical continuity of Russian interest

in the Lebanon and the Levant countries in general. Until recently, Soviet writers have presented the Lebanon as overwhelmingly dominated, both economically and politically, by Western influence. But Soviet historians are now taking a new look at the history of Lebanon's independence movement (together with that of Syria); and the present Lebanese Government's policy, since its rejection of the Eisenhower Doctrine, has received the approval of Soviet political commentators as tending to reduce Lebanese dependence on the West."

*Mizan* concluded: "It would appear that at present Soviet writers are content to advocate progressive dissociation of the Lebanon from Western influence and express support for the Lebanon Government in so far as they consider it to be bringing that about." (*Mizan*, May; see also *Mizan*, Dec)

Soviet support for Lebanon's struggle for independence was emphasized, e.g., in a *Pravda* article on the occasion of Lebanese Independence Day: "The Lebanese recall with gratitude the aid given by the USSR in 1946, when the Lebanese question was discussed at the UN. The Soviet Union was the sole great power that demanded immediate withdrawal of foreign troops... In the spring of 1958, at the time of the US intervention, it was only through the perseverance of peace-loving forces that the US was forced to withdraw its troops." (*Pravda*, 22 Nov)

**Soviet Comment on US Sixth Fleet Visit to Beirut.** The Soviet Press described Lebanese public opinion as protesting against a forthcoming visit by the US Sixth Fleet to Beirut, terming it an infringement of Lebanon's national sovereignty and her policy of neutrality. (*Krasnaya Zvezda*, 23 Mar; *Mizan*, Apr; *Sovremenniy Vostok*, May)

On 30 July an article in *Pravda* accused the US of using the favourable strategical location of Lebanon in the interests of the cold war. US and NATO forces were using Beirut port and airport for aggressive purposes against the USSR, the article said, adding that "Lebanese political circles considered the government's apparent approval of these activities as a deviation from neutrality." (*Pravda*, 30 July)

[A visit to Beirut by the Sixth Fleet, starting on 10 Oct, was accompanied by another spate of Soviet criticism and warnings.] According to Moscow Radio, the Lebanese Press described the forthcoming visit as a direct danger to the independence and sovereignty of the state. (*R. Moscow in Arabic*, 30 Sept-IMB, 2 Oct) *Pravda* condemned the "frequent and massive US naval visits to Beirut" as a means of threatening and blackmailing independent delegations to the UN. (*Pravda*, 10 Oct)

[The visit was criticized by Lebanese papers.]

**A Lebanese Protest.** The Soviet embassy distributed the *Pravda* article of 30 July to Ministers, deputies and newspapers on 2 Aug. It was stated that the manner of its distribution caused "aversion" among officials because it took place while the Ministers were at a meeting with President Shehab [?]. Philippe Taqla, Foreign Minister, received the Soviet Ambassador on 3 Aug. Official sources said he told him that the article and the manner of its distribution represented an "improper action." (*Mid. Mirror*, 6 Aug)

**Lebanon's Vote Against Admission of People's China to UN.** Lebanon voted for the proposal not to place the admission of People's China on the Agenda of the UN General Assembly. (*A/PV*, 895, 8 Oct) Moscow Radio cited internal opposition to this vote. (*R. Moscow in Arabic*, 4 Oct-IMB, 5 Oct)

**Church Relations.** In Aug it was reported that the Russian Orthodox Church had granted LL7 million [?] worth of medical equipment to the new St. George's (Greek Orthodox) hospital in Lebanon. The rumour that the grant had been made by the USSR Government was denied. (*Nida'*, 12 Aug)

The head of the Russian Orthodox Church, Patriarch Alexius, arrived in Beirut on 9 Dec during a tour of ME countries; he was met at the airport by PM Sa'ib Slām. (*Hayat*, 10 Dec)

Metropolitan Ilya Kareem of the Beirut Greek Orthodox Church stated that "by his visit, Patriarch Alexius had helped to strengthen the old bonds of friendship between the Russian and Lebanese Churches." (*R. Moscow, Tass in English*, 15 Dec-BBC SU, 17 Dec) On 11 Dec the Patriarch laid the foundation stone of the St. George's Hospital. He said that the Russian Orthodox Church would donate all the equipment required, worth an estimated LL4 million. (*Mid. Mirror*, 17 Dec) President Shehab gave a banquet for the Patriarch. (*R. Moscow, Tass in English*, 15 Dec-BBC SU, 17 Dec)

On 14 Dec PM Slām invested the Patriarch with a high Lebanese order and the latter presented the Premier with the Vladimir medal. (*Mid. Mirror*, 17 Dec)

**Armenian Ties.** The Chairman of the Armenian Supreme Soviet arrived for a formal visit on 3 May, and was welcomed by an Armenian Deputy in the name of the Speaker of the Lebanese Parliament. (*Jaridah*, 4 May)

**Lebanese Communist Party.** The General Secretary of the Lebanese CP, Hasan Qraytim, who took part in the conference of Communist and labour parties in Moscow, was received, together with the General Secretary of the Syrian CP, Khālid Bakdāsh, by N.A. Mukhitdinov, member of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU. "The ensuing talk was held in a warm and friendly atmosphere." (*Pravda*, 28 Dec)

**Commercial Relations.** On 16 Mar, at a meeting concerned with trade relations, the Soviet Ambassador informed PM Karami that his government had decided to increase the import of apples [a very important export] from Lebanon. (*R. Beirut*, 16 Mar-IMB, 17 Mar)

A Soviet "Atom for Peace Fair" was to be opened in the UNESCO building in Beirut on 23 May. (*R. Baghdad*, 22 May-IMB 22 May)

In Oct Lebanon officially expressed her desire to renew the trade agreement with the USSR, concluded in 1954 and extended annually since then, and to increase the volume of trade from LL15 million to LL20 million. Negotiations were expected to be conducted at the beginning of 1961 in Beirut. (*R. Damascus* 23 Oct, *R. Amman* 23 Dec-IMB, 24 Oct, 23 Dec; *Jaridah*, 14 Dec)

**Cultural Relations.** On 28 Oct the building of the Association for Cultural Relations between Lebanon and the USSR was formally opened in Beirut. (*R. Moscow in Arabic*, 29 Oct-BBC SU, 1 Nov)

**Czechoslovakia.** In Apr a Lebanese trade delegation visited Czechoslovakia to discuss changes in the trade agreement. (*R. Amman*, 2 Apr-IMB, 3 Apr)

On 23 Nov, the Lebanese Government agreed to open negotiations for an aviation agreement with Czechoslovakia; there was no direct air link between the two countries. (*Mid. Mirror*, 26 Nov) A Czechoslovak proposal to open a Prague-Beirut airline, reportedly rejected three years before by Charles Malik, then FM, had been renewed in Feb 1960. (*Nida'*, 21 Feb)



People's Republic of China. See p 368.

**Poland.** On 7 Apr Poland and Lebanon extended the commercial agreement in force since 1956. (*BBC*, 7 Apr)

**Hungary.** In Mar it was reported that Hungary had invited a visit by the Lebanese trade delegation to Poland and Czechoslovakia. The Lebanese Government apologized that for technical reasons this request could not be met, but it was agreed that a Hungarian commercial delegation would visit Lebanon in Apr. It was reported that in 1958 Lebanon had not responded to a Hungarian proposal for a trade agreement. (*Sahafah*, 24 Mar)

At the beginning of June it was reported that the Lebanese Government was discussing the conclusion of a trade agreement with Hungary. (*Hayat*, 2 June)

Some days later the Hungarian Consul-General in Damascus arrived in Lebanon and reportedly asked the government to invite a commercial mission from Hungary. (*Jaridah*, 10 June)

### THE COMMUNIST BLOC AND SUDAN

**USSR-Sudan Political and Military Relations.** On the occasion of the Sudanese Revolution Day, the Soviet Press voiced approval of the Abbud government's foreign policy, saying that it had confirmed in practice its declared intention to pursue a policy of neutrality and independence, recognized People's China, and concluded the Nile waters agreement with the UAR and a trade agreement with the USSR. The previous government, on the other hand, had "revolved in the orbit of the Anglo-American bloc." (*Izvestia*, 17 Nov according to *Mizan*, Dec)

*Pravda* wrote of the great progress that had been achieved in Sudan, especially in the Sudanization of the administration. However, the paper said, the British were engaged in provocations against the resettlement of peasants dislocated by the building of the Aswan High Dam, in order to create difficulties and tension with the UAR (see p 416). Relations with the Socialist countries, on the other hand, were developing. (*Pravda*, 17 Nov)

Twenty-five Soviet troop carriers took part in the military parade in Khartoum on 17 Nov. Five were a gift; the others had been bought recently. Major-General Hassan Bashir Nasr declared that the gift had great significance in the eyes of the President. (*Sudan Daily*, 13 Nov; *Ahram*, 18 Nov)

At the end of Dec it was announced that President Abbud was to visit the Soviet Union at a date to be fixed later. The visit was to be returned by PM Khrushchev and Brezhnev, President of the Supreme Soviet. (*Pravda*, 27 Dec)

[There were reports of Soviet pressure on Sudan at the end of the year to permit transit of supplies to the Gizenga government in Stanleyville, Congo—see p 32.]

**Increased USSR-Sudan Trade.** A Soviet-Sudanese trade protocol, renewing the trade agreement of 1959, was signed on 16 Apr in Khartoum. It increased the annual exchange of goods from SL2 million to SL3 million during 1960. (*R. Cairo*, 18 Apr; *R. Moscow in Arabic-BBC/W*, 21 Apr)

On 2 Dec a contract was signed for the import of 170,000 tons of Soviet flour at a cost of "over 2 million pounds," the "largest trade transaction between the USSR and the Sudan." It had been agreed to import 100,000 tons of Soviet wheat in 1961. (*MENA*, 3, 4 Dec-BBC/W, 8 Dec)

In Dec negotiations were started in Moscow for the renewal of the trade agreement, and on 9 Jan 1961 a protocol was signed stipulating an increase in trade in 1961 to more than double the 1960 amount, on the basis of balanced trade. The USSR was to supply Sudan with equipment and machinery, rails, timber, cotton, textiles, wheat, sugar, cement and other goods, and to import from Sudan cotton, oil seeds, raw hides and other traditional Sudanese exports. (*Sudan Daily*, 29 Dec; *R. Moscow in Arabic*, 9 Jan-BBC SU, 11 Jan 1961)

**Cultural Relations, with USSR and GDR.** The USSR offered 20 scholarships for Sudanese students and it was reported that many were already studying there. (*Ayyam*, 9 June) It was agreed that applications for the People's Friendship University in Moscow should go through the Sudanese Government and not the Soviet embassy. (*R. Cairo*, 18 July-BBC/W, 28 July)

The GDR offered Sudan five university scholarships. (*Sudan Daily*, 16 Sept) In Nov Sayyid Bushra, the Sudanese Deputy Minister of Education, and two Sudanese Cultural Attachés visited the GDR on the occasion of the Humboldt University anniversary. Bushra said he was glad that some young Sudanese were studying at GDR universities. [There are no formal relations between the Sudan and the GDR.] (*R. Berlin (GDR) in Arabic*, 11 Nov-BBC EE, 15 Nov)

**GDR-Sudan Trade.** A delegation from the GDR Central Bank visited Khartoum in Feb. A GDR trade delegation came in Sept, when a contract was signed for the purchase of SL750,000 worth of agricultural machinery. (*NIL*, 18 Feb; *Ra'y al-Amm*, 8 Sept)

**People's Republic of China.** [Sudan maintains diplomatic relations with People's China] and supports its admission to the UN. (*A/PV*, 895, 8 Oct)

China offered Sudan five scholarships; the first two students to go to China left in Aug to study textile engineering. (*Ra'y al-Amm*, 1 Sept) In Dec the BBC in Arabic reported that four Sudanese students had returned from People's China, saying that they had surrendered their scholarships because they had been obliged to study Chinese for two years, as well as Communist doctrines. It would have taken four years before they could start their studies. (*BBC in Arabic*, 20 Dec-IMB, 21 Dec)

In Sept talks were held in Khartoum on arrangements for a Chinese textile fair there "next January." A Sudanese photographic exhibition in Peking was to open "in October." (*ANA*, 8 Sept-BBC/W, 15 Sept)

An aluminium wire factory opened at Khartoum North on 18 Nov, with 400 workers and 34 Chinese technicians, who were training Sudanese to take their places. (*R. Umdurman*, 21 Nov-BBC/W, 1 Dec)



## THE COMMUNIST BLOC AND THE UAR

COMMUNIST VIEWS ON INTERNAL  
SITUATION IN UAR

**July: Approval of the Egyptian Revolution.** An article by I. Belyayev on the eighth Anniversary of the Egyptian revolution was published in *Pravda* on 23 July: "The sweeping success of the July coup d'état was prepared by the whole march of events of Egyptian history." Achievements were enumerated: 800 thousand feddans distributed in the Egyptian Region between 180 thousand families of fellaheen; agricultural reform in Syria after the setting up of UAR; notable progress in industry and other fields. "There were difficulties, but not a little has been done." Recalling the 1956 tripartite aggression, the author said that the USSR and other peace-loving countries had saved the Arab national liberation movement by saving Egypt. The article dwelt at length on the important contribution of Soviet aid which was given unconditional to the progress of the UAR. (*Pravda*, 23 July; an article in the same vein appeared in *Izvestia*, according to *Mizan*, Sept.)

**Economic Policy Criticized, Nationalization Advocated.** Writing in Jan from Cairo, a correspondent of *New Times* said that Western economic influence in Egypt was on its way back. Egypt was accepting American aid though she had to pay ruinous interest. The rights of the former British and French owners, whose property had been sequestered following the Suez campaign, were being restored. These measures left "the working folk," perplexed. The average monthly income per capita in Egypt was LE3.5, inadequate for normal nourishment, let alone for other needs. Why then let in the brutal British and French exploiters again?—the correspondent asked. "Could not their enterprises be dealt with in the same way as the banks?" [Foreign-owned banks and insurance companies had been "Egyptianized", i.e. completely taken over—with the state the largest shareholder in the new companies.] (*New Times*, No. 7, Feb)

Soviet publications voiced approval of the nationalization of banks in Egypt [Feb 1960] as an important measure in mobilizing the country's finances, strengthening the economy, expanding the State sector in the financial field, and tightening government control over the activity of private capital. (*Izvestia*, 2 Apr; *Sovremenniy Vostok*, May)

**Criticism of Internal Policies and National Union.** In an article in *Sovremenniy Vostok*, Kondrashov, *Izvestia*'s permanent correspondent in Cairo, described a visit to Asyut. He was accompanied by a guide, an "official propagandist," and in his article he emphasized the contrast between the official line as expressed by his guide and his own observations.

The guide stated the official theory of a cooperative, democratic socialist society, but "he did not consider it necessary to explain these concepts."

The writer stressed the prominence of the police, who were everywhere. The administration was in the hands of army and police officers sent from Cairo, while civilian organs and independent activity by the people were given "an extremely modest place." But these officers—as the government itself realized—"are passive." This was one reason for setting up the National Union (NU).

Kondrashov met the Chairman of the local NU committee, who "was also a person of importance during the Farūq regime." The writer noted that there were no

workers on the NU committee or the municipal council, and that members whom the "official propagandist" described as "farmers" were in reality landowners.

In practice, Kondrashov concluded, all the NU did was to submit petitions by the local population to the central authorities. As it was created from above, however, the role of the people's representative was adopted by those who were close to the authorities—the landowners, merchants and capitalists.

In a Muslim youth club, the author found that while it was expensively furnished, there were only 100 books in the library. Young people played backgammon. "All ideological work revolves round themes that have already become trite: 'The Arab Nation of Egypt,' 'Religion and Society' and 'Should Women Work?'"

The tone of the article was emphatically ironic throughout. (*Sovremenniy Vostok*, June; *Mizan*, July-Aug)

The continued prominence of the landowners was also stressed in travelling notes on Syria by the Soviet journalist V. Katin. The Syrian peasants, he wrote, were suffering from severe drought and derived no benefit from the partial land reform. They complained, according to the article, of lack of funds and water and absence of aid on the part of the authorities, who did not rally to the peasants' side after traditional landowning relations were upset. Katin also described the general poverty of the countryside and the marked contrast between the position of smallholders and of big landowners, the latter still enjoying official protection. He also drew attention to the employment of child labour in cotton and textile plants. (*Sovremenniy Vostok*, Oct)

**Suppression of Democracy in Syria Criticized.** Outspoken criticism of the situation in Syria appeared in GDR (East German) broadcasts and in the *World Marxist Review*, culminating in a call by Khālid Bakdash, the emigré Syrian Communist leader, for organized opposition to the regime. (See below: Communist comment on Communism in the UAR)

Berlin Radio (GDR) in its Arabic broadcasts quoted the Lebanese Press on "difficulties in the Syrian Region of the UAR," adding that UAR reports "only mention economic difficulties attributed to drought." The station quoted reports that Akram Hurāni, the Ba'ath party leader, was seeking political asylum in Lebanon (see p 498) and that TU officials in the Syrian Region had submitted their resignations in protest against official pressure. It quoted Jordanian charges that the union of Egypt and Syria represented the domination of one party over the other. However, it also reported Abdel-Nasser's refutation of the rumours that Syria was trying to break away from the UAR. (*R. Berlin (GDR) in Arabic*, 7, 14 Aug, 23 Oct, 4 Dec—BBC EE, 10, 17 Aug, 28 Oct, 6 Dec)

In a most outspoken review of the situation in Syria (mixing comment with quotations from the Lebanese Communist paper *an-Nidā*), Berlin Radio (GDR) warned Syria against "imperialist machinations"—especially in connection with the reports of a Jordanian subversion campaign (see p 154)—but at the same time spoke critically of the serious political situation in the country: "Imperialist activity seeks to exploit the wrath of the Syrian people against the situation which has befallen them, and tries to exploit the increase in the public movement to revise the Union and to revive democracy in the country as well as its economy... But the UAR sources do not acknowledge the existence of any diffi-

culties in the Syrian Region. In his speeches in Syria Abdel-Nasser emphasized the strength of the unity between Egypt and Syria. Despite the absolute denial of difficulties the Arab Press considers that what is going on between the UAR and Jordan is evidence of the existence of such difficulties, which the imperialists and their agents are trying to use for their own benefit. These imperialist attempts will no doubt put the people of Syria on their guard." (*BBC, 30 Oct*)

**Communist Appeal to Fight Abdel-Nasser Regime.** The most severe assault on the UAR appeared in the *World Marxist Review*, which quoted an appeal to the people in the "underground organ of the Syrian Communist Party—*Nidāl ash-Sha'ab*" on the 14th anniversary of the withdrawal of the Anglo-French troops from Syria.

This anniversary, the appeal said, "is celebrated today when Syria is embroiled in Abdel-Nasser's unification measures which have immobilized all her forces [and] threaten to destroy our national customs and traditions." The democratic regime and way of life won after independence "have been replaced by ruthless dictatorship, unbridled terror, a police regime, prisons and concentration camps. The prosperous national economy has been rapidly strangled"—all strata of society and the economy had been affected. "As a result, living standards have declined and unemployment and poverty are widespread. The horrible spectre of hunger has reappeared..."

"The experience of the past two years has demonstrated that Egyptian rule is a substitution for foreign imperialist domination." Everything was being Egyptianized—the economy, the army, the schools.

"The majority of the Syrian people are opposed to domination by Egypt. There is no public support for the dictatorship and Nasser retains his grip only by means of terror, violence and slander."

In conclusion the appeal called on all Syrians to fight "to save our independence and sovereignty," to struggle against "Egyptian political and economic rule..., against Egyptianization," and for better living, democracy, an end to terror and for "genuine Arab solidarity," and to use "every weapon" in this struggle; to organize, to protest, to demonstrate and to go on strike.

The *World Marxist Review* added editorially that this appeal was passed from hand to hand and that the authorities, having failed to arrest the distributors, started a wave of terror. (*World Marxist Review, Aug*)

#### COMMUNIST VIEWS ON COMMUNISM IN THE UAR

[Direct attacks on Abdel-Nasser for persecuting Communists were made in 1960 by international Communist publications and by Arab Communists, but not by the Communist countries.]

**Bulgaria-UAR Controversy over Sofia as a UAR Communist centre; clash between Communists and Arab nationalist students at Sofia University—see below: Bulgaria.**

**Why UAR Persecutes Communists.** An article by Farūq Mahmūd in *World Marxist Review* in Mar on the trials of "Communists and Democrats" in the UAR, declared that the UAR was persecuting Communists because of its reactionary policies and its compromises with imperialism. The article quoted at length from a speech said to have been made for the defence at one of the trials by Professor Fu'ād Mursi of Alexandria University, a "prominent democrat." The UAR, he was quoted as

saying, was seeking friendship with imperialist enemies, especially the US, while waging war against friends. The slander campaign against the Arab Communists and the Communist countries harmed only the UAR; Abdel-Nasser had shattered national unity. The government's compromise with imperialism was a consequence of its reactionary, anti-democratic policy at home, especially in Syria. It was because the Communists fought imperialism that the government persecuted them. (*World Marxist Review, Mar*)

**Communist Struggle Against Abdel-Nasser's "Democracy."** A variation on the above themes appeared in the same journal in an article by Karim Hafid, which emphasized, however, that the Communists were in clear-cut opposition to Abdel-Nasser's regime. Abdel-Nasser had attacked the Communists in a series of speeches in Syria as foreign agents and enemies of Arab nationalism. This was "downright slander," the writer said; the Communists fought the patriotic struggle for national liberation everywhere, and had supported Abdel-Nasser in every instance of this struggle. When the colonialists had been driven out, the Communists had continued the struggle against the imperialist monopolies, in the service of the "national-democratic revolution."

"There is a climate of fear in the country," Hafid wrote. "... The Communists refuse to defend 'democracy' of this kind and that is the reason for Abdel-Nasser's anti-Communist attacks. They are working for the re-establishment of democratic freedom in the UAR, are demanding respect for the people's right." The national interests, Hafid continued, could not be upheld without democracy and social progress. The success of the struggle for national freedom depended on the popular will and this could only be won if the interests of the people were served and the people's hopes realized. The Communists' programme was designed to achieve just this, and they therefore assisted the national struggle. The class interests of the proletariat and the peasantry were completely in accord with the aims of the national liberation movement, and in this they were united with the national bourgeoisie, whom they urged to join with them in the struggle. The Communists, therefore, were in fact working for national unity. Not they, but Abdel-Nasser had deviated, he was "being sucked down into the quagmire of anti-Communism" as he veered towards the West.

The people supported the Communists, Hafid declared. "Only a powerful party deeply entrenched among the people could cause so much worry to the President and his police." The Communists would carry on the struggle; the terror could not stop them. Anti-Communism "will never become an Arab steed just because the President of the UAR has put a saddle on it." To fight against the Communists meant fighting against the people and weakening the anti-colonialist struggle." (*World Marxist Review, June*)

**The Case of Farajullah al-Hilu.** The Communist countries joined in a campaign for the release of Farajullah al-Hilu, SG of the Lebanese CP, who, according to Communist sources, was arrested in June 1959 and imprisoned in Mezza prison, Damascus.

The *World Marxist Review* wrote editorially that Hilu had been seen in Mezza prison; he looked exhausted and his life was in danger. The Cairo authorities denied that a prisoner bearing this name was being held, but Lebanese sources said he was registered under the name of Asāf Mansūr, and Cairo admitted that such a person was under arrest. There was world-wide support for his release, the editorial continued, and only such support could

eventually force the UAR to release him. "The silence maintained by the UAR authorities is at variance with national and international law. Their methods are reminiscent of those used by the Gestapo." (*World Marxist Review*, Jan; see also June)

Details on the international campaign for Hilu's release were reported by *Pravda* (23 Mar) and by the GDR Radio. (*R. Berlin (GDR) in Arabic*, 26 June-BBC EE, 30 June) [These reports, however, were not accompanied by attacks on the UAR.]

**Khālīd Bakdāsh Attacks Abdel-Nasser and the Egyptian-Syrian Union.** Writing in the US paper *The Worker* [as broadcast], Khālīd Bakdāsh [the exiled Syrian Communist leader] said that 99 per cent of the Syrian people had begun to understand that the situation could not go on as it was. Abdel-Nasser was a tool of the capitalists; his policy in Syria was designed to open the region to Egyptian economic exploitation. The union of Egypt and Syria had proved to be based on a number of mistakes and could not continue by force. Bakdāsh called on Syrian democratic and nationalist organizations to form a united national front to save Syria from the chaos and dictatorship it had suffered as a result of its union with Egypt. (*BBC ME*, 5 Apr)

#### USSR-UAR POLITICAL RELATIONS

**Soviet Economic Aid—Political Aspects.** Soviet sources again and again stressed that Soviet aid to the UAR—like all Soviet aid—was given unconditionally, on a large scale, and on the easiest of terms; it had the best possible effect on the economy of the receiving country; all Soviet aid undertakings were speedily, competently and scrupulously fulfilled. [See e.g.: *Pravda*, 11 Jan, 22 Feb; *Souremenniy Vostok*, Feb; *Mizan*, Mar; *MENA*, 21 May-BBC, 24 May] In contrast, US aid was said to be burdened with heavy interest and aimed at opening the doors to American monopolies; it was described as a drop in the ocean in comparison with massive Soviet aid. (See e.g. *New Times* No. 7, Feb; *R. Moscow in Arabic*, 20 May-BBC SU, 24 May)

On 8 May, at the opening of a textile plant built by the USSR at Damietta, President Abdel-Nasser said: "It is my duty to render homage to the tact and disinterestedness which the Soviet Union has demonstrated towards us. In spite of divergence of opinions, Moscow never put pressure on us, never threatened to stop her aid." (*Ahram*, 9 May)

The two important developments in this field during the year under review were the agreement on Soviet assistance on the second stage of the Aswan High Dam project (p 524 ff) and the amendment of the 1957 Soviet-Syrian aid agreement (see below, USSR aid to the Syrian Region).

**Soviet Political and Military Support.** Soviet leaders and commentators often emphasized that the Soviet Union had supported Egypt and Syria against imperialist designs, and especially that it had "saved Egypt" during the Suez and Sinai campaigns in 1956. (*Pravda*, 1956) At the Rumanian CP Congress in Bucharest, Khrushchev mentioned the USSR's active help to Egypt in 1956, to Syria in 1957 and to Iraq in 1958, though in the last two cases they had to deal with the strongest imperialist power—the US. (*Pravda*, 22 June)

This state of affairs was also acknowledged by UAR leaders. (See below: Amer's visit to Moscow.)

**Apr–May: Moscow Critical of UAR Press Comment on Summit Conference.** Moscow in Arabic quoted *al-Gumriyah* headlines, saying: "We do not allow big powers to solve questions of the future of the world alone," and commented: that UAR papers had gone so far as to say that the participants in the Summit meeting, which included the Soviet Union, desired to impose their policy on the Afro-Asian countries and bring back the era of spheres of influence—such propaganda was incompatible with the interest of the Arab countries. The Cairo Press was also criticized for not seeing the connection between world and regional problems. (*R. Moscow in Arabic*, 7 Apr-BBC SU, 9 Apr)

However, Moscow also broadcast favourable UAR reactions, such as a comment by Sa'ad Afrah, Director of the Department of Information, who welcomed a rapprochement between East and West. (*R. Moscow in Arabic*, 23 Apr-BBC SU, 26 Apr)

(On the UAR attitude to the Conference see pp 3–4.)

**Apr–Nov: Communist-UAR Differences About Control Over Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Organization.** See pp 22–3.

**July–Aug: Soviet Backing for UAR Attitude to Iran.** [When, in July, the UAR broke off relations with Iran on the grounds that the Shah had newly recognized Israel, Soviet and UAR propaganda attacked the Shah on the same lines as an agent of imperialism and a traitor to the Muslim world. See pp 216 ff, 67.]

**Sept–Dec: UAR and Soviet Union at UN General Assembly.** [The UAR was one of the first countries to respond to PM Khrushchev's call to heads of governments to attend the Assembly. The UAR and the Soviet lines at the Assembly on anti-colonialism and on the Congo question were in the main identical, but the UAR did not back the Soviet proposal on the reorganization of the UN Secretariat. UAR and USSR voting coincided in the great majority of cases. See p 14ff.]

**Sept–Oct: Khrushchev-Abdel-Nasser Meeting.** [The two leaders met twice while in New York to attend the UN General Assembly. They dealt with the international situation and reviewed the 1959 crisis between the two countries "in order to strengthen [their] friendship." See pp 12–3.]

**Aug–Dec: USSR-UAR Understanding on Congo Problem.** [Throughout 1960 USSR and UAR policies on the Congo crisis were in the main the same: support for Lumumba, and later for Gizenga's Stanleyville Government, and attacks on the UN Secretariat as a stooge for imperialism. There were reports of UAR-USSR cooperation in the supply of arms to the Stanleyville Government. See pp 32–4.]

*Pravda* (and other Soviet papers) gave great prominence to the role played by the UAR in the Congo problem, to the personal prestige of President Abdel-Nasser with the Stanleyville Government and in Africa in general, to the activities of African and Afro-Asian organizations in Cairo, and to the Cairo Press appreciation of the role the USSR was playing in Africa. This was especially marked during the Lumumba kidnapping crisis and Gizenga's rise to power in Stanleyville. (*Pravda*, 14, 16, 19, 26 Dec)

In a speech on 9 Dec during the visit to Moscow of Abd al-Hakim Amer, UAR Vice-President, Mikoyan, USSR Deputy PM, said: "We fully appreciate the work of the UAR in supporting the... legitimate Congolese



[i.e. Stanleyville] Government." (*R. Moscow*, 9 Dec-BBC *SU*, 12 Dec) (See also below, the Amer Visit.)

**Nov-Dec: Patriarch Alexius' Visit.** Patriarch Alexius of Moscow and All Russia, accompanied by other Russian Church leaders, started his tour of the ME countries on 25 Nov with a visit to the UAR. (*BBC SU*, 26 Nov, *R. Moscow*, *Tass in English*, 3 Dec-BBC *SU*, 5 Dec)

Patriarchs Alexius and Christopher of Alexandria issued a joint communiqué on safeguarding peace, condemning colonialism. (*R. Moscow*, *Tass in English*, 1 Dec-BBC *SU*, 4 Dec) In a speech in Damascus on 4 Dec, Patriarch Alexius said that the visit of his delegation was evidence of the friendship between the Russian and Arab peoples, and between the Russian and Antioch Orthodox Churches. In the West, Patriarch Alexius said, there were some Christian leaders who preached hostility to the East on the pretext of defending Christian faith and civilization, but the majority of Western Christians were coming to the conclusion that violence must not be used to settle outstanding issues between peoples. (*R. Moscow*, 5 Dec-BBC *SU*, 8 Dec)

**Nov-Dec: Amer's Visit to USSR.** A 15-man UAR military and economic government delegation, led by FM Abd al-Hakim Amer, arrived in Moscow in a Soviet jet plane on 30 Nov. (*Ahram*, 1 Dec; *BBC*, 2 Dec) No official reason for the visit was given in Cairo. (*Mid. Mirror*, 3 Dec) Amer had talks with PM Khrushchev, First Deputy PM Mikoyan, Deputy PM and Chairman of the USSR Planning Commission Novikov, Grechko, the Deputy Minister of Defence, and others.

Military, political and economic committees were formed to discuss cooperation in detail. A UAR source said it could "reveal an important secret of the discussion. Khrushchev himself issued instructions on the need for close cooperation." (*MENA*, 12 Dec-BBC, 13 Dec)

[During the visit expression was given to USSR political, military and economic support for the UAR, the UAR's appreciation of this support, and the identical policies of the two countries on central international issues. It was reported that one of Amer's aims—or perhaps his primary aim—was to secure supplies of modern weapons. Another topic discussed was USSR participation in the UAR's five-year economic development plan. (See items below.) Amer left for home on 10 Dec.]

**Political and Military Cooperation.** In his speeches in Moscow Amer said (on 8 and 9 Dec): "Our people have found in the Soviet people their best friends in time of adversity... You here, in this friendly country, have been among the... most ardent supporters of freedom. The valuable aid offered to us... has had a great influence on strengthening our economic and political independence."

The strength of the UAR was in turn a support in the struggle against imperialism and for freedom and peace, in which the Soviet Union and the UAR saw eye to eye. Amer made special mention of the UAR's "complete support" for the Soviet demands for disarmament and the liquidation of colonialism and military bases, and laid stress on the need for cooperation between the "peace-loving states" in the Congo crisis. "Our aims meet with those of the Soviet Union for the consolidation of the pillars of peace," he said on 8 Dec, adding that "the cooperation between the USSR and UAR has become a living model of fruitful and disinterested cooperation between peoples and governments."

On a third occasion Amer said that Soviet support to the UAR had become "especially evident since 1955,

when Mr Khrushchev did everything for the Soviet Government to adopt the historic decision to supply us with arms. The decision put an end to the existing monopoly of the supply of arms, deprived the traditional army purveyors of their illegal profits, and helped us to repulse the definite pressure which they and their governments tried to bring to bear on us."

President Brezhnev said (6 Dec): "I believe that those present here will agree that friendship between our two countries has withstood the test of time." Brezhnev and Mikoyan stressed USSR economic aid to the UAR as a measure strengthening her economic and political independence, the friendship between the two countries, and their understanding on the political issues mentioned by Amer. Mikoyan said (8 Dec): "You know that we support wholeheartedly the peace-loving policy of positive neutrality pursued by the UAR Government... The UAR also supports... the idea of ending military blocs, such as CENTO, which are regarded as a source of tension in international relations."

Mikoyan spoke of the Aswan High Dam as "a symbol... a shining beacon showing the way out of poverty, backwardness and calamity for the peoples living in the valleys, plains, savannahs and jungles of Africa." (*R. Moscow in Arabic*, 6, 8, 9, 10 Dec-BBC *SU*, 8, 10, 12 Dec)

FM Amer was received by Khrushchev on 8 Dec. They discussed economic relations, problems of current interest, and international questions, particularly the situation in Africa. (*Pravda*, 9 Dec; *R. Cairo*, 9 Dec-IMB, 10 Dec)

**Soviet Arms Supplies.** Israeli reports said that Amer's visit was closely linked with a new arms deal. A further supply of Soviet arms to the UAR had been agreed on in principle when Abdel-Nasser met Khrushchev in New York; Amer's task was to work out the details. It was also claimed that Amer's main task was to clinch a contract for the supply of Mig-9 jet fighters of the latest model, and it was suggested that his "shopping list" included at least three submarines, which would increase the size of the UAR's submarine fleet to twelve. (Quoted by *Mid. Mirror*, 3 Dec)

Cairo Radio, reporting on the visit, said that the USSR had met the UAR's request for military equipment. (*R. Cairo in Hebrew*, 12 Dec-IMB, 12 Dec)

**Cairo on Results of Visit.** MENA, reporting on the results of the visit, said that agreement had been reached on Soviet participation in the implementation of the second industrialization plan. FM Abd al-Hakim Amer had expressed the UAR's desire to strengthen economic cooperation and the Soviet leaders had fully concurred. The Soviet Union had also declared that the High Dam might be completed ahead of schedule. There had been general agreement on the broad lines of the two countries' policies regarding the stabilization of world peace, liquidation of imperialism and support for liberation movements. There had been full agreement on the need to preserve the independence of the African states. The discussions had also dealt with military questions. The Soviet Union had shown complete understanding of the UAR's position. Amer renewed the invitation to Khrushchev to visit the UAR. (*MENA*, 12 Dec-BBC, 13 Dec)

#### USSR ECONOMIC AND TECHNICAL AID TO SYRIAN REGION

**Jan: Irrigation Project Study.** Early in Jan it was reported that Soviet experts had begun a study, to be completed within four months, of a project for storing



the water of the Barada and al-A'waj rivers jointly for use in irrigation projects. (*Nassr, Syria, 14 Jan*)

**Jan: Talks on Aid in Communications Projects.** On 13 Jan the Syrian Communications Minister, Muhammad al-Alim, discussed with the Soviet Techno-Export enterprise the latter's participation in surveys for the construction of bridges on the Euphrates and Khabur rivers, and the supply of locomotives, coaches, rails and sleepers for the Syrian railways. (*BBC/W, 21 Jan*)

**Feb: Aid in Prospecting.** On 7 Feb the Syrian Minister of Industry stated that 13 Soviet groups, each consisting of 20 to 25 experts, were working with Arab technicians on mineral prospecting. Iron, magnesium, coal and "other minerals" had been discovered in several regions of Syria. (*MENA, 7 Feb-BBC/W, 11 Feb*)

On 16 Feb Tass reported that Soviet specialists had begun seismic and gravimetric exploration of potential oil bearing areas in Syria. (*BBC/W, 25 Feb*)

**Mar-May: Soviet Mission On Aid Projects.** A Soviet mission headed by Arkhipov, First Deputy Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, arrived in Damascus from Cairo on 24 Mar. Nur ad-Din Kahalah said in his welcoming speech that the object was to proceed from the previous general agreement to executive contracts on projects the study of which had been completed. [The 1957 aid agreement specified no definite credits for the projects to be carried out with Soviet aid. Technical assistance and equipment were offered for 19 projects, but contracts had been signed only for some of them.] (*MEED, 25 Mar*)

The mission was to visit areas where projects were planned, including the Euphrates and Khabur districts. (*R. Damascus, 25 Mar-BBC ME, 26 Mar*) Later reports said that new industrial projects were to be added, and that an agreement would be signed for the supply of machinery. (*MENA, 7 Apr-BBC, 9 Apr; R. Moscow in Arabic, 8 Apr-BBC SU, 11 Apr*)

On 6 May it was reported from Cairo that the mission had submitted a preliminary report on the possibilities of dam construction on the Euphrates and power plants near the lake at Homs. A week later, Tass said that a protocol providing for additions to the 1957 agreement had been prepared and was to be signed later as an addendum. The protocol envisaged several irrigation projects in the Syrian Region, in particular a high dam on the Euphrates. The Soviet delegation left on 10 May. [The talks were continued in Moscow in Aug-Sept—see below.] (*R. Moscow, Tass, 10 May-BBC SU, 12 May*)

**July: Additional Survey on Irrigation in Euphrates Basin.** In July a Cairo report said that Soviet experts were to make a topographical study of an area of 10,000 hectares in the lower Euphrates basin, in addition to the survey work they were already doing there. The lower Euphrates irrigation project affected an area estimated at 100,000 cultivated hectares (*MENA, 11 July-BBC, 13 July*) The water for the project was to be supplied from a deviation barrage on the Euphrates, from which a 690-km canal would start. This was the first phase of the Euphrates development project, the second being the High Dam. (*Ahram, 19 Nov*)

**Aug-Sept: 1957 USSR-Syrian Aid Agreement Amended.** Nur ad-Din Kahalah, Vice-President of the UAR and Chairman of the Syrian Executive Council, arrived in Moscow on 21 Aug at the head of a Syrian Government

delegation, for talks for the revision of the 1957 Soviet-Syrian aid agreement. He was received by Soviet leaders, including President Brezhnev, Mikoyan and Vladimir Novikov (Deputy Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers and Chairman of the USSR State Planning Commission). (*R. Moscow, 22 Aug, Tass, 23 Aug-BBC SU, 24 Aug*) Preparatory talks had been held in Cairo prior to the delegation's departure. (*IMB, 5, 15 Aug*)

A protocol was signed in Moscow on 7 Sept as an amendment to the 1957 agreement. It provided for: technical assistance in the construction of the Qamishli-Aleppo-Latakia railway, nearly 770 km long; the construction of a nitrogen fertilizer plant with an annual output capacity of 110,000 tons of ammonium nitrate, the construction of a lubricating oil plant, with a capacity of nearly 25,000 tons per annum; and topographical and geological surveys, including water, oil and mineral prospecting, in the Syrian Region. The protocol also provided for an extension of the implementation period of the projects from seven years—as fixed in the 1957 agreement—to all the time needed. (*R. Moscow in Arabic, Tass in Russian, 7 Sept-BBC SU, 9 Sept; VEFRPA, Sept*) PM Khrushchev was present at the signature ceremony at the Kremlin. (*Ha'aretz, 8 Sept*) The total value of these projects was 185 million roubles (\$46.25 million approx.), and the door was left open for further agreements totalling at least 100 million roubles. (*Mid. Mirror, 17 Sept*) [This was not a new credit, but part of the credit agreed in 1957.]

The contracts for the railway, the fertilizers factory and the oil prospecting programme were signed during Kahalah's stay in Moscow. (*VEFRPA, Sept*) The contract for mineral prospecting and the survey for the geological map was signed on 12 Nov in Damascus. On the same day 19 experts arrived in Damascus from Moscow, forming the advance party of a sixty-expert team for the geological survey. (*Mid. Mirror, 19 Nov*)

On his return to Cairo, Kahalah stated that memoranda were exchanged in Moscow to amend the general conditions [of the agreement] so as to remove "certain difficulties which impeded the speedy and good use of certain equipment." (*MENA, 13 Sept-BBC, 15 Sept*)

On 18 Sept Kahalah said that President Abdel-Nasser had signed the agreement; its ratification by the Supreme Soviet was reported on 13 Nov. The instruments of ratification were exchanged in Cairo on 2 Jan 1961. (*R. Cairo, 18 Sept-IMB, 18 Sept; Pravda, 13 Nov; Gumburiyah, 3 Jan 1961*. On the 7 Sept agreement, see also *MEED 26 Aug, 16, 23 Sept*)

**No Agreement on Euphrates Dam Project.** The Euphrates Dam project was not included in the 7 Sept protocol. On his return from Moscow, Kahalah said that the Russians had handed his delegation the technical and economic report on the project. He added that a preliminary examination by the UAR side would take several months, and only then would it be possible to start work on the blueprint. (*VEFRPA, Sept; Ayyam, 18 Sept*) In 1961 negotiations on aid in the building of the dam were opened with West Germany, the USSR having rejected the UAR request in this respect. (*Hawadith, Lebanon, 30 June 1961*)

#### USSR AID TO THE EGYPTIAN REGION

**Agreement on Soviet Aid in Construction and Financing of Aswan High Dam, Second Stage; Progress on Project.** See p 524 ff.

**Industrial Enterprises.** On 8 Feb Tass reported that the USSR was to provide technical aid to the UAR in build-

ing an antibiotics factory and a pharmaceuticals plant. Soviet specialists were to experiment in preparing nutritive media for antibiotics from Egyptian raw materials, and 66 UAR specialists were to train in the USSR for six months. (*BBC/W*, 11 Feb)

President Abdel-Nasser spoke at the opening of a 15,000 spindle cotton mill, built with Soviet aid, in Damietta on 8 May. (*R. Moscow*, 9 May—*BBC SU*, 11 May)

On 26 May five Soviet experts arrived in Cairo to study, with UAR experts, five industrial projects under the UAR-USSR economic and technical aid agreement. (*Gumhuriyah*, 7 May)

A hundred tons of equipment for the coke oven battery of a coke chemical plant under construction in the Egyptian Region had been manufactured by the Alma Ata engineering works ahead of schedule, Tass reported in June. (*R. Moscow*, 10 June—*BBC SU*, 13 June)

**Geological Surveys, Mining.** On 16 Feb a Soviet source said that the construction in Cairo by Soviet technicians of a chemical laboratory for geological research "is now almost completed." Equipment had been supplied by the USSR. (*BBC/W*, 25 Feb)

A Soviet source said that Soviet aid had been instrumental in the discovery of coal, suitable for power generation and industry, in three districts in the Sinai Peninsula. (*Tass in English*, 23 Apr—*BBC SU*, 26 Apr)

In July it was reported that a new contract under the Egypt-Soviet loan agreement provided for supplies of mining equipment valued at LE1.5 million for Egypt's exploration programme in the eastern desert and in Sinai. (*MEED*, 8 July)

**Atomic Centre.** Soviet sources reported that the atomic centre of the UAR, including a reactor and a nuclear physics laboratory, was being built at Inshas, near Cairo.

The blueprints for the buildings were drawn up by Soviet and Egyptian engineers, the latter having received their training in Moscow and Leningrad. The USSR had offered the equipment needed on advantageous terms. In Dec it was reported that experiments were being made in the nuclear physics laboratory and work on the 2000 kw atomic reactor was almost complete. (*Sovremenniy Vostok*, May; *R. Moscow*, 11 Dec—*BBC/W*, 15 Dec)

**Shipyard.** In May MENA reported a UAR request for Soviet aid in designing and building a shipyard in Alexandria. A delegation was to leave for Moscow within a week. (*MENA*, 13 May—*BBC ME*, 16 May) In Aug a contract to this effect was signed in Moscow with the Soviet Institution Prom-Mash-Export, under the Soviet-Egyptian aid agreement. The project was to be carried out in three stages and completed in 1968, when it would be equipped to repair vessels of up to 40,000 tons and build vessels up to 10,000 tons. (*R. Moscow*, 23 Aug—*BBC SU*, 25 Aug; *MEED*, 26 Aug; *Mid. Mirror*, 27 Aug)

**Drilling and Refining.** Tass reported that deliveries of Soviet equipment for drilling deep oil wells had been, in the main, completed. Soviet engineers had arrived and started showing the Egyptians how to handle the equipment. (*BBC/W*, 28 Apr)

On 9 June a high-capacity drilling installation, the first of its kind in the UAR, delivered by the Soviet Union and assembled by Egyptian specialists under Soviet guidance, was started up in Rahma. It was fitted with a turbo-drill for test drilling to a depth of 3,000 m. (*R. Moscow*, 10 June—*BBC SU*, 13 June)

On 2 July a mission of Soviet experts arrived in Suez

for talks with government officials on the import of a mineral oil and lubricants factory costing LE6 million. (*MENA*, 2 July—*BBC ME*, 4 July)

### USSR-UAR TRADE

(See also tables of foreign trade, pp 57-8.)

**May-Nov: Talks on Long-Term Trade Agreement.** On 17 May a Soviet delegation headed by the Minister of Trade arrived in Cairo for trade talks. According to Cairo sources, one aim was to discuss means of overcoming obstacles to the implementation of the trade and payments arrangements. A joint UAR-Soviet statement issued on 2 June said that it had been agreed in principle to conclude a long-term agreement, on the understanding that further talks would be held in Moscow in Sept-Oct. Members of the Soviet delegation also had in this connection talks with officials of the Northern Region. (*R. Cairo*, 12, 17, 18, 29 May, 2 June—*IMB* 13, 18 May—*BBC*, 20, 31 May, 4 June)

The draft agreement reached was said to envisage an increase of LE20 million a year in the value of trade exchanges over the present level of about LE60 million a year both ways. (*MEED*, 10 June)

In Oct Hasan Abbās Zaki, Minister of Economics of the Egyptian Region, discussed in Moscow the terms of the proposed agreements. The aim, he said, was to adjust the arrangements to the enormous increase in the trade between the two countries during the last five years and to provide for a further expansion of trade. According to Cairo sources, another aim was to discuss the unification of the Soviet trade and payments agreements with Egypt and Syria. (Egyptian-Soviet trade relations were covered by an agreement of Mar 1954. Between 1955 and 1959 UAR exports to the USSR, mainly cotton and rice, rose from LE7 million to LE28.3 million, imports increased from LE2.3 million to LE26.8 million.) (*R. Moscow*, 5 Oct—*BBC SU*, 7 Oct)

A UAR mission of Egyptian and Syrian representatives was to leave for Moscow on Zaki's return to draft the long-term agreement. (*MENA*, 8 Oct—*BBC/W*, 20 Oct; *MEED*, 28 Oct)

**June: Transport Talks.** UAR-Soviet transport talks were held in the UAR for coordinating the shipment of goods between the USSR and the UAR. (*R. Cairo*, 1 June—*BBC ME*, 3 June)

**USSR Cotton Purchases.** During the Sept 1959–Aug 1960 season the USSR bought 6,237 tons of Egyptian cotton out of 85,000 tons exported. During the first three months of the 1960/61 season the USSR took 111,811 kantars, out of 819,000 kantars registered at the customs (1 kantar=44 kilograms). (*MEED*, 23 Sept, 16 Dec)

**UAR Oil Purchases.** In Dec it was reported that a contract had been signed for the purchase by the UAR of LE15 million worth of oil from the USSR. (*Akhbar*, 8 Dec)

### USSR-UAR CULTURAL TIES AND TOURISM

On 20 Jan the Leningrad Ballet Co. gave its first performance in Damascus. (*BBC/W*, 28 Jan)

As part of the programme of cultural exchanges between the UAR and the USSR, a UAR delegation visited Moscow, Kiev and Leningrad in June. (*R. Moscow in Arabic*, 6 June—*BBC SU*, 9 June)

In June 500 tourists from the USSR visited the UAR. (*Musawwar*, Cairo, 3 June)

On 25 Aug Tharwat Ukāshah, Executive Minister of Education, Egyptian Region, left for Moscow to discuss the implementation of the UAR-USSR Cultural Agreement. (*R. Cairo*, 23, 25 Aug-*IMB*, 23, 26 Aug)

In Sept Georgiy Zhukov, Chairman of the Soviet State Committee for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries, discussed cultural relations in Cairo. He was received by Abdel-Nasser. (*BBC in Arabic*, 4 Sept-*IMB*, 4 Sept; *R. Cairo*, 6 Sept-*IMB*, 6 Sept)

**Dec: Cultural Agreement Extended.** A Soviet cultural mission, led by Zhukov, arrived in Cairo on 16 Dec and a working programme for cultural and scientific cooperation for the year 1961/62 was signed on 22 Dec. The USSR was to send experts in cultural films and the preparation of scientific specimens for museums. Six professors were to lecture in UAR universities on astronomy; oral surgery and the transplanting of teeth; electronics; animal diseases; land reclamation and the medical industry; three experts were to help in improving physical and scientific training. Three hundred UAR students would attend Soviet institutes in 1961/62. Soviet ballet, musical, theatrical, singing and dancing ensembles were to be sent to the UAR. There would also be an exchange of educational films, broadcasting, music, education and health programmes. (*R. Cairo*, 16 Dec-*BBC*, 19 Dec; *Ahram*, 18, 23 Dec)

#### BULGARIA

**Dec 1959-Jan 1960: Arab Students Clash in Sofia.** On 20 Dec 1959 an "ideological quarrel" took place on the campus of Sofia University between "a group of Arab nationalists" [Syrians] and Communist students—followers of Khālīd Bakdash [SG of the outlawed Syrian Communist Party]; ten Arab students were injured and hospitalized. (*Ahram*, 22 Dec 1959) [No mention was made of the nationality of the Communist students.] *Al-Ahrām* expressed "surprise and bitterness" at the attitude of the Bulgarian authorities, who had not permitted a UAR representative to attend the investigation. (*Ahram*, 29 Dec 1959)

In Cairo it was reported that the Bulgarian Ambassador in Cairo had informed the UAR Foreign Ministry that the clash was a normal incident between students and in no way a hostile political movement directed against the Arab students. Nevertheless, the UAR was considering the political implications of the incident and the future of its students at Sofia University. (*MENA*, 16 Jan, quoting *Ahram-BBC/W*, 21 Jan)

At the end of Jan Cairo Radio announced that the UAR students in Bulgaria had been requested to return home. (*R. Cairo*, 29 Jan-*IMB*, 29 Jan) Eighteen students were reported to have returned in Feb and 20 Syrian students in Mar. (*BBC in Arabic*, 7 Feb-*IMB*, 8 Feb; *Nasr*, 15 Mar)

On 29 Jan the Bulgarian Ambassador in Cairo left for Sofia for consultations. (*Ahram*, 30 Jan) The UAR Ambassador in Sofia, Ahmad Mukhtār al-Ghamrāwī, arrived in Cairo on 3 Feb for consultations (*Ahram*, 4 Feb) and returned to Sofia on 18 Feb. (*MENA*, 18 Feb-*BBC ME*, 20 Feb)

**Sofia as Centre for UAR Communists.** On 28 Jan Muhammad Hasanein Haykal, chief editor of *al-Ahrām*, denounced editorially "the radio campaign launched by Sofia Radio, backed by the Bulgarian Government, against the UAR." This campaign, he said, could be attributed to "the dismal failure of the Communists in the Arab countries, which was a defeat for Sofia as the centre of

guidance and leadership for ME Communists," or simply to the fact that "Sofia is the place to which Khālīd Bakdash had escaped as a refugee to prepare for his return and think of vengeance." Arab nationalism had faced antagonists and battles before, he declared. "The guns which are being used today by the Sofia Government are old and its ammunition is unserviceable. It does not reach its targets and backfires at those who fire." (*Ahram*, 28 Jan)

On 17 Feb Abdel-Nasser, in a speech at Aleppo, attacked the imperialist agents as well as the "Communist agents" who had disavowed their Arabism and nationalism and been expelled by the people. "They are now living in Sofia on foreign funds and help," he added. (*R. Damascus*, 17 Feb-*BBC*, 19 Feb) Sofia termed this speech regrettable. It also complained of anti-Bulgarian articles by *al-Ahrām* and *al-Akhhār*, stressing Bulgarian friendship and assistance to the UAR. (*R. Sofia*, 15, 21, 26 Feb-*BBC EE*, 17, 23, 29 Feb)

**July: Bulgarian Ministers to Syria; Bulgarian Work on Development Projects.** On 12 July Lyubomir Angelov, the Bulgarian Deputy Foreign Minister, and Rusinov, the Deputy Minister for Construction, arrived in Damascus to inspect the work of three Bulgarian companies in Syria. They were building the Rastan dam on the Asi river, making a technical study of the Ghab project, and preparing a geological map of the Syrian Region. (*ANA*, 11 July, *MENA*, 12 July-*BBC ME*, 14 July)

#### CZECHOSLOVAKIA

**Political Relations.** President Novotny was quoted as saying on 24 Oct that Abdel-Nasser had accepted an invitation to pay a state visit to Prague. No date was fixed. (*Mid. Mirror*, 29 Oct)

**Trade and Credit Agreements.** In June a trade and credit agreement was concluded in Prague between Czechoslovakia and the Egyptian Region which was represented by Nusayr, the Region's Minister of Municipal Affairs. The Czechs were to supply engineering equipment and machinery for water installations and power stations under the Egyptian municipalities development programme. Payment was to be in Egyptian currency on a five year credit basis. (*Ahram*, 17 June; *Mid. Mirror*, 18 June; *MEED*, 24 June; *MENA*, 10 Sept-*BBC/W*, 15 Sept) Contracts for over LE4 million of equipment for Cairo Municipality were signed in Cairo in Sept. (*R. Cairo*, 6 Sept-*BBC/W*, 15 Sept)

In July Czechoslovakia agreed to supply the installations for the expansion of the government refineries in Suez and Alexandria by a million tons a year each. Deliveries for the Alexandria plant were to start in 1960. (*MEED*, 22 July)

Mūsā Arafah, Executive Minister of Public Works, Egyptian Region, visited Czechoslovakia en route from Moscow to discuss Czech participation in UAR development projects. The Czech authorities responded favourably, Arafah said. (*Mid. Mirror*, 8 Oct)

On 14 Dec an agreement was signed in Damascus for a £1 million five-year credit to be utilized by the Syrian Ministry of Municipalities for water and electricity projects and road construction. (*R. Damascus*, 14 Dec-*IMB*, 15 Dec; *MEED*, 23 Dec)

Between 1 Sept 1959 (beginning of season) and 25 May 1960 Czechoslovakia bought 762,000 kantar of Egyptian cotton (out of total exports of 6.7 million kantars). During the first three months of the 1960/61 season the corresponding figures were 201,000 out of 819,000. (*MEED*, 10 June, 16 Dec)



**Assistance in Industry.** A ceramics factory, with automated production processes, was built near Cairo with Czech equipment and assistance. It produced household, sanitary and other ceramic articles, and was to start manufacturing porcelain at the end of the year. (CTK, 6 Apr-BBC EE, 8 Apr)

Four Czechoslovak experts arrived in Cairo on 2 July to cooperate with Arab experts in experiments in the manufacture of rubber shoes, toys and other household goods, to be produced in cooperative rubber factories. (R. Cairo, 2 July-BBC/W, 7 July)

**Cultural Relations.** Early in June al-Ahrām reported that an operational agreement had been concluded between the UAR and Czechoslovakia under the cultural agreement of 1959. There was to be an exchange of scientists, research workers, students and teachers. Czechoslovakia would offer four scholarships to UAR students and the UAR two to Czechs; a Czech lecturer would be invited to teach the "Czechoslovakian language" in the UAR. Twenty young people from the UAR would be invited to spend a month's vacation in Czechoslovakia. (Ahrām, 5 June) MENA, reporting on the agreement, added that Czechoslovakia would help the UAR in setting up a glass factory and a photographic exhibition. (MENA, 2 June-BBC/W, 9 June)

A plan for scientific and cultural cooperation between the two countries was signed in Prague [the same as above?]. It provides for the exchange of visits between Czech experts in experimental physics, hydrology and hydro-engineering, and UAR experts in health care and members of the UAR Atomic Energy Commission. Czech teachers were to teach Czech in Cairo and UAR graduates would study at Czechoslovak colleges and universities. (CTK in English, 7 Nov-BBC EE, 10 Nov)

#### THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

**Question of Recognition of GDR.** A GDR source said that a West German protest against the hoisting of the GDR flag on official occasions in Cairo and Alexandria was prompted by fear of UAR recognition of the GDR. (R. Berlin (GDR) in Arabic, 30 Mar-BBC EE, 8 Apr)

**Commercial Relations with Egyptian Region.** On 10 Feb an Egyptian-GDR trade protocol was signed in Berlin fixing the total amount of the barter trade between the two countries at LE28 million [according to a later report, cited below as LE23 million], instead of LE20 million as in 1959. (R. Beirut, 11 Feb-IMB, 12 Feb, MEED, 19 Feb)

In Feb an East German maritime delegation visited the UAR and in May the Director of the UAR Maritime Transport Board visited the GDR. Topics discussed were the possible supply of passenger and cargo vessels by the GDR, the extension of marine transport, technical assistance to the UAR, and related subjects. (Akhbar, 24 Feb; ADN in German, R. Berlin (GDR)-BBC EE, 6 May; MENA, 5 May-BBC/W 12 May)

In an agreement concluded in July the GDR undertook to construct a plywood factory, the first of its kind in the UAR. (Ahrām, 8 July)

In Sept an order for a complete bicycle manufacturing plant was placed in East Germany. The equipment and machinery, capable of producing 30,000 bicycles a year, were to be shipped in 1960. (MEED, 30 Sept)

On 23 Oct GDR experts discussed in Cairo the supply of equipment for the expansion of the Damanhur power station. (Ahrām, 24 Oct)

On 15 Nov an East German commercial mission arrived in Cairo. (Gumhuriyah, 16 Nov) A protocol signed

on 28 Nov provided for Egyptian-GDR trade up to LE32 million both ways in 1961. In 1959 the amount was LE20 million (LE8.9 million Egyptian imports and LE10.5 million exports according to MEED, 18 Nov) and in 1960 [up to Nov] LE23 million. Discussions on a long-term trade and payments agreement were to be held in Berlin after the next Leipzig fair. The protocol contained a list of over 200 commodities that might be exchanged. The most important goods from the GDR were: fertilizers, agricultural machinery, newsprint, mechanical and electrical equipment, typewriters, passenger vehicles, iron bars and insecticides. The main UAR commodities to be exported were: raw cotton, textiles, rice, onions, peanuts, manganese, hemp and shoes. Talks had begun with a view to the import of 80,000 tons of fertilizers from the GDR as a first consignment. The UAR was to export LE7 million worth of long-staple Egyptian cotton to the GDR, as well as "other quantities" of medium-staple Syrian cotton. (MENA, 28, 29 Nov-BBC, 1 Dec-BBC/W, 8 Dec; see also MEED, 18 Nov, 2 Dec)

**GDR Aid to Egyptian Region.** In July a GDR delegation discussed in Cairo GDR aid in the creation [extension?] of a television network. (R. Berlin (GDR) in Arabic, 3 July-BBC EE, 5 July)

In Sept Mūsa Arafah, Executive Minister of Public Works, Egyptian Region, en route from Moscow, visited the GDR, to investigate its readiness to participate in UAR development projects. The GDR authorities responded favourably, Arafah said. (Mid. Mirror, 8 Oct)

The Egypt-GDR agreement on economic and technical cooperation of 29 Aug 1958 was ratified [at the end of Nov?]. It provided a long-term credit of up to LE7.5 million in the form of industrial equipment, various industrial products and three complete factories: a dyeing plant for cotton textiles, a film developing and printing unit, and a wood-pulp factory. GDR technicians were to be sent to Egypt to help install the equipment and train workers. (MEED, 2 Dec)

**Cultural Relations.** In Mar a GDR educational exhibition was opened in Cairo. (R. Moscow in Arabic, 8 Mar-BBC/W, 17 Mar)

In June a delegation of the GDR youth organization arrived in Cairo at the invitation of the UAR Higher Council for Youth Guidance. (R. Berlin (GDR) in Arabic, 18 June-BBC EE, 21 June)

#### HUNGARY

**May: Trade Talks Inconclusive.** In May a Hungarian trade delegation, headed by Jenőe Bacsoni, Minister of Trade, conducted talks in Cairo on the implementation of the trade and payments agreements concluded on 15 Apr 1959 and the possibility of Hungarian participation in Egypt's road and railway development programme. (Ahrām, 11, 12 May; R. Damascus, MENA, 11 May-BBC ME, 13 May) In Damascus the delegation held talks on the possibility of aid in developing telegraphs and telephones, and bridge building. (R. Damascus, 22 May-BBC ME, 24 May)

On 18 May Cairo reported that a trade protocol and a protocol providing for a LE4 million Hungarian credit to the Egyptian Region would be signed next day. According to the *Mideast Mirror*, however, the delegation left Cairo on 25 May, "while the talks were suspended when a Hungarian request for a discount for their cotton purchases was rejected." (Mid. Mirror, 29 May)

UAR Foreign Minister to Hungary. Dr Mahmūd Fawzi,



the UAR Foreign Minister, paid an official visit to Hungary between 16–19 July, meeting Janos Kadar and several Ministers. According to Hungarian sources, they agreed on the importance of general disarmament and condemned "the aggressive policies of the colonial powers." They were able to "note with pleasure that [their] relations are becoming ever closer. As for international problems [their] views often agreed." Dr Fawzi left Budapest on 19 July. (*Ahram*, 20, 21 July; *MTI*, 19 July–*BBC EE*, 21 July; *Mid. Mirror*, 23 July)

It was reported that Dr Fawzi took back a personal message from PM Kadar inviting Abdel-Nasser to visit Hungary. (*Akhbar al-Yawm*, 23 July)

**Sept–Dec: Renewed Trade and Aid Discussions.** In Sept and Oct three UAR Ministers paid consecutive visits to Hungary to discuss economic relations.

Nur ad-Din Kahalah, the Syrian Vice-President of the UAR, visited Hungary between 9–13 Sept, and investigated the possibility of closer economic relations. (*Ayyam*, 10–14 Sept) He stated that his visit had been successful and that a conference would be held soon to discuss details. (*MENA*, 13 Sept–*BBC*, 15 Sept)

Hasan Abbās Zaki, Minister of Economy of the Egyptian Region, arrived in Budapest on 16 Oct to study the possibility of a £5 million Hungarian credit to the UAR. (*Gumhuriyah*, 17 Oct) R. Cairo said he would discuss in detail the insurance fees on the loan. (*R. Cairo*, 9 Oct–*IMB*, 9 Oct)

Mūsa Arafah, Executive Minister of Public Works, Egyptian Region, visited Hungary en route from Moscow in Oct to investigate its readiness to participate in UAR development projects. The Hungarian authorities responded favourably, Arafah said. (*Mid. Mirror*, 8 Oct)

At the beginning of Nov, Oedoen Kishazi, Hungarian Minister of Labour, returned to Budapest after a fortnight in the UAR. He stated that he had talks with UAR-Syrian Ministers and was convinced that both sides wanted closer relations. He pointed to the construction by Hungarian specialists of the at-Ta'abin power plant and the Hilwan bridge, and stressed the importance of Soviet assistance in the construction of the Aswan Dam. (*MTI in French*, 2 Nov–*BBC EE*, 4 Nov)

**Dec: £6 million Hungarian Credit.** Talks with Hungary were resumed on 12 Dec to discuss ways of overcoming difficulties in trade exchange, the broad lines of the credit facilities agreement proposed by Hungary, and the avoidance of double taxation. On 22 Dec an agreement was signed in Cairo for Hungarian credits of £6 million to the two regions of the UAR in the form of capital goods, to be repaid in five equal annual instalments. In Damascus the import of fertilizers under the Hungarian-Syrian credit agreement was discussed. (*BBC/W*, 22, 29 Dec)

## POLAND, RUMANIA, PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

**Economic Relations with Poland.** In June a Cairo source reported that the Polish Commercial Attaché in Damascus had submitted to the Syrian authorities a list of industries that Poland could help to establish as part of Syria's development programme. The terms of credit were also indicated. (*Gumhuriyah*, 16 June)

On 2 Nov the Polish Deputy Minister for Foreign Trade signed a three year trade and payments agreement in Cairo, envisaging an increase of about 20 per cent in barter trade. Poland would buy wheat, while Egypt would order freighters in Poland. (*R. Cairo*, 2 Nov–*IMB*, 3 Nov)

A UAR delegation led by Deputy Minister Abd al-Azīz Mustafa visited Poland in Nov. It studied the organization of the fishing industry and held talks on the development of deep-sea fishing by the UAR. Before leaving, Mustafa said that nothing specific had been settled and that "a visit of a Polish delegation to the UAR would be a continuation of the contacts established. Next would come the settlement of concrete questions." (*PAP*, 23 Nov–*BBC EE*, 25 Nov)

**Economic Relations with Rumania.** The Rumanian Minister of Commerce said in Feb, after a visit to Cairo, that he had discussed the possibility of closer economic relations. (*R. Cairo*, 28 Feb–*IMB*, 29 Feb)

On 1 Aug Dr Kaysūni, UAR Minister of Finance, left for Britain and Rumania. (*R. Cairo*, 2 Aug–*BBC ME*, 4 Aug)

**The People's Republic of China.** On 24 Feb a UAR-China trade protocol was signed in Peking whereby the two countries agreed to extend their trade and payments agreement for another year. The ceiling of barter trade for 1960 was fixed at £15 million each way, the same as in 1959. In 1959 Egyptian exports had been only LE11.7 million, while Syrian exports had been virtually non-existent. (*MEED*, 4 Mar) According to one source this protocol was signed in Peking on 11 Apr. (*R. Cairo*, 12 Apr–*IMB*, 12 Apr)

On 11 Aug a Chinese folklore dance troupe arrived in Damascus to participate in the Damascus International Fair scheduled to open on 15 Aug. (*Anwar, Lebanon*, 12 Aug)

Between 26 Sept and 23 Oct a Chinese military delegation, headed by General Chang Tsung-Sun, Deputy Chief of the General Staff, visited the UAR. The delegates conducted talks with UAR military and economic experts. (*Ahram*, 2, 3, 14, 24 Oct)

In Sept, at the UN General Assembly, President Abdel-Nasser called for the admission of People's China to the UN (see p 11).

## THE COMMUNIST BLOC AND ISRAEL

### COMMUNIST VIEWS ON ISRAEL

**"An Imperialistic Base."** [Soviet commentary described Israel consistently and in relation to every subject as an imperialistic base. See above: The Communist Bloc and the Arab-Israel Conflict; The Soviet Bloc and the Western Powers in the ME. The theme also appears in the following items.]

**Israel and the Summit Meeting; Relations with Bonn.** [PM Ben-Gurion was reported to have advocated in his

talks with the Western leaders in Mar the inclusion of the ME in the agenda of the Summit Conference—scheduled to open in Paris on 16 May—with a view to East-West agreement on the reduction of tension in the area. Deep regret was expressed in Israel at the failure of the Conference (see pp 3–4).] Soviet comment pictured Israel in general—and in particular PM Ben-Gurion, "a stubborn defender of imperialism"—as making every effort to bring about the failure of the Conference. Special emphasis was laid on Israel's "stubborn desire to streng-

then contacts with Bonn, which today is the bulwark of the cold war policy." The fact that PM Ben-Gurion and Chancellor Adenauer visited the US at the same time was said to have been no coincidence. Both, it was said, aimed to prevent the success of the Summit Conference, and to continue the arms race. In the ME, Israel was interested to heighten tension. (*Literaturnaya Gazeta*, Feb according to *Ha'aretz*, 1 Mar; *Pravda*, 13 Mar; *Tass*, 10 Mar, quoted by *Reuter—Jer. Post*; *Ha'aretz*, 11 Mar; *Pravda*, 12 Mar according to *UP*, *AP—Ha'aretz*, 20 Mar)

**"Zionist Organization a Front of Big Business and Colonialism."** In Dec Moscow Radio broadcast a series of talks by Leonidov to Africa and Arabic-speaking listeners entitled: "Whose Interests do the Zionist Organizations Serve?" It was asserted that Israel's policy was mainly determined by the "Executive Commission of the International Zionist Organization," which ever since its formation in 1929 "has become an affiliated accredited organ of the big business circles for whom Zionism was mainly a profitable colonial business."

Originally "Zionism was a British commodity which the City subsequently exported at a low price." When Britain lost its power over the ME after World War II, the Zionists transferred their service to new masters: Wall Street. Consequently, when Israel was established it was used by the ruling circles of the US and Britain as "a hostile military base against the awakening Arab world" and later also for the neo-colonialist penetration of Africa. (*Moscow in English for Africa*, 21 Dec—BBC SU, 23 Dec; *Moscow in Arabic*, 22, 26, 29 Dec—BBC SU, 24, 25, 28, 31 Dec)

**Mapai "in the Service of US Oil Monopolies."** In one of the Leonidov talks Mapai, the Israel Labour Party, was described as an allegedly socialist party which in fact served the interests of "Zionist monopolist capitalists." It was not only a political organization but also a commercial one, as it owned, through the Histadrut, "scores of stock companies." The main capital of this "Mapai monopoly company" was under the control of US banks; the real control was in the hands of AMPAL, a New York corporation, whose chairman, the Zionist leader Rudolf Sonneborn, was "one of the agents of the Rockefeller group." Here Israel's expansionist dreams and the Rockefeller family interest met. "The characteristic of adventure and extreme folly which stamps the present foreign policy of Israel appear clearly when we view this policy in the field in which the oil millionaires play their dirty game against the Arabs." (*R. Moscow in Arabic*, 22 Dec—BBC SU, 24 Dec)

**Israel in Africa.** [Israel's close relations with many of the newly independent African countries received particular Communist attention. The Soviet attitude was reflected in numerous commentaries and news items broadcast to Arab and African countries or given as originating from these countries.] Moscow's transmissions to Africa in French and English called Israel a "puppet of the Western powers." The broadcasts stressed Israel's financial difficulties, and said that the US and other Western powers were financing Israel's activities with a view to a renewed enslavement of Africa. This was being done because Western prestige in Africa was "so low, they could not depend on it." (*R. Moscow, in English*, 8 July, in French, 9 July—BBC SU, 12 July)

Another Moscow commentary to Africa in English said: "Israel has long been helping [the colonialists] to fight against the national liberation movements of the oppres-

sed peoples," and enumerated a number of cases to support this statement. The Rehovot International Conference on the Role of Science in the Advancement of New States, for instance, was described as "a new plan for enslavement of the Afro-Asian states with the help of the dollars." Israel's Afro-Asian Institute was said to have the "job of carrying out the US theory of neo-colonialism." (*R. Moscow*, 25 Nov—BBC SU, 28 Nov; on the Rehovot Conference and the Afro-Asian Institute see pp 302-3.)

**Israel's Nuclear Capacity** (see also pp 286-8). Moscow Radio in Arabic on 17 Dec, commenting on the reports of the construction in Israel of a nuclear reactor capable of producing plutonium, which could be used for bombs, said this was being done with American aid. "This is not strange, for Israel is at present the US's only support in the Near East." (BBC SU, 20 Dec)

On 23 Dec, however, in an English broadcast to North America, Moscow acknowledged that Washington was "disturbed or at least concerned" over the issue. But what Washington really objected to was the development of nuclear capacity outside its control: "With brazen hypocrisy it wags a reproving finger at... Tel Aviv while giving the professionals in Bonn a pat on the back." (BBC SU, 23 Dec)

**The Eichmann Case.** (For background and Soviet attitude at the Security Council, see pp 278-9, 285-6.)

The capture and projected trial of Eichmann were generally well received in the Eastern bloc countries. At the same time there was a concerted effort, notably in East Germany, to incriminate West German officials said to have been connected with Nazi activities, especially GFR State Secretary Globke [who, among his other functions as a civil servant during the Nazi period, participated in drafting the Nuremberg race law]. (*R. Berlin (GDR) home service*, 25 May—BBC EE, 27 May)

Numerous talks on Eichmann were broadcast by the Polish, Czech and GDR services with no reference to Israel. In the Polish Press and radio Israel's right to try Eichmann was justified, but on one occasion the desire was voiced that he should be tried in Poland: "No one's national pride would be hurt if Eichmann were to be tried at the scene of his crimes." (*PAP in English*, 10 June—BBC EE, 13 June)

The GDR at first approved Eichmann's trial in Israel. Berlin said: "If the trial of Eichmann takes place in the country [Israel] where every single citizen has a personal account to settle... nothing will be hidden from the public." (*R. Berlin (GDR), home service*, 14 June—BBC EE, 16 June)

However, a tone of warning crept into these broadcasts, as the case was not brought to trial immediately and doubts cropped up whether West German leaders would be implicated: "We shall see what the Eichmann case produces about Globke... We shall produce the documents at the right time and place of our choosing." (*R. Berlin (GDR), home service*, 2 Aug—BBC EE, 4 Aug)

GDR's Arabic service now voiced doubts as to the legality of the trial taking place in Israel: "There are many reasons why Israel has in fact no right to try Eichmann." (*R. Berlin (GDR) in Arabic*, 9 Oct—BBC EE, 11 Oct)

#### USSR-ISRAEL RELATIONS

(See also Views and Policies, p 275, the Communist Bloc and the ME in General, pp 67-8.)

**Jan-May: Moscow Rejects Ben-Gurion's Request for Meeting with Khrushchev.** In Dec 1959 or Jan 1960 PM Ben-Gurion requested a meeting with PM Khrushchev at his convenience. At a Press conference in London on 19 Mar, Ben-Gurion said he had asked for a meeting with Khrushchev before he thought of his present visit to the Western capitals but no reply had been received. Before his departure he had reminded the USSR Ambassador in Israel that he was awaiting a reply and the latter had told him that there would be a reply after his return. (*Ha'aretz*, 20 Mar)

On 24 Mar the USSR Ambassador to Israel confirmed that Ben-Gurion had expressed his wish to meet Khrushchev (*Jer. Post*, 25 Mar), but on 2 Apr Khrushchev said in reply to a question at his Press conference in Paris that he had not received such a request. On 5 Apr it was stated in Jerusalem that the Foreign Ministry had instructed the Israel Ambassador in Moscow to request a formal reply to Ben-Gurion's proposal for a meeting. (*Jer. Post*, 3 Apr; *Ha'aretz*, 4 Apr; *Kol Israel*, 4 Apr-BBC ME, 6 Apr; *Israel Digest*, 15 Apr)

Later (on 26 Apr) however, the Soviet Deputy FM Jacob Malik told the Israel Ambassador officially in Moscow that "in view of the statements of Israel public figures, and even Ministers of government, which are not conducive to the furthering of peace, the Soviet Government considers that a visit of the Israel PM would be premature." The reply added, however, that "the policy of the Soviet Union continues to be based on the desire for good relations with all the states in the Near and Middle East without discrimination." (*Jer. Post*, 4 May).

*Le Monde* described the answer as clear discrimination, since anti-Soviet leaders have been willingly, even warmly, received in Moscow. The paper continued: "This is the first time the Soviet Union has refused to receive a PM making such a request. This attitude possibly reflects anti-Semitism, but at least the desire to keep the sympathy of Arab governments on the eve of the Summit. If these considerations do in fact motivate Soviet diplomacy, then the possibilities for a real detente in the ME are rather illusory." (Quoted by *Jer. Post*, 5 May)

**Feb: Russia Urged to Support Israel's Disarmament Proposals.** In Feb the speaker of the Knesset, Kadish Luz, expressed the hope that the Government of the USSR would support the Israel Government's proposal that a non-aggression pact be signed between Israel and her neighbours. He was commenting on the appeal of the Supreme Soviet to the Parliaments of the world to support a reduction in the size of the armed forces of all countries. The Hebrew translation of the appeal was tabled in the Knesset on 8 Feb.

The Speaker said he believed he was expressing the view of the Knesset in saying that this appeal (as well as the Supreme Soviet's appeal for general disarmament dated 31 Oct 1959) was consistent with the opinion of the Knesset, the government and the entire nation. He concluded: "I wish to express my hope that the Government of the Soviet Union will support our efforts for general disarmament in our area and that, even before Israel and her neighbours achieve a viable peace and political, economic and cultural cooperation—as we desire—the armistice agreements between us and our neighbours should be replaced by treaties of non-aggression and the cessation of all hostile political, economic or military actions, under the effective guarantee of UN bodies." (*Israel Digest*, 19 Feb)

**Jan-July: Diplomatic Contacts.** On 20 Jan the USSR Ambassador presented an official note to the Israel Foreign Ministry on the Supreme Soviet's decision to cut the Soviet armed forces by one-third, and requested that it be brought to the attention of the Cabinet and the Knesset. (*Jer. Post*, 21 Jan)

On 8 Mar the USSR Ambassador met the Israel Foreign Minister and requested Israel's support for the Soviet Union's proposal that the next World Exhibition should be held in Moscow. (*Jer. Post*, 9 Mar)

In July the USSR handed a note to the Israel embassy in Moscow on its position regarding the Congo situation. (*Ha'aretz*, 15 July)

**Feb: Visa Agreement.** An agreement was reached between the USSR and Israel that Soviet citizens and Israelis having to change planes at airports in each other's country would no longer require transit visas and would be allowed to leave the airport on permits issued by the local authorities. Israelis having to make stopovers for more than 48 hours would, "in special cases," be allowed to visit cities open to tourists. (*Jer. Post*, 10 Feb)

**June-Sept: Israeli Scientists and Scholars Attend Conferences in Moscow.** Israeli scientists attended the International Symposium on Macromolecular Chemistry held in Moscow in June. (*Jer. Post*, 22 July)

Twelve Israeli scholars attended the International Conference of Orientalists held in Moscow during Aug. A month after the Conference it was noted that there was still no mention in any traceable Soviet publication of the fact that Israeli scholars had attended. Personally, the Israeli delegates had been treated well. The Soviet Press, however, both popular and scientific, ignored Israel and the Israeli participants had not been invited to a number of the Conference events. (*Jer. Post*, 15 Sept)

**July-Dec: Israel-USSR Property Talks.** Negotiations on the ownership of Russian property in Israel opened in Jerusalem on 18 July, between the Soviet and Israel Governments. The Soviet delegation submitted a list of property which it believed rightfully belonged to the Soviet Government as heir to the Czarist regime.

It was understood that the Israel delegation might also raise the question of property in the Soviet Union owned by Israel citizens.

The talks were adjourned on 10 Aug and were resumed on 20 Dec. (*Israel Digest* 5 Aug; *Jer. Post*, 9 Aug, 21 Dec)

**Dec: Russian Church Group Visits Israel.** A delegation of the Russian Orthodox church came to Israel for a brief visit on 19 Dec. [The Russian Ecclesiastical Mission has been in Palestine for nearly a century. There are several Russian churches and other religious institutions in Israel.] (*Jer. Post*, 20 Dec)

## RUSSIAN JEWRY AND ISRAEL

(See also Israel Views and Policies, pp 270, 275.)

**Question of Reunion of Jewish Families.** On 9 July PM Khrushchev told a questioner at a Press conference in Vienna that the Soviet Union would not be opposed in principle to Jews or members of other nationalities leaving the Soviet Union to be reunited with their families abroad. He added, however, that this was an abstract problem; the USSR Foreign Ministry had no requests for exit permits to Israel for this purpose, but it did have a number of requests from Israeli residents who would



like to return to their Soviet homeland. (*Ha'aretz*, 10 July)

*Davar* and *Herut*, two Israeli dailies, replied that Russian Jews were afraid to apply for exit permits under the Soviet regime. (*Davar*; *Herut*, 10 July)

On 17 July Moscow Radio cited a *Trud* dispatch warning the Jews of the Soviet Union not to be influenced by "Zionist propaganda which spreads deceptive illusions regarding Israel." The broadcast declared that "the Zionists and the special agents of Israel" were attempting to create an image of Israel as a "paradise" of the Jewish people among the Jews of East Europe, but in fact it was a country of unemployment and hunger. (*R. Moscow, Tass in Russian*, 17 July—*BBC SU*, 19 July; *Ha'aretz*, 18 July)

On 8 Aug Mrs Golda Meir, the Foreign Minister, told the Knesset, in reply to a question, that thousands of Israel residents were incessantly appealing to the Israel Government for help in bringing their kin from the Soviet Union. In the last five years, residents of Israel had sent their relations in the Soviet Union, at the latter's request, 9,236 requests for the relatives to join them in Israel. Mrs Meir said that only a few out of this total had been united with their families in Israel. She expressed the hope that the Government of the USSR would "reveal a greater measure of understanding and readiness to solve the tragic human problem of the reunion of families." (*Jer. Post*, 9 Aug)

The illustrated Soviet weekly, *Ogoniok*, carried on 14 Aug a batch of letters, purportedly from Israel, in which the writers deplored conditions in the country. The recipient told an *Ogoniok* correspondent: "I would like to go to Israel and beat up those who had persuaded my mother and brothers to go there." (*Jer. Post*, 8 Sept)

**Nov: "Blood Libel" in Soviet Publications.** On 9 Aug *Kommunist*, the official Communist Party organ in the autonomous Soviet Republic of Daghestan, accused the Jews in the area of drinking the blood of Muslims in observance of religious rites.

Replying to a Knesset question on 29 Nov, Mrs Meir, the Foreign Minister, said that what was so shocking about this blood libel "is the very fact that such a report, the like of which we have not heard since the days of the Czars, could find its way into an official newspaper anywhere in the Soviet Union." Mrs Meir noted that on a previous occasion, on 30 July, the same paper had published an article calling for the closing of the local synagogue. After prolonged efforts by a delegation of Daghestan Jews which had gone to Moscow, *Kommunist* had published a retraction, and it had been promised that the author and editor would be punished, she continued.

"I cannot find words to express the full extent of our shock," Mrs Meir declared, "and can only hope that the authorities of the Soviet Union will understand the deep gravity of this phenomenon, and that they will observe their promise to punish the guilty parties and to do everything to prevent the repetition of similar incidents." There was considerable concern in view of the climate prevailing following the publication of this report, she concluded. (*Jer. Post*, 30 Nov)

#### BULGARIA, CZECHOSLOVAKIA, RUMANIA

**Bulgaria.** The Foreign Ministry announced on 2 Apr that the protocol of the trade agreement between Israel and Bulgaria, dating from Nov 1958, had been extended to the end of 1960, without any change in the appended quota list. (*Jer. Post*, 3 Apr)

A tourist agreement was signed between the Bulgarian Government Tourist Corporation, Balkantourist, and Pel-tours, an Israeli travel agency. (*Ha'aretz*, 19 Apr)

The Dean of the Ear, Nose and Throat Faculty of the Sofia Medical School spent three weeks in Israel in Apr, meeting the Minister of Health and discussing the possibility of an exchange of medical personnel. (*Ha'aretz*, 3 May)

The question of compensation to the families of 22 Israelis—(among 58 passengers) who had been killed in July 1955 when an El-Al Constellation which had violated Bulgarian air space owing to bad weather was shot down by the Bulgarian Air Force—continued to be the object of memoranda and discussions between Bulgaria and Israel. [No solution was reached.] (*Jer. Post*, 31 July)

**Czechoslovakia.** [Israel accredited Ministers to Czechoslovakia in 1956 and in 1958.] In [May] 1960 Israel appointed a Chargé d'Affaires in Prague. (*IGYb*, 1960/61) [Czechoslovakia has been represented in Israel by a Chargé d'Affaires since she recalled her Minister in 1951.]

In Oct Czechoslovakia announced her readiness to make available evidence for the case against Eichmann. (*Ha'aretz*, 28 July)

Summing up relations with Czechoslovakia, an official Israeli source stated: "Czechoslovakia has so far rejected every attempt of ours to establish commercial and cultural relations." (*IGYb*, 1960/61)

**Rumania.** On 5 Apr, the Israel Mission's Third Secretary was declared *persona non grata* by the Rumanian Foreign Ministry for "activity incompatible with diplomatic procedure." (*Jer. Post*, 7 Apr)

In July Rumania expelled another Israel diplomat on the same grounds. It was reported that the Israel Minister in Bucharest, Shmuel Bendor, denied the accusations as baseless.

*The Jerusalem Post* of 10 July noted that this was the fourth Israeli diplomat in Bucharest to have been declared *persona non grata* during the past two years. (*Jer. Post*; *Ha'aretz*, 10 July)

#### POLAND

**Jan: Poland Expels Israel Attaché.** On 29 Jan the Polish Government gave an Attaché at the Israel Legation in Warsaw three days to leave the country on the grounds that he had "indulged in activities not permitted to diplomats." (*Jer. Post*, 1 Feb)

**Mar–Nov: Israel and Poland's Frontiers.** In Mar Polish diplomatic circles in Israel were reported to have expressed the hope that Israel would not support the West German "revanchists" in connection with the Oder-Neisse Line, but would support General de Gaulle's position that the Line was final and irrevocable. (*Ha'aretz*, 24 Mar)

On 18 Nov PM Ben-Gurion assured the Polish Minister that no responsible person in Israel, and certainly no member of the government, had ever considered abetting any country's claims against Poland. To his regret, he added, the question of West Germany and the Oder-Neisse Line had been raised during a debate in the Knesset by a member who had compared the restoration of Poland's historical frontiers with the Return to Zion. He had then replied that the adjustment of a frontier, no matter how justified, could not possibly be equated with the Return, which was an event unique in history. (*Jer. Post*, 2 Nov. For text of Ben-Gurion's remarks in the Knesset see *Ha'aretz*, 1 Nov.)



## THE COMMUNIST BLOC AND ISRAEL

On 1 Dec a correspondent reported, however, that Polish diplomatic circles in Israel had not been convinced by Mr Ben-Gurion's explanations. (*Ha'aretz*, 1 Dec)

Apr: Polish Paper Defends Israel. See p 68.

**Aug: Anti-Israel Directive to Polish Press.** At the end of Aug it was reported that a noticeable cooling-off had been detected in Polish Press comment on Israel. The new tone, it was suggested, could be traced to a specific directive from the Press Department of the Central Committee of the Polish Communist Party, which depicted the Israel Government as reactionary and stressed that a distinction must be drawn between the sufferings of the Jewish people during the war and the pro-Western policy of the Israel Government today. (*Jer. Post*, 29 Aug)

**Commercial Relations.** Trade throughout the year was normal; an agreement providing for an annual exchange of goods valued at \$4½ million on each side was renewed at the beginning of 1960. (*IGYb*, 1960/61)

Israel participated in the Poznan Fair. The manager

of the Israel pavilion announced that a considerable quantity of Israeli goods had been sold and trade contacts had been established with various countries, including those of the Eastern bloc. (*Kol Israel*, 18 July-BBC/W, 21 July)

**Cultural Relations.** According to an official Israel source, "Relations [with Poland], always friendly, were variously bettered, by way of widening cultural contacts and reciprocal visits of scientists, intellectuals, artists, journalists, sportsmen and public figures—signifying mutually advantageous exchange of know-how; and through reciprocal displays of fairs and exhibitions of national literature." (*IGYb*, 1960/61)

A Polish Book Fair was opened in Tel Aviv at the beginning of Apr; a delegation of Polish publishers attended. (*Jer. Post*, 3 Apr)

The Ministry of Education announced on 2 Aug that the Government of Poland had made available to Israel two scholarships for advanced study for the next academic year. (*Jer. Post*, 3 Aug)

# THE WESTERN POWERS AND THE ME

## NOTES AND REFERENCES

This section includes topics directly concerning relations between one or more Western powers and the ME in general. For relations between individual countries, see under countries.

The one occasion on which all three Western powers made a common move in the ME was the reaffirmation of the Tripartite Declaration on the Arab-Israel conflict (see below). For other Western attitudes to this conflict see Synopsis, p 169 ff.

Britain's main concern in the area during the year continued to be to safeguard her interests in the oil-producing Persian Gulf area and in Southern Arabia and Aden (see p 382 ff—the Buraimi dispute; p 380). Outstanding events in her relations with the other Arab countries were the negotiations with the UAR for the re-establishment of full diplomatic relations (p 534 ff) and the negotiations between the Government of Iraq and the Iraq Petroleum Company (IPC) for changes in concessions and agreements (pp 263–4). An agreement with Cyprus, providing for the maintenance of British bases in the island, was reached in July (p 223 ff).

The US was the Western power most involved in the Arab-Israel conflict (see Synopsis and References, p 196 ff). US views and policies on the ME are set out below (p 102 ff).

The US continued to provide the largest amount of economic assistance to the ME, more going to the UAR than to any other country. Western Germany also provided large-scale aid to the area (p 46 ff).

France still had no diplomatic relations with most of the Arab countries, which continued to attack her because of her Algerian policy, while friendly relations and cooperation continued with Israel.

There were no material changes in the Western military position in the area, including CENTO (p 94 ff).

On West-ME relations pertaining to the world conflict, see under international relations of individual countries, and: The ME Countries and the Summit Conference, pp 3–4. The UN General Assembly, p 4 ff, and The Congo Question, p 25 ff. The UAR was the ME country most actively involved in world affairs, as a rule taking up an anti-Western attitude (p 510 ff).

## THE TRIPARTITE DECLARATION RE-AFFIRMED

**Background Note.** The Tripartite Declaration (TD) was issued by the UK, France and the US, on 25 May 1950. In it the three governments stressed their opposition to the development of an arms race between the Arab states and Israel, and declared that three considerations would govern arms supplies to the ME:

- (a) Internal security needs;
- (b) The needs of legitimate self-defence;
- (c) The level of armament necessary to permit the Arab states and Israel to play their part in the defence of the area.

They stated that they had received assurances from ME recipients of arms supplied by them that the purchasing states had no aggressive intentions, and they would request similar assurances from states permitted to receive Western arms in the future.

The declaration went on to stress the interest of the signatories in peace and stability in the ME and concluded: "The three governments, should they find that any of these states (in the area) was preparing to violate frontiers or armistice lines, would, consistent with their obligations as members of the UN, immediately take action, both within and outside the UN, to prevent such violations."

(For text, see: J.C. Hurewitz: *Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East*, Vol. II, New York, 1956.)

The renewed tension on the Syrian-Israeli border,

culminating in the Tawafiq incident at the end of Jan 1960, and UAR and Israeli mobilizations (see p 197 ff), caused a spate of announcements reaffirming the continued validity of the Declaration.

### THE BRITISH POSITION

**Feb: TD Still in Force.** The first statement was made in Britain on 10 Feb. In reply to questions regarding the incidents on the Syrian-Israel border, Profumo, the Minister of State at the Foreign Office, stated in the House of Commons that the British Government regarded the TD as still being in force. "Exchanges of view about the frontier situation are continually taking place as a matter of course between Her Majesty's Government and the interested governments, including signatories of the Declaration," he added. (*Hansard*, Vol. 617, No. 53)

**Feb: No Obligation to Give Unwanted Help.** On 17 Feb in reply to further questions in the House, the Foreign Secretary, Selwyn Lloyd, stated: "At discussions held since the formation of the UAR, the signatories agreed that the Tripartite Declaration remained a valid declaration of policy." Asked to clarify whether this meant that it was applicable in the case of war between Israel and the UAR, Lloyd said: "We do not regard ourselves under an obligation to come to the help of a state which says it does not want our help." When pressed

further, Lloyd agreed that this interpretation was a violation of the text of the TD, but said he did not know whether it was also in violation of the US view. Lloyd was then asked whether in view of the "deliberate defiance" of the TD by Britain in 1956 and the denunciation of the main clause now enunciated by him, "it would not be wise to scrap the TD altogether so that all know where they stand." He answered: "That, of course, is a possibility, but the Declaration has some validity with regard to contributing to the stability in the area." (*Hansard*, Vol. 617, No. 58)

On 7 Mar when more questions were put to the Foreign Secretary, he refused to enlarge on his previous statements, but made two additional points:

1. There had been no consultations with the other signatories on implementing the TD;
2. The British Government did not intend to make proposals for a new agreement outside the UN to guarantee peace in the ME. (*Jer. Post*, 8 Mar)

**20 Feb: British Comment.** A British commentator interpreted Lloyd's reference to a state that "does not want our help" as meaning that Britain would never go to the help of the UAR, but did not wish to say so bluntly. The whole point of Section 3 of the TD was, however, that it was a statement of intent, not dependent on the agreement of the states in the area. "No one was asked... to put in a request for help." (*Guardian*, 20 Feb)

#### FRENCH AND US ATTITUDES

**French Attitude.** On 23 Feb a French Foreign Ministry spokesman said that his government considered the TD to be still in force. Abdel-Nasser was not a party to it, and was therefore not qualified to express an opinion on its validity. (For Abdel-Nasser's remarks on the TD see below.)

Unofficially, however, French Foreign Ministry sources admitted that the effectiveness of the TD was doubtful and that the situation called for inter-allied consultations to work out a common line of action to prevent a new ME conflagration. But, they added, London and Washington seemed unwilling to associate with France in a common ME policy. (*Jer. Post*, 24 Feb)

**US Statements.** The US State Department affirmed that the TD continued to reflect the policy of the US Government. (*Ha'aretz*, 28 Feb)

US Senator Sparkman, a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, stated at a Press conference in Tel Aviv that the Senate Foreign Relations Committee regarded the TD as valid. He added that he believed it would remain part of US policy in the ME until a substitute was found. (*Ha'aretz*, 6 Sept)

For Senator Kennedy's references to the TD during his election speeches, see p 108.

#### ME REACTIONS

**UAR Reactions: TD Null and Void.** In a speech in Damascus on 22 Feb, President Abdel-Nasser referred to the British statement of 17 Feb and said that even if there had been some ground for the TD at one time, it had become null and void since British and French aggression against Egypt. (*Ahram*, 23 Feb)

The TD contradicted the basic interests of the peoples of the area, who became victims to the imperialist designs of two of its signatories. It had been rejected by Egypt as long ago as 1955. It was designed to serve Israel. The imperialists would never give up their position in the ME, unless ousted by force. The UAR (and the Arabs generally) had no faith in the powers which appointed themselves guardians in the region and guarantors of its borders, and then resorted to armed interference to preserve their influence. The UAR would oppose any attempt to attack it in the name of the TD. (*Ahram*, 25 Feb)

**Israel Alleged to be Asking for Protection.** When Premier Ben-Gurion's imminent visit to the US and Europe was announced, *al-Ahrām* stated on 6 Mar that the UAR's telling military rejoinder on the Syrian border had caused Israel to despatch three Ministers to ask for the protection of the TD states.

The same daily commented that Israel had staged the Tawafiq incident in order to be in a better position to ask them for increased military aid. (*Ahram*, 6 Mar)

A week later, *al-Ahrām* summed up the issue as an international plot against Arab interests, claiming that news from Washington indicated that the TD signatories had set up a secret committee to consider Israel's application for modern arms. (*Ahram*, 12 Mar)

**Other Arab Comment.** No official comments came from other Arab countries. A UAR daily and a Lebanese anti-Jordanian paper reported that the Jordanian delegate to the Arab League Council's Feb session had opposed, and thus in effect vetoed, a resolution opposing the TD supported by all other delegations. (For a League resolution on the issue, see p 127) (*Ahram*, 7 Mar; *Sahafah*, Beirut, 11 Mar)

**Israel and the Declaration.** No official statement or comment bearing directly on the TD was made by the Israel authorities.

A *Davar* editorial stressed the major responsibility of the Soviet Union for the difficulties facing the signatories. It argued that in these new circumstances the US should change its policy on arms supplies and strengthen Israel's Defence Forces. (*Davar*, 28 Feb)

At a Press conference in Britain, Premier Ben-Gurion declared that in his conversations in Washington he had not asked for guarantees for Israel from the TD powers. (*Ha'aretz*, 20 Mar)

#### THE MILITARY POSITION OF THE WEST IN THE ME

[NOTE: On the Russian military position in the area, Western reports and views only were available; these are included below.]

##### SYNOPSIS

There was no considerable change during 1960 in the military position of the great powers in the ME.

The West relied principally on the presence in the Mediterranean of the US Sixth Fleet, whose main mission was to serve as a nuclear deterrent and "to reassure friends." This was backed by the presence of British armed forces, organized in two Commands, whose headquarters were Cyprus and Aden, and by the British Mediterranean Fleet, centred in Malta.

When Cyprus became independent, the status of the British base there changed, but Britain retained sovereignty over 99 square miles of the island.

Western military strength in the ME was supplemented by NATO, whose responsibility in the area was confined to Turkey, and by CENTO, which served as the link between NATO and SEATO, but did not possess a command organization and was confined to joint staff planning.

Although, as stated, there was no significant change in Western military strength in the area, both the US and Britain were concerned to increase their general capability to intervene quickly and effectively in local wars. Both countries possessed strategic forces earmarked for this purpose and took steps to increase their airlift capacity. A British exercise, in which an entire brigade group was transported from Britain to Libya, tested the effectiveness of the British Strategic force.

The Soviet Union's military presence in the ME was confined to a submarine flotilla, based on Albania, and military missions in several Arab countries. However, Soviet capacity to intervene in the area in a non-nuclear war was estimated to be greater than that of the West.

### WESTERN STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES

[There was no noticeable change during the year in the strategic objectives of the Western powers in the ME. Western sources defined them as follows]:

**Safeguarding of Land, Air and Sea Routes.** The ME is the land, sea and air bridge between Europe, Asia and Africa. It is, therefore, a strategic objective of the powers to safeguard their passage through the region. In the past, control of the Suez Canal was of crucial importance for this purpose, but the development of nuclear power and air striking forces, as well as the evacuation of the British forces from Egypt in 1956, has increased the probability of the Canal being blocked in the event of war. As a result, there has been increased emphasis on the safeguarding of alternative air and land routes—bypassing the Canal from the North, through Turkey and Iran, and from the South, through Libya, Sudan, East Africa and Southern Arabia. These routes, in effect, link the NATO system with the SEATO system.

Of no lesser importance is the objective of denying air, sea and ground passage through the ME to an aggressor, who might use it as a bridge to Africa, where Europe could be outflanked.

**Base for Nuclear Attack.** Turkey and Iran, together with the Eastern Mediterranean bases, are the nearest of all Western bases to the vital centres of the Soviet Union. In the present transition period, before the US has fully developed its ICBMs, these countries are suitable bases for shorter-range missiles.

**Oil.** The ME is still a principal source of oil for Western Europe, although its role as such may decline in the future, in view of the development of sources of oil elsewhere. For Britain, the Middle East—especially Kuwait—is the main source of imported fuel and a most important source of foreign exchange. Safeguarding sources of oil, politically and militarily, is therefore a strategic objective of prime importance, especially for Britain. The vital area in this respect consists of Kuwait, Bahrain, the Persian Gulf, the Amirates of Southern Arabia and Aden. (*Military Review*, May, Oct 1960, Feb 1961; *Revue Militaire d'Information*, Sept 1959; *Times*, 25 Feb 1960)

### ORGANIZATION AND FUNCTIONS OF WESTERN FORCES

The forces of the Western powers in the ME consisted of the following in 1960:

**United States Forces.** The US Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean and the Strategic Air Command bases in Turkey and Libya formed the main deterrent power of the West in the ME. The role of the Sixth Fleet, according to the US Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Burke, was "to reassure friends and restrain the Soviet Union." (*Times*, 17 Feb 1961)

**British Forces.** British forces in the ME are organized in two commands:

*The Middle East Command*, with headquarters in Cyprus, comprises forces in Cyprus, Libya and Malta. Its function is to cover the Mediterranean approaches of the ME, safeguard the eastern gates of the Mediterranean, to strengthen CENTO, and possibly to take action should the Suez Canal be closed against Britain.

*British Forces Arabian Peninsula*, unlike the ME Command, is no longer concerned with the ME as a through route. Its task, according to the *Military Review*, is to maintain the pre-emptive policy of the past in the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea or, more baldly, to defend the British-protected states of the Persian Gulf and Southern Arabia, both oil-producing areas and others, against subversion, or aggression by their independent Arab neighbours. (*Military Review*, Feb 1961)

**Central Treaty Organization (CENTO).** [This defence organization, formerly named the Baghdad Pact, consists of Turkey, Iran, Pakistan and Britain, with the US participating only in its committees. (The US has also bilateral defence agreements with Turkey, Iran and Pakistan.) CENTO is active on the economic as well as on the military plane.]

**NATO.** [Although NATO does not cover the Middle East, it reaches into it by virtue of Turkey's membership.]

### US FORCES AND BASES

**The Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean.** Its primary function is to complement the fixed-base NATO nuclear deterrent. It also provides the naval support and striking force for the armies of Turkey, Greece and Italy. (*Aeroplane*, 9 Sept)

Its composition in 1960 was as follows:

- (a) Attack carrier striking force, consisting of: 2-3 aircraft carriers (one in the 75,000-ton class), with a total of about 300 aircraft with an operating radius of more than 1,000 miles. The missile-carrying capability of the fleet was between 50-60 nuclear weapons for each aircraft carrier;
  - Polaris submarines;
  - Two cruisers;
  - About 20 destroyers.
- (b) An amphibious force, with appropriate vessels and a reinforced marine battalion of 1,800 marines equipped with helicopters.
- (c) A service force, forming a floating base capable of keeping the Fleet at sea for indefinite periods.
- (d) The Fleet is supported by land-based aircraft for reconnaissance and anti-submarine operations. In emergency, it is augmented by an anti-submarine force, with a specialized carrier air group, for such



operations. (*Aeroplane*, 9 Sept 1960; *Times*, 17 Feb 1961; *NYT*, 22 Feb 1961)

**Nuclear Bases in CENTO Countries.** According to the US Major-General Vicellio, American nuclear-armed supersonic units could be operational within 12 hours in Turkey, 16 hours in Iran and 22 hours in Pakistan, apart from the time taken by governments to make up their minds. (*Times*, 25 Feb)

**IRBMs in Turkey.** The US installed 15 Jupiter IRBMs in Turkey. They do not belong to NATO, but are there by virtue of a bilateral agreement with the US, concluded despite Soviet warnings. (*NYT*, 22 Feb 1961)

Turkey and Pakistan also served as bases for the American U-2 aircraft which made photographic reconnaissance flights over the Soviet Union. Both countries received Soviet notes of protest over the affair in May. (*NYT*, 15 May) (See also p 65.)

**Wheelus Air Base in Libya.** [Wheelus Air base east of Tripoli, serves mainly as a training base for American squadrons based on the European continent. In emergency, Strategic Air Command planes and Military Air Transport aircraft use this airfield for operational purposes.]

In Aug the US and Libyan governments signed a financial annex to the 1954 Libyan-American Base Agreement, according to which the US would pay Libya, starting in 1960, \$10 million a year, \$9 million more than in the past. In addition, the US would continue to give assistance for economic development projects. Libya also received 62,000 tons of wheat for drought relief, valued at \$8.5 million, in 1960. (*Times*, 4 Aug)

**US Air Base in Dahrhan (Saudi Arabia).** [The US Air Force base at Dahrhan, in Saudi Arabia, primarily serves the Military Air Transport service and no combat aircraft are stationed at the base. It is used by transport aircraft on the long haul to the Far East. In emergency, however, it might serve for the deployment of SAC aircraft, although the likelihood of such a move being needed is diminishing with the growth of American ICBM strength.]

In Mar 1961 the Saudi Arabian Government informed the US that it would not renew the agreement for US use of Dahrhan, which expires in Apr 1962. By that date the US would have to remove its military units based there, which would leave Wheelus Base in Libya as the only US air base in the Arab world. (*Times*, 17 Mar 1961) (For Saudi Arabian statement on the status of the Dahrhan base, see p 381.)

### BRITISH ME COMMAND

**Scope.** [The British ME Command was established in 1939, when it comprised the entire ME and part of East Africa. Since the Second World War, its scope has gradually been reduced. Since the establishment of a separate command in the Arabian peninsula, in 1959, the ME Command has been confined mainly to the Mediterranean region. Until 1960 it was a land command only.]

In Jan the British Ministry of Defence announced the appointment of General Ward as C.-in-C., ME, with headquarters in Cyprus, w.e.f. 1 May. He would take over a new unified command for the Mediterranean area, with over-all command of the land and air forces in "his area of responsibility." Command of the naval forces

in the Mediterranean would be retained by C.-in-C., Mediterranean, with headquarters in Malta. The main effect of this change was, according to *The Times*, that military affairs in the Mediterranean would henceforth be directed by a single commander, instead of being run by a committee (the British Defence Coordinating Committee, ME, in Cyprus, comprising the land, sea and air commanders or their representatives). The navy was not placed under the new unified command, although, presumably, this could be done in times of stress. (*Times*, 25 Jan)

[The Ministry of Defence announcement did not define "the area of responsibility" of the C.-in-C., ME. The Command is known, however, to include British forces in Cyprus, Libya and Malta.]

### THE BRITISH BASE IN CYPRUS

The Treaty concerning the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus gave Britain (see also map):

Two sovereign base areas at Akrotiri and Dhekelia totalling 99 sq. miles. A note from the British Government stated that it did not intend to relinquish sovereignty over the base area, and a note from Cyprus stated that it would not demand the relinquishment of sovereignty.

Twenty-five scheduled sites, to be used without restriction; 13 of these are to be given back to Cyprus as soon as practicable. Fifteen scheduled leave camps, groups of residential buildings and other installations, access to which may be controlled by the British.

Ten training areas.

Use of Nicosia Airfield as required, including the exercise of operational control.

In return, Britain was to provide Cyprus with aid amounting to £13,340,000 over five years, as well as £1.5 million for the Turkish community. (*HMSO, Cmd. 1093, July; Army Quarterly, Oct*)

**Role of Cyprus Base.** According to the British Minister of Defence, the purpose was to preserve the defence facilities essential not only for the UK's narrow national purposes, but also for the great alliance of which Britain was a member. In the sovereign areas a theatre reserve could be held to meet the UK's responsibilities; at times some 20,000 men might have to be deployed in them. (*Times*, 10 Feb) *The Army Quarterly* explained that the Cyprus base was important for Britain not only to retain her influence in the Eastern Mediterranean seaboard and the ME, but also to continue to carry out her obligations to CENTO and the southern flank of NATO. (*Army Quarterly, Oct*)


In an emergency Britain might station in Cyprus three mobile brigade groups plus aircraft and depots of nuclear weapons. Cyprus could also be used as a military springboard for effective ripostes against subversion or menaces aimed at Kuwait, Bahrain or other sheikhdoms. (*NYT*, 19 Mar)

Cyril Falls, the military commentator, wrote that no one could deny that as a base Cyprus had weaknesses, especially from the naval point of view. But it possessed valuable airfields, which could be further improved, and considerable importance as a station for land forces in the Eastern Mediterranean. It was not always possible to find a base which could rank as ideal both in nature and in situation, and when that was lacking the second best was precious. (*Ill. London News*, 16 Jan)


**Forces in Cyprus.** British forces in Cyprus comprised, in 1960:

ME HQ (unified land and air command);

3-4 Canberra squadrons, 2 Hawker Hunter squadrons



# ORGANIZATION AND STRENGTH OF WESTERN FORCES IN THE MIDDLE EAST - 1960



**US Air Bases**  
(Turkey (including 13 Japlan Intermediate range missiles)  
Lahya (Wheeler)  
Saudi Arabia (Dhahran)<sup>5</sup>

**US Sixth Fleet (Mediterranean)**  
2-3 Aircraft Carriers each with a capacity of 30-40 nuclear weapons  
300 Aircraft  
2 Cruisers  
about 20 Destroyers  
combined force with 1 reinforced Marine BN

**British Forces<sup>1</sup>**  
**Arabian Peninsula**  
**Headquarters—Aden**  
Strategic Reserve  
1 Inf Bde in Kenya  
Aden  
Cairney  
Protectorate

Forces at the disposal of this command (in addition to strategic reserve)  
include:  
3 Squadron of combat aircraft  
Military transport aircraft  
4 Frigates  
1-2 Inf BNs  
1 Tank Bde  
1 Armored Cavalry BN  
1 Marine Commando Group (BN)  
local forces BNs

**British Mediterranean Fleet**  
**Headquarters—Mediterranean**  
1-2 Aircraft Carriers  
1 Cruiser  
3 Destroyers  
4 Frigates  
1 Guided missile ship  
1 Submarine Squadron

**Middle East Command<sup>6</sup>**  
**Headquarters—Cyprus**  
Cyprus Air Bde  
5-6 Squadrons of Combat Aircraft  
1 Transport Aircraft Squadron  
3 Infantry BNs  
1 Parachute BN  
1 Armored Car Bn  
LYBIA  
Airfield  
2 Infantry BNs  
1 Armored BN  
MALTA  
Air Bde  
Marine Commando Group (BN)  
1 Inf BN

## WESTERN STRATEGIC RESERVES CAPABLE OF BEING DEPLOYED IN THE MIDDLE EAST

**US Strategic Army Corps (STRAC)**  
(in US)  
including  
2 Airborne Divisions  
1 Infantry Division  
1 Armored Division  
Number of long range transport aircraft to be increased from 30 to 129

**British Strategic Reserve (in Britain)**  
1 Parachute Bde  
1-2 Inf Bde  
30 British and Commonwealth aircraft  
1 of Sea  
1 Commando Group (BN)  
based on aircraft carrier

**Remarks:**  
1 Lease ends in 1962  
2 Bilateral defense agreements with US  
3 As from 1 Mar 1961 this command was renamed the Middle East Command  
4 As from 1 Mar 1961 this command was renamed the Near East Command  
5 Member of Cento Countries only

### Abbreviations

Headquarters  
BN  
Bde  
Inf  
Armored  
Squadron

and one transport squadron. (In addition, Akrotiri air base is equipped for the Strategic Bomber Command with its V-bombers); Three infantry battalions, parachute battalion, armoured car battalion.

(*Times* 3, 20, 26 Jan, 8 June, 28 July; *Army Quarterly*, Oct; Ill. *London News*, 13 Feb, 24 Oct; *Soldier*, June)

**British Forces in Libya.** [British forces are stationed in Libya under terms of a Treaty of Friendship of 1953, which permits Britain to use specified areas as training grounds, in return for financial aid.]

The permanent British garrison in Libya consisted in 1960 of two infantry battalions and one armoured battalion. Most of these troops were stationed in Tobruk and the El Adem airfield, which served as a staging base. One battalion was stationed in Tripoli. (*Soldier*, Jan, Mar 1960, Jan 1961; Ill. *London News*, 10 Sept)

**Military Exercises in Libya.** In 1960 Britain used Libya extensively as a training ground, especially for units of the Strategic Reserve based in the UK. (Units based in Malta and Cyprus also underwent training in Cyprus.) The exercises included formation training, desert training and the examination of air transport capabilities, mostly in World War II battlefields between Derna and Tobruk. (*Soldier*, Mar, June 1960, Jan 1961; *Times*, 23 Feb) [For details of a Strategic Force exercise in Libya, see below, p 102.]

**British Forces in Malta.** [Malta is the base and headquarters of the British Mediterranean Fleet (which is independent of ME HQ in Cyprus, although represented there). However, British troops in Malta have since 1959 become part of the ME Land Forces.]

British land forces in Malta included in 1960 one commando group and one infantry battalion. (*Journal of RUSI*, May)

#### BRITISH FORCES ARABIAN PENINSULA

[This command was established in Oct 1959 and is a unified command comprising land and air forces. The CO is an air force officer, mainly because the air force has been responsible for internal security in Aden and the protectorates since the inter-war years. Headquarters are in Aden. There are three local commands:

Aden Colony and Aden Protectorate;  
Persian Gulf sheikhdoms and sultanates;  
A strategic reserve, located in Kenya (Kenya itself is outside the scope of Arabian Peninsula Command).  
The reserve in Kenya is based on Nairobi, which is 950 miles by air from Aden.]

**Strength.** British forces under the Arabian Peninsula Command included in 1960:

One infantry brigade group as strategic reserve in Kenya;

Land forces deployed in the Arabian Peninsula, including one to two infantry battalions, one marine commando, one tank battalion, one to two armoured cavalry battalions, and locally recruited levies;  
Squadrons of Canberra, Hunter and Venom aircraft (one of each type) and a sizable number of military transport aircraft, the latter based in Aden and Kenya. (*Army Quarterly*, Jan, July; *Journal RUSI* Feb, May; *Air Estimates* 6061; *Military Review*, Feb 1961)

#### CENTRAL TREATY ORGANIZATION (CENTO)

**Organization.** The only change in the organization of CENTO during 1960 was the establishment, in Jan, of a Permanent Military Deputies group in Ankara. This group is subordinate to the Military Committee (which consists of Chiefs of Staff or Commanders in Chief), and directs the detailed planning of the Combined Military Staff (also located in Ankara).

For the structure of CENTO in 1960 see table.

[Unlike NATO, CENTO did not possess in 1960 a command organization and was confined to joint military planning. The question of establishing a military command organization did, however, arise in 1960.]

**Mar: Meeting of CENTO Military Committee.** On 28-30 Mar the CENTO Military Committee met in Tehran under the chairmanship of General White, USAF Chief of Staff, who headed the US delegation. The other delegations were headed by General Hedayat, Chief of the Joint Iranian Staff, General Musa, C.-in-C. of the Pakistani Army, General Erdelhun, Chief of Staff of the Turkish Armed Forces, and Admiral Mountbatten, Chief of the [British] Defence Staff.

According to an official communiqué issued on 30 Mar, the Committee studied preliminary military plans for the Pact region, a number of operational plans, and a joint training programme for 1961, to include units from all five members. The Committee noted with particular satisfaction the work done and the progress made by the permanent group of military deputies, since its formation in Ankara on 1 Jan, in examining the question of military command organization. (*R. Tehran*, 30 Mar-BBC, 1 Apr)

**Apr: Meeting of CENTO Foreign Ministers.** On 28-30 Apr the Foreign Ministers of the CENTO countries held a meeting in Tehran, at which the US Secretary of State and the UK Foreign Secretary explained their policy on the approaching Summit Conference.

The Foreign Ministers adopted the report submitted by the Military Committee. The SG of CENTO indicated that the question of a unified military command would be studied in the future. There was no question, however, of equipping the ME members with more complete and more modern armaments. The question of establishing contacts with NATO and SEATO was considered premature. (*Monde*, 2 May)

[No further developments were reported in 1960 on the question of establishing a military command organization.]


**May: CENTO Air Manoeuvres.** Air manoeuvres were held by CENTO in Iran in May. [On 14 May, shortly after the U-2 incident, the USSR had warned Iran against putting her airspace at the disposal of the US, whose government had proclaimed "that its policy was to violate the sovereignty and the frontiers of other states."] (*Monde*, 17 May)

**Meetings of Other CENTO Bodies.** Other CENTO bodies, such as the Scientific Council, the Economic Committee, the Sub-Committee on Trade and the Sub-Committee on Communications and Public Works, also met in 1960. (*Istanbul*, 26 Jan, 13-14 Feb; *J. de Téhéran*, 31 Jan, 3 Apr)

**Nov: CENTO Naval Manoeuvres.** In Nov ships belonging to the US, UK, Iranian, Turkish and Pakistani navies took part in CENTO naval manoeuvres. (*NYT*, 8 Nov)



THE MILITARY POSITION OF THE WEST IN THE ME



(Based on "The Story of the Central Treaty Organization," published in Ankara, Oct 1959, by the CENTO Public Relations Division)

## WESTERN CAPACITY TO INTERVENE IN ME

[In recent years, increasing emphasis has been placed in the West on the development of its capacity to deal quickly and effectively with local wars, to which the nuclear deterrent is inapplicable. This capacity directly concerns the ME, in view of the possibility of a local war breaking out in the area. Its importance lies not only in its effectiveness as an instrument of Western military action; but also as a possible deterrent, which might outweigh calculations of local advantage made by a potential aggressor.]

The development of this capacity revolves around two principal issues:

The size of the special strategic force capable of intervening in local wars at short notice;

The amount of air transport available, which determines the speed with which the force could be conveyed to its objectives.]

**Possibility of Need to Intervene in ME War.** The possibility that the West might have to intervene in a local war in the ME was mentioned in Western military publications during 1960. Thus, Rear Admiral Buzzard (UK) wrote that the real danger today was local aggression or unintentional local war, arising as a result of miscalculation or the action of a small country, such as Israel or Egypt, which if not handled properly might unintentionally develop into a total global war. If limited conflicts can be prevented or suppressed, there will be no total war. (*Military Review*, July)

**US Strategic Army Corps (STRAC).** According to an article in *National Security in the Nuclear Age* (edited by G. B. Turner and R. D. Challener), the US Army Staff view is that the key to success in local and limited wars lies in the rapidity with which reinforcements can be sent to designated trouble spots. To this end a strategic army reserve has been constituted in the US, consisting of seven divisions and substantial supporting elements. Within this strategic reserve the hard core or "fire brigade" consists of a Strategic Army Corps (STRAC).

STRAC was originally envisioned as a four-division mobile force. (*NYT*, 17 June) In 1960, a US Army source described STRAC as "a well balanced combined arms force of many units built around the 101st and 82nd Airborne Divisions and the fourth Infantry Division." He added: "It is a force that can be employed, either as a whole or in part, to meet the precise demands of any situation to which it is committed."

"In an emergency the active force is prepared to move out to any part of the world. Advanced combat elements of the 101st Airborne Division are prepared to load aircraft within one hour after receipt of an initial alert. Certain elements of the 82nd Airborne Division are prepared to load within three hours. The entire fourth Infantry Division can leave within nine hours." (*Dep. Chief of Staff for Ops (CONARC)*, Army, Sept)

STRAC can also be equipped with nuclear weapons. (*General Lyman L. Lemnitzer*, Army, June)

The employment possibilities of STRAC are however dependent on the ability of the Air Force and Navy to provide the necessary transport. An American source stated that "sufficient airlift for probably two thirds of it is non-existent." (*Army*, Feb)

**US Airlift Capability.** US airlift capability came under severe criticism in 1960. According to the testimony of the then Army Chief of Staff, General Lemnitzer [now

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff], reported in May the Military Air Transport Service (MATs) could not, in emergency, airlift two divisions anywhere in the world within four weeks, an overall requirement that was "necessary, reasonable and obtainable." Moreover, MATs was, at best, capable of dealing with only one of many possible limited war situations and did not take into account the possibility of two or more emergencies arising simultaneously.

According to Army, even an increase in funds for MATs would not necessarily assure the army of sufficient airlift "available on call" to move promptly even one division to a trouble spot anywhere in the world. (*Army*, May)

When President Kennedy assumed office in Jan 1961, one of his first directives was to order prompt action to increase US airlift capacity which will, in his words, "better assure the ability of our conventional forces to respond with discrimination and speed to any problem at any spot on the globe at any moment's notice. In particular it will enable us to meet any deliberate effort to avoid or divert our forces by starting limited wars in widely scattered parts of the world." (*State of the Union Message to Congress*; *NYT*, 31 Jan 1961) In a subsequent message to Congress, Kennedy specified an increase in the number of long-range transport aircraft from 50 to 129. (*Time*, 7 Apr 1961)

**US Sixth Fleet.** The US Sixth Fleet is capable of intervening in a local war mainly with its air and naval arms. Its present capacity to intervene on land is confined to its one reinforced battalion of marines, in case of emergency it is generally reinforced by two US based battalions. (*Army*, Sept)

**British Strategic Reserve.** The British Strategic Reserve in the UK consists of one divisional headquarters, one parachute brigade (when available) and up to two infantry brigade groups. According to an article in the *Royal Engineers' Journal*, it is very doubtful whether the overall standard of training of this force is high enough, owing to constant changes both in units and individuals. (*RE Journal*, Mar; *Journal of RUSI*, Aug)

In addition to the central strategic reserve in the UK, there are theatre reserves, which in the ME are located in Cyprus, Kenya and Aden. Of these, one brigade group is stationed in Kenya, another brigade group will eventually be stationed in Cyprus, and there are two battalions in Aden. (*RE Journal*, Mar)

In war, heavy transport, weapons and equipment would be available to the strategic reserve from overseas stock piles in Cyprus and Aden. (*Soldier*, June)

For its transport capability the British Strategic Reserve force depended upon the Strategic Transport Force, which consisted at the beginning of 1961 of 23 Britannic aircraft (a military version of the Bristol Britannia, capable of carrying 110 men) and 10 Comet C-2 aircraft. [According to the 1960 and 1961 Defence White Papers, the number of transport aircraft was to be increased.]

The Strategic Transport Force was also to be supplemented by aircraft capable of carrying exceptionally heavy and bulky freight. In addition there exists a medium-range force of 48 Hastings, 32 Beverlys, and 12 Valettas. (*Times* 17, 21 Feb 1961; *Army*, Apr 1961)

A move to ensure greater mobility was the commissioning of the Commando Carrier *Bulwark* in Mar. It was described as "a development of the experience gained at Suez." (*Journal RUSI*, May)

The *Bulwark* is designed to carry a "highly mobile

amphibious force to any trouble area." She carries helicopters only (16 plus five spares) and a Commando, consisting of 600 officers and other ranks. The helicopters can carry this force and equipment to last two weeks and put them ashore within four hours while the carrier is lying between five and ten miles offshore. *Bulwark* carries stores and fuel to support the force in active operation.

The carrier took part in exercises in the Mediterranean in Apr-May whence she sailed for Singapore. (*Ill. London News*, 18 June; *Journal RUSI*, Aug)

**Mar: British Strategic Reserve Exercise in Libya.** An air mobility exercise was held in Mar to test the effectiveness of the British strategic reserve in extinguishing a "brushfire war" (exercise "Starlight"). The setting of the exercise was that British forces had to come to the aid of a friendly but defenceless country, which had been attacked on land by a hostile neighbour.

The exercise consisted of three phases. During the first an entire brigade group was airlifted, with its equipment and vehicles, from Britain to El Adem airfield in Cyrenaica. According to *Soldier*, all the troops were flown out in five Britannias in 28 sorties. Their light vehicles, weapons and equipment went by Hastings and Beverlys (some of which carried helicopters). Heavy transport was sent by sea, to represent weapons and equipment which in war would be available from the stockpiles in Cyprus. Altogether, nearly 4,000 men, 400 vehicles, 300 trailers, 40 guns and all the supplies needed by the force were brought by air.

The second phase of the exercise covered the setting up on an airhead at Tmini, 50 miles northeast of El Adem, and the concentration of ground forces there by tactical air transport.

The third phase, which was the actual battle exercise, tested the operational and logistic air support of troops up to 50 miles west of the airhead. One hundred and twenty tons of supplies were flown daily from the airhead to the forces, and combat aircraft came from a British aircraft carrier. Nuclear weapons were not involved.

The move of the entire brigade group from Britain to Libya and its deployment in the battle area by tactical transport aircraft took three days.

The main criticism of the exercise was that the brigade group had to leave its heavy armour in Britain, in the absence of aircraft capable of carrying it. It was pointed out, however, that in due course the strategic transport force would be supplemented by aircraft with that capability. (*NYT*, 23 Mar; *Soldier*, June; *Journal RUSI*, May)

**Proposal for Establishment of NATO Task Force.** On 2 Mar General Norstad, Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, announced that the US, the UK and France

had tacitly agreed to integrate a battalion each into a task force. It was hoped this brigade would be established during 1961.

The force, initially consisting of 2,500 to 3,000 men, would have both conventional and nuclear arms, under a single commander. From the initial three battalions the task force might be expanded to five and even more. The battalions would be brought together for training and equipment, but most of the time they would remain with their permanent units. The force would have air and naval support.

Norstad said that the force would perhaps have more political than military value, in giving an "allied coloration" to the particular area in which it was sent to operate. (*NYT*, 3 Mar)

## WESTERN VIEWS ON SOVIET MILITARY CAPACITY IN ME

[Soviet military presence in the ME was confined in 1960 to a submarine flotilla in the Mediterranean and the Soviet military missions of advisers and experts in the UAR, Iraq and Yemen. However, Soviet military capacity to intervene in a ME conflict was considerable.]

**Soviet Submarine in the Mediterranean.** According to British Admiralty reports in Mar, the USSR had reinforced its submarine fleet in the Eastern Mediterranean, which now included eight submarines. The report mentioned in this connection also nine Soviet submarines in the UAR Navy. The Soviet submarine flotilla in the Mediterranean was based on the port of Valona in Albania, which had recently been completed under the direction of Soviet engineers. (*NYT*, 9 Mar)

**Soviet Capacity to Intervene in ME.** According to the British military expert, Liddell Hart, in his book *Deterrent or Defence*, the Soviet Army has some 15 well-equipped active divisions poised in the Caucasus, west of the Caspian, and a further nine to ten stationed fairly close. This total could soon be doubled with the help of three railway lines running up to this strategic area.

The Soviet Union thus has a strength easily capable of overrunning Persia. However, it might be difficult for her to maintain supplies for a force of more than 15 divisions in a prolonged advance to the Persian Gulf.

The Russians also have the strongest airborne force in the world—some ten airborne divisions and, probably, sufficient air transport to carry two of these in a single flight. The sudden arrival of two such divisions in a ME country on the invitation of its government would place the Western powers in an extremely awkward position. (*Deterrent or Defence*, Stevens, London, 1960)

## US POLICY ON THE MIDDLE EAST

### SYNOPSIS

**Policy of the US Administration.** The declared purpose of US policy in the ME continued to be the preservation of peace and stability in the area as a prerequisite for preventing Communist penetration. Statements made during the year generally stressed that the main danger lay in subversive action, rather than the threat of encroachment from without. One statement asserted that

the objective of the US was "the support of the security of those independent countries determined to resist the subversive threat of international Communism." The Eisenhower Doctrine of Mar 1957 (which had authorized the President to use the armed forces of the US to assist ME countries requesting such aid in seeking to resist aggression from international Communism) was reaffirmed as "an important basic document of US policy"

but was viewed as "a safeguard in reserve," for it was recognized that for the moment international Communism had "not been able to threaten seriously the independence and integrity of the ME countries."

The State Department expressed its belief that these countries themselves desired to remain free from outside control and to choose their own way of life, and that the Afro-Asian nations in general and the Arab countries in particular were becoming aware that the "Communists have been falsely posing as patriotic nationalists."

Practically speaking, the US assured the anti-Communist CENTO countries—Iran, Pakistan and Turkey—of "close support" economically and militarily. At the same time it continued to provide aid to countries cooperating with the Eastern bloc—UAR and Yemen (as well as Afghanistan)—in order to give them an "alternative to large-scale Communist bloc aid," and to meet its declared aim of contributing to the promotion of human betterment.

It was stated that one of the US's general objectives was to encourage the ME countries to resolve their disputes in accordance with the UN Charter. In this respect too, US support for their independence and integrity was emphasized.

Looking back, the administration regarded the 1958 intervention of American forces in Lebanon (and British forces in Jordan, in support of the existing regimes against UAR aided attempts by nationalist factions to overthrow them) as having helped materially to stabilize the area and to assert the US presence in the ME. More recently the US threw its weight behind Jordan when it was again under pressure, regarding her as a keystone in the present equilibrium of the area. In regard to the UAR, the US appeared to pursue the double aim of providing her with economic assistance to prevent total dependence on Soviet aid, while seeking to stem aspirations that might endanger the equilibrium.

As for the Arab-Israeli dispute, the US sought to avoid attitudes that might be detrimental to her position in the cold war. Thus the State Department opposed the action of New York longshoremen in picketing a UAR ship in protest against the UAR boycott of American ships trading with Israel (p 39 ff), as well as the Douglas Amendment to the Mutual Security Bill, which was designed to curb the Arab boycott. These steps, in the State Department's view, were coercive measures to which the Arab countries would naturally react. Moreover, it was thought, their repercussions would be detrimental to US interests not only in the Arab world, but also among the "mutual friends" of the Arabs, the Afro-Asian countries in general, where the US was trying to counter Communist efforts. The point was stressed that no strings should be attached to US aid.

The State Department did not believe that such measures could achieve their intended aims: any US "favoritism" for Israel could only make it more difficult for the US to bring about a relaxation of the Arab-Israeli tension. In its view, the boycott, as well as the Arab refugee problem, could be solved only by way of a general settlement of the Arab-Israel conflict. In the meantime, Israel's development was progressing, thanks, *inter alia*, to US aid, it was pointed out.

While the Administration thus advocated a non-active policy towards the specific issues of the Arab-Israeli conflict, it reiterated its view that such issues could be more effectively treated by "concerted international action," i.e. through the UN.

Views Expressed in the US Senate. Views expressed in

the US Senate on ME affairs, though coinciding with those of the Administration on US aims in the area, differed in some respect in regard to actual policies to be employed, mainly in regard to the Arab-Israeli conflict, where a more active policy was advocated.

In the vote on the Douglas Amendment, a majority of Senators were in favour of providing the President with discretionary power to withhold aid from Arab countries boycotting Israel, with special emphasis on the UAR closure of the Suez Canal against Israeli shipping and trade. Senators Douglas and Keating, taking issue with the State Department and Senator Fulbright (see below), argued that the Suez blockade endangered peace in the ME, thus threatening American interests; that the UAR was violating UN decisions and moral principles for which the US should try to gain acceptance and that the UAR was receiving generous American aid while enforcing measures that the US had condemned.

Senator Fulbright, Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, who took a special interest in the area during the year, adopted the same attitude as the State Department; in addition, he also charged that the amendment was inspired by pro-Israel pressure groups. He also advocated a better understanding of the aspirations of Arab nationalism and its strength, criticizing what he regarded as America's negative attitude towards political change in the Arab countries and advocating "some changes" in US policy in the ME.

Senator Fulbright was mainly preoccupied with the Arab-Israeli conflict, which he regarded as the chief factor influencing US policy in the area, making American relations with the ME countries most difficult.

At the heart of the conflict, he believed, was an Arab desire "to drive the Israelis into the sea" and an Israeli desire to expand her borders. No peaceful development could be achieved, he suggested, until both sides realized that efforts to achieve these aims would not be tolerated. He repeatedly returned to the Arab refugee problem, advocating a solution whereby Israel would accept the principle of repatriation or compensation, while the Arabs would agree to absorb the majority of the refugees. He thought that off-the-record negotiations might perhaps lead to such an agreement.

Senator Kennedy advocated a "new approach" to the ME based on: an acceptance of Arab nationalism, combined with an effort to guide it; an attempt to hasten Arab acceptance of the permanence of Israel and of a peace settlement; the resettlement of the refugees; and regional development. (For other Kennedy statements, see The US Election Campaign.)

Senator Mansfield proposed six guiding principles for US policy in the area, for which see below.

## FEB-JUNE: REPORTS ON ACTIVITIES UNDER THE EISENHOWER DOCTRINE

In 1960, President Eisenhower presented two periodical reports to Congress on activities under "The Joint Resolution to Promote Peace and Stability in the Middle East," approved in Mar 1957 (the Eisenhower Doctrine). The Fourth Report, dated 15 Feb, supplementing earlier such reports, covered the period up to June 1959, and the Fifth, dated 15 Aug, the period up to June 1960.

The Fourth Report dealt mainly with the crisis in the Arab countries in the summer of 1958 (the insurrection in Lebanon, the Iraqi coup d'état and the plot to overthrow the regime in Jordan) and the dispatch of American troops to Lebanon. Following are excerpts (headings inserted by editor):



**US Intervention in Lebanon Not Directly Based on Eisenhower Doctrine.** "While this successful US action was not directly based on the joint resolution, it was fully in accord with that resolution and in particular with the resolution's declaration that the United States regards as vital to the national interest and world peace the preservation of the integrity and independence of the nations of the Middle East." (*Dep. of State Bulletin, 14 Mar*)

**US Intervention had Stabilizing Effect on Inter-Arab Relations.** "The stabilizing result... of the US troop landings in Lebanon proved in fact to be an enduring reality in the ensuing months... The increased stability and security enjoyed by the governments of Lebanon and Jordan has been accompanied by substantial abatement of area tensions. Lebanon's relations with the United Arab Republic have substantially improved... Similarly there has been a growth toward more normal relations between the United Arab Republic and Jordan. This growth in mutual respect and understanding among Arab countries has been accompanied by an increased awareness on their part of the dangers of international communism... The bold action taken in Lebanon by the US Government has had a salutary effect in impressing the peoples of the Middle East and elsewhere that the United States is a tried and true friend of nations seeking to preserve their independence and integrity." (*Dep. of State Bulletin, 14 Mar*)

Following are excerpts from the Fifth Report :

**Eisenhower Doctrine Reaffirmed.** "As a basis for existing and contingent courses of action by the United States in the Middle East, House Joint Resolution 117, approved by the President 9 March, 1957, remains an important basic document of US policy. The resolution sets out in terms clearly understandable to the leaders of international communism the continuing interest of the United States in the preservation of the independence and integrity of the nations in the Middle East. It authorizes US cooperation with and assistance to nations of the Middle East in development of their economic strength and directs continuance of US support to the United Nations Emergency Force. Under the resolution's provisions, the US Government continues active pursuit of policies aiding world peace and the security of the United States." (*Dep. of State Bulletin, 19 Sept*)

(NOTE: A similar paragraph appears in the Fourth Report, which, however, included in addition a sentence saying that the Resolution "continues... as a repository of powers indispensable to US efforts toward enhancing the stability and progress of this vital area of the world.")

**No Serious Threat From "International Communism."** After surveying efforts made by Communist countries in the ME, the report continued: "These efforts have not so far enabled the forces of international communism to threaten seriously the independence and integrity of any countries in the region. Hence no occasion arose on which it was necessary for the President to invoke powers provided him under section 2 of the resolution by which he may, if requested, use Armed Forces of the United States to assist countries seeking to resist aggression from international communism." (*Dep. of State Bulletin, 19 Sept*)

**Eisenhower Doctrine a Safeguard in Reserve.** "The Middle East resolution remains as a safeguard in reserve, avail-

able to any country of the region desiring outside assistance against a possible threat to its independence and stability from the external forces of international communism." (*Dep. of State Bulletin, 19 Sept*)

#### MAY: POLICY STATEMENT BY ACTING SECRETARY OF STATE DILLON

Following are excerpts from a letter by Acting Secretary of State Douglas Dillon to Senator J.W. Fulbright, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, dated 2 May, 1960, in reply to his request for the Department's views on the implications of the Douglas Amendment to the Mutual Security Bill (headings inserted by editor):

**Elimination of Trade Restrictions Against Israel a US Objective.** "As we understand the intent of its 18 sponsors, the Douglas Amendment is designed to support efforts toward eliminating trade restrictions in the Middle East, particularly with respect to those practised against the State of Israel. I am sure that you are aware that this purpose is fully consistent with long standing objectives of the US Government."

**Douglas Amendment Harmful to US Interests.** "It is our conviction, however, that the inclusion of this amendment in current Mutual Security legislation will in fact be counter-productive and will not achieve its intended purpose. In addition, such inclusion will in our view have harmful repercussions on United States interests in a wide area of the Middle East..."

"The amendment would be widely interpreted as :

"(a) Demonstrating favoritism for the State of Israel to the extent that it would render more difficult our efforts to bring about a relaxation of tensions between Israel and the Arab States; and

"(b) An attempt to 'tie strings' to our economic aid, and, by implication, to threaten the use of aid as an instrument of political coercion... Incorporation of this amendment would without doubt have the effect of making the task of eliminating the Arab boycott of Israel more difficult and would play into the hands of the Soviet bloc which seeks to exacerbate Middle East tensions to further its penetration of the area."

**Boycott and Refugee Problem Can be Solved Only Through General Settlement.** "Our government has repeatedly made clear... its support for freedom of transit through the Suez Canal, as well as our opposition to the Arab boycott against Israel. These undesirable restrictions... are an outgrowth of the Palestine problem which continues to cause tension between Israel and the Arab states and to perpetuate unfortunate circumstances such as those whereby nearly one million Arab refugees are not able to return to their homes. It is our government's firm conviction that an Arab-Israel settlement will one day come, not by coercion but by a spirit of accommodation on both sides. As progress is made in that direction, such problem as boycotts, restrictions and homeless refugees will disappear."

(Mentioning the picketing in New York of the UAR ship *Cleopatra* (p 39 ff), the letter goes on): "Asserting their determination to resist such pressures, the Arab countries are establishing counter-picketing against American shipping. This reaction against coercion... is not unnatural in young emerging states."

**Strings on Aid to Arab Countries Liable to Incur Resentment of Afro-Asian Countries.** "As can be seen, outside

attempts, no matter how well intentioned, to coerce one or more of the Middle Eastern countries to follow a certain behavior have wide repercussions. I might add that while resentment against such pressure in Arab-Israel matters has direct repercussions on our interests in 10 Arab countries from Morocco to the Persian Gulf, the sympathy for these 10 nations is inevitably widespread throughout Africa and Asia. This is a critical juncture in the history of those two continents. Just when young Afro-Asian nations and particularly the Arab nations appear for the first time to be becoming aware of the fact that the communists have been falsely posing as patriotic nationalists, it ill behooves us, through an appearance of placing 'strings' on our aid, to incur the deep resentment of hostility not only of the 10 Arab nations but of their natural friends, the states of Africa and Asia. In fact, we do not believe it is in Israel's long-range interest that such enmity be aroused and choosing of sides precipitated throughout the Afro-Asian region."

**Israel's Economic Progress and American Aid.** "In our view, avoidance of coercive tactics against Israel's neighbors is in Israel's interest. In just over a decade Israel has quadrupled its exports. Its unfavorable trade balance has steadily been reduced. Israel's gross national product per capita is now more than twice that of any of its neighbors and even exceeds that of the Netherlands and Italy. While foreign funds from various sources at an average rate of nearly \$1 million per day have been partly responsible, primary responsibility for its progress lies with the Israeli people themselves, their ingenuity, industriousness, and devotion to purpose. Parenthetically, I should note that our government has been consistent in its support to Israel. We have extended to Israel with its population of under 2 million a sizable total of various types of assistance, including PL480. Such assistance, as you know, is continuing. Conditions have thus far been sufficiently favorable to allow Israel to make great strides. In our view it would be a grave mistake to have that progress disturbed by actions which can only stir up area tensions to Israel's detriment."

**International Action More Effective than US Unilateral Action.** "As you know, it is the view of our government that the tension of the Middle East can more effectively be treated by concerted international action than by unilateral action on the part of the United States. That was the essence of President Eisenhower's address before the United Nations General Assembly during the fateful Middle East crisis in the summer of 1958. Such progress as has been recorded since that time has been in large measure due to such international agencies as the United Nations Emergency Force and the United Nations Truce Supervisory Organization. With specific reference to the restrictions on Israel shipping in the Suez Canal, the United Nations Secretary General has actively sought a solution. Although his efforts have not succeeded and have in fact met with a number of setbacks, the Secretary General as recently as 8 April reported his continued interest in the problem and his unextinguished hope that a solution may yet be found. Our government is giving these endeavours its fullest support." (USIS, 3 May)

#### JUNE: STATE DEPARTMENT STATEMENT ON SITUATION AND US AIMS IN THE ME

On 16 June, G. Lewis Jones, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, made the following statement before the Senate Appropriations Committee (USIS precis, headings inserted by Editor) :

**US Objectives.** America's most important objective in the Near East and South Asia is "the maintenance of peace and security in this critical area of the world."

The US Mutual Security Program is "essential to the fulfillment" of this objective, Jones told the committee. He noted that all the nations in the area of his responsibility had one thing in common—"the desire to remain free from outside control and choose their own way of life."

Jones listed US objectives in the Near East and South Asia as "first, to support the security of those independent countries determined to resist the subversive threat of international communism. Second, to encourage the countries of the area to resolve their disputes in accordance with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations. Third, the encouragement and promotion of human betterment throughout the area."

**Close US Support for CENTO.** In his remarks concerning individual countries, Jones pointed out that Iran had "refused to renounce its agreement with the free world" in spite of "a hostile and abusive propaganda campaign conducted by the Soviet Union and its allies, starting in 1959, and in spite of other Soviet threats." He said Iran had made progress during the past year in a number of economic fields.

Referring to the "firm anti-Communist policy" of Pakistan and the economic progress there, Jones said "Pakistan is a good example of the way we can cooperate through the Mutual Security Program with a strong and friendly government, and can advance the interests of both by contributing to the achievement of economic development, defensive military strength and political stability."

Jones described the Turks as a "stalwart, resolute people who share our detestation of Communist imperialism and with whom our mutual defense arrangements are practical and meaningful."

Noting that Turkey, Iran and Pakistan are all members of the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO), Jones said the US plans "to continue to give CENTO our close support through economic activity designed to further the trend towards greater regionalism."

**Jordan Keystone to ME Equilibrium.** The Assistant Secretary described Jordan as "firmly committed to the free world" and "in a sense a keystone in the preservation of the existing equilibrium of the Near East." He said the US had continued to "manifest its friendship" for Jordan by extending economic aid.

(Statement on Afghanistan deleted)

**US Aid to UAR and Yemen as Alternative to Communist Aid.** Jones stated that "as in the case of Afghanistan, we are conducting in the United Arab Republic and Yemen projects designed to provide those countries with an alternative to large-scale Communist bloc aid. The fact that these countries are receiving aid from the Communists does not affect our interest in their stability and progress."

**No Prospects for Settlement of Arab Refugee Problem.** In discussing specific problems, Jones said the "pressing and crucial element of the Palestine refugee program continues to be the care and future of the refugees themselves." He went on: "We would be deluding ourselves were we to say that there is hope on the horizon for an early solution of this distressing problem. To date, despite the efforts of the United States, and the equally sincere

efforts of other members of the United Nations, neither the Arab states nor Israel have shown the degree of willingness to negotiate or to make the compromises necessary to ensure a peaceful and lasting settlement." He noted that the requested aid funds included America's continuing contribution to the UN Relief and Works Agency for the care of these refugees. (*USIS*, 17 June)

## US SENATE AND ARAB-ISRAEL CONFLICT; THE DOUGLAS AMENDMENT

[The debate on the Douglas Amendment took place at a time when the whole question of the US attitude to the Arab boycott had become acute following the picketing in New York of the UAR ship *Cleopatra* by the Seafarers' International Union (see p 39 ff).]

**The Douglas Amendment.** On 28 Apr the US Senate approved by a vote of 45 to 25 an amendment to the Mutual Security Act aimed at the UAR closure of the Suez Canal to Israeli shipping and the Arab boycott of Israel. The amendment was sponsored by Senators Douglas (Democrat) and Keating (Republican), and by 28 other Senators including Senator Kennedy.

The amendment stated: "It is the sense of the Congress that inasmuch as—(1) the United States favors freedom of navigation in international waterways and economic co-operation between nations; and (2) the purposes of this Act are negated and the peace of the world is endangered when nations which receive assistance under this Act wage economic warfare against other nations assisted under this Act, including such procedures as boycotts, blockades and the restriction of the use of international waterways—the Mutual Security Programme should be administered according to such principles "as the President may determine" and the President "shall report on measures taken to ensure their application."

An identical amendment had been approved by the House of Representatives, without debate, on 21 Apr. (*NYT*, NY, 22 Apr, 1 May; *NE Report*, 2 May)

**Senator Fulbright and State Department Oppose Amendment.** Senator Fulbright (Democrat), Chairman of the Relations Committee, was the main opponent of the amendment. He charged that a pro-Israel pressure group was trying to "whipsaw" US foreign policy for the benefit of a foreign state. He said that the amendment would accomplish nothing "beyond the appeasement of certain uninformed minority groups" in the US; it would not help end the Arab boycott, but would inflame the Arabs, lend comfort to the Communist argument that the US attached "political strings to its aid," and encourage Arab retaliation against American shipping. He proposed a second amendment providing that the President should not apply the Douglas Amendment when this would "constitute partiality by the US" in determining the merits of a dispute.

In reply to a request by Senator Fulbright for the State Department's views, the Acting Secretary of State, Douglas Dillon, expressed the Department's opposition to the amendment on the grounds that it was detrimental to the US's interests while not helping Israel (for details see above). *The New York Times* reported, however, that "some State Department officials" did not agree with this view, arguing that since Egypt had seized the Suez Canal, the UAR should abide by the accepted rules of international law. (*NYT*, NY, 1, 3, 8 May)

Senator Fulbright initially also proposed another amendment, to the effect that it was the sense of Congress that Israel should permit the Arab refugees to re-

turn and compensate those who did choose not to do so. Senator Wayne Morse spoke against this amendment and finally Fulbright did not offer it. (*NE Report*, 2, 16 May)

**Fulbright Amendment Rejected.** On 30 Apr, Senators Douglas and Keating cabled members of the Senate, urging them to defeat Senator Fulbright's measures. They declared that his charges "belittle the considerations and impugn the motives that moved a substantial majority of the Congress to act." "Violation of the principle of free navigation in Suez endangers the stability and uneasy peace in the ME. It therefore threatens American interests as well as those of other nations," the message said. The UAR was continuing the blockade, which had been condemned by the UN and the US, in spite of the generous American economic aid she had received. The passage of the Fulbright amendment would amount to a "green light" to Abdel-Nasser to continue the blockade.

On 2 May, the Senate voted by 45 to 39 to table the Fulbright amendment, thus retaining the original Douglas Amendment.

During the debate preceding the vote, Senator Douglas stated that the position of Senator Fulbright and the State Department rested on a "fundamental error," namely that the Suez blockade constituted a purely Egyptian-Israeli dispute and that the US would be guilty of partiality if it took up a stand. This was, however, "a case of one country, Egypt, having violated treaties, refusing to allow the rulings of the UN, and going back upon its own promises." It was a question of whether the US would try "to get now general acceptance of the principle that there are moral laws in the world, and that there is some obligation to follow the decisions of international bodies." (*NYT*, NY, 1, 3 May; *NE Report*, 16 May)

## SENATOR FULBRIGHT'S VIEWS ON THE ME

[Senator Fulbright, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, showed special interest in the Arab-Israel conflict during the year under review.]

In May he visited Egypt, Jordan and Israel (see *IMB*, 12, 17 May; *Ha'aretz*, 18, 23 May; *NE Report*, 2 June) On 15 June he published and had inserted in the Congressional record a report on this visit. (*USIS*, 16 June) Earlier, on 9 June, he made public a study entitled "United States Foreign Policy—Middle East," prepared by the staff of the Foreign Relations Committee. (*Staff Study No. 13*; also *USIS*, 9 June)

[In both documents the Arab-Israel conflict was presented as the major obstacle to stability in the area and the Arab refugee question as the key to a solution of the conflict. Following are excerpts from both documents]:

"Basic US Attitudes to ME. In his report on his ME visit Senator Fulbright enumerated four points which he felt formed "basic US attitudes":

"First, . . . we desire to have friendly relations with all states in the Middle East.

"Second, . . . we recognize the right of each state to determine its own policies, domestic as well as foreign . . . We do not seek satellites. We believe peace in the area is dependent upon political independence.

"Third, . . . we do not ask that they adopt political or economic forms or organizations similar to those that have developed in Western Europe or the United States . . . It is our hope, however, that . . . given time, stability and economic development, . . . the peoples of the Middle East will decide that democratic forms of gov-



ernment are more suitable for their development than totalitarian forms of government.

"Fourth, the US declares it a 'primary objective' of policy to provide assistance to peoples working for independence and economic viability." (*USIS*, 16 June)

**Arab Nationalism and the US.** [Arab nationalism] "is not a force personified by a single individual behind whom the Arab host eventually can exorcise the twin devils of imperialism (real or imagined) and Israel. Neither is it a facile term embracing all of the realities of Arab politics, or all of the changes occurring in all parts of the Middle East.

"Arab nationalism is a catalyst animating a people bent on asserting themselves after centuries of subjugation and backwardness. The Middle East is changing. There is brightly blooming disaffection with the ways of the past, and, whatever direction it takes, it is doubtful that anything... can stifle this process of Arab assertion." (*Staff Study No. 13, USIS*, 9 June)

Senator Fulbright reviewed "the ups and downs" of US relations in the area and concluded that during the past year "our relations with the Arab states seemed gradually improved, despite apparent UAR unwillingness to be more accommodating in permitting Canal transit." He said tendencies in the past "to confuse nationalism with communism, neutrality with anti-Americanism, and to believe that the regimes with which we may currently have relations are better than anything different," had led the US into "unnecessary troubles." "Marked improvement" in US relations with the ME would result from some changes in attitude on the part of the US. (*USIS precis*, 16 June)

**The Arab-Israel Conflict and the US.** [The Arab-Israel conflict is] "the most all-pervasive situation which influences the formulation of United States policy in the Middle East.

"Until there is acceptance on the part of the Arab states that most of the nations of the world could not stand idly aside if world peace were endangered by any attempt to drive the Israelis into the sea; and until there is acceptance on the part of Israel that efforts to expand her borders by forceful means will not be tolerated; the main ingredients of peaceful economic or political development of the Middle East will be lacking.

"Furthermore, so long as this condition exists, United States relations with states in the area will be most difficult. With Middle East emotions closely bordering those which exist in time of war, almost any statement of individual Members of Congress relating to the Middle East will be tortuously interpreted by one side or the other as evidence of support or opposition." (*USIS precis*, 16 June)

**The Arab Refugee Problem.** "Diplomats, scholars and journalists... [and] United Nations officials familiar with the Palestine refugee problem, are generally agreed on the elements that would represent a genuinely feasible and workable solution. Obviously, any such proposal would have to respect the two conflicting viewpoints, yet, both these viewpoints would have to concede something. The Israelis... would have to make the greatest diplomatic concession. That is, they would have to accept the principle of repatriation, or compensation, as set forth in several United Nations resolutions.

"The Arabs, on the other hand, would have to make the greatest practical concession. That is, they would have to agree that the refugees opting against repatriation

could be integrated into the other Arab societies; this would represent all but a small proportion of the refugees." (*Staff Study No. 13; USIS*, 9 June)

"I cannot help but wonder, however, whether it might not be possible for quiet, off-the-record conversations to be held [on the refugee problem] so that some agreement might be made which would move the problem off dead center. Perhaps the Israelis could agree to repatriation or compensation as the United Nations has recommended, with the understanding that the numbers who might accept repatriation would be of manageable size over a period of years. Perhaps the Arabs could indicate a willingness to help resettle those who might decide against repatriation, if reasonable compensation is agreed upon." (*USIS precis*, 16 June)

#### VIEWS OF OTHER US SENATORS

**Senator John F. Kennedy: New Approach to ME** (statement in the Senate, 14 June): "We must formulate, with both imagination and restraint, a new approach to the Middle East—not pressing our case so hard that the Arabs feel their neutrality and nationalism are threatened, but accepting those forces and seeking to help channel them along constructive lines, while at the same time trying to hasten the inevitable Arab acceptance of the permanence of Israel.

"We must give our support to programs to help people instead of regimes—to work in terms of their problems, as well as ours, and seek a permanent settlement among Arabs and Israelis based not an armed truce but on mutual self-interest. Guns and anti-Communist pacts and propaganda and the traditional piecemeal approach to the Middle East are not enough—refugee resettlement and a regional resources development fund in full partnership with the Middle Eastern nations are all part of a long-range strategy which is both practical and in the best interests of all concerned." (*NE Report*, 1 July)

**Senator Mansfield: Six Principles to Guide US Policy in the ME** (statement in the Senate, 23 June). [These principles] "favor neither Arab nor Israeli. They favor those who mean it when they talk of peace and are prepared to begin now to work for it.

"The important need is to spell out these principles, by a vigorous adherence to them, not only in official public statements, but in diplomacy, in aid activities and in all other aspects of the conduct of our policies."

The following are Senator Mansfield's six principles:

1. Stabilization of existing frontiers, except as they may be altered by peaceful agreement;
2. Dissolution of the refugee problem by the joint principle of repatriation, as practicable, and just compensation;
3. Full freedom of passage of Suez now and a gradual reduction of the other practices of economic warfare in the area;
4. Full support of the use of UN emergency forces for the safeguarding of the borders of any nation which fears for its security, with all UN members bearing reasonable portions of the cost of such operations;
5. Internationalization of the Holy Places in Jerusalem;
6. Efforts to control and reduce the flow of armaments to all nations of the ME coupled with international guarantees of support to any nation which may be victimized by an act of aggression. (*NE Report*, 1 July)



## JULY-NOV: ME ASPECTS OF THE US PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN

## SYNOPSIS

ME issues were involved in the US Presidential election campaign from the time it started in earnest. Both official party platforms referred to the region's problems and pledged action for an Israel-Arab peace settlement. This was given more specific form later on, when Kennedy declared that he would call a conference of Israel and Arab leaders, while Nixon stated that he would ask his Vice-President to direct negotiations aimed at finding a solution to ME hostility. The ending of the boycott and the opening of the Suez Canal to Israel also figured in the election statements.

The Israeli Press on the whole received these pledges with some caution, while Arab commentators seized on them with a good deal of emphasis, proclaiming that no US President would be able to impose his policies on the Arabs or force them to make peace. Both US parties were denounced as equally subordinated to Zionist influence.

Two incidents marked the course of the campaign:

The first was the appeal of the UAR Ambassador to the US to Arab students to spread pro-Arab propaganda among their American friends to counter pro-Zionist election statements. The other was the use of excerpts from the Israeli Press (quoted out of context) to prove that Israel preferred Nixon and that US Jews should vote accordingly.

UAR reactions to the election results showed how seriously election statements had been taken: there was evident fear of imminent US pressure and threatening hints of future clashes. In other Arab countries, however, an optimistic note of hope for improved relations with the new administration was not entirely lacking.

## JULY: THE PARTY PLATFORMS

The first official statements, general in nature and to be elaborated upon later by the candidates, came as part of the two party platforms.

**The Democratic Platform**, officially adopted on 12 July by the party convention, included the following paragraph:

"In the ME we will work for guarantees to insure independence for all states. We will encourage direct Arab-Israel peace negotiations, the resettlement of Arab refugees in lands where there is room and opportunity for them, an end to boycotts and blockades, and unrestricted use of the Suez Canal by all nations." (*USIS*, 14 July)

**The Republican Platform**. The Republican platform, adopted on 27 July, mentioned the ME area several times. It referred to the Lebanon as one of the regions where the US had made a stand against aggression, and listed CENTO among collective security alliances which the party meant to uphold.

It said: "We will encourage the countries of Latin America, Africa, the ME and Asia to initiate appropriate regional groups to work out plans for economic and educational development" and offered US cooperation for this purpose. It declared its sympathy for the aspirations of these areas to improve their standard of living and to enjoy equality with the rest of the world. Turning to specifically regional problems, it read:

"With specific reference to Israel and the Arab nations we shall encourage in every feasible manner an

early resolution of differences between them, an equitable solution of the refugee problem, an end to transit and trade restrictions, the cessation of discrimination against Americans on the basis of religious beliefs, and progress toward peaceful relations which will render unnecessary the continuation of the current wasteful and dangerous arms race." (*USIS*, 29 July)

## AUG-NOV: DEMOCRATIC POLICY STATEMENTS

**Aug: Kennedy Statement**. The central and most detailed Democratic statement of policy was made on 25 Aug, when Kennedy addressed the annual convention of the Zionist Organization of America in New York. The key phrase of his address was: "Friendship for Israel is not a partisan matter. It is a national commitment." Discussing the ME situation, Kennedy said that what was needed was leadership—not rhetoric. There had been enough rhetoric about free transit through the Suez Canal. Yet "our policy in Washington and in the UN has permitted defiance of our 1956 pledge with impunity—indeed with economic reward. If America's word... is to have any meaning, if the decisions... of the UN are to be binding..., if the Mutual Security amendment which I co-sponsored with Senator P. H. Douglas is to have meaning (see above), if the... Democratic platform is to have meaning—the influence of this nation and other maritime powers must be brought to bear on a just solution that removes all discrimination from the Suez Canal."

He went on to criticize the Eisenhower administration's ME policy, mentioning "the incredible American blunders which led to the 1956 Suez crisis" and the Eisenhower doctrine, which had been repudiated. He declared that there had been a "general deterioration" in US relations with ME countries owing to the lack of clarity in American policy. Peace in the ME had not been brought nearer and Russian influence had increased.

Turning to the tasks of the new President, the speaker said: "First, I propose that the new President reaffirm our sincere friendship for all people in the ME, whatever their religion, or their race, or their politics."

"Secondly, I propose that we make it crystal clear that the US meant what it said in the Tripartite Declaration of 1950. (For other developments in connection with the TD see pp 93-94) ... I propose that we make clear both to the Israelis and the Arabs our guarantee that we will act with whatever force and speed is necessary to halt any aggression by any nation."

"I propose that an international effort be made to limit an arms race in the ME, with a realization that if this is not accomplished we shall not permit an imbalance to exist... Once the nations of the ME have a firm and precise guarantee, then the need for continuing an arms race can disappear, the easing of tension can follow and both sides will be able to devote their energies to peaceful pursuits."

"Third, I propose that all the authority of the White House be used to call in a conference the leaders of Israel and the Arab states to consider privately their common problems, assuring them that we support in full their aspirations for peace, unity, independence and a better life; and that we are prepared to back up this moral commitment with economic and technical assistance."

He went on to say that he believed that such an

American presidential initiative would not be lightly rejected and promised to waste no time in taking that initiative. Speaking again of the need to end the arms race, he added: "I cannot believe that anyone in Israel... wants to live their lives out in a garrison state. And I cannot believe that the Arab world would not find a better basis for unity in a united attack against... their social problems, an attack in which they could benefit immensely from a closer association with Israel."

In conclusion, Kennedy stressed that peace in the ME was America's objective and, in part, her responsibility. (NYT, NY, 26 Aug, text as recorded by the NYT.)

Other sources used the prepared text and reported a slightly different version of the speech.)

**Sept: Democrats to Change Policy towards UAR.** The Democratic National Committee, in an official party publication entitled *1960 Fact Book*, accused the Eisenhower administration of appeasing the UAR, thus enabling Abdel-Nasser to get away with arbitrary policies, while Soviet penetration in the ME had gone on. The publication indicated that a Democratic administration would change US policy towards Abdel-Nasser. (Jer. Post, 27 Sept)

**Oct: "Israel There to Stay."** In an interview published in *The Christian Science Monitor*, Chester Bowles said that the Arabs did not understand America's long commitment to the development of Israel. He added: "The ME conflict will be eased a great deal when the Arab nations begin to realize that whatever they think of Israel, it is there to stay. The Israelis should make it as easy as possible to achieve that understanding." He went on to say that in the ME economic justice and social betterment should have greater priority than military requirements. (Christian Science Monitor, 19 Oct)

**Nov: Pledge to Act Against Boycott.** In a letter to the American Jewish Congress on the subject of the Suez Canal blockade, Kennedy said he would exercise the authority empowering the President to withhold US assistance from countries waging economic warfare against recipients of US aid. (See also p 106.) He added that he would act to "protect all American citizens from the practice of religious or racial discrimination by foreign governments." (Jer. Post, 4 Nov)

#### AUG-NOV: REPUBLICAN POLICY STATEMENTS

**Aug: Nixon Statement.** The Republicans, too, made the most detailed declaration of their ME policy at the ZOA convention. In a recorded message heard by the convention on 27 Aug, Vice-President Nixon said it was important not only to the ME but to the peace and security of the US and the world to find a solution to the hostility existing between Israel and the Arab world. "I intend to give this problem the highest priority by assigning primary responsibility for directing negotiations in this field to Cabot Lodge." There must be a "continued and tireless search" for means to achieve peace in the ME.

Nixon went on to say that it was "most fortunate" that both presidential candidates agreed that the "US is committed to the preservation of the independence of Israel, the prevention of armed aggression in the Near East and the use of our best offices to bring about a stable peace between Israel and the Arab states."

"The US are resolved to come to the aid of any nation which falls victim to aggression," he added. The US should continue to work for free navigation in the

Suez Canal; to help the Arabs to develop their resources so as to better the chances for the resettlement of the refugees; and to assist Israel in her development efforts.

Evidently referring to Senator Kennedy's undertaking before the same convention two days earlier to call a conference of Israel and Arab leaders (see above), Nixon said it would be preferable to refrain from promises the emptiness of which had already been proved in the past, and to concentrate instead on negotiations by all available diplomatic channels. (Ma'ariv, 28 Aug; NYT, 29 Aug; NYHT, 30 Aug; Washington Post, 5 Sept)

**Lodge Outlines Settlement Possibilities.** The Republican Vice-Presidential candidate, Henry Cabot Lodge, addressing a meeting of Jewish leaders in New York on 5 Sept, called for a high-level initiative to find a fair and comprehensive solution to the Palestine problem. He added that such a solution must include: a settlement of the refugee problem, a Jordan water development project and a solution to other common Arab-Israel problems. This would require mutual consideration, and the US should prepare to contribute generously to such a solution. The search would not be easy, and no miracles should be expected, but a serious attempt ought to be made. The situation, difficult though it was, contained constructive elements, such as the presence of the UN force in Sinai. (Davar, 6, 7 Sept)

**Oct-Nov: Policy of Friendship and Cooperation with Israel.** On 31 Oct, Lodge declared in Washington that the cause of Israel was close to his heart and that of Nixon. If elected, they would both continue the policy of friendship for, and cooperation with, Israel. (Ha'aretz, 1 Nov)

On 3 Nov, Nixon wrote in a letter to the Jewish War Veterans' Association that, if elected, he would act to increase economic aid to Israel. He added that he supported steps to enable the Arab states to resettle the refugees in places where they could be of the greatest use. (Ha'aretz, 4 Nov)

#### JULY-SEPT: ARAB COMMENT DURING ELECTION CAMPAIGN

**July: Abdel-Nasser: "Neither Party will be Able to Impose its Will on the Arabs."** On 26 July, in the course of a speech at Alexandria, devoted mainly to an attack on the Shah of Iran (see p 217), Abdel-Nasser said that both US parties were vying for the favours of the Zionists by declaring that they would bring about peace between Israel and the Arabs. They could try, but they would find that they were far removed from their goal. The people of Palestine needed to be given its rights.

"Let them make declarations in Washington as much as they like: they will not be able to determine our policy. Our own people will do that. The Republican party has declared that it will act for the free passage of Israeli ships through the Suez Canal. They may have become used to the Zionist yoke, but we shall oppose it and fight it to the last man and to the last drop of blood. We care for the full rights of the Palestine Arabs and not for announcements by the Democratic or the Republican party."

Neither party would be able to impose its policies on the Arabs; such talk was behind the times. (R. Cairo, 26 July-IMB, 27 July)

**Other Arab Comment.** [Arab Press and Radio commentators, particularly in the UAR, returned frequently to

the subject of the election campaign, stressing the following points:

- ME policies are made by the Arabs and not by the US;
- Both parties are equally dominated by Zionism;
- Both parties disregard the rights of the Arabs;
- Both parties ignore the real interests of the US, and the ME.]

**Sept: Iraqi Diplomatic Protest.** The Iraqi Foreign Office handed a note to the US embassy in Baghdad, stating that the candidates' statements were bound to affect US relations with the Arabs. (*R. Baghdad*, 22 Sept-IMB 25, Sept)

**Aug: UAR Ambassador Renounces Candidate Statements.** The UAR Ambassador to the US, Mustafa Kāmil, addressed the annual meeting of the Organization of Arab Students in the US at Harvard University on 29 Aug. The text of his speech, which *The Washington Post* described on 5 Sept as "treading hard on the borderline of diplomatic language," was later distributed by the UAR embassy.

Kāmil said that the candidates' speeches to the ZOA Convention (see above) proved "the urgent need to take the Arab-Israeli conflict out of the American election campaign." He described these speeches as "auctioneering" for the vote of a "fanatic self-centred minority" of "intriguing Zionist groups," and stigmatized them as "unwarranted, aggravating, provocative and unfair." He declared that the speeches could cause irreparable damage to Arab-US relations.

"The Arabs have not given up yet their faith in the integrity, courage and wisdom of the American people," Kāmil said. "Nevertheless, the Arabs' patience and tolerance of Zionist plots and games in the US are nearing exhaustion." The Arabs were not helpless, he continued, and, when pushed far enough, would show they held strong cards.

The association between Zionist groups and Israel, which "permits Israel to direct the Zionist groups to bargain with the Jewish vote," was "unprecedented, unparalleled and hardly permissible." "A great part of the public media of communications" was "controlled by the Zionist minority" in the US. He concluded by appealing to his student audience to "spread the truth" among the Americans and to tell them "that the legitimate interests of the US in the ME are in the lands of the Arabs." (*Washington Post*, 5 Sept)

The Organization of Arab Students later adopted a resolution deploring the injection of the Israel-Arab conflict into US politics. (*Hayat*, 6 Sept)

**Sept: Demands to Declare Kāmil Persona Non Grata.** A Republican Representative, Seymour Halpern of New York, referring to the above speech, asked the Secretary of State to look into the UAR Ambassador's conduct and to determine whether it did not constitute interference in the internal affairs of the US and whether he should not be proclaimed *persona non grata*. He also demanded that the State Department should investigate whether the Arab students did not abuse their privileges by following the Ambassador's advice, and accused the latter of inciting against an American minority. (*Davar*, 14 Sept)

**State Department Demands Explanations.** Replying to Halpern's communication, the State Department announced that it had demanded an explanation from the

UAR Ambassador regarding certain passages in his speech of 29 Aug. (*Ha'aretz*, 30 Sept)

In a statement addressed to the US War Veterans, the State Department declared that it was concerned about the UAR Ambassador's interference in the election and had brought its anxiety to Kāmil's notice. (*Ha'aretz*, 23 Oct)

#### OCT-NOV: ISRAELI PRESS QUOTES USED IN CAMPAIGN

A stir was caused by two attempts by Republican campaign workers to use the Israel Press to prove that Israel preferred Nixon, and that Jewish voters should therefore vote Republican.

**Oct: Yediot Aharonot Editorial Used for Nixon.** In the first instance, an editorial in the evening paper *Yediot Aharonot* of 12 Aug was used. This said that Kennedy was likely to follow a policy of appeasement towards the Arabs and that Nixon's election "would therefore mean an important security guarantee for Israel."

The Republican campaign HQ issued a statement on 10 Oct saying that this editorial pointed to the fact that there were 2,000,000 Jewish votes in the US and that, for the sake of Israel, they should be cast for Nixon.

On 13 Oct, a group of Jewish leaders protested against the Republican release, saying that "Americans of the Jewish faith vote their individual conscience." (*NYT*, 14 Oct)

The following day, Nixon's Press secretary disavowed the release and stated that it had been issued without his own or Vice-President Nixon's knowledge. He added that Nixon had consistently denied the existence of blocs of voters on the basis of nationalities or special group interests. Nixon "strongly opposes any effort . . . to appeal to any group on a bloc basis." (*NYT*, 15 Oct)

The second instance occurred very shortly before the elections, at a Press conference on 5 Nov in New York, when two Jewish Republican leaders were defending Senator Lodge against Democratic charges of being pro-Nasser and anti-Israel. A leaflet was handed out containing in addition to the quotation from *Yediot Aharonot* already mentioned, three passages from the Israeli Press quoted out of context to prove that Israel public opinion was vehemently opposed to Kennedy.

They were taken from *Ha'aretz*, 5 Feb; *Herut* 9 Sept; and *The Jerusalem Post*, 15 Sept. (*Ha'aretz*, 6 Nov; *Jer. Post*, 7 Nov)

#### SEPT-NOV: THE ISRAELI PRESS ON THE ELECTIONS

Israel Press opinion as a whole showed no preference for either candidate.

"Peace too Serious for Mere Election Talk." *Davar* appealed to both parties not to talk about peace in the ME as an election matter only, but to regard the question with the seriousness due to it. (*Davar*, 6 Sept)

Commenting on the use made of the *Yediot Aharonot* article (see above), the same paper said that the Israeli public received the pledges of both candidates with equal confidence, accompanied by that amount of doubt with which it is customary to regard election promises. US friendship for Israel did not depend on the outcome of the elections. (*Davar*, 16 Oct)

"A Major Disservice." *The Jerusalem Post*, referring to the same incident, described appeals by Israeli papers to US Jews to vote one way or another as "a major



disservice" to Israel. For Israelis to agitate on one side of the campaign would be an offence under US law, as well as being nonsensical and ineffective. (*Jer. Post*, 17 Oct)

"Nothing to Choose Between Parties." On the eve of the election, *Herut* wrote: "We do not favour either side... Experience has taught us that we have many friends in both parties." (*Herut*, 8 Nov)

*Lamerhav*, summing up the campaign, said it had shown once more that there were no major differences between the parties: both were guided by capital, oil, trade and the stock exchange. (*Lamerhav*, 8 Nov)

**After the Elections.** Following election day, the Press was congratulatory as well as cautious. *The Jerusalem Post* wrote: "At the time of a major crisis... the Democratic approach is perhaps more likely to produce understanding of our point of view... At the same time, the inherent plight of Egypt, as well as of the other Arab countries, is more likely to appeal to the Democrats and there is no knowing to what use at least Abdel-Nasser might put increased aid." (*Jer. Post*, 10 Nov)

*Ha'aretz* believed that the widespread friendship for Israel was a factor which any President would want to take into consideration. (*Ha'aretz*, 9 Nov)

*Haboker* felt that without great efforts on the part of Israel to prove the justice of her cause, the election promises would not mean much. "The day after the Presidential campaign is over, Israel's campaign begins." (*Haboker*, 9 Nov)

#### NOV: ARAB REACTIONS AFTER THE ELECTIONS

**UAR Comment.** UAR comment generally expressed anxiety lest the US should take steps for a Palestine settlement, and conveyed a warning to it not to do so:

"Should Kennedy try, under pressure from his Jewish voters, to implement his promises concerning the passage of Israel ships through the Suez Canal and the imposition of a peace settlement—this will lead to new troubles in the ME, since there is no doubt that Kennedy will encounter opposition... Should mounting pressure be exerted by the Democrats out of ignorance of the changes which have occurred in the ME, the resulting clash may increase tension and lead to the brink of the abyss." (*R. Cairo*, 11 Nov—*IMH*, 21 Nov)

Muhammad Hasanain Haykal, the Editor of *al-Ahrām*, wrote: "If what I heard and saw (in the US) was the only indication of the future, I should say that Kennedy's election is a grave danger for us." All Kennedy had to say about Israel was "utterly opposed to our own attitude." But, Haykal went on, Kennedy the President would be different from Kennedy the candidate. A candidate was free to say what he thinks will help him. Having been elected, he must act responsibly, without considering what he said before the elections. (*Ahrām*, 11 Nov)

Kennedy's election victory was attributed by the UAR Press not to any preference for the Democrats but to the public's reaction to the Republicans' many mistakes—both in the conduct of the Cold War and in their ME policy. Kennedy was enjoined to learn from these mistakes: "If the US supported those striving for independence and stopped supporting Israel..., it would recover its prestige not only in the ME but in the world at large. The US must learn that the new nations need friends, not custodians." (*Akhbar*, 12 Nov)

If Kennedy wanted Arab friendship and he wished to raise American prestige, he must learn to understand Arab views on imperialism, on foreign bases, on Israel and on Afro-Asian solidarity. (*R. Cairo*, 13 Nov—*IMB*, 14 Nov)

**Iraq: Little Hope for Improvement.** Radio Baghdad devoted only one talk to the election results. Reviewing the mistakes of the Republican administration and its "hostility to the Arabs" and referring to the election promises made to Israel, the commentator saw little hope for a change for the better. However, he concluded with a favourable reference to Kennedy's statements on Africa, which, he said, gave hope for a revised US attitude towards that continent. (*R. Baghdad*, 11 Nov—*IMB*, 13 Nov)

**Jordan: "A Danger to Palestine."** The Jordan Press treated the election entirely from the point of view of the "Palestine problem." Some papers followed a line similar to that of the UAR:

"Neither Kennedy nor any other President of the US can trade away the downtrodden rights of Palestine in order to satisfy the Jews of America. Should he do so, our anger against the US... will rise and make us lose our confidence in the deeds and words of its leaders." (*Jihad*, 10 Nov; *IMH*, 21 Nov)

A different note was sounded in the following comment: "We must free ourselves from the Jewish vote complex... and prove to Kennedy that we do not hold the election campaign against him. We must ask him to turn over a new page... and to work out a new attitude towards the problems outstanding between us and the US." (*IMH*, 21 Nov, source not specified)

**Lebanon: Wide Gamut of Opinions.** Pro-UAR Lebanese papers mostly took a sombre view and expressed anxiety about the future policy of the US. The tone of the independent papers leaning to the West (such as *al-Jarīdah* and *al-Hayāt*) was generally slightly more optimistic. (See *IMH*, 28 Nov)

**Iranian Opinion.** *Kayhan*, on the other hand, said that the Republicans would have been more likely to support dictatorial regimes in a number of countries. (*Kayhan*, 8 Nov)



PART TWO

RELATIONS BETWEEN  
THE COUNTRIES OF  
THE MIDDLE EAST

# INTER-ARAB RELATIONS

## SYNOPSIS: MAJOR DEVELOPMENTS

In 1960 as in previous years, relations among the Arab states were dominated by the conflict in which the UAR government was arraigned against each of the governments of Iraq, Jordan and Tunisia.

The UAR continued, in words and deeds, to claim the exclusive leadership of a united Arab world, in the name of Arab nationalism as personified by itself. The policy of each of the other Arab countries was based on the following principles: that an Arab political union was not possible at present; that the independence of each Arab country should be respected and interference in its affairs avoided; that all Arab states, large or small, are equal in rights; that the Arabs should cooperate, in the framework of the League, in matters of common agreement; and that the only way to achieve Arab unity was to base it on these premises.

It was this near-unanimity which helped to preserve the status quo, despite the UAR's attempts to change it. At no time during the year, however, was an anti-UAR coalition actually formed.

The situation at the beginning of the year was as follows:

The UAR was engaged in open conflict with Iraq and Tunisia; there was intensive propaganda warfare between the UAR and Iraq; all relations between the UAR and Tunisia had been cut in 1958. Between the UAR and Jordan a truce had come into being in 1959, but the two countries remained mutually suspicious. All relations between Iraq and Jordan had been cut off in 1958, after the Iraqi revolution, and there was no contact whatsoever. All other Arab countries kept on the sidelines.

The following major changes occurred during the year:

In Mar, open conflict broke out anew between the UAR and Jordan.

Meanwhile, starting in Apr, relations between the UAR and Iraq began to improve and the propaganda warfare ceased. However, relations remained cool; full diplomatic relations were not established, nor were they expected in the near future.

Following this development, the full force of the UAR's efforts was concentrated on Jordan, where it seemed the UAR was determined to effect a break-through in the inter-Arab situation. The UAR tried to overthrow King Hussein's regime and reportedly took part in the organization of assassination plots, to one of which Premier al-Majāli fell victim. After Majāli's murder, Jordan took the offensive, concentrated forces on the Syrian border and reportedly organized sabotage in Syria. Sabotage also continued in Jordan, especially towards the end of the year.

Jordan, however, succeeded in improving her own position vis-à-vis the UAR. Although King Hussein's regime could not be called stable, he succeeded in keeping order in his Kingdom (at no time during the year was there a chance of a popular uprising). He also brought about a *rapprochement* with Iraq, which relieved him of the need to wage a two-front struggle.

This development, which also improved Iraq's position,

paved the way for a more effective cooperation between the other Arab countries in the face of the UAR's aspirations. An important part in this realignment was played by the North African countries. Morocco and Tunisia had entered the Arab League in 1958. Morocco now displayed interest in a revival of Arab cooperation in the League. Morocco, Tunisia and the Algerian Provisional Government endeavoured to develop cordial relations with all the Arab countries of the ME, except in the case of Tunisian relations with the UAR. They treated all Arab countries as equals, thereby ignoring the UAR claim for leadership. The very fact that they cooperated with Iraq or Jordan, though not especially important in itself, improved the position of these countries vis-à-vis the UAR.

Thus, by the end of the year the UAR found itself isolated in so far as its special brand of Arab nationalism was concerned, while her adversaries had succeeded in escaping from their former isolation. However, the other Arab countries had no wish to isolate the UAR, but only to have her cooperate with them as equals.

The major issues which arose in the inter-Arab struggle for power were mostly connected with Israel and the Palestine issue. Both the UAR and Iraq advocated, in different terms, the setting up of a representative organization of the Palestinian Arabs and a Palestinian army. They clashed with each other over the issue, and both with Jordan, which feared that these proposals were meant by them and especially by the UAR, to lead to the dismemberment of the Kingdom. Nothing came of the plans on the inter-Arab level.

Twice during the year the UAR tried to rally the Arab countries to her side on issues relating both to the West and to Israel. She was unsuccessful in this attempt when she severed relations with Iran over the issue of the recognition of Israel, sharply attacking Western imperialism, and tried in vain to induce the other Arab countries to follow her example (see p 218 ff). The UAR was more successful in achieving solidarity in the case of the Arab counterboycott against American shipping, following the picketing of the UAR freighter *Cleopatra* in New York harbour (in protest against the UAR black-listing of American ships trading with Israel). The boycott, however, did not have to be put to a practical test. Another major issue was the Israeli project to divert part of the Jordan waters. The Arabs were unanimous in their wish to prevent Israel from completing the project, but the UAR, Jordan and Lebanon, the countries concerned, could not agree on any coordinated plan (see p 204 ff).

The general attitude of the Arab countries towards the world blocs also served as an issue of conflict. In her propaganda campaigns, the UAR accused Jordan, Tunisia and Iraq of subservience to Western imperialism; she also suspected the West, especially Great Britain, of cooperating with these countries (and, during a certain period, also with Morocco) to form an anti-UAR coalition. Jordan and Tunisia, on the other hand, sided

openly with the West, and Jordan accused Qassim and Abdel-Nasser of serving as pacemakers for Communism.

The Arab League Council served mainly as an arena where the various warring factions debated these and other issues (except for the last one), while others tried to mediate. Resolutions were always adopted unanimously, but problems were postponed rather than solved. Not only was there a failure of agreement on questions relating to Israel and Palestine, but no consensus was reached either on major proposals regarding Algeria, or on the amendment of the League Charter, which was advocated by some states in order to end UAR domination, and/or to strengthen the authority of the League.

The picture presented by the economic, cultural, technical and other inter-Arab forums was not much different.

Here political issues were relegated to the background; but of the many hundreds of resolutions taken in numerous conferences only one important decision was put into execution: the renewal of transit between the UAR and Iraq and between Iraq and Jordan, brought about as a result of improved relations among these countries. The test for putting into practice the major inter-Arab economic projects was postponed to 1961.

Although by the end of 1960 the underlying causes of conflict in the Arab world had not been removed and major problems were still unsolved, an improvement in the general inter-Arab atmosphere was apparent. This was brought about by the realignment of the majority of the Arab countries in favour of the status quo as discussed above.

## UAR—VIEWS AND POLICIES ON INTER-ARAB RELATIONS

### SYNOPSIS

The following are the principal points made by President Abdel-Nasser regarding Arab unity and inter-Arab relations: The Arabs constitute one people, one nation, based on a common language and a common history. Arab nationalism itself is not a new phenomenon; it is deeply rooted in history. As early as the period of the Crusades the "Arab Religion" linked Muslims and Christians (this point was made in Syria). Arab nationalism finds its fulfilment in Arab union. The natural state of the Arab people is therefore complete union. Union, or, at least, complete unity is also vital because the Arabs are completely interdependent. A weakness at any one point affects the whole Arab nation, while unity and union are the way to power. (NOTE: Abdel-Nasser uses almost exclusively the term *wahdah* which denotes both unity and union.)

Arab nationalism is represented by the UAR, in fact the two, in Abdel-Nasser's view, are synonymous, by virtue of the Egyptian-Syrian merger, which embodies the true aspirations of the Arabs. The UAR is carrying out a threefold revolution: political (to rid the Arab nation of imperialism), social and Arab. The success of each of these depends on the success of the others. (For further development of this theme see pp 469-70). In pursuance of the Arab Revolution, the UAR has undertaken to achieve a complete Arab unity. Anyone opposing the UAR opposes the only legitimate Arab nationalism—and must be dealt with accordingly.

Two different approaches towards the realization of unity were discernible throughout the year. On the one hand, it was said that union must come about by the free will of the people, not by force or coups d'état. At the same time it was emphasized that unity among the Arab people everywhere already exists; the road to union is blocked only by their false leaders, stooges of imperialism, as well as the external enemies of Arab nationalism: Western imperialism, Zionism and Communism. These false leaders seek to hide behind a display of false solidarity in the Arab League, but the UAR will have no part in a solidarity of traitors. Its task is to tell the people the truth, so that they may rid themselves of traitors, as they did in the case of Abdullah, Abdul-Illāh, Nūri as-Sa'īd and others.

### ARAB UNITY A FACT AND A NECESSITY

Basis of the Arab Nation. Abdel-Nasser at the UN General Assembly, New York, 27 Sept: "We here declare

that we believe in one Arab nation. The Arab nation has always had one language. The unity of language is the unity of thought. The Arab nation has always had one common history and common history means unity of conscience. We cannot see a more solid and firmer national foundation than this..." (*Eg. Gaz.*, 28 Sept)

Arab Nationalism Rooted in History. Abdel-Nasser, Aleppo, 15 Oct: "We were not deceived by the sectarian dissensions which the Crusaders tried to sow amongst us. The Arab religion linked us all (*ad-diyānah al-Arabiyyah*). The Christian is an Arab and so is the Muslim..."

"Today, brethren, when we appeal for Arab Nationalism (*al-qawmiyyah al-Arabiyyah*), we do not appeal for a new ideology and when we appeal for an Arab unity (union—*al-wahdah al-Arabiyyah*), we do not appeal for something new, we appeal for the call of our fathers and grandfathers who shed their blood for it..." (*Ahram*; *Eg. Gaz.*, 16 Oct)

Regional Differences Non-existent. Kamāl Rif'at, Minister of State, Dec: "To suggest that certain parts of the Arab world have their distinguishing territorial features is dangerous and wrong and an attempt to create suspicion about our national solidarity which has its long-standing background..." (*Eg. Gaz.*, 12 Dec)

Interdependence of the Arabs. Abdel-Nasser, 7 May: "We should feel what our forefathers felt a long time ago—the fate of the Arab nation is similar... Victory of the Arab people anywhere is considered a victory for Arab people everywhere... Any occupation, foreign domination or influence existing in any Arab country, is considered as paving the way for the domination of the remaining part of the Arab nation. The battle of the Arab nation is an old and joint one. It has always been so in the past, and is so at present and in the future..." (*Eg. Gaz.*, 8 May)

Unity Source of Independence and Power. Abdel-Nasser, 14 Feb: "Arab unity (*wahdah*) will mean the end of foreign occupation, zones of influence, domination and usurping of Arab rights... Arab unity constitutes a constant source of anxiety and agony to the enemies of the Arab nation." (*Ahram*; *Eg. Gaz.*, 15 Feb)

Abdel-Nasser, 16 Oct: "Independence represents the road to unity (*wahdah*), and unity leads to power and life..." (*Ahram*; *Eg. Gaz.*, 17 Oct)

### THE ROLE OF THE UAR

**The UAR—Embodiment of Arab Nationalism.** Abdel-Nasser in an interview with a foreign correspondent, 8 Feb: "The UAR is the first achievement of Arab nationalism. It is also the powerful fortress of Arab nationalism..." (*Eg. Gaz.*, 15 Feb)

Abdel-Nasser, in an address to Indian Parliament, New Delhi, 31 Mar: "The merger of Egypt and Syria is representative of the aspirations of the Arab peoples..." (*Eg. Gaz.*, 1 Apr)

**Impact of Merger of Egypt and Syria.** Abdel-Nasser, 21 July: "The birth of the UAR was the moment of explosion of Arab potentialities which was felt with the force of an atom bomb... The very seats of certain thrones were shaken and crowns removed, frontiers disappeared and others came into existence, some peoples were shaken as by earthquakes and others engaged in open revolt, bringing about a change in things and men and indeed in nature itself.

"Nūri as-Sa'īd disappeared forever... the American Sixth Fleet left our coasts after a futile essay at Beirut... Arab reactionary elements were taken unawares, hoping against hope they might be by-passed by the tidal wave of history.

"Israel is no longer able to manoeuvre, for it is not faced with two divided fronts where it can make its choice of attack...

"Menderes eventually vanished... into the seclusion to which he was preceded by Anthony Eden and Guy Mollet...

"The fast-moving events will continue to develop until they sweep away the remnants of the age of imperialism—the remnants of the Baghdad Pact, Zionist aggression and the reactionaries...

"Meanwhile, this energy started, with the same efficiency and capacity, to construct dams across rivers for great irrigation and electrical projects, to establish factories, schools and hospitals, and free the Arab citizen from any kind of economic and political exploitation." (*Eg. Gaz.*, 22 July)

**UAR Represents Arab People.** Introduction to the Resolution of First National Congress of National Union, Cairo, 16 July: "We, members of the first NU Congress of the UAR, expressing the aspirations of the Arab people which we are honoured to represent..." (*Eg. Gaz.*, 17 July)

**Arab Solidarity Means Following the UAR.** Abdel-Nasser in interview with American correspondents, Cairo, 25 Apr:

"A. What we want from the Government of Jordan is for it to work for Arab solidarity and not to work against it. So long as the Government of Jordan works against the UAR it is difficult to have good relations...

"Q.: Does this apply to Iraq?

"A.: Yes.

"Q.: Don't you feel some encouragement now that Major General Qassim has refused to recognize a Communist party?...

"... This is not at all the principal problem. The principal problem to us is the policy of the Iraqi Government towards Arab solidarity and its attitude towards the Arab causes. This, in the first degree, defines our attitude towards any government in any of the Arab countries." (*Eg. Gaz.*, 26 Apr)

**The UAR will Liberate and Unite the Whole Arab World.** Abdel-Nasser, Hama, 20 Feb: "You will liberate the

entire Arab nation, and will win back the usurped parts of the Arab world..." (*Eg. Gaz.*, *Ahram*, 21 Feb)

Abdel-Nasser, 14 Feb: "We shall endeavour to realize complete Arab unity (*al-wahdah al-Arabiyyah al-kāmilan*)—whether in the forms of merger (*wahdah*), federation (*ittihād*) or simple solidarity (*tadāmun*)." (*Ahram*; *Eg. Gaz.*, 15 Feb)

### ROADS TO UNITY AND UNION

**Free Choice and National Solidarity—Requirements for Union.** From resolutions of First National Congress of the National Union, Cairo, 16 July: "In reaffirming the call for Arab national unity, the Congress hereby announces the following principles for the realization of that unity:

"(a) That free and independent choice shall be the means of each member of the Arab nation for unity (*wahdah*).

"(b) That an Arab state must have national solidarity (*wahdatahu al-wataniyyah*) within its own frontiers before entering into association beyond those frontiers.

"(c) That the Arab people is unanimously agreed on unity (*wahdah*) and perfectly sure of its need for it." (*Eg. Gaz.*, *Ahram*, 17 July)

**Arab Union Not To Be Forced.** Abdel-Nasser in interview with Woodrow Wyatt, broadcast by British television, 2 Sept: "We cannot force Arab unity. We can under no circumstances accept Arab unity as a result of coups d'état, because it will weaken us and it will not result in unity but rather in disunity... We are for the unity of the Arab people, but the Arab people have to decide, nobody can fix a date for that."

"Q.: Do you feel this will be in ten years—twenty years—fifty years?

"A.: It is for the people to decide." (*Eg. Gaz.*, 4 Sept)

**Arab Union by Destruction of Artificial Borders.** Abdel-Nasser speaking of the Three Revolutions, the National, the Arab and the Social (see also pp 469–70). Cairo, 9 July: "The second, the Arab revolution... urges its nationals to pass the artificial barriers and knock down the hurdles that represent false frontiers invented by intruders who spread dissension and suspicion." (*Eg. Gaz.*, 10 July)

**Arab Union Dependent on Social and Anti-Imperialist Revolution.** Abdel-Nasser, 17 Oct: "We shall continue our Arab revolution with great strength. You know that the Arab revolution is the outcome of our political and social revolutions. Imperialism and the imperialist influence in any Arab country would impede the social and Arab revolutions..." (*Eg. Gaz.*, 18 Oct)

**True Arab Unity Not To Be Achieved By Solidarity With Arab "Supporters of Imperialism."** Abdel-Nasser, 18 Oct: "There is no solidarity with the enemies of the Arab nation; there will be no solidarity in serving imperialist aims; there is no solidarity with imperialist enemies. There is always a revolution against imperialism and supporters of it..." (*Eg. Gaz.*, 19 Oct)

Abdel-Nasser, 16 Oct: "We, brethren, do not incite anyone to kill or get rid of any person. But we cannot shut our eyes to the attempts to betray the Arab nation... Silence would mean treason against the Arab cause." (*Eg. Gaz.*, 17 Oct)

**Enemies of Arab Nationalism.** Abdel-Nasser, 7 Mar: "The forces hostile to Arab nationalism and to the UAR got to work in Iraq. The Anglo-Communist forces, British



and Communist agents, set out to wipe out Arab nationalism in Iraq..." (*Ahram*, 8 Mar; *BBC*, 9 Mar)

Abdel-Nasser, 1 Mar: "Zionism, imperialism and the Arab's enemies used dissension and hatred to divide the Arab ranks..." (*Ahram*, 2 Mar; *BBC*, 3 Mar)

### THE PEOPLE VERSUS THE RULERS

Unity Between the Arab Peoples a Fact. Abdel-Nasser, 2 Sept: "There is Arab unity between the Arab people. If you see the people in Iraq, in the UAR, in the Lebanon, you will find there is unity between the Arab people..." (*Eg. Gaz.*, 4 Sept)

Abdel-Nasser, 8 Feb: "I cannot imagine that there are any disputes between the Arab people in Iraq and the Arab people in the UAR. The disputes arose as a result of anti-UAR and anti-Arab solidarity acts by the Iraqi Government..." (*Eg. Gaz.*; *Ahram*, 9 Feb)

"Arab Leaders" an Obstacle to Unity. Abdel-Nasser, 18 Oct: "At the end of every meeting of the Arab League in the past a statement was issued stating that 'Arab leaders' had agreed on the interests of the Arab nation. But actually... Arab leaders had never come to an agreement because personal ambitions had stood in the way of reaching an agreement, and because the principles advocated by 'Arab leaders' were totally different to those advocated by the people..." (*continued*).

The People Must be Told the Truth About the Leaders in Order to Achieve Their Aims Themselves. "Having pledged ourselves that this rule should be of the people and for the people, we cannot deceive the people... We cannot tell them we have agreed while we, in

fact, did not agree. For if we tell them that we have agreed this would mean that we drug them and prevent them from taking the path leading to the realization of their objectives. If rulers delay or refrain in achieving the people's aims it should be the duty of the people themselves to achieve their aims..." (*continued*).

Destruction of Imperialism and Imperialist Stooges the Road Towards Unity. "When you, here in Syria, rid yourselves of imperialism and we rid ourselves of imperialism in Egypt, our power was released from its prison..."

"It was a natural historical development. In the first place, the people had to destroy the elements of weakness, dissension, imperialism and its stooges..."

"Destruction of imperialist stooges is the first step towards ridding one's self of the influence of imperialism... This is the road towards protection of Arab nationalism and the goals of Arab nationalism..." (*Eg. Gaz.*, 19 Oct)

Abdel-Nasser, 24 June: "Imperialist agents and stooges may be able to survive for some time, but there is no escape from facing the inevitable doom of Nūri as-Sa'īd and Abdul-Ilāh..." (*Eg. Mail*, 25 June)

The Meaning of Abdel-Nasser's Call for Arab Unity. "Some people might allege that Gamal Abdel-Nasser's call for unity will weaken Arab solidarity. Our answer to that is that when we call for Arab unity and Arab solidarity we mean the unity of free men with free men, and the solidarity of free men and free men. We do not mean unity or solidarity with imperialist stooges. We do not call for unity or solidarity in the service of imperialism." (*Eg. Gaz.*, 19 Oct)

## IRAQ—VIEWS AND POLICIES ON INTER-ARAB RELATIONS

### SYNOPSIS

The starting point of General Qassim's approach to the question of Arab unity is the consolidation and preservation of the national unity of the people of Iraq: the unity of the Arabs—the majority—with the Kurds and other minorities in the geographical and political framework of the Iraqi Republic. This is not a transitory regional union, to be finally merged into an all-Arab union, but it is there to stay, it is "eternal." This Iraqi entity forms part of the Arab nation; the exact way in which this comes about is not made clear, it is presented as a fact. Qassim uses terms such as People, Nationality, Nation and Homeland indiscriminately, although the term "Nation" (*ummah*) seems to be reserved mainly for the Arabs. As Iraq constitutes a separate entity, it follows that each of the other Arab countries, even Syria or "Falastin," is an "immortal Republic" as well. Even after relations with the UAR improved, Qassim, when speaking of the UAR, added: "which includes Egypt and Syria."

The relations between these separate entities in the framework of the Arab Nation are basically those of brothers with equal rights. They are independent and should cooperate and support each other, but they must not interfere in each other's affairs; their independence and separate identity must be respected. Moreover, because they constitute separate entities they must help themselves before they can be helped by others. Each

people must liberate itself. This principle may be regarded as strengthening the principle of non-interference.

Interference in the affairs of other Arab states is the policy of ambitious, covetous dictators, preaching extreme, Nazilike nationalism. They will meet their fate like Hitler.

Inter-Arab cooperation, says Hāshim Jawād, should be concentrated on areas of common agreement, such as aid in the liberation of Palestine, Algeria, Oman, etc. In this way the Arabs will be able to preserve unity, and united they will conquer imperialism.

It is "unity" which is required of the Arabs at the present time. Qassim does not mention "union" at all, and Jawād, when asked, referred the question of political "union" to future generations.

NOTE: Two minor changes only have been made in the original translation by INA. Where exact terms might be of special interest, an alternative translation and the Arabic terms are given in brackets, according to the text in Iraqi Arabic newspapers.

### THE SEPARATE IRAQI ENTITY AND ITS RELATION TO THE ARAB NATION

The Immortal Iraqi Republic. Qassim, 2 Aug: "What delights me and delights you, sisters and brothers, is the immortal Iraqi Republic, and I will always repeat, the immortal (eternal—*khālid*), and it is immortal. We the sons of the people have built it with our victorious efforts and as a result of our long and bitter struggle. After it

has emanated [emerged] it will be immortal through the immortality of time and the immortality of the blessed... July [revolution]..." (INA, 2 Aug)

**The Homeland—Iraq.** Qassim, 27 May: "Each individual must feel that he is living in the immortal Iraqi Republic... He must not be ungrateful to the homeland (*watan*), its soil and national heritage. He who repudiates his homeland and his people commits a great sin and will be a loser..." (INA, 28 May)

**The Entire Iraqi People Supports its Arab Brothers.** Qassim, 14 July: "The Iraqi people is composed of the Arab nationality (*qawmiyah*), the Kurdish and Turkmani nationalities and the other loving nationalities. The big percentage is that of the Arab people in Iraq, followed by the Kurdish nationality, the nationality of our brothers inside the homeland whom we take pride in, and then come the other percentages..."

"Strength lies in this unity. The whole of us, the triumphant Iraqi people (*sha'ab*), are a strong support to the defence of the interests of the entire Arab nation (*ummah*)..." (INA, 15 July)

Qassim, 5 Feb: "This noble people will always... support its brothers outside the Iraqi Republic and in the Arab fatherland (*watan*)..." (INA, 6 Feb)

**Iraq—True Homeland of Arabism.** Qassim, 14 July: "The homeland of noble ancestry and Arabism is Iraq... The Arabs were found in Iraq thousands of years ago, they were living in Iraq before the magnificent Prophet's birth. The Tai tribes... the Qahtanite and Adnanite tribes, all had their origin in Iraq thousands of years ago... the majority of the Iraqi tribes... immigrated from Yemen after Ma'rab's dam had fallen down... The Prophet's grandfather immigrated from Iraq. Thus the homeland of Arabism is in Iraq. Tigris and Euphrates are in an Arab land. We do not like anybody to claim Arab nationalism with fake claims, singing its praises for the purpose of demolishing the liberal Iraqi entity..." (INA, 15 July)

**"The Three Principles."** [During the year General Qassim reiterated many times "the three principles" as the essence of the Iraqi revolution.]

Qassim, 21 Apr: "O Sisters, O Brothers, I ask you to bear in mind these three principles (*mabadi*) and work according to them... These principles are: Long live the Immortal Iraqi Republic... Long live genuine Iraqi unity... Long live the glorious Arab nation (*ummah*)."

#### INTER-ARAB RELATIONS

**Every Arab Country an Immortal Republic.** Qassim, 7 Jan: "I made an appeal... to establish the immortal Palestine Republic... We are brothers... to the Republic of Syria..." (Iraq Times, 10 Jan)

**Guiding Principles: Brotherhood, Equality, Non-interference, Cooperation and Mutual Support.** Qassim: In an interview published by *al-Ayyām*, Sudan: "Relations among the Arab countries do not go beyond the relations among brothers in one family. These brothers include the elder and the younger but they are all equal in rights and duties. Their relations are established on this basis, the basis of brotherhood, cooperation, tolerance and respect, and not on disunity, treachery, attack, interference and intrigue..." (INA, 9 Apr)

Qassim, 14 July: "We do not discriminate among the Arab states, we do not discriminate between the grand

and the minor, they all are our brothers... Jordan,... Libya, Sudan, Palestine, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, and the United Arab Republic (which includes) Syria and Egypt and the other parts of the Arab Nation are all brothers; and we are their brothers and their supporters..." (INA, 15 July)

Qassim, 15 Aug: "We, the Arab countries, must understand the problems and circumstances of every other Arab country, make things easy for it and not interfere in its affairs..." (INA, 15 Aug)

**Arab Solidarity Through Serious Work.** Qassim, 3 Aug: "The Leader touched on Arab solidarity which he said would not be achieved by random talk but by serious realistic work. The work, he added, is in building welfare projects, raising the level of the people and by taking pride in our strength and our victorious army..." (INA, 3 Aug)

**Against Hitlerist Nationalism and Inter-Arab Aggression.** [This theme in General Qassim's speeches is usually directed at the UAR and its President. These are never mentioned by name in this connection, but called: "the covetous" (*at-tami'un*) or just "those."]

Qassim, 14 July: "I advise those not to be extreme, for other despotic dictators had preceded them in preaching extreme German nationalism in the time of Hitler. All of you know the fate of that dictator and the outcome of the extreme nationalism that he preached.

"We do not ask anybody to be extreme to such an extent as to carry out aggression against others. We like for the Arab nationalism, pride and respect from other nations. We do not want anybody to consider it as evil. We desire for Arab nationalism all goodness. Iraq is working for this end and in this way. Hitler, in the past, preached the sublimity (supremacy—*sumuwwu*) of Germanic nationalism to other people and destroyed many other nations for the sake of extremity (extremism—*tataruff*), but ruined the German people and they are still tormented..." (INA, 15 July)

Qassim in an interview published by *al-Ayyām*, Sudan: "If the proverb 'On the oppressor will the wheels turn' is true, then the Arab country that commits aggression on her sister country should know what fate awaits her..." (INA, 3 Apr)

#### HASHIM JAWAD'S SPEECH AT SHTURA CONFERENCE

[During the year, the most complete Iraqi statement on inter-Arab relations was given by the Iraqi Foreign Minister. Hashim Jawād, at the Arab Foreign Ministers' Conference at Shtura, Lebanon, in Aug. Excerpts are given below, under headings, in their original order.]

**Interdependence and Differences Between Arab Countries.** "The future of every Arab country is firmly connected with the future of her other sister countries..."

"We sincerely believe that what every Arab country has achieved or will achieve of freedom and advancement are but basic gains for the other Arab countries... Iraq's revolution cannot be considered but a link in the chain of the upsurges of the Arab people to be followed by other upsurges in the remaining parts of the Arab homeland still suffering under foreign domination..."

"The liberation movements in any Arab country have political, economic and social indications [implications] that do not cease at its frontiers but go beyond that, in the first place, to the other Arab countries, and are connected with the liberation movements of the peoples in general..."

"Any aggression against the Iraqi Republic and any interference in its domestic affairs or an attempt to hinder its progress or completing its freedom is but an aggression against the entire Arab Nation and a hindrance to its endeavours, whatever the source of this aggression. The same also applies to any other Arab country.

"We deem ourselves obliged here to be aware of a clear and lucid fact, namely that the difference in the circumstances of Arab countries and the various factors of their development during the long period they passed through have necessitated that there should be a little disparity in the direction and guidance in the march of the Arabs' struggle to attain their objectives. This disparity, however, is ostensible in its reality and does not constitute an obstacle preventing the march of the Arab Nation towards achieving those common goals..."

**Every Arab Country an Independent Political Entity.** "There are, however, two basic matters which must be recognized and considered as essential in the field of Arab relations. The first one is that every Arab country has its independent political entity which all must recognize..."

**Cooperation through Concentration on Common Interests.** "The second one is that the path of common questions among these Arab countries is what should be concentrated upon, and [the Arab should] endeavour to expand it [the area of agreement] with constructive positive work and in as much as is allowed by the circumstances of each of these countries, and in an atmosphere removed from pressure and threats... The Arab solidarity sought by this nation is in our opinion a belief and a feeling of the oneness of destiny..."

**Main Aim—National Liberation.** "At the top of our common aims is the cause of the Arab countries still deprived of freedom and independence, foremost of which is the battle of Arabs for the sake of liberating Palestine, Algeria, the Trucial Coast, Oman, Hadhramout and the Protectorates..."

**Every People Its Own Liberator—With Arab Help.** "We see it our duty to stress the point of entrusting the question of liberating every one of these countries entirely to its own people, and also to recognize their complete entity (personality—*shakhsyah*) and make the preparation to organize their military forces and support them with money, munitions and joint action in both Arab and international spheres..."

**Arab Unity—Basic Requirement for Arab Success.** "We, gentlemen, believe that the Arabs are capable of fighting imperialism, vanquishing oppression and despotism, redeem the usurped parts of the homeland and liberate what remains of it under imperialism if they would solve their problems in a spirit of cooperation, understanding and toleration and have as their aim the genuine service for the common interests and keep away from what diverts them from the greater goal. Peace be with you..." (INA, 23 Aug)

**Arab Union a Task for Future Generations.** Interview with Jawād by Editor of *al-Jaridah*, Beirut, 19 Aug:

"Q.: Do you agree to form a federation (*ittihād*) with the UAR?"

"A. You jumped into the third story without taking the lift at the ground-story, and you also left behind the two other stories. Let us leave the completion of the union (*wahdah*) to the coming generation because it is premature." (*Jaridah*, 20 Aug)

## JORDAN—VIEWS AND POLICIES ON INTER-ARAB RELATIONS

### SYNOPSIS

For King Hussein, Arab nationalism is based on Islam, and therefore opposed to Communism. Its adherents can side only with other free men who believe in God, i.e. with the West. Continuing the valorous tradition of the Hashimite Dynasty in the service of Arabism, Hussein proclaims his determination to work for the fulfilment of the true aspirations of the Arabs. His country stands in the forefront of the Arab struggle, he says, and in its union of the two banks of the Jordan is a model of Arab unity.

Hussein regards the state of the Arab world as deplorable: it is diseased and rent by dissension. Bad leadership makes things worse. In order to change this state of affairs and to face their enemies, especially Zionism and Communism, the Arabs must unite. The Arab League is the forum where united action can and should be achieved. However, Arab unity is obstructed by Abdel-Nasser's brand of Arab nationalism, which splits the Arabs' ranks and renders the Arab League ineffective.

Arab unity means voluntary association and cooperation, which should be fostered, in the general framework of the League, mainly inside the four great Arab national units: the Fertile Crescent, the Arabian Peninsula, the Nile Valley and the Maghrib. Political Union, if desirable at all, should be the last step.

### DEFINITION OF ARAB NATIONALISM

The following are excerpts from an article contributed by King Hussein which appeared in: *Life*, 23 May; *Hayat*, 31 May; *Jihad*, 31 May and 2 June.

**Arab Nationalism Based on Islamic Tradition.** "Arab nationalism was born when the rest of the civilized world was slumbering in the Dark Ages and when Arabism was contributing greatly to mankind's progress... Arab history really began with Islam..."

"The concepts of morality and behaviour of Islam are the principles for which we in the free world stand... It molded different races and civilizations into a progressive and creative movement based on all the good from their pasts as well as from our own. It spurred development of the most advanced civilization of its time... Islam's contributions are enjoyed today. This tradition, rooted in Islam—and not some new political concept—is the foundation of today's Arab nationalism..."

**The Unifying Power of Arab Nationalism.** "Arab nationalism is a potential force for good. It binds Arabs together even when they are split into many factions. It drives them towards a more cohesive Arab world regardless of explosive changes in rulers or regimes..."

**Arab Nationalism Opposed to Communism.** "There is no future for Arabism without the teachings of Islam and without the faith in God which unites us in the free world..."

"Arab Nationalism... can only be the enemy of Communism. Communism denies all faiths and thus the very principles on which Arab nationalism is based. Arab nationalism, given the chance, the respect, the support and the understanding of others in this free world can only side with those who are free and who believe in God..."

"How then can anyone who believes in true Arab nationalism defend a policy of 'positive neutrality' whereby a country pretends to maintain good relations with both the free world and Communism?..."

## PLACE OF HUSSEIN, THE HASHIMITE FAMILY AND JORDAN IN ARAB NATIONALISM

**Hussein Continues Hashimite Tradition of Dedication to Arab Cause.** Hussein, 19 May: "I am proud of my Hashimite heritage, my history and my past. Those who have attacked me have no past to be proud of..." (*Jer. Times*, 20 May)

Hussein, 26 June: "The glorious history of my family, which is the history of the Arabs, and the deeds of my ancestors who rendered great services to the Arab nation, point out for me the path I have, and indeed, must tread—the path that leads to complete fulfilment of the cherished and long sought aspirations of my people and my nation..." (*Jer. Times*, 27 June)

**Jordan—Vanguard of the Arab World.** Hussein, 29 June: "Our country, my brothers, has played the part of the spearhead of the Great Revolt, which came about for the liberation of the entire Arab homeland..." (*Jer. Times*, 30 June)

Hussein in *Life*: "As for the Hashimite Kingdom of Jordan in the Arab world, we are the devoted bearers of the ideals of the Arab Revolt. We believe, and will never cease to believe, in the basic need for Arab freedom, unity, equality strength and progress. Jordan's main strength lies in holding to those ideals bravely..." (*Life*, 23 May)

**The Aims: Jordanian Sovereignty and Arab Unity.** PM at-Talhūni, 9 Sept: "Our aims are straightforward and clearcut. We intend to retain our liberty and sovereignty and to bring about in the Arab world the long sought and cherished ideal of Arab Unity..." (*Jer. Times*, 10 Sept)

**Jordan a Model for the Arab States.** Hussein in *Life*: "Jordan seeks to play only one role, that of a model state. It is our aim to set an example for our Arab brethren, not one that they need follow but one that will inspire them to seek a higher, happier destiny within their own borders. We propose to devote, without ever losing sight of the ultimate goal of a united Arab nation, our full time and energy to the creation of a way of life that we hope in time all Arabs will achieve."

"We will pursue our own policies, in the militant democratic tradition. We will preach among our brethren in the Arab world the spirit of Jordan..." (*Life*, 23 May)

**Jordan—Example of Arab Unity and Union.** Hussein, 16 Mar: "Unity between the two Banks was the most successful of all other unities achieved between any two Arab states. This union has produced the fruits enjoyed

in all walks of life, resulting from the exertion of joint efforts conceived against enemies, dangers and conspiracies..." (*Jer. Times*, 17 Mar)

## STATE OF THE ARAB WORLD

**Disunity and Chaos.** Hussein, 19 Mar: "We find the Arab world swinging from one side to the other. We find nothing but plots, accusations, doubts and suspicions..." (*BBC*, 22 Mar)

Hussein, 1 Mar: "Ambitions, ignorance and egoism still exist in the Arab world..." (*BBC*, 3 Mar)

Hussein, 25 May: "In addition, there are also corruption, mistakes, inaction, ignorance, disease, retrogression, loss of energies and neglect of capacities. These phenomena are regrettably weakening the Arab body in most parts..." (*Jer. Times*, 26 May)

Hussein, 1 Mar: "The lack of sincerity is responsible for the state of disunity and chaos. The absence of joint and collective action has turned many of our military institutions, which were meant to be for vengeance and victory, into political seminaries where the incense of hypocrisy is burned..." (*BBC*, 3 Mar)

**Bad Leadership.** Hussein, 25 May: "On looking around to see what the Arabs have prepared to offset these evils, one does not perceive in some cases but ignorant, adventurous, and opportunist leaderships who are always active but only for the needs of the day, and who are continually offering sacrifices in which they only sacrifice the public interests and Arab capabilities..." (*Jer. Times*, 26 May)

Hussein in *Life*: "The sad fact is that the crisis has not yet produced leaders..." (*Life*, 23 May)

**Lack of Planning.** Hussein in an interview with the *US, News and World Reports* correspondent, Amman, Apr: "We feel that there is a lot of waste of every kind in the Arab world and that, up to now, there hasn't been any really organized planning to meet the dangers that we face—whether they be Communist or Zionist. There has not been any real plan for making the best use of our resources to build up the area properly..." (*US, News and World Reports*, 18 Apr)

**Speeches Instead of Action.** Hussein, 1 Mar: "The thousands of speeches we deliver before each other with a view to obtaining applause and cheers will not alter the reality of the Zionist danger lurking near our homes, or the Communist danger surrounding parts of our dear homeland..." (*BBC*, 3 Mar)

**Disunity—Cause of Weakness.** Hussein in *Life*: "It is our power as Arabs to unite on all important issues, to organize in every respect and to dispel the frictions between us..."

"There was a time when we could unite, in spirit at least, against the imperialist enemy. But we have as yet been unable to unite properly against our two most potent enemies: Communism and Zionism..." (*Life*, 23 May)

## SOLUTIONS AND OBSTACLES

**The Remedy: Arab Unity.** Hussein, 1 Mar: "I am fully convinced that, should Arab efforts be unified with every good will, the Arabs will be able to face all dangers, however colossal they are..." (*BBC*, 3 Mar)

**Complete Equality—not Abdel-Nasser's Brand of Unity.** Hussein in *Life*: "My own concept of Arab nationalism..."



is quite different from... President Nasser's... He believes that political unity and Arab nationalism are synonymous... (and)... that Arab nationalism can only be identified by a particular brand of political unity... I disagree. It can only lead, as it has in the past, to more disunity. The seeking of popular support for one point of view or one form of leadership in countries other than one's own has fostered factionalism to a dangerous degree, splitting countries to the point of revolution... Arab nationalism can survive only through complete equality... (Life, 23 May)

**United Action Required Through Arab League.** Hussein in Life: "In my mind, the problem of the Arab world is to define itself clearly and positively through united actions in the Arab League in a manner that would be respected and adhered to on all issues..."

"Given sincerity and sound leadership the Arab League has great potential. It is the anvil on which Arab nationalism will be forged. But it must weld together its strong links with the past, with Islam, and with the Muslim world. The Arab League has a common tongue, a common cause, a common future and a common challenge of survival. Combining the best of its past and the best it can absorb from modern civilization, it should prosper..." (Life, 23 May)

**Why Arab League Failed.** Hussein, 15 Apr: "Attempts

by ambitious quarters to acquire personal gains through the machinery of the Arab League has weakened the League and its effectiveness and led to the failure of the positive aims and aspirations of the alliance..." (Jerusalem Times, 16 Apr)

**Voluntary, Regional Association Advocated.** Hussein in Life: "Let us debate a practical plan. There are four great natural units in the Arab-speaking world, the Fertile Crescent, the Arabian Peninsula, the Nile Valley, and the Maghrib, including Algeria."

"Let the countries in these natural units associate themselves in whatever way they choose as a step toward the great goal of an Arab nation. Let their association be voluntary, and let it embrace only what the people of each country want it to embrace—whether it be culture, economics or defence. (Life, 23 May)

**"Let Political Alliance, If it is Desirable At All, Be the Last Step.** Let all of this be undertaken through an active, respected Arab League, in which equality and sincerity of joint purpose would be assured and in which danger of domination by any member of the family would be eliminated."

"To such a proposal Jordan pledges the full weight of its power and strength. It would subscribe immediately to any practical step designed to realize it. Our only plea is for well considered action..." (Life, 23 May)

## LEBANON AND SUDAN—VIEWS AND POLICIES ON INTER-ARAB RELATIONS

### LEBANON

**Synopsis.** The point of departure for the official approach to inter-Arab relations is the national unity and independence of Arabic Lebanon. For Lebanon, the Charter of the Arab League is to a large extent an instrument guaranteeing its independence and integrity. Lebanon's role in the Arab world is seen as that of a mediator.

**Lebanese Lebanon.** PM Sa'ib Slām, in Parliament, 8 Aug: "I cannot accept the suggestion that there is anyone in Lebanon who is more Lebanese than I am... I have never had, and will never have, two identities. I am Lebanese inside and outside Lebanon." (Mid. Mirror, 13 Aug)

**Basis of Policy: National Unity and Independence of an Arabic Lebanon.** Government Statement of Policy, 18 Aug: "If it were not for the national unity, and the feeling of every subject—to whichever party he belongs—that Lebanon is his country, we could not have achieved its independence, established its sovereignty and fortified its position. Out of this unity sprang our National Charter, which lays down for us an independent policy, purely Arabic and internationally free..."

"Our ultimate aim... is that Lebanon... should remain an Arabic and consolidated democratic Republic, whose sovereignty springs from national unity." (Nahar, 19 Aug)

**Policy in Arab Affairs: Friendship and Cooperation based on Mutual Benefit.** Government Statement of Policy, 18 Aug: "It is our aim to establish relations of fraternity and pure comradeship with the Arab nations, to take steps towards the protection and development of all Arabs and their unity, to carry the message of peace and friendship between them, to cooperate with them in all fields,

and to work with honesty and zeal for the strengthening of all these relations on the basis of mutual benefit. We shall always work for the strengthening of the Arab League, respect its Charter and cooperate with our Arab brethren in their great causes, particularly that of freedom and independence, most important of which is that of Palestine." (Nahar, 19 Aug)

**Role of Mediator.** Philippe Taqla, Foreign Minister, 23 Sept: "Lebanon's role was and still is, as we understand it, to reduce the differences between the outlooks of the Arab nations." (Hayat, 24 Sept)

**Charter of the Arab League—Guarantee of Lebanon's Independence and Non-Interference in its Internal Affairs.** Sa'ib Slām PM, at UN General Assembly: "The independence and integrity of Lebanon are also guaranteed by both the Charter of the Arab League and the Charter of the United Nations." (UN, A/PV, 885, 4 Oct)

Philippe Taqla, Foreign Minister, commenting in Parliament on the Arab League SG's reference to an Arab Federation, 19 Apr (for particulars see pp 124-5): "The Charter of the Arab League... indicates in its second clause that the purpose of the League is to strengthen the relations between its members and to determine its political steps in mutual cooperation, thus protecting their independence and sovereignty."

"In its 8th clause, however, the League's Charter indicates that every member nation should respect the form of government of the other and that none should take steps to change the form of rule existing in any nation which belongs to the League." (Hayat, 20 Apr)

### SUDAN

**Synopsis.** The President, General Abbud, does not speak at all of Arab nationalism, while Abdullah Khalil, op-

position leader and former PM, says he is "not totally against it." In his rare references to inter-Arab relations Abbud speaks of cooperation and unity between independent Arab nations. (In his joint communiqués with Abdel-Nasser, inter-Arab relations were not mentioned—see pp 155-6.)

**Point of Departure: The Independence of the Sudan.** Abbud, 26 June: "The main objective of the Revolution is to preserve the independence of the country and protect it, whatever may be the cost." (*Sudan Daily*, 27 June)

**Inter-Arab Relations.** Abbud, at Arab League Headquarters, Cairo, 23 July: "We hope (the League) will be of true effectiveness in supporting [the Arab states'] free-

dom and independence and in strengthening national confidence and respect among each other. The Republic of the Sudan is working hard in this organization... to promote cooperation and unity among them." (*Sudan Daily*, 24 July)

General Tal'at Farid, Minister of Information: "The Sudan is undoubtedly much concerned with the crisis prevailing between the two sister countries, the UAR and the Hashimite Kingdom of Jordan. The Sudan, I believe, on the strength of its brotherly relations with the two countries, can undertake an effective role in solving the casual crisis." (*Sudan Daily*, 14 Oct)

**On Arab Nationalism.** Abdullah Khalil in a letter to the Press: "I am not totally against Arab Nationalism but personally, Islamic Union and the unity of the African nations are nearer to my heart." (*Sarahah*, 12 July)

## THE ARAB LEAGUE

(Jāmi'at ad-Duwal al-Arabiyyah)

### BACKGROUND NOTE: MEMBERSHIP AND ORGANIZATION

The Pact of the League of the Arab States (usually referred to as the Arab League) was signed in Cairo on 22 Mar, 1945. The League was defined as a "regional voluntary association of sovereign Arab states" aiming at "strengthening the close ties between the Arab states."

**The Members of The League Are:** Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Tunisia, the UAR and Yemen.

**Organization.** The Council is the supreme body. All member states are represented, each with a single vote. The Presidency rotates among the member states. Sessions take place in Cairo, unless otherwise decided by the member states. The Council meets regularly in Mar and Sept, and in extraordinary session at the request of two members. Unanimous decisions are binding on all member states, majority decisions are binding on those that voted for them. "In either case, the decisions of the Council shall be enforced in each state in accordance with its respective basic laws."

Seven special Committees of the Council: Political, Economic, Communications, Cultural, Legal, Social and Health, "are charged with the task of laying down the principles of agreement prior to their submission to the member states."

The Council appoints the Secretary-General by a two-thirds majority. He heads the Secretariat-General, located in Cairo, and prepares the Budget. The present SG, Abd al-Khāliq Hasūnah, a former Egyptian Minister for Foreign Affairs, was elected on 14 Sept 1952.

Other principal bodies of the League are: The Economic Council and the Joint Defence Council, both set up by the "Joint Defence and Economic Treaty" of 1950; the Refugee Office; the Boycott of Israel Office; the Anti-Narcotic Office; the Institute of Arab Studies; the Institute of Arab Manuscripts; and Information Offices. (*The Arab Information Centre: Basic Documents of the League of Arab States*, New York, 1955)

### GENERAL ACTIVITIES 1960

The Council of the Arab League met five times during the year.

1. The 32nd regular session, part II, took place in Cairo on 8-29 Feb. This was formally a continuation of the 32nd session, which convened in Casablanca in Sept 1959.
2. The 33rd regular session took place in Cairo from 31 Mar to 9 Apr at the level of Ambassadors.
3. An extraordinary meeting was convened on 8 Aug in Cairo on the demand of the UAR, on the issue of Iran's recognition of Israel (see pp 219-20).
4. An extraordinary meeting, in the form of a conference of the Arab Foreign Ministers, met at Shtura, Lebanon, on 22-28 Aug. This conference was proposed at the Feb session, to deal mainly with inter-Arab relations.
5. The 34th regular session took place in Shtura, Lebanon, on 1-7 Sept, at the level of Ambassadors. (For synopsis of the proceedings of the Council, see above: Synopsis—Major Developments.)

**Other Activities.** The Economic Council met twice during the year, in Mar and Dec.

For conferences of various bodies attached to the League and activities of the Secretariat, see text.

### LEAGUE CHARTER REVISION ISSUE

[Not long after the establishment of the League, the first demands were made (mainly by Iraq, Jordan and sometimes Syria) for the revision of the League Charter in a way that would end Egyptian hegemony in the organization.]

**1958-1960: SG's Proposals.** In 1958, the SG presented a set of proposals for the revision of the Charter, which he developed further in Oct 1959 and Aug 1960. They included the following points:

1. The Arab Foreign Ministers' Conference shall be the main and supreme organ of the League and shall meet four times a year.
2. The creation of a League of the Arab People, to include well-known Arab personalities throughout the world. This "Arab popular organization" would assist the League in its activities and would submit practical solutions to disputed problems.
3. The Treaty of Joint Defence and Economic Cooperation should be reinforced.

4. Decisions adopted by simple majority should be binding on all members.
5. Disputes arising between member states should henceforward be referred to the Arab League for arbitration. The decision of the Council should then be obligatory and enforceable.
6. An Arab Court of Justice should be set up to which the League could summon member states which fail to implement its resolutions. (*Ahram*, 28 Aug 1958; *Hayat*, 22 Aug 1960)

**1958: Moroccan Initiative.** On the admission of Morocco and Tunisia, Morocco started to promote the amendment of the Charter. On the re-allocation of members' contributions to the Budget, Morocco suggested "a revisal of its whole concept, so that the recent development in the Arab world, and especially the liberation of North Africa, could be better represented in the League's personnel." (*Hayat*, 24 Oct 1958) (For further Moroccan initiative, see below.)

[The UAR suggested that the new members contribute 8 per cent of the budget, to be reduced proportionally from the contribution of other members. This arrangement would have left the UAR with the financing of over 50 per cent of the budget—and proportionate influence in the Secretariat.]

**1959-1960: Amendment of Charter Advocated—No Action Taken.** In Sept 1959 the League Council decided to refer the issue to a special committee to be convened by the Secretariat. (*Hayat*, 9 Sept 1959) In Dec 1959 Morocco suggested a timetable to be followed in the revision of the Charter, including a special meeting of heads of states in Jan 1960 to take final decisions. The proposal was accepted in principle, but the timetable was rejected. (*Hayat*, 22, 23, Dec 1959) [No measure proposed in the schedule was carried out.]

In Jan, during the Middle East tour of King Muhammad of Morocco, the amendment of the Charter, in order to strengthen the League, was called for in joint communiqués between King Muhammad and King Hussein (*Difa'*, 31 Jan), General Qassim (*Zaman*, 4 Feb) and President Shehab of Lebanon. (*Hayat*, 7 Feb) The Moroccan-Iraqi communiqué specified that the Charter should be amended "in a manner securing complete equality of all its member states respecting each state's structure, and not interfering in each other's affairs, and to make the League an effective instrument for cooperation and solidarity among the Arab countries." (*Zaman*, 4 Feb) In the joint communiqué of King Muhammad with Abdel-Nasser (20 Jan) and King Saud (*Hayat*, 2 Jan) the strengthening of the League was advocated, but the Charter was not specifically mentioned.

In Feb King Saud and King Hussein advocated revision in a joint communiqué at the end of Hussein's visit to Riyadh. (*Difa'*, 11 Feb)

In Aug 1960 the Arab Foreign Ministers' conference at Shtura again recommended that the Secretariat convene the special committee. [By the end of the year it had not been convened.]

**Lebanese Attitude.** The organ of the Phalanges rejected the proposals to amend the Charter, regarding them as a threat to Lebanon's sovereignty and independence. An attempt to make a simple majority vote binding on all member states "would oblige Lebanon to reconsider seriously its membership in the League." (*Amal*, 5 Jan) *Al-Hayāt* favoured the revision of the Charter in principle, but advised thorough study and deliberation before

taking hasty steps which "might infringe upon the sovereignty of the member states." (*Hayat*, 22 Mar)

**Iraqi Attitude.** Both official spokesmen and the Press deplored the hegemony of the UAR over the League. The Press also suggested the transfer of its headquarters from Cairo to Beirut and a new and just distribution of posts in the Secretariat. (*Zaman*, 15, 23 Mar; *Bilad*, 4 Apr; *Mabda'*, 13 May)

**Jordanian Attitude.** King Hussein, his Ministers and the Press concerned themselves mostly with UAR domination of the League, e.g.: "The League is only a political office under the control of the Egyptian propaganda apparatus... and this is the main reason for its failure." (*Hawl al-Alam*, 24 Mar) (See also above: Views and Policies.)

**The UAR Press.** A Cairo paper supported the amendment of the Charter, without specifying particulars, in the hope that it would prevent the contradiction between words and deeds which had marked the behaviour of "some Arab states." (*Akhbar*, 30 Dec 1959)

On the other hand, a Cairo monthly, discussing the issue at length, found the proposed amendment undesirable, for the following reasons: There were two premises on which the arguments for a revision of the Charter were based: (1) The desire to lessen the influence of the UAR by strengthening the voting power of a non-UAR majority; (2) To make the League an "organ of Arabism" by strengthening majority decisions so that they could be imposed on governments.

The writer rejects this approach because: (1) As the votes of the Council were not binding, no government was compelled to apply a "UAR-dictated decision." "Therefore the criticized UAR domination is entirely dependent for its strength on mass Arab support within the territory of dissident governments. The objection here is best dealt with by allowing nationalist public opinion to have a greater influence on government policy." (2) There was no point in strengthening the executive authority of the Council because few members would be ready to cede their sovereignty and because some Arab countries were still under foreign influence. Therefore "... to strengthen the authority of the Council is tantamount to weakening the authority of Arab nationalism in favour of external influences."

The writer also opposed the moving of the Secretariat from Cairo in order "to pander to the requirements of some transient leader apprehensive of President Abdel-Nasser's prestige... There is no more authentic capital for Arab nationalism than Cairo." (*The Egyptian Economic and Political Review*, Mar)

#### MAR: SG IN DISPUTE OVER ARAB UNION

**Mar: SG Calls for Arab Confederation.** In a broadcast from Cairo on 22 Mar, marking the League's 15th anniversary, the SG declared that the League as established in 1945 was not the ideal organization the Arab nation desired. What the Arab nation really wanted was a confederation [he used this term in his Arabic text] like the Swiss Confederation or the US, in which Arab states would unite for defence, foreign representation, financial organization and other common aspects. (*Eg. Gaz.*, 23 Mar)

**Mar: Lebanese Reaction.** The pro-UAR Lebanese papers hailed the SG's speech as "highly instructive." (*Beirut Masa'*, 25 Mar; *Hawadith*, 24, 26 Mar, 20 Apr) Others

criticized him. (*Orient*, 23, 26 Mar; *Amal*, 24 Mar; *Nahar*, 29 Mar) *Al-Amal* emphasized that Lebanon would always remain the "immortal Lebanon, free, independent and sovereign." (*Amal*, 29 Mar)

Philippe Taqla, the Lebanese Foreign Minister, answering a question in Parliament, said that Hasūnah's proposal did not prejudice the independence of Lebanon or any other Arab state. It was an expression of opinion, not committing the Arab states to anything. Lebanon's independence was too strong to be shaken by a statement, and there was no need to assert it daily, he added. (*Hayat*, 20 Apr)

**Mar: Tunisian Reaction.** The Tunisian daily *as-Sabāh* regarded the speech as a move inspired by the Cairo leaders, "indicating something that has become permanent in the minds of the Cairo people—their insistence on devouring the other Arab states." (*Sabah*, 25 Mar)

**Apr: SG's Explanation.** On 4 Apr the SG declared that his speech had been misunderstood. In referring to the Arab confederation, he had been speaking about the deliberations that led to the conclusion of the League Pact 15 years ago. His status and duties as fixed in the League Pact would debar him from making such a proposal. (*Ahram*, 4 Apr)

#### MISCELLANEOUS ACTIVITIES OF LEAGUE SECRETARIAT

**Mar: New Premises for the Arab League.** On 22 Mar, the 15th anniversary of its foundation, Hasūnah, the SG of the Arab League, inaugurated its new nine-story headquarters building at Midān at-Tahrir in the centre of Cairo. (*Eg. Gaz.*, 23 Mar)

**Aug–Nov: New Arab League Offices in Rome and New Delhi.** Early in Aug the Italian Government approved the application of the Arab League Secretariat to open an office in Rome. (*Akhbar*, Cairo, 10 Aug) Zuhayr al-Kabbāni was appointed to head the office. (*Akhbar al-Yawm*, 19 Nov) In India the Foreign Ministry agreed to permit the League to open an office in New Delhi. (*Falastin*, 8 Nov) [Offices of the League already existed in New York (with branches at Washington, Chicago, San Francisco, Ottawa and Dallas), Geneva, Bonn, Rio de Janeiro and Buenos Aires. (*The Middle East 1961*, Europa Publication, London, p 27)]

**SG's Visit to Moscow.** On 2 Aug the SG left Cairo for a two-week visit to the USSR at the invitation of the Soviet Society for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries. (*R. Moscow*, 2 Aug–*IMB*, 3 Aug) Hasūnah was received by Gromyko, the Soviet Foreign Minister, for a two-hour discussion, and also met the Soviet Deputy Premier Mr Mikoyan. He returned to Cairo on 16 Aug. (*IMB*, 7 Aug; *Ahram* 16, 17 Aug)

#### THE ARAB LEAGUE AND AFRICA

[During the year the Arab League and its subordinate bodies passed numerous resolutions on the strengthening of political, commercial and cultural relations with the African countries, but few were carried out. The League also intended to open bureaux in several African countries.] (For the Mauritania problem at the League see pp 163–4.)

**Intentions.** Among the measures resolved upon in 1960 were:

The opening of an Arab League Office at Conakry (*Akhbar al-Yawm*, 25 May);

Extending invitations to delegations from eight African countries to visit Arab refugees in Gaza, Jordan and Lebanon (*Akhbar al-Yawm*, 9 July);

The establishment of 14 commercial centres and two permanent exhibitions in Asian and African countries (*Ahram*, 18 July);

The establishment of an information office at Dakar. (*Nahar*, Beirut, 20 Nov)

[There were no subsequent reports of the decisions being implemented.]

**Aug–Sept: Arab League Resolutions on Aid to Africa.** The Arab League Foreign Ministers' Conference held at Shtura, Lebanon, in Aug resolved to support the independence of African countries. It called for cooperation with them in the economic, social and cultural fields; for granting of scholarships to Africans and the dispatch of teachers to Africa. It also requested the Arab Chambers of Commerce to send missions to African countries. (*Falastin*, 29 Aug; *Hayat*, 30 Aug)

Similar decisions were reached on 1 Sept by the Permanent Office of the Arab Information Committee, which urged the member states to supply African countries with technicians, experts and doctors and "open their eyes to Israel's attempts to create for itself a commercial basis in these countries." It also called for the opening of Arab League bureaux in East and West Africa. (*Ahram*, 2 Sept)

**Jordanian Comment: "Chatterers."** A Jordan daily commented that the recommendations were nicely phrased, but apart from this no Arab state had hastened to carry them out, even in one African country. "This means that we excel in passing resolutions and moulding them in pretty shapes, but we do not by one iota cross the dividing line between talk and action. And yet we are angry when Asian and African countries exchange missions with Israel. We are, unfortunately, chatterers... in conferences and in offices... and no more." (*Falastin*, 13 Sept)

In Nov the Arab League sent a circular to its members requesting them to carry out its resolutions on the strengthening of relations with African countries. (*Nahar*, Beirut, 20 Nov)

**Sept: Technical Aid Committee.** A new committee was established in Sept by the Arab League Secretariat to examine the possibilities of extending technical aid to African countries. An official of the UAR Foreign Ministry was appointed Chairman of the Committee. (*R. Cairo*, 25 Sept–*IMB*, 26 Sept)

**Nov: Chambers of Commerce Resolution.** The Conference of Arab Chambers of Commerce and Agriculture resolved to work for the establishment of joint Afro-Arab projects and the conclusion of commercial agreements between Arab and African countries; to seek ways to stop Israeli "penetration" into Africa; and to request Arab countries to expand production intended for African markets in order to exclude Israeli products. (*Hayat*, 23 Nov)

**May–June: Arab League Contacts with Ghana.** On 9 May the SG of the League met the Ghanaian Chargé d'Affaires in Cairo and discussed with him Israeli influence in Ghana, as well as economic and political relations between Ghana and the Arab countries. The Ghanaian representative stated that his country would welcome the opening of an Arab commercial bureau in Accra. (*Hayat*, 10 May)

At Ghana's request the Arab League sent a circular to its members requesting support for the election of Ghana



to a post [unspecified in the newspaper report] in the International Monetary Fund. (*Akhbar*, 30 May)

The Arab League SG attended the celebration of Ghana's proclamation as a republic. He was to discuss with the Ghanaian authorities the relations between Ghana and Arab countries and Israeli economic activity in the country. (*Gumhuriyah*, 27 June)

Aug: Somalia to Participate in Arab Chambers of Commerce. The permanent bureau of the Association of Arab Chambers of Commerce proposed that a representative from Somalia should participate in its next conference as an observer. It would be, according to *al-Ahrām*, the first time that a delegate from a "non-Arab" country participated in such a conference. (*Ahrām*, 24 Aug)

## THE ARAB LEAGUE COUNCIL

NOTES: (a) No official reports on the Arab League Council proceedings are published except for the agreed resolutions, and its deliberations are mostly secret.

(b) Some issues which were discussed by the Council but also developed independently have been extracted from the report on its proceedings and are given under separate headings, to enable them to be presented as complete wholes. These are the Palestinian Entity and the Palestinian Army (p 132 ff), the Diversion of the Jordan Waters (p 204 ff), and the Revision of the League Charter (pp 123-4).

### 32nd REGULAR COUNCIL SESSION FIRST PART: SEPT 1959

[The first part of the 32nd session of the Arab League Council took place in Casablanca, Morocco, from 1 to 8 Sep 1959. Iraq and Tunisia did not participate because of their grievances against the UAR (see p 144 ff and pp 164-5); an observer of the Algerian Provisional Government attended for the first time. The main issues discussed were: Mr. Hammarskjöld's report on the rehabilitation and resettlement of the Arab refugees; Jewish immigration to Israel from Eastern Europe; the passage of Israeli shipping through the Suez Canal; the formation of a representative body for the Palestinian Arabs and the creation of a Palestinian Army of Arab refugees; and the Algerian question.

Saudi Arabia, supported by the UAR, proposed the creation of a "Palestinian Entity"—a separate political status for the Palestinian Arabs—and the formation of a Palestinian Army in the Arab host countries (see also p 132 ff).

These questions were referred, because of "lack of time" (in reality because of Jordanian opposition) to the Arab Foreign Ministers' Council to meet in Jan 1960. (For full text of resolution—see *Hayat*, 9 Sept 1959.)]

### 32nd REGULAR COUNCIL SESSION SECOND PART: 8-29 FEB 1960

The session opened on 8 Feb in Cairo. Some Lebanese and Iraqi newspapers had persistently demanded a neutral venue in Lebanon or Libya. (*Hayat*, 13, 18, 23 Dec 1959; *Orient*, 13 Dec 1959, 3 Jan; *Amal*, 12, 27 Dec 1959, 2 Jan; *Zaman*, Baghdad, 14, 21 Dec 1959, 11 Jan)

Participants. The session was attended by delegations from: Morocco (headed by the Premier); Libya (Minister of State); Jordan (Foreign Minister); Yemen (representative in Cairo); the UAR (Deputy Foreign Minister); the Sudan (Ambassador to UAR); Lebanon (Foreign Minister); Saudi Arabia (Minister of Education); and observers from the Algerian Provisional Government. (*Hayat*, 9 Feb)

Absence of Iraq and Tunisia. The Iraqi Foreign Minister stated in a cable (dated 3 Feb) addressed to the SG: "Iraq cannot... attend the League meeting held in the UAR, since Iraq is being subjected to unjust attacks from the UAR... The Iraqi Republic wishes to emphasize that it will not attend any Arab League meeting unless it is held elsewhere in the Arab homeland." (*Zaman* 9 Feb) A repeated invitation to Iraq by the Chairman, Hajj Hussein al-Uwayni, to attend in order "to achieve Arab unity" was rejected. (*Zaman*, 11 Feb)

The Tunisian Foreign Minister stated on 11 Feb that his government had already apologized for not attending and pledged its support for all resolutions "unanimously agreed upon by the member states in the interest of the Palestine Cause." (*R. Tunis*, 11 Feb-BBC, 13 Feb) [Tunisia started its boycott against the League in 1958, immediately after becoming a member, because of its strained relations with the UAR.]

President Abdel-Nasser said that Tunisia and Iraq, by accusing the UAR of exercising pressure and dominating the League, were using the "style of imperialists and Zionists." He dismissed their objections to Cairo as the meeting place and pointed out that they had also abstained from the session in Casablanca, where it became obvious that their real objective was to deal a blow to Arab solidarity. (*Ahrām*, 15 Feb) The UAR Press and radio followed up the President's line (see e.g.: *Ahrām*, 9, 10, 13, 21 Feb; *Gumhuriyah*, 8, 10, 15 Feb)

In answer, Tunis Radio said: "We find it extremely difficult to attend meetings of an organization which has no power to settle disagreements between two of its members and which cannot even condemn one or the other... Our concern for our national dignity obliges us to refuse to take part in an organization which fails to come up to our expectations." (*R. Tunis*, 23 Feb-BBC, 25 Feb)

Iraqi dailies and broadcasts attacked the League's SG as Abdel-Nasser's stooge, denounced UAR pressure on the member states, and made fun of its call to liberate Palestine. (*Akhbar*, 11 Feb; *Bilad*, 10 Feb; *Mabda'* 28 Feb; *Zaman*, 28 Feb) Pierre Jumayil, Lebanese Minister of Public Works and leader of the Katā'ib Party, referring to the absence of Iraq and Tunisia, reiterated that "the seat of the Arab League should be removed from Cairo to a neutral Arab country." (*Amal*, Beirut, 12 Feb)

Agenda. The Council's discussions were held behind closed doors. However, *al-Hayāt* published the agenda, which included subjects already discussed at Casablanca, such as the Palestinian Entity, the recruitment of a Palestinian Army, the Algerian question, as well as new topics: Israel's attempt to divert the Jordan waters and a common policy towards the UN Conciliation Commission and the UN Conference on the Law of the Sea (to meet in Geneva in Mar 1960). (*Hayat*, 10 Feb)

**Impact of Border Incidents.** Throughout the meetings, the Council was under the impact of the rising tension on the Israel-UAR borders (see p 197 ff). The opening ceremonies were cancelled and instead a high UAR Army officer briefed the participants on "Israel's latest aggression." (*Ahram*, 9 Feb)

In this connection, Salīm al-Habāki, an *al-Hayāt* reporter, reported an incident during the discussion of the agenda at the opening session on Feb 8 [from which the Press was excluded]. The Jordan Foreign Minister raised a number of problems relating to the Palestinian Entity and asked who would defend a Palestinian Government if it were attacked. Several delegates answered that the Arab governments would be obliged to declare war on Israel, should the situation necessitate this. The Saudi Arabian representative, ash-Shukairy, asked: If so, why do we not regard the latest Israeli aggression as an attack upon the Palestinian Entity, and act accordingly? Mūsā Nāsir asked: Does this mean a declaration of war on Israel? "Some of those present answered affirmatively and a wave of intense enthusiasm swept over the conference." Here General Ali Amer, the UAR Chief of Staff, intervened, saying that this subject should not be brought up for general discussion without a draft resolution. (*Hayat*, 14 Feb)

Military briefings were repeated three times during the meeting. According to the *al-Hayāt* correspondent, the delegates agreed, after consulting their governments, "that force should be used against any new Israeli provocative action." (*Hayat*, 15, 26 Feb)

The Council and the Arab governments were reportedly not consulted by the UAR authorities on military developments and were informed of UAR measures only afterwards. Thus, while the UAR started on 18 Feb to mobilize reserves and concentrated forces in Sinai and along the northern border with Israel, the League members were informed only on 19 Feb. (*Hayat*, 26 Feb) *Falastin*, the Jordanian daily, reproached the UAR for not consulting the other Arab states in advance: "Had the UAR done so, Lebanon and Jordan would have joined her in concentrating their troops, and thus the whole world could have seen real Arab solidarity." (*Falastin*, Jordan, 10 Mar)

**Deadlock over the Palestinian Entity.** Differences among the member states became apparent after the opening sessions on the UAR's proposal to create a Palestinian Entity which Jordan regarded as an attempt to subvert the Kingdom (see p 132 ff). (*Hayat*, 14 Feb; *Ahram*, 17 Mar) To avoid an official deadlock, the meetings were adjourned three times successively. The Council finally met on 11 Feb, only to be suspended for another three days. In the meantime efforts were being undertaken (mainly by the SG and the Lebanese delegation) to reach common ground. On 16 Feb the Council again decided to adjourn for three days, so that the Jordanian Foreign Minister, Mūsā Nāsir, could fly to Amman for consultations. (*Hayat*, 8-28 Feb; *Ahram*, 8 Feb-7 Mar)

**Attitude of Other Members.** *Al-Hayāt's* special correspondent in Cairo reported that while the Saudi Arabian delegate supported the UAR (according to some sources the Moroccan delegate did the same against the wish of King Muhammad who apologized later to King Hussein—see *Nahar*, Beirut, 27 Feb; *Ahram*, 7 Mar), the other member states adopted a cautious attitude, trying not to commit themselves, thus preventing a possible split in the League. (*Hayat*, 25 Feb) Between 19 and

28 Feb, the Council met four times to discuss other items and finally closed the session on 29 Feb.

**Arabic Press Comment on the Deadlock.** Iraqi papers criticized both the UAR and Jordan for their "egoistic" policies, which resulted in frustrating the Council's activities. (*Zaman*, 17 Feb; *Ahali*, 14 Feb; *Akhbar*, 16 Feb) The Jordanian dailies and the neutral and anti-UAR Lebanese papers regarded the differences as clear proof that the Arab League had failed in its present set-up. Thus *ad-Difa'* (Jordan) said that it was useless to try either to conceal or to remedy the differences within the League, and concluded: "We fear that the Arab League has already reached such a degree of pointlessness that we cannot expect anything good from it, and it would be useless to offer it any advice." (*Difa'*, 12 Feb, see also *Amal*, 10, 13 Feb; *Bina'*, 9 Feb; *Nida'*, 10, 13 Feb; *Jaridah*, 9 Feb (all of Beirut); *Falastin*, 19 Feb, *Jihad* (Jordan), 16 Feb) On the other hand the Lebanese pro-UAR papers totally ignored the repeated postponement of the meetings and dwelt on the importance of the session in fostering Arab solidarity. (*Siyasah*, 14, 16, 20, 23 Feb; *Kifah*, 11, 17, 24, 28 Feb; *Beirut al-Masa'*, 8, 11, 18, 29 Feb)

The UAR radio and Press continued to observe the official correct attitude towards Jordan, and paid little attention to the League's activities. In their rare references to the session, they emphasized its "great importance," especially "when Israel seemed to be moving again." (*Gumhuriyah*, 22 Feb; *Ahram*, 8, 22, 29 Feb; *IMB*, 9-25, Feb)

However, a week after the end of the session, the UAR brought the "truce" in relations with Jordan to an end (see p 149). Its radio and Press launched a severe propaganda campaign against Jordan, blaming it, among other things, for sabotaging UAR efforts to create a Palestinian Entity and a Palestinian Army. (*Ahram*, 7 Mar; *Gumhuriyah*, 11 Mar; *Eg. Gaz.*, 11 Mar; *IMB*, 6-12 Mar)

**Resolutions Adopted.** On 29 Feb the Council closed its 32nd ordinary session by adopting the following resolutions:

To postpone further discussion of the Palestinian Entity and of the Palestinian Army and in the meantime to set up a committee to prepare a study on the whole question of Palestine. However, some basic principles were adopted regarding the right of the Palestinian Arabs to self-determination and their legitimate ownership of Palestine, as well as their right to return to their homes (see p 134).

The Jordan waters must be utilized in the interests of the Arab countries, and Israel's designs in this regard are aggressive and justify Arab self-defence. A coordination committee was to be set up (see also pp 208-9).

All countries in the world must take measures to stop Jewish immigration to Israel.

Israel must be prevented from exploiting the "fabricated campaign" of anti-Semitism for its own ends, e.g. increasing Jewish immigration to Israel and obtaining more financial and military aid (see also pp 277-8).

Any foreign interference (referring mainly to the Tripartite Declaration—see pp 93-4) in Middle East affairs connected with the Palestine question or any associated issues, or inconsistent with the spirit of the UN and based on the attitudes of certain foreign powers, would complicate the Palestine question... and threaten security in the area.

The Arab states should examine their attitude toward

other countries in the light of the views these countries hold on Zionism and imperialism.

Member states should exert joint efforts in African and Asian countries against Israeli penetration.

The Council supported the attitude of the Algerian Provisional Government and denounced President de Gaulle's conditions for self-determination. (For further details see p 165 ff.)

France was condemned for exploding a nuclear bomb in the Sahara.

The Council urged member states "to define at once the limit of their territorial waters as 12 miles," to participate in the second Geneva Conference on the Law of the Sea due to open on 17 Mar, and to "firmly continue to regard the waters of the Gulf of Aqaba as internal Arab waters" (see also p 179). [Full text in *Hayat*, 1 Mar.]

**Morocco Proposes another Foreign Ministers' Conference.** The Council also approved a Moroccan proposal that the Foreign Ministers should meet in extraordinary session on 30 Apr to discuss Arab affairs in general and strengthen Arab solidarity. The Secretary-General was to fix the venue after consulting the member states. (*Hayat*, 1 Mar)

**Iraq and Tunisia Approve.** *Al-Hayāt*, quoting official League circles, reported that Iraq and Tunisia had approved these resolutions. (*Hayat*, 2 Mar)

**Comments on the Resolutions Concentrated on Palestine Issues.** Farid Zayn ad-Dīn, UAR deputy Foreign Minister, declared that the resolutions represented for the first time a "national charter" on the Palestine problem, and met all "imperialist measures and plots to interfere in the Arab region." (*Ahram*, 1 Mar) (See also *Ahram*, 3, 7 Mar, *Gumhuriyah*, 1, 7 Mar and the Lebanese pro-UAR papers *Beirut Masa'*; *Siyasah*; *Ayyam*, *Damascus*, 1 Mar.)

Amman Radio commented (on 29 Feb) that a practical plan for dealing with the enemy did not appear to have emerged. "It is time," it said, "to realize that events cannot wait for the Arab League to meet, discuss and finally pass a resolution devoid of any planning, and incommensurate in study and planning with the enemy's study and plans." (*R. Amman*, 29 Feb-BBC, 2 Mar) Jordanian newspapers belittled the resolutions and criticized the League for wasting its time on a controversial issue (an indirect reference to the Palestinian Entity). However, they did not openly criticize the sponsors or supporters of the idea. (*Difa'*, 28, 29 Feb, 1, 3 Mar; *Falastin*, 1, 5 Mar; *Haw al-Alam*, 3 Mar)

Tunis Radio reported briefly: "The Arab League Council today issued a statement in Cairo saying that the members of the council have not reached agreement on the adoption of any resolution in the interest of the Palestinian refugees." (*R. Tunis*, 29 Feb-BBC, 2 Mar) [No such statement was issued.]

Radio Baghdad commented that the resolutions had not provided any feasible and realistic solution for the Palestine question but "smelled of bargaining and lack of daring and sound appraisal." (*R. Baghdad*, 29 Feb-BBC, 2 Mar)

(For Iraqi Press criticism see *Zaman*, 1, 2, 3 Mar; *Mabda'*, 2 Mar; *Akhbar*; *Ahali*, 1 Mar.)

**Implementation of the Resolutions.** It was reported that the League's SG intended to visit Arab capitals to discuss methods of executing the latest resolutions of the League Council. (*Hayat*, 2 Mar)

### 33rd REGULAR COUNCIL RESSION—

#### FIRST PART: 31 MAR–9 APR 1960

On 31 Mar, the 33rd regular session of the Arab League Council opened in Cairo on the ambassadorial level, Khalīl al-Qallāl, the Libyan delegate, presided, as it was Libya's turn to assume the chairmanship.

**Participants.** The UAR, Jordan, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Sudan, Libya and Morocco were represented. Ahmad Hilmi, head of the defunct "All-Palestine Government," and a representative of the Algerian Provisional Government were also present. [In 1953, the League abolished the All-Palestine Government but resolved that Ahmad Hilmi would continue to attend the Council sessions.] Iraq and Tunisia failed to attend because of their differences with the UAR. (*Zaman*, *Baghdad*, 28 Mar; *Hayat*, 29 Mar, 1 Apr. For the Agenda see *Hayat*, 1 Apr.)

**Aden Protectorate Question Not Discussed.** In a memorandum, the Iraqi Government suggested that the British-Yemeni dispute over the Aden Protectorate be submitted to the UN. The proposal was struck off the agenda without argument after the Yemeni delegate had described it as "interference in Yemen's internal affairs." [Yemen claims sovereignty over the Protectorate.] (*Hayat*, 1 Apr)

**Resolutions Adopted.** On 9 Apr, the Council concluded its session and adopted the following resolutions:

To refer the issue of the Palestinian Entity to the Arab Foreign Ministers' Council scheduled for the end of Apr;

To denounce France for its nuclear explosion in the Sahara and to contact the Afro-Asian states at the UN with a view to summoning an extraordinary session of the UN General Assembly to discuss the matter. (The Political Committee of the Council had also discussed a complete Arab boycott of France and the freezing of all French holdings in Arab countries.) (*Ahram*, 3 Apr; *Hayat*, 4 Apr) In Lebanon, Pierre Jumayil, Minister of Public Works and leader of the Katā'ib Party, declared that Lebanon would not recognize any recommendation of the League to boycott France. (*Amal*, 6 Apr)

To recommend that the member states should contribute to the funds of the "Omani Strugglers," work for the inclusion of the Omani question on the agenda of the next UN General Assembly, and to "make efforts with Britain" to settle the dispute and restore the usurped rights of the Omani (see also pp 401–2);

To denounce South Africa's policy of racial discrimination;

To urge member states to fulfil their financial obligations to the Algerian Provisional Government;

To ask the Arab states participating in the June conference of Independent African states in Addis Ababa to urge support for the Algerian people and the cause of other oppressed peoples;

To urge member states to support Lebanon's efforts to obtain a seat for Cypriots of Lebanese origin in the Cyprus Chamber of Deputies when set up;

To thank the Pakistani Government for preventing the attendance of an Israeli observer at the meetings of the UN Economic Committee for South-East Asia, planned for Karachi (but subsequently shifted to Bangkok). Also to request permanent Arab delegations at the UN to urge friendly delegations to follow the example of the Pakistani Government at meetings of UN regional committees;

To approve the recommendations of the Arab Information Committee [which met in 1959];

To approve the recommendations of the Communica-



tions Committee [which met in 1959] on the establishment of an Arab Transport Union, the construction of Arab roads, the exchange of meteorological information among the Arab states, etc.;

To approve the recommendation of the Arab Economic Council to establish a Permanent Technical Office for Arab Economic Unity Affairs. To approve the recommendations of the fifth Conference of Arab Experts on Social Affairs on the training of social workers and the recommendations of the 4th Arab Cultural Conference and the Antiquities and Libraries Conferences. [These conferences took place in 1959.] (*Hayat*, 10 Apr)

#### EXTRAORDINARY SESSION OF THE ARAB LEAGUE COUNCIL: CONFERENCE OF ARAB FOREIGN MINISTERS AT SHTURA—

22-28 AUG 1960

**Date and Place:** On 22 Aug 1960, a conference of Arab Foreign Ministers met at the Lebanese summer resort of Shtura. As decided at the Feb session, its main aim was to discuss general Arab affairs in order to strengthen Arab solidarity. (*Hayat*, 2 Mar, 23 Aug)

**Earlier Development.** This conference, originally scheduled for 30 Apr, was postponed indefinitely on 22 Apr (*Ahram*, 23 Apr), [mainly as a result of the rising tension in inter-Arab relations].

The UAR was adamant in its demand that the conference should take place in Cairo (*Ahram*, 22 Mar; *Hayat*, 19, 29 Apr), which meant the exclusion of Iraq, in view of its declaration that it would not attend any League meeting in Cairo (see p 145).

However in Apr relations between the UAR and Iraq started to improve (see p 146).

By 6 May it became known that the UAR had agreed to have the conference held in Beirut. (*Hayat*, 6 May) At the same time Iraq decided to renew its cooperation with the League following the visit of the Assistant SG, Isma'il ad-Dardiri, to Baghdad from 24 Apr to 8 May. (*Zaman*, Baghdad, 26, 28 Apr, 12 May)

**Participants:** The Foreign Ministers of the UAR, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Sudan, Libya and representatives of Saudi Arabia and Yemen took part. The Prime Minister of the Algerian Provisional Government attended as an observer during the first three days. Tunisia maintained its boycott. (*Hayat*, 23 Aug) (See p 126.)

**Reactions to Tunisia's Absence.** Cairo Radio attacked President Bourguiba of Tunisia on 24 Aug, describing him as an "imperialist agent" and "traitor." (*BBC*, 25, 26 Aug) *Al-Gumhuriyah* urged the Council to adopt a "practical" reply to Bourguiba, such as the support of the "Algerian people," which would lead "to a tightening of the noose around any agent in the area whether he be Bourguiba or anyone else." (*Gumhuriyah*, 24 Aug; see also *Anwar*, Beirut, 23 Aug) A Jordanian comment on the efforts to persuade Tunisia to attend said: "The ebb and flow of abstentions, manoeuvres and bargains show the Arab struggle in its real colours. It has no roots and springs from no clear-cut principles... A mediator at one conference may have been a party to a dispute at a former conference... We do not believe that it is right to boycott the conference, whatever the motives and the reasons, because the Arab League—from an official point of view at least—does not belong to a single party. This is so even if there are signs of a

certain party controlling its machinery..." (*Manar*, 18 July)

**Opening Session Public.** On Iraqi and Lebanese insistence, the proceedings of the opening session were made public.

The Libyan and the Jordanian delegates spoke of the need for a strong Arab solidarity and a strong Arab League. The Lebanese representative urged the Council to "tackle matters frankly and fundamentally so as to eradicate all inter-Arab disputes." (*Hayat*, 23 Aug; *BBC*, 24 Aug)

**Iraq for "Independent Political Personality."** The Iraqi Foreign Minister delivered the central speech, emphasizing the interdependence of the Arab countries.

However, he said, the independent political personality of every Arab country must be recognized by everyone, and Arab cooperation should be concentrated in the area of the problems of the Arab countries... "in an atmosphere free of coercion and threats." The responsibilities of liberating the still dependent part of the Arab world (Palestine, Algeria, the Trucial Coast, Oman, Hadhramaut and the Protectorates) should be placed "squarely on the shoulders of its peoples" while the Arab countries should "support them with money, military aid and political backing. For this purpose, a coordinating organization is needed. The Arab League could fulfil this task, provided that some of the principles included in its Pact are seriously reviewed and that its effectiveness in dealing with important problems is increased." (*Hayat*, 23 Aug; *BBC*, 24 Aug; for excerpts from the speech see pp 119-20.) Dr Mahmūd Fawzi, the UAR Foreign Minister, did not speak, explaining after the session: "The other Arab delegates have expressed in their speeches our feelings and opinions." (*Ahram*, 23 Aug)

**Agenda.** At a secret session, on 22 Aug, a revised agenda finally emerged as follows, according to *al-Hayāt*: Algeria; Arab Affairs in general; the establishment of a Palestinian Entity and Army; Israel's attempts to divert the River Jordan; dangers facing the Arabs in the Negev; Israel's efforts to obtain a World Bank loan; Iran's recognition of Israel; Mauritania; Support of the countries of Africa. (*Hayat*, 23 Aug)

**Secret Deliberations.** The Iraqi Foreign Minister described the deliberations as follows: "The conference was one of Arab Foreign Ministers without the delegations. The debates were conducted behind closed doors... No minutes were taken. All participants were able to state their views in complete freedom on all issues..., and the various resolutions adopted were reached in a spirit of understanding and appreciation of the different conditions of the Arab countries and of what should be done within this framework of reality." (*Iraq Times*, 1 Sept)

The Algerian Question was discussed first. [On some important proposals brought up by the representative of the Algerian Provisional Government, no decision was reached (see p 166).]

**Inter-Arab Relations.** On 24 Aug the Council began to discuss inter-Arab affairs. No official statement was issued on the topics discussed. The Jordan Government had originally insisted that inter-Arab relations should be the chief item at the conference, and had also decided to lodge with the League a formal complaint against UAR interference in its affairs. (*Jihad*, Jordan, 23, 28, 29



June, 2 Aug) But on 24 Aug the Jordanian delegation, presumably through Lebanese mediation, showed signs of moderation in pressing its charges against the UAR, and did not insist on the inclusion of its complaints in the agenda. Instead it submitted an informative memorandum to the chairman of the conference, containing "charges based on defendants' admissions to Jordanian Courts that the UAR had plotted against Jordan and interfered in its internal affairs. It also included quotations from President Abdel-Nasser's speeches and UAR radio commentaries." (*Jihad*, 26 Aug; *BBC*, 27 Aug)

**Inter-Arab Relations and the UAR-Jordan Radio Campaign.** Mūsa Nāsir, the Jordanian Foreign Minister, informed the conference, that, as a gesture of good will for its success, King Hussein had ordered the cessation of the Jordan radio campaign against the UAR "provided that the UAR likewise ceased its radio and Press campaign." (*Hayat*, 24 Aug) On 24 Aug Jordan Radio ceased to attack the UAR. (*BBC*, 24, 30 Aug) UAR radio stations continued their attacks on King Hussein and the Jordanian authorities, however, though on two days (24, 25 Aug), they used relatively moderate language. (*BBC*, 25 Aug, 2 Sept; *IMB*, 24-30 Aug) *Al-Akhbar* (Cairo) expressed doubt whether the UAR should stop its radio campaign, declaring that the UAR attitude towards Jordan was one of "principles" and not of "sentiments," and principles could not be changed overnight. (*Akhbar*, 25 Aug)

Premier al-Majālī, commenting on the UAR's behaviour, said on 25 Aug that Jordan would not renew its Press and radio campaign against the UAR "for the duration of the conference," and expressed the hope that "the Arab delegates and Arab public opinion in general would appreciate Jordan's attitude." (*Jihad*, 26 Aug)

**Resolution on Arab Solidarity.** On 25 Aug, the Council adopted a resolution to strengthen Arab solidarity. Member states were urged to redouble their efforts to promote an atmosphere of cordiality and understanding. Radio and Press campaigns against each other should be avoided, and the Arab League should be approached whenever there was a need to settle disputes. Adherence to the principles of international law and Arab chivalry with regard to political asylum was emphasized, but any political refugee who undermined the relations between the sister Arab states "should be deprived of the right of asylum." (*Hayat*, 26 Aug)

Mamdūh Rida, the Egyptian journalist, reporting from Shtura, wrote that pessimism was widespread among the delegates when inter-Arab relations were discussed. After a day of intensive consultations, he wrote, "The meeting was adjourned with a feeling of pessimism. The next day, the SG came out of the meeting smiling and read, to everyone's surprise, the Council's resolutions on the strengthening of Arab solidarity." (*Ruz al-Yusuf*, 5 Sept) *The Times* reported that differences of opinion in this matter were sidetracked by reminding the members of the League principles of non-interference in internal affairs and recognizing the regimes of other members. But no attempt was made to discuss the dispute between Jordan and the UAR. (*Times*, 29 Aug)

**Private Meetings Between the Foreign Ministers.** Following the resolution on Arab solidarity, private meetings were held between the Foreign Minister of the UAR and those of Iraq and Jordan. Arab radio stations paid much attention to these meetings, regarding them as an attempt to regulate inter-Arab relations. (*R. Amman*, *R. Beirut*; *R. Cairo*; *R. Baghdad*, 28 Aug-*IMB*, 29 Aug)

**The "Palestinian Entity."** The discussion on the Palestinian Entity opened on 26 Aug. The UAR and Iraq proposed their respective plans for the reorganization of the Palestinian Arabs. Jordan opposed both proposals on the ground that they would destroy the "Jordanian Entity" (see pp 136-7). (For Iraqi attitude see also p 135.) Mamdūh Rida quoted Wasfī at-Tal, "the strong man" in the Jordanian delegation, as saying that Jordan "will hold fast to its attitude even if it led to the failure of the Council." But when the other eight delegates threatened to adopt a resolution without Jordan's consent, "the Jordanian Foreign Minister, Mūsa Nāsir, left the meeting to contact his government from a public telephone... He told his Premier that any such resolution [without the participation of Jordan] would aggravate the situation in the West Bank, and suggested that Jordan should support the common resolution and disregard it later." (*Ruz al-Yusuf*, 5 Sept)

No decision was reached on the UAR and Iraqi proposals. The resolution adopted called upon the Arab states to preserve the Palestinian personality. It declared that the Palestinian people "are the legitimate owners of Palestine" and that they should be helped to restore their "usurped rights and country" through the support of the Arab states and peoples. The SG was urged to implement the Arab Foreign Ministers' resolution of 29 Feb 1960 (see p 127) (which provided for the formation of a committee to draw up a comprehensive plan for regaining Palestine). (*Hayat*, 29 Aug; *BBC*, 30 Aug)

**Resolutions Adopted.** On 28 Aug the Council unanimously approved resolutions on:

1. The Algerian question.
2. The Palestine question.
3. Arab solidarity—see above.
4. The diversion of the Jordan River waters, calling on the Technical Committee established in Feb 1960 (see pp 208-9) to expedite its study of counter-plans.
5. Amending the Pact of the Arab League—this should be considered in conformity with the Council's resolution at Casablanca (see pp 123-4).
6. The Arabs of the Negev. It was decided to raise the question of the Arabs in the Negev (Israel), at the next UN session. In the meantime the UN SG should be approached to protect the Arabs in Israel.
7. Mauritania. The Council decided to support Morocco in demanding the restoration of Mauritania on the ground that it was an integral part of Morocco (see also pp 163-4).
8. The newly independent African and Asian states. It was decided to welcome them and cooperate fully with them in economic, social, cultural and other fields.
9. Iran's *de facto* recognition of Israel. The Council urged the member states "to continue efforts to enable Iran to place her relations with the Arab states on a sound basis..." (see pp 219-20).
10. It was decided to hold another Foreign Ministers' conference after the next session of the UN General Assembly. (*Hayat*, 26-29 Aug)

**Favourable Arab Reactions.** The Lebanese Foreign Minister declared that "the most important general interpretation (of the resolutions) is that the Arabs have proved to the world that they are still capable of rallying together in genuine fraternity and cordiality..." (*Hayat*, 29 Aug) The Iraqi Foreign Minister believed that the results "will open the doors to action in other spheres of economic, cultural and military affairs." (*Iraq Times*, 30 Aug) The Jordanian Foreign Minister stated: "The

conference was very successful; the results... will enable the Arabs to work towards restoring their rights in Palestine." (*Jihad*, 29 Aug) The UAR Foreign Minister said that "the atmosphere of the conference was very frank and factual—we sought no illusions... We did our best to take one step after another along the road of the aims in which we believe and for which we work." (*Ahram*, 29 Aug)

The Arab Radio and Press commented favourably on the resolutions, seeing in them the beginning of a new era in inter-Arab relations. (*R. Baghdad*, 27, 28 Aug; *R. Amman*, 26-28 Aug; *R. Cairo*, 27-28 Aug-*IMB*, 26-29 Aug) See also Press of UAR (*Akhbar*, 27-29 Aug; *Ahram*, 27-29 Aug); Lebanon (*Hayat*, 28-29 Aug; *Jaridah*, 26, 28, 29 Aug); Jordan (*Jihad*, 26-29 Aug; *Falastin*, 26 Aug) and Iraq. (*Zaman*, 27, 29 Aug; *Ahali*, 29 Aug)

**Foreign Comments.** The *Daily Telegraph's* Beirut correspondent wrote on 22 Aug: "The meeting will, if anything, show further that the UAR has lost the political leadership of the Arab states. It was only on condition that the meeting was held outside the Republic that General Qasim let an Iraqi delegation attend." (*D. Telegraph*, 22 Aug) The same correspondent described the resolutions adopted by the Council as "compromises for saving the talks at any cost." (*D. Telegraph*, 29 Aug) The correspondent of *The Times* wrote: "The conference saved itself and the life of the League by avoiding the main issues on which agreement was not expected and could not be reached in spite of strenuous diplomatic efforts, specially by the Lebanese delegation." The correspondent referred to the questions of the Palestinian Entity, inter-Arab relations, and "even... an issue like Algeria, in which the other party concerned was non-Arab..." (France). (*Times*, 29 Aug)

**Murder of Jordanian Premier Hazzā' al-Majālī.** On 29 Aug, the day after the conclusion of the Shtura conference, the Jordanian Premier, Hazzā' al-Majālī, was assassinated. The Jordanian authorities accused the UAR of instigating and planning the assassination (see pp 151-2). Amman Radio commented: "To the few Arabs who believed that there took place in Shtura yesterday a pure Arab meeting, that Arab solidarity had been achieved, and that inter-Arab relations had been strengthened, to them we now announce the death of al-Majālī; to all these, we also announce that Damascus will not long remain a source of crime and treachery, and that it will no longer serve as a haven for the murderers of Majālī." (*R. Amman*, 29 Aug-*IMB*, 30 Aug) (See also pp 152-3.)

### 34th ORDINARY COUNCIL SESSION— 1-7 SEPT 1960

On 1 Sept 1960, the 34th ordinary session of the Arab League Council was officially opened in Shtura, Lebanon, on the ambassadorial level. The chairmanship passed to the Yemeni delegate, Hasan Ibn Ibrahim. All the permanent representatives, save the Tunisian, took part. (*Hayat*, 2 Sept)

**Tribute to Premier Majālī.** The SG requested the delegates to stand for two minutes in memory of the late Jordanian Premier, and other victims of the "filthy plot," (*Hayat*, 2 Sept)

**The Council's Work.** For the Agenda—see resolutions (text in *Eg. Gaz.*, 2 Sept). The Council held its meetings amidst a severe Jordanian-UAR propaganda conflict, following the murder of Premier Majālī. It refrained from intervening in the dispute, and occupied itself with routine questions. The Arab Press and radio paid negligible attention to its deliberations. (*IMB*, 1-8 Sept)

**Published Resolutions.** On 7 Sept the Council adopted secret and non-secret resolutions. Those disclosed recommended extension of the validity of *laissez-passers* issued to Palestinian refugees to two years—instead of one as formerly, support for the nomination of Lebanon and Iraq to UN posts, approval for a draft agreement between the League and the Arab Postal Union, approval for an agreement between the League and the World Health Organization; participation by the Arab states in the international conference discussing diplomatic relations and immunity, scheduled to convene in Vienna in Mar 1961.

It was agreed that the Arab countries should try to prevent oil companies operating in their territories from altering "posted prices" without their consent (see pp 60-61);

The building of new premises for the Arab Higher Studies Institute in Cairo was approved. It was resolved that the member states should explain to the world the purposes of the Arab boycott, and that committees of Arab diplomatic representatives be formed in the US, India, Burma, Great Britain, Italy, Ethiopia, Turkey, Japan, Iran, the German Federal Republic, France, Ghana and Cyprus for the above purposes.

A resolution was passed explaining to the West German authorities and firms that the granting of loans to Israel was detrimental to Arab interests.

The formation of an Arab bloc in the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund was referred to the League Economic Council for further study. (*Hayat*, 8 Sept)

**Secret Resolutions.** According to the *Daily Star* (Beirut), the Council approved several secret resolutions, especially as regards relations between the Arabs and the Afro-Asian countries in which Israel was active. It called for the dispatch of missions of businessmen, economists and industrialists to study the needs of those countries, and similar missions from those countries were to be invited to visit the Arab states. The Council also recommended financial, technical and administrative aid for the Afro-Asian countries.

The question of whether to put the Oman problem on the agenda of the UN was left to the Arab chief delegates at the UN. The Council advised patience in view of Mr Hammarikjold's effort to reach a settlement.

Other secret resolutions were adopted to combat Israel's economic relations with, or penetration into, Turkey, Ethiopia, and Nigeria. (*Daily Star*, 8 Sept)

## THE PALESTINIAN ENTITY (AL-KIYAN AL-FALASTINI) AND THE PALESTINIAN ARMY—1959–1960

(NOTE: "Entity" is used for *Kiyān* by Arab as well as by English sources. It is quite close to the meaning in the present context, but the word might also be translated "nature," "existence," "being," "independent political status," etc.)

### SYNOPSIS

The question of the Palestinian Entity (PE) was first brought up by the UAR in the Arab League in the spring of 1959. Thus the Palestine question was reintroduced as a main theme of the inter-Arab struggle, which, since the Sinai Campaign, had concerned itself mainly with the nature of the regimes and relations with the world powers.

The PE served as a main topic at all League Council meetings since the Casablanca session in Sept 1959.

The basic idea of the PE is to organize politically all Arabs of Palestinian origin so that they may constitute an independent factor which could claim the right to all former Palestinian territory and play an active part in the conquest of the part of Palestine "now usurped by Israel." For the latter purpose a Palestinian Army would be organized.

Since the end of 1959, the PE became an issue primarily between the UAR, Iraq and Jordan. The first two competed with each other in proposals for the organization of the Palestinians, as a theme in the struggle between themselves and between both of them and Jordan.

The UAR proposed that each Arab country should enable the Palestinians living in it to establish a popular representative organization. These would be merged into one main body, attached to the League, and at the same time a Palestinian Army would be organized in the host countries. No details of organization, finance, etc. were published, and according to the Jordanian Foreign Minister none were ever given by the UAR representatives.

As its point of departure, Iraq stressed the principle of self-help. To enable the Palestinian Arabs to take their fate in their own hands, a Palestinian Republic should be created, headed by a provisional government and including, at first, the West Bank territories of Jordan and the Gaza Strip. A Palestinian Army to take part in the conquest of Israel would be built up only after the establishment of the Republic. But during the year Iraq started to train and organize in Iraq a "nucleus" of a "Palestinian Liberation Army," so that the practical difference between the Iraqi and the UAR proposals in this request is not quite clear.

Jordan opposed the proposals of both the UAR and Iraq, regarding them as an attempt to dismember the Kingdom, most of whose inhabitants are Palestinians.

A minor factor was the "Arab Higher Committee" (a former representative body of the Palestinian Arabs), headed by Amin al-Husseini, which, after being attacked by the UAR, started to cooperate with Iraq. No initiative emanated from the Arab refugees or former Palestinians in Jordan themselves. The other Arab countries generally treated the whole question with reserve.

Even when relations between the UAR and Iraq improved, starting in Apr, their positions on the PE remained apart. For this reason, and also because of Jordanian opposition to both, the resolutions adopted by the League Council in Feb and Aug only stressed in

general terms the separate personality of the Palestinian Arabs, and their right to self-determination and to the whole of the territory of former Palestine. The discussion of the actual political and military organization of the Palestinians was to be entrusted to a special committee. This did not come into being until the end of the year, principally because of Jordanian obstruction.

Meanwhile, the UAR and Iraq started on their own to organize the Palestinian Arabs in their territories (the UAR also in the Gaza Strip). The UAR laid special stress on their organization in the "Palestinian National Union." Iraq started to form "the nucleus of the Palestinian Army." Thereupon the UAR announced that a Palestinian Army already existed in the UAR, while Jordan claimed that her forces constituted the real "Palestinian Army." The Jordanian authorities, especially King Hussein, campaigned to win the support of the Palestinians for the continued existence of the Kingdom.

Although these activities continued throughout the year, the public discussion of the issue lost much of its intensity after the cessation of the propaganda warfare between the UAR and Iraq (in Apr) and between Jordan and Iraq (in May). But at the end of 1960 the PE was still a matter of inter-Arab controversy, and no joint action had been taken by the Arab states to put any of the various proposals into practice.

### DEVELOPMENTS IN 1959

**Mar 1959: The UAR's Initiative.** The issue was first brought up during the 31st regular session of the Arab League Council in Cairo on 29 Mar 1959. On the UAR's initiative, the Council resolved to call a top-level meeting to deal with the whole Palestine question, including the question of "reorganizing the Palestinians and giving them an entity (*kiyān*) of their own." (*Ahram*, 6 Apr 1959) In June Abdel-Nasser appointed General Abd al-Hakim Amer to head a "Higher Planning Committee" to prepare a general policy on the Palestinian question for the UAR. (*Ahram*, 23 June, 9, 17 July 1959) The Egyptian Press kept the issue in the limelight throughout 1959. *Al-Musawwar*, commenting on the imminent meeting of the Arab League Council, urged the member states to consider the possibility of establishing a "strong Palestinian Government" similar to the Algerian Provisional Government, to be elected (not appointed) on the basis of a plebiscite among Palestinians throughout the Arab world. (*Musawwar*, 10 July 1959)

**July 1959: Rift Between the UAR and Amin Al-Husseini.** The UAR's drive to reorganize the Palestinian Arabs was accompanied by a deterioration in its relations with the Arab Higher Committee. [The Arab Higher Committee was established in the 'thirties to represent the Palestine Arab parties; it was dominated by the Husseini family. In 1947 the Arab League and, later, the UN General Assembly recognized it as representing the Palestinian Arabs. It continued its activities after the Palestine war in Cairo.] Late in July 1959, Hajj Amin al-Husseini, Chairman of the Arab Higher Committee, moved from Cairo [where he used to cooperate with the UAR in inter-Arab affairs] to Beirut. Earlier, the Egyptian weekly *Ruz al-Yūsuf* had launched a virulent campaign against him, accusing him of "betraying the Palestinian cause," "collaborating with imperialism," "plotting" with a for-



eign country to establish a "Palestine Free Government," and "plundering" for "his selfish purposes, as he has done throughout his life," funds collected for the Palestinian cause. (*Ruz al-Yusuf*, 6, 17 July; 10, 24 Aug 1959; *Nasr*, Damascus, 21 July)

**Aug 1959: Lebanese and Jordanian Reaction.** Minister Pierre Jumayil of Lebanon advocated the establishment of a Palestinian state, with its own government and army. (*Amal*, Beirut, 23 Aug) This statement was criticized on 23 Aug by Hazzā' al-Majālī, the Jordanian Premier, who claimed: "We are the Government of Palestine, we are the Army of Palestine, we are the refugees." (*Difa'*, Jordan, 24 Aug)

**Sept 1959: Arab League Council in Casablanca.** At this session, the Saudi Arabian representative, supported by the UAR delegate, expounded the idea behind the PE, but no definite proposal was submitted. The Jordanian delegate said later that his impression was that the PE was meant for international propaganda purposes and to enable the UAR to dispense with the Arab Higher Committee. (*Jer. Times*, 24 Mar 1960; *Difa'*, 11 Jan 1961)

**1959: "Machineries" for Handling of Palestinian Affairs Set Up.** The Casablanca Council decided to refer further discussion to a special Arab Foreign Ministers' meeting and recommended (on the UAR's suggestion) that the member states establish a special machinery (*jihāz*) in their Ministries for Foreign Affairs, to handle and coordinate Palestinian affairs. By the end of 1959, the UAR, Lebanon and Jordan had informed the SG of the implementation of this recommendation. (*Hayat*, 2-9, 13, 18 Sept 1959; *Musawwar*, 4 Sept 1959; *Difa'*, 22 Dec 1959; *Ahram*, 27 Dec 1959)

**Dec 1959: General Qassim Proposes to Set up a Palestinian Republic.** In Dec 1959 General Qassim proposed the establishment of a "Palestinian Republic." His main theme was that "three gangs"—Israel, Jordan and Egypt—had usurped Palestine and that the correct way to restore it was to set up a state composed of Palestinians in Jordan and Gaza. All Arab states should offer funds, arms and even men to that "immortal Palestinian Republic... which will restore the whole of Palestine from the hands of Israel." (*Zaman*, 8, 16, 23 Dec 1959) Qassim mentioned a memorandum dated 9 Nov 1959 sent to Arab leaders by the Arab Higher Committee demanding "the restoration to existence of Palestine" (*BBC-sic*), the formation of a "Palestinian Army" and compulsory recruitment for all Palestinians between 18 and 50. (The memorandum was made public in Baghdad on 11 Jan—*BBC*, 13 Jan.)

**Jordanian Reaction.** Premier Majālī denounced Qassim's statement, and accused him of disrupting Arab ranks and furthering Zionist-Communist ends in the area. He added that the merger of Palestinian territories with Transjordan in 1950 had been freely decided on by the Palestinians themselves and was irrevocable. (*Difa'*, 23 Dec 1959)

[Thus, by the end of 1959, the Palestine problem had become mainly the subject of a triangular conflict between the UAR, Jordan and Iraq.]

#### JAN-FEB 1960: THE ISSUE BETWEEN IRAQ AND JORDAN

**Jan: Iraqi Initiative.** At the 3rd Iraqi Students' Congress on 2 Jan, Qassim reiterated his call for the establishment

of the "Palestinian Republic." Stressing Iraqi initiative, he added: "We have prepared the necessary money, weapons and plans to help the Palestinian people to recover their usurped land." (*Zaman*, 3 Jan)

**Jan: Cooperation Between Qassim and Arab Higher Committee.** On 11 Jan the Chairman of the Committee, Hajj Amīn al-Husseini, came out in support of General Qassim's plan to create the Palestinian Republic. (*Hayat*, 12 Jan)

On 28 Aug General Qassim revealed that Iraq was allocating 250,000 dinars (£250,000) a year as a preliminary contribution to the Arab Higher Committee. (*Thawrah*, Baghdad, 28 Aug; *BBC*, 30 Aug)

**Jan: Jordan Denies Existence of Arab Higher Committee.** Premier Majālī of Jordan, taking issue with the Arab Higher Committee's memorandum of 9 Nov 1959 (made public in Baghdad on 11 Jan 1960) denied the very existence of that body. He told the Jordanian Parliament on 12 Jan: "There is no longer any Arab Higher Committee... which can claim to represent... the Palestinian Arabs."... The Jordanian Government is "a legal, constitutional government which represents the overwhelming majority of the Palestinian Arabs..." (*Difa'*, 13 Jan)

**Jan: Jordan Proposes a "Comprehensive Arab Plan" for Palestine.** A week later, on 19 Jan, King Hussein and his Premier attended a special meeting of the Jordanian Parliament in the old city of Jerusalem, at which Premier Majālī declared that Jordan would urge the Arab League members at the coming Foreign Minister's meeting (scheduled for Feb) to prepare a "comprehensive Arab Plan" to restore the "usurped land." This plan should include a number of basic principles: it should not be exploited for inter-Arab bargaining but should be based on collective Arab participation; it should first of all recognize the legitimate and existing entity of Jordan which includes the West Bank. Any attempt to shift the responsibility for Palestine from the level of all-Arab participation to the narrow regional level "is a plot against the Palestine question and an attempt to evade responsibility." He added: "Twelve years have passed and the Palestine question is still spinning in an empty circle of tricks, exploitation, bluster, drafts of alleged settlements, overt and covert bargains and calls for steps which fall mainly within the scope of imagination and illusion. The responsibility for this vicious circle falls on those Arab leaders who have failed to properly assess the situation... failed in manoeuvres on the international level, and failed to mobilize Arab strength..." (*Difa'*, 20 Jan) [The call for a "comprehensive plan" was to remain Jordan's permanent counterproposal to the plans of the UAR and Iraq.]

**Jan: King Hussein Replies to Iraqi Proposal.** The first direct Jordanian comment on Qassim's proposal was made on 20 Jan by King Hussein, who said that the concept of a separate Palestine Government was "dangerous and unrealistic" and "an attempt to evade responsibility for the Palestine question." (*Jihad*, 21 Jan) [For other Jordanian comments see: *Difa'*, 22, 26 Jan, *Falastin*, 21, 22, 28 Jan.]

**Jan: Iraqi Reaction.** Baghdad Radio reacted immediately (20 Jan), describing the Jordanian attitude to Qassim's plan as "selfish and invalid objections." By insisting on the recognition of Jordan's "entity" as a prerequisite, it



said, the Jordanian rulers had sabotaged all Arab co-operation for a solution of the Palestine question, and Qassim's proposal was dangerous only to Hussein's "illegal status." (*R. Baghdad*, 20 Jan-BBC, 22 Jan)

**Feb: Jordanian Citizenship for all Palestinians.** On 4 Feb the Jordanian Government decided to grant Jordanian citizenship to all Palestinians living abroad who wished to acquire it. Thus, the previous condition that a Palestinian must reside four years in Jordan before acquiring citizenship was abrogated. (*Falastin*, 5 Feb)

**Feb: Iraq Raises Money for Palestinian Republic.** General Qassim denounced the Jordanian step "as a measure to erase the name of Palestine," and as a counter-action urged the Iraqi people to contribute generously to the "Palestinian Republic." (*Zaman*, 10 Feb) He himself was the first donor in the fund-raising campaign, which began on 14 Feb. (*Zaman*, 16 Feb)

**Feb: Lebanese Comment.** *Al-Amal*, the organ of the Phalanges, expressed full support for the Jordanian decision, describing it as "the best positive solution under the present circumstances." (*Amal*, 7 Feb) *Al-Hayāt* said that the Palestinians had become the scapegoat of inter-Arab rivalry and that certain statesmen had exploited their problem as the easiest step towards Arab popularity and as a means of playing with the feelings of the masses. The paper strongly criticized Qassim, accusing him of making empty promises. (*Hayat*, 11 Feb)

**Jan-Feb: UAR Press Comment.** Egyptian newspapers, although otherwise active in denouncing Qassim's regime (see p 145) refrained from taking a stand in what was at this stage primarily an Iraqi-Jordanian dispute. They pointed out that the matter would be dealt with at the imminent meeting of the Arab League Council. (*Gumhuriyah*, 27 Jan, 3, 8 Feb; *Ahram*, 18, 26 Jan, 3 Feb)

## FEB: AT ARAB LEAGUE COUNCIL

The PE was one of the main subjects discussed by the Arab League Council meeting of 8 to 29 Feb in Cairo (see p 126 ff). The subject was brought up on the UAR's initiative (*Ahram*, 14 Feb), and UAR-Jordanian differences came to the fore. Iraq did not participate in the session and its attitude was therefore not presented.

**UAR's Proposal.** According to *al-Ahrām*, the UAR proposed that each Arab state would take practical measures to enable the Palestinians living in it to establish a popular representative organization. All of these would be merged into one body attached to the Arab League, within which it would actively cooperate with the rest of the Arabs in the restoration of the "usurped part of Palestine." (*Ahram*, 14 Feb) Mūsa Nāsir, the Jordanian Foreign Minister, said later that "no clear-cut and complete proposal was submitted as regards the objective of the PE, its procedures, location and responsibilities, or ways and means to carry them out." (*R. Amman*, 5 Mar-*IMB*, 6 Mar; *Jer. Times*, 11 Jan 1961) Moreover, he said, the sponsors of the proposal did not visualize the establishment of a Palestinian Government or intend to prejudice Jordanian sovereignty. (*Jer. Times*, 11 Jan 1961)

The UAR delegate was apparently supported by the Moroccan (*Ahram*, 7 Mar; *Nahar*, Beirut, 27 Feb) and Saudi Arabian representatives (in spite of King Hussein's visit to Riyadh on 8 to 9 Feb, where, according to Jordanian sources, he was assured by King Saud of Saudian

backing in this matter—see p 168). (*Ahram*, 7 Mar; *Hayat*, 25 Feb)

**The Jordanian Attitude.** The Jordanian delegate contended that unless the "usurped land" was restored there would be no advantage in an independent PE. Instead he urged the member states to join in preparing and carrying out a comprehensive Arab Plan "to restore the usurped land." (*Jihad*, 22 Feb; *Jer. Times*, 11 Jan)

Requested to submit a proposal of his own, he proposed the establishment of an organization composed of leading Palestinians, presided over by a Palestinian appointed by King Hussein and acting as his representative. This proposal was rejected. (*Ahram*, 7 Mar)

A three-man Committee was formed on 14 Feb to "draft a project on how to assert the PE." It consisted of the Libyan and Moroccan chief delegates, and the Saudi Minister of State, Ahmad ash-Shukairy. (*Gumhuriyah*, 15 Feb)

On 16 Feb Mūsa Nāsir, the Jordanian delegate, left for Amman "to consult the government on various problems connected with the deliberations of the Committee." (*Difa'*, 17 Feb)

On 19 Feb the Council resumed its discussions on the PE.

**Resolutions Adopted.** On 29 Feb the session was finally closed with the adoption of the following resolutions on the PE:

The Council decided to postpone to a future session the discussion on the reorganization of the Palestinian Arabs for the purpose of asserting their entity as a united people and the establishment of a Palestinian Army in the host Arab countries;

The Council decided to set up a five-man committee of experts headed by the SG "to complete the drafting of plans for Arab endeavours on various national and international aspects of the Palestine question";

The Council laid down the principles of a unified Arab policy towards the Palestine question "by which all Arab states are bound and which is a base for all Arab plans and schemes." These were:

The people of Palestine are the legitimate owners of Palestine, and have the right to self-determination; their struggle is regarded as a national liberation movement against Zionism;

The present situation in Palestine, which is dominated by World Zionism, constitutes a constant menace to peace and security in the Middle East and is contradictory to the UN Resolution. Consequently, the Arab states should "collectively and individually take every possible measure to repel the Israeli danger and safeguard their independent status (*kiyān*), relying on the lawful right of self-defence." In the event of any aggression, the Arab states "in pursuance of their duties and obligations shall immediately rally in joint defence."

The question of the Arab refugees is part of the Palestine question. The only way to solve it is to repatriate the refugees and enable them to live in freedom, security and peace. (*Hayat*, 1 Mar)

**Foreign Comment.** *The Spectator*, commenting on the deliberations of the League Council, said: "Each Arab ruler, whatever his true preoccupations, feels bound to strike an attitude over the Palestine problem, because only in terms of the Palestine problem can he lay a claim to be a leader of the Arabs. The wider ambitions of General Qassim demand that he should campaign publicly for a Palestine State, a concept which has no

reality whatsoever in the present (or indeed in any foreseeable future) context of affairs... But if Qassim presumes to speak out on behalf of Palestine, Abdel-Nasser (whose frontiers march with those of Israel, where Qassim's do not) can do no less. In Jordan King Hussein—as the *de facto* ruler of the only substantial section of Palestine left to the Arabs—too must stake his claim to the leadership of the Palestinians. And so the Arabs have presented to the world during the past two weeks the spectacle of the Arab League, bent on discussing the Palestine problem but unable even to agree on the terms in which the problem could be approached." The paper concluded: "Only when one of them is strong enough to disregard the protests of the rest will the Arabs be able to tackle the Palestine problem in earnest—and that day seems as far distant as ever." (*Spectator*, 26 Feb)

**Mar-Aug: Failure to Form the Five-man Committee.** [Any progress in the formulation of a common Arab policy in the PE was now largely dependent on the setting up of the five-man committee decided on by the League.] The SG, supported by the UAR, insisted that the members of the committee should not be government representatives, but Jordan insisted on sending an official representative, who would "defend the Kingdom's interests." (*Difa'*, Jordan, 22 Apr) Correspondence between the SG and the Jordanian Government during Mar-Aug produced no results, and the issue came up for discussion at the League Foreign Ministers' conference in Aug. (*Hayat*, 4, 12, 22 Mar, 5, 24 Apr, 27 June, 15 July; *Difa'*, 6 Mar, 23 June, 17 July)

**Apr: 33rd Regular Session of Arab League Council (31 Mar-9 Apr) Defers Discussion of PE.** After two days (2-3 Apr) of fruitless discussions the issues of the PE and the Palestinian Army were deferred to the forthcoming meeting of the Arab Foreign Ministers. (*Ahram*, 4, 10 Apr)

## MAR-AUG: THE ISSUE BETWEEN UAR, JORDAN AND IRAQ

### IRAQ

Following the League session of Feb 1960, the PE became a central theme in the inter-Arab conflict, mainly between the UAR, Iraq and Jordan. While a propaganda campaign developed between Cairo, Amman and Baghdad the governments were taking measures to consolidate their positions on the PE.

**Feb-Mar: Iraqi Press Attacks Jordan and UAR.** The Iraqi Press accused Jordan and the UAR of exploiting the Palestinian Arabs for their "dirty egoistic ambitions" after having plundered their "rights and lands" and thus collaborated with Israel in bringing about and perpetuating the Palestinian tragedy. (*Zaman*, 5 Mar, see also 18 Mar, 22 May, 24 June; *Mabda'* 24 Feb, 11 Mar, 11 Apr)

**Mar: Iraqis Raise Money for Palestine Republic.** The Iraqi Press gave wide coverage to the measures taken to realize General Qassim's plan for the establishment of a Palestine Republic. On 10 Mar it reported the establishment of public committees throughout Iraq to collect a million dinars for it. (*Zaman*, 10 Mar) Iraqi workers were called on to work an additional hour during the week beginning 28 Apr, the proceeds going to the "Fund of the Palestinian Republic." (*Zaman*, 29 Apr)

By 27 June about ID1.4 million had reportedly been collected. (*Zaman*, 27 June)

**Mar: Iraqi Proclamation on Formation of Palestinian Army.** On 27 Mar, Qassim issued a proclamation to "our brothers the Palestinians, wherever they may be" to join Iraqi military courses in order to form the nucleus of a Palestinian Army. (For further developments in this matter see below, pp 137-8.)

**Apr-May: Qassim Explains Goal of "Palestine Republic" Plan.** In an exclusive interview with the Sudanese daily *al-Ayyām*, Qassim explained: "The Palestine Republic has to be established in the whole country of mandatory Palestine... We squarely reject the UN Partition Plan... and the existence of Israel... We are planning for the Palestinians to regain the usurped land from the enemy: Israel, Jordan and the UAR... This is the ultimate goal of the Palestine Republic and we will extend it our generous aid in cash, arms and men." (*Ayyam*, Khartoum, 3 Apr; *R. Baghdad*, 5 Apr-IMB, 6 Apr)

On 15 May, General Qassim, receiving Palestinian cadets, declared that "the heavy burden of the restoration of Palestine cannot be shouldered except by its own people." Iraq had a "plan for liberating Palestine and it will be as successful as that of 14 July" (date of the Iraqi Revolution). "This plan will astound and destroy the enemy and it must be a surprise plan. We will not leave the antagonist, the enemy and the foreigner any chance to know this plan before its execution." (*Iraq Times*, 17 May)

**Aug: Qassim Announces Formation of "National Arab Committee."** On 11 Aug, Qassim addressing Palestinian graduates of the first military course (see below pp 137-8) said: "You are the fighting core who will shoulder the main task of regaining your homeland... Very soon National Arab Committees (*hay'at Arabiyah wataniyah*), consisting of your Palestinian brothers and your struggling brothers in the Arab countries, will come into being." (*R. Baghdad*, 11 Aug-BBC, 13 Aug) Four days later, Qassim said that "the 'High Arab National Organization' for the liberation of Palestine, as well as the national branches and local committees representing every town and village in Palestine, have come into being today." (*Iraq Times*, 17 Aug) [No further news of these committees was reported.]

**Aug: Qassim Declared: Fida'iyyūn Will Soon be Sent to Palestine.** On 11 Aug, Qassim expressed his belief that "in the not too distant future, groups of Palestinian 'Fida'iyyūn [Suicide Squads] will act against the enemy... it will be the beginning of the great battle to restore Palestine." (*Iraq Times*, 12 Aug) [Up to the end of 1960 no marauder action in Israel was reported.]

### THE UAR

**Mar: Truce Between UAR and Jordan Broken.** In the first days of Mar the relative truce in UAR-Jordanian relations came to an end. Relations deteriorated rapidly. The Jordanian attitude towards the PE became a permanent subject of UAR attacks (see UAR-Jordanian relations, p 149). King Hussein and his Premier Majālī were accused of opposing the establishment of the PE and the Palestinian Army. (*Ahram*, 7, 11, 22 Mar, 4, 22 April, 16 May, 22, 27, June, 6, Aug; *Gumhuriyah*, 8, 24 Mar, 22 May, 27 June, 7 July)

**Mar: UAR Accuses Qassim of "Bluffing."** On 18 Mar the UAR Deputy Minister of State for Presidential Af-

fairs, Abd al-Qādir Hātim, accused General Qassim of "bluffing" and resorting to lies "with regard to the Palestine question." He reiterated Abdel-Nasser's invitation to Qassim (made on 16 Feb) (*Ahram*, 17 Feb) "to send the Iraqi Army to our Republic to stand beside its brothers... in the firing line." [In Feb there was military tension between the UAR and Israel—see p 197 ff.]

"But," Hātim added, "Qassim has never intended to liberate Palestine, he is simply boasting and bluffing." (*Ahram*, 19 Mar)

**Apr to End of 1960—UAR-Iraqi Rapprochement.** As a result of the relative rapprochement between the UAR and Iraq, the UAR Press and radio refrained from attacking Iraq or General Qassim since early Apr (see UAR-Iraqi relations, p 144 ff).

**1959–1960: UAR Intensifies Development Projects in Gaza Strip.** In 1959 the UAR authorities began to intensify their development programmes in the Gaza Strip, and continued to do so in 1960. Projects included: afforestation on sand dunes; road-building; construction of a small port; distribution of agricultural land in the Rafah area; building of schools and opening of small industries such as cigarette manufacture (with the co-operation of UNWRA), carpet weaving and leather processing. (*Ahram*, 4 Sept, 1959, 24, 29 Jan, 12 Feb, 30 June, 21, 20 July, 8 Aug, 1960)

**Establishment of "Palestinian National Union" in UAR.** In Dec 1959, a "Palestinian National Union" (*Al-Ittihad al-Qawmi al-Falastini* (PNU) was set up in the Gaza Strip, with Munir ar-Rayyis as chairman. (*Ahram*, 23 Dec) [This organization corresponded to the NU in the UAR—see p 478 ff.]

**Apr:** A delegation headed by Munir ar-Rayyis was permitted to represent the "Palestinian Arabs" at the Afro-Asian Conference in Conakry. Wide circulation was given to its activities in helping to bring about the eviction of the Israeli Ambassador from the meetings. (*Ahram* 14, 15, 24 Apr) (See also p 186.)

**May:** On 24 May, Vice-President Amer proclaimed the establishment of the PNU in Syria. Its functions were to be "to build Arab Society on a sound basis, to reorganize the Palestinian people, to mobilize their efforts and capabilities for the liberation of this usurped part of the Arab home, and to keep the Palestine question and the refugee question as one standing whole as long as the country remains usurped and its inhabitants displaced." (*Gumhuriyah*, 25 May) The UAR Press saw in the establishment of the PNU the start of the realization of the UAR's plans to reorganize the Palestinian Arabs. *Al-Gumhuriyah* wrote: "The day is very near when our brethren the Palestinian Arabs in Lebanon and Jordan will join the PNU, thus giving the ultimate significance and meaning to the PE." (*Gumhuriyah*, 8 Aug)

Damascus Radio promised that a unified PNU would soon be set up to include all Palestinians residing in the UAR and the Gaza Strip. (*R. Damascus*, 17 June—BBC, 20 June) [This was not done during 1960.]

**July:** On 1 July elections for the executive committees (31 in number) of the PNU were conducted in Syria, and 244 out of 534 candidates were elected. (*Hayat*, 2 July, 3 Oct)

**Nov:** Following the congress of the PNU in the Gaza Strip during the first week of Nov, it was stated that the UAR authorities were considering the possibility of holding general elections to replace the appointed officials of the PNU. (*Akhbar*, 23 Nov)

## JORDAN

**Jan to End of 1960: Campaign for Public Support.** While both the UAR and Iraq attacked the Jordanian Government, using the PE as their main theme, King Hussein and Premier al-Majali conducted a campaign for public support throughout the Kingdom, especially in the West Bank. After the assassination of al-Majali in Aug, the King and his government resumed the campaign (see pp 322–3, 333).

One of their main themes was that "the arguments of certain Arab leaders about the PE are but an attempt on their part to evade responsibility towards Palestine." (*King Hussein, Difa* 2 Mar) "If these schemes are realized—God forbid—our brethren the Palestinians will have to face Zionist intrigues and danger alone." (*R. Amman*, 17 Feb—IMB, 18 Feb) In contrast, they declared, Jordan stood in the front line against Israel. The East and the West Bank had freely united and the Palestinians did not want to break up the union. King Hussein said that he was prepared to have a mission of neutral representatives from the Arab League states set up to conduct an on-the-spot enquiry in any part of Jordan. "If necessary the mission could supervise a plebiscite among the ex-Palestinians, to determine their future status... I am fully prepared to accept the plebiscite results whatever these may be." (*Jer. Times*, 17 Mar)

[The King reiterated this proposal in Oct—see below—but it was not taken up.]

In June, the Jordanian Minister of the Interior recommended the issue of Jordanian passports to Palestinians from Gaza working in the Persian Gulf. (*Jihad*, 30 June) Six such passports were issued during July. (*Difa*, 28 July)

**In the Inter-Arab Arena.** During Apr–May King Hussein paid official visits to Iran, Turkey, Morocco and other African countries (see pp 335–7). *Al-Hayat* estimated that the tour had raised his prestige in Jordan and especially in the West Bank. The King had also pressed his country's point of view on inter-Arab problems, including the PE. "He had good grounds for the hope that his explanations had made a favourable impression on the Moroccan King." (*Hayat*, 22 May)

It was reported that intensive Jordanian endeavours were being made to persuade the Saudi-Arabian authorities to support the Jordanian attitude on the PE. (*BAPP*, 6 May)

## AUG: THE ISSUE AT THE SHTURA MEETING

The question of the PE came up again at the Arab League Foreign Ministers' Conference at Shtura, 22 to 28 Aug (see p 129 ff).

**UAR and Iraqi Proposals.** The UAR again proposed the organization of the Palestinians into representative independent bodies and the creation of a Palestinian Army in the Arab host countries. Iraq, on the other hand, called for the creation of a Palestinian State, with a provisional government, first to include the Palestine territories outside Israel and later on to include the whole country, after its liberation. (*Ruz al-Yusuf*, 5 Sept; *Hayat*, 26–27 Aug)



In a Press conference, Hāshim Jawād, the Iraqi Foreign Minister, elaborated on the difference between his government's position and that of the UAR: "The battle against Zionism requires that we give it a tangible reality by including it in a defined geographical framework, which is the Palestinian State, which initially will claim the Palestinian lands with the exception of the occupied part." This State ought to be established under the auspices of the Arab League. It would be administered by Palestinians only. Sufficient guarantees would be given to safeguard its sovereignty. Referring to the Palestinian Army, Jawād said that the "Palestinians realize their responsibility and are taking the initiative in the battle." Only after the Palestinian State was formed would it be possible to organize the Palestinian Army proposed by the Iraqi Republic, which had already formed a nucleus for it. "The project of the Palestinian Army is part of the whole plan and cannot be realized outside the framework necessary for bringing it into existence." (*Jaridah, Beirut, 20 Aug; INA No. 193, 21 Aug*)

According to UAR sources, the Iraqi delegate had accepted the UAR's explanation that the formation of a Palestinian State could be regarded as the second step after organizing the Palestinian Arabs into independent entities. (*Ruz al-Yusuf, 5 Sept*)

[However, it seemed that Iraq took the Jordanian attitude into account. Thus in his opening speech, Jawād, had said that "the independent political personality of every Arab country must be recognized by everyone" (see p 129).]

**The Jordanian Attitude.** The Jordanian delegate rejected both proposals on the ground that their execution would put an end to the "Jordanian Entity." (*Hayat, Beirut, 25 Aug; Ruz al-Yusuf, 5 Sept*) Instead, he referred to Jordan's previous proposal to adopt a comprehensive plan for the restoration of Palestine, taking into consideration all military, economic and diplomatic aspects. (*R. Amman, 24 Aug-BBC, 26 Aug*)

**Resolutions Adopted.** No decision was reached on the proposals of Iraq and the UAR. On 28 Aug, the Council approved the following resolutions on the PE:

It reaffirmed that the Palestinian Arabs are the legitimate owners of Palestine and that they are entitled to recover their homeland with the aid and backing of the Arab states;

It emphasized that Arab states should maintain the Palestinian personality and avoid anything "apt to emaciate this personality, so that once the Palestinian people have retrieved their homeland and rights, they will be in a position to exercise these rights in a complete and sound manner";

It considered that circumstances had become more favourable for setting up the five-man committee of experts, decided upon by the Arab League Council in Feb 1960, to lay down a "comprehensive Plan" for the restoration of Palestine. (*Hayat, 29 Aug; BBC, 30 Aug*)

**The Arab Higher Committee on Shtura Resolutions.** *Al-Hayat* reported a declaration by the Arab Higher Committee criticizing the Shtura Conference for the "lack of any immediate and practical plan to regain Palestine." (*Hayat, 3 Sept*)

#### DEVELOPMENTS UP TO THE END OF 1960

**Aug:** Another "Palestine Government." It was reported that a "Free Palestine Government" had been established

in Geneva under the premiership of Tawfiq Tuqān, an ex-Palestinian. (*Hayat, 22-24 Aug*)

[No significance was attributed to Tuqān's activities.]

**Sept:** Conference of "Palestine Machineries" Postponed. The first conference of the "Palestine Machineries" of the Arab foreign offices (see above p 133) was scheduled to meet on 24 Sept, but was postponed at Jordan's request (*Difa', Jordan, 16 Sept*), [and did not meet until the end of the year].

**Oct:** Hussein Offers Jordan's Palestinians Freedom to Choose their Future Status. On 21 Oct King Hussein, in a "speech to the nation" on his participation in the UN General Assembly stressed Jordan's contributions to the Palestine question. He added: "We repeat today—in the face of the attempts by the deluded Abdel-Nasser to arouse suspicions about the unity of the Arab people in Jordan—that we are prepared to give the Jordanian citizens of the West Bank the opportunity to express their opinion on their fate and future... (*R. Amman, 21 Oct-IMB, 23 Oct*)

**Oct:** Abdel-Nasser Addresses the PNU in Damascus. On 18 Oct President Abdel-Nasser, addressing the executive committee of the PNU in Damascus, said: "Our first aim is to preserve the PE... because Zionism and imperialism consider that if they eradicate this then they can eliminate everything connected with the Palestine issue and bury it for ever... Your duty towards the people of Palestine is to organize them, leaving aside all differences and personal and material interests." (*BBC, 20 Oct*)

**Oct:** UAR Enlarges "Palestine Corner" Radio Programme. On 29 Oct the "Palestine Corner" programme of the Voice of the Arabs station was expanded to 2½ hours a day, and its name was changed to "The Voice of Palestine Broadcast" (*Idha'at Sawt Falastin*). (*Gumhuriyah, 29 Oct*) [Since 29 Oct the broadcast was heard daily between 0900-1100 and 1830-1900 local time.] The intention was reported to establish a separate "Palestine Broadcasting Station" to transmit directly from the Gaza Strip in Arabic and other languages. (*Akhbar, 3 Nov*)

**Dec:** Activities of Amin al-Husseini. *Ruz al-Yusuf* accused Hajj Amin al-Husseini and the Arab Higher Committee of "opposing" the reorganization of the Palestinian Arabs, "plotting" against the PE, and withholding financial help from Palestinian refugees in Lebanon who supported the PE. (*Ruz al-Yusuf, 27 Nov, 9 Dec*) On 8 Dec, the Arab Higher Committee published a statement rejecting "lies" accusing it of opposing the PE and emphasized that it had frequently urged the Arab countries to hold a free election among the Palestinian refugees, to establish an independent PE, to set up a Palestinian Army and to recruit Palestinian Arabs as irregular fighters [compare with General Qassim's announcement on Palestinian Fida'iyyūn—see above p 135]. (*Hayat, 9 Dec*)

#### THE "PALESTINIAN ARMY"

**Mar:** Iraqi Initiative. On 27 Mar, General Qassim issued a proclamation to "our brethren the Palestinians, wherever they may be... to join Iraqi military courses." Holders of university degrees were invited to register at the officers' college; recruits were promised equal terms of service with Iraqi recruits; and "those who will pass the courses as officers and other ranks will form the nucleus of the Palestinian armed forces when they are



formed." (*Zaman*, 28 Mar) "Large numbers" of Palestinian refugees were reported to have registered. (*Iraq Times*, 6 Apr)

**Apr-Aug: First Course.** On 15 Apr a ceremony took place at the Reserve Officers' College to celebrate the enrolment of the Palestinian cadets. The candidates were divided into holders of secondary school certificates and university degrees who would join a reserve officers' course, and others, who would undergo basic military training. (*Zaman*, 17 Apr)

On 11 Aug the first group of 199 Palestinian NCO's completed its basic military training. (*Zaman*, 12 Aug) Four days later, a group of 60 Palestinians was commissioned, four as officers and 56 as cadet officers. (*Zaman*, 16 Aug) The graduates were called "The First Palestinian Liberation Battalion," which was attached to the Fifth Division and charged "to train the subsequent Palestinian candidates." (*Al-Jumhuriyah al-Iraqiyah: Jaysh al-Tahrir al-Falastini*, Baghdad, 1961, p 12)

On 14 July, the Palestinian Battalion participated in a military parade to commemorate the Iraqi Revolution of 14 July 1958. (*Zaman*, 15 July)

**Iraqi Law on "Palestinian Liberation Army."** On 29 Aug the "Law on the Palestinian Liberation Army" was promulgated in the Iraqi Official Gazette, retroactive to 15 Apr (date of enrolment of the Palestinian cadets). The Law was aimed, according to the accompanying explanatory note, at forming the "Palestine Liberation Army" in order "to organize a courageous and active instrument (*Jihāz*) from among the sons of Palestine, who have faith in regaining their homeland." It stipulated that the Palestinian military forces would be attached to the Ministry of Defence and "linked" to the C.-in-C. of the armed forces. Candidates would be recruited on a voluntary basis. The Law also provided that, after passing the required courses, Palestinian college graduates would be commissioned as lieutenants, and holders of secondary school certificates as cadet-officers. The Law authorizes the C.-in-C. of the Iraqi armed forces to cancel the contracts of the Palestinians at his discretion (*ibid*, pp 13-14).

**Dec: Second Officers' Course.** In the first week of Dec the second officers' course was opened at the Reserve Officers' College in Baghdad. (*Zaman*, 8 Dec)

**Apr-Dec: Palestinian Army in the UAR.** Following the

news about General Qassim's intentions to give military training to Palestinians, the Cairo Press of 5 Apr stated that the UAR had already started to recruit a Palestinian Army in both regions of the Republic and in the Gaza Strip. (*Ahram*, 5 Apr) *Ruz al-Yusuf* reported that "thousands of courageous Palestinian young men have already undergone intensive military training in the Gaza Strip." (*Ruz al-Yusuf*, 6 June)

[NOTE: A "Palestine Division" in the Gaza Strip had been gradually built up by the Egyptian Army before 1956. It was commanded mostly by Egyptian officers. Designated the 8th Division, this formation took part in the Sinai Campaign, where it was destroyed. The remnants of one brigade were reorganized in 1957 and afterwards, into a "Palestine Brigade," stationed in Sinai.]

A Palestine detachment, carrying a banner reading "The Pioneers of the Palestinian Army," participated in the Military Parade in Cairo on 23 July, in commemoration of the 8th Anniversary of the Egyptian Revolution. (*Ahram*, 24 July)

On 2 Dec it was reported that "within 20 days" a "large group" of young Palestinians would be commissioned in the Gaza Strip. The training of this group was being undertaken by Palestinian officers. (*Akhbar*, 2 Dec)

**Nov: Military Training of Palestinian Students in Egyptian Universities.** *Al-Gumhuriyah* reported that Palestinian students in Egyptian universities were to be organized and trained in special Palestinian battalions." [Presumably within the framework of the pre-military training conducted in the universities.] (*Gumhuriyah*, 16, 28 Nov)

**July-Aug: Jordanian Forces Said to "Constitute the Palestinian Army."** King Hussein said on 16 Mar that the Jordanian forces "are actually the Palestinian Army . . . , which awaits the final day when it shall battle to regain our usurped rights in Palestine." (*Jer. Times*, 17 Mar)

During the discussion of the Palestine question at the Arab Foreign Ministers' conference in Shtura (see p 129 ff), the Jordanian delegate stated that the Jordanian National Guard composed of Palestinians, which "protects the Jordanian frontiers against Israel," is the Palestinian Army. (*BBC*, 29 Aug)

[NOTE: In 1949 the Jordanian Government established the National Guard and entrusted it with the responsibility of defending the villages along the Israel-Jordanian border. Most of its members are Palestinian Arabs. In addition, Jordanians of Palestinian origin serve in the Jordanian Army.]

## INTER-ARAB ECONOMIC RELATIONS

### THE ECONOMIC COUNCIL OF THE ARAB LEAGUE

**Background Note:** The Economic Council (EC) was established in 1950 under the Treaty of Joint Defence and Economic Cooperation to coordinate efforts to raise the standard of living in the member states, develop and exploit their natural resources, and foster the exchange of agricultural and industrial products. The Treaty was signed by Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia and Yemen.

The first session took place in 1953, and four more were held up to the end of 1959.

**1959-1960: Change in Status of Council.** In Mar 1959

the League decided to give the EC an independent status, thus enabling Arab countries which were not members of the League or had not signed the "Joint Treaty" to join it. Morocco took part as a full member in the Dec 1960 session, during which it was decided to admit Kuwait as of 1961. (*Ahram*, 26 Mar 1959; *LLA*, Apr 1960, Jan 1961)

**Mar-Dec 1960: 6th and 7th Sessions of the EC.** The EC met twice during the year, in Mar and Dec, with the participation of the member states: the UAR, Jordan, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Iraq and Morocco (the last two in Dec only). The Mar session was also attended by observers from Sudan, Libya and Morocco; the Dec session by Sudan, Libya, Kuwait and Qatar.

At its Dec session the EC unanimously decided to admit the Kuwait Government as a regular member. (*Hayat*, 19 Dec)

There were many subjects on the agenda of the EC for its Mar and Dec session, but some were postponed for the next session in 1961.

**Topics Discussed.** The subjects discussed included the Arab boycott against Israel (see p 187) and coordination of the Arab League states' oil policy (see pp 60-61). In reaction against French policy in Algeria, the EC decided at its Dec session to recommend that the Arab governments adopt strict measures in all economic aspects binding France with the Arab countries, and attempt to divert Arab trade from French markets. [No measures were apparently taken by Arab countries to implement this recommendation.]

In both Mar and Dec the Council discussed the advancement of the Arab economies. At the latter session it decided to set up a technical-agricultural body to coordinate the agricultural development of the Arab countries.

With a view to industrial coordination, the EC recommended a survey of industries in the member countries, and a conference of Arab Ministers of Industry to establish procedures. Basic studies were to be prepared by a committee of senior specialists before the conference.

**Topics Postponed.** The following topics [which included all the important projects for inter-Arab economic co-operation] were considered by the EC but further discussion was postponed until 1961.

- (a) Exemption of Arab companies and establishments from local nationality restrictions;
- (b) Ratification of the agreement on the Arab Financial Foundation for economic development;
- (c) Ratification of an Economic Union Agreement (*Wahdah Iqtisadiyah Arabiyah*) and setting up the Arab Common Market (*Suq Arabiyah Mushtarakah*);
- (d) "Completion of the signing and ratification of the agreement for the establishment of the Arab Pipeline Company";
- (e) Transit between Arab countries;
- (f) The Arab Navigation Co. and the Arab Airline Co. (*Hayat*, 6, 7 Mar, 16 Dec; *BBC*, 20 Dec)

Details of some of these projects are given below. [The sources cited in this section do not make clear whether the Common Market and the Economic Union constitute one or two separate projects. They are usually referred to jointly.]

**Arab Common Market and Arab Economic Union.** [In Jan 1959 the EC discussed practical measures to speed up the establishment of an Arab Common Market on the pattern of the European Common Market, as a first step towards Arab economic union. Iraq insisted that the Common Market and the Economic Union should be established only after detailed study and research.]

At the Mar and Dec 1960 sessions, the EC discussed again the project, and it was again accepted in principle.

At its Mar session, the EC approved the establishment of a Permanent Technical Office to examine the problem and submit proposals for approval. (*LLA*, Apr)

At its Dec session, the EC again emphasized the need for setting up the Office; this time it decided to expand its scope to cover all aspects of inter-Arab economic co-ordination, and recommended that the League's Council should draw up an adequate budget for it. At this session the EC also adopted a series of recommendations to

members on the reduction of the use of inter-Arab import and export licences to the minimum and their final abolition not later "than ten years hence." (*BBC*, 20 Dec)

**Boycott of Israel.** See p 186 ff.

**The Arab Financial Foundation** (*Al-Mu'assasah al-Maliyah al-Arabiyyah*). [In 1957 an agreement was signed between the Arab League countries, with the exception of Iraq and Lebanon (which adhered later), on the establishment of an Arab development bank to be called the Arab Financial Foundation, with a capital of LE20 million. The member states would take up shares in the bank in proportion to their participation in the Arab League budget.]

In Jan 1959 the EC adopted Iraq's proposal to limit to 40 per cent the participation of any one country in the Foundation's capital. (The UAR's share in the League budget was still 50.29 per cent at this time, but was reduced later, after the adhesion of Morocco and Tunisia to the League.)

The purpose of the bank was to be the economic development of its member countries by encouraging the steady growth of productive projects undertaken by governments organizations and individuals, by granting or guaranteeing loans, or directly participating in their projects. (*LLA*, Feb 1959, Apr 1960)

The members of the Foundation in Jan 1959 were the UAR, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Lebanon, Yemen, Jordan and Libya, (*LLA*, Feb 1959)

By January 1959, subscriptions for over 75 per cent of the Foundation's capital had been confirmed, which made it possible for it to start legal operation. (*LLA*, Feb 1959) [Up to the end of 1960 preparations for the actual establishment and operation of the bank had not been initiated.]

**The Arab Monetary Fund** (*Sandūk an-Naqd al-Arabi*). On the UAR's recommendation, the EC decided at its Mar 1960 session on the establishment of an Arab Monetary Fund to facilitate capital transfers and encourage barter trade between the Arab countries. The Fund was also to help settle monetary problems arising between the member states and to provide temporary cover for deficits in the balance of payments between them. (*LLA*, Apr; *VEFRPA*, Mar)

[No practical steps for the implementation of this decision had been taken up to the end of 1960.]

**Arab Shipping Company.** [The establishment of an Arab Shipping Company was proposed to the EC by the UAR in Jan 1959 and accepted. It was decided that the company's capital should be LE5.3 million, to be divided as follows: UAR 40 per cent; Iraq 14 per cent; Saudi Arabia 14 per cent; Lebanon 5 per cent; Sudan 4 per cent; Jordan 2.5 per cent; Yemen 2 per cent; Libya 1.5 per cent. The remaining 17 per cent was to be taken up by Tunis, Morocco, Kuwait, Qatar and Bahrain.]

At its Dec session, the EC recommended that the Arab states should approve the company's final regulations before the opening of the next session of the Council. (*Hayat*, 19 Dec 1960)

**All-Arab Aviation Company.** [A plan for the establishment of an Arab aviation company, which should maintain flights between the Arab countries, as well as between them and foreign countries, was first raised at the Arab League Conference of experts on civil aviation in Beirut in Oct 1959. The Company's capital was estimated

at £17 million, and the member states were to contribute in proportion to their technical capacity, the number of air passengers and the number of their nationals living abroad. (*VEFRPA, Mar 1960*)

The proposal was brought up at the EC sessions in Mar and Dec. On the proposal of the Iraqi representative, who welcomed the idea, the EC decided to limit the shares to be allotted to any one country, to 20 per cent. (*BBC, 15 Dec*)

Lebanon proposed that the international airport at Beirut should serve as the centre for the Company's aircraft, or that it should establish its offices in Beirut. Both proposals were rejected. (*Hayat, 4 Jan 1961*)

The EC also decided to send a delegation to Montreal to negotiate with the International Civil Aviation Organization on securing a recognized international status for the company. The final allocation of its capital's share among the Arab states was entrusted to the League's Communications Committee, which was to meet in Feb, 1961. (*Falastin, Jordan, 22 Jan 1961*)

### INTER-ARAB TRANSIT

[Inter-Arab transit trade, which is mainly concerned with traffic between Iraq, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait with the Mediterranean ports in Lebanon and Syria, was seriously affected by growing inter-Arab tensions, especially since 1958. Frontiers were closed, and Syria imposed serious restrictions on transit. Iraq and Jordan began to look for substitutes; Iraq developed Basra port and made much use of the Turkish port of Alexandretta, Jordan developed Aqaba port. These changes caused damage to the Lebanese economy.]

**1959: Agreement Reached.** After several months of discussions and contacts, representatives of Lebanon, the UAR, Jordan and Saudi Arabia, met in Damascus at the end of 1959. Iraq did not send a delegation. An agreement was reached, based on the following principles:

(a) Abolition of transit imposts on capital goods and machinery;

(b) Transit rights in Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait for trucks belonging to the signatory states without hindrance, customs procedure or transit fees;

(c) Freedom of transit for goods between Saudi Arabia and the other Arab countries by all means of transport, without any limitations;

(d) A minimum of 40 per cent of the quantities of goods to be carried by rail between Beirut and Damascus, in order to enable the railway between the two countries to be fully utilized;

(e) Of the transit trade by road through Syria, 40 per cent was to be carried in UAR trucks. (*Hayat, 22 Jan 1960*)

A committee of representatives of the signatories was to meet from time to time to examine the implementation of the agreement, which was to enter into force when signed by at least three countries. Each country notifying the League Council of its consent to the agreement would be obligated to observe it in full. (*Hayat, 18 Dec 1959*)

**1960: Ratification and Implementation.** In Jan the agreement was ratified by Lebanon, Jordan and Saudi Arabia. (*Hayat, 21 Jan*) The UAR, on the other hand, delayed its ratification in spite of repeated promises. (*Hayat, 22 Jan, 14 Feb, 5 Mar, 10 Apr*) The UAR ultimately ratified the agreement at the beginning of May [as the result of Lebanese pressure?]. (*Hayat, 4 May*) The implementation of the agreement began early in Aug. (*Hayat,*

*4 Aug*) At its Dec session, the EC urged the member states to adhere to the existing transit agreement. If they had reports, amendments or complaints, they should submit them to the Secretariat of the Council, which would present them for discussion at the next session in 1961. (*LLA, Jan 1961*)

In the meantime, Iraq agreed, under Lebanese influence, to examine the terms of the agreement to determine the possibilities of adhesion. (*IMB, 16 Dec*)

### ARAB CRITICISM OF THE EC'S WORK

The work of the EC was sharply criticized during the year in Lebanon, the UAR and Iraq.

**Mar Session Described as "Complete Failure."** *Al-Amal*, Beirut, described the Mar session of the EC as a complete failure. Mainly to blame, the paper said, was the League Secretariat, which had manoeuvred to prevent the EC meeting in Beirut, submitted plans without previous preparation, shown a lack of sincerity in its efforts to secure real cooperation, and diverted the discussions to unpractical subjects. The paper was particularly critical of the decisions on oil, which it regarded as impracticable. (*Amal, 13 Mar*)

**Radical Reform Called For.** A Damascus periodical said that the EC's resolutions at its Mar session were of a routine character and of little value. They were a disappointment to everyone who regarded the League as a supreme body aiming at the unity of the Arab people, and contained no more than aspirations and recommendations. The structure of the EC should be radically reformed. It should be regarded as a purely economic, non-political body, and it should be granted super-national authority to enact laws and determine solutions for the common economic problems of the Arab countries. (*VEFRPA, Mar 1960*)

**"Enormous Amount of Talking—No Deeds."** Referring to the "enormous amount of talking" on Arab economic cooperation, which was not put into practice, the Iraqi Communist paper *Sawt al-Ahrar* deplored that such issues as the Arab Monetary Fund and the Arab Common Market should have so far remained in the sphere of mere polemics, with no sign of translating words into deeds.

It had become fashionable for Arab delegates to do extensive talking on such matters as solidarity, harmony and readiness to sacrifice without ever troubling to define precisely what these terms imply, the paper said. (*Sawt al-Ahrar, 13 Dec, quoted in Iraq Times, 14 Dec*)

**Disregard for EC Alleged.** A Cairo paper described the meeting in Cairo of a sub-committee of the EC [on 14–23 Nov] as an example of the Arab states' disregard for every subject connected with economic union. [The paper did not mention the subjects dealt with by the sub-committee.]

The sessions were theatrical and ridiculous, the paper declared. The attitude of the delegates was "most extraordinary." The Director of the League's Economic Department left the meetings and went to Beirut. Whenever asked to express his opinion on any subject, the Iraqi delegate replied: We have already expressed our opinion last year. The Saudi representative said: Our attitude is in accordance with what all Arabs think. The Lebanese representative said: I am no expert, to be able to express an opinion. As for the representatives from Libya, Sudan, Yemen and Morocco—all they did was to listen to the discussions. (*Akhbar al-Yawm, 26 Nov*)

# INTER-ARAB TRADE

EXPORTS (according to statistics of exporting countries) in thousands of US dollars and per cent

		EXPORTS FROM							
	to	Bahrain <sup>1</sup> 1959	Iraq <sup>2</sup> 1959	Jordan <sup>4</sup> 1959	Lebanon <sup>5</sup> 1959	Libya <sup>6</sup> 1958	Sudan <sup>7</sup> 1958	UAR-Egypt <sup>8</sup> 1959	UAR-Syria <sup>9</sup> 1959
Aden		—	—	0,001	—	—	0,548	0,479	0,269
Bahrain		—	—	0,002	—	—	—	—	0,092
Iraq		—	—	0,500	4,443	7,03	1,638	0,252	3,285
Jordan		—	0,006	—	5,518	8,72	—	1,385	6,596
Kuwait		1,386	3,158	1,114	—	—	—	—	3,576
Lebanon		—	3,110	1,080	—	—	0,914	7,013	14,652
Libya		—	—	0,003	—	—	—	1,174	0,029
Morocco		—	—	—	—	—	—	0,218	0,001
Qatar		3,281	—	0,006	—	—	—	—	—
Saudi Arabia		12,860	1,708	0,771	7,907	12,51	4,080	7,431	5,695
Sudan		—	—	0,001	—	—	—	15,911	0,180
Tunisia		—	—	—	—	0,147	1,22	—	0,003
UAR-Egypt		—	1,747	0,002	1,004	2,021	16,73	—	19,100
UAR-Syria		—	—	2,009	9,392	14,85	—	17,608	—
Yemen		—	—	—	—	—	—	0,166	0,009
Exports to Arab States		17,527	9,729	5,489	28,264	44,70	8,277	51,638	53,487
Total Exports		22,781	32,480 <sup>3</sup>	9,553	63,225	12,076	131,500	455,000	119,000

(See notes and sources on next page)



## INTER-ARAB TRADE

IMPORTS (according to statistics of importing countries) in thousands of US dollars and per cent

INTER-ARAB TRADE

	IMPORTS INTO						
	Iraq <sup>2</sup> 1959	Jordan <sup>4</sup> 1959	Lebanon <sup>5</sup> 1959	Libya <sup>6</sup> 1958	Sudan <sup>7</sup> 1958	UAR-Egypt <sup>8</sup> 1959	UAR-Syria <sup>9</sup> 1959
<i>from</i>							
Aden	—	1,139	—	—	0,809	0,211	0,200
Bahrain	—	—	—	—	—	—	0,009
Iraq	—	0,592	7,066	—	0,213	0,780	4,184
Jordan	—	—	2,133	—	—	0,014	2,136
Kuwait	—	0,018	—	—	—	—	0,558
Lebanon	4,116	4,800	—	—	0,196	2,085	8,114
Libya	—	—	—	—	—	3,961	0,048
Morocco	—	—	—	—	—	0,624	0,072
Muscat and Oman	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Saudi Arabia	—	1,487	15,332	—	1,800	16,667	1,463
Sudan	—	0,900	—	—	—	5,101	0,588
Tunisia	—	—	—	0,714	—	0,062	0,151
UAR-Egypt	—	2,058	5,484	2,089	5.63	—	11,395
UAR-Syria	3,410	8,482	28,525	—	—	21,868	—
Yemen	—	—	—	—	—	0,502	0,003
Imports from Arab states	7,526	19,476	58,540	2,803	13,182	51,875	28,921
Total imports	278,320	112,918	318,106	96,600	180,624	630,700	190,600

## Notes and Sources:

(a) Separate tables for exports and imports are required because of the disparity between the statistics published by different countries in regard to the same foreign trade transactions.

(b) The dollar figures are calculated at official exchange rates as published by International Financial Statistics, International Monetary Fund, Jan 1961.

1. The Middle East, 1961 (Europa Publication Limited).

2. Etude Mensuelle sur la Vie Economique et Financière de la RAU et des Pays Arabes, Oct 1960 (Bureau des Documentations Arabes—Damascus).

3. Excluding exports of petroleum products amounting to 564.5 million dollars.

4. Statistical Yearbook, 1959, Ministry of National Economy, The Hashimite Kingdom of Jordan.

5. Commerce du Levant (Beirut), 6 Apr 1960.

6. Yearbook of International Trade Statistics, 1958, UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs.

7. Ibid.

8. Monthly Summary of Foreign Trade, 1959, Presidency of the Republic, Department of Statistics, UAR Southern Region.

9. Statistical Abstract, 1959, Ministry of Planning, UAR Syrian Region.

## INTER-ARAB CONFERENCES

**Feb: 7th Arab Pharmaceutical Conference** (*al-Mu'tamar as-Saydali al-Arabi*). Delegates from Saudi Arabia, Morocco, Yemen, Jordan, Lebanon, the UAR and Algeria attended the seventh Arab Pharmaceutical Conference, which opened in Alexandria on 4 Feb. (*Ahrar*, 5 Feb) The Conference called for: encouragement for the marketing of Arabic pharmaceutical products; the raising of the scientific standards of Arab pharmacists; the unification of pharmaceutical laws in the Arab countries; the stabilization of prices of medical products; the unification of university curricula in pharmacology in the Arab world. These resolutions were passed on to the Secretariat of the Arab League. (*Falastin*, 26 Feb)

**Feb: Fifth Conference of Arab Tourist Agencies** (*Mu'tamar Wakalat as-Safar al-Arabiyyah*). The Conference took place in Damascus between 19-22 Feb, and was attended by some 100 representatives of travel offices in Lebanon, Jordan, Libya, the Sudan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar and both regions of the UAR. The conference discussed tourist problems in the Arab world in general; ways to encourage tourists to visit Arab countries, and the easing of entry formalities for Arab tourists. (*Hayat*, 24 Feb)

**Mar: Arab League Anti-Locust Conferences** (*Mu'tamar Mukafahat al-Jarad*). On 18 Mar delegates from Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Lebanon, Yemen and the UAR attended a conference in Damascus to discuss joint measures for combating locusts. (*Hayat*, 10, 24 Mar)

**Mar: Arab League Information Standing Committee.** On 2 Mar a five-day meeting of this committee was opened at Arab League headquarters, under the chairmanship of Sa'ad Afrah, head of the UAR delegation. The other participants were the Directors of Information of Morocco, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Libya and Lebanon. Iraq, Jordan, Sudan and Tunisia declined to attend. (*Gumhuriyah*, 3 Mar)

The committee called on the Arab countries to send missions to African and Asian countries to counter Zionist and imperialist activities there. It emphasized the importance of cultivating Arab personalities and communities in foreign countries. Clubs should be opened in these communities, to which influential non-Arabs should be invited. The committee advocated the unification of the League members' information services, and the coordination and dissemination by the Secretariat-General of informative material of a general Arab character. (*Hayat*, 9 Mar)

**Mar: Arab League Anti-Narcotics Conference** (*Mu'tamar Mukafahat al-Mukhadarat*). On 29 Mar this conference ended its sessions in Cairo by proposing the establishment of a regional anti-narcotics organization for the Middle East. (*Ahram*, 30 Mar)

**Apr: Arab Postal Union Conference** (*Mu'tamar Ittihad al-Barid al-Arabi*). In Apr a preparatory meeting for this conference took place in Riyadh. It was attended by representatives from Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Yemen, Libya, Lebanon, the UAR, Iraq, Kuwait, Bahrain, Tunisia, and Algeria. (*Ahram*, 12 Apr)

**May-Aug: Arab Lawyers' Conference** (*Mu'tamar al-Muhamim al-Arab*). In May the permanent committee of this

conference met in the Old City of Jerusalem. Delegates representing lawyers associations in Jordan, Damascus, Aleppo, Latakia, Beirut, Tripoli, Iraq, Gaza, Egypt and Sudan attended. (*Jihad*, 24, 27 May)

Another meeting was held in Beirut during Aug. (*Hayat*, 17 Aug) These meetings were preparatory for the sixth Lawyers' Conference to take place in Cairo in Feb 1961.

**May: Arab Broadcasting Committee** (*Hay'at al-Idha'at al-Arabiyyah*). A meeting of this committee took place in Rabat on 24-29 May. (*Jaridah*, Beirut 19, 30 May)

**June: Arab League Physicians' Conference** (*Mu'tamar al-Atibba' al-Arab*). Delegates from the UAR, Saudi Arabia, Morocco, Yemen, Libya, Iraq, Jordan, Tunisia, Sudan and Lebanon participated in the 28th session of this conference, which took place in Beirut on 4-8 June. It called for the suspension of all nuclear tests and the coordination of the Arab states' efforts in the medical field. The next meeting was fixed for May 1961 in Cairo. (*Hayat* 9, 10 June)

**June-July: Sixth Session of Arab League Meteorological Committee** (*Lajnat al-Ahwāl al-Jawwīyah*). This session (26 June-5 July) took place in Amman, and was attended by representatives from Jordan, UAR, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Yemen and Libya and the Secretary of the Arab League Communications Committee. (*Falastin*, 26 June) The Committee recommended the expansion and standardization of meteorological services in the Arab countries, and the adoption of a common policy in the UN's international meteorological committee. (*Gumhuriyah*, 7 July)

**1-3 July: Third Conference of International Arab Tourism Union.** This conference met in Beirut on 1-3 July under the auspices of the Arab League. It recommended freedom of movement and currency transfers between the Arab states; the extension of the validity of Arab states' passports from one to three years, and the granting of visas for several journeys. It also recommended that the Arab states should provide better customs and tourist facilities, set up information and tourist offices abroad, unify hotel classifications and standards, and preserve Arab and Oriental architecture. (*BBC*, 5 July) According to the *Jerusalem Times* the conference decided "to work earnestly for the construction of a land network between Suez, Aqaba, Amman, Jerusalem, Damascus and Beirut." The conference decided also to accept Kuwait, Tunisia, Sudan and Morocco as members of the Union and to hold its forthcoming meeting in Morocco in the following Mar. (*Jer. Times*, 6 July)

**Aug: Arab League Telecommunications Conference.** This Conference was opened on 4 Aug in Tripoli, Libya. Delegates from the UAR, Jordan, Iraq, Sudan, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, Kuwait and Libya attended. After five days of discussions 16 resolutions and 19 recommendations were adopted. The main resolutions provided for the establishment of direct telephone communications between Jordan and Libya, and the restoration of cable and radio communications between Amman and Baghdad as soon as possible. Another resolution called for "the unification of the internal systems of the member states in connection with cable, postal and telephone works."

Recommendations were submitted for the establishment of a regional training institute in Cairo for cable, telephone and postal engineers and technicians, and the formation of a committee to create Arabic technical terms to replace foreign ones. It was decided to hold the next conference in Kuwait in Jan 1962. (*BBC, 30 Aug*)

21-24 Nov: The 10th Conference of Arab Chambers of Commerce and Agriculture was opened in Beirut on 21 Nov by Premier Sa'ib Slām of Lebanon. (The permanent committee had met in May, in Cairo.) (*Hayat, 3-6 May*) It was attended by 338 delegates from 14 Arab countries, as well as by representatives of the Arab League and of the Arab Head Office for the Boycott of Israel.

The Conference recommended that all Arab governments should seek to free inter-Arab trade from restrictions and adopt the principle of "Arab economic citizen-

ship" (*al-Muwatiniyah al-Iqtisadiyah al-Arabiyyah*), under which Arab individuals and industrial undertakings would be exempted from all commercial restrictions applied to foreigners in Arab countries. Arab countries were urged to establish close relations with the newly independent states of Africa and thus to counter Israeli trade activities there, to aid the Algerian insurgents and to unite in the task of "regaining Palestine." The Conference recommended the promotion of tourism in all Arab countries, the establishment of joint tourist agencies, and measures to foster economic cooperation and tourism between Cyprus and the Arab world. (*Hayat, 21-24 Nov*)

17-22 Dec: The International [Arab] Engineering Committee met in Cairo. Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Tunisia, Morocco, Yemen, Sudan, Saudi Arabia and the UAR were represented. (*Akhbar, 25 Dec*)

## RELATIONS BETWEEN THE UAR AND IRAQ

### SYNOPSIS

In the first three months of 1960 relations between Iraq and the UAR remained extremely tense. During Jan, in the trials before the People's Court in Baghdad, the UAR authorities were formally accused of complicity in the attempt on the life of General Qassim in Oct 1959. In a propaganda campaign lasting until the beginning of Apr, the severest insults were exchanged. At the beginning of this period Iraq also called for the "liberation" of Syria. In Feb, Iraq expressed opposition to Cairo as the meeting place of the Arab League Council, and when overruled boycotted the session.

In Apr there were signs of an improvement in relations, the propaganda campaign subsided in the first week of the month. Later in the month there was a show of solidarity over the *Cleopatra* affair (see below). In May, Iraq resumed participation in the League's activities. In June, Abdel-Nasser and Qassim made conciliatory statements and in July UAR and Iraqi representatives attended the celebrations of the anniversaries of their respective revolutions. Later in the year, other conciliatory gestures were made by both sides, and in Oct, Abdel-Nasser had a discussion with the Iraqi Foreign Minister in New York.

Some strain in relations remained, however. Generally, Iraq was slightly more eager than the UAR to clear the atmosphere; for instance, while Iraqi radio attacks on the UAR ceased completely in Apr, the UAR radio continued to attack in special programmes featuring Iraqi political refugees until Sept. In May-July some foreign observers commented that "the hatchet was not yet buried." In particular, they suspected the UAR of having changed only its tactics rather than its objective of effecting a change in the Iraqi regime.

Towards the end of the year, the Iraqi Foreign Minister said that a complete cure "might take some time" and that there was yet no intention of sending an Ambassador to Cairo. (Diplomatic relations were maintained at the level of *Chargés d'Affaires*.)

### DEC 1959-FEB 1960: ALLEGED UAR COMPLICITY IN ATTEMPT ON LIFE OF QASSIM

From 26 Dec 1959 to 30 Jan 1960 a Ba'athist group accused of attempting to assassinate General Qassim was on trial before the People's Court in Baghdad. Evidence was produced incriminating as-Sarāj, President of the Executive Council of the Syrian Region, and the Syrian

Bureau of Military Intelligence in the planning and financing of the attempt and the supply of arms to the group. The verdict was given on 25 Feb (see p 247).

### JAN-APR: THE PROPAGANDA CAMPAIGN: IRAQI PROPAGANDA

Iraqi propaganda directed at the UAR was dominated by the abuse showered on Abdel-Nasser by Colonel Mahdāwī, President of the People's Court. Outside the Court the situation in Syria, and the call for the "liberation" of Syria from the "Egyptian yoke" served as propaganda topics. Another permanent topic was the Palestine question: General Qassim called for the creation of a Palestinian Republic (a counter-plan to the UAR's Palestinian Entity project) and the UAR was accused of being one of the "thieves who stole parts of Palestine" (i.e.: the Gaza Strip). (For this last topic, see pp 135-6.)

Colonel Mahdāwī. Colonel Mahdāwī, while presiding over the Baghdad trial (see above), showered abuses on President Abdel-Nasser, using such terms as "mangy," "fool," "pig," "outcast," "a filthy one," "the son of Memphis," "the henchman of the British and the French," "traitor," "conspirator," "scoundrel," "abject person," "imperialist Quisling," "Communist agent," "Gamal The Butcher" (recalling Jamāl Pāsha, nicknamed "the Butcher," an Ottoman commander in Syria in the First World War, notorious for the persecution of Syrian nationalists). (*BBC, 19 Dec 1959-28 Mar 1960; IMB, 10 Mar; Mab-da', 26 Feb*)

The Iraqi radio and Press gave wide coverage to Mahdāwī's insults. On 9 Jan, Baghdad Radio promised the Arab people that "the day would come when the Arabs would cooperate to get rid of the microbe in Cairo." (*BBC, 11 Jan*) (See *BBC, Iraq Times*, and the *Iraqi Arab Press, 29 Dec 1959-Jan-Feb 1960*.)

General Qassim never mentioned Abdel-Nasser by name, and seldom referred directly to the UAR. He generally spoke of "the covetous ones" (*at-Tami'im*), who, because of their evil ambitions, disrupted the ranks of the Arabs and sought to sow dissension among the peaceful people of Iraq. Qassim used words such as "advocates of falsehood," "advocates of disunity," "Musaylamah the liar" (a famous liar in Arab history). (*Zaman, 3, 7, 22 Jan, 6 Feb*)

In one speech he said: "The Arab countries know the state which divides the Arab ranks and charges others with apostasy and treason... It claims Arabism while it is far from it... Our sister Arab countries have suffered much from those renegade rulers who have indulged in their sins because no one pursued them. They did not face enough resistance to make them keep within bounds... But now they have struck upon the Iraqi rock and will—God willing—be crushed to pieces." (*Zaman*, 5 Jan)

**Call for "Free Syrian Republic."** In Dec 1959, General Qassim called on several occasions for the establishment of "the immortal Syrian Republic" and promised Iraq's support. He emphasized that with the liberation of Iraq, the idea of the "Fertile Crescent" should be regarded as a "national plan," while previously it was an imperialistic tool. (*Zaman*, 7–31 Dec 1959) On 6 Jan, Qassim spoke again of the "liberation of Syria" and said that "as soon as we find our neighbour and sister Syria liberated and enjoying sovereignty, there is nothing to prevent us from consolidating our ties with her on the basis of fraternity and mutual interest. We shall give Syria's interests priority over ours." He declared that the "tyrannical injustices in Syria had not yet reached their limit" but "our country will not stand with hands tied in face of any injustice done to the Syrian people, because they are brothers and cousins." (*Zaman*, 7 Jan)

On 25 Dec 1959 a "Voice of the UAR" programme was introduced by Baghdad Radio. In Dec 1959 and Jan 1960 the Syrian people were called upon, in this programme and in the Iraqi radio and Press in general, to liberate themselves from the "false unity" with Egypt, and to regain their freedom and their leadership of Arab nationalism. Syria was referred to as "immortal Free Syria," "the immortal Syrian Republic," "the banner of true Arab nationalism," and "the revolting colony of Abdel-Nasser." "Confidential news" was given on Syria under the "despotism" of President Abdel-Nasser, describing general dissatisfaction, economic depression, students' clashes with the police, widespread agitation and demonstrations demanding freedom for Syria. (BBC; *IMB*; *Iraqi Press*, Dec 1959–Feb 1960)

#### JAN-APR: THE PROPAGANDA CAMPAIGN: UAR PROPAGANDA

**Topics.** The UAR accused General Qassim's regime of succumbing to Communism, deviating from the principles of the July revolution, and trying to destroy Arab solidarity. Iraq's plans for creating a "Palestinian Republic" were described as empty propaganda (for the last topic see p 136). Other topics were: the "terror regime" in Iraq, economic deterioration and general dissatisfaction, clashes between Nationalists and Communists, etc. (BBC; *IMB*; *UAR Press*, Jan–Mar)

**Special Radio Programmes and Clandestine Station.** Three special radio programmes were directed to Iraq daily: "The Iraq Corner," "What is Inside Iraq?" and "The Free Iraq Corner from Damascus." A clandestine station called "The Radio of the Free Iraqi Republic" (which according to Iraqi sources was located in Syria—*Zaman*, Baghdad, 12 Mar), also broadcast daily. Much of the regular commentaries from Cairo and Damascus Radio and the "Voice of the Arabs" was also devoted to the campaign. (BBC, *IMB*, Jan–Mar)

**Language Used.** The Iraqis were urged to fight against the "red regime" of the "pro-Communist" General Qassim and his henchmen. They were reminded of the "atrocious massacres" in Mosul, Kirkuk and Baghdad com-

mitted by the Communists "who are now dominating Qassim." Qassim was described as "traitor," "murderer," "red agent," "fool," "divider of Iraq" (*Qassim-al-Iraq*, a play on words, often used by Abdel-Nasser), "enemy of God" and "infidel," while Colonel Maḥdāwī was referred to as "the clown," "pirate," "bitten dog." (BBC; *IMB*; *UAR Press*, Jan–Mar)

**Abdel-Nasser Says Qassim Successor of Nūrī as-Sa'īd.** On 16 Feb, in a speech at Deir az-Zor (Syria), Abdel-Nasser said, "The leader of Iraq has changed the course of the revolution and made himself the successor of Nūrī as-Sa'īd... The leaders of Iraq have fallen under the influence of Communism and the imperialist stooges and sided with the enemies of Arab nationalism." (*Ahram*, 17 Feb)

**Iraqi People "Will Liberate Themselves."** Referring to Qassim's promise to help the Syrians against their "oppressors" (see above), Abdel-Nasser said: "I would never say that we would liberate the people of Iraq, because they are capable of liberating themselves as they have done in the past... Baghdad Radio and the leaders of Baghdad have declared war against the Arab people, a war against the UAR and its Arabism and nationalism, but all these do not affect the Arab people of Iraq... They are resisting this defection and deviation regardless of their martyrdom." (*Ahram*, 17 Feb)

**Feb–Mar: Abdel-Nasser–Qassim Exchanges on "Liberation of Palestine."** In his speech President Abdel-Nasser accused General Qassim of making a mockery of the Palestine issue in order to boost his collapsing popularity. "If Qassim wants to liberate Palestine... I hereby invite him to send the Iraqi Army to our Republic to stand side by side with the UAR forces... I hereby extend to him a sincere invitation to come to the front lines." (*Ahram*, 17 Feb) On 26 Feb the UAR Deputy Minister of State for Presidential Affairs reiterated this invitation. (*Ahram*, 27 Feb) In answer, General Qassim wondered "what purpose this is to serve! Is it the idea that the army should just stand on the border? Undoubtedly, blows will be dealt by the enemy to the army which stands on the borders..." [But if the purpose is] "to attack the occupied lands, we shall send it [the Iraqi Army]. If they wish this, we are fully prepared..." (*Zaman*, 7 Mar)

#### FEB-APR: VARIOUS INCIDENTS

**Feb: Iraq Objects to Cairo as Venue of League Council Session.** The official explanation for Iraq's non-participation in the League Foreign Ministers' Council of Feb was that "Cairo could not be a suitable place for the meeting" because "Iraq is being subjected to unjust attacks from the UAR." (*Zaman*, 11 Feb) President Nasser and the UAR Press described Iraq's defection as an attempt to destroy Arab solidarity, while the Iraqi propaganda machine denounced the UAR's manoeuvres and the League SG's weakness (see p 126).

**Apr: Iraq Protests to Indian Government on its Attitude to Nasser.** According to *az-Zamān*, Baghdad, the Iraqi embassy in New-Delhi made representations to the Indian Government regarding a reference by the President of the Indian Parliament to President Nasser, then on an official visit to India (see pp 538–9), as a probable future president of all Arab countries. (*Zaman*, 3 Apr)

**Apr: An Iraqi Pilot Defects to Damascus.** On 4 Apr an Iraqi pilot, with his Hawker-Hunter fighter plane, defected



to Damascus, where he requested political asylum. (*Ahram*, 5 Apr) *Al-Ahrām* described him as "one of the free Iraqi officers who could not tolerate the treason of the Iraqi leaders and the domination of the Communists in Arabic Iraq." (*Ahram*, 6 Apr) The UAR radio stations paid only passing attention to this issue in their general programmes, but much was made of it in the special programmes such as "The Free Iraq Corner" and the "Radio of the Free Iraqi Republic." [The pilot later fled to Amman, where he told of UAR plans for a coup d'état in Iraq, see below.] (*BBC*, *IMB*, 4-10 Apr)

#### APR-JULY: RELAXATION OF TENSION

**Apr:** Propaganda Campaign Subsides. Signs of a relaxation in UAR-Iraqi tension appeared in the first half of Apr. During the first week of the month the propaganda campaign began to subside. By mid-Apr, Iraqi radio attacks had ceased completely. Radio Baghdad started to refer to Syria as, "the Northern Region of the UAR" (the official designation instead of "Abdel-Nasser's Colony," etc.). The Iraqi non-Communist Press started to call for the strengthening of Arab solidarity, to forget the harm done to Iraq in the past, and to open a new page in inter-Arab relations (see *Zaman*, 18, 26 Apr; *Taqaddum*, 23, 28 Apr; *Bilad*, 26 Apr).

The UAR broadcasting services also stopped their attacks on Iraq in their general programmes in mid-Apr. The last attack on Iraq by the "Voice of the Arabs" came on 26 Apr after a week of silence. However Damascus Radio's "Free Iraq Corner" programmes and the "Radio of the Free Iraqi Republic" continued to attack General Qassim and his regime. Each of these programmes was broadcast daily for half an hour. (They stopped only in Sept—see below.) (*BBC*, *IMB* for Apr; *IMH*, 15 Apr)

The UAR Press did not comment on these developments, even indirectly, as the Iraqi Press did (see UAR Press for Apr).

**Apr:** Iraqi-UAR Solidarity on "Cleopatra" Incident. The *Cleopatra* incident in New York port was the occasion of a display of inter-Arab agreement on a counterboycott of the US, in which Iraq supported the general Arab attitude (see p 41).

On 7 May, Radio Baghdad, summing up, said that the struggle against imperialism and Zionism was the proper field for Arab solidarity, which was conditioned on non-interference by all Arab countries in each other's internal affairs. (*IMB*, 8 May)

The UAR Press gave wide publicity to the attitude of the Iraqi Government and Press. (*Gumhuriyah*, *Akhbar*; *Ahram*, 26 Apr, 8 May)

**May:** Iraq Renews Relations with Arab League. In May, Iraq agreed to renew its relations with the Arab League (see p 129). This was regarded as a further step in the improvement of relations between Iraq and the UAR. (*Times*, 16 May) In the first week of May a commercial delegation represented Iraq at the Conference of the Arab Chambers of Commerce in Cairo. (*Zaman*, 6 May)

**4-9 June:** Conciliatory Statements by Qassim and Abdel-Nasser. In a speech on 4 June, General Qassim named Egypt and Syria among the countries with which Iraq had "shared in the joint struggle in matters of foreign policy... We have forgotten the past and the wrongdoing and the assaults made on us." (*Zaman*, 5 June—*BBC*, 7 June) Basing himself on this speech, the Vice-President of the National Democratic Party, Hudaib al-

Hajj Hammūd, called on the men in power in the UAR and Iraq to show themselves forgiving and tolerant and "to prepare to unify parts of the Arab nation in a democratic manner as chosen by the Arab people." [This Iraqi party advocates the federation of the Arab states—see also p 245.] (*Ahali*, 16 June, 5 July)

On 9 June, at a Press conference in Athens, Abdel-Nasser said, in reply to a question about the UAR's relations with Iraq, that their disagreements should be regarded as a family matter: "The clouds will soon pass, as happens between members of the same family." (*Ahram*, 11 June)

**July:** Partial Renewal of Iraqi Transit Through Syria. [In mid-1959 Iraq closed its frontier with Syria. The UAR retaliated by forbidding Iraqi aircraft to fly over Syria. The transit of goods from Beirut Port to Iraq through Syria was severely restricted, and when it was permitted, Syrian vehicles carried the goods to the Iraqi frontier.]

On 2 July the Syrian authorities, at the request of the Lebanese Government (*Hayat*, 1 July) agreed to permit Iraqi tourists to cross Syrian territory with their vehicles on their way to Lebanon and back. The frontier was opened three days a week. (*Ayyam*, 3, 13 July) [The banning of Iraqi Airlines from Syrian skies remained in force.]

**July:** Iraq Refugee Accuses UAR of Planning Coup d'Etat in Iraq. The Iraqi pilot who had requested political asylum in Syria early in Apr (see above) arrived in Amman via Beirut on 4 July (see p 153). He declared that Abdel-Nasser, in cooperation with Iraqi political refugees in Syria and the Lebanon and a group of officers in Iraq, had planned a coup d'état in the latter country. (*Jer. Times*, 7 July)

In spite of the intensive exploitation of this issue by the Jordanian radio and Press in their propaganda campaign against the UAR, Baghdad Radio did not even include it in its news bulletin. (*BBC*, 5-12 July)

Cairo Radio denounced the allegation as another slander on the UAR. (*BBC*, 7 July)

**Representatives of UAR and Iraq Attend Celebrations of Each Other's Revolutions.** Iraq invited the UAR to send representatives to the celebrations of the second anniversary of the 14 July Revolution. The UAR Chargé d'Affaires in Baghdad represented his country at the celebrations (but no special representatives were sent). (*Ahram*, 15 July)

The UAR Deputy Foreign Minister attended a reception given by the Iraqi Chargé d'Affaires in Cairo, and UAR Ambassadors abroad attended the receptions given by the Iraqi embassies. (*Ahram*, 15, 18 July) In its general broadcasts, the UAR did not mention the Iraqi anniversary. (*BBC*, 15 July) The "Free Iraq Corner" programme of Damascus and the "Radio of the Free Iraqi Republic" attacked the regime and denounced General Qassim's deviation from the principles of the revolution. (*BBC*, 16-17 July)

The reception at the UAR embassy in Baghdad on the anniversary of the Egyptian revolution on 23 July was attended by the Iraqi Foreign Minister and the C-in-C, General Abdi. Several Iraqi newspapers carried editorials praising the revolution (*Zaman*; *Akhbar*; *Bilad* 23, 24 July) while one also published a portrait of President Abdel-Nasser. (*Baghdad*, 24 July) [This was the first time for over a year that a portrait of Abdel-Nasser had appeared in Iraqi papers.]

A foreign observer saw in these exchanges of courtesies a formalization of the improvement in relations between the two countries. He noted, however, that the UAR had been "slightly less enthusiastic" on these occasions than Iraq. (*Scotsman*, 28 July)

#### COMMENT: "HATCHET NOT BURIED"

**July: Qassim Offers Friendship.** On 15 July General Qassim, addressing Iraqi cadets at the Military College, said: "We are brothers to the UAR, which includes Egypt and Syria... [naming other Arab countries] and we support them." He stressed "Iraq's policy of cooperation with other Arab countries" and said, "We have decided to settle our differences with our neighbours by peaceful means." (*Zaman*, 16 July) The UAR Press reported the above declaration under large headlines without comment. *Al-Ahrām* and *al-Gumhuriyah* published a large photo of General Qassim. (*Ahrām*, *Eg. Gaz*; *Gumhuriyah*, 16-17 July)

**May: Comments on Background to Rapprochement.** *The Times* and *Scotsman* Middle East correspondents commented during May: "The relaxation was made possible," *The Scotsman* said, "by Qassim's recent toughness with the Iraqi Communists and partly by Nasser's apparent inability to make any headway against Qassim by propaganda or intrigue." (*Scotsman*, 27 May) [On Qassim's measures against the Communists, see p 230.]

*The Times* correspondent in Cairo surmised "that the UAR believes General Qassim's latest anti-Communist measures will prove efficacious enough for the nationalist camp to be strengthened; Baghdad, on the other hand, according to recent indications, appears to have been regretting its self-imposed exclusion from the League meetings, which has deprived it of a platform for expressing its own view-point." (*Times*, 16 May)

**May-July: Comments on Prospects of the Rapprochement.** *The Times* commented that the conciliatory remarks of Abdel-Nasser and Qassim (see above) "fall still short of burying the hatchet." (*Times*, 16 June) In May, *The Scotsman* wrote that "so long as Qassim keeps Abdel-Nasser's pan-Arab friends in a state of total suppression the hatchet cannot be more than half-buried." (*Scotsman*, 27 May)

Later, in July, the paper commented: "The rapprochement may have little foundation so far as the UAR is concerned. President Abdel-Nasser appears to be ready to forgo attempts to overthrow Brigadier Qassim by force or subversion merely because he believes that they will not be necessary. There is a widespread belief in Cairo that Qassim will be overthrown by the pro-Nasser Iraqi nationalists who have gained in strength recently." (*Scotsman*, 28 July)

#### AUG-DEC: IMPROVEMENT OF RELATIONS CONTINUES

**July-Aug: UAR Criticizes Iraqi Attitude Towards Iran.** [On 26 July the UAR broke off diplomatic relations with Iran because the Shah had allegedly newly recognized Israel. The reaction of the other Arab countries was much more moderate (see p 216 ff). The "Voice of the Arabs" commentator accused General Qassim of preferring to side with "agents and traitors" rather than with the UAR, "because he is afraid to incur the Shah's anger." (*BBC*, 8 Aug) [This was the only attack in the UAR's general radio programmes.] *Al Ahrām* appealed to Qassim "in the name of Arab solidarity" to follow the UAR line to-

wards Iran instead of accepting the Iranian explanations. (*Ahrām*, 4 Aug) On the other hand, the "Free Iraq Corner" of Damascus Radio and "Radio of the Free Iraqi Republic" launched severe attacks on Qassim in connection with this issue. (*BBC*, 1-8 Aug)

**Aug: Iraq Participates in League Council Session.** Iraq took an active part in the Arab Foreign Ministers' Conference in Shtura at the end of Aug (see p 129 ff). During the Conference a private meeting was held between the Iraqi and UAR Foreign Ministers. The former, Jawād, expressed his favourable impression of the conversation. (*Hayat*, 26 Aug)

**Aug-Sept: UAR Anti-Iraqi Broadcast Stopped.** At the end of Aug, in an interview, General Qassim deplored the hostile broadcasts against Iraq, clandestine and open, from the "Free Iraq Corner" of Damascus and the "Radio of the Free Iraqi Republic." He added: "Does it promote Arab solidarity to broadcast lies and falsehoods? When will our brethren in the UAR abandon this course, which events have shown to be futile?" (*Thawrah*, 28 Aug) The next day a government spokesman advised the UAR authorities to realize that attacks against Iraq and its achievements would not harm Iraq, but would split the Arab ranks. Besides they were contrary to the recent decision taken by the Arab Foreign Ministers in Shtura, urging all Arab countries to refrain from such actions. (*Iraq Times*, 30 Aug)

On 8 Sept the programmes of the "Free Iraq Corner" and the "Radio of the Free Iraqi Republic" were heard for the last time in 1960. (*BBC*; *IMB*, Sept-Dec)

**Oct: President Abdel-Nasser Meets Iraqi Foreign Minister.** On 4 Oct President Nasser had a 40-minute meeting with the Iraqi Foreign Minister, Hashim Jawād, in New York. According to INA, the two leaders discussed "Arab world aspirations, the interests of the Arab nation and the future of relations between the fraternal Arab countries." (*BBC*, 7 Oct) Baghdad Radio gave prominence to the meeting and expressed the hope that it would lead to an improvement in Iraqi-UAR relations. It also broadcast an *al-Ahrām* dispatch which said that the meeting had been very cordial and would have an important effect. (*Ahrām*, 5 Oct; *BBC*, 7 Oct)

**Nov: Jawād: Gradual Improvement—but Meeting Between Abdel-Nasser and Qassim "Premature."** On his return to Baghdad, Jawād said that he expected relations between Iraq and the UAR to improve gradually, but "a complete cure of the recently failing relations might take some time... Things have to be built up gradually and should be developed with patience and not in a rush. They should be built so they will not be swept away by emotions." He added that a meeting between President Abdel-Nasser and General Qassim would be "premature now... let us, small people, prepare the thing, we need to do plenty of talking and preparing." He announced also that "there is no thought now of sending an Ambassador to Cairo." (*Zaman*, 6 Nov)

**Dec: Syrian Border Patrol Detained in Iraq.** On 1 Dec, Iraqi authorities detained a six-man Syrian border customs patrol which had crossed by mistake into Iraqi territory. (*R. Beirut*, 1 Dec-*IMB*, 2 Dec) The patrol was released on 8 Dec. (*R. Beirut*, 10 Dec-*IMB*, 11 Dec)

**Renewal of Economic Relations?** It was reported that various commercial institutions in Cairo offered to exchange industrial products against Iraqi dates. (*Hayat*, 1

*Dec*) On 5 Dec a large Iraqi delegation attended the meetings of the League Economic Council in Cairo, and the Iraqi Minister of Commerce met the UAR Minister of Economic Affairs and discussed matters relating to

their respective countries. (*R. Baghdad, 14 Dec-IMB, 16 Dec*) Between 17-22 Dec, an Iraqi delegation took part in the International [Arab] Engineering Committee in Cairo. (*Zaman, 25 Dec*)

## RELATIONS BETWEEN THE UAR AND JORDAN

### SYNOPSIS

At the beginning of 1960, the truce in the propaganda war between the UAR and Jordan, which had been initiated in Aug 1959, was still in force. Yet even while the agreement on the truce was being reached, the UAR had brought up a new proposal which was to result in the renewal of the open conflict between the two countries. This was the creation of a Palestinian Entity (see p 132) which would perforce have led ultimately to the dismemberment of Jordan, and even at the beginning would have meant a serious infringement of its sovereignty. Jordan's blocking of the UAR proposal at the League Council in Feb 1960, and King Hussein's subsequent public denunciation of the Palestinian scheme led in the first week of Mar to the renewal of the UAR campaign against Jordan, which soon retaliated.

The campaign had two major aspects: propaganda warfare and directly subversive activities. In the period before the assassination of the Jordanian Premier, al-Majāli, at the end of Aug, the UAR was on the offensive; after the assassination Jordanian initiative was more prominent, while the UAR continued to press the attack.

From the beginning of the campaign, UAR propaganda concentrated on incitement to murder King Hussein and leaders of his regime and this was kept up until the end of the year (though at times priority was temporarily given to other topics). During the first period, the basic approach of the Jordanian authorities—though not the tone of their propaganda—was mainly defensive. Hussein fought for the loyalty of the Palestinians—the majority of his subjects. The King, the Premier and others made extensive tours all over the country to win the support of the people. King Hussein's visits to Middle East, Arab, European and African countries in Apr and May were also to a large extent part of this campaign; they were designed to strengthen the King's prestige at home and the position of the Kingdom vis-à-vis the UAR abroad (see pp 335-7). (See also Jordan, internal affairs p 316 ff.)

Simultaneously with the UAR propaganda offensive, clandestine subversive activities were carried out in Jordan. A plot to assassinate al-Majāli was discovered in Mar, and in July the Jordanian authorities discovered another. In Aug al-Majāli and ten others were killed by an explosion in the offices of the Premier.

The Jordanian authorities and courts found that the "Revolutionary Council" of Jordanian political refugees in Damascus and the Bureau of military Intelligence of the UAR Army in Syria were involved in these acts (see p 326 ff). After the assassination speculation arose as to Abdel-Nasser's objectives in Jordan; was he really interested in the elimination of Hussein at the present time, in the face of Israel's warnings that she regarded the status quo on the West Bank of Jordan as vital to her security, or did he intend no more than to intimidate the King and make him subservient to his policies?

The assassination of al-Majāli immediately followed the League Council session at Shtura, where efforts had been made to conciliate between the two countries and reach

a *modus vivendi*. Jordan had unilaterally stopped her propaganda campaign as a sign of goodwill.

Immediately after the assassination the Jordanians, while continuing their propaganda efforts at home, took the offensive. Radio incitements to revolt against Egyptian rule were beamed to Syria, and Hussein brought his feud with President Abdel-Nasser before the UN General Assembly.

In Sept, Jordanian troops were concentrated on the Syrian border, and the UAR reported a series of small-scale attacks on Syrian border posts and installations. Reports appeared that King Hussein had intended to invade Syria, but that in the end Western counsels of caution prevailed.

Later, in Oct, acts of sabotage were carried out in Syria, for which the authorities in Syria, and apparently in Lebanon as well, blamed Syrian political emigrés in Lebanon working hand in hand with the Jordanian authorities. For other acts of sabotage the Syrians held Jordan directly responsible.

In Dec sabotage plots by Syrians and Jordanians connected with Syria were again discovered in Jordan, including an alleged plan to poison water reservoirs in Irbid.

The propaganda campaign on both sides was still in full force at the end of the year. Diplomatic relations between the two countries were not broken off.

Jordan's position vis-à-vis the UAR had improved by the end of 1960, because of her renewal of diplomatic relations with Iraq, and the general inter-Arab realignment in favour of the status quo (see pp 115-6).

The internal situation in Jordan, which might be seen as the main front in King Hussein's struggle with the UAR, did not seem to have been adversely affected by the year's campaign. The murder of al-Majāli did not break the surface calm, but for some time at least the trend towards relative stability seemed to have been reversed. On the other hand, the Bedouin element inside and outside the army were more determined than ever to safeguard the sovereignty of the Kingdom even if Hussein himself should be assassinated (see pp 330-2).

### JAN-FEB: UNEASY TRUCE

**Jan: Jordan Rejects Credentials of UAR Consul.** On 16 Jan the credentials of the UAR Consul-General in the Old City of Jerusalem, Ahmad Kamāl Fathi, were rejected by the Jordanian Government on the grounds that they referred to the West Bank as "that part of Palestine occupied by the Jordanian armed forces." (*Di'a', 17 Jan*) This incident was followed by an exchange of protests. (*Jihad, Jordan, 18 Jan*) and the recall of the UAR Ambassador in Amman for consultations. (*Ahram, 22 Jan*) Finally, the UAR decided not to open a consulate in the Old City. (*Hawl al-Alam, Amman, 18 Feb*) [The Jordanian and UAR Press reported this without comment.]

**Feb: Differences Over "Palestinian Entity" at League Council.** The UAR proposal for the creation of a Pales-



tinian Entity served as the central topic of the Arab League Council meeting on 8-29 Feb. Jordan blocked this proposal, seeing in it an attempt to dismember the Kingdom (see pp 132-34).

### MAR: THE TRUCE BROKEN OVER THE ISSUE OF THE PALESTINIAN ENTITY

**1 Mar:** On 1 Mar, King Hussein, in a speech on the Palestine issue, attacked "certain Arab quarters" which denounced Jordan for occupying the West Bank. He said that this campaign was started "in the service of the devil." (*R. Amman, 1 Mar-BBC, 3 Mar*) [This speech was generally interpreted as a retort to General Qassim, as during the preceding two months Jordan had been severely attacked over the Palestine issue by Iraqi propaganda, while the UAR Press and radio had been silent (see p 135). On the other hand, the UAR and Jordan had clashed over the issue at the League Council.] On 3 Mar, the Amman Radio commentator severely attacked the Iraqi rulers in connection with the Palestine issue. He did not mention the UAR. (*IMB, 4 Mar, see also Daily Telegraph, 14 Mar*)

**4 Mar:** Cairo Press Attack on Hussein. On 4 Mar, the Cairo Press came out with a direct and severe attack on King Hussein because of his "derision" of the Arab League's resolutions and his "deviation from the Arab line." The King's arguments were said to be identical with those of imperialism and Zionism, and his "former deals" with imperialism were recalled. (*Masa'; Akhbar, Akhbar al-Yawm, 4 Mar*)

**4 Mar:** Abdel-Nasser Joins Attack. The same evening President Abdel-Nasser, in a speech in Damascus, attacked "supporters of imperialism barking in certain parts of the Arab world... those who have inherited treason from their fathers and forefathers..." [This description is usually applied by the UAR to Hussein and the Hashimite Dynasty.] Western observers in Cairo regarded this speech as a reply to the Jordanian stand on the Palestine issue in the Arab League, and wondered whether it presaged a new and open rift. (*BBC in Arabic, 4 Mar-IMB, 6 Mar*)

**5-6 Mar:** First Jordanian Reactions. On 5 Mar Amman Radio again broadcast Hussein's 1 Mar speech.

On 6 Mar the Jordanian Premier expressed surprise and indignation at the UAR Press attacks, though he refrained from attacking the UAR's leaders or its stand on the Palestine issue, and declared that Jordan would protest to the UAR. (*R. Amman, 6 Mar-IMB, 7 Mar*) The Jordanian Ambassador in Cairo protested on 10 Mar and was told that the UAR Press was free and that Jordan had started the propaganda campaign. (*Akhbar, 11 Mar*)

**7 Mar:** UAR Direct Attack. On 7 Mar President Abdel-Nasser, in a speech in the Syrian Region, directly attacked the "rulers of Amman" as agents of "British and American imperialism." (*BBC, 9 Mar*) The same day *al-Ahram* accused Jordan of having sabotaged the UAR's plans for the Palestinian Entity and Army, and of being the only Arab country which did not agree to condemn the Tripartite declaration (see p 94). (*Ahram, 7 Mar*) On 10 Mar, the Jordanian Foreign Minister denied this allegation. (*Difa', 11 Mar*)

**8-9 Mar:** Propaganda War Fully Joined. In the wake of Abdel-Nasser's speech, the UAR Press and radio intensified these attacks on King Hussein and Premier Majāli,

and soon started to predict that they would meet the death of traitors. On 9 Mar Amman Radio and the Jordanian Press started to retaliate in kind, attacking Abdel-Nasser and UAR policies, whereas previously the Jordanian reaction had been mainly defensive. (*IMH, 10 Mar*) The propaganda war continued until the end of the year (with the exception of one week in Aug, when Jordan unilaterally stopped its campaign—see below).

**Comment on UAR Motives.** UAR as well as foreign comment attributed the UAR campaign mainly to Jordan's opposition to UAR plans on the Palestine issue. "The Arab Press," wrote a Cairo daily, "in its campaign against Jordan... was merely exposing exploitation of the Palestine question by imperialism and its supporters, such as King Hussein and Premier Majāli." (*Akhbar, Cairo, 7 Mar; see also Daily Telegraph, 14 Mar*) Another comment was: "President Abdel-Nasser could not let General Qassim get away with a propaganda trick to pose as champion of Arab Palestine rights by advertising his plan for a Palestine Republic... while Nasser's plans had been watered down at the League Council of Feb... The only possible approach to save prestige... is by putting the whole blame on the Jordanians." (*Rome Daily American, 17 Mar*)

Premier Majāli said that the UAR wanted the resumption of relations in 1959 to result in "Jordan's subservience and passive submission to its whims and inclinations, while we understood and wanted it to mean true fraternal cooperation, on an equal footing... When we failed to come up to their expectations... they started to assail us." (*Difa', 10 Mar*)

**Iraqi Comment.** Baghdad Radio saw in the UAR-Jordan propaganda campaign a falling out of thieves, who after coming together in common fear of the Iraqi revolution, had had their conflicting interests in Palestine exposed by General Qassim's call for a Palestinian Republic. (*R. Baghdad, 8 Mar-BBC, 10 Mar*)

### MAR DEC 1960: THE PROPAGANDA CAMPAIGN

**Themes in UAR Propaganda.** The main themes of UAR propaganda throughout the year were: King Hussein and his regime are traitors to Arab nationalism and agents of imperialism and Zionism. So, in fact, was his grandfather, King Abdullah, and the whole Hashimite dynasty. Just as Abdullah, the Hashimites in Iraq and Nūrī as-Sa'īd had met their fate at the hands of the people, so would Hussein and his collaborators.

Variations on this theme were introduced from time to time, as new topics came up. One topic to which much attention was given was Jordan's opposition to the UAR's Palestine Entity plan. (For others, see below.) Following are some examples of the language used:

President Abdel-Nasser described the King as "the one insignificant individual" still playing a major role as an imperialist agent in the Arab world who "would be destroyed by the people like Nūrī as-Sa'īd and his grandfather King Abdullah." (*Ahram, 25 June*) King Hussein was described as "the descendant of the House of Treason... whose fate will be the same as that of his cousin Faisal, Abdul-Illah and Nūrī as-Sa'īd who thought that the world was eternal for them, but they died like dogs." (*Akhbar, 27 June*) An official UAR spokesman said: "The Jordanian people, which did away with King Abdullah and his treason against the Arab nation, will not allow a gang of traitors like Hussein and Majāli to remain but will crush them underfoot."



This kind of language was used both before and after the assassination of Hazzā' al-Majālī.

Hussein was also described as "the child King, the childish King, the dwarf from Amman, traitor, thief, stooge, hireling, criminal agent, servant of imperialism, slave of the American dollar, Israeli agent, Zionist agent, corrupt, rotten, immoral."

The UAR radio stations introduced special programmes and utilized existing ones for anti-Jordan propaganda, e.g. "Lest we Forget"; "This is your Enemy"; "Listen, Hussein"; "What is There in Jordan?"; "Lies Exposed by Facts"; "The Palestine Corner"; "The Sudan Corner." At one of the peaks of the campaign, for a fortnight from 28 July, about 14 programmes and commentaries attacking Jordanian leaders were broadcast daily. (For sources see BBC, IMB, and the UAR Press of Mar and throughout the year.)

**Themes in Jordanian Propaganda.** The main themes of Jordanian propaganda were: Abdel-Nasser disrupts the ranks of the Arabs for the sake of his evil ambitions. He enslaves the people of Syria, and Jordan calls upon them to revolt against their oppressor. Abdel-Nasser is unfaithful to the cause of Palestine, and is unable, because of his weakness, to deal with Israel. In this last connection frequent reference was made to the presence of the UN force in the Gaza Strip, "defending Abdel-Nasser," and the unhindered passage of Israeli shipping through the Gulf of Aqaba. The "rulers of Cairo" were also accused of serving as the pacemakers of Communism in the Arab world.

Following are some examples of the language used: King Hussein said: "The Egyptian Dictator, whose profession is to falsify the history of Arabism and Islam, insists that conflict should replace cooperation, that discord should supersede concord, and that the Arab nation should be disrupted and disunited." (*R. Amman*, 2 July-BBC, 5 July) Premier Majālī described Abdel-Nasser's policy on the Palestine question as one of "sabotage, division and failure... empty talk and a foolish repetition of hackneyed phrases, which arouse in us only pity for the Arab brothers whom Abdel-Nasser is ruling." (*Difa'*, 27, 28 June) King Hussein accused Abdel-Nasser of "distorting history... and having hallucinations like a delirious man," and said of him: "Time will bear witness to the crime being committed by this clown who causes the claques and the audience in his comic circus to laugh over the bodies of colleagues betrayed by him in their struggle... He tramples the dignity, pride and disdain of Syria, which has been suffering under him and his rule and the henchmen of his black regime." He had "set loose his agents to sow sedition and corruption in the homeland of Arabism." "The sinking star of this blood-thirsty ruler has appeared on the pale and sinful horizon of crime... His greed will crush him and reduce him to a small Pharaoh who has appeared and disappeared in miserable failure." (BBC, 24 Oct) (For sources see BBC, IMB and the Jordanian Press for Mar and throughout 1960.)

#### MAR-AUG: DEVELOPMENTS UP TO ASSASSINATION OF MAJALI

**Mar: Temporary Closure of Syrian-Jordanian Frontier.** The Voice of the Arabs station accused the Jordanians of having closed their frontiers with Syria to prevent the Jordanian people from crossing into Syria to see President Abdel-Nasser during his visit. (*IMB*, 18 Mar) Actually, the Syrian authorities had informed the Jordanian Government of their intention to close the frontier

for a short period. (*Ayyam, Damascus*, 26 Feb) [This was done shortly before the President's visit to the Syrian Region, no reason being given.]

**Mar-Apr: Lebanese Mediation Fails.** In Mar and Apr, Jordanian and Lebanese newspapers reported Lebanese efforts to bring about a halt in the UAR-Jordanian radio and Press campaign. (*Hayat*, 17, 24 Mar, 14, 22, 28 Apr; *Difa'*, 13 Mar, 3 Apr) [The campaign was not affected.]

**Mar: UAR Accused of Plot to Assassinate al-Majālī.** On 30 Mar Premier Majālī announced that a plot to assassinate him and Sharīf Nāsir Ibn Jumayl, King Hussein's uncle, had been discovered. He described it as "the latest gift presented by the UAR on the occasion of Id al-Fitr" and accused the UAR of trying to "dismember Arab unity... by eliminating national leaders." (*Jer. Times*, 31 Mar) (For details see pp 338-9). The UAR rejected the accusation, describing it as excuse for "setbacks" in Jordan. The UAR would not meet Premier Majālī's demand for the extradition of Abdullah ar-Rimāwī and Abu Nuwār (Jordanian political refugees in Damascus, who were accused of having planned the plot). (*Ahram*, 4 Apr) *Akhbār al-Yawm*, denying UAR involvement, said, "We feel that his [Premier al-Majālī's] value is less than that of a bullet which would be fired at him." (*Akhbār al-Yawm*, 9 Apr)

**Apr-May: UAR Denounces Jordan's Attitude at Law of the Sea Conference.** Between 26 Apr-8 May, the UAR radio and Press denounced the "shameful pro-western and pro-Israeli attitude" of the Jordanian "imperialist stooges" at the Conference on the Law of the Sea then taking place in Geneva, at which the Jordanian delegation had voted for the Canadian draft resolution to fix territorial waters at six miles (see p 179).

[The UAR wanted a 12-mile limit, apparently because this would place the entire width of the Gulf of Aqaba within Arab (UAR-Saudi Arabian) territorial waters.] (*R. Cairo*, 29 Apr-5 May-BBC, 1-7 May; *Ahram*, 29 Apr-5 May; *Masa'*, 3 May)

Amman Radio rejected this "false accusation" and explained that Jordan voted for the Canadian draft resolution only after the Soviet proposal for a 12-mile limit had been rejected. It ridiculed the UAR's "empty propaganda" while "Israeli ships are passing within a mile and a half of the Egyptian shores in the Gulf of Aqaba." (*R. Amman*, 29 Apr-BBC, 1 May)

**Apr-May: UAR-Jordanian Conflict Carried to Africa.** [Between 4 Apr and 16 May, King Hussein made a tour of Middle Eastern and African countries. The main purpose of the visit was to strengthen Jordan's position in the Arab world, especially vis-à-vis the UAR (for particulars see pp 335-7).]

In some African countries Hussein attacked Abdel-Nasser directly or indirectly. In Laos, Nigeria, he accused him of seeking to control the entire Arab world and of bearing the responsibility for the penetration of Communism into the ME. (*Jihad*, *Jer. Times*, 10 May) In an interview broadcast over Nairobi Radio, Kenya, the King spoke of the resistance of the people of Jordan to outside pressure and warned the Arabs and Muslims of East Africa of misleading propaganda and false leaders. (*R. Amman*, 13 May-BBC, 16 May)

At the same time the Jordanian Press and radio attacked Abdel-Nasser for harming the Arab cause in Africa. Because of his unscrupulous drive for domination of

the Arab and African countries the Africans now hated him, and he had opened the road for Zionism and Communism to Africa. (*Hawl al-Alam* as quoted by *R. Amman*, 15 Apr-BBC, 19 Apr; *R. Amman*, 9-10, 13, 18 May-BBC, 11, 12, 16 May-IMB, 19 May)

The UAR reported that Hussein was serving the interests of imperialism and Zionism in Africa, whereas the UAR was working for Afro-Asian solidarity. (*R. Cairo*, 12, 15 May-BBC, 14, 17 May)

[Similar exchanges between the UAR and Jordanian radio and Press also occurred later in the year.]

**June: Personal Exchanges Between Abdel-Nasser and Hussein.** On 24 June, on his return from visits to Greece and Yugoslavia, President Abdel-Nasser attacked Hussein by name for the first time during this campaign, predicting that he would be "destroyed by the people." (*Ahram*, 25 June) Hussein and Majāli retaliated in kind. Hussein said that the President was "bound to be caught by the inevitability of history which will dispose [of him] as it disposes of every beguiled adventurer." (*Jer. Times*, 27 June) After these exchanges, both sides intensified and extended their broadcast campaigns. (*IMH*, 29 June)

**June-Aug: Amman Calls for Revolt in Syria.** On 29 June, Amman Radio called on the people of Syria to revolt against the UAR. It compared their tribulations under Gamal Abdel-Nasser with those inflicted by the Ottoman Governor-General Jamal Pasha (Cemal Paşa) called "the Butcher." (*R. Amman*, 29 June-BBC, 1 July)

In Aug Cairo Radio alleged that King Hussein intended to set up a "Syrian Liberation Army" to liberate Syria from the "Egyptian domination." (*R. Cairo*, 12 Aug-IMB, 13 Aug) No Jordanian comments were reported. Amman Radio reported that ten UAR First Army (i.e. Syrian Army) soldiers had entered Jordan following an abortive coup, to "escape Egyptian mistreatment." (*R. Amman*, 12 Aug-BBC, 13 Aug) Damascus radio described this "Jordanian lie" as one more proof of the Jordanian rulers' plots against Arab nationalism. (*R. Damascus*, 12 Aug-BBC, 14 Aug) [On 11 Aug, a group of nine Syrian soldiers headed by a sergeant crossed the border into Jordan.]

**July: UAR Warning to Jordan.** A Foreign Ministry spokesman in Cairo said on 6 July that the UAR had warned Jordan, in a note, of the serious consequences of a continued radio and Press campaign against the UAR. (*Ahram*, 7 July) Official Jordanian sources said that no such note had been received and that it would have been surprising if the UAR had sent such a note "because she alone is responsible for the campaign." (*Difa'*, 8 July)

During this period UAR radio commentators accused Amman of responsibility for the campaign. [Between Mar and July radio attacks on Jordan by Cairo services were at times fewer than those by Amman on the UAR. The UAR never stopped attacking King Hussein in special programmes, but did not always use the topic in the general programmes and comments. In Apr and the first half of May, for instance, they concentrated on the "Israeli spy case in Cairo" and the *Cleopatra* affair. (*IMH*, 15 Apr, 18 May, 8 July)]

**July: Alleged UAR Plot Against Iraq Revealed in Amman.** On 4 July Flight Lieutenant Abbūd Sālim Hasan, an Iraqi officer who had landed in Syria on 4 Apr in a Hawker Hunter Jet fighter and been accorded political asylum, arrived in Amman via Beirut. At a Press conference he declared that the UAR had tried to use him

in a plot to overthrow General Qassim's regime in Iraq. (*Difa'*, 4-8 July (See also pp 145-6.) The issue was intensively utilized by Jordan to denounce the UAR for subversive activities in the Arab world. (*Difa'*; *Falastin*, 4-16 July; *R. Amman* 4-14 July-BBC; IMB, 4-16 July) The UAR Press and radio rejected these allegations and accused the Jordanian authorities and the pilot of "fabrications." (*Ahram*, 4-8 July; BBC; IMB, 4-16 July)

**July: Another Alleged UAR Plot to Overthrow Jordanian Regime.** On 26 July Amman Radio announced the discovery of "a new UAR plot to overthrow the Jordanian regime... The culprits have been arrested thanks to [the help of] many brothers in Syria." [The Jordanian authorities arrested Colonel Qāsim an-Nāsir, a former Deputy Chief of Intelligence in the Jordanian Army, who had clandestinely entered Jordan from Syria (see p 328).]

On 27 July the UAR officially denied "Jordanian allegations of a plot." (*Mid. Mirror*, 30 July)

**July-Aug: UAR Radio and Press Allege Instability in Jordan.** During July-Aug, the UAR radio and Press published allegations of acts of sabotage, explosions and executions of Jordanian citizens in Jordan. (*R. Damascus*; *R. Sawt al-Arab*; *R. Cairo*-BBC, 12 July-31 Aug, *Akhbar*; *Masa'*; *Ayyam*, July-Aug)

Amman Radio invited listeners in Jordan and elsewhere to investigate for themselves whether such acts had really been committed. (*R. Amman*, 4 Aug-BBC, 6 Aug)

**Jordan Accused of Collaboration with Iran in Support of Israel.** Following UAR attacks on the Shah of Iran for allegedly renewing recognition of Israel (see p 216 ff), the UAR Press and radio denounced the Shah and King Hussein as "agents of imperialism" who were called upon by their master to strengthen the position of Israel." (*R. Voice of the Arabs*, 12 Aug-IMB, 13 Aug; also *Gumhuriyah*, 2, 3 Aug)

**Aug: Lebanese Mediation Denied.** Rumours of official Lebanese mediation between the UAR and Jordan had persistently appeared in the Lebanese and Jordanian Press, although denied by the Lebanese Government and practically ignored by the UAR Press. (*Hayat*, 26 July, 8 Aug) *Al-Ahrām* dismissed these rumours, saying that "the UAR neither feels the existence of King Hussein nor does it recognize his Arab status, hence it feels no need to improve relations with him so long as he remains hostile to Arab nationalism." (*Ahram*, 17 Aug)

**Aug: League Council at Shtura—Unilateral Cessation of Jordanian Campaign.** The Arab League Foreign Ministers' conference started to discuss inter-Arab relations on 24 Aug. As a gesture of good will, King Hussein ordered the cessation of the Jordanian radio campaign against the UAR "provided that the UAR likewise ceased its radio and Press campaign." (*Difa'*, 24 Aug) However, the UAR campaign continued (see p 130). The Jordanian radio refrained from attacking the UAR for six days—24-30 Aug (see BBC-IMB).

#### AUG: ASSASSINATION OF MAJALI

On 29 Aug the Jordanian Premier al-Majāli was assassinated in his office in Amman. (For particulars see pp 328-9.)

**Aug: UAR Charged with Complicity.** On 30 Aug King Hussein charged the UAR with "direct complicity" in

the assassination, saying that the killers were "linked up with responsible people in the UAR—mainly in Syria." (*Times*, 31 Aug) On 6 Sept King Hussein declared that he was convinced that Abdel-Nasser was personally aware of the plot in advance. (*Difa'*, 7 Sept) (During the trial of the culprits, the Court accepted evidence that the Syrian Second Bureau was directly involved in planning, financing and executing the plot—see p 329.)

**Aug-Sept: UAR Denies Complicity.** The UAR radio and Press denied any connection with the assassination plot and concentrated on the theme that "King Hussein and his clique" had provoked this "eruption" by becoming agents of Britain, the USA and Zionism. Thus *al-Gumhuriyah* wrote: "Do you wish to know who killed Hazza' al-Majali, you little simpleton-King? Search for him in your policy. You killed him. You alone are the murderer. He is your agent and the executor of the policy of your masters who put you in control of the people. What occurred is not the explosion of a bomb. It is a people who erupted and blew up your policy represented by your Premier." (*Gumhuriyah*, 4 Sept) (See also *Ahram*, 2, 4, 8 Sept; *Akhbar*, 1-6 Sept and *BBC*, 31 Aug-10 Sept.)

**29 Aug: Mr Spinelli Ordered Back to Jordan.** The UN SG instructed Mr Pier Spinelli, the UN Special envoy to Jordan, to return immediately to Amman (from Geneva) and give any help needed by the Jordanian Government. (*Difa'*, 30 Aug) On 30 Aug Mr Spinelli was received in audience by King Hussein. (*Difa'*, 31 Aug) *Al-Hayat* regarded Mr Spinelli's return as a direct hint to the Middle East countries that the situation in Jordan should neither be exploited nor exacerbated. (*Hayat*, 2 Sept, see also *Daily Express*, 1 Sept; *Times*, 2 Sept)

**Sept: The League SG Hasūnah in Amman.** On 2 Sept the Arab League SG arrived in Amman at the Jordanian Government's invitation. After inspecting the ruins of the PM's office and talking with King Hussein and other Jordanian leaders, he left Amman on 3 Sept for Cairo to "explain to the UAR Foreign Minister the views of the Jordanian authorities in connection with the bomb outrage in Amman." (*Eg. Gaz.*, 5 Sept, *Difa'*, 3-5 Sept) Hasūnah said that his task was to endeavour to ease the tension between Jordan and the UAR. (*Daily Star*, Beirut, 5 Sept) [He had no success.]

**Sept: Jordan Demands Extradition of Three Officials From Damascus.** On 2 Sept the UAR denied the Jordanian allegation that two of those responsible for planning the outrage had fled to Syria. They said that no such persons had ever crossed the border. (*R. Cairo*; *R. Damascus*, 2 Sept-BBC, 4 Sept) On 5 Sept Jordan sent a note to the UAR demanding the extradition of three Jordanians accused of having taken an active part in the assassination and having fled to Syria. The demand was based on the 1953 extradition agreement between Jordan and Syria. (*Difa'*, Jordan, 6 Sept) On the same day according to an official source in Amman, the UAR notified Jordan of the unilateral abrogation of this agreement because it had preceded the formation of the UAR. (*Difa'*, 6-9 Sept) [No UAR comment was reported.] The UAR had not answered the Jordanian note by the end of the year. (*Difa'*, 1 Jan 1961)

**Sept: Lebanese Comment on Possible UAR Involvement.** The *al-Jar'idah* (Beirut) correspondent in Jordan, Edouard Sa'ab, said that because "revolutionary elements" working in Jordan and Syria had so far failed to stage a military revolution in Jordan because of the faithful

Bedouin elements in the army, they had decided to "strike at the heads," convinced that with their liquidation all obstacles to the annexation of Jordan to the UAR would be removed. But "these elements" did not reckon with the attitude of the Bedouin leaders and that of Israel. The Bedouins were adamant in their determination to safeguard Jordanian sovereignty with or without King Hussein, Israel would occupy the West Bank "within three hours" of the liquidation of King Hussein, as otherwise she would have to face the danger of a United Arab Army engulfing her from all sides. President Abdel-Nasser was aware of these facts and he was not at all happy to face them, but he had either to bear the consequences of the acts planned and executed by his ardent supporters in Syria, who acted with ideological zeal without taking subsequent implications into account or he had to restrain them—not an easy task. (*Jaridah*, Beirut, 1-3 Sept) [European comment, while attributing to the UAR at least indirect responsibility for the assassination because of its incitement to murder, also asked whether, in view of the danger of Israeli intervention, Abdel-Nasser could be really interested at this time in a rebellion or the liquidation of King Hussein (see *Times*, 30 Aug; *Daily Telegraph*; *Economist*, 3 Sept, and others).]

**6 Nov: Israel Warns Abdel-Nasser on Jordan.** In an exclusive interview with *The Sunday Times*, Mrs Golda Meir, the Israel Foreign Minister, commented on the possibility that Cairo's propaganda might one day succeed in converting Jordan into an Egyptian satellite. "Israel cannot remain passive if any country tries to dominate Jordan," she said. "We cannot accept the presence of another army on our frontiers... Nasser is deliberately trying to dominate Jordan and although we can do nothing to help her we understand her position. We have no wish to interfere with anyone, but if the status quo in Jordan is changed Israel's national security will be in jeopardy. To this we cannot remain indifferent." (*Sunday Times*, 6 Nov)

**Sept: UAR Propaganda After Assassination.** From 1 Sept UAR radio and Press commentaries were dominated by severe attacks on King Hussein and Premier Talhūni, who were warned that they would meet a traitor's end at the hands of the people—e.g. 'Hussein, you will meet your fate... under the feet of the people and army.' (*BBC*, 3-17 Sept) UAR propaganda sought to create the impression that the Jordanian regime was on the brink of collapse, spreading reports of alleged widespread troubles, explosions, arrests and discontent in Jordan. (*Gumhuriyah*; *Ahram*; *Akhbar*, 1-6 Sept) [In fact, the internal situation in Jordan remained quiet—see p 330] (*IMB*, 1-8 Sept)

#### SEPT: JORDANIAN PLANS TO INVADE SYRIA?

**Sept: Jordan Calls for Syrian Revolt.** Immediately after the assassination Jordanian propaganda concentrated on Syria. From 1 Sept Jordanian programmes beamed to Syria urged revolt against Egyptian domination and "colonialism." The programme started and ended with the anthem of the Syrian Republic. (*Mid. Mirror*, Beirut, 3 Sept)

**31 Aug: Hussein Threatens "Physical Action."** On 31 Aug King Hussein declared: "We shall take any physical action to stop aggression by the UAR... I am not threatening to resort to war, but if we have to fight, we will fight for the freedom of the Arab world..." (*Mid. Mirror*, 3 Sept)



**Sept: Border Incidents.** On 17 Sept it was reported that "armed aggressors" from Jordan had attacked Syrian border posts several times between 11 and 14 Sept. (*Wahdah, Damascus, 17 Sept*) This report was later in the day officially repeated by the UAR. (*R. Damascus, 17 Sept-IMB, 18 Sept*) On 18 Sept an official spokesman in Amman denied that any Jordanian had been concerned. These acts might, he said, "have been committed by Syrians tired of suppression and the stifling of freedom under the terrorist Egyptian rule..." (*R. Amman, 18 Sept-IMB, 19 Sept, Difa', 19 Sept*)

**17 Sept: Defection of Egyptian Official Reported.** Amman Radio reported the defection of an Egyptian official from the UAR embassy in Amman. (*R. Amman, 17 Sept-IMB, 18 Sept*) The report was at once denied in Cairo. An official spokesman declared that "on 8 Sept the Jordanians kidnapped an embassy messenger, Abd al-Aziz Abd al-Al when he was on his way back from the telegraph office." (*R. Cairo, 17 Sept-IMB, 18 Sept*) In an official protest, the UAR declared that three messengers of the UAR embassy in Amman had disappeared and that the Jordanian authorities would be held responsible for the safety and security of UAR personnel in Jordan. The Jordanians denied these allegations, stating that one messenger had requested political asylum while the other two were Jordanians accused of various crimes. They also assured the UAR of their vigilance in protecting Arab citizens, especially those belonging to the Diplomatic Corps. (*R. Amman, 4 Oct-IMB, 5 Oct*) [No further news on this incident was reported.]

**Sept: Jordan Accused of Massing Troops on Northern Border.** On 16 Sept the UAR accused Jordan of massing troops on its northern border with the intention of invading Syria. (*R. Cairo; R. Damascus, 16 Sept-IMB, 18 Sept*) For the next ten days, military tension between Jordan and the UAR was high. On 19 Sept the Jordanian Minister of Defence denied the accusation, though, he said, certain army units were carrying out their normal manoeuvres in the customary areas in the North. (*Difa', 20 Sept*) This interchange was repeated in an official UAR protest and a Jordanian reply. (*R. Amman, 4 Oct-IMB, 5 Oct*)

The *New York Herald Tribune* correspondent, quoting diplomatic sources in Amman, reported that more than half of the 30,000-man Jordanian Army had been moved to the Syrian frontier. (*NYHT, 20 Sept*)

The First (Syrian) Army announced on 16 Sept that all roads leading to Jordan would be closed from 7.00 p.m. to 6.00 a.m. (*Ahram, 17, 18 Sept*)

**Sept: Reported Western Counsels of Caution.** H. A. R. Philby commented: "The quality of the Jordanian Army is almost certainly better than that of the Syrians, but it is unthinkable that Jordan would attempt a full-scale military invasion of Syria." But "if a severe blow could be dealt at the prestige of the Syrian Army, the Syrian officers might turn in disgust and join hands with the dissatisfied peasants, landowners and merchants, and start a breakaway movement which would snap the link binding Syria to Egypt..." (Thus) the Jordanians are convinced that a quick operation of 24-36 hours aimed to send the Syrian Army reeling out of, say, Der'a might provide just the right stimulus to widespread Syrian revolt." Counsels of caution were reportedly tendered to King Hussein by Western embassies. (*Scotsman, 26 Sept*) The Egyptian Press and radio, on the other hand, accused Britain of aiding King Hussein in a "new conspiracy" against the UAR (*see BBC, IMB, 16-26 Sept; Times, 24 Sept*).

On 26 Sept, Cairo Radio was still accusing Jordan (as well as Israel in collaborating with Jordan) of massing troops. (*IMB, 26 Sept*) [But with the departure of King Hussein for the UN on 26 Sept, the military tension subsided.]

#### SEPT-OCT: THE INCIDENT OF THE UAR PILOT ADNAN MADANI

On 29 Sept it was officially announced in Jordan that Adnan Madani, a Syrian pilot officer in the UAR Air Force, had fled to Jordan in his Mig 17K fighter aircraft. He had landed on "suitable ground," though not at an airport, and slightly damaged the aircraft. Madani had asked for political asylum, the announcement said, having fled from the "oppression and tyranny" of the Nasserist regime in Syria. (*Difa', 30 Sept*) The UAR authorities denied that the officer had defected and said that he had been compelled to land for lack of fuel. (*R. Cairo, 30 Sept-IMB, 1 Oct*)

On 4 Oct the Lieutenant committed suicide, three hours before he was due to appear at a Press conference. (*R. Amman 4 Oct-IMB, 5 Oct*) Cairo Radio at once denied the report of suicide and claimed that Pilot Officer Madani had first been tortured and then murdered by the Jordanians. (*R. Cairo, 4 Oct-IMB, 5 Oct*)

On 5 Oct the Pilot Officer's body was brought to the Syrian border in a military funeral ceremony attended by the Jordanian Minister of Defence, and on 6 Oct a "tremendous public funeral" took place in Damascus. (*Ayyam, Damascus, 7 Oct*)

On 7 Oct the Jordanian Government rejected a UAR note accusing it of having killed Madani. (*R. Amman, 7 Oct-IMB, 8 Oct*)

The story of the accidental landing and suicide was generally accepted outside the two countries involved. The motive of the suicide was thought to be the officer's unwillingness to embarrass his country by appearing against it in Jordan. "Instability" of the pilot was also alleged (*see, e.g. Observer, 22 Oct; Times, 24 Oct*).

The UAR radio and Press concentrated on the incident during the following two weeks. (*Ahram; Gumhuriyah; Akhbar, 1-15 Oct*)

#### SEPT-OCT: MUTUAL DENUNCIATIONS BY ABDEL-NASSER AND HUSSEIN

**Sept-Oct: Hussein Denounces Abdel-Nasser at UN General Assembly.** King Hussein declared in London (on his way to the UN General Assembly in New York) that he had no wish to meet President Abdel-Nasser, who, he said, was "responsible for many a crime in our part of the world and is responsible also for many of the problems my country is facing today." (*Daily Telegraph, 28 Sept*)

Addressing the UN General Assembly, King Hussein declared that the UAR's intention in its campaign of "abuse, subversion and external pressure... is our destruction." "Incitements to overthrow our government and assassinate our leaders were broadcast daily over their government radio," he continued. "Borders between us were closed to damage our economy, and convicted traitors to Jordan were encouraged, or at least permitted, to engage in subversive acts against us." (*A/PV 882, 3 Oct*) (See also p 9) On 30 Oct *al-Jihad* reported that the Arab League had transferred to the Jordanian Government a UAR complaint on King Hussein's speech. (*Jihad, 30 Oct*)

**Oct: Abdel-Nasser Describes Transjordan as the Extension of Syria.** On arriving in Cairo from New York,



on 5 Oct, President Abdel-Nasser attacked King Hussein as an agent of imperialism, hired to attend the General Assembly to destroy the prestige of the UAR and of all Arabs. He called him "little King," "hired King," "boy," "mercenary," "traitor" and "hireling." (*Ahram*, 6 Oct) A few days later, he paid a sudden visit to Syria, where he toured the main centres and delivered six speeches in four days, denouncing King Hussein and the Jordanian leaders. (*Ahram*, 15-20 Oct) On 17 Oct he declared in Damascus: "Before the first world war there was no Transjordan, but Syria, whose bounds extended southwards as far as Aqaba... We therefore belong to one and the same nation. Imperialism, trying to reward its agents, sliced Transjordan from Syria and gave it to Abdullah, Hussein's grandfather. Today we see the hired King carrying out a hectic campaign against Arab nationalism and unity." (*Ahram*, 18 Oct; *Gumhuriyah*, 18 Oct) King Hussein retorted on 21 Oct, using extreme language (see above p 150).

#### OCT-NOV: JORDAN ACCUSED OF ORGANIZING SABOTAGE IN SYRIA

**Oct: UAR Accused Jordan of Planting Explosives.** On 17 Oct Damascus Radio accused the Jordanian frontier authorities of planting explosives in Syrian vehicles travelling from Kuwait to Damascus, without the knowledge of their drivers, while ostensibly searching them at the frontier. (*R. Damascus*, 17 Oct-*IMB*, 18 Oct) Abd al-Hamid as-Sarrāj, President of the Syrian Executive Council, declared on 17 Oct that the explosives were timed to explode amidst Syrian crowds listening to President Abdel-Nasser in at-Tahrir Square in Damascus. (*R. Damascus*, 17 Oct-*IMB*, 18 Oct) On 20 Oct the Jordanian Defence Minister categorically denied the charges. (*Difa'*, Jordan, 21 Oct)

**Oct: Collusion Alleged Between Jordan and Syrian Exiles.** On the night of 25 Oct, three bombs exploded in Damascus, causing minor damage but no casualties. The next day the Assistant Director-General of Police of the Syrian Region declared that he had discovered clues pointing to collusion between the criminals who had planted the bombs and "Syrians now in exile in Lebanon—mainly the former Syrian President Adīb ash-Shishakli"—working for the Jordanian Intelligence. He added that the Lebanese security authorities were permitting Jordanians and Syrians wanted by the police to enter Syria under cover of Lebanese identity cards. (*Ahram*, 26, 27 Oct)

*Al-Gumhuriyah* accused Jordan of trying by these actions to cause internal strife in the UAR. (*Gumhuriyah*, 27 Oct) *Al-Ahrām* blamed "Syrian traitors" working for Jordan for the explosion at the UAR consulate in Beirut on 10 Sept (in which part of the waiting room was destroyed and one official was slightly wounded—*Eg. Gaz.*, 11 Sept). (*Ahram*, 28 Oct)

The UAR Press urged the Lebanese Government to put an end to the activities of "Syrian and Jordanian traitors" working in Lebanon "against the interests of the Lebanese people in the first place." (*Ahram*, 29 Oct; *Gumhuriyah*; *Akhbar*; *Akhbar al-Yaum*, 27-30 Oct) (For further information see pp 504-6.)

**Oct: Lebanese Reaction.** The Lebanese Premier said on 27 Oct that Lebanon was anxious that peace and internal stability be maintained in Syria and would co-operate with the Syrian authorities in taking immediate action. On the same day, Lebanese and Syrian security officials met in Damascus.

The "Voice of the Arabs" station described the atti-

tude of the Lebanese authorities in the matter as "regrettable and painful." (*Voice of the Arabs*, 28 Oct-*IMB*, 29 Oct)

**Oct: Lebanon Tightens Security Measures.** On 29 Oct an official communiqué advised all political refugees in Lebanon to submit fresh applications for political asylum, imposed restrictions on their freedom of movement, and warned them against any activities which might "harm" Lebanon or their countries of origin. (*Hayat*, 30-31 Oct) On 30 Oct the Lebanese police raided the house of Salāh ash-Shishakli, brother of Adīb ash-Shishakli, ex-President of Syria, but found that he had already left for Amman. (*Hayat*, 1 Nov)

**Nov: Jordanian Military Attaché in Lebanon Suspected.** On 21 Nov the Jordanian Military Attaché in Beirut, Major Ghāzi al-Khatīb, left for Amman. Conflicting accounts of the reason for his departure were given. *Al-Hayat* stated that Jordan would not permit him to appear before a Lebanese Committee investigating charges against Muhammed al-Fadl, a former Lebanese Minister and member of the Chamber of Deputies, suspected of heading a sabotage "gang" in Lebanon and Syria, and that the Lebanese Government had therefore requested the Attaché's withdrawal. (*Hayat*, 22 Nov) *Al-Hawādhith* (pro-UAR) reported that the Lebanese security authorities had detained "suspected persons" and one of them "confirmed" that the Jordanian Military Attaché had recently given him a bomb to plant in Damascus, which he had done. (*Hawādhith*, 19 Nov)

On 23 Nov an official spokesman in Amman denied that the Lebanese Government had ordered the Attaché to leave. (*Difa'*, 24 Nov) On 24 Nov, however, it was officially announced that Lebanese frontier posts were instructed "not to allow Major Khatīb, the Jordanian Military Attaché, to re-enter Lebanon, should he try to do so." (*Hayat*, 25 Nov)

On 27 Nov Major Khatīb was appointed First Aide-de-Camp to King Hussein. (*Difa'*, 28 Nov)

**Nov: King Hussein Sees No Need to Meet President Abdel-Nasser.** King Hussein declared in an interview that he "sees no need for a meeting with President Nasser. In any event, I do not think anything good could come of it, as long as Nasser pursues a policy aimed at destroying my country." (*General-Anzeiger*, Bonn, 29 Nov)

**Dec: New Jordanian Ambassador to UAR.** According to *al-Jihād*, Jordan proposed the nomination of Anwar al-Khatīb as Jordanian Ambassador in Cairo. (*Jihad*, 14 Dec [Al-Khatīb was a member of the pro-UAR National Socialist Party] (Up to the end of the year no UAR response had been reported.)

**Dec: Amman Accuses UAR of Planning Sabotage in Jordan.** During Dec there were various Jordanian allegations of minor acts of sabotage by "Nasser agents," Syrian and Jordanian. On 13 Dec Amman Radio announced the discovery of two UAR bombing plots in Jordan. On 20 Dec the UAR was accused of attempting to poison Irbid's water reservoirs. (*BBC*, 22 Dec) On 22 Dec Amman Radio broadcast a Press conference with a Jordanian sent by the Syrian Second Bureau to assassinate an important Jordanian personality and to commit sabotage. (*R. Amman*, 23 Dec-*BBC*, 25 Dec) (See p 330.)

**31 Dec: Jordan Ready for Conciliation.** On 31 Dec Pre-

mier Talhūni declared: "For the sake of future Arab generations, Jordan is willing to put into cold storage all her differences with certain Arab countries so as to ensure the adoption of a joint policy in relations to

Israel's reported intentions to manufacture an atomic bomb." (*Difa'*, 1 Jan 1961) (See pp 286-8.)

[The propaganda campaign between the two countries was still in full swing at the end of Dec.]

## RELATIONS BETWEEN THE UAR AND SUDAN

### SYNOPSIS

The development of friendly relations between the governments of the two countries was emphasized by an exchange of state visits between Presidents Abdel-Nasser and Abbud. A Sudanese force was withdrawn from a disputed border area and the special privileges granted to Sudanese employees in Egypt were renewed. The Sudanese Government said that this improvement of relations was a primary aim of the Sudanese revolution, though it also stressed its determination to safeguard the complete independence of the country and usually refrained from comments on Arab nationalism (see pp 122-3). It expressed its adherence to the policy of positive neutrality expounded by the UAR, but in practice tried to avoid involvement in conflicts to which the UAR was a party. Sudan did not follow the UAR's lead in its conflict with Iran over the latter's recognition of Israel; even more significant was the fact that it reportedly withstood pressure by the UAR and other countries to allow the transfer of military equipment to the Gizenga Government in Stanleyville, Congo (see pp 32-5).

### JULY: PRESIDENT ABBUD'S VISIT TO THE UAR

On 20 July President Abbud, on his way back from Yugoslavia, arrived in Cairo for an eight-day official visit to the UAR. He was accompanied by Major-General Hasan Bashir Nasr, Deputy C-in-C. (coming from Khartoum), Brigadier Amin al-Hajj, Minister of Communications, Agriculture, Irrigation and Electric Power (both members of the Defence Council of the Armed Forces), Abd al-Majid Ahmad, Minister of Finance and Economy, and Ahmad Khayr, Foreign Minister. They were received at the airport by President Abdel-Nasser.

They held several meetings with Abdel-Nasser and members of the UAR Government, and visited Cairo, Damascus and Alexandria. (*Ahram*, 21 July; *R. Cairo*, 28 July-BBC, 30 July)

**UAR Press Comment.** The main theme of UAR Press and radio comment was the close cooperation and brotherhood between the UAR and the Sudan. The Egyptian revolution was given credit for promoting the Sudan's independence [the visit coincided with the celebration of its 8th anniversary], and the Sudanese revolution was praised for establishing good relations with Egypt. (*Ahram*, 21, 24, 27 July; *Gumhuriyah*, 23, 28 July; BBC, 22 July)

**Exchange of Honours.** President Abdel-Nasser and President Abbud invested each other with the highest decorations of their countries. They also decorated many leading officials of each other's country. (*Eg. Gaz.*, 26 July)

**July: Joint Communiqué.** On 28 July an official communiqué was published. The two sides had exchanged views which resulted in full agreement. The "fraternal and friendly bonds" between the two sister countries" were emphasized. The agreement on the Nile waters (8 Nov 1959) was welcomed: they would see that the Nile

should constitute "a bond of welfare and prosperity between them." Both leaders were determined to prevent an increase in international tension and to preserve peace "on the grounds that this objective is the duty of all states today, and not restricted to the big powers alone," and adhered to the policy of non-alignment, positive neutrality, and the Bandung resolutions. They welcomed the independence of African states, and announced their support of the Congolese people "against imperialist conspiracies" and of the "Algerian people" against France. They denounced Israel and promised support of the Palestinian Arabs "until they recover their rights in full." They denounced the policy of racial segregation and especially the "brutal activities of the Government of South Africa." (*Eg. Gaz.*, 29 July; BBC, 30 July)

[There was no reference in the communiqué to Arab nationalism or Arab unity. Nor was the issue of Iran's recognition of Israel, which led to a rupture of diplomatic relations between the UAR and Iran, mentioned, though the affair broke during the visit—see pp 218-9.]

**Sept: Sudanese Forces Withdrawn from Halaib Area.** In Sept the Sudanese forces stationed in the Halaib area on the Sudanese-Egyptian border were withdrawn and replaced by a small police force. The decision was taken as an indication of the good relations now existing between the governments of the two countries. (*ANA*, 9 Sept-BBC, 12 Sept)

[Sudanese Army units had been stationed in this area since the dispute over it between the UAR and Sudan early in 1958.]

### NOV: PRESIDENT ABDEL-NASSER'S VISIT TO SUDAN

On 15 Nov President Abdel-Nasser arrived in Khartoum for a ten-day state visit. He was accompanied by Mahmud Fawzi, the Foreign Minister, Zakariyah Muhi ad-Din (Interior), Ali Sabri (Presidential Affairs), and many officers and officials. (*Sudan Daily*, 15 Nov; *Ahram*, 16 Nov)

They attended the celebrations of the second anniversary of the Sudanese revolution and visited the provinces of the Sudan.

**The Official Welcome Was Well Prepared.** Umdurman Radio appealed to the townspeople to give Abdel-Nasser a reception worthy of his status, and described arrangements for free taxi-rides to the airport. Government employees would be released from work. (BBC, 16 Nov) The official spokesman, Tal'at Farid, said, "You are welcome, Gamal, among your own people." (*Sudan Daily*, 14 Nov)

Cairo programmes to the Sudan on the eve of the visit contained material on the Sudanese people's devotion to Abdel-Nasser and the preparations to welcome him. (BBC, 16 Nov)

Throughout the visit, both the UAR and Sudanese Press and radio gave it wide coverage.

**Sudanese Pronouncements on Relations with UAR.** President Abbud emphasized that "one of the objects of the revolution was the elimination of the artificial

estrangements between the two sister republics." (BBC, 26 Nov)

Underlining the independence of Sudan, Sadiq al-Mahdi, head of the Ansār sect, said that the welcome to Abdel-Nasser "emanates from a new and conscious understanding between independent Sudan and its neighbouring independent sister, the UAR." (BBC, 25 Nov)

**Demonstrations against Abbud and Abdel-Nasser.** Amman Radio and Tunis Radio reported that thousands of Sudanese demonstrated on 15 Nov against Abdel-Nasser's visit and the Abbud government. Clamorous demonstrations organized by students had taken place in Khartoum and other Sudanese towns. (IMB, 16 Nov; BBC, 17 Nov) On 17 Nov Amman Radio reported that at least 45 persons had been injured, some seriously, during a clash between the police and Sudanese demonstrators, who shouted for the downfall of Abdel-Nasser. (BBC, 19 Nov) A Lebanese paper said that the Sudanese, dissatisfied with Abbud's regime, had taken the opportunity of the visit to protest against the Nile Water agreement of 1959, which provided for the evacuation of 52,000 Sudanese from the Wadi Halfa area (Nubia), soon to be flooded by the Aswan High Dam. (Orient, 16 Nov) [The UAR and Sudanese Press totally ignored these reports.] (See also pp 366-7)

The joint communiqué issued on 25 Nov resembles that of July (see above). (Ahram, 26 Nov)

**25 Nov: Aircraft and Trucks for Sudanese Army.** A special military mission left Cairo in Nov to hand over six Mig aircraft and 20 trucks as Abdel-Nasser's gift to the Sudanese Army. (Akhbar, 28 Nov)

#### JAN-NOV: QUESTION OF SUDANESE EMPLOYEES IN EGYPT

In 1959 the Egyptian Civil Service Commission had decided that Sudanese, like all other foreigners, should be

barred from employment in the Egyptian Region of the UAR. All those previously employed should either be dismissed immediately or acquire Egyptian nationality. (Morning News, Khartoum, 4 Nov 1959)

Sudanese employed in Egypt were estimated at some 50,000. (Morning News, 4 Nov 1959) In Apr-May 1960 it was announced that pension rights of Sudanese in Egyptian Government employment would be cancelled retroactive from 1955, that Sudanese in the armed forces and the police would be dismissed at the end of 1960 and that 115 Sudanese railway workers had already been dismissed. (Sarahah, 2 Apr; Ra'y al-Am, 22 May; Zaman, 24 May)

**Sudanese Reaction.** The Sudanese Press paid much attention to the issue, calling for a reconsideration of the measures. (Sarahah, 19 Apr, 31 May; Ra'y al-Amm, 19 June) The Sudanese Government took up the issue with the UAR. The problem was raised at Abbud's meeting with Abdel-Nasser in Cairo, and the latter ordered the suspension of the decision. (Sarahah, 31 July; Morning News, 4 Nov)

**Nov: The Solution.** In Nov the UAR National Assembly unanimously passed a bill assuring Sudanese citizens working for the government of the same conditions of work as UAR citizens. The Minister of the Interior, Muhdi ad-Din, welcomed the Bill as "an expression of brotherhood towards our Sudanese brothers, who have been working with us and been through good and bad with us." (Cairo "Sudan Corner," 8 Nov—BBC, 10 Nov)

The Sudanese Minister, Major-General Hasan Bashir Nasr, called the decision "one of the great events of this year," and "a gracious gesture from our sister country." (Sudan Daily, 15 Nov)

UAR-Sudan Relations Regarding Congo. See pp 34-5.

## RELATIONS BETWEEN THE UAR AND LEBANON

**Synopsis.** Although various incidents, political and economic, tended to cause tension between the two countries, both governments endeavoured to keep the relations correct. The most serious issue during the year was the anti-UAR activities of Syrian political émigrés in Lebanon in the summer and autumn. However, the Lebanese authorities acted against them, after prompting by the UAR, and consequently the UAR dropped the issue (at least publicly). (See pp 154, 504-6.)

Relations were also affected by internal Lebanese politics. The Muslim opposition leaders maintained contact with the UAR (although their attitude changed when they came into power—as in the case of PM Sa'ib Slām). During the election campaign, UAR interference in nominations inside the Muslim sector was reported (see p 353). On the other hand, certain Christian leaders—especially Pierre Jumayil—and newspapers sometimes manifested an anti-UAR attitude (see e.g. p 360, and Lebanese Press comment on various issues).

In the sphere of economic relations, Lebanon worked to free inter-Arab transit, tourist traffic (through and from Syria) and trade from restrictions and achieved some progress (see text below, and p 140). At the end of the year criticism of the conduct of the anti-Israel boycott was voiced in Lebanon and directed especially against the UAR (see p 188).

**Feb: Lebanese Private Delegations Visit President Abdel-Nasser.** During the second half of Feb, private Lebanese delegations from Tripoli, Beirut and the South of Lebanon arrived in Syria to congratulate Abdel-Nasser on the occasion of the second anniversary of the Egyptian-Syrian Union. The delegation from Beirut was headed by Sa'ib Slām (later in the year to become PM) and Abdullah al-Yafi. (Ahram, 22-24 Feb) In a public speech on 23 Feb Abdel-Nasser thanked the delegations for their visit and later conferred with them. (Ahram, 24-26 Feb) A Syrian source said that the heads of the delegations wrote in the President's guest book: "We hope that Lebanon will become a third region [the UAR is composed of two regions] wherein the spirit of the Arab positive neutralist union will be manifested." (Ayyam, 24 Feb) [Compare Slām statement, p 122.]

**Feb: Anti- and Pro-UAR Demonstrations.** On 22 Feb buses bringing back Lebanese from the UAR anniversary celebrations in Syria were stoned on entering Beirut. Some of the occupants, mostly students, were said to be shouting slogans and displaying pictures of Abdel-Nasser. On the next day, Ali Bizzi, Minister of the Interior, addressing the Chamber of Deputies, described the incident as slight and added that troops were being sent to various trouble areas to ensure the safe passage of

cars returning from Damascus. In the discussion which followed, a Deputy, Ma'aruf Sa'ad, urged the government to impose severe penalties "on those who assault the right of belief of other Lebanese."

The Minister of the Interior replied: "There is no doubt that any Lebanese has freedom of belief, but he is not free to act as he wants. In the present situation every one of us ought to recognize his responsibilities, and guard his country's interests. It is a great mistake for anyone to believe that he alone is the true Lebanese, while the other is not." He added that nine persons from the villages which attacked the buses had been detained for investigation. (*Hayat*, 23, 25 Feb)

On 24 Feb about 400 students gathered inside the American University Campus and acclaimed Arab Union and President Nasser. Another group of a hundred students gathered and cheered Lebanon. (*Hayat*, 26-27 Feb)

**Apr: Lebanese Merchants Accuse UAR Government Firm of Manipulating Price of Rice.** Early in Apr a complaint was submitted to the Lebanese Minister of Economy that the Egyptian Government's Foreign Trade Company had raised the prices of Egyptian rice imported by Lebanon by \$23 per ton. (Lebanon imports about 20,000 ton of rice from the UAR free of duty—importers from other countries have to pay \$23 customs per ton.) The Minister promised to discuss the matter with

the PM. (*Nahar*, Beirut 7-8 Apr) [No further news on this matter was received.]

**May: Lebanese Student Delegation Visits Damascus.** During the last week of May, a Lebanese student delegation visited the Southern R of the UAR on an official invitation by Marshal Abd al-Hakim Amer. It visited historical places and institutions, including agriculture cooperatives. On 30 May Amer received the delegation for a two-hour talk. (*Hayat*, 31 May; *Hawadith*, 1 June)

**June: Reports on UAR's Intervention in Lebanese Elections.** See p 353.

**July-Aug: Tourism.** Through Lebanese mediation, the border between Syria and Iraq was opened for the passage of Iraqi tourists with their vehicles to Lebanon and back. (*Hayat*, 1-4 July)

Tourists' entry visas between Lebanon and the UAR were abolished as of 23 Aug. (*Ahram*, 23 Aug)

**Mar-Aug: Lebanese Mediation to Ease UAR-Jordanian Tension.** See pp 150-1.

**Aug-Dec: Anti-UAR Activities of Syrian Political Refugees in Lebanon.** See pp 154, 504-6.

**May-Dec: Lebanese Criticism of the UAR over Boycott of Israel.** See p 188.

## RELATIONS BETWEEN THE UAR AND YEMEN

**Background Note:** Political cooperation between Yemen and the Egyptian military regime began in 1955, when both countries, which were at the time in conflict with Britain (Yemen over Aden), established close relations with Soviet Russia. In Mar 1958 Yemen and the UAR—which had been established in Jan—formed a loose federation known as the United Arab States (UAS). A UAS Council was established in Cairo.

The Imam, however, proved wary of Egyptian influence and there was little actual cooperation. His son, the Crown Prince, Sayf al-Islam al-Badr, who is more inclined to reform, was more cooperative. In 1959, when al-Badr introduced reforms during the Imam's absence abroad, he brought in Egyptian advisers and officers. On his return, the Imam reversed this policy and expelled most of the Egyptians.

Even after the creation of the UAS Egypt continued to give asylum to Shaykh Ahmad Muhammad Nu'mān, leader of the "Free Yemen" group, who took part in the coup d'état in 1949 during which the father of the present Imam was murdered. Cairo also harbours the al-Jifri brothers, leaders of the South Arabian League, a former Aden opposition party, and Ali Abd al-Karīm, ex-Sultan of Lahej, Western Aden Protectorate. The former were exiled and the latter deposed by the British authorities in 1958. They—like the Imam—advocate the union of Aden and Yemen, but in the framework of a general Arab union on the lines of the UAR, and they oppose the present regime in Yemen and a union with it under present conditions. (See also pp 382-4, 396-7) While Yemen refers to Aden as "Southern Yemen," these exiles, when broadcasting from Cairo, speak of the "Arab South," as do the UAR authorities.

**New Appointments in Cairo.** In Feb the Imam appointed

Shaykh Muhammad al-Mansūr as his representative [or deputy] at the UAS Council, and the Amir Sayf al-Islam as his representative to President Abdel-Nasser. Hasan Ibn Ibrahim was appointed Minister to Moscow. (*R. San'a*, 23 Feb-BBC, 25 Feb; *Gumhuriyah*, 5 June) [Ibn Ibrahim remained in Cairo, however, and at the end of the year again appeared in the reports as deputy of the Imam—see below.]

In Mar Muhammad al-Mansūr, Deputy of the Imam in Cairo, congratulating the Imam and President Abdel-Nasser on the second anniversary of the Union, said that among the results achieved so far was that the Yemeni soldier was now training with the same [i.e. Russian] weapons as the UAR soldier and on the same system. (*MENA*, 8 Feb-BBC, 10 Mar)

**Mar: Egyptian Officers to Yemen?** In Mar it was reported that Egyptian officers with their families had arrived in Hodeida. The Imam "welcomed their return." [Egyptian officers were expelled in 1959—see above: Background.] (*Aden Chr.*, 24 Mar)

**UAR Economic Aid Discussed.** Amir Abd ar-Rahmān discussed with the UAR authorities the strengthening of the ties between the two countries, especially the possibility of UAR technical and economic aid for development projects in Yemen. (*Gumhuriyah*, 7 Jan) Later in the month Amir Abd ar-Rahmān said that Yemen was "waiting for UAR experts to start building the first Yemeni spinning and textile factory." (*MENA*, 17 Jan-BBC, 19 Jan) [No reports were available of such a project being undertaken by UAR experts during the year; the construction of Yemen's first textile plant was started by People's China, see p 398.]



**Mar-July: Indications of Friction.** In Mar a rumour was reported from San'a that the Imam had got hold of documents and secret letters of al-Badr and a friendly Arab State, which were connected with the future rule in Yemen. (*Fatat al-Jazirah, Aden, 27 Mar*)

The Imam's representative in Cairo had reportedly protested to the UAR Government against the representative of the Cairo-based South Arabian League (see Background) being invited to the AASP conference in Conakry, and threatened that Yemen would not attend. (*Fatat al-Jazirah, 18 Apr*)

In June, the Imam Ahmad urgently recalled his two Ministers on the UAS Council, Ahmad Muhammad Pasha and Ahmad Shāmi, and his former deputy in Cairo, Hasan Ibn Ibrahim. A Yemeni official source explained that the object was consultations on matters connected with the Yemen and the UAR. (*MENA-BBC, 20 June*) [At this time a wave of terrorism was sweeping the country, and there was a tribal rebellion—see p 393 ff.]

In connection with the rebellion, President Abdel-Nasser reportedly refused the Imam military assistance to suppress the tribes. (*Aden Chr., 16 June, see also p 395*)

In July, Muhammad al-Mansūr, deputy of the Imam in Cairo, delivered a note to the National Union of the UAR pointing out that, grateful as the Yemenite Government was for the support of the NU Congress for the "Yemenite people's struggle against British imperialism in the occupied territory," it hoped that expressions of support would adopt the phrase "the occupied south of the Yemen" instead of the term used by the "separatists" and imperialists, "the Southern Arabian Peninsula." (*MENA, 13 July-BBC, 14 July*)

The Imam's brother, Sayf al-Islam Abd ar-Rahmān, who came to Cairo to lead the Yemeni delegation to the revolution anniversary celebrations, said that neither the Imam nor the Amir al-Badr had been able to come because of "certain affairs [the terrorist activities?] requiring their presence in Yemen at this particular time." Both had given him messages for Abdel-Nasser. (*BBC, 23 July*) An earlier report said al-Badr would attend. (*Saba, 21 July*)

[In spring Shaykh Nu'mān, the "Free Yemen" leader, left Cairo for Aden, but after a three-month stay was expelled by the Aden authorities—reportedly at the request of the Imam, who held him responsible for terrorist activities then taking place in Yemen. Nu'mān returned to Cairo. See p 396.]

**Jan-Aug: Yemeni Study Groups in the UAR.** Thirty Yemeni workers arrived in Cairo for a three-month training course in textile manufacture. (*Akhbar al-Yawm, 16 Jan*)

In Aug several Yemeni missions left for the UAR to study broadcasting, printing and administration. (*R. San'a, 17 Aug, MENA, 26 Aug-BBC, 19, 29 Aug*)

**The Future of the UAS.** In Dec the "Free Yemenis" declared, in an article published in a Cairo paper, that the UAR was deeply interested in the implementation of the UAS Convention, which was being obstructed by Yemen. The authors believed that Yemen was exposed to grave dangers: (1) The British plot to form an imperialistic satellite federation in the Yemeni South (i.e. the Aden Protectorate), which, if successful, would bring Yemen itself under imperialistic tutelage; (2) Yemen's policy of establishing close ties with world powers without having statesmen and experts capable of looking after her interests. As a result of these and other developments, the UAR itself might be dangerously involved. It was therefore the UAR's inescapable duty to do something about this situation. The union must not be dissolved, but there were two possibilities for action. First, the UAR could demand the implementation of the union; the entire Yemeni people would support this demand, and eventually it would be able to force the government to agree. Secondly, the struggle against imperialism in the Yemeni South (Aden) could be supported: the term "Arab South" should be replaced by "Southern Yemen"; a united front of Yemeni fighters in the South, Yemen proper and abroad should be set up, with its centre in Yemen, or, if the Government refused, in Cairo. The solution of the Yemeni problem was easy, the article concluded, as it depended on the life of a ruler who was now in his last hours. (*Haqa'iq, 7 Dec*)

## RELATIONS BETWEEN IRAQ AND JORDAN

### SYNOPSIS

At the beginning of 1960 there was still no official contact between Iraq and Jordan. In Mar 1958 a Federal Union had been formed between the two countries, but in July, following the Iraqi coup d'état, in which the Hashimite King and Crown Prince were killed, all relations were broken off and the frontier was closed.

For the next two years, until the summer of 1960, the overt hostility between their rulers was more extreme than that between any other two Arab countries. On the other hand, the propaganda warfare between them was less intensive than that between the UAR and Iraq or the UAR and Jordan, and there were no signs of attempts at mutual subversion.

In June 1960, the propaganda warfare between the two countries died down, and gradually other signs of a rapprochement began to appear. In Aug the Iraqi and Jordanian Foreign Ministers met in Shtura. In Sept King Hussein met the Iraqi Foreign Minister in New York, and on 1 Oct Jordan accorded recognition to the

Iraqi Government. Later in the year, various steps were taken for the development of full normal relations, especially in the economic field.

From the beginning of the rapprochement Jordan showed herself openly eager for an early and full resumption of relations, while Iraq was comparatively slow in responding. [One reason may have been the unpopularity of this development in certain (and perhaps large) sections of Iraqi public opinion.]

Two political aspects of this development were stressed: the success of the Hashimite regime of Jordan in breaking out of its comparative isolation in the Arab world, and the possibility of the formation of an anti-Nasser (or "non-Nasserist") bloc or coalition. Iraq, Jordan, Tunisia and Morocco were mentioned as possible partners. However, Iraq categorically denied any intention of setting up such a bloc, and both Iraq and Jordan, in official pronouncements, said that the aim of the rapprochement was to pave the way for Arab solidarity in general.

**JAN-JUNE: THE PROPAGANDA CAMPAIGN**

**The Issue of the "Palestinian Republic."** Between Dec 1959 and Mar 1960, the Iraqi plan for the establishment of a Palestinian Republic was the main topic in the propaganda warfare between Iraq and Jordan (see also pp 133-4).

**Jan-June: Iraqi Propaganda.** The Iraqi radio and Press usually mentioned both the UAR and the Jordanian leaders as the "thieves of Palestine" who had betrayed the Palestinian Cause, served as agents of imperialism, were enemies of Arab nationalism, etc. Few comments were exclusively directed against Jordanian leaders (see *BBC, IMH, Jan-June*). On 6 Jan General Qassim said: "Jordan is hitched to imperialism... It is an imperialist puppet." (*BBC, 9 Jan*) Colonel Mahdāwī assured his audiences at the "People's Court" in Baghdad that the Jordanian people would overthrow King Hussein and that the border between Iraq and Jordan would disappear. (*BBC, 4 Jan*). One of the last personal attacks was heard on 26 May when an Iraqi commentator predicted for King Hussein the fate that had befallen Faisal II in Baghdad. (*R. Baghdad, 26 May-BBC, 28 May; INA, 3 June*)

**Jan-June: Jordanian Propaganda.** The Jordanian leaders, Press and radio denounced the "Palestinian Republic" plan as "imaginary," "ridiculous," "a childish innovation," and "contrary to the wishes and interests of the Palestinians."

Jordan accused the Qassim regime of being pro-Communist and called for joint Arab action to prevent the spreading of Communism in the Arab world. The Iraqi leaders, especially General Qassim, were accused of trying to isolate Iraq from her Arab sisters by not cooperating in the Arab League's activities. Colonel Mahdāwī's conduct in the "People's Court" in Baghdad was criticised. (*BBC; IMB; IMH; Jordanian Press, Jan-June*)

King Hussein declared at a Press conference on 6 June that Jordan was following developments in Iraq with great concern and was ready to come to the aid of the Iraqi people should she be asked to do so or if the Communist danger there became an established fact. (*Jihad, 7 June*)

**JUNE-DEC: THE RAPPROCHEMENT**

**June: Cessation of Propaganda Warfare.** In mid-June, radio propaganda warfare between Amman and Baghdad ceased. Instead, calls for the strengthening of Arab solidarity became more frequent. (*IMH, 23 June*) The Press in both countries also ceased direct attacks at this time. Indirect criticism continued for some time, but by the end of July this too stopped.

**July-Aug: Jordanian Reports on Rapprochement.** In early July reports indicating a Jordanian-Iraqi rapprochement started to appear in the Jordanian Press (see below), while the Iraqi Press kept silent.

**July: Iraqi-Jordanian Border Opened for Kuwaiti Transit.** On 7 July the Iraqi-Jordanian frontier was opened for Kuwaiti transit traffic. (*R. Amman, 7 July-IMB, 8 July*) Subsequently, Jordanian papers reported expectations that the frontier would shortly be opened to all traffic, and that telephonic and telegraphic communications between Amman and Baghdad would be restored. (*Jihad, 5, 25 July; Falastin, 22 July; IMB, 30 Aug*) On 14 Aug *ad-Difā'*, quoting official sources in Amman, said that Jordan would not oppose commercial transactions between Jordanians and Iraqis. (*Difa', 14 Aug*)

**July-Sept: Conciliatory Gestures by Iraq.** On 14 July General Qassim declared that all the Arab countries were sisters to Iraq, and "we do not differentiate between Lebanon, Jordan, Libya, the UAR, etc... We are all brothers." (*Iraq Times, 15 July*)

In Aug, during the Arab Foreign Ministers' Conference in Shtura, the Iraqi Foreign Minister, Hāshim Jawād, proposed the setting up of a Palestinian Republic—to which Jordan objected—but at the same time he declared that any arrangements to organize the Palestinian Arabs must obtain the support and consent of all Arab League members. [This could be interpreted as conceding to Jordan the right to veto the Palestinian projects.] (See also p 129.) The Iraqi and Jordanian Foreign Ministers met privately during the Conference. (*Hayat, 25 Aug*)

**Oct: Jordan Recognizes the Revolutionary Regime in Baghdad.** On 1 Oct it was officially announced in Amman that Jordan had recognized the republican regime in Baghdad, and a cable to this effect was sent to the Iraqi Government. An official spokesman said that this step was taken following the receipt of a telegram from King Hussein (then at the UN in New York), who had engaged in long discussions with Hāshim Jawād in New York. He added that Jawād had denounced the "bomb outrage in Amman" on 29 Aug [when Premier Majālī was killed] and had also, on behalf of General Qassim, denounced the assassination of King Faisal on the first day of the Iraqi revolution. He said that "Iraq and Jordan would shortly open negotiations for an exchange of diplomatic representations." (*Difa', 2 Oct*) According to the Jordanian Press, extensive negotiations (in Shtura and New York) between the Jordanian and the Iraqi Foreign Ministers had preceded the recognition. (*Manar, 5 Oct*) (There appeared also a report on contacts as early as the end of 1959 between the two countries, established by their Ambassadors in Saudi Arabia—*BAPP, 786, 14 Oct.*)

The Jordanian Press received the news with great enthusiasm and praised King Hussein for his wise and bold policy and his strength of character in overcoming his personal bitterness [over the killing of the Hashimite family in Baghdad]. (*Jihad; Manar; Difa', 1-2 Oct*)

**Oct: Baghdad Reaction Late, Cautious but Favourable.** [While the Jordanian authorities showed themselves eager to resume full normal relations as quickly as possible, Iraqi reaction during the first two weeks was late, slow and almost reluctant—though in the end favourable.]

Iraq's first public reaction came only on 4 Oct, after three days' silence, in a broadcast from Baghdad Radio: "Official circles have welcomed the Jordanian recognition, which was fully in accordance with the policy of Arab solidarity adopted by the government of the Immortal Iraqi Republic under the leadership of General Qassim... The Iraqi Government expressed the hope that the Jordanian decision would shortly lead to a resumption of diplomatic relations as a first step towards the resumption of trade and economic ties in the interests of both countries and the remaining Arab states." (*IMB, 5 Oct*)

The Iraqi papers, on the other hand, continued to ignore the news until 8 Oct, and even then they gave it only scant coverage, especially the Communist ones. (*Zaman; Ahali; Sawt al-Ahrar; Mabda'; Taqadum, 1-10 Oct; IMH, 26 Oct.*)

On 10 Oct the Jordanian Minister of Communications, Anwar Nashashibi, announced that he had cabled two days before to his opposite number in Baghdad proposing

the resumption of the telephone service between the two capitals—but had received no answer. The acting Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Adil Khālidi, said the same day that Baghdad had not even answered a telegram sent eight days before conveying Jordan's recognition of the republican regime in Iraq. (*Guardian*, 11 Oct)

**Oct: Qassim on Iraqi-Jordanian Relations.** In an interview published in the Lebanese daily *al-Jarīdah*, given on 12 Oct, Qassim said, in answer to a question about "the reasons which made Jordan unexpectedly recognize the Iraqi Government": "We always welcome any step towards solidarity and cooperation with all the Arab brethren... Scheming, slander, provocation and rash deeds... between the Arab countries serve only the interest of the greedy imperialists... Iraq harbours goodwill towards every Arab country and wishes to support it without interfering in its domestic affairs." Qassim denied any intention to unify Iraq and Jordan, and declared that "Iraq maintains solidarity with all her Arab brothers..." On the allegations that Abd as-Salām Arif was responsible for the killing of the Hashimite family on 14 July, and that it had taken place without his knowledge, Qassim said: "That is not true... In our revolution we were not after certain persons but against an entire system... Our aim was to overthrow the government; anyone who stood in the way was killed, and got his deserved punishment in the revolution." (*Jaridah*, 14, 15 Oct; *INA*, 15 Oct)

**Iraq Ready to Defend Jordan Against UAR Intervention?** Asked in the same interview whether Iraq would intervene militarily "in the event of tension between the UAR and Jordan," Qassim said: "The Iraqi Army stands in the way of any external foreign intervention and will not raise the sword in the face of any Arab soldier. The Iraqi Army's only [task] is to serve and defend the Arab nation" (sources—see above). However, the Baghdad Radio commentator, referring to this interview, declared: "Iraq will not stand by with arms folded in case of exterior aggression against any Arab country... or in inter-Arab disputes." (*IMH*, 26 Oct) *Al-Hayāt*, quoting Iraqi political circles in Baghdad, reported that General Qassim had stressed in the interview that "any aggression against Jordan should be considered as an aggression against Iraq herself." (*Hayat*, 30 Oct)

**Oct–Nov: Hussein: Recognition for the Sake of Arab Nationalism.** In Oct King Hussein said in a BBC radio interview in London, "We have a feeling that Iraq as well as Jordan wishes to improve relations to a point where we would work jointly for a better Arab world within the Arab League." (*Jer. Times*, 14 Oct) On 1 Nov, in his speech from the throne, King Hussein referred to "Dear Iraq," saying: "We thought of the interests of the Arab nation in such a rapprochement... We decided to put our duty towards our homeland above our personal sentiments, for the sake of Arab nationalism and the interests of the Arab nation." (*Jihad*, 2 Nov)

**Oct: Communications Re-established: Jordan Expects Economic Benefits.** On 20 Oct road, post, telephone and telegraphic communications were resumed between Iraq and Jordan. Iraq had informed Jordan of its decision in this respect on 16 Oct. (*INA*, 16 Oct; *Zaman*, 21 Oct) Dr Jamil Tutunji, the Jordanian acting Foreign Minister, said that the opening of the frontier would stimulate economic development in the two countries and the trade

between them would provide work for Jordanian lorries. (*Jer. Times*, 21 Oct) Expectations of large-scale economic benefits to both Jordan and Iraq to accrue from the renewed relations were voiced by Jordanian officials and newspapers. (*Falastin*, 3 Oct; *Jihad*, 4, 6 Oct)

**Oct: Iraq Expects Renewal of Diplomatic Relations.** On 29 Oct the Iraqi Foreign Minister said that Jordan's recognition of the Iraqi Government "will undoubtedly result in the resumption of diplomatic relations with Jordan... There are some routine affairs which can be quickly considered and implemented." (*Zaman*, 1 Nov)

**Nov: Jordanian Delegation in Baghdad.** A four-man Jordanian delegation arrived in Baghdad on 5 Nov. On 7 Nov its head declared, after an audience with General Qassim, that the delegates had presented the name of the candidate for Jordan Ambassador for approval. (*Zaman*, 7 Nov)

**Nov: Agreement on Trade and Traffic.** On 10 Nov the delegation signed an agreement with the Iraqi Government "on matters of transportation; movement, trade and customs procedure between the two countries." It was also agreed to implement the trade exchange agreement of 20 Sept 1953 between the two countries and the agreement on trade exchanges and the regulation of the transit trade concluded between Arab League member states on 15 Dec 1954. (*Zaman*, 11 Nov) Under this agreement, visas for cars and trucks would be granted at the frontier, and visas for passengers would be granted by the security authorities. Iraqi merchants were offered facilities at the Jordanian port of Aqaba. (*R. Baghdad*, 10 Nov–*IMB*, 11 Nov)

**Nov: Exchange of Courtesies.** On 13 Nov the Jordanian Premier cabled General Qassim his Government's appreciation for the friendly and generous reception afforded to the Jordanian delegation during its stay in Baghdad. (*Jihad*, 14 Nov) On the same day the President of the Iraqi Sovereignty Council congratulated King Hussein on his birthday. (*IMB*, 14 Nov), and King Hussein answered the cable. (*Jihad*, 15 Nov)

**Dec: Steps to Implement Customs Agreement.** On 4 Dec Iraqi and Jordanian committees met on the frontier to discuss the setting up of a customs station on the Ramadi-Amman highway. (*Jihad*, 5 Dec) On 7 Dec the committees concluded their discussion by adopting a recommendation to their respective governments to hasten the demarcation of the frontier, in order to facilitate the establishment of a common custom station. (*Jihad*, 8, 10 Dec)

**Dec: Jordan Appoints Ambassador in Baghdad.** On 1 Dec King Hussein appointed Wasfi at-Tal, the former Director General of Guidance and Press Services, as Jordanian Ambassador in Baghdad. (*R. Amman-IMB*, 2 Dec) [At-Tal is regarded as a prominent supporter of the Hashimite regime in Jordan. He attended the Arab League Conference in Shtura, and was described by the UAR papers as the "strong man" of the delegation—see p 130.] On 12 Dec the Ambassador arrived in Baghdad and five days later submitted his credentials to General Qassim. (*Zaman*, 20 Dec)

[On 10 Jan 1961 Qassim appointed General Abd al-Karim Shākir, a former Iraqi Ambassador to Morocco, to the post of Iraqi Ambassador in Amman.]



### OCT-NOV: INTER-ARAB POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE RAPPROCHEMENT

Most of the comment on the rapprochement was concerned with its effect on inter-Arab relations.

**Anti-UAR Bloc?** The possibility of the formation of an anti-UAR bloc was brought up by UAR and Lebanese pro-UAR papers. A new collusion against the UAR, to include Jordan, Iraq and Tunisia was in the making under the inspiration of imperialism, they alleged, but "it would surely fail, as did the collusion between Israel, France and Britain in 1956." (*Beirut Masa'*, 3 Oct) The organ of the Ba'ath party in Lebanon, *as-Sahāfah*, said that imperialism had chosen Qassim to lead a "reactionary front," including Tunisia, Jordan and other Arab countries, in order to encircle the "Arab liberation movement." (*Sahāfah*, 8 Oct)

*Ruz al-Yūsuf*, Cairo, spoke of a "British plot" to bring about a union between Iraq and Jordan, in order to consolidate Western influence in the area. General Qassim was credited with a prominent role in this plan. (*Ruz al-Yusuf*, 17 Nov) [But generally the UAR Press and radio reported the developments without comment. (*BBC*; *IMB*; *IMH*, 26 Oct)]

The neutral Lebanese paper, *al-Jarīdah*, said that President Abdel-Nasser's sudden visit to Syria (see pp 506-7) had been necessitated both by the growing internal opposition in Syria and by the rapprochement between Amman and Baghdad; he suspected that a new anti-UAR "axis" was in the making, which would utilize the opposition in Syria to break up the union (*Jaridah*, 16 Oct)

**Oct: Favourable Reaction of Lebanese Independent Papers.** *Al-Hayāt* and *al-Jaridah* spoke of the economic benefits of the move for Jordan and Iraq, but mainly stressed its political significance. *Al-Hayāt* said that King Hussein's recognition of the Iraqi regime on 1 Oct was nicely timed to serve the King's aim to strengthen his position and enhance his prestige before addressing the UN General Assembly (which he did two days later, see p 9), and to show the UN that Abdel-Nasser "is not the

sole leader of the Arab world, and that there exists another bloc that does not identify itself with Nasser. This bloc now includes Jordan, Iraq, Tunisia and Morocco, and may be enlarged by the adherence of other Arab states." (*Hayat*, 4, 16 Oct) The Iraqi-Jordanian rapprochement had reanimated the Arab League and would have a great influence in its future role. (*Hayat*, 21 Oct) "The general belief in Iraq is that in due time some kind of a federation will combine the two countries, which would bring about the establishment of the Palestine Republic in the West Bank of the Jordan." (*Jaridah*, 9 Dec)

**King Hussein's Escape from Isolation.** This was the main factor stressed in comments by British papers. (*Scotsman*, 5 Oct; *Economist*, 8 Oct, *Sunday Times*, 9 Oct, *Daily Telegraph*, 18 Oct) The *Sunday Times* also dwelt on reports on the possibility of cooperation between Jordan, Iraq, Tunisia and Morocco "to end Abdel-Nasser's pretensions to speak for the Arab world" and upon the economic benefits to Jordan.

**Oct-Nov: Iraq Denies Collusion Against UAR.** Baghdad Radio on 20 Oct rejected allegations in foreign papers that the Iraqi-Jordanian rapprochement was directed against the UAR, and stressed that Iraq would always be a force for friendship and affection between all the Arab countries. (*IMB*, 21 Oct) The Iraqi Foreign Minister declared: "We do not agree to the division of the Arab ranks. Our main concern is to convert the Arab League into a real league for the Arab states. It is the policy of the Iraqi Republic to work to attain this aim and not to form Arab blocs, because only imperialism and the covetous ones would benefit from a division of the Arab ranks. If any such division occurs—God forbid—we shall not be a party to it." (*BBC*, 1 Nov) Iraqi papers commented generally in the same vein. (*Zaman*, 13 Oct; *Ahali*; *Mabda'*, 16 Oct) The Jordanian paper *al-Manār* (expressing the views of governing circles), which immediately after the recognition spoke of "a new bloc" in inter-Arab relations, now endorsed the Iraqi view. (*Manar*, 2 Oct; 8 Nov)

## MOROCCO AND THE ARAB COUNTRIES OF THE ME

### SYNOPSIS

Morocco, which had joined the Arab League in Oct 1958, showed growing interest in inter-Arab relations during 1960. It was primarily King Muhammad himself who was active in this field, as exemplified by his visit to the Arab countries of the ME in Jan-Feb. His general approach was to strengthen Morocco's relations with all the Arab states, and to bring about an improvement of inter-Arab relations. He advocated the amendment of the League Charter so as to strengthen the League on the basis of equality between all its members (see p 124). This approach was more favourably received by such countries as Jordan and Iraq than by the UAR.

All Arab countries, save Tunisia, backed Morocco's claim to Mauritania.

### JAN-FEB: KING MUHAMMAD V's STATE VISIT TO ARAB COUNTRIES

In Jan-Feb King Muhammad V of Morocco, accompanied by his Premier, Abdullah Ibrahim, and other senior officials and army officers, paid state visits to the Arab countries: he spent 11 days in the UAR (7-18 Jan); 7

days in Saudi-Arabia (19-26 Jan); 4 in Jordan (26-29); one in Kuwait (30 Jan); 3 in Iraq (31 Jan-2 Feb) and 5 in Lebanon (3-7 Feb). (*BBC*, 9 Feb)

In the UAR he received an honorary degree at Cairo University, visited Port Said and Syria, took part in the inauguration of the High Dam Project, and attended the opening of the Aswan hydroelectric station.

In Saudi Arabia, the King made the pilgrimage to Mecca, and initialled a convention for fraternity and solidarity between Morocco and Saudi Arabia; in Jordan he visited an Arab refugee camp and donated 14,000 dinars to the refugees; in Iraq he visited the holy places in Najaf and Karbala, and attended a military parade; in Lebanon, he attended a conference of Moroccan diplomats in Beirut, received a doctorate from Beirut University, and was present at the signature of a cultural agreement between his country and Lebanon. (*BBC*; *IMB*, 7 Jan-10 Feb)

**General Reactions to Visit.** On the whole, the Arab Press and radio gave King Muhammad a cordial welcome and all his movements and pronouncements received wide coverage. He was hailed as the leader of Morocco's



struggle for independence and champion of Arab causes. Dissident views appeared, however, in the pro-UAR Lebanese Press.

**Moroccan Source on Purpose of Visit.** The daily *al-Istiqlal* quoted official Moroccan sources as emphasizing the religious purpose of the visit (the pilgrimage to Mecca) and the King's deep desire to bring the eastern and western wings of the Arab peoples closer together. (*Istiqlal*, Rabat, 8 Jan)

**Visit Regarded in Jordan as Sign of Support.** The Jordanian papers highlighted the great contributions of King Muhammad and King Hussein to the Arab cause, stressing the descent of both from the House of the Prophet. They regarded the visit as an encouragement to Jordan and an approval of its policy on the Palestinian question, imperialism and Communism. (*Jihad*, 14, 27, 29, 31 Jan; *Difa'*, 28 Jan; *Falastin*, 31 Jan; *IMH*, 21 Feb)

**Wide Coverage in Iraq.** Especially wide coverage was given to the visit in Iraq. [This was the first visit to Iraq of an Arab head of state since the 1958 revolution.]

*Al-Ahali* hoped that the King would discuss with the Arab leaders "ways and means to clear the Arab atmosphere and lift the clouds that disturbed it." (*Ahali*, 1 Feb)

**UAR Press Favourable—Lebanese Pro-UAR Press Suspects Intentions.** The UAR papers stressed the King's desire to strengthen the ties of friendship and cooperation between Morocco and the Arab world. (*Ahram*, 8, 12 Jan; *Gumhuriyah*, 7, 14 Jan; *Akhbar*, 14 Jan; *IMH*, 21 Feb) *Al-Ahrām* revealed that the employment of UAR experts to help in Morocco's industrial, agricultural, and educational plans was among the subjects discussed by the King with President Nasser. (*Ahram*, 16 Jan)

The Lebanese pro-UAR papers, however, suspected the intentions behind the visit. They expressed concern lest the King should try to mediate between the UAR and Iraq (*Siyasah*, 18 Jan) and lest the visit should provide support for the "dwindling position of reactionary monarchs." (*Beirut Masa'*, 21 Jan) *Al-Hawādhith* thought that the visit was intended to weaken the trend of positive neutrality pursued by Arab countries in the Middle East. (*Hawadhith*, 15 Jan)

A sharp attack was made by *as-Sahāfah*, the organ of the Ba'ath party. In three articles it denounced "the reactionary regime in Morocco, and French and American imperialism working there." It quoted the Moroccan opposition paper *ar-Ra'y al-Amm* to the effect that the present regime in Morocco had put "many national leaders" in prison, and had closed newspapers. (*Sahafah*, 14, 16, 20 Jan)

**Other Lebanese Comment.** *Sada Lubnan* pointed to what it understood as the motive of these papers: "While Cairo showers honours and praises on the King... some Lebanese pro-UAR papers are doing the dirty job [for Cairo] of criticising him and his activities... all this because of his aim and persistent demand to amend the Arab League Charter" (see p 124). (*Sada Lubnan*, 19 Jan)

**No Favourable Effect on Inter-Arab Relations.** *Al-Hayat* wrote: "Those who thought that the King would be able to persuade the Arab leaders to hold a summit meeting

were too optimistic. No such meeting could be held as long as the Arab leaders are so busy with their internal conflicts." (*Hayat*, 5 Feb—see also *The Times*, 29 Jan)

### JOINT COMMUNIQUE

All joint communiqués issued in the Arab capitals at the end of each visit expressed support for Arab causes, such as Algeria, Palestine, Oman, etc.; called for increased efforts to consolidate Arab solidarity; denounced France's atomic tests in the Sahara, and pledged solidarity and cooperation, mainly in the educational, economic and cultural fields, between Morocco and the other Arab countries. The Moroccan character of Mauritania was also stressed in all communiqués.

[However, there were divergences between the communiqués regarding some central Arab issues. In the joint communiqué with King Hussein, the latter's attitude to the question of the Palestinian Entity was brought out by stressing the need for a "well studied comprehensive plan" (see p 133). Hussein's attitude to Arab questions also found expression in the declaration that "all kinds of trends and ideologies which are contrary to the principles of Arab nationalism and the spirit of Islam should be resisted." In the joint communiqué with the UAR, special stress was laid on African solidarity, but no mention was made of positive neutralism. (For the different attitudes to the amendment of the League Charter brought out in the communiqués, see p 124).

(For full text of the joint communiqué with the UAR see *Ahram*, 20 Jan; with Saudi Arabia, *Hayat*, 27 Jan; with Jordan, *Difa'*, 31 Jan; with Iraq, *Zaman*, 4 Feb; with Lebanon, *Hayat*, 7 Feb; also BBC, 2, 5 Feb.)

### MOROCCO-IRAQ

**Jan-Feb: King Muhammad V's Visit to Iraq.** See above.

**Mar: Iraqi Medical Mission to Morocco.** On 5 Mar an Iraqi medical mission arrived in Rabat to treat victims of a mass outbreak of food poisoning. Baghdad Radio emphasized that Iraq was the only Arab country taking part in this task. (*R. Baghdad*, 5 Mar—BBC, 8 Mar)

**22 Apr: Iraq Presents Fighter Planes to Morocco.** On 22 Apr an Iraqi mission arrived in Rabat to present a flight of four Hawker Fury fighters donated by General Qassim during King Muhammad V's visit to Iraq. The Moroccan Crown Prince received the donation as C.-in-C. of the army at a military ceremony. (*Zaman*, 23 Apr)

**Cultural Relations.** In May an Iraqi source reported that 32 Moroccan students were studying in Iraq during the academic year 1959/60. (*Bilad*, 13 May)

In Aug the Moroccan Government officially requested Iraq to supply 13 professors and 96 secondary school teachers. [It is not clear whether any Iraqi teachers were sent; there is a shortage of teachers in Iraq itself.] (*Ra'y al-Amm*, Rabat, 12 Aug)

In Nov there were frequent references in Iraqi papers to a cultural agreement between Iraq and Morocco to be signed in the near future. (*Zaman*, 11 Nov; *Iraq Times*, 14 Nov; *Bilad*, 22 Nov) [No further development in this regard was reported up to the end of the year.]

**Aug: Commercial Agreement.** On 9 May a commercial agreement between Iraq and Morocco was signed in Rabat (*Siyasah*, Beirut, 24 Apr; *IMB*, 12 May), and ratified by the Iraqi Government on 1 Aug. (*INA*, 1 Aug) The agreement called for the exchange of various products, and mutual "most favoured country"

treatment. A mixed Iraqi-Moroccan commission was to be formed to implement it. (Full text in *Sawt al-Ahali*, Baghdad, 2 Aug)

#### MOROCCO-JORDAN

Jan: King Muhammad's Visit to Jordan. See above.

Apr: King Hussein's Visit to Morocco. On 21 Apr King Hussein arrived in Rabat on a ten-day state visit to Morocco (*Jihad*, 22 Apr; see also p 336). A joint communiqué issued on 30 Apr said that the two Kings had discussed relations between their countries, Arab affairs and the international situation, and that their viewpoints coincided completely. They proclaimed their adherence to the principles of the joint Jordanian-Moroccan statement of 29 Jan and their determination to achieve its objectives. (*BBC*, 3 May)

July: Jordanian Military Mission to Train the Moroccan Army. On 19 July Premier Majāli of Jordan declared that his government had accepted a Moroccan request to send a Jordanian military mission to "aid in training the Moroccan Army." (*Jihad*, 20 July) Rabat Radio said that it would help to "arabize the departments of the Royal Army." (*R. Rabat*, 18 July-BBC, 20 July) [No dispatch of such a mission had been reported by the end of 1960.]

Oct: Jordan Sides with Morocco on Mauritania Question. See below.

#### MOROCCO-LEBANON

Feb: King Muhammad's State Visit to Lebanon. See above.

July-Nov: Miscellaneous Contacts. In July the Moroccan Ambassador in Beirut discussed with the Lebanese authorities the possibility of hiring Lebanese teachers to work in Morocco. (*Siyasah*, 16 July)

On 10 Aug a Moroccan Youth delegation arrived in Lebanon for a two-day visit. (*Hayat*, 11 Aug)

On 8 Sept Morocco and Lebanon signed an agreement for the exchange of radio programmes. (*BBC*, 12 Sept)

On 10 Nov the Lebanese Airline Co. inaugurated a weekly direct flight Beirut-Rabat-Beirut. (*Hayat*, 19 Nov)

#### MOROCCO-UAR

King Muhammad's Visit to UAR. See above.

UAR Teachers in Morocco. A Cairo source gave the number of UAR teachers working in Morocco secondary schools as approximately 170. (*Ahram*, 8 Mar)

May: Air Agreement. Under an agreement for the co-ordination of air services initialled in Rabat on 19 May, the Moroccan and UAR airlines were to be authorized to link the two countries either via Libya, Tunisia and Algeria, or across the Mediterranean through Athens, Rome and Barcelona or Lisbon. The UAR airlines would continue to Dakar and South America. The Moroccan airline services were to be extended from Cairo to Baghdad. It was hoped to start the new arrangement in 1961. (*BBC*, 23 May)

#### THE MAURITANIA PROBLEM

Aug: Mauritania on Agenda of Arab League. On 14 Aug Morocco demanded that the Arab states should not

recognize Mauritania, and the problem was placed on the agenda of the forthcoming Shtura Conference. Morocco submitted to the Conference a note insisting that Mauritania should form part of its territory. The PM of Mauritania cabled to the Conference to protest against the inclusion of the Mauritanian problem on its agenda. He accused Morocco of imperialist ambitions vis-à-vis his country and demanded support for its independence. (*Ahram*, 20 Aug; *Hayat*, 26 Aug; *IMB*, 28 Aug)

Aug: Arab League Supports Morocco. The Shtura Conference resolved that Mauritania was "an inseparable part of Morocco"; that imperialism was aiming to give an "artificial existence" to Mauritania in order to establish there a focal point for neo-imperialism in Africa; that France intended to grant Mauritania formal independence in order to separate it from Morocco and despite the allegiance of all Mauritania to Moroccan Arab nationality, etc.

Accordingly the Conference decided to support Morocco's demand for the return of the territory and her request that the problem should be raised at the UN. Friendly countries were to be asked to support Morocco's demand. (*Hayat*, 30 Aug) [Tunisia, which did not support this all-Arab stand, did not participate in the Conference.]

Oct: Mauritanian PM's Reaction. In a Press interview at Dakar, the PM of Mauritania stated that despite the Arab League's decision he would make efforts to strengthen relations with the Arab countries: Mauritania would invite them to send representatives to its independence celebrations; would endeavour to strengthen cultural ties with Arab countries, because it regarded its culture as Arab; and would welcome Arab immigrants. (*Hayat*, 22 Oct)

Oct: Mauritanian Mission Admitted to Lebanon. In Oct, a Mauritanian mission went to the Middle East, to obtain support from the Arab countries. Most of them refused it admission, but it was allowed to enter Lebanon. When Morocco demanded explanations, the Lebanese Government replied that it had refused to meet the mission "officially" and had paid it no attention. (*Hayat*, 13 Oct)

Earlier, *al-Hayāt* had expressed reservations about Morocco's claims and called for a referendum in Mauritania to clarify the position. It demanded that the Arab League should not be hasty and should mediate between the two sides. (*Hayat*, 29 July, 16 Aug) The paper also published views of Mauritania in support of the independence of their country. (*Hayat*, 30 July, 8 Sept)

Sept: Jordan Against "French Agents" from Mauritania. King Hussein forbade a delegation of "French agents" from Mauritania [apparently referring to the mission mentioned above] to enter Jordan, even to visit the Dome of the Rock [one of the holy places of Islam]. The King of Morocco thanked Hussein for his stand. (*Akhbar al-Ushu'*, Jordan, 23 Sept; see also *Jihad*, 9, 11 Oct; *Difa'*, 4 Nov; *Falastin*, 27 Nov)

Nov: Tunisian Attitude. On 23 Nov Tunisia announced that she would support the entry of Mauritania into the UN as an independent state. (*Hayat*, 24 Nov) On 24 Nov the Moroccan Government retorted by announcing the recall of its Ambassador in Tunis. (*Hayat*, 25 Nov)

Nov: Only Tunisia at Independence Celebrations. All

the Arab League countries, except Tunisia, decided not to be represented at Mauritania's independence celebrations. (*Akhbar*, 28 Nov)

**Nov: Morocco Fails to Gain Support at UN.** When Morocco's demand to postpone the grant of independence

to Mauritania was raised at the Political Committee of the UN Assembly, it was supported only by the Arab states (excluding Tunisia) and the USSR, and opposed in particular by the newly independent countries of Africa. As a result, no resolution was adopted at Morocco's request. (*Times*, 28 Nov)

## TUNISIA AND THE ARAB COUNTRIES OF THE ME

### SYNOPSIS

Tunisia's relations with the Arab countries of the ME were dominated by its conflict with the UAR (see below), in consequence of which it boycotted the Arab League Council (see pp 126, 129). On the other hand, closer relations developed between Tunisia and Iraq.

### TUNISIA AND THE UAR

[Background Note. On 15 Oct 1958 Tunisia severed diplomatic relations with the UAR, on the ground that the UAR had meddled in Tunisian affairs by harbouring Salāh ben Yūsuf (in Cairo since Jan 1957), President Bourguiba's foremost political opponent, and encouraging subversive activities in Tunisia, including an attempt on the President's life in summer 1958. The Tunisian representative had tried to induce the Arab League Council to take up the dispute, but in vain (see also p 126). Since Oct 1958 there were no political, economic and cultural relations between the two countries, and sporadic accusations and recriminations were exchanged.]

**Jan-Dec: UAR Propaganda.** [UAR propaganda against Tunisia and President Bourguiba, though sharp in style and content, was much less intensive than its propaganda campaign against Iraq or Jordan; e.g. no special programmes were beamed to Tunisia.] The following topics were featured: The Tunisian attitude towards the Algerian question was denounced (*Ahram*, 3 July); Bourguiba was alleged to be working in the service of French and US imperialism. (*Gumhuriyah*, 11 Feb, 28 June, 15 Oct); Tunisia's boycott of the Arab League political sessions (see p 126 ff) was denounced as stemming from a desire to sabotage Arab solidarity (*IMB*, 10 Feb; *BBC*, 24 Aug); Tunisia was accused of all-embracing collaboration with Israel. (*Musawwar*, 22 Feb; *Ahram*, 12 Feb, 26 Sept; *Gumhuriyah*, 24 Aug; *Ruz al-Yusuf*, 15 Aug) Throughout Aug Tunisia and President Bourguiba were accused of trying to split the Algerian, African and Arab ranks in the service of French imperialism. (*IMB*; *UAR Press*, Aug) *Al-Gumhuriyah* accused Bourguiba of being "the only head of an African government to have attacked the Congolese people." (*Gumhuriyah*, 24 Aug)

**Jan-Dec: Tunisian Propaganda.** Tunis Radio in Arabic referred to "Sawt al-Arab" (The "Voice of the Arab" station in Cairo) as "Sawt al-Harj" (the "Voice of Excitement") and described the programmes as "screaming, noises, full of absurdities and paranoic lies." (*BBC*, 19 Feb, 11 Apr, 29 Aug, 14 Nov)

The general theme was that "the UAR is appointing itself to denounce imperialism and use the problems of struggling peoples as a means of fulfilling its expansionist aims. When it failed, it created lies and fabrications as a cover for its wailing and screaming." (*BBC*, 6 Feb; *Dépêche Tunisienne*, 14 Feb, 22 Mar, 22 June, 5 July, 31 Aug, 14 Oct, 21 Nov)

Regarding Algeria, Tunis Radio advised "those who

use cheap words to cover their inactivity to take example from Tunisia's contribution in sheltering and feeding hundreds of thousands of Algerian refugees who seek sanctuary in Tunisia." (*BBC*, 13 Feb, 28 June; *Dépêche Tunisienne*, 14 Oct) The Egyptian Press was attacked for "falsification, bias, and dishonesty." (*BBC*, 25 Feb, 24 Mar, 21 Sept)

**Mar: President Bourguiba on Cairo Policies.** On 22 Mar Bourguiba recalled the "plots hatched in Cairo against Tunisia" and other Arab countries and said that when Cairo had failed to attain its ambitions for domination (*matāmi' istila'iyah*) under the guise of Arab solidarity, it had resorted to plots and intrigue and to Press and radio campaigns, in the hope of creating chaos. All these attempts, however, had failed abysmally, because the Arab people were alert and conscious of their real interests. He declared: "We harbour no enmity towards anyone. But we reject [the quest for] hegemony and interference in our domestic affairs in any shape or form." (*Dépêche Tunisienne*, 23 Mar)

**Mar: Activities of Tunisian Opposition in Cairo.** A conference of Tunisians and other "patriotic Arabs" was held in Cairo on 25 Mar, the fourth anniversary of Tunisia's independence. Resolutions were adopted: to pledge allegiance to Abdel-Nasser; to urge the governments of Tunisia and Morocco to put their resources at the service of the Algerian revolution; to denounce the trials of the Free Men (*al-Ahrār*) in Tunisia and Iraq; and to ask Bourguiba to liquidate the military bases in Tunisia. (*BBC*, 28 Mar) The UAR broadcasting services gave wide circulation to these resolutions. (*IMB*, 26-31 Mar)

**Apr: Tunisian Workers Support UAR's Boycott of American Ships.** On 28 Apr the SG of the Tunisian Workers' Union announced a decision to join the boycott against American vessels in solidarity with the UAR's stand following the picketing of the s/s *Cleopatra* in New York Port—see p 42. (*IMB*, 30 Apr)

**30 Apr: UAR Promises Support to Tunisia.** On 28 Apr Tunisia complained to the UN Security Council of violations of her frontier by French troops in Algeria and warned that in future she would invoke the right of self-defence. (*Hayat*, 29 Apr) Following this the UAR Press reported from official sources that the UAR would support Tunisia in case of French aggression against her territory. (*Ahram*; *Gumhuriyah*, 30 Apr) Tunisian papers, quoting these reports, added that Tunisian official sources thought that the UAR attitude might enable steps to be taken towards the normalization of relations between the two countries. (*Dépêche Tunisienne*, 1 May)

**May: Libya to Take Care of UAR Interests.** The Libyan Government agreed that its embassy in Tunisia would take care of the UAR's interests there. (*Hayat*, 18 May)

**Sept: Bourguiba Criticizes UAR.** In a speech in Sept, Bourguiba said: "We see in one Islamic and Arab country a small and well-known group who have claimed that the strength of Arabism and Islam depends on extending their influence to other Arab Muslims and on controlling them, surpassing them and spreading division among them, on the pretext of nationalism and unity; a group which makes use of harmful propaganda, adopts elusiveness and misrepresentation and tries to intrigue against us and others with unsuccessful manoeuvres. Thus it has gone astray from the Caravan which amalgamated us with other Arab and Islamic nations under one cause." (BBC, 6 Sept)

**Sept: UAR Press Accusations.** The UAR Press accused Bourguiba of exercising pressure on the Algerians to accept the French cease-fire terms. (*Ahram*; *Akhbar*, 9 Sept) *Al-Amal*, the organ of the Tunisian Neo-Destour Party, described these reports as "criminal lies" and stated that Bourguiba had skilfully conceived plans to bring about the defeat of France. (BBC, 12 Sept)

### TUNISIA AND IRAQ

**Mar:** A weekly programme on the "brother region Iraq" was introduced by Tunis Radio on 1 Mar. (BBC, 3 Mar)

According to Iraqi official statistics, 55 Tunisian students were studying in Iraq universities, 15 of them on Iraqi Government scholarships. (*Bilad*, Baghdad, 13 May)

**May-July:** A 28-man Iraqi military delegation represented Iraq at the Tunisian Independence Anniversary

(1-2 June). (*Dépêche Tunisienne*, 25 May, 2 June) Tunisia was represented by "a big delegation" at the anniversary celebrations of the 14 July revolution in Baghdad. (*Zaman*, 15 July)

**Dec:** On 9 Dec a Tunisian commercial delegation arrived in Baghdad to exchange documents relating to the payments agreement concluded between Tunisia and Iraq. The head of the delegation declared that the agreement aimed at expanding and developing commercial relations and economic ties between the two countries. (*IMB*, 12, 13 Dec)

### TUNISIA AND LEBANON

**Jan:** It was reported that President Bourguiba had invited President Shehab of Lebanon to visit Tunisia. The invitation was cordially accepted, but no date was fixed for the visit. (*Hayat*, 28 Jan) [The visit did not materialize in 1960.]

### TUNISIA AND LIBYA

**Dec 1959-Jan 1960:** On 20 Dec 1959 a law was passed forbidding foreigners to work in Tunisia without special permission. (*Dépêche Tunisienne*, 22 Dec 1959) On 3 Jan an amendment was approved exempting Libyan workers. [There are more than 50,000 Libyan workers in Tunisia.] (*Libi*, Tripoli, 5 Jan)

**June:** A good-neighbour agreement between Tunisia and Libya was initialled on 17 June. (*Dépêche Tunisienne*, 16 June; *Libi*, 20 June)

## THE ARAB COUNTRIES OF THE ME AND THE ALGERIAN QUESTION

### GENERAL ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE QUESTION

(NOTE: APG=Algerian Provisional Government.) The Algerian question was a recurrent theme in almost every public rally or convention in the Arab countries and in almost every speech, interview, pronouncement or joint communiqué of the Arab leaders. The struggle of the Algerian Muslims was praised and France denounced. The Arabs tried to mobilize international support for the APG in the UN and other international forums, etc. Press and radio followed suit.

The UAR and Iraq also condemned "Western imperialism" in general, and denounced NATO, the USA and Britain for supporting France. The Iraqi and, to a lesser extent, the Jordanian, Press urged the Arab countries to follow the example of Iraq and Jordan and to boycott France. Iraq, Jordan and Saudi Arabia had broken off diplomatic relations with France late in 1956. The UAR has no diplomatic relations with France, but commercial and cultural relations exist; France is a large importer of Egyptian cotton. (See *Arabic Press*, BBC, *IMB* and *IMH* throughout the year. For a concentrated sample of Arab comment and reports on activities concerning Algeria, see the sources on the commemoration of Algeria Day, 1 Nov, e.g. BBC; *IMB* 2-3 Nov; *Arabic Press*, 1-3 Nov. See also Views and Policies p 116 ff.)

However, the APG's requests for practical support were only partly fulfilled, and its main political demands, e.g. the severance of all relations with France, efforts for the evacuation of NATO bases in the Arab countries, and

the holding of an Arab summit conference on the issue, were not met. FLN members were given military training in the Arab countries; but no volunteers were sent to Algeria, although the APG asked for them and volunteers were registered in some Arab countries. Financial contributions apparently lagged behind commitments in most cases, except for Iraq, and the League Council found it necessary to urge members to speed up the fulfilment of their obligations.

### THE ALGERIAN QUESTION IN THE ARAB LEAGUE COUNCIL

The Algerian question was a permanent item on the Arab League Council's agenda throughout 1960.

**At Feb Meeting.** At the Feb 1960 Foreign Ministers' Council Meeting in Cairo, little attention was given to the issue, and "within a few hours" (*Hayat*, 26 Feb) resolutions were passed—declaring that the Algerian issue was a sacred cause for all Arabs; denouncing French policy in Algeria; rejecting General de Gaulle's conditions for self-determination; warning against the partition of Algeria; and supporting all declarations and resolutions adopted by the APG.

The member countries were urged to extend "all material, financial and moral help" to speed up the payment of their contributions to the annual budget of the APG [the budget amounts to LE12 million as approved by the Council in Sept 1959 (*Siyasah*, 9 Sept 1959)] and to show a ready response should the APG call for volunteers. (*Ahram*, 1 Mar)



**At Apr Meeting.** At the Council's Apr session (see pp 128-9), it was decided that the Arab states "should redouble their efforts in the valiant Algerian struggle" and fulfil their financial obligations to the APG. (*Hayat*, 10 Apr)

**Aug: At Foreign Ministers' Meeting.** The Algerian issue was the first item on the agenda of the Arab Foreign Ministers in Shtura, 22-29 Aug (see p 129 ff). A memorandum submitted by Krim Belkacem, Deputy PM and Foreign Minister of the APG, contained the following five demands:

The Arab states should adopt all measures to win support for the Algerian cause at the next session of the UN General Assembly;

They should sever all relations with France;

They should work for the evacuation of military bases of NATO states in Arab territories;

They should help in the recruitment and formation of volunteer units and facilitate the transports of volunteers, "whether Arabs or otherwise," to Algeria;

The Arab heads of state should hold a Conference to study the Algerian question and take binding decisions. (*Hayat*, 24 Aug; *BBC*, 25 Aug)

It was reported from Conference sources that "Lebanon and Morocco found themselves in a delicate position in regard to the severance of relations with France, because of their close relations with her... At the same time, present conditions do not permit Morocco and Saudi Arabia to demand the withdrawal of [Western] armed forces." [This source mentioned Wheelus air base, Libya, apparently placing it into Morocco.] (*Jihad*, 24 Aug)

On 24 Aug the head of the Moroccan delegation denied that Morocco would not sever its relations with France should the conference decide to approve the Algerian request. The SG, Hasūnah, at the same time denied the accuracy of Press reports about the Conference's deliberations on this question. Conference sources were said to have affirmed that Hasūnah's statement was made under pressure by the Moroccan delegation which was afraid of the reactions of public opinion at home. (*BBC*, 26 Aug)

The Conference accepted part of the APG's demands. It was decided to mobilize support at the UN; to make diplomatic efforts, particularly in Asia and Africa, to speed up the recognition of the APG; to facilitate the recruitment of volunteers in Arab and other countries; and to notify the NATO Powers of the grave consequences of the French use of NATO arms and equipment in Algeria. However, on Belkacem's more important demands (the severance of relations with France, the convening of an Arab Summit conference and the evacuation of NATO bases) no decisions were taken and they were referred to the Arab governments. (*Hayat*, 25 Aug; *BBC*, 26 Aug)

#### LEBANESE AID

**Apr-Dec: Volunteers.** A recruiting office for Lebanese volunteers for the FLN forces was opened in Beirut on 19 Apr. (*IMB*, 20 Apr)

In Dec it was reported that the APG had requested the Lebanese Government to equip several Lebanese volunteers who had been admitted to the Algerian Army and to finance their transfer. (*Hayat*, 13 Dec)

**Dec: Financial Aid.** On 13 Dec Premier Sa'ib Slām declared that his government was ready to increase its contribution to the budget of the APG from £L0.4

million to £L0.5 million (\$160,000-\$170,000). (*Hayat*, 15 Dec)

#### JORDANIAN AID

**Apr-Nov: Volunteers.** On 18 Apr Amman Radio announced that 200 Jordanians had applied to join the Algerian Army. (*IMB*, 19 Apr) Five days later the Jordanian papers announced the recruitment of 400 volunteers. (*Jihad*; *Difa*; *Falastin*, 23 Apr) Six months later the number was given as "more than 2,500." (*IMB*, 31 Oct) However, on 24 Nov the Algerian representative in Amman, Abd ar-Rahmān al-Aqqūn, stated that "the first group of Jordanian volunteers to join the Algerian Army consists of 100 persons to be chosen from a list of 300 applicants and that he had proposed to the Jordanian Premier that they should receive basic military training before going to Algeria. (*BBC*, 26 Nov)

**Mar-Dec: Financial Aid.** On 1 Mar King Hussein handed to the APG a cheque for 35,686 dinars, collected from the public. (*BBC*, 4 Mar) On 31 Oct another payment of 30,000 dinars was made by the Jordanian Government. (*IMB*, 1 Nov) In Dec 1,000 dinars were collected within the Jordanian Army. (*IMB*, 28 Dec)

**15 June: Training of Algerians.** On 16 June 15 Algerians concluded a military course at the Jordanian Royal Military College and were commissioned as officers. (*Hayat*, 17 June) On 15 Sept ten Algerians started a two-year course at the Royal Military College. (*Jihad*, 16 Sept)

#### IRAQI AID

**Apr: Algerian Delegation in Baghdad.** Between 17-20 Apr an official delegation of the APG headed by Krim Belkacem visited Iraq. (They also visited Saudi Arabia.) Their main purpose, it was believed, was to solicit Iraqi aid in cash and weapons. (*Hayat*, 31 Mar) On 20 Apr, in a joint communiqué issued in Baghdad, Iraq promised to the APG 2 million dinars during 1960 (see below), as well as full political and moral support for the (Muslim) Algerians. The communiqué emphasized Iraq's complete boycott of France. (*Zaman*, 18, 21 Apr)

**Jan-Nov: Aid in Cash, Kind and Weapons.** On 3 Jan the Iraqi Government contributed food and clothes to the Algerian rebels; 100 tons of rice; 50 tons of date syrup; 20,000 yards of cloth; 2,000 blankets, 200 tins of oil; 100 cases of soap and 150 tons of dates. (*Jihad*, 9 Jan)

General Qassim said on 4 June that "since 14 July 1958, Iraq had paid ID3.5 million in cash to the APG and had supplied the rebels with offensive weapons worth ID1,250,000." He added that his government would extend even more aid in cash and in weapons to the "Algerian brother fighters." (*BBC*, 7 June)

Earlier, the French Foreign Minister had declared in the National Assembly: "It has not been possible so far for any arms from Iraq to reach Algerian territory." (*BBC Weekly*, 5 May)

On 8 May the Iraqi Premier handed a cheque of ID1 million to the APG representative in Baghdad. Six months later, on 10 Nov, another cheque of ID1 million was handed over to APG. [Thus the promise made to the APG mission in Apr was made good.] (*Zaman*, 9 May, 11 Nov)

**June-Nov: Training of Algerians.** A farewell party was given on 2 June by the Military College to a group

[number not given] of Algerian cadets who had concluded their training at the college and were due to return to Algeria. (*Thawrah, Baghdad, 3 June*)

In Oct more than 170 Algerians were reported to be receiving military training in Iraq. (*Hawl al-Alam, Jordan, 21 Oct*)

On 6 Nov Baghdad Radio announced the arrival of nine Algerians to join the Iraqi Military College of Aviation. (*IMB, 7 Nov*)

#### UAR AID

**Mar-Apr: Volunteers Registered.** On 23 Mar a recruiting office for volunteers for the FLN forces was opened in Cairo. (*Ahram, 25 Mar*) The office was attached to the secretariat of the National Union. (*Gumhuriyah, 28 Mar*) In the Syrian Region volunteers were registered directly in the offices of the National Union. (*IMB, 15 Apr*) In Apr it was reported that 4,000 applications had been submitted in Syria alone, and that "most of the applicants were intellectuals." (*Ahram, 16 Apr*)

**Sept: No Volunteers Sent.** On 5 Sept *Ruz al-Yusuf* reported that the UAR authorities had decided to delay the departure of volunteers to Algeria until after the UN General Assembly "in order to give France time to reconsider its policy in Algeria." (*Ruz al-Yusuf, 5 Sept*)

**June: Training of Algerians.** An authoritative UAR source said that several groups of Algerians had long been receiving commando training in the UAR. (*al-Quw-*

*wat al-Musallahah, the UAR Armed Forces Magazine, 1 June*)

**June-July: Financial Aid.** A Cairo source reported that the UAR had already paid its contribution to the APG's budget. (*Ahram, 5 June*) But *Le Monde* quoted official APG sources in Tunisia as denying the receipt of any financial aid from Cairo. (*Monde, 11 June*) A month later *al-Ahrām* reported that a total of £E1,825,000 for the purpose had been included in the UAR budget for the year 1960/61. (*Ahram, 5 July*)

On 8 Nov the UAR National Assembly decided to contribute £E1,500, representing one day's salary of its members, to the Algerian Army. (*Ahram, 9 Nov*)

**June-July: UAR Press Warns Against Algerian-French Peace Talks.** [While the Lebanese, Jordanian and Iraqi Press viewed with favour the APG's decision to accept General de Gaulle's offer for talks in Melun, the UAR papers expressed apprehension.] *Al-Gumhuriyah* warned on 21 June against stopping the fighting in Algeria and called for great vigilance in the next two or three weeks. A day later, the paper expressed "real fear" that the Algerian negotiators might be captured and thrown into prison, not by de Gaulle but by Lacoste, Soustelle and other "reactionaries." (*Gumhuriyah, 21, 22 June*)

#### SAUDI ARABIAN AID

In Apr Krim Belkacem visited Saudi Arabia, and on 13 Apr King Saud gave the APG 100,000 riyals, (about \$22,000), and another 100,000 riyals on behalf of his sons. (*BBC, 19 Apr*)

### RELATIONS BETWEEN SAUDI ARABIA AND YEMEN; SUDAN AND JORDAN; IRAQ AND YEMEN

#### SAUDI ARABIA-YEMEN

**Mar-Dec: Yemeni Workers in Saudi-Arabia.** [The incident related below came about as a result of the competition of Yemeni workers on the Saudi Arabian labour market, where unemployment is rife.]

Prompted by the Saudi Arabian PM's injunction of Mar 1960 "to treat Yemeni citizens as citizens of the Arab League states in respect of work and sojourn in the Kingdom," the labour authorities published an ordinance on 9 July to all employers, under which the employment of all Yemeni workers would cease within 30 days of its publication, and their work permits would be cancelled. Employment of a skilled Yemeni worker would be permitted only if no Saudi worker could do the job. Offending employers would be liable to a fine. (Full text in *Bilad, 10 July*.)

The ordinance aroused bitterness in the Yemeni community as well as among Saudi employers, who were satisfied with the diligence of the Yemeni labourers. One employer wrote to a local newspaper, stating that unskilled Yemenis were excellent workers in fields requiring hard work, which Saudi labourers were inclined to avoid. (*Bilad, 13 July*) On the other hand, it was reported that the ordinance was welcomed by local unemployed and by those who were concerned about the state of unemployment in the Kingdom. (*Bilad, 11 July*)

On 13 July King Saud personally intervened to cancel the ordinance, and ordered that all Yemeni labourers' work permits be renewed. He even granted them special facilities. (*Bilad, 19, 21 July; Manar, Jordan, 31 July*)

In Dec, however, 83 Yemenis who had arrived in the country "illegally" were deported. (*Bilad, 14 Dec*)

**Abrogation of the Ta'if Treaty.** [BACKGROUND NOTE: On 23 June, 1934, Saudi Arabia and Yemen concluded a Peace Treaty in Ta'if, following Ibn Saud's victory over the army of Imam Yahya after a war lasting three months. Ibn Saud had invaded Yemen to crush refugees of the Asir district who had received political asylum in Yemen and made raids on Saudi Arabia. Ibn Saud showed goodwill in the Ta'if Treaty, demanding only minor frontier adjustments. The effective clauses laid down:

1. Mutual obligation to extradite political and criminal offenders;
2. Mutual consultation prior to the signing of any treaty or agreement with a third country.]

On 11 July a spokesman of the Saudi Arabian Foreign Ministry announced in Jeddah that the governments of Saudi Arabia and Yemen were consulting on the question of preparing a new treaty in place of the Ta'if Treaty, which had been drawn up under special circumstances and the aims of which had been fulfilled. It would be replaced by an Arab-Islam Brotherhood Treaty expressing the friendly relations between the two brother nations. (*Um al-Qura, 22 July*) [The announcement made no reference to the UAR-Yemen Federation.]

**Rumours of Soviet Arms Smuggling from Yemen to Saudi Arabia.** In the meantime, rumours had been

spreading in Baghdad that the Yemeni authorities had sold Czechoslovakian and Soviet arms to disaffected tribes in Saudi Arabia. The Saudi Arabians were said to suspect that the Russians were responsible, and had therefore asked General Qassim of Iraq to try to restrain the Russians. (*Jew. Obs.*, 22 July)

#### SAUDI ARABIA-SUDAN

**June:** Sudan Concerned About Sudanese in Saudi Arabia. It was reported that the Sudanese authorities were consulting with the Saudi authorities about the future of the Sudanese community in Saudi Arabia. It was feared that the government would enforce its decision to withdraw Sudanese bus proprietors' and drivers' licences because of the unemployment in Saudi Arabia. (*ANA*, 13 June-BBC, 15 June)

**Nov-Dec:** Tension Between Saudi Arabia and Sudan. At the beginning of Dec *al-Hayāt* quoted Cairo Radio of 3 Dec to the effect that Saudi-Sudanese relations were at their lowest ebb after the recall of their respective Ambassadors. [No mention of this report was found in BBC and IMB.] The reason was said to be an incident on 9 Nov, when at a cocktail party in the Saudi embassy in Khartoum, the Saudi Arabian Ambassador had sided with opposition leaders in a discussion on the internal situation in Sudan. Sudanese high official personalities had left the party in protest, and later the Sudanese Government had requested the withdrawal of the Saudi Arabian Ambassador. The Saudi Government, after reviewing the report of its Ambassador on his return home, rejected the Sudanese attitude, and the Sudanese Ambassador in Riyadh was ordered to return home. (*Hayat*, 6 Dec)

[Up to the end of the year no reports on further developments were received.]

#### SAUDI ARABIA-JORDAN

**Feb:** King Hussein's Visit to Riyadh. On 8 Feb King Hussein, accompanied by PM Majāli and Bahjat al-Talhūni, arrived in Riyadh for a two-day state visit. (*Jihad*, 9, 11 Feb) According to *al-Hayāt* he had initiated diplomatic correspondence with King Saud before the visit. (*Hayat*, 5 Feb)

A Joint Communiqué issued in Riyadh at the end of the visit emphasized the identical views of the two Kings on

various questions, mainly: the necessity to amend the Charter of the League, the need for a "comprehensive plan" to tackle the Palestine question [the demand for a "comprehensive plan" is the Jordanian version of a "solution of the Palestine problem" as against the Palestinian schemes of Iraq and the UAR, see p 133]; support for the "Algerian struggle," determination to oppose all ideologies which present a threat to Arab nationalism and contradict the principles of Islam; the strengthening of commercial relations between the two countries and the repair of the Hijaz Railway.

King Saud accepted the invitation to pay a state visit to Jordan as soon as possible. (*Jihad*, 11 Feb)

**Jordan's Hope for Saudi Support on "Palestine Entity" Question Disappointed.** The Jordanian Press expressed expectations that as a result of the visit Saudi Arabia would support Jordan's rejection of the Palestine Entity scheme at the Arab League Council then in session. (*Difa'*, 14 Feb) [However, these expectations did not materialize.] (See p 134.)

**Feb-June:** No Visit by King Saud to Jordan. In spite of the persistent reports in Jordan's newspapers of an imminent visit by King Saud (*Jihad*, 12 Feb, 5 Mar, 18 Apr, 2 May, 2 June), [there was no further news of the visit after June].

**Apr:** Transit Facilities. The Saudi Arabian Government gave permission to Jordanian passenger vehicles to cross Saudi territory on their way to Kuwait and back. (*Jihad*, 27 Apr) [Usually Jordanian communications with Kuwait passed through Iraq, but as the border with Iraq had been closed since July 1958, Jordanian vehicles ceased to travel to Kuwait until the SA permission was given.]

#### IRAQ-YEMEN

A Yemeni delegation participated in the second Anniversary of the Iraqi Revolution. (*Zaman*, Baghdad, 13 July)

Sayyid Shami, the head of the delegation, said he had delivered a personal message from Imam Ahmad to General Qassim concerned with strengthening the ties between the two countries. (*Zaman*, 17 July) It was reported that the two countries intended to establish diplomatic relations. (*Mid. Mirror*, 20 Aug) [Diplomatic relations had not been established by the end of the year.]

# THE ARAB-ISRAEL CONFLICT

## SYNOPSIS

The relationship between the Arab states and Israel may be described as one of "cold war" in the fullest sense of the term. In fact, there are no diplomatic relations or other normal international intercourse between the two sides, and the only official contacts are conducted through the Mixed Armistice Commissions.

Officially, the relations are governed by the Armistice Agreements of 1949. The Arab countries of the ME claim that a state of war exists between them and Israel. The UAR does so officially, basing its ban on Israeli shipping and trade in the Suez Canal on the claim of belligerent rights. Israel, on the other hand, has considered the Egyptian-Israeli armistice as invalid ever since the Sinai campaign.

The terms of the conflict were redefined during the year in statements by the Arab and Israeli leaders. The chief innovation in the Arab attitude was that the spokesmen of the majority of the Arab countries now explicitly or implicitly expressed in the United Nations an attitude which they had hitherto maintained mainly in their domestic utterances, namely that any solution of the conflict should be based on the elimination of Israel as a state. In deciding on the establishment of Israel, they argued, the UN had committed an "error" which must be corrected (p 177). Israel had not only evicted the Palestinian Arabs from their homeland; together with World Zionism she not only constituted an evil in herself, but she served also as an imperialistic base to combat Arab nationalism. (The last argument was confined mainly to the adherents of Positive Neutralism—the UAR, Iraq and Sudan—see p 171 ff.)

Inside the Arab countries of the ME a solution by force was incessantly advocated. The main spokesman to this effect was President Abdel-Nasser. According to his statements, however, there were certain prerequisites for a war of elimination against Israel: Arab unity, the building up of organic strength, and the elimination of imperialistic strongholds which might endanger the Arabs in such a war (pp 172–3). In the statements of other Arab leaders, commitments to the future war were less detailed. Statements in Jordan and Iraq largely reflected the fact that since 1959 the Palestine problem had again become an issue in inter-Arab conflicts.

In 1959 the UAR had started a campaign in the inter-Arab arena to organize the Palestinian Arabs into a Palestinian Entity and a Palestinian Army. Iraq countered with a proposal to set up a Palestinian Republic (p 132 ff). The purpose of these organizations would be to enable the Palestinians to take a direct part in the "return of their usurped land." However, while for the UAR these proposals constituted a minor item in her policy on the Arab-Israeli conflict, Iraq made her proposal the mainstay of her entire concept of the struggle. It was the duty of the Palestinians to redeem Palestine, just as the Algerian Muslims fought for Algeria. Nobody could relieve them of this duty; the Arab countries

could only aid them in their task (p 174). Jordan rejected all these proposals, fearing that they meant the dismemberment of the Kingdom, and stressed that she and her army represented the Palestinians and stood in the forefront of the struggle against Israel (pp 174–5). There was no initiative in this respect from the Palestinian Arabs themselves. The whole problem remained primarily an issue between the Arab governments.

Israel continued to ask the Arabs to sit down with her for direct negotiations without prior conditions. As her invitations remained unheeded, she concentrated her efforts on an attempt to strengthen her international position and to maintain a military establishment of a size and quality sufficient to deter the Arabs from attacking her. These measures, she hoped, would ultimately convince the Arabs of the futility of their aspiration to destroy her and thus pave the way to peace.

Israel's determination to carry out this policy on the one hand, and Arab efforts to frustrate it and to weaken Israel in preparation for the final armed encounter on the other, made up much of the contents of the Arab-Israeli diplomatic cold war in 1960, as in the years before.

As far as the relations of the two parties to the great powers are concerned, there was one main difference between the Israeli and the Arab attitude. Israel's chief concern was with their attitude to the Arab-Israel struggle (see p 265 ff). The UAR's relations with the powers, on the other hand, were influenced by other main considerations, such as her position between East and West in general, the attitude of the powers towards her aspirations in the Arab world, her struggle for influence in Africa (as evident, e.g., in the Congo problem), etc. (see p 510). For Jordan, the main consideration governing her attitude in this respect was the problem of safeguarding her very existence (p 265 ff). The Arab countries in general mentioned the Arab-Israeli conflict as one case, though a supremely important one, in their relations with the West, others being, e.g., Algeria, Oman, Aden, etc.

Of the world powers, the USSR sided with the Arabs in every instance and provided the UAR, Iraq and Yemen with arms (p 62 ff).

France had had no diplomatic relations with Arab countries of the ME, except Lebanon, since the Suez campaign. As she was in conflict with the Arabs over Algeria, and also provided Israel with arms, the Arabs assumed that she could not be influenced in favour of their cause (except, perhaps, in the economic field) for the time being.

As for the United Kingdom, the main concern of the Arab countries lay in fields other than Israel. Relations with the UAR, for instance, centred on the question of the renewal of diplomatic ties and Britain's "enmity towards Arab nationalism" (p 534 ff); relations with Jordan centred on general aid (pp 337–8); with Saudi Arabia



on Buraimi; with Iraq on oil (pp 263-4). The one big power most involved in the actual Arab-Israeli conflict in 1960 was the US (for which see below).

During 1960, there was no direct East-West involvement over the Arab-Israeli conflict. However, the policies of the powers in this area were regarded as contributing to the conflict—by Israel especially in respect of the Russian policy of supplying arms to the Arabs, and by the UAR where the policies of the West were concerned. PM Ben-Gurion was said to have advocated the inclusion of the ME topic in the Summit Conference (which failed to convene) in order to arrive at a relaxation of tension in the area (see p 3).

All three Western powers expressed their concern in one instance, when a tense situation prevailed on the Israeli-Syrian border. They declared the Tripartite Declaration as still valid, though in the case of Britain the reaffirmation was accompanied by some reservations. Israel did not react, while Abdel-Nasser attacked the Declaration as an imperialist device and declared that he regarded it as invalid.

The main events through which the US was drawn into the conflict were: the visit of PM Ben-Gurion to the US in Mar, the *Cleopatra* affair in Apr-May, and the US election campaign in the summer and autumn.

Of PM Ben-Gurion's visit to Western countries in 1960, the one to the US drew most attention. His purpose was understood to be "part of a broad diplomatic offensive designed to bring Israel's case before the Western world." The UAR leaders and Press responded with heavy attacks on the US as a "Zionist colony" (p 288 ff).

The picketing of the UAR freighter *Cleopatra* by New York port workers because of the UAR boycott of US ships trading with Israel led to another spate of severe attacks on the US by the UAR, which organized an Arab counter-boycott of all American shipping, despite the State Department's support for the UAR's case.

At the same time (Apr) the whole issue of Arab economic warfare and restrictions on navigation came up in the US Congress, leading to the "Douglas amendment" (see p 106). Intervention by the State Department led to a statement on US policy towards the Arab-Israeli conflict, contained in the "Dillon letter" to the Senate (pp 104-5).

A prominent part in the discussion of the conflict was played by Senator Fulbright, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (pp 106-7).

In the US election campaign both Republican and Democratic candidates and party platforms advocated the establishment of peace in the ME, envisaging the acceptance of Israel as a *fait accompli* in the area. Arab reaction was sharp, and involved the intervention of the UAR Ambassador in the campaign. President Kennedy's election was coolly received by the Arab Press (p 108 ff).

The political struggle between the Arabs and Israel had repercussions in many countries and in connection with many issues, as a result of Israel's efforts to combat Arab endeavours to isolate her and the measures taken by the Arabs to counter these efforts. Consequently, while Israeli policy aimed at achieving fruitful intercourse with other countries without trying deliberately to undermine the relations of the Arab states with them, Arab measures, on the other hand, were in most cases a reaction to Israeli successes and assumed the character of an attempt to nullify them.

This state of affairs emerged perhaps most clearly in Arab and Israeli relations with sub-Saharan Africa. There, Israel's success in establishing friendly relations with the great majority of the new states evoked Arab counter-

action in the form of suggestions for new economic initiatives and technical and economic aid projects, though little was actually done. On the other hand, the Arab countries, particularly the UAR, managed to use their political leverage and their advantageous geopolitical position to bring about anti-Israel resolutions in some of the African and Afro-Asian forums. In the second half of the year the UAR was also aided in this respect by the adhesion of some West African countries to the policy of Positive Neutralism, in the wake of the Congo conflict (pp 25-6).

Other areas in which the Arab-Israeli political struggle had repercussions in the period under review included Ceylon, Cyprus, West Germany and Iran. Arab pressure brought about the withdrawal of Ceylonese diplomatic representation in Israel (p 180). Arab efforts to prevent the establishment of diplomatic relations with Israel failed in the case of Cyprus (pp 181-2), but succeeded in the case of the German Federal Republic (pp 180-1). In the case of Iran, an announcement by the Shah that Iran had accorded *de facto* recognition to Israel in the past and that nothing had changed in this respect, was followed by the severest UAR attacks on the Shah (accusing him of being a reactionary and subservient to imperialism, as evidenced by his adherence to CENTO), incitements to the Iranians to revolt, and the breaking-off of diplomatic relations. In this case, however, the UAR suffered a defeat on the Arab scene as no Arab country could be induced to follow her lead. No change took place in the friendly relations between Iran and Israel (see p 216 ff). There were other manifestations of the political struggle in the UN General Assembly (pp 177-9); in many other international forums (see p 179); and in the majority of joint statements made by Abdel-Nasser and visiting statesmen (p 182).

Official Arab sources, including President Abdel-Nasser personally, denied reports that any Arab government, and in particular the UAR, had helped to incite the anti-Semitic outbreaks at the beginning of the year, especially those which took place in Latin America. Arab sources generally commented that the outbreaks were organized by Israel and the Zionist movement in order to win sympathy and to strengthen Israel (p 278).

The political warfare was accompanied, as in the years before, by the Arab economic boycott against Israel, including the closure of the Suez Canal by the UAR to Israeli shipping and trade. There were no major developments regarding the boycott. The Israeli case received the support of labour in the US as well as in other countries and at international gatherings (pp 39 ff, 186 ff).

Issues nearer home over which the conflict ranged were the refugee problem, border relations, the question of the Jordan waters and the possibility of a change in the *status quo* in the Kingdom of Jordan.

In regard to the Arab refugees, the 1959/60 Annual Report of the Director of UNRWA, Dr Davis, submitted to the UN at its 15th session, was pessimistic as to the possibility of their rehabilitation under present conditions. Dr Davis told the UN committees concerned that UNRWA had no proposals for a solution of the refugee problem. In the discussion of the issue in the UN Special Political Committee the Arabs concentrated on efforts to achieve UN recognition of the refugees' right to return to their homeland, to bring about the appointment of a UN custodian for Arab property left in Israel, and to augment the Palestine Conciliation Commission by including Eastern Bloc, Afro-Asian and Latin-American members.

Israel refused to consider any general return of Arab

refugees in the present circumstances; she declared that peace negotiations must come first and that the refugee problem could not be separated from the general question of Arab-Israeli relations. Israel was prepared to pay compensation on three conditions: integration of the refugees into the Arab world, international financial aid and the taking into account of similar losses by 500,000 Jewish emigrants from the Arab countries.

No resolutions were submitted and the debate was adjourned in Dec to the second half of the session in Mar 1961.

There were "routine" activities on the borders (p 189 ff), except for that between Israel and Syria where there was a serious flare-up over rights in the Southern Demilitarized Zone. Armed clashes culminated on 1 Feb in a raid by Israeli forces on the abandoned Arab village of Lower Tawafiq in the Zone, which had been fortified by the Syrians. This was the first raid of the kind since before the Sinai campaign. Subsequently the UAR mobilized and built up her forces in both Sinai and Syria in anticipation of an Israeli attack on Syria. According to Israeli sources, the UAR had acted on false information that the Syrian forces had defeated the Israelis at Tawafiq, which had led them to expect an Israeli revenge attack. It was also reported that outside sources had fanned the UAR's anxiety. At the end of Mar, however, the tension subsided (p 197 ff). Local problems on the border remained unsolved, however, and sporadic flare-ups occurred later in the year (p 190 ff).

A question which foreboded tension for a long time to come was the diversion of the waters of the Jordan river. While Israel and Jordan recorded progress in the execution of their respective projects, both of which fit into the water allocations of the Johnston plan, the Arabs contemplated action to deny Israel her share of the waters. Plans were framed to divert the headwaters in Syria and Lebanon, but the Arab states concerned could not agree among themselves. Besides, serious technical and financial difficulties were involved. Consequently, military action was contemplated. Inter-Arab contacts on the problem continued into 1961 (p 204 ff).

Another question which was a potential source of trouble was the future of the regime in Jordan. Following the assassination of PM al-Majali, Israel made it clear that she could not remain indifferent to a change in the status quo in Jordan which might endanger Israel's security (p 152).

In Dec, the US State Department announced that Israel was constructing a second atomic reactor, theoretically capable of producing plutonium for the building of nuclear weapons. The anxiety which this aroused in the Arab countries was not allayed by Israeli public assurances that the reactor would serve peaceful purposes only (p 286 ff; inter-Arab consultations on this issue which took place at the beginning of 1961 are not reviewed in this volume).

## UAR VIEWS AND POLICIES

### SYNOPSIS

Israel, in the speeches of Abdel-Nasser, is presented as a cancer in the body of the Arab world, which must be removed. She is evil in herself and she is a base for imperialism, which established her with the aim of destroying Arab nationalism. The danger to the Arabs lies in the coalition of the forces of evil: Israel, World Zionism and imperialism.

No negotiations are possible with Israel. Israel wants a settlement, but her aim is to deprive the Palestinian Arabs permanently of their rights. The Arabs, on the other hand, are determined to restore these rights in full. Therefore there is no basis for negotiations, and to attempt them would be dangerous to the Arabs. Besides, the Israeli leaders, especially Ben-Gurion, are treacherous; they speak of peace while preparing for war, as proved by experience.

Two different approaches to a solution are discernible in Abdel-Nasser's statements to the outside world. First, a solution is demanded on the basis of the "UN Charter and resolutions"; secondly, the demand is made "to restore matters... to the conditions prevailing before the error was committed," i.e. the elimination of Israel. The latter demand was made at the UN General Assembly. (The second approach appeared later in the year and it is possible that it represents a development of the first, as Abdel-Nasser's interpretation seemed to be that the setting up of Israel was itself contrary to the UN Charter.)

In his speeches in Arabic, Abdel-Nasser does not review different solutions but discusses how the elimination of Israel is to be brought about. In this respect Arab unity is represented as the main weapon, the achievement of which will mean the end of Israel. The elimination of

imperialism and its agents in the Arab world is regarded as a vital contribution (perhaps even a prerequisite?) to the "liberation of Palestine." Stress is also laid upon the need to build up organic strength, social, economic and military; this is the lesson of the 1948 defeat. His hearers are exhorted to realize that a great effort is needed, and that Israel cannot be eliminated merely by denying her existence.

In Abdel-Nasser's pronouncements on Israel there are no references to the political and economic warfare being waged against her. He very seldom mentions the issues of the Palestinian Entity and the Palestinian Army (see p 132 ff), and then only in answer to questions or at meetings of Palestinians. The setting up of these institutions is demanded in National Union resolutions, cited below, which also make it clear that the prevention of an agreed solution of the refugee problem is regarded in the UAR as a vital prerequisite for the eventual solution of the Palestine issue as striven for by the UAR. (For UAR policies on the Suez Canal, see p 39 ff.)

### THE MEANING OF ISRAEL AND ZIONISM

**Israel—Force of Evil and Treachery.** Abdel-Nasser, 25 Oct: "Israel does not merely imply those who have raped Palestine and entrenched themselves there for ever after having massacred its lawful population. Israel also means the forces of evil and treachery and colonialist conspiracy to stamp out our Arabism. Israel further signifies a colonialist fifth column, which is used at the opportune moment, as was done in 1956 during the tripartite aggression on Egypt." (*Eg. Gaz.*, 26 Oct)

**Israel—A Cancer that Must be Removed.** Abdel-Nasser, 12 July: "Israel is a cancer in the body of the Arab Na-

tion. This cancer must be remedied, because if left as it is the situation will become worse." (*Eg. Gaz.*, 13 July)

**The Anti-Arab Coalition: Israel, Zionism, Imperialism.** Abdel-Nasser, 28 July: "Israel is not only composed of the one or two million inhabitants of the usurped Palestine. Israel is composed of those inhabitants and World Zionism and is supported by all the imperialist powers. It is supported by Britain, France, the United States.

"It represents a new series of Crusades, directed towards demolishing Arab nationalism. During the First World War this was only an idea, which later took a palpable form in the heart of the Arab world. Zionist and imperialist ambitions are the demolition of Arab nationalism and the Arab world.

"Zionism and Israel constitute a menace to the entire Arab people." (*Eg. Gaz.*, 29 July)

**Israel Serves Imperialism in Africa.** Abdel-Nasser, 12 July: "The question of Israel is a basic one. In Africa, for instance, we find Israel offers loans to African countries despite the fact that she begs money from the imperialistic powers. Naturally the imperialistic powers give her money in order to impose their influence on African countries and to attempt to create economic interests in African countries." (*Eg. Gaz.*, 13 July)

#### ON PEACE AND NEGOTIATIONS

**Israel Policy of "Forcing Peace."** Abdel-Nasser to American journalists, Cairo, 21 Mar: "We are now facing what the Israeli rulers call 'the policy of forcing peace.' What does 'forcing peace' mean? It obviously means war." (*Ahram*, 22 Mar; *BBC*, 24 Mar)

**Israel Wants Settlement at Expense of Arabs.** Abdel-Nasser in interview with Canadian correspondent, Cairo, 3 Feb: "We are aware that Israel is at present attempting to reach a settlement. I know that Israel wants a settlement at the expense of Arab rights and interests. Israel does not conceal her intentions. Israel's attempts are not the end of her aggressive plans, but the beginnings of new aggressions to realize her mad dream of expansion between the Nile valley and the Euphrates." (*Eg. Gaz.*, 9 Feb)

Abdel-Nasser in interview with American journalists, Cairo, 25 Apr: "The Israelis are simply trying to deceive world public opinion. They say they are ready to sit with the Arabs and to negotiate with them a settlement on one condition—provided that the Arabs have no conditions. What does this mean? It means that the Israelis want us to forget the UN resolutions with regard to the rights of Palestine Arabs." (*Eg. Gaz.*, 26 Apr)

[The same theme also appears in Abdel-Nasser's speeches in the UAR, see e.g. speech in Damascus, 4 Mar. (*Ahram*, 5 Mar; *BBC*, 7 Mar)]

**"Negotiations Impossible."** Abdel-Nasser in interview with Canadian correspondent, Cairo, 3 Feb: Asked whether both sides could possibly revise their attitudes and modify their terms for the sake of achieving some settlement, the President said:

"In so far as we are concerned, it is not a matter of terms or conditions. It is a matter of the usurped rights of the Arab people of Palestine... It is a very grave case: for we have to decide whether what we call *fait accompli* can be the outcome of aggression, or whether the principles of the UN Charter should be the basis for any *fait accompli*."

Asked whether any benefit could be gained if a settlement was reached, Abdel-Nasser said:

"Those who are of this opinion cannot see the danger which we can see plainly before us."

The President emphatically declared that negotiations were impossible "for... the Israeli aggressions on Arab rights are still taking place."

**Israeli Leaders Untrustworthy.** Abdel-Nasser (*ibid*): "In the second place, [negotiations are impossible because] we do not trust the leaders of Israel... Their pleas for peace were always combined with preparation for war.

"A few days before the tripartite aggression on Egypt, the Israeli PM made a statement in the Israeli Knesset in which he declared that he was willing to fly to meet me for the sake of peace, while at that particular time he was up to the ears in preparation for the tripartite aggression on our country." (*Eg. Gaz.*, 9 Feb)

[Abdel-Nasser often made similar statements, e.g. on 4 Mar in Damascus, (*Ahram*, 5 Mar); in Cairo on 21 Mar, (*Ahram*, 22 Mar); and on 24 Apr, (*Eg. Gaz.*, 26 Apr).]

#### SOLUTIONS

**Solution on Basis of UN Charter and Resolutions.** Abdel-Nasser in interview with Canadian correspondent, Cairo, 3 Feb:

Q: "Does this mean that there are two solutions to this important problem: either leave the situation outstanding as it has always been or go into total war?"

A: "There is a third solution and it is the nearest one to logic and the nature of things: that is, the UN Charter and resolutions. This is the only open road." (*Ahram*, 9 Feb; *Eg. Gaz.*, 9 Feb)

Abdel-Nasser to American journalists, Cairo, 21 Mar: "All we want is to restore the rights of the Palestinian Arabs and to see that the UN resolutions are respected." (*Ahram*, 22 Mar; *BBC*, 24 Mar)

[The demand for a solution on the basis of the UN resolutions was also voiced in joint communiqués of Abdel-Nasser with non-Arab statesmen, see p 182.]

**Solution Through Elimination of Israel.** Abdel-Nasser at the UN General Assembly, General Debate, 27 Sept:

"Have the people of Palestine accepted the loss of their motherland? Did the Arab nation accept that loss? It is certain that the determination of the Arab peoples to restore the Arab rights in Palestine has since this aggression become one of the major driving forces in the Arab East.

"But, now, what is the solution?

"The only solution to Palestine, just as it is the only solution to the Congo, is that matters should be restored to normalcy and should return to the condition prevailing before the error was committed... The UN has to bear its responsibilities towards Palestine and the Arab people...

"We do not intend to solicit pity for the Arab refugees of Palestine, but we demand the restoration of the full rights of the people of Palestine...

"Justification based on acceptance of the *fait accompli* is sinful and harmful... The *fait accompli* which is not based on justice and the rule of law is a perversion which society must remedy." (*A/PV*, 873, 27 Sept)

Abdel-Nasser, 8 May: "Regardless of the support Israel finds in the US, Britain and France, we declare that we are determined to restore our rights by our own hands and power." (*Eg. Gaz.*, 9 May)



## ROADS TO ELIMINATION OF ISRAEL

**The Whole People to Fight Israel.** Abdel-Nasser at Deir ez-Zor, Syria, 16 Feb: "You, brethren, constitute the main and great army. If our First and Second Armies of the UAR are stationed along the frontiers and on our borders with Israel which has usurped Palestine, you actually constitute the main army which will be in the battle when the time comes for the protection of our fatherland, Arabism and our nationalism."

"While we feel certain that Israel's dreams have evaporated in thin air, we must remember that we have a great duty to carry out. We have to restore to the people of Palestine their usurped rights in their fatherland." (*Ahram*, 17 Feb; *Eg. Gaz.*, 17 Feb)

**Prerequisite for Elimination of Israel: Building Up of Organic Strength.** Abdel-Nasser, 16 Oct: "Now for the Palestinian issue. Wherever I have been in this or the Southern Region I hear the strong call for the liberation of this Arab territory of Palestine, and I would like to tell you, countrymen, that all that we are now doing is just a part of the battle for Palestine. Once we are fully emancipated from the shackles of colonialism and colonialist agents' intrigues we will take a further step forward towards the liberation of Palestine."

"When we have brought our armed forces to full strength and made our own armaments we will take another step forward towards the liberation of Palestine, and when we have manufactured jet aircraft and tanks we will embark upon the final stage of the liberation of Palestine."

"These, fellow-citizens, are the lessons we learnt in 1948 because we lost Palestine in that year without a fight. We lost it through colonialist intrigues, through treachery, foreign influence and arms monopoly..."

"We the Arab people are a patient people as also a militant people and an intelligent people and are aware of the causes of defeat and points of weakness which we are doing our utmost to remove. I am aware of the causes of defeat and impotence which adversely affected our position in 1948. We know only too well the political, social and domestic factors to which the 1948 disaster was due." (*Eg. Gaz.*, 19 Oct)

Abdel-Nasser, 28 July: "Israel's ambitions are endless. They represent those of Zionism and of imperialism."

"We should always bear this fact in mind in order to protect our independence, and to build up and develop our country and establish the socialist, democratic and co-operative society we aspire to have. We want a society of justice and equality, a society of welfare." (*Eg. Gaz.*, 29 July)

**Arab Unity—the End of Israel.** Abdel-Nasser, 8 May: "We feel that our main weapon against Zionism and imperialism is to restore Arab nationalism and Arab unity..."

"Imperialism and Zionism are frightened by our unity, because they realize it means the end of Israel. They plot against Arab nationalism because they know that there will be no place for them in our country if Arab nationalism arises and if Arab unity is achieved..." (*R. Cairo*, 8 May-BBC, 10 May)

**Realities Must be Faced.** Abdel-Nasser, 12 July: "If I say that I must not mention Israel because it is not actually a state, this would not be a practical solution. We must face this question, discuss it and then suggest a solution." (*Eg. Gaz.*, 13 July)

[Note: Abdel-Nasser refers in this remark to a widespread tendency in the Arab countries of the ME to deny the very existence of Israel, e.g., to refrain from mentioning her name and to use substitutes such as *ad-dawlah al-maz'umah* (the alleged state), *rabibat al-istimār* (the favourite offspring of imperialism), etc. In recent years this tendency has somewhat diminished. Passages like the following also appear.]

Abdel-Nasser, 24 June: "We all know that Moshe Dayan was a failure on the Sinai borders. We also know that he stood still for 100 hours in the mud in front of the Sinai borders. With his armies, added to the armies and the planes of France, Dayan was not able to defeat a small power that was in control of the area of Abu Ajela."

"We have repeatedly announced these facts. We never knew that the war-failure, Moshe Dayan, had occupied a single position inside the territories of Sinai and Gaza from the time the Israeli aggression began on Oct 29 1956 until the withdrawal of the Egyptian Army from Sinai on November 2, 1956... when Britain and France entered the war and joined the Israelis against us." (*Eg. Mail*, 25 June)

## RESOLUTIONS OF THE NATIONAL UNION CONGRESS

[The resolutions of the National Congress of the National Union of 16 July 1960 represent perhaps the most comprehensive and detailed statement on views and policies ever made in the UAR (see also p 485).]

The following points were made regarding the Palestine issue and Israel:

1. Israel was set up by colonialism to fight Arab nationalism. Hence "the struggle against Israel is one of life or death," which the Arabs are determined to wage until "colonialism and Zionism are eradicated."
2. The Congress regards the Palestinians as "the principal pillar" for a solution of the Palestine issue and recommends the setting up of a Palestinian administration on Palestinian soil and the formation of a Palestinian Army.
3. An end should be put to every attempt at the "absorption of Palestinians other than in their own home." The Congress "abhors attempts... by colonialist stooges and Zionist agents to force Palestinians to give up their nationality in favour of another nationality."
4. Immigration into "occupied Palestine" constitutes an aggression against the Arabs.
5. The Congress warns the world against "Israel's claims that it represents World Jewry," which is proof of "Israel's racial and terrorist tendency," and against Zionist propaganda in "certain states." (*Eg. Gaz.*, 17 July; the numbers do not represent the original numbers of the paragraphs.)



## IRAQ, JORDAN, LEBANON, SUDAN: VIEWS AND POLICIES

## IRAQ

**Synopsis.** In 1960, Iraqi statements regarding Israel revolved mainly around the issue of the Palestinian Entity and Army. Iraq, like the UAR, regards Israel as an imperialistic stronghold against the Arabs, which must be eliminated. Palestine must be restored to its rightful owners, the Palestinian Arabs, but it is on them that the main burden of the liberation of their homeland falls. The Arabs, including Iraq, must assist them, and to enable them to fulfil this task: a Palestinian Republic, and then a Palestinian Army, must be formed. In line with this "indirect approach," comparatively little direct involvement with Israel was apparent in Iraqi statements. (For more Iraqi material on the Palestine issue, see p 132 ff.)

**Israel an Imperialistic Agent.** Hāshim Jawād at the UN General Assembly, 6 Oct: "Economic and financial aid generously provided to Israel by certain Western countries, particularly the United States and France, offer an irrefutable proof of the determination of those countries to make of Israel a stronghold against the Arab states. The special task assigned to Israel by certain Western powers since its creation was divulged during the tripartite aggression against Egypt in 1956." (*A/PV, 890, 6 Oct*)

**Israel Must and Will be Eliminated.** Hāshim Jawād at the UN General Assembly, 6 Oct: "Israel, being an alien body in the Arab homeland, has no right whatsoever to continue to exist in the territories of the Arab East.

"The situation of the Palestine Arab refugees during the last twelve years reveals their determination not to accept the *fait accompli* imposed upon their homeland by an ill-considered, prejudicial and extremely unjust decision of the UN. Today, more than ever, they are determined to regain their country—Palestine; they are not alone in their determination, they have the whole Arab world behind them... The only way [to a solution]... is that Palestine in its entirety should belong once more to its Arab population." (*A/PV 890, 6 Oct*)

**Road to Solution—Setting-up of Palestinian Republic.** Qassim, 14 Mar: "The establishing of the Palestine Republic is the only logical step to solve the 11-year-old Palestine problem. The UN had done nothing all this time." (*INA, 16 Mar*)

Qassim, 14 July: "They said: 'How do you announce the establishment of the Palestinian Republic whereas Israel still occupies the main part of it?' We replied: 'How do they announce the Algerian Republic whereas France still commits tyranny in her country?' The people of Palestine and the Arab states must have faith in their right to rescue its country and regain its dignity." (*INA, 15 July*)

Hāshim Jawād, 19 Aug: "The battle we are undergoing against Zionism requires that we give it a tangible reality through including it in a defined geographical framework which is the Palestinian State." (*INA, 21 Aug*)

**Elimination of Israel—the Responsibility of the Palestinians, with Arab Aid.** Qassim: "The good land of Palestine can be liberated only by its people, with the help and support of their sincere brothers in the Arab countries." (*INA, 27 Mar*)

Qassim, 14 July: "Algeria... carries her heavy burden by herself for the sake of independence; so, the Palestinian people has to carry his own burden for the sake of his independence whereas we are supporting them with funds, weapons, equipments and efforts and everything." (*INA, 15 July*)

Qassim, addressing Iraqi and Palestinian cadets, Baghdad, 15 Aug: "We have prepared for you the arms, money, men and efforts to... do away with the usurping enemy as we have done away with the unjust clique and the imperialist and the covetous in our country on July 14th." (*INA, 15 Aug*)

**Positive Arab Action to Counter Israeli Influence in Asia and Africa.** Hāshim Jawād, 28 Dec: "We believe that the old method followed by the Arab League, i.e. to wage a counteraction to whatever Israel might do, is useless and effectless. We proposed that a plan be drawn up and the Arab states use their material and intellectual capabilities in order to implement it gradually, thus blocking all inlets before the Israeli infiltration into these [Asia and Africa]... It is not in our interest to boycott the new states. We want to show our existence and entity to those states and to answer their needs in the technical and economic fields, because interests in this world are almost material, and these states are after progress and economic flourishing as they also want to be economically independent." (*INA, 28 Dec*)

## JORDAN

**Synopsis.** During 1960, Jordanian statements on the issue were closely linked with her campaign against the Palestinian Entity proposals (see p 132 ff). Stress was laid on Jordan's stand "in the forefront" of the struggle to recover Palestine. In Hussein's speeches, there was almost no direct comment on Israel.

**Jordan in Forefront of Struggle.** Hussein, 10 July: "The Palestine Problem is the No 1 issue in our thoughts at all times." (*Jer. Times, 11 July*)

Hussein, 21 Oct: "For 12 years the Jordanian Army and people have stood upon the frontiers. It is time for Jordan to expose the alleged *jihads* and holy marches which they lead from the balconies and guarded open places in Cairo squares and Damascus streets." (*BBC, 24 Oct*)

Hussein, at UN General Assembly, 3 Oct: "Jordan, which has borne the brunt of the Palestine problem, stands at the forefront of those who demand that the rights of the Palestinians be restored to them without fail." (*A/PV, 882, 3 Oct*)

Hussein, 16 Mar: "This army [the National Guard, consisting mostly of Palestinians] and the armed forces constitute the Palestine Army which was formed to do its duty to defend the nation and now awaits the final day when it shall battle to regain our usurped rights in Palestine." (*Jer. Times, 17 Mar*)

PM al-Majālī, 12 Jan: "Mobilization and preparation to recover the rights of Palestine are the main features of our policy." (*BBC, 14 Jan*)

Hussein 19 Mar: "It is the duty of all to spare no effort in preparing ourselves for the battle to regain our usurped rights." (*Jer. Times, 20 Mar*)

**Solutions.** At the UN General Assembly, Hussein rejected "a *fait accompli* as a basis of policy." He demanded the

implementation of UN resolutions, "those of 1948 and 1959, for example," and "the complete restoration of the rights of the Arab people of Palestine." (*A/PV*, 882, 3 Oct)

### LEBANON

**Synopsis.** Lebanese statements on the question of Palestine stress the national unity of Lebanon and Lebanese solidarity with the Arabs in this (as in other) respects. Lebanon's special concern in 1960 was with Israeli activities in Africa (see p 182 ff). At the UN General Assembly PM Sa'ib Slām advocated a solution on the basis of the UN resolutions (see p 177). In other pronouncements, a more radical solution was advocated (see below).

**Lebanese Solidarity.** PM Karami, at a student demonstration against the boycott of *Cleopatra*, 30 Apr: "Have confidence, young men, for between all the Lebanese, government and nation, there is no difference, particularly when it comes to fighting for the national unity." (*Hayat*, 1 May)

**Palestine to be Freed.** PM Karami (ibid): "The Palestine problem and its liberation... is a precious trust with us and we will continue working for this purpose until Palestine is freed from the filth of Zionism." (*Hayat*, 1 May)

**Not Even "Spiritual Jewish State" in Palestine Possible.** PM Sa'ib Slām, 1 Nov: "It was said that I called for the establishment of a spiritual Jewish state in Palestine, but the fact is that I said that any nation that will rise, be it spiritual or not, which is Jewish, Zionist and Israeli, cannot possibly be agreed to by any Arab." (*Hayat*, 2 Nov)

**Lebanon's Solidarity with the Arabs.** Government Statement of Policy, 18 Aug: "We shall always work for the strengthening of the Arab League and respect its Charter, and cooperate with our Arab brethren in their great causes, particularly that of freedom and independence, most important of which is the Palestine cause." (*Nahar*, 19 Aug)

### SUDAN

**Synopsis.** Sudanese statements lay special stress on the duty of the "free" and "peace-loving" nations to achieve a just solution of the Palestine problem. There was no Sudanese commitment to any specific direct contribution to the solution of the problem. In the UN General Assembly, the Sudanese delegate advocated a solution on the basis of the conditions prevailing before the creation of Israel (see p 177), while President Abbud called for a settlement on the basis of the UN resolutions.

**The Duty of the Nations to Help the Palestinians.** Abbud, in Cairo, 23 July: "Words are not sufficient to express our sorrow for the Palestine tragedy. The Sudan has already sacrificed many souls in the Palestinian war... Peace will not be restored to that region unless the rights [of the Arab refugees] are fully redeemed. Our duty is to illustrate clearly to the whole world the gravity and seriousness of that catastrophe, so that all peace-loving nations will hasten to act for the restoration of peace, freedom and justice to that region." (*Sudan Daily*, 24 July)

General Tal'at Farid, 15 Sept: "It is the duty of the free nations, who helped and still help the Palestinian people in their distress... to secure a final settlement... which will accelerate the faith of helpless nations in the United Nations' justice and ability to solve the problems.

"However, the solution lies mainly in the hands of the Arab nations and depends on their cooperation." (*Sudan Daily*, 16 Sept)

**Solution on Basis of UN Resolutions.** Abbud, in Belgrade, 10 July: "The Sudan... put[s] the Palestine question at the top of international problems because of the humanitarian questions it raises and in particular because of its endangering peace in the Middle East. We call for its settlement on the basis of the UN resolutions of 1948." (*Sudan Daily*, 11 July)

### SAUDI ARABIA

(See statements by the Saudi Arabian delegate at the UN General Assembly, p 177.)

## ISRAEL VIEWS AND POLICIES ON ARAB-ISRAELI RELATIONS

### SYNOPSIS

The main themes permeating Israeli policy statements are the following:

The Arab states, especially the UAR, are as determined as ever to annihilate the State of Israel. In the meantime, they are endeavouring to strangle Israel gradually by economic and political means, while continuing their military build-up in anticipation of the "final and decisive battle."

Israel visualizes two possible roads to peace. One is by direct negotiations with the Arabs. So long as the Arabs are not prepared to do this, she concentrates on improving her international position, increasing her internal consolidation, and strengthening her defences. She thus hopes gradually to convince the Arab leaders of the futility of their policy. In the meantime, Israel's prime concern must be to maintain military superiority in order to deter the Arabs on the one hand, and to "win the next war" if the Arab states start one.

### ON ARAB AIMS AND POLICIES

**"Military Test" Expected During "Next Decade."** Ben-Gurion, 3 Jan: "During the next decade we are liable to face a grave, and perhaps decisive, military test. In our own area there are dictators who make no secret of their intentions; quite openly, day by day, they proclaim their designs against our very existence; they are preparing for the purpose with all the energy at their command, and mighty forces, over whom we have no control or influence, are sending them an unceasing flow of arms.

"Moreover, we must not rely too much on our... victories in the past for the conditions, circumstances, relationships and strengths are incessantly changing, and the tests of the future will be quite unlike those of the past—unless in the meantime we increase our strength." (*Jer. Post*, 4 Jan)

**Arab Hostility to Israel Intensifies.** Ben-Gurion, 24 Oct: "The hostility of our neighbours has not ceased, or even

weakened. On the contrary, immediately after the Egyptian dictator's peace address at the UN Assembly he returned to Syria and renewed his public advocacy of the annihilation of Israel. This advocacy has also been renewed recently in Baghdad.

"The Arab boycott is being intensified and expanded; Libya and Morocco have joined in, and shut the doors on their Jewish citizens to prevent them coming to settle in Israel." (*Divrei Haknesset*, 24 Oct)

**Israel Threatened from North and South.** Ben-Gurion, 24 Oct: "The most disturbing feature... is the growing rearmament on two of our borders—in the North and the South... In recent years Egypt has gained control of Syria as well, so that she threatens us from the North and the South at the same time." [For the same theme in Abdel-Nasser's speeches, see p 173] (*Divrei Haknesset*, 24 Oct)

**Growing Potential of the Arab States.** Ben-Gurion, 24 Oct: "Tens of thousands of Arab students are studying at the universities of the Arab states, the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, the US, Britain and France. Hundreds of Soviet instructors are working for the improvement of the Egyptian Army, and Soviet arms are flowing unceasingly into Egypt and Syria. Our qualitative superiority is playing—and will continue to play—an important role, but we cannot disregard the quantities of armaments. There is also an improvement in organization, training and weapons. And the growth of our young forces is becoming a matter of life and death." (*Divrei Haknesset*, 24 Oct)

**Arab Political Warfare Unsuccessful.** Golda Meir, 23 May: "We have never taken the line that the friendship of any country towards Israel must entail absence of good relations with our neighbours, or that good relations with our neighbours should necessarily lead to estrangement from Israel. That, however, is not the way our neighbours see it. They attempt to confront the world with the alternative and choice between good relations with them and friendship with us. And, in their relations with many countries, they keep on trying to introduce the Israel element and make the development of those relations conditional on the loosening of ties with Israel..."

"We can state that the activity of Nasser in that direction has not been crowned with success. Israel's relations with the countries of the world are growing in scope and depth. It has an important by-product, by bringing nearer the time when the Arabs will reach the conclusion that they can no longer defeat Israel in the international arena..." (*Divrei Haknesset*, 23 May)

#### HOW TO ACHIEVE PEACE

**The Direct Approach.** Golda Meir, 10 Oct: "Ever since the Arab aggression against Israel in 1948 we have called on our neighbours to negotiate in order to settle all problems at issue between us and to conclude peace. So

far they have refused to do so and they insist on maintaining a state of war against Israel.

"We again call most solemnly to the leaders of the Arab states: let us sit down in a free, not pre-conditioned conference, to discuss peace. We are convinced that that is the only realistic approach." (*A/PV*, 879, 10 Oct)

**The Indirect Approach.** Ben-Gurion, 24 Mar: "We shall attain the supreme goal of our foreign policy—peace and fruitful cooperation between Israel and her neighbours—not by a frontal approach, as many believe, but by an indirect one; by means of friendly relations with the peoples of the near and distant periphery, in all the continents." (*Jer. Post*, 25 Mar)

Ben-Gurion, 24 Oct: "We cannot be content merely with the avoidance of war and defeat. Our aim is peace, and for one Jew to preach to his neighbour about the desirability of peace will not bring it a single step forward. Only through internal consolidation, the strengthening of our international standing and the acquisition of the friendship and sympathy of nations near and far in all the continents, shall we in time breach the wall of hatred and boycott that surrounds us and bring about peaceful relations—and also, in the course of time, political, economic and cultural cooperation with all the peoples of the Middle East, including our near neighbours." (*Divrei Haknesset*, 24 Oct)

#### THE REFUGEE ISSUE

**Golda Meir at UN General Assembly**, 10 Oct: "We are the last people to be insensitive to the question of refugees. We are the classic people of refugees. Over the last twelve years we have accepted over a million refugees into Israel, of whom over 500,000 came from Iraq, Yemen, Egypt, Syria and other Arab lands.

"Those Arabs, on the other hand, who left our country did not go into strange lands; they crossed the borders into the same countries from which the invading armies came. They speak the same language, they hold the same religion, they are of the same culture. Why are they not absorbed, as we absorbed our refugees?..."

"As to the solution of the Arab refugee problem, objective observers have said over and over again that there is one factor and one only standing in the way, and that is the political policy of the Arab leaders.

"I reject the contention that when I say this I am saying something contrary to any UN resolution. The General Assembly resolution of 1948 is frequently invoked in this respect, and just as frequently misquoted.

"Moreover, I do not believe that Arab spokesmen are in a fitting moral position to be sanctimonious about United Nations resolutions. The Arab states not merely refused to implement the partition resolution of 1947, but by the force of arms tried to annul it. The Arab aggression in Palestine against Israel and the United Nations is the one and only reason for the existence of the Arab refugee problem. Yet, in spite of that we permitted the return into Israel of more than 40,000 Arab refugees on humanitarian grounds in order to permit the reunion of families." (*A/PV*, 897, 10 Oct)

## THE STRUGGLE FOR INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT

(For synopsis, see p 169 ff. For US, see p 62 ff. For USSR, see pp 67-8. For Iran, see p 116 ff. For the refugee problem, see p 210 ff. For non-Arab Africa, see p 182 ff.).

SEPT-OCT: ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT AT  
GENERAL DEBATE IN UN GENERAL  
ASSEMBLY

The 1960 UN General Assembly, which, through the initiative of PM Khrushchev of the USSR, had become a partial world summit meeting, concerned itself mainly with major world problems. (For ME countries' attitude see p 4 ff.) In the General Debate local problems such as the Arab-Israeli conflict received comparatively little attention, and it was not mentioned at all by the NATO and Eastern bloc countries. However, the question was brought up by all the Arab representatives and by Israel, and was also mentioned by some African, Asian and South American delegates.

**Arab Views—Synopsis.** Some of the Arab speakers referred directly or indirectly, in their opening speeches, to President Nkrumah of Ghana's statement to the Assembly that the solution of the Arab-Israeli conflict "lies in the recognition of political realities there" (see below). This approach was categorically rejected by the representatives of the UAR, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Sudan and Iraq; they denied Israel's right to exist and advocated a solution on the basis of this denial. The Lebanese delegate advocated a solution on the basis of the UN resolutions, while the remaining Arab delegates made no explicit references to solutions.

**Arab Speakers.** Fekini of Libya, in a brief passage on the Palestine question, said that the UN resolutions had been disregarded and deplored the lot of the refugees. He did not propose solutions. (A/PV, 878, 29 Sept)

Abdel-Nasser said that a *fait accompli* based on injustice was a "perversion." The only solution was "that matters should return to the conditions prevailing before the error was committed." (A/PV, 873, Sept. See also the relevant passage in detail, p 172.)

Shukairy of Saudi Arabia referred directly to Dr Nkrumah's speech and said that "to recognize the political realities... is a colonial philosophy" aiming to justify facts created by colonialism. No solution taking the *de facto* situation as the starting point was possible. The Arab refugees must go back to their homeland; the Jews, if only permitted to, would "go home" too, i.e. they would emigrate from Palestine, and a Palestinian state would be set up "representing all the legitimate citizens of the country, Muslims, Christians and Jews alike." (A/PV, 879, 30 Sept)

King Hussein of Jordan demanded that the UN enforce its resolutions "of 1948 and 1959, for example," but also said that the partition of Palestine was unjust and that "The world is too prone to accept a *fait accompli* as a basis of policy." (A/PV, 882, 2 Oct)

The Lebanese PM, Sa'ib Slām, also condemned "the great injustice" committed by the UN in its decision to partition Palestine, but demanded the implementation of this resolution as well as the return of the refugees to their homes, according to the 1948 UN resolution. He also demanded a just solution. Sa'ib Slām condemned Zionism in general and the Zionist policy of the ingathering of the exiles in particular. (A/PV, 885, 4 Oct)

Crown Prince Mulay Hasan of Morocco referred to the Palestine refugees only, describing the problem as one instance of "the injustices that have been committed in the world," which affected all Arabs. The UN "could not remain indifferent in the face of this situation and take it as an accomplished fact." He proposed no solution. (A/PV 886, 4 Oct)

The Sudanese delegate, Khayr, described at length the plight of the refugees. "A just solution should start at the point where the wrong was committed, that is to say, immediately before the termination of the Mandate," he declared. (A/PV, 887, 5 Oct)

Hāshim Jawād, the Iraqi Foreign Minister, said that Israel was a foreign body in the Arab homeland and had no right to exist there. As regards the refugees, they would not accept the *fait accompli* and "more than ever they are determined to regain their country." The whole Arab world supported them in this. (A/PV, 890, 6 Oct: see also relevant passages in detail p 174.)

Zabarah of Yemen referred in a brief passage to the problem of the Palestine refugees. He did not speak of solutions. (A/PV, 892, 7 Oct)

The Tunisian delegate, Mongi Slim, in a brief passage, deplored the lot of the refugees and said that Nazi crimes (against the Jews) could not justify the expulsion of the Palestinian Arabs. "Many resolutions" by the UN, regarding Palestine, had been disregarded. He did not speak of solutions. (A/PV, 897, 10 Oct)

**Israeli Call to Arab Leaders to Meet Israel PM.** The Israeli Foreign Minister, Golda Meir, linked the question of Israel-Arab relations with the wider problem of disarmament. Neither Israel nor her neighbours could afford an arms race. Israel was committed to a policy of disarmament. "One of the planks in the Israel Government's programme, as approved by Parliament, is complete disarmament of Israel and the Arab states under mutual inspection and control," she said.

She addressed herself directly to Abdel-Nasser, who had advised President Eisenhower and PM Khrushchev to meet and negotiate, and to other Arab leaders, asking whether they were ready to meet the Israeli PM for peace negotiations or at least for talks on non-aggression pacts. The Israeli PM "is prepared for such a meeting without any preconditions, immediately, here or at any other place."

Mrs Meir welcomed the approach expressed in the speeches of the representatives of Ghana, Nepal, Uruguay, Guatemala and others (see below). Referring to Abdel-Nasser's declaration that an error, which ought to be corrected had been committed in the ME, she quoted another of his statements to show that his intention was to correct it by force of arms. (For original, see p 172, item of 8 May.) She asked how this approach, as well as the economic boycott against Israel and the non-implementation of the Security Council's decisions on shipping in the Suez Canal fitted the UAR to become a member of the Security Council.

Replying to those who denied Israel's right to exist, she traced the historic connection between the Jewish people and the Land of Israel. When the Jews returned they made the desert bloom, she declared. In 1947 the UN had decided on the establishment of Israel, and in 1948, seven Arab armies had crossed the borders "to correct the error" of the UN. The Arabs had created the refugee problem by inducing the Palestinian Arabs to



leave the country in order to return as victors. (For her reference to the refugee problem, see also p 176.) (*A/PV, 897, 10 Oct*)

**Arab Reactions: Israel's Bid for Negotiations Rejected.** Several Arab delegates used the right of reply in order to comment on Golda Meir's speech.

Lutfi of the UAR refuted the comparison between his country's call for an Eisenhower-Khrushchev meeting and its refusal to meet Israel: "Between the Soviet Union and the US there has not been any war. Our relations with Israel were settled by the Armistice Convention, which Israel does not even recognize as existing." Israel's conduct was aggressive and belligerent. If Israel was serious in wanting peace, let her comply with all the UN resolutions on Palestine. "We for our part are prepared to implement all (these) resolutions," he said. Israel singled out the question of passage through the Suez Canal, but the UN resolution of 1951 in favour of free passage was based on the Armistice Agreement, which in Israel's opinion no longer existed. (*A/PV, 897, 10 Oct*)

Shukairy (Saudi Arabia), in a lengthy reply to "the lady from Israel," argued that the war of 1948 had been started by the Jews and not by the Arabs, and that the Jews had created the refugee problem. The Jewish forces had acted with a cruelty similar to the conduct of the Nazis towards the Jews in Europe. He supported this argument by quoting from Arnold Toynbee, the historian. On the Nazi theme he also quoted from a speech by Sir Winston Churchill on the assassination of Lord Moyne "in 1948." [The assassination took place in 1944.] The argument that the Jews had developed a semi-desert country he called "the language of imperialism."

Shukairy rejected the call for peace talks. The comparison with US-Soviet relations was not valid, since the US was not occupying Soviet territory. He reiterated his proposal for a solution. (*A/PV, 899, 11 Oct*).

Fu'ad Amoun of Lebanon, in a lengthy speech, rejected the Israeli appeal. Israel had been created by Zionist and imperialist aggression and remained aggressive. Her intentions were to conquer the Arab world from the Euphrates to the Nile. Israel was not viable and was kept alive by Western colonialistic interests. He warned the African states not to let Israel gain a foothold in their countries, for eventually this would make them victims of colonialism. He also said that the Arabs in Israel were second-class citizens living under prison-like conditions. (*A/PV, 905, 14 Oct*)

Mūsa Nāsir (Jordan) repeated the points made by Amoun and suggested the appointment of a commission to examine the conditions of the Arabs in Israel. (*A/PV, 907, 17 Oct*)

**Israeli Reply.** M. Comay of the Israel delegation rose after Shukairy's speech "to register our sense of disgust that there should be on the records of the Assembly a comparison of any people, my own and any other, with the Nazis." (*A/PV, 899, 11 Oct*)

Replying to the Arab reactions to her proposals, Mrs Meir said "that nothing angers the representatives of the Arab states more than a call for peace... We have listened to outbursts of hate quite unworthy of this forum." Commenting on the Arab demands for the implementation of the 1947 resolutions, she said that the Arabs had not only rejected them at the time but had also gone to war to defeat them. That was the historic "error." Regarding the refugees, she quoted from Arab sources to show that the Arabs were responsible for the problem. She stressed the political rights and high eco-

nomic, social and cultural standards enjoyed by the Arab citizens of Israel.

Referring to Israel's relations with African people, she said: "They are hardly in need of having others guarding their independence or telling them what to do. We, and the African people, know that the accusation of [Israeli] colonialism is nonsense. The Arabs know that it is nonsense. The African countries can be relied upon to judge their relations with other countries by the behaviour of those other countries towards them, and not by propaganda speeches." Finally, Mrs Meir repeated the call to the Arab states "for negotiations—without prior conditions—for disarmament, for peace, or at least for a non-aggression agreement." (*A/PV, 907, 17 Oct*)

**Other Speakers on Arab-Israeli Relations—Synopsis.** Other speakers on the ME were all from Afro-Asian and South American countries. The Venezuelan representative spoke on oil problems only. (*A/PV, 883, 3 Oct*) The South African delegate, in reply to attacks on his country's Apartheid policy, accused certain Arab countries of violating the UN Charter by maintaining slavery and near-feudal conditions. (*A/PV, 905, 19 Oct*) The Afghanistan and Guatemalan representatives advocated respectively "cooperation" and "peaceful" negotiation in the ME, without expressly mentioning the Arab-Israeli conflict. (*A/PV, 874, 27 Sept; A/PV, 876, 28 Sept*) The representatives of Ghana, Guinea, Nepal, Pakistan and Uruguay referred directly to the conflict.

**Nkrumah: Solution in Recognition of Political Realities.** President Nkrumah of Ghana spoke of two factors making for unrest in the ME: oil and the Arab-Israeli conflict. Regarding the latter, he said: "The solution lies in the recognition of the political realities there. In the light of this, I submit that the UN should set up a committee to study and evolve a machinery in which it will be impossible either for Israel to attack any of the Arab states or for the Arab states to attack Israel, and for some sort of arrangement to be made to keep the cold war out of the ME." (*A/PV, 869, 23 Sept*) (For reactions in the Assembly, see above. For other reactions, see p 184.)

**Guinea: UN Resolution to be Implemented.** President Sekou Touré of Guinea mentioned the Palestine problem as one of those for which the UN should find a solution at the present session. He stated: "To remove the Palestine problem from the present deadlock, we ask the UN to recognize in fact the legitimate rights of the Arab people of Palestine, by taking all necessary measures to see to it that the resolutions already adopted on this problem are strictly implemented." (*A/PV, 896, 10 Oct*)

**Nepal: Political Realities Must be Accepted.** The Nepalese PM, Koirala, said: "We are of the view that the solution of the problem confronting the ME lies in the direction of recognizing and accepting the political realities that prevail there today. Prospects of peace in this area would be strengthened if some realistic and practical solution could be devised to end the Arab-Israeli conflict." (*A/PV, 878, 29 Sept*)

**Pakistan: UN Resolution on Refugees Must be Implemented.** The Pakistani delegate, Bhutto, referred to the "negation of justice to that part of the Arab nation which comprises the population of Palestine." The failure to solve the Palestine question had kept the ME "on the verge of conflagration."

"It has been suggested that the tension in the ME should be removed by the dictates of realism... The only realistic approach in this case is to recognize the human rights of a million Arab refugees... Unless the resolutions of the General Assembly on this question are implemented, no arrangements to enforce peace in the ME by outside powers are likely to be effective or lasting." He added that every solution must be achieved by peaceful means. (*A/PV*, 878, 29 Sept)

**Uruguay: Appeal for Peace through Direct Negotiations.** The Uruguayan delegate, Haedo, expressed the "deepest hopes of peace" between the Arabs and Israel. "If they had met together and could, as a result of direct negotiations, work out an armistice which would bring about a truce to their struggle, we would then see once again how fitting it would be for them to enter into negotiations in order to attain the benefits of final peace." (*A/PV*, 875, 28 Sept)

#### ARABS AND ISRAEL AT INTERNATIONAL MEETINGS; CHANGES OF VENUE

**Jan: ECAFE Moved from Karachi to Bangkok.** In Jan Pakistan refused to issue a visa for an Israeli observer to attend the session of the Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE) at Karachi. The Pakistani Foreign Minister, Mansur Qadir, gave as the reason "Pakistani sympathy for the unredressed grievances of Arab Muslims following the establishment of the State of Israel." He said that Pakistan had made her position clear in May and June 1959 and had undertaken preparations for the session after assurances from ECAFE and the UN Secretariat that they would try to dissuade Israel from sending an observer. (*Ha'aretz*, 17 Jan, 20 Jan; *Jer. Post*, 25 Jan) [Because of this refusal the session was moved from Karachi to Bangkok, where it took place on 17 Feb, with an Israeli observer attending.]

At its Apr session the Arab League Council adopted a resolution thanking the Pakistani Government for this action. (*Hayat*, 10, 11 Apr)

**Jan: Reception in Bonn.** The Arab envoys in Bonn boycotted a New Year reception held on 11 Jan by President Lübke because of the presence of Dr P. Shin'ar, head of Israel's Reparations Mission in Germany. (*Ha'aretz*, 12 Jan)

**Mar-Apr: International Conference on the Law of the Sea.** At the second International Conference on the Law of the Sea, which took place in Geneva in Mar and Apr, the main issue was the limit of territorial waters. The USSR and the Arab countries, except for Jordan, supported a proposal to extend the limit to twelve miles. [In Arab opinion such a limit would entitle the Arab states to block the Gulf of Aqaba to Israeli shipping.] Israel supported the Canada-USA proposal to extend territorial waters from the present three mile limit to six miles, with a further six-mile zone in which the littoral state alone could fish. (*Ha'aretz*, 18 Mar, 13 Apr) The six-six proposal obtained a simple majority in committee but failed to gain the necessary two-thirds majority in the plenary session. The USSR-backed proposal was defeated at the committee stage. Jordan voted for the Canada-US proposal and was attacked for this by the UAR. (*Ahram*, 28 Apr; *Jer. Times*, 3 May) The conference ended in deadlock and no decision was reached. (*Ha'aretz*, 28 Apr)

**Apr: Iraq intended to try to prevent Israeli participation**

at the Afro-Asian Olympic Games to be held in Jakarta (Indonesia) in 1962. (*Zaman*, 16 Apr)

**Apr: Medical Conference in Tehran.** Arab representatives left the Conference of Middle East military doctors and pharmacists held in Tehran on 25 Apr because of the presence of Israeli representatives. (*Ha'aretz*, 27 Apr; *R. Baghdad*, 27 Apr-IMB, 28 Apr)

**May: Students' Meeting in Israel.** Arab students invited to a work camp and seminar organized by the World University Service in Israel informed the organization that they would be unable to attend because of their government's objections. (*Ha'aretz*, 22 May)

**May: World Congress of International Federation of Petroleum Workers.** For the first time an Israeli delegation took part in this Congress, the third of its kind, which convened in May, in Amsterdam.

There were several clashes between the Israeli and the UAR delegates. One of the resolutions was "in favour of lifting the restrictions on the free transport of petroleum and other products of world trade under international law." This was a modified version of a draft resolution tabled by the Israeli delegate [with obvious bearing on the freedom of navigation in the Suez Canal—although the Canal was not mentioned]. Other Israeli proposals with no political bearing were also opposed by the Arab delegates. The UAR delegate opposed the admission of Israel to the International Secretariat of the Federation, and the question was referred back to the executive committee for consideration. (*Ha'aretz*, 9 May; *Jer. Post*; *Ha'aretz*, 15 May) An Arab proposal to evict Israel from the Federation was defeated. (*Ha'aretz*, 24 May) [This item from *Ha'aretz* perhaps refers to the *Jer. Post* item of 15 May.]

**June: International Commission on Irrigation and Drainage.** At its session in Madrid in May-June, this 52-nation Commission decided, by a majority of more than two-thirds, to meet in Israel in May and June 1962. The representatives of Egypt, Iraq, Tunisia and Morocco raised no objections. (*Ha'aretz*, 25 June)

**June: Mediterranean Air Navigation Commission.** Arab representatives refused to attend the meeting of the Mediterranean Regional Air Navigation Commission, which had been transferred from Cairo to Tehran because of the Israel representatives' inability to receive UAR visas. The Commission's offices are in Cairo. (*Ha'aretz*, 29 June)

**July: Narcotics Conference.** At an international conference on narcotics the UAR accused Israel of permitting the transfer of narcotics through its territory. Israel denied this allegation and the Turkish representative said he was tired of hearing these false accusations for the fourth time running. (*Ha'aretz*, 12 July).

**July: Third International Congress of Transport Workers.** See p 45.

**Cypriot Trade Exhibition Boycotted by Arabs.** The Arab states boycotted the annual Cypriot trade exhibition because Israel had been invited to participate. (*R. Amman*, 22 July-IMB, 24 July)

**Oct: International Parliamentary Conference.** Arab parliamentarians attacked Israeli representatives at the In-

terparliamentary Conference in Tokyo on 1 Oct. (*R. Cairo*, 2 Oct-IMB, 2 Oct). Israeli representatives replied vigorously. (*Ha'aretz*, 3 Oct)

Oct: Cattle Experts' Conference in Athens. Jordan did not take part in a cattle experts' conference in Athens because of Israeli participation. (*R. Amman*, 16 Oct-IMB, 17 Oct)

Dec: International Congress of Businessmen in Pakistan. Pakistan refused visas to the Israeli delegates to the International Congress of Businessmen organized by the International Chambers of Commerce in Karachi in Dec. When the Israeli delegates protested against this "surrender to the Arab boycott policies," the SG of the International Chamber of Commerce replied that the Chamber was "strongly opposed to segregation of any kind" and would make sure that in the future all delegates could attend meetings. However, the Chamber found it too late to change the venue of the Congress. (*Ha'aretz*, 21 Dec)

#### CEYLON WITHDRAWS ENVOY FROM ISRAEL

First Minister of Ceylon to Israel and a UAR Warning. In Jan 1960 Ceylon's Ambassador in Rome presented his credentials as his country's first non-resident Minister to Israel. (*IGYb*, 1960/61)

In Apr it was reported that the UAR had officially informed the Ceylonese Government that trade between the two countries would be affected by this appointment; unless Ceylon reconsidered it, Arab countries would boycott Ceylonese tea. [Ceylon sells to the Arab countries some 80 million pounds a year of tea. This is about a quarter of its tea exports.] (*UPI*; *Jer. Post*, 27 Apr.)

On 20 Apr PM Dudley Senanayake said that the accreditation of an envoy to Israel did not involve any change in Ceylon's friendship with the Arab states. "Our common objectives will be pursued according to the principles agreed to at Bandung," he declared. (*Reuter*; *Jer. Post*, 20 Apr)

[In July, following elections, Senanayake was succeeded as Premier by Mrs Bandaranaike.]

Mrs Bandaranaike's Statement. In a Press statement on 20 Aug Mrs Sirimavo Bandaranaike, PM of Ceylon, said that the accreditation of the Ceylonese Ambassador in Rome to Israel by Dahanayake's caretaker government "was carried through without adequate regard to the special difficulties of the situation in the ME or proper consideration of the possible effects the action would have on our relations with Arab countries, with whom we have close bonds of friendship." The late Ceylonese PM (Mr. Bandaranaike) had "decided to refrain from doing so in recognition of the complexities of the situation in the ME."

"It is the view of my government that the action of the caretaker government of Mr Dahanayake reversed those basic policies," the statement continued. "My government now proposes to take certain urgent remedial measures with a view to strengthening and fostering our relations with the Arab countries." (*Ceylon News Letter*, 25 Aug)

Interpretation of Ceylonese Motives. The Israeli Press regarded the Ceylonese step as mainly due to Arab threats to stop purchase of Ceylonese tea and several other items. (*Davar*; *Al Hamishmar*; *Haboker*, 21 Aug) Half of a year later, when Ceylon cancelled the accreditation of her envoy to Israel, a Ceylonese paper com-

mented: "The Ceylonese Government's increasingly close ties with the Soviet bloc and Casablanca powers have inevitably led to an increasingly unfriendly attitude towards the State of Israel." (*Ceylon Observer*, 13 Feb 1961)

Israeli Attempt at Remedy. Israel took diplomatic steps in an attempt to remedy the situation. (*Jer. Post*, 25 Aug) In Sept Dr Lewin, the Israeli Minister to Tokyo, and non-resident Minister to Ceylon, met the Ceylonese PM, but the Israeli Press reported that his efforts had failed. The Ceylonese PM was understood to have told Dr Lewin that "while Ceylon would continue to be friendly to Israel, it would not take any action to create new difficulties with the Arab states, particularly since Ceylon was a member of the Afro-Asian bloc." (*Jer. Post*, 14 Sept)

Arab Reaction. Hāshim Jawād, the Iraqi Foreign Minister, welcomed the Ceylonese decision. He said that Iraq had never ceased clarifying her position to the various governments on the Arab problems in general and the Palestine problem in particular, and called on the Arab states to cultivate economic and cultural ties with the new states in order to prevent Israeli penetration. (*BBC*, 21 Aug-IMB, 22 Aug)

A UAR spokesman declared that the UAR and the Arab world highly esteemed Mrs Bandaranaike's stand. The Arabs wished to strengthen economic and cultural ties with Ceylon, "whose leaders refused to be agents like the Shah of Iran." (*R. Cairo*, 21 Aug-IMB, 22 Aug)

Withdrawal Effected. On 11 Feb 1961 it was published that Ceylon had cancelled the accreditation of her envoy to Israel. (*Jer. Post*, 17 Feb 1961)

[The non-resident Israel Minister to Ceylon remained accredited and the Israeli Chargé d'Affaires in Colombo remained at his post.]

#### THE ARABS, ISRAEL AND THE GERMAN FEDERAL REPUBLIC

German Interests in Arab Countries Hinder Establishment of Diplomatic Relations with Israel. In Jan the West Germany Foreign Minister, von Brentano, explaining in the Bundestag's Foreign Affairs Committee the rejection of a proposal by Carlo Schmidt, the German Socialist leader, to establish diplomatic relations with Israel, emphasized West Germany's vital economic interests in its Arab trade.

Hitherto the Bonn Government had based its attitude on the "Hallstein Doctrine," which opposes the establishment of diplomatic relations with any country if it might evoke the subsequent recognition of East Germany by other countries [i.e. the assumption that because of non-establishment of relations with Israel the Arab countries will refrain from establishing relations with East Germany.]

A public announcement in Germany at the same time of a new order for mortar shells placed with Israel was thought to have been designed to counterbalance the effect of the above. (*Jer. Post*, 20 Jan)

The head of the Information Division of the West German Foreign Ministry, von Ekhardt, on a tour of Arab countries, said in the Old City of Jerusalem that after German reparations to the Jews ended at the end of the year "nothing will tie us to Israel except very limited relations, and I assure you that Germany will not establish diplomatic relations with Israel." (*Jer. Post*, 2 Feb)

A Bonn spokesman, asked about this statement, said



that the problem was not whether but when to establish relations. (*Jer. Post*, 4 Feb)

On 12 Feb von Brentano said during a stopover in Beirut airport, that Germany wanted friendly relations with Israel, especially so as the Germans had committed wrongs against the Jews. German sources later explained that von Brentano was speaking of Germany's general attitude, not of the establishment of diplomatic relations. (*Ha'aretz*, 14 Feb)

**Bonn Denies Loan to Israel.** Following PM Ben-Gurion's meeting with Chancellor Adenauer in New York on 14 Mar, reports appeared that the latter had promised Israel a \$500 million loan. There was no confirmation from Israeli sources and a Bonn spokesman denied the report. (*Jer. Post*, 24 Mar). A sharp reaction followed in the Arab countries. (e.g. *IMB*, 20, 29 Mar, 3 Apr)

On 22 Apr the West German embassy in Cairo announced "for the second time" that there was nothing in these reports, and accused Communist propaganda of circulating rumours in order to damage the good relations between the German and Arab peoples. (*R. Amman*, 23 Apr-*IMB*, 24 Apr)

### THE ARABS, ISRAEL AND THE REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS

**Synopsis.** The Arab states tried to hamper the development of Cypriot-Israeli relations and dissuade the new Republic from establishing diplomatic relations with Israel. Except for the postponement of the presentation of the Israel Ambassador's credentials from Aug 1960 to Jan 1961, their efforts were unsuccessful. Israel countered the Arab efforts by the continued development of friendly relations with Cyprus in all fields.

**July 1959: Policy Statement by Archbishop Makarios.** In July 1959, while outlining Cyprus' future foreign policy, Archbishop Makarios said: "We will, of course, establish relations with the UAR first, but then they do not want us to have relations with Israel. We need to be friendly with both groups. I will have to persuade our Arab friends to let us be friendly with Israel too." (*Washington Post*, 5 July 1959)

**Sept 1959-Jan 1960: Arab League Recommendations.** The Arab League Council in Sept 1959 (at Casablanca) recommended all Arab states to recognize the new republic immediately on the attainment of its independence, to support its application for membership in the UN, and to conclude commercial agreements with Cyprus in order to eliminate Israel's economic and political activities in the island. (*R. Cairo*, 7 Sept-*IMB*, 8 Sept 1959) On 3 Jan 1960, the League Secretariat requested the member states to implement these recommendations. (*Ahram*, 4 Jan)

**1959: UAR Pressure.** Cypriot Press reports from Cairo indicated the great interest shown by the Arab states in the possibility of preventing the establishment of diplomatic relations between Cyprus and Israel, and the UAR papers emphasized the need for vigorous political and economic action for the purpose. The 15,000-strong Cypriot community in Egypt expressed concern about its future in case such relations were established. (*Phileletheros*, Cyprus, 21 Nov; *Haraughi*, Cyprus, 26 Nov 1959)

**Mar: Archbishop Makarios Reiterates Policy of Neutrality.** The Archbishop stated on 9 Mar that Cyprus must maintain equal friendship with all nations, and "so far

as we can, we will try to avoid interfering in the Israeli-Arab dispute. We would be happy if Cyprus can be used as a bridge between these disturbed areas and we would always be willing to provide any political good offices which might improve peace in this area." (*Eleftheria*, Cyprus, 10 Mar)

**Apr-July 1960: British Comment.** The *Spectator* and the *Guardian* stated that relations with Israel would benefit Cyprus economically in view of the possibility of Israeli technical assistance, tourism and commerce, and at the same time would strengthen its position in the international field. The *Guardian* wrote: "In many respects the economic problems facing the new Cypriot administration will be similar to those which the Israelis have had to overcome... In all these fields the Israelis have the necessary experience and a supply of trained specialists." The Arabs, on the other hand, "start with the advantage of having been among the most constant supporters of the Greek Cypriots in their fight for independence, but are hampered by the fact that there is very little they can offer the Cypriots who are spiritually and temperamentally much more akin to the westward-looking Israelis." (*Spectator*, 15 Apr; *Guardian*, 26 July)

**June-Sept: Arab Measures Against Cypriot-Israeli Commercial Relations.** The representative of the Arab Chambers of Commerce in Nicosia stated on 11 June that Cypriot merchants who traded with Israel were "automatically blacklisted in Arab countries as part of the Arab League's Israel boycott policy." He suggested that Cypriots should make up their minds whether they wanted to trade with Israel or the Arab states. The Turkish Cypriot newspaper *Bozkurt* said that this declaration amounted to blackmail. (*Mid. Mirror*, 18 June)

The Lebanese Consulate in Nicosia exercised pressure on the Armenian merchants in Cyprus, most of whom have Lebanese passports or relatives and property in Lebanon, to discontinue their commercial relations with Israel. It warned them that their passports would be cancelled and that those who were British subjects would not be allowed to enter Lebanon. The latter step was taken against an Armenian impresario, who managed the Israel Philharmonic Orchestra's visit to Cyprus. (*Akhbar al-Usbu'*, Jordan, 8 July)

In July, Cyprus invited Israel and the Arab states to take part in the yearly agricultural exhibition to be opened on 15 Sept. (*Hayat*, 24 July) [The Arab states boycotted the exhibition because of Israel's participation.]

**Aug 1960-Jan 1961: Establishment of Israeli Embassy in Cyprus.** Israel officially recognized the new Republic on the day it achieved its independence (16 Aug). Cyprus agreed to enter into diplomatic relations with both Israel and the Arab states. On 16 Aug Israel requested the Cyprus Government's agreement to the establishment of an Israel embassy in Nicosia, and the latter gave its formal consent on 17 Aug. The Israeli Consul General in Nicosia, Mr Levin, was appointed Ambassador. (*Jer. Post*, 19 Aug)

The Arabs, especially the Lebanese, meanwhile continued their efforts to prevent the establishment of diplomatic relations between Cyprus and Israel. Lebanon promised every aid to Cyprus, in its own name and in that of the Arab countries in general, on condition that it "not recognize Israel." (*Hayat*, 23 Aug, 2, 6 Sept; *Beirut al-Masa'*, 17 Oct)

Arab pressure resulted in the postponement of the presentation of the Israel Ambassador's credentials. Al-



though agreement to his nomination was given in Aug, Mr Levin presented his credentials only on 21 Jan 1961, after the UAR Ambassador who had arrived in the island much later, but presented his credentials on 14 Jan 1961. (*Jer. Post*, 12, 22 Jan 1961)

[Until the end of 1960 Cyprus did not open embassies in either the Arab countries or Israel. However, it opened its embassy in Cairo in Feb 1961.]

**Nov: Arab Efforts at Boycott.** On 24-25 Nov an Arab-Cypriot economic conference was held in Beirut. To the joint recommendations the Arab delegations added a statement expressing the hope that Cyprus would bear in mind the Arab boycott of Israel, and stating that certificates of origin of goods exported from Cyprus to the Arab countries would be closely scrutinized. (*R. Beirut*, 25 Nov-BBC/W, 1 Dec)

#### THE PALESTINE QUESTION IN JOINT STATEMENTS BY PRESIDENT ABDEL-NASSER AND NON-ARAB LEADERS

Joint communiqués were issued in 1960 after meetings between Abdel-Nasser and PM Nehru of India (twice), President Ayub Khan of Pakistan (twice), President Sukarno of Indonesia, King Paul of Greece, President Tito of Yugoslavia and King Muhammad Zaher, Shah of Afghanistan.

The Palestine question and Israel were not mentioned in the joint communiqués after the meetings with Nehru, on 20 May (which dealt with the breakdown of the summit meeting in Paris), King Paul of Greece, on 9 July (*BBC*, 11 July), and the second meeting with Ayub Khan, on 21 Nov. (*Eg. Gaz.*, 13 Nov)

**10 APR: Abdel-Nasser-Nehru Communiqué.** Delhi: "The President and the PM reiterated their view that the question of Palestine should be solved in conformity with the provisions of the UN Charter, the resolutions of the

UN and the principles unanimously adopted at the Bandung Conference of 1955 for the peaceful settlement of the Palestine question." (*Eg. Gaz.*, 11 Apr)

**16 Apr: Abdel-Nasser-Ayub Khan Communiqué.** Karachi: "The two Presidents reiterated their view that the Palestine problem should be resolved in keeping with the resolutions of the UN and the principles unanimously adopted by the Afro-Asian Conference at Bandung for the peaceful settlement of the Palestine question." (*Eg. Gaz.*, 17 Apr)

**26 Apr: Abdel-Nasser-Sukarno Communiqué.** Cairo: "The two Presidents deplored the plight and the depriving of the Arab people of Palestine of their rights, homes and country.

"They deplored furthermore the aim of Israel to disrupt the Afro-Asian solidarity, hoping thus to serve as the spearhead of the action of new colonialism." (*Eg. Gaz.*, 27 Apr)

**20 June: Joint Abdel-Nasser-Tito Communiqué.** Belgrade: "Both Presidents are also strongly convinced that the Palestine problem should be settled according to the terms of the UN Charter, and by the previous resolutions passed by the UN for solving the Palestine problem on a sound basis." (*Eg. Gaz.*, 21 June)

**25 Oct: Joint Statement by Abdel-Nasser and King Muhammad Zaher, Shah of Afghanistan.** Cairo: "Both sides emphasize that the continued deprivation of the Palestinian Arabs of their legal rights, including their return to their homeland and the restoration of their property, has become a serious danger threatening security and peace in the ME. For this reason both sides declare their complete support of the Palestinian people until they restore their rights in full in accordance with the resolutions of the UN which must not hesitate to support them until they achieve these rights . . ." (*Eg. Gaz.*, 1 Nov)

## ARAB ANTI-ISRAELI ACTIVITIES IN NON-ARAB AFRICA

### SYNOPSIS

One of the motives given by the Arab countries for devoting attention to relations with the African countries was to nullify Israel's achievements there. While PM Ben-Gurion believed that the establishment of friendly relations with these countries would help to strengthen Israel's international standing and ultimately to bring about peace with the Arabs, this was precisely what the latter sought to prevent.

No reports were published of anti-Arab Israeli activities in Africa. The Arab Press maintained, however, that Israel's constructive achievements in African countries were in themselves a defeat for the Arabs.

The Arabs acted in several fields. In the Press and on the radio, Israel was presented as a tool and collaborator of the imperialists and the former colonial powers in Africa. In the political field, some of the Arab countries in the ME enjoyed the advantage of being African states, whose collaboration was necessary to achieve solidarity in African forums. The UAR, in particular, could secure the passage of anti-Israel resolutions at African conferences in return for its collaboration in purely African matters.

The UAR could also claim that the group of West-

African countries tending towards the doctrine of positive neutralism (Ghana, Guinea, Mali) had become somewhat reserved in their attitude towards Israel. This development became pronounced in the wake of the Congo conflict, which brought these countries closer to each other and to the UAR, and found a clear expression in the anti-Israel resolution of the Casablanca Conference of the UAR, Ghana, Guinea, Mali and Morocco in Jan 1961. (This conference is not reported in detail in this volume.)

Somalia and Mauritania, both Muslim countries, altogether refused to have official relations with Israel.

In the field of economic cooperation and technical aid, there were many Arab proposals for constructive activities to combat Israel's influence, but few of them were carried out.

### GENERAL ACTIVITIES, VIEWS, POLICIES AND PROPAGANDA

(NOTE: For motives and policies see also: Arab Views and Policies, p 171 ff.)

**UAR: Closer Relations With Africa to Frustrate Israel's Aims.** "We must get closer to the African countries and

improve relations with them," wrote *al-Akhbār*. "If Israel succeeds in strengthening her relations with the nations of the continent, she would thus pave the way for breaking out of the economic blockade imposed on her." (*Akhbar, Cairo, 1 June*)

#### Arab Views on Israel in Africa

*Agent of Imperialism.* "Israel's objective in Africa is to carry out the schemes of robbery hatched by imperialism. Israel fulfils the role of an agent of imperialism in each country that imperialism has been forced to abandon." (*R. Cairo, 18 Jan-IMB, 19 Jan*)

Israel supported France in its Algerian war and its nuclear tests in the Sahara. Israel proposed to Belgium cooperation with other states in the exploitation of the Congo. Israel supported South Africa's apartheid policy. (*Ahali, Baghdad, 21 Dec*)

*Parasite.* Israel is a parasite in Asia and Africa, as it is a parasite in the Arab world. (*Akhbar, 4 May*)

*Similar to White Colonists.* Israelis were compared with the white colonists in Africa, who dominated the African majority. (*R. Cairo in Swahili, 14 Dec-BBC, 16 Dec*)

*Zionism Attempts to Replace Imperialism* and to dominate the African economy. (*Gumhuriyah, Cairo, 21 Jan*)

**Lebanese Opposition to Israel in Africa.** [After the UAR, Lebanon was the most outspoken of Arab countries in calling for initiative against Israel in Africa. The following are typical examples.] In Jan reports from Lebanese missions in Africa recommended that Israeli "penetration" be combated through the establishment of a large Arab development company which would carry out economic projects in Nigeria and Ghana. (*Jaridah, 6 Jan*)

In Apr Lebanon submitted to the Arab League "an important memorandum" on Zionist activities in Africa. (*Ruz al-Yusuf, 18 Apr*)

The Lebanese Foreign Ministry proposed in June the holding of a conference of Lebanese diplomats in Africa to discuss, *inter alia*, the struggle against Israel's activities in Africa, which injured the interests of the Lebanese emigrés and other Arabs. (*Hayat, 12 June*)

More anti-Israeli plans and proposals by the Lebanese Foreign Ministry were reported subsequently in the Lebanese Press. (*Anwar, 23 June; Siyasa, 3 July; Hayat, 21 Aug*) (For a Lebanese-Israeli exchange on the question at the UN General Assembly, see p 178.)

**Islam to be Used Against Israel in Africa.** The UAR Press proposed to use Islam in combating Israeli influence in Africa. A Cairo paper said in Jan that Israel's activities in Africa were doomed to failure. The Arabs would easily frustrate Israel's attempts to establish closer relations with African countries because most of the population of Africa was Muslim and Arabic-speaking. It was possible to stimulate their Muslim sentiments and explain how Israel had stolen the property of Muslim Arabs. (*Gumhuriyah, 3 Jan*) Another Cairo paper said that al-Azhar and the Islamic Congress could be utilized for this purpose. (*Akhir Sa'ah, 1 Jan*) (For activities of these institutions in Africa, see p 544 ff.)

This theme was repeated in the Press of other Arab countries. (*Zaman, Baghdad, 25 Jan; Akhbar al-Usbu', Jordan, 8 July*) *Al-Manār* proposed to send to Africa Muslim ulamā' to counteract Israel's activities. (*Manar, 13 Oct*)

Cairo sources also reported that Israel was active in the Islamic field in Africa, and was attempting to win

over African Muslims by sending them Arabic teachers. (*Ruz al-Yusuf, 21 Nov*)

Cairo Radio reported that Israel had spread 100,000 copies of the Qur'ān in a forged edition, in an attempt to prove that she was not anti-Arab or anti-Muslim. (*R. Cairo, 28 Dec-IMB, 28 Dec; see also BBC, 30 Dec*)

**UAR Warning to Africa.** Abdel-Nasser was reported to have explained to the Lebanese Government that one of his reasons for breaking off diplomatic relations with Iran was to prevent African countries following the example of Iran [which had recognized Israel *de facto*] on gaining their independence. In this way, Israel's relations with other Muslim countries would be "paralyzed." (*Hayat, 17 Aug*)

**Mar: Anti-Israel Boycott Office Proposals.** The Central Anti-Israel Boycott Office in Damascus prepared a list of proposals for the elimination of Israeli economic activities in Asia and Africa. They included:

An exchange of delegations between the Arab countries and the new African states to establish economic relations, to review the latter's needs, and to discuss technical and financial aid;

Rich Arab sheikhdoms should invest their surplus income in African countries;

Arab countries should be encouraged to produce goods that could compete with Israeli products;

Permanent Arab exhibitions should be established;

The number of cultural missions to Asia and Africa should be increased and more scholarships provided. (*Akhbar, 29 Mar*)

The Arab League Economic Committee subsequently approved these proposals. (*Hayat, 30 Apr*) (See also p 125.)

**Other Arab League Anti-Israel Proposals.** In Apr the Arab League Political Committee recommended a united Arab political plan to frustrate Israel's activities in Asia and Africa. (*R. Cairo, 4 Apr-IMB, 5 Apr*)

A plan was mooted to establish joint Arab bureaux to counter Israeli activities in several African countries. (*Gumhuriyah, 30 Apr*)

The Conference of Arab Anti-Israel Boycott Officers in Tripoli in July decided on means to strengthen the economic blockade against Israel and frustrate her "expansion" in Asia and Africa. (*Hayat, 13 July; Ahram, 18 July*)

The Arab League circularized its members in July on the increasing Israeli propaganda in Africa and the counter-measures which were planned. (*Zaman, Baghdad, 30 July*)

The Arab League Secretariat proposed in Sept that Arab countries should send missions to African countries, to discuss measures against "Zionist activity" in Africa and the establishment of economic ties which would put an end to "Zionist activities" in the continent. (*Akhbar, Cairo, 20 Sept*)

[Other bodies, such as the Arab Chambers of Commerce and Agriculture, made similar proposals (see *Ayyam, Damascus, 7 Sept; Hayat, 23 Nov*) (See also p 144).]

**Arab Self-Criticism.** [The Arab Press, but not UAR or UAR-inspired papers, occasionally voiced its disappointment over the incapacity of the Arab countries as compared with Israel's achievements in Africa. The Jordanian Press linked this theme with its criticism of the UAR—see, e.g., pp 150-1.]

A Jordanian paper wrote that Israel's achievements had been made possible only through great efforts, such as those she had made in Ghana, and through the bad conduct of Arab diplomatic missions in Africa. (*Manar*, 29 Jan)

Referring to an Israeli decision to grant 1,000 scholarships to new African countries, *al-Hayāt* wrote that this was only one link in her long chain of activities in the continent. Israel was adding a new link every day; a cultural link was joined to a political link, which in turn was joined to an economic link. "Israel opens before her the gates of Africa by way of the mind and the heart, in addition to money, but we are content to open our mouths." (*Hayat*, 28 Sept)

An article by a Lebanese emigré in Nigeria criticized Arab countries for an unimaginative policy in Africa, compared with the "active and mature Israeli policy." Arab countries had promised Nigeria to send her teachers, but so far not a single one had arrived. On the other hand, Israel had promised to help Nigeria in planning water projects and immediately sent out a group of experts and engineers who began work without delay. (*Sayyad*, Beirut, 13 Oct)

The organ of the Ba'ath party in Lebanon maintained that Israel had succeeded in presenting herself as a civilized country and showing the Arabs in an unfavourable light. Africans in Sierra Leone were saying that the Arabs were a primitive nation incapable of assisting the Africans in their development projects. (*Sahafah*, 19 Aug)

#### GHANA

**Feb: Anti-Israel UAR-Pakistani Communiqué in Accra.** Following the Israeli Foreign Minister's visit to Ghana [see p 310] the UAR and Pakistani Ambassadors in that country published a joint anti-Israel communiqué seeking to disprove a statement by Mrs Meir about Israel's friendship towards Muslim and Afro-Asian countries. Israel, the communiqué maintained, was "an agent of imperialism trying to spread its monstrous net over Africa, under the excuse of economic cooperation." Israel, furthermore, did not respect African countries and voted in the UN against their interests. (*Ahram*, 7 Feb)

**Replacement of Israeli Flight Controllers by Egyptians.** See p 547.

**Aug: Anti-Israel Pressure by Lebanon.** In Aug, during the negotiations in Lebanon for an air agreement with Ghana, the Ghanaian Minister of Transport was told that Ghana's ties with Israel obliged Lebanon to undertake measures within the framework of the Arab boycott.

The Ghanaian Minister was reported to have said that his country understood this problem very well. Ghana had formed "certain ties" with Israel, but Nkrumah was now following a firm policy towards Israel and many institutions which "Jews" had established in Accra and other towns had already been closed. (*Anwar*, Beirut, 27 Aug)

**Sept: Reactions to President Nkrumah's UN Speech.** In his speech at the UN General Assembly on 23 Sept, President Nkrumah asked for the settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict on the basis of "the recognition of political realities." The Arab leaders and delegates speaking after him, referring to his remarks directly or indirectly, disagreed with his approach (see pp 177-8). Following are further developments:

President Nkrumah's opinions on the ME situation were welcomed by the Israel Press as "a constructive development" (*Ha'aretz*, 25 Sept) and as "an important

contribution to the cause of peace in the ME." (*Davar*, 25 Sept)

The Arab delegations protested unofficially against the inclusion in Nkrumah's speech of what they interpreted as an appeal to recognize Israel. (*R. Amman*, 25 Sept-*IMB*, 25 Sept)

Amman Radio criticized Nkrumah for ignoring the rights of the Palestine Arabs. (*R. Amman*, 24 Sept-*IMB*, 25 Sept)

A few days later, speaking at a luncheon of the UN Correspondents' Association, President Nkrumah again emphasized that Israel was firmly established as a political reality, which must be recognized by the Arabs. He called for the establishment of a separate Arab Palestine state, where the Arab refugees would rule themselves. (*Jer. Post*, 2 Oct)

An Arab delegation, consisting of the Lebanese PM, Sa'ib Slām, the UAR Foreign Minister, Fawzi, and Ahmad Shukairy of Saudi Arabia, met Nkrumah on 4 Oct to discuss the Palestine problem. (*R. Cairo*, 5 Oct-*IMB*, 5 Oct)

*Al-Hayāt* reported that after Nkrumah's speech on 23 Sept, a crisis threatened in the relations between Ghana and the Arabs. In private talks with Arab delegates, Nkrumah had appealed for peace with Israel. It was then decided that an Arab delegation should meet him and explain fully all aspects of the Palestine situation (see immediately above). The result of their meeting was reported to have been satisfactory to the Arab side. (*Hayat*, 6 Oct)

#### ETHIOPIA

**Apr: UAR Demand for Exclusion of Israel from Red Cross Bazaar Rejected.** The UAR requested Ethiopia to exclude Israel from participation in an Ethiopian Red Cross bazaar, maintaining that this was a political demonstration on the part of Israel. The Ethiopian authorities rejected the request. (*Davar*, Tel-Aviv, 7 Apr)

**Economic Warfare.** At the Economic Boycott Against Israel Conference, held in Tripoli in Aug, the problem of Israel's relations with Ethiopia was discussed. (*Zaman*, Baghdad, 20 Aug) In Sept the League Council at Shtura decided that Arab representatives in Ethiopia should form a committee to explain to the authorities the purposes of the Arab boycott. (*Hayat*, 8 Sept)

In a series of articles in the Israeli daily *Ha'aretz*, it was reported that the UAR was making use of a large intelligence network in Ethiopia—particularly in Eritrea and border regions—to incite the population against economic cooperation with Israel. Activities were directed especially against Incode, the Ethiopian-Israeli meat-processing firm. The UAR reportedly tried to persuade Arab merchants in Ethiopia not to sell Israeli products, but the latter replied that they could not boycott Israeli goods, as they were offered at prices much lower than other imports. (*Ha'aretz*, 18 Oct-15 Nov)

**Emperor's Projected Visit to Israel Criticized.** The UAR Press criticized the reported intention of the Emperor to include Israel in a tour of countries in which he had spent his exile during the Italian occupation. (*Gumhuriyah*, 24 Nov; *Ruz al-Yusuf*, 21, 28 Nov) [The tour was later cancelled.]

#### REPUBLIC OF SOMALIA

(On 1 July, Somalia, the former Italian trust territory, and Somaliland, the former British protectorate, became independent and formed the Republic of Somalia.)

Before independence, invitations had been sent to all UN members, including Israel, to participate in the independence celebrations. When the invitation became known in Arab countries, they exercised pressure on Somali leaders to cancel it. Arab sources reported that the then Somalia PM, Abdullah Issa, subsequently did so.

The two largest parties in Somaliland stated on 25 June that Somalia would maintain relations with all countries except Israel. (*Ahram*, 11 June; *Ruz al-Yusuf*, 20 June; *Hayat*, 11 June; *Anwar*, Beirut, 25 June; *R. Cairo*, 27 June-*IMB*, 27 June)

**Somali PM on Relations with Israel.** According to the Lebanese PM, the Somali PM told the Lebanese representative at the independence celebrations that the invitation to Israel had been sent "absent-mindedly." Despite its cancellation, Israel had sent a cable recognizing the new state, but the Somali Government was ignoring this cable. [A message from President Ben-Zvi to the Somali Head of State sent on 30 June was not acknowledged by the latter.] The Somali Government would not establish any ties, even commercial, with Israel. Somalia would not follow a policy which might hurt the Arab countries, which she regarded as friendly countries. (*Hayat*, 20 July)

**Israel—Somalia's No. 2 Enemy.** During the visit of the Somali delegation to Iraq (see p 163), its leader, the Finance Minister, stated that Israel was considered by his country as its No. 2 enemy. Somalia's first enemy was Ethiopia which according to the Minister had robbed her of a considerable part of her territory.

He demanded that the Arab countries adopt towards Ethiopia an attitude similar to that of Somalia towards Israel. (*Al-Huriyah*, Baghdad, 1 July; *Falastin*, Jordan, 22 July)

#### LIBERIA

**Aug: Firestone Company Blacklisted.** The Tripoli conference of the Arab Boycott Officers decided to blacklist the Firestone Rubber Company [the largest company in Liberia] because it was reported to have exercised pressure on Liberia to recognize Israel. (*Nahar*, Beirut, 4 Aug)

**Sept: Liberia "Examines" Activities of Shipping Companies.** According to the Arab Press, the Liberian Government informed the Arab League that it was "examining" the activities of Liberian shipping companies co-operating with Israel. (*Ruz al-Yusuf*, 19 Sept; *Hayat*, 25 Sept)

**Cancellation of Tubman's Visit to Israel.** During 1960 it was reported that President Tubman intended to visit Israel. In Oct the leader of a Liberian Parliamentary Mission visiting the UAR stated that Tubman had finally cancelled this plan.

The Arab League subsequently stated in a circular to its members that Tubman had cancelled his visit because he wished to maintain friendly relations with the Arab countries. (*Ruz al-Yusuf*, 17 Oct; *Zaman*, 3 Nov)

**Arab-African Company.** A project for an Arab-African company, proposed by the Liberian Minister in Lebanon, Jamil, included among its objectives the combating of Israel's increasing activities in Liberia (see p 370).

**Nov: Liberian Representative: Israel an Established Fact.** In a speech on refugees at the UN Special Political Com-

mittee, on 24 Nov, the Liberian representative was reported to have said that Israel must be recognized as an established fact. He demanded that Israeli and Arab representatives should meet for a round-table conference, to discuss a solution to the Palestine problem. He proposed the creation of an Afro-Asian Committee to find a solution to the problem. (*Falastin*, 30 Nov) (see also p 213.)

#### MALI

**Lebanese Dissatisfaction at Israeli Representation in Mali.** *Al-Hayāt*, in June, expressed dissatisfaction at the fact that the Israel Ambassador was one of the first seven accredited to the Mali Federation; while Lebanon, which had 30,000 emigrés in that country, was still unrepresented there. (*Hayat*, 28 June)

**Muslim Protest over Israeli Minister's Visit.** After the visit of Levi Eshkol, the Israel Finance Minister, to Dakar in July, it was reported in the Arab Press that a delegation of Muslim dignitaries met the Senegalese authorities and expressed their protest against the visit and against the negotiations which had taken place with a view to strengthening the relations between Senegal and Israel. (*Manar*, Jordan, 12 Aug)

**Israel Ambassador Accused of Participating in Break-up of Federation.** The UAR Press alleged that the Israel Ambassador in Dakar had cooperated with "Western imperialism" in breaking up the Mali Federation. An *Akhir Sa'ah* correspondent who visited Mali wrote that "its leaders, including Modibu Keita, knew that Israel had participated in the plot to split Mali." (*Ruz al-Yusuf*, 12 Sept; *Akhir Sa'ah*, 12 Oct) [For Israel's relations with Mali and the signature of an Israel-Mali technical assistance agreement in Nov, see pp 312-3.]

**Arab League to Establish Anti-Israel Bureau in Dakar.** The Arab League decided to establish an office in Dakar which would act against Israeli penetration into Africa. (*Jihad*, Jordan, 1, 10 Nov)

#### CAMEROUN

When a Cameroun parliamentary mission visited Lebanon in Dec (see p 371), its leader was asked about his country's relations with Israel. He said Cameroun had no relations with Israel, nor had she yet recognized her, but the Cameroun PM had stated that his country maintained an open-door policy for all states. However, Cameroun sought in particular to strengthen its relations with the Arab countries for their mutual benefit. (*Hayat*, 2 Dec)

*Al-Hayāt* commented that Israel was making use of the open door and the Arab countries must not lag behind. (*Hayat*, 3 Dec) [For Cameroun-Israeli relations, see p 309.]

#### MAURITANIA

**Morocco Accuses Mauritania of Collaboration with Israel.** In her campaign to annex Mauritania, Morocco made use of the Israeli factor, accusing Mauritania of collaborating with France and Israel. (Example: *R. Rabat*, 27 Nov-BBC, 29 Nov)

In reaction, Daddah, the Mauritanian PM, recalled at a Press interview in Oct that in a statement which had appeared in *Le Monde* on 18 June he had said that Mauritania would maintain no contacts with Israel. "We shall act in accordance with the general Arab policy until Arab Palestine is won and the Arab nation restores its rights and its honour." (*Hayat*, 22 Oct)



## GUINEA

Expulsion of Israel Ambassador from Conakry Conference. See below.

## THE ISSUE AT AFRO-ASIAN AND AFRICAN CONFERENCES

**General.** In 1960, African Arab countries participated in five (out of seven) political, and two economic, African and Afro-Asian conferences. In one of the political and one of the economic conferences the Israel and Palestine issues were not reported to have been raised. These were the All-African Peoples' Conference (Tunis, 25-30 Jan) and the Preliminary Meeting of the Conference of African Businessmen (Monrovia, 1-4 Aug).

**Apr:** All-African Conference on Positive Action For Peace and Security in Africa, Accra 7-9 Apr. This conference was convened in Accra at the invitation of the President of Ghana to deal with acute African problems (see also p 23). A UAR delegation and a "Palestinian" one took part, the latter to explain the danger of Israel to the Africans. (*Ahram*, 15 Mar; *R. Cairo*, 6 Apr-*IMB*, 7 Apr) Neither Israel nor the Palestine question were mentioned in the resolutions (text in *Monde*, 12 Apr).

**Apr and Nov:** Second Afro-Asian Solidarity Conference, Conakry 11-15 Apr. The Arab states and a "Palestinian" delegation, organized by the UAR and headed by Munir ar-Rayyis of Gaza, took part.

Shlomo Hillel, the Israel Ambassador to Conakry, who had been invited to attend as an observer, together with other members of the Diplomatic Corps in Conakry, was asked by Ismail Toure, the chairman, to leave the conference, and did so. (*NYT*; *Ha'aretz*, Tel Aviv, 17 Apr) Cairo sources reported that it was the "Palestinian" delegation which brought about the Ambassador's eviction (*Gumhuriyah*, 30 Apr), and also that on its initiative a sub-committee of the political committee was formed to deal with the Palestine question. (*BBC*, 14 Apr)

When Liberia objected to a resolution denouncing Israel proposed by this delegation, the UAR delegate, Saadat, retorted sharply. (*Akhbar al-Yawm*, 26 Apr) A resolution denouncing Israel as an imperialistic base and demanding the return of the refugees was reportedly adopted by acclamation (as was the procedure with all resolutions). It was said to have been published after most of the delegations and journalists had already left Conakry. (*Eg. Gaz.*, 18 Apr) It was not mentioned by the *NY Times* and *al-Hayat* of 17 Apr and the *Ghana*

*Times* of 16 Apr, reporting the resolutions of the conference.

The Executive Council of this conference, which met in Beirut in Nov, adopted a resolution denouncing Israel as an imperialist tool. (*Hayat*, 14 Nov)

**Second Afro-Asian Economic Conference, Cairo 30 Apr-3 May.** Abdel-Nasser, opening the conference, devoted part of his speech to a sharp attack on Israel in the usual vein (text in *Ahram*, 1 May). A "Palestinian" delegation took part. No anti-Israeli resolution was adopted (see pp 24-5).

**June:** The Second Conference of Independent African States, Addis Ababa 14-26 June. (For proceedings see p 24.) All African Arab states took part. The delegates of Libya, Morocco and the UAR mentioned Israel in their speeches. The latter, Hussein Dhu-al-Fiqr Sabri, devoted a large part of his address at the opening session to a denunciation of Israel: he warned of the "new and much more dangerous imperialism than the old one—the imperialism of international Zionism." He said that it was because of Israel's aggressive intentions that the UAR had not aided Africa "according to its potentialities"; it had to spend "time, money and thought" to beware of this danger. (*The Second Conference of Independent African States, Addis Ababa, 14-26 June*—no date)

The UAR delegation tried to induce the conference to resolve on the condemnation and the economic boycott of Israel. It was reported to have warned that it would not vote for the resolution against South Africa, and would even withdraw completely from the organization, if an anti-Israel resolution was not passed. The paragraph given below was consequently included in the resolution. (*Hayat*, 25 June; *Lamerhav*, Tel Aviv, 26, 28 June)

The Resolutions on South Africa included a call to the Arab states to endeavour to prevent the supply of oil to that country. On his return to Cairo, Sabri said that the UAR's endeavours in this respect would be much more effective if the African countries adopted a similar attitude towards Israel. (*Ahram*, 1 July)

The paragraph on the Palestine issue, which formed part of the resolutions on the strengthening of world peace and security, stated that the Congress "expresses concern for the non-implementation of the United Nations General Assembly resolutions, the Bandung Declaration and Accra resolutions, pertaining to the solution of the problem of Palestine which is a disturbing factor to world peace and security in the North East of the African Continent." (*The Second Conference of Independent African States, Addis Ababa, 14-26 June*—no date)

## THE ARAB ECONOMIC BOYCOTT AGAINST ISRAEL

(See also: Freedom of Navigation in the Suez Canal, p 39 ff; Arab Anti-Israel Activities in non-Arab Africa, above.)

## BACKGROUND NOTE AND SYNOPSIS

Arab attempts at economic boycott go back to the thirties, when the Arab Higher Committee tried to institute a boycott of the products of the Jewish community in Palestine. After a partial success in 1936/37, the boycott was abandoned during the Second World War. In 1945, however, the Arab League recommended a full boycott

of industrial and agricultural products of Palestinian-Jewish make throughout the Arab world.

After the Palestine war, the Arab boycott machinery was organized with the aim of bringing about the eventual economic collapse of Israel. In 1952, a Central Boycott Office was established in Damascus, with branches in the Arab capitals. In Egypt, Jordan, Iraq, Syria and Lebanon laws were passed prohibiting any commercial, social, or other relations with Israelis. In the international field, foreign firms working in or with Israel and ships trading with Israel were blacklisted, and the ships

were denied service in Arab ports. The Suez Canal was closed to Israeli shipping and later also to Israeli cargoes; so were the Straits of Tiran in the Red Sea for some years prior to the Sinai campaign in 1956. Aircraft of any flag bound to or from Israel were forbidden to fly over Arab territories. Passports bearing an Israeli visa were regarded as non-valid by some Arab states. The boycott was also extended to all fields of international contact, such as diplomatic, cultural, scientific, sport and other organizations, congresses, etc.

**The Boycott Machinery.** Arab boycott activities against Israel are handled by the Head-Office for the Boycott of Israel (*Al-Maktab ar-Ra'isi li-Muqāta'at Israel*) in Damascus, aided by regional offices in the majority of Arab countries. The office is attached to the Arab League Secretariat and reports to the Arab Economic Council. The Arab League Council decides boycott policy, mostly as recommended by the Economic Council, and resolutions are passed for implementation to the Head Office and regional offices. The latter, which are generally attached to the Ministries of Economy, may initiate boycott policies and activities of their own. They require government approval for all their activities.

By the end of 1959, there were regional offices in the UAR, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Libya, Yemen, Sudan and Kuwait. The Boycott Officers who head these offices periodically attend conferences summoned by the Head Office to coordinate activities and recommend future ones. The Boycott Offices are served by their own intelligence services as well as by those of the Arab states and the Arab diplomatic and consular missions.

**Synopsis** (references are given only to events not described in this chapter). 1960 was mostly a year of routine activities. Special attention was paid to the extension of the boycott to the emergent states of Africa (see p 183). Israeli Press sources attributed the withdrawal of Ceylonese diplomatic representation from Israel partly to threats of economic boycott.

There were counteractivities on an international level. In New York the Seafarers' International Union picketed an Egyptian vessel, on the ground that US seamen had lost their jobs as a result of the UAR boycott, and the International Transport Workers' Federation adopted resolutions against it (see p 45). The US Navy was forced by public pressure to formally abolish a clause in its shipping contracts which in effect sanctioned the boycott.

In Apr the US Senate adopted the Douglas amendment to the Foreign Aid bill, giving the President discretionary authority to withhold assistance from nations that obstructed free navigation or waged economic warfare against nations receiving US Aid (p 106).

In Israel, the Foreign Ministry opened a department to deal i.a. with Arab boycott activities.

The boycott became also an inter-Arab issue. The UAR was accused by Lebanon of opportunism in its conduct of the boycott.

## ARAB BOYCOTT ACTIVITIES

**Routine Activities.** The boycott offices sent questionnaires to "more than 1,500" foreign firms requesting them to define their relations with Israel, and to liquidate existing relations within a definite period, on pain of being barred from Arab markets. (*Ahram*, 13 Jan, 21 Oct) The firms were told that the Arab countries were still in a state of war with Israel; they were acting in self-defence and safeguarding the "vital interest of the Arabs of Palestine." (*Ayyam*, Damascus, 11 Nov)

At the end of June, it was reported that 483 commercial vessels had been blacklisted for calling at Israeli ports. (*Beirut al-Masa'*, 24 July).

Some American films were formally banned in Arab countries because of the "Zionist activities" of their key stars. (*Siyasah*, 14 Aug; *Falastin*, 23 July; *Ahram*, 1 Sept; *R. Baghdad*, 10 Nov-*IMB*, 11 Nov) Nevertheless, in the UAR some of these films were shown. (*Jaridah*, 11 Jan, 1961)

**Mar-Dec: Boycott Affairs at The Arab Economic Council (EC).** At its Mar session, the EC was urged by the UAR to "take definite measures" against growing Israel-Turkish economic relations. The matter was referred to the Conference of the Arab Boycott Officers. (*Gumhuriyah*, 13 Mar; *Siyasah*, 18 Mar)

At its Dec session, the EC requested the General Secretariat and the Head Boycott Office to list the main Israeli export products, and to study the possibilities of producing them in the Arab countries so as to enable them to compete with Israel in export markets. The Council also decided to warn foreign oil companies working in the Arab countries and Israel that they must make a choice between the two, and the Head Boycott Office was asked to ascertain the foreign companies from which Israel purchased crude oil, with a view to boycotting them. (*BBC*, 20 Dec)

**Apr-July: New Boycott Offices.** A boycott office was reported to have opened in Qatar in Apr (*Kifah*, *Beirut*, 21 Apr) and in Tunisia in July. (*Hayat*, 26 July) [Until the end of the year there was no confirmation of the establishment of these offices.] In Morocco an office was to open early in 1961. (*R. Beirut*, 27 July-*IMB*, 28 July)

**20 June-9 July: 15th Conference of the Arab Boycott Officers.** The conference convened in Tripoli, Libya, under the chairmanship of Abd al-Karim al-A'idi, the General Commissioner of the Central Boycott Office. Representatives from the UAR, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Sudan, Saudi Arabia, Libya, Yemen, Kuwait, Tunisia and Morocco attended, the latter two for the first time. (*R. Cairo*, 22 June-*IMB*, 23 June; *Hayat*, 21 June; *Ayyam*, 23 June) The agenda and the discussions were kept secret. It was stated in the communiqué published at the end of the conference that the agenda included 75 topics, including precautions against "Israeli conspiracies and the attempts of international Zionists and their hired agents to break the economic blockade." The conference resolved: (1) to resist the development of economic relations between Israel and Afro-Asian countries; (2) to resist the "Zionist-Israel organization established to work against the Arab boycott organization [referring to the new department established in the Israeli Foreign Ministry—see below]; (3) to blacklist 24 foreign companies, remove ten from the blacklist and investigate nine others accused of dealing with Israel; (4) to blacklist certain films starring actors "who work for Israel's interests." (*Mid. Mirror*, 16 July) The resolutions were passed to the Arab League Council for approval. In comments on the conference special stress was laid on the recommendations regarding Israeli activities in Afro-Asian countries. (*Siyasah*, 13 July; *R. Cairo*, 15 July-*IMB*, 15 July; *Falastin*, 12 July)

**Sept: League Council Approves New Boycott Measures.** At its regular session in Sept the Arab League Council approved various measures to tighten the boycott against Israel and to try to bar its way into Asia, Africa and Europe. (*Hayat*, 8 Sept)

**JAN: ISRAELI "ANTI-BOYCOTT OFFICE"**

On 13 Jan, the Israel Foreign Ministry announced the establishment of a Division for Political and Economic Planning in the Ministry. It is to investigate various political factors hindering Israel's economic development and to plan countermeasures to Arab boycott activities. (*Jer. Post*, 14 Jan) (For Arab reaction—see above: Resolutions of Arab Boycott Conference.)

**JAN-FEB: THE US NAVY AND THE BOYCOTT: "HAIFA CLAUSE" ISSUE**

On 22 Jan the *New York Times* reported that for nearly two years the Navy had virtually barred US-flag ships which had previously done business with Israel from bidding for oil cargo shipping contracts. Navy officials confirmed that they had included cancellation clauses—known in shipping circles as the "Haifa clause"—in contracts with US-flag ships to take into account the Arab boycott of Israel. (*NYT*, 22 Jan; for text of "Haifa clause" see *NYT*, 20 Feb)

**Jan: Pressure to Abolish Clause.** On 23 Jan Representative Emanuel Celler said that "the US Government is permitting the Arab boycott against Israel to spread to its own citizens and companies." (*Jer. Post*, 24 Jan)

*Ha'aretz* reported that several Jewish organizations had protested vigorously to President Eisenhower. (*Ha'aretz*, 24 Jan)

The *New York Times* declared editorially: "It is something of a shock to learn that the US Navy is supinely accommodating itself to the Arab boycott of ships trading with Israel... The United States Navy is, in effect, acting as the enforcement agent of the Arab boycott... Démarches concerning the boycott had proved futile. Nevertheless, for the record, it is surely up to the American authorities concerned to make continued efforts to put an end to this senseless embargo. The navy cannot be asked to do the impossible, but it can be asked to take a correct and dignified position." (*NYT*, 24 Jan)

In reply to an official Israel note submitted by the Israel Ambassador to the US, Mr Louis Jones, US Assistant Secretary of State for ME Affairs, was understood to have stated, that a thorough investigation would be carried out. (*Ha'aretz*, 28 Jan)

**Feb: US Navy Formally Annuls Boycott Clause.** On 18 Feb the US Navy announced that it was withdrawing the "Haifa clause." In a statement prepared for the US Congress, the navy took note of the protests, explained the background of the form of the contract and stressed that it did not "assist any boycott in any manner." The statement emphasized that "elimination of the Haifa clause would not change by one iota the posture of the boycott or the status of any vessel offered to the navy... Its elimination would not enable any vessel to get into any port otherwise barred to it." However, the statement concluded, the Navy "can accomplish its mission without using the clause" and thus "the navy will discontinue its use." (*NYT*, 20 Feb)

**BOYCOTT AS ISSUE BETWEEN LEBANON AND UAR**

**June-Dec: Lebanese Complaint: Boycott Detrimental to National Interests.** On 8 June *al-Amal*, the organ of the Phalanges Libanaises, charged that the activities of the regional boycott office in Beirut were detrimental to Le-

banon's commercial interests, while they had only a minor effect on Israel. It accused the head of the office of being too rough with international firms operating in Lebanon. (*Amal*, 8 June)

Later in the year the same paper accused the UAR of violating the boycott regulations by permitting "Zionist films to be shown in Cairo," while "Lebanon is denounced for being too faithful to these regulations." The paper concluded that the boycott policy should be radically revised. "It is damaging the free economy of Lebanon, and we cannot compromise about our supreme national interests." (*Amal*, 25 Nov)

On 17 Nov Sulaymān al-Ali, the Lebanese Minister of National Economy and of Tourism, announced that he would not approve any further recommendations to blacklist foreign firms operating in Lebanon submitted to his Ministry by the regional boycott office. "In the future the national interest of Lebanon should be the guiding factor before any such recommendation becomes a final decision." (*Jaridah*, 19 Nov)

On 24 Nov the Lebanese PM denied any Lebanese "conspiracy" against the boycott and stressed that his country would always follow the policy approved by the Arab League "to strangle Israel economically." (*Anwar*, 25 Nov)

**Dec 1960-Jan 1961: Incident of the S.S. Mars.** On 23 Dec the Norwegian s.s. *Mars* arrived in Beirut harbour, carrying a cargo of seed potatoes to Lebanon. The Beirut boycott office prohibited the unloading of the cargo because the vessel had been blacklisted since 1956. However, the unloading of the cargo was permitted in Alexandria. [This incident brought Lebanese economic grievances to the fore.]

On 29 Dec Pierre Jumayil, the Lebanese Minister of Finance, denounced "this farce of the boycott," which was damaging Lebanon's economy rather than that of Israel. (*Amal*, 30 Dec; *Orient*, 7 Jan 1961)

*Al-Jaridah* accused the UAR of dominating the activities of the boycott offices, and guiding them in a way that did great harm to the Arab, and especially to the Lebanese, economy. Upon the UAR's orders, foreign companies, shipping agencies and commercial vessels were being blacklisted without investigation of the ultimate damage to the Arab countries concerned. On various occasions the Central Boycott Office in Damascus had removed foreign firms from the blacklist, though they still maintained their relations with Israel, because the UAR had bargained with them for special benefits. It was an open secret that various foreign firms, after being removed from the blacklist, "decided to open branches in the UAR, or to supply her with spare parts at reduced prices." (*Jaridah*, 11 Jan 1961)

*Al-Amal* complained of the "dangerous" divergences between the attitudes of various Arab countries to the boycott. Thus if a blacklisted vessel carried vital cargoes to Lebanon, that country was called a "traitor," but when the same vessel called at Alexandria it was received with affection and gratitude. If a Lebanese representative sat down unintentionally beside an Israeli at an international forum, Lebanon was called a "defector," and because by mere chance Miss Lebanon appeared in the same picture as Miss Israel, Lebanon became a "sinner." On the other hand, when UAR representatives attended a conference together with Israelis that was "heroism." The paper concluded: "It is time that the Arab states should reconsider their boycott policy and the behaviour of the various Arab countries." (*Amal*, 5 Jan 1961)



## ARAB-ISRAEL BORDER RELATIONS

(NOTE on Sources: Sources on border relations between the Arab countries and Israel are rather fragmentary. Incidents are quite often reported by one side only. When both sides report an incident they generally contradict each other. UNTSO (see below) does not usually publish its records, and its observations, in so far as they are available, are also fragmentary. An attempt has been made to present all versions available on the more serious incidents. There are more quotations from Israeli than from Arab sources because, according to published sources, infiltration is more frequent from the Arab countries into Israel than vice versa.)

## BACKGROUND NOTE AND SYNOPSIS

All Israel's land borders are with Arab states; Lebanon in the north, the UAR-Syrian Region in the north-east, Jordan in the east and the UAR-Egyptian Region in the south-west. Under the General Armistice Agreements negotiated between Israel and her Arab neighbours at the conclusion of the Arab-Israel war, Armistice Demarcation Lines were designated, some of which coincide with the frontiers of Mandated Palestine and some do not.

According to these agreements, demilitarized zones (DZ) were fixed on various locations along the Egyptian, Jordanian and Syrian borders, and also defensive areas in which the parties to the agreement are permitted to maintain limited military forces. (For detailed background on the DZ along the Israeli-Syrian border, see below, p 198.)

The supervision of the armistices was entrusted to Mixed Armistice Commissions (MACs), which are assisted in their operations by the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO). UNTSO is headed by a Chief of Staff (at present General von Horn of Sweden) responsible to the Security Council. Complaints about violations of the Armistice Agreements are dealt with by the respective MACs, which are chaired by the UNTSO Chief of Staff or his representatives. In the absence of unanimity, decisions are taken by majority vote of the members present and voting.

UNTSO maintains an observer corps of officers from various countries who man observation posts in sensitive areas, investigate complaints, etc.

The UN Emergency Force is stationed on UAR territory along the Israel-Egyptian borders and the Straits of Tiran, and in the Gaza strip. It was formed following the Sinai campaign.

Following the Sinai campaign in 1956, and in view of developments arising out of that crisis, Israel has taken the position that its Armistice Agreement with Egypt could not be considered valid, having been fundamentally undermined by Egypt's insistence on her right to maintain a policy of active belligerency in violation of an express ruling of the Security Council to the effect that no party to the Armistice Agreement can claim such rights. Accordingly, Israel takes the position that the Egypt-Israel Mixed Armistice Commission has no legal basis for its continued operation. This position is not accepted by the UAR and by UNTSO, who continue to hold meetings regarded by them as legitimate MAC meetings.

However, the formation of the UAR in 1958 has not changed the original separate status of Egypt and Syria in respect to the agreements, and the Israel-Syrian MAC operates with the participation of both parties.

The borders are in principle closed to all movements but that of UN personnel; the one exception is the Israeli-Jordanian border where a comparatively free traffic of foreigners is permitted through the frontier post in Jerusalem.

Border violations and incidents consist mainly of the following: inadvertent crossings (from both sides); crossings to seek asylum (from both sides); non-political criminal acts, such as kidnapping, theft, robbery, sometimes accompanied by murder, and "economic" infiltration, such as grazing, fishing in the other side's territorial waters (almost exclusively from the Arab side); infiltration of armed intelligence squads (in 1960 from the UAR only); mining of roads and fields (in 1960 from the UAR only); violations of airspace, inadvertently or for intelligence purposes, sometimes resulting in aerial fights (from both sides); and armed clashes, which may be the result of misunderstandings, interception of infiltrators, initiative of soldiers or local commanders on the spot or the policy and initiative of the central authorities. Disputes over rights in the DZs constitute a major cause of clashes of the latter type.

In 1960 the Israeli-Syrian border was the most unruly; mainly because of a dispute over rights in the southern DZ, in which both sides showed themselves obdurate, and also because of Syrian border policy, exemplified by official statements and belligerent warnings to Israel. The dispute in the southern DZ culminated in Jan in the Tawafiq raid by Israeli forces (see special synopsis p 197), which in turn was followed in Feb by a warlike, but essentially defensive build-up of UAR military forces. Incidents also spread northwards, to the borders of the Huleh valley. Relative quiet followed for a time, but in June and July armed clashes recurred in the southern DZ and at the Bnot Ya'akov Bridge, south of Huleh. These were accompanied by Syrian declarations warning Israel of severe punishment for the slightest aggressive act, as they had been "punished" and "defeated" at Tawafiq. Israel warned of the consequences of this Syrian policy. Sporadic incidents, mostly fire from Syrian positions, continued until the end of the year.

The Israeli-Egyptian border, on the other hand, was comparatively quiet. There was "routine" infiltration for criminal purposes. The main causes of armed incidents were the activities of armed Egyptian intelligence squads in Israel and aerial reconnaissance—apparently by both sides.

There were no serious armed clashes between the respective forces on Israel's border with Jordan and Lebanon. "Routine" crossings of the borders took place, the great majority into Israel, some with "economic" aims, some for other criminal purposes, and some inadvertent. Legal traffic across the Israeli-Jordanian border was normal. Lebanon, on the other hand, changed her policy by refusing to permit the traditional periodical reunions of Arab families on the border. In both cases the MACs operated regularly.

Casualties on both sides cannot be authoritatively ascertained. In the incidents described below (including the Tawafiq raid), Israeli casualties were at least 11 dead and 14 wounded, the majority on the Syrian border. UAR casualties numbered at least five dead and four wounded (including those in the Tawafiq raid) on the Syrian border, and at least 11 dead, mostly intelligence agents, on the Egyptian border. There was no report of fatalities suffered by Jordan or Lebanon.



## THE ISRAELI-SYRIAN BORDER

[Incidents in the southern DZ started in Dec 1959, and armed clashes occurred daily from 26 Jan. The village of Tawafiq was raided by Israel Defence Forces (IDF) units on 1 Feb and clashes continued until 6 Feb. Later in the month war-like tension ensued between Israel and the UAR. (On these see p 197 ff.) The incidents in the northern DZ in Feb described below were regarded at the time as a consequence of the tension.]

**Jan-June: Various Incidents.** During the sowing season, the kibbutz (collective village) of Dan in the Huleh Valley also cultivated its land in the northern DZ. In the course of this work, Israeli tractors struck mines in the area nine times. (*Ha'aretz*, 14 Jan)

An Israeli patrol was fired on north-east of Kfar Szold. (*Ha'aretz*, 14 Jan)

On 26 Jan an Israeli soldier was slightly wounded when a squad of Syrian troops penetrated about 150 metres into Israel territory and fired at a patrol, north-east of Kfar Szold. The Israel patrol did not return fire. The Syrians kept up automatic fire for 15 minutes and withdrew when UN observers arrived. Israel immediately lodged a complaint with the Israeli-Syrian MAC. (*Jer. Post*, 27 Jan)

Israeli sources reported that a member of an Israeli patrol moving in Israel territory was wounded by Syrian fire from Tel Azizat in the Huleh Valley, which continued during attempts by an armoured car to extricate the soldiers. A cease-fire was arranged by UN observers. (*Jer. Post*, 5 Feb) Syrian sources said that an Israeli armoured car had penetrated the DZ and opened fire on the Arab border position, and another armoured car appeared later. One of them was hit by Syrian fire. (*R. Cairo*, 4 Feb-*IMB*, 5 Feb)

On 12 Feb two members of an Israeli patrol were killed by Syrian machine-gun fire in the Tel Hilal sector, north of Ashmura (formerly known as Dardara). It was on its way to check a fire in the eastern Huleh Valley, and was in Israel territory when attacked. (*Jer. Post*, 13 Feb) The Israel Chief of Staff, General Laskov, reported to a Cabinet meeting that Syrians were building fortifications on the border. (*Jer. Post*, 15 Feb) The Syrian Army spokesman said that the incident started when Israeli forces opened fire on Arab cultivators in the DZ. (*R. Damascus*, 12 Feb-*IMB*, 14 Feb)

In Mar Israel and Syria cooperated for the first time since the Armistice Agreement was signed in destroying swarms of locusts near the border. After Syrian agreement, Israeli planes sprayed the border areas without interference from 17 to 25 Mar. (*Ha'aretz*, 3 Apr)

The Israeli Press reported that Syrians had penetrated into Israel territory in the Tel Katzir area several times in a few days, some of them crossing the drainage ditch and reaping summer crops. (*Ha'aretz*; *Jer. Post*, 23 May)

On 28 May Syrian forces fired at Israeli agricultural officials locating swarms of locusts near the Bnot Ya'akov bridge. (*Ha'aretz*, 29 May)

In June the waters of the Dufilla spring on the Syrian side of the border, which flow into Israel and are used by the Shamir kibbutz, were diverted into Syria, as the Syrians do every year at this season. UNTSO dealt with the situation. (*Ha'aretz*, 9 June)

**June-July: Flare-up in Southern DZ and Bnot Ya'akov Bridge Sector.** [The relative quiet which had prevailed in the southern DZ area since mid-Feb was broken in mid-June.] On 11 June an Israeli jeep was damaged by a mine near the Bnot Ya'akov bridge. (*Ha'aretz*, 12 June)

On 12 June fire was opened from Syrian positions in

Upper Tawafiq at a tractor ploughing a field in the Tel Katzir area, and later in the day at a UN and an Israeli officer investigating the incident. (*Ha'aretz*, 13 June) A Syrian Army spokesman said that Israel was contemplating aggressive action in the DZ and warned that she would be repelled by force. (*R. Damascus*, 13 June-BBC, 14 June)

On 14 June fire was opened on an Israeli patrol near the Bnot Ya'akov bridge. (*Ha'aretz*, 15 June)

On 15 June Syrian positions in Upper Tawafiq fired at a tractor ploughing a field near Tel Katzir. (*Ha'aretz*, 16 June)

On 27 June Cairo Radio in Hebrew quoted from *al-Akhhbār* a statement by the First (Syrian) Army spokesman to the effect that the slightest provocation on the borders by "Israeli gangs" would be repelled by the victorious UAR Armies in the most severe fashion. Should Israeli artillery fire one single shell, "we shall transform the Israeli border area into a living hell; our reaction will follow the aggression in a minute; we shall not wait for the establishment of contact or for negotiations." Another warning in the same vein was broadcast by Cairo Radio on 29 June, again quoting the Cairo Press. [These warnings were not broadcast in Arabic.] (*IMB*, 27, 29 June)

On 28 June an Israel border police officer was killed on a routine border patrol south-east of Tel Katzir in the DZ by heavy Syrian fire from Upper Tawafiq positions. Several UN attempts to secure a cease-fire and to evacuate the wounded man were turned down by the Syrians. He died on his way to a hospital. (*Ha'aretz*, 29 June)

An Israel note to the Security Council (not asking for specific action) asserted that the border situation had deteriorated. It listed previous incidents (including Syrian fishing in the Sea of Galilee under military cover), quoted UAR threats (see above), and asserted that Syrian forces on the border had orders to fire first and then to wait for further instructions. Diplomatic circles termed the note a "warning" to the UAR. (*Ha'aretz*; *Davar*; *Jer. Post*, 3 July)

On 3 July Syrians opened fire at an armoured car engaged in a routine patrol in the area where the border police officer was killed a week previously. (*Ha'aretz*, 4 July)




Dr Biran, Director of Armistice Affairs at the Israel Foreign Ministry, met General von Horn, Chief of UNTSO, and told him, according to Israel Press reports, that the latest spate of incidents could be understood only in the light of recent UAR threats. Syrian troop concentrations on the border were a danger to peace. (*Ha'aretz*; *Davar*, 6 July)

The UAR sent a note to the UN Security Council rebutting Israeli allegations of renewed UAR military activity along the Syrian border. The note accused Israel of 259 aggressive acts along the border since the beginning of 1960. (*R. Cairo*, 6 July-*IMB*, 6 July)



General von Horn held talks with General Faisal, Commander of the UAR First Army in Damascus. (*R. Amman*, 8 July-*IMB*, 9 July)

On 11 July an Israeli tractor-driver from Tel Katzir was injured when Syrian positions in Upper Tawafiq opened fire on him. (*Ha'aretz*, 12 July)

On 22 July, two Syrian soldiers were killed, according to the IDF spokesman, when a Syrian platoon penetrated into Israel territory south of Kfar Szold. The Syrians brought up heavy reinforcements, and their fire continued for six hours, being directed also at Kfar Szold. (*Ha'aretz*, 24 July) Reporting on this incident, Damascus Radio said: "Heavy casualties were inflicted on an Israeli patrol on 22 July. The Israelis thought we were pre-



# ARAB-ISRAEL BORDER RELATIONS





occupied with preparations for the eighth anniversary of the revolution." (*R. Damascus*, 22 July-IMB, 24 July)

On 27 July the First Army spokesman said that an Israeli patrol had tried to infiltrate Syrian lines and had been ambushed, suffering heavy casualties. The First Army had demonstrated absolute supremacy. (*R. Damascus*, 27 July-IMB, 28 July) The Israel Army spokesman said on 27 July that on the previous night Syrian forces had been observed firing heavily at targets inside their own territory. No Israeli unit was involved. (*Ha'aretz*, 28 July)

**Aug-Oct: Various Incidents.** In Aug Syrians were reported to have stepped up fishing in the north-eastern part of the Sea of Galilee, employing about 20 boats. (*Ha'aretz*, 15 Aug) [The whole of the Sea of Galilee is in Israel territory including a demilitarized strip of the eastern shore, 10 metres wide.]

On 4 Aug Syrians opened fire at the Shamir Kibbutz in the Huleh Valley. (*Ha'aretz*, 5 Aug)

On 9 Aug Syrians opened fire at a patrol east of Tel Katzir. (*Ha'aretz*, 10 Aug)

On 22 Aug Syrian fire was trained on Mishmar Hayarden. (*Ha'aretz*, 23 Aug)

On 23 Aug Syrian shots were fired at Gadot, near Mishmar Hayarden. (*Ha'aretz*, 24 Aug)

On 6 Sept Syrian fire was aimed at workmen 100 metres from the border near Shamir. (*Ha'aretz*, 7 Sept)

On 7 Sept Syrian positions in Upper Tawafiq fired at a patrol on a routine checkup east of Tel Katzir. (*Ha'aretz*, 8 Sept)

On 19 Sept Syrian fire was opened on Israeli workmen near Tel Katzir. (*Ha'aretz*, 20 Sept)

On 18 Oct Syrians opened fire on an Israeli patrol south of Tel Katzir. (*Ha'aretz*, 19 Oct)

On 25 Oct three Syrian positions east of Tel Katzir opened fire on officials of the Geophysical Institute, 1 km. south-east of Tel Katzir. (*Ha'aretz*, 26 Oct)

**Nov: General Faisal: UAR Army has Regained Large Part of Southern DZ.** On 2 Nov, in a speech on the UAR Air Force Day, General Faisal, C-in-C of the First (Syrian) UAR Army, said that the whole world had praised the UAR Army for its heroic deeds in the battle of Tawafiq. Lower Tawafiq (in the southern DZ) was now a model village. The UAR Army was defending the village and the UAR flag was flying over it. "I would like to reveal a secret: the First UAR Army has regained a major part of the southern demilitarized zone, which others abandoned previously." (*R. Sawt al-Arab*, 3 Nov-IMB, 4 Nov) (See: The Tawafiq Incident, p 197 ff.)

**Nov-Dec: Various Incidents.** On 26 Nov Syrians opened fire on the Ma'agan kibbutz in the southern DZ from positions in Upper Tawafiq. (*Ha'aretz*, 27 Nov)

On 29 Nov Syrian soldiers in Nuqib village opened fire on Israeli fishermen on the Sea of Galilee, 50 metres from the eastern shore damaging their boat. (*Ha'aretz*, 30 Nov)

In Dec it was definitely ascertained that Syrians were digging a 1.5 km. anti-tank trench in the ten-metre strip between the eastern shore of the Sea of Galilee and the international border. (*Ha'aretz*, 7 Dec) Israel demands that work cease forthwith were not complied with. (*Ha'aretz*, 8 Dec) Further Israeli demands to the same effect were ignored. (*Ha'aretz*, 16 Dec)

On 7 Dec two rounds of automatic fire were fired from Lower Tawafiq at two tractor-drivers near Tel Katzir. (*Ha'aretz*, 8 Dec)

On 11 Dec a tractor struck a mine north of the Dan kibbutz in the DZ. Evidence showed that it had recently been planted. (*Ha'aretz*, 12 Dec) [A similar incident had occurred a year before in the previous sowing season—see above.]

On 20 Dec a Syrian infiltrator armed with a sub-machinegun and handgrenades was killed inside Israeli territory in an encounter between Israeli border police and a group of infiltrators. (*Jer. Post*, 20 Dec)

On 21 Dec a border police vehicle on a routine patrol struck a mine south of the Bnot Ya'akov bridge. One policeman was slightly wounded. (*Ha'aretz*, 22 Dec)

On 24 Dec Syrians opened fire on a group of picnickers near Dan. There were no injured. (*Ha'aretz*, 25 Dec)

### THE ISRAELI-EGYPTIAN BORDER

[For Egyptian military build-up in Sinai in Feb, see pp 203-4.]

**Jan: Egyptian Complaint.** Egypt complained to the MAC that Israeli fighter planes had violated its airspace over the Gaza strip on 10 Jan. (*R. Amman*, 11 Jan-IMB, 12 Jan)

**Mar: Egyptian Intelligence Squads Intercepted** [BACKGROUND NOTE: Armed Egyptian intelligence squads have been infiltrating into Israel since the 1948 war to reconnoitre, especially to register traffic. They are recruited from the settled population and the refugees of the Gaza strip and the Sinai Bedouins, mostly from criminal elements. In many instances they committed criminal acts, apart from their intelligence mission. In 1955-1956 the numbers were increased. They were sent by the Egyptian command into Israel on missions of murder and sabotage (see p 327) and became officially known as "Fida'iyyūn." The destruction of their bases of operation was one of the declared aims of the Sinai campaign. After the campaign they were reorganized and again employed on intelligence missions in Israel, under the command of the Chief Intelligence Officer in Gaza. These squads usually move by night and hide by day. Their interception generally takes the form of an exchange of fire.]

On 2 Mar a squad of three Fida'iyyūn was intercepted by an Israeli patrol in the Halutza dunes. One was killed, one captured and the third escaped. They were armed with Karl Gustav submachineguns [the Fida'iyyūn's standard weapon] and had been sent by Egyptian military intelligence to register traffic in Israel. The captured man said that there were marauder squads in "every" police station in the Gaza strip. (*Jer. Post*, 4 Mar)

On 5 Mar another Egyptian intelligence squad was intercepted in the western Negev, seven kms. inside Israeli territory. An armed clash ensued, three of the squad being killed and one wounded. There were no Israeli casualties. (*Jer. Post*, 6 Mar)

**Apr-May: Incidents on Gaza Strip Border.** On 26 Apr an Ashkelon resident was murdered by infiltrators from the Gaza strip. (*Ha'aretz*, 27 Apr)

In May Cairo reported that an Israel policeman had been wounded while trying to recover a herd of cattle which had crossed 30 metres into the Gaza strip. (*R. Cairo*, 19 May-IMB, 19 May)

At the end of May one of two armed marauders from the Gaza strip, stealing irrigation pipes in the western Negev, was killed. (*Jer. Post*, 31 May)

**May: Spate of Aerial Incidents.** An Egyptian spokesman said that four Israeli jet fighters had penetrated



into the airspace of the Gaza strip and Sinai peninsula on 5 May and that one plane had been hit. (*R. Beirut*, 6 May-*IMB*, 6 May) The Israel Army spokesman denied the whole story. (*Ha'aretz*, 8 May)

On 19 May Israeli jet fighters intercepted a UN plane one mile inside Israel territory, and after identification escorted it back to the border. Subsequently it became known that the plane carried Mr. Jawaharlal Nehru, the Indian PM then on a visit to the UAR. (*Ha'aretz*, 20 May) On 1 Aug Nehru, speaking in the Indian parliament, intimated that Israel had prior knowledge of his intended visit to the Gaza strip. (*Ha'aretz*, 2 Aug) This was officially denied by the Israel Foreign Ministry spokesman. (*Ha'aretz*, 2 Aug) Mr. Nehru said that Israel's action was unwarranted, but that the UN SG had expressed regret at the incident, and that he (Mr. Nehru) considered it closed. (*Ha'aretz*, 2, 11 Aug)

On 26 May, according to Israeli sources, an Egyptian Mig 17 jet fighter was hit by Israeli planes and was seen falling into Egyptian territory with smoke billowing from its rear and parts of it falling away. It was one of four Migs which had violated Israel airspace and were intercepted by two Israeli jet fighter planes. (*Ha'aretz*, 27 May) UAR sources claimed that an Israeli plane had been hit over UAR territory and that the "dog-fight" had taken place between two planes against two (*R. Cairo*, 26 May-*IMB*, 27 May) The Israel Press carried an aerial photograph of the damaged Egyptian plane in the air. (*Ha'aretz*; *Davar*; *Jer. Post*, 28 May) On 26 May Egypt demanded a MAC enquiry, which resulted in Israel being condemned in *absentia*. (*R. Cairo*, 27 May-*IMB* 27 May; *R. Cairo*, 30 May-*IMB*, 31 May) Foreign military attachés in Israel, quoted by the Israel Press, expressed the opinion that Israel had once again demonstrated air superiority, especially in so far as the quality of her pilots was concerned. (*Ha'aretz*; *Davar*, 29 May)

**Aug-Sept: Egyptian Intelligence Missions Intercepted.** On 19 Aug two infiltrators, believed to have been students sent to spy in Israel, were killed in the Yad Mordechai area. (*Jer. Post*, 22 Aug)

On 20 Sept a UAR intelligence agent and his two-man armed escort were killed by an IDF patrol in the Yad Mordechai area. The guards carried Karl Gustav machineguns, and the agent a revolver, an Israeli identity card, Israeli currency, etc. (*Ha'aretz*, 25 Sept)

**Sept-Oct: Aerial Incidents.** The UAR reported that four Israeli Mystère jet fighters had violated the air space of Gaza and Khan Yunis on 8 Sept. (*BBC in Arabic*, 8 Sept-*IMB*, 8 Sept) This was denied by an Israel Army spokesman. (*Ha'aretz*, 9 Sept)

On 19 Oct one of two Egyptian Mig 17 jet fighter planes which penetrated into Israel airspace was reported by Israel sources to have been damaged in a dog-fight over Israel territory. (*Ha'aretz*, 20 Oct) A UAR spokesman said that on this date four Israeli jet fighters had crossed into Sinai airspace and that one had been shot down. (*R. Cairo*, 19 Oct-*IMB*, 20 Oct) This was denied by the Israel Army spokesman. (*Ha'aretz*, 20, 21 Oct)

**Oct-Dec: Further Incidents.** On 18 Oct an infiltrator was killed by an Israeli patrol in the Yad Mordechai area after refusing an order to halt. (*R. Israel*, 19 Oct-*BBC/W*, 27 Oct)

On 26 Oct UAR security authorities detained two Israeli fighting vessels, with eight seamen on board, near Gaza. (*Ahram*, 27 30 Oct; *R. Cairo*, 26 Oct-*IMB*, 26 Oct)

On 19 Dec fire was opened on an Israeli patrol in the Nitzana area. [This area, also known as Auja-al-Hafir, was demilitarized according to the Israel-Egyptian Armistice Agreement which is no longer considered valid by Israel.] The Israel Army spokesman said that three members of the patrol were slightly injured. A complaint was lodged with the UN Emergency Force. (*Ha'aretz*, 20 Dec)

#### ISRAELI-JORDANIAN BORDER RELATIONS

**The Mount Scopus Demilitarized Zone.** Background Note: The Mount Scopus-Isawiyah DZ, north-east of Jerusalem, consists of Israeli and Jordanian territory and is surrounded completely by Jordanian territory. Communications between Israel and the zone, in which the original buildings of the Hebrew University are located, are kept up by a bi-weekly convoy. Israel, however, demands that Jordan comply with the Armistice Agreement, which provides for the resumption of normal activity on Mount Scopus, including work at the Hebrew University. Israel contends that the Israeli part of the zone is sovereign Israel territory, and that except for restrictions imposed upon it by the Armistice Agreement Israel is free to act as it deems fit.

According to the truce map of 8 July 1948, Isawiya village is in the Israel sector of Mount Scopus. However UNTSO regards the village as a special district not belonging to the Israel sector. This and the fact that Isawiyah is physically contiguous with Jordan has led to frequent friction in the area.

The bi-weekly Israeli convoys to Mount Scopus were maintained regularly throughout the year.

In Jan General von Horn, Chief of UNTSO, met the Jordanian Foreign Minister, Mūsa Nāsir, and discussed Israeli activity on Mount Scopus. (*Difa'*, 11 Jan)

In July General von Horn had talks with Jordanian officials on Jordan's complaints that Israel was hampering free movement between the Old City of Jerusalem and Isawiyah village as well as complaints against Israeli flights over Jordanian territory. (*Ha'aretz*, 10 July) Beirut Radio reported on 2 Sept that Jordan had protested against Israel's blocking the way from Jerusalem to Isawiyah. (*IMB*, 3 Sept) (See above.)

**Jan: Various Complaints.** An Eilat inhabitant complained that shots had been fired at him from across the Jordanian-Israeli border on 6 Jan. (*Ha'aretz*, 7 Jan)

In Jan Jordan complained that two Israeli Mystère fighters had penetrated into Jordanian airspace in the Jarash area. (*Difa'*, 5 Jan) This was denied by Israel. (*Ha'aretz*, 6 Jan)

**Jan: Jordanian Aircraft Enter Israeli Airspace with Israeli Consent.** On 27 Jan Jordanian jet fighter planes circled low over Jerusalem, violating Israeli airspace, in an air display in honour of King Muhammad V of Morocco, who was on a state visit to the Old City of Jerusalem. Israel circles stated that Israel had known in advance about the intended flypast and that the planes would have to enter Israeli airspace. This was, of course, a violation of the Israel-Jordan Armistice Agreement, but in view of the nature of the display Israel tacitly consented, just as Jordan had not objected to Israel bringing heavy military equipment to Jerusalem for Independence Day parades. (*Ha'aretz*, 28 Jan)

**Feb-Dec: Various Incidents.** [All kidnappings by Jordanians in Israel were of Israeli Arabs; the motives were probably of a private nature.]

On 6 Feb 20 sheep disappeared from Kfar Shmuel in the South. (*Ha'aretz*, 7 Feb)

On 13 Feb Jordanians stole a herd of cattle belonging to Amatzia village. Security circles quoted in the daily Press intimated that Israel regarded this incident, the fourth of its kind during the past few weeks, as serious. (*Ha'aretz*, 15 Feb)

On 24 Feb an Israeli hiker was killed and another injured by Jordanians north of Ein Gedi. Both were armed. No complaint was lodged with the MAC. (*Ha'aretz*, 25 Feb) According to a Jordanian source an Israeli patrol had crossed the border near Ein Gedi and opened fire on a Jordanian patrol. Fire was returned and the Israelis were forced to retreat. (*R. Amman*, 26 Feb-*BBC/W*, 10 Mar)

On 27 Feb an Israeli patrol inadvertently crossed the border north of Ein Gedi. (*Ha'aretz*, 28 Feb)

On 8 Mar an Israeli Bedouin Arab was kidnapped near the Hebron road in the Judean hills. (*Ha'aretz*, 9 Mar)

On 21 Mar a Jordanian plane, carrying 19 passengers, violated Israeli airspace near Eilat. Jordan claimed that Israeli planes had attacked it, while Israeli sources stated that they had met it and directed it to return to Jordan. (*R. Beirut*, 22 Mar-*IMB*, 23 Mar; *Difa'*, 22 Mar; *Ha'aretz*, 23 Mar) A Jordanian resolution condemning Israel failed to secure a majority at a MAC meeting because the chairman abstained. (*Ha'aretz*, 1 Apr)

On 3 Apr a Jordanian soldier unsuccessfully tried to kidnap an Israeli woman from Barta'ah village. (*Ha'aretz*, 4 Apr)

On 13 Apr, the MAC at an official meeting discussed Israeli complaints that Israel citizens arrested by Jordanian forces had been tortured. Jordanian representatives undertook to investigate and see to it that such incidents should not recur. (*Ha'aretz*, 14 Apr)

On 27 Apr an Israeli Arab from Umm-al-Fahm was kidnapped by Jordanian soldiers. (*Ha'aretz*, 28 Apr)

On 9 June Jordanian patrol boats were chased out of Israel territorial waters in Eilat. (*Ha'aretz*, 10 June)

In June Jordan complained that Israel was carrying out flights over her territory to spy on Jordanian fortifications. (*R. Beirut*, 11 June-*IMB*, 12 June)

On 21 June an American tourist aged 63 was killed by Jordanian guards when he inadvertently crossed the border near Tulkarm. (*Ha'aretz*, 22 June)

On 20 Sept a mother and her young son were arrested by Jordanian soldiers after inadvertently crossing the border from Israel. They were subsequently released. (*Ha'aretz*, 21 Sept)

On 5 Oct Amman Radio reported that an Israeli patrol had crossed the border the same day and retired after being fired on by Jordanian soldiers. One Jordanian soldier was slightly wounded. (*R. Amman*, 5 Oct-*IMB*, 7 Oct) The Israel Army spokesman denied the report and reported that an Israel Army patrol had been fired on in Israel territory near Magal in the "Triangle" south of Tulkarm. A man of the patrol was slightly wounded. (*Ha'aretz*, 7 Sept)

On 12 Oct, a lunatic, who had left a hospital in Israel, was killed by a patrol in Jordan, according to Jordanian statement—after ignoring an order to halt. (*BBC/W*, 20 Oct)

On 19 Oct a Jordanian taxi driver drove his taxi through the Mandelbaum Gate (see below) into Israel, and continued full speed ahead. He said that this was an act of despair and that he wanted to stay in Israel. He was returned to Jordan. (*Ha'aretz*, 20 Oct)

On 19 Oct an exchange of fire between Israeli and

Jordanian forces took place near Tulkarm. (*Ha'aretz*, 20 Oct)

On 28 Nov Jordan complained to the MAC that Israel fighter planes had violated her airspace on 28 Nov. (*R. Beirut*, 29 Nov-*IMB*, 30 Nov)

On 3 Dec Jordanian soldiers stoned and injured a woman who was having her photograph taken on a Jerusalem rooftop near the border. (*Ha'aretz*, 4 Dec)

On 6 Dec about a hundred camels which had "infiltrated" into Israel during the previous few weeks were returned to their owners through the MAC. The Arab shepherds, while staying on the Jordanian side of the border, had sent the camels across to graze. (*Ha'aretz*, 7 Dec)

In Dec it was reported that border stones had been shifted 100 metres westwards into Israel, north of Ein-Sahla, near Umm-al-Fahm. (*Ha'aretz*, 23 Dec)

**Legal Border Crossings.** [The "Mandelbaum Gate" is the point where legal border crossings are made between Israel and Jordan. Most crossings are made by the diplomatic and consular corps, and by Christians of foreign nationalities resident in Israel and Jordan. Jordan permits foreign tourists to cross into Israel, but not to return to Jordan, provided that they do not have an Israeli visa in their passports. Israel places no such restrictions on tourist crossings. Israeli Christians, Arabs and others, are allowed to cross into Jordan for Christmas only.]

On Easter pilgrims crossed the border both ways. More than 1,000 tourists and foreign residents of all Christian denominations crossed into Jordan for a stay of three to five days. (*Jer. Post*, 15 Apr)

2,500 Christians, 1,500 of them from Nazareth (the great majority being Israeli Arabs) crossed the border into Jordan for a two-night stay to celebrate Christmas at the holy places there. (Another 1,500 to 2,000 crossed the border a fortnight later to celebrate Christmas according to the Gregorian-calendar.) Many more who had applied were rejected by the Jordanian authorities "on security grounds." The crossings, as always, were arranged jointly by the Israeli and Jordanian authorities. [This traditional Christmas crossing provides an opportunity for family reunions.] (*Jer. Post*, 19, 23, 25, 26 Dec)

#### ISRAELI-LEBANESE BORDER RELATIONS

**Feb-Nov: Various Incidents.** On 11 Apr four members of the Yiftah kibbutz were kidnapped by Lebanese forces in Israel territory. (*Ha'aretz*, 14 Apr) They were returned on 19 Apr.

On 19 Apr three Lebanese fishing boats, with 14 fishermen aboard, were caught in Israeli territorial waters. (*Ha'aretz*, 20 Apr) The fishermen were subsequently released. (*Ha'aretz*, 8 May)

On 22 May Lebanese fishing boats were chased away from Israeli territorial waters. (*Ha'aretz*, 23 May)

On 10 Aug several Lebanese youths were caught by Israeli policemen stealing fruit from the groves of the Malkiyah kibbutz and arrested. (*Ha'aretz*, 11 Aug)

On 11 Aug a Lebanese policeman who had gone hunting was arrested in Israeli territory. He was subsequently returned. (*Ha'aretz*, 13, 19 Aug)

On 17 Sept a Lebanese civilian passenger airplane penetrated into Israeli airspace in the North. It was intercepted by Israeli jet fighters and escorted back to the border. (*Ha'aretz*, 18 Sept; *R. Cairo*, 17 Sept-*IMB*, 18 Sept)

On 27 Sept two Lebanese fishermen were caught in

Israel territorial waters. They were later released. (*Ha'aretz*, 28 Sept)

On 17 Oct a Lebanese herd was seized on the Israeli side of the border. It was subsequently returned. (*Ha'aretz*, 19 Oct)

On 1 Nov a Lebanese civilian airplane violated Israeli airspace and was ordered back over the border. (*Ha'aretz*, 2 Nov)

On 7 Nov an Israeli patrol was fired on while seizing a herd which had crossed the border south of Metulla. (*Ha'aretz*, 9 Nov) At a MAC meeting, Lebanese representatives ascribed the incident to the fact that the border was not clearly delimited in the area. (*Ha'aretz*, 10 Nov) In the incident an Israeli patrolman was slightly bruised. (*Ha'aretz*, 8 Nov)

On 20 Nov and 27 Nov Lebanese fishing boats were caught in Israeli territorial waters. (*Ha'aretz*, 21, 28 Nov)

**Legal Border Crossings.** [Rosh Haniqra (Ras an-Naqurah), on the shore of the Mediterranean, is the point where legal crossings between Israel and Lebanon are made. In 1960 border crossings were permitted for UN personnel and for foreign bearers of diplomatic passports only, and this after previous notice. Lebanon refuses any tourist traffic.]

**Lebanese Change of Policy.** On 31 Mar Lebanon refused to allow border meetings between families with members on both sides of the border. Hitherto such meetings were allowed every three months. [No change was reported in the Lebanese position on this question by the end of 1960.] (*Ha'aretz*, 1 Apr)

**July: Lebanese Bishops in Israel.** In July two Maronite Bishops from Lebanon visited the 2,500-strong Maronite community in Israel. They were Yūsuf Hūrī and Anton Harish of the town of Zor. The Bishopric of Zor has religious authority over the Maronites in Israel and the West Bank of the Jordan. They dealt with Maronite community matters, visited various places, including a kibbutz and industrial plants, and met Israeli officials. According to an interview with an Israeli correspondent, they had told an Israeli official that Israel had committed an injustice by transferring the inhabitants of the Maronite village of Bar-Am on the border to another village some years ago, although they had been compensated. To the official's claims that equality for all reigned in Israel, they had retorted that this was just a theory. Jewish circles in Haifa refused an invitation to attend a reception given by local Maronites in honour of the Bishops, as the invitations, in Arabic and French only, omitted to mention the State of Israel. Israeli officials accompanied the Bishops to the border on their return. (*Ha'aretz*, 24, 26 July)

### ESPIONAGE

[NOTE ON SOURCES: Owing to the very nature of espionage, published information on the subject comes almost exclusively from cases brought to court and is almost entirely one-sided. The following items should therefore be regarded only as examples of activities reported.]

**Synopsis.** According to Israeli public sources, the great majority of espionage activities in Israel were organized by the UAR intelligence services. These might be classified into four categories: (1) Reconnaissance and registration of traffic by armed Egyptian intelligence agents (see pp 193-4); (2) Espionage cells of Israeli Arabs, especially in the North, organized by the Syrian Deuxième

Bureau; (3) Israeli Arab youths crossing the borders for various reasons, mostly into the Gaza strip, and sent back to Israel on missions by UAR intelligence; (4) Israeli Jews crossing the borders intentionally or inadvertently and giving classified information under interrogation or voluntarily approaching Arab representatives. (In reports on three major espionage cases tried in Israel in 1960, those of Prof Sitte, A. Cohen and "The Third Man," no connection with Arab countries was mentioned.)

According to Arab public sources, Israeli intelligence activities in Arab countries consisted of two main categories: (1) Citizens of Arab countries with contacts in Israel; (2) Mixed espionage nets of Arab and foreign agents recruited by Israeli agents in Europe.

**Reported Arab Espionage in Israel.** In Feb a former Israeli Jewish journalist was given a suspended prison sentence and fined for having passed military information on Israel in 1957 to the Egyptian Intelligence while under arrest in Egypt after having been detained in a ship passing through the Suez Canal. (*Ha'aretz*; *Jer. Post*, 12 Feb)

In Mar five Israeli Arab youths from Acre and vicinity were arrested on charges of espionage in the service of the UAR. Three of them were secondary school students on government scholarships. One of them had crossed into the Gaza strip, where he contacted the Egyptian intelligence. Armed Egyptians escorted him back into Israel, where he recruited the other four. (*Ha'aretz*; *Jer. Post*, 28 Mar)

In Mar a deserter from the IDF was sentenced to ten years' imprisonment for having supplied information to Lebanon on Israeli security matters. (*Ha'aretz*, 28 Mar)

In Apr an Israeli Arab villager was sentenced to six years' imprisonment for espionage for the UAR, Syrian region. (*Jer. Post*, 11 Apr)

In July six Israeli Arabs from a village in Galilee were arrested on a charge of having passed information, especially on IDF units in the North, to agents of the Syrian (UAR) Deuxième Bureau who had infiltrated into Israel for the purpose. (*Ha'aretz*; *Jer. Post*, 6 July)

In Sept an Israeli Jewish boat-owner was arrested on suspicion of having turned over intelligence data on Israel to the UAR military attaché in Ethiopia. The man was known as an adventurer and had got into financial difficulties while on a cruise in the Red Sea. (*Ha'aretz*; *Jer. Post*, 8 Sept)

In Dec three Israeli Arab youths from the "Little Triangle" area were sentenced to prison terms ranging from four to six years on charges of espionage. They had crossed into the Gaza strip, where they met UAR intelligence officers, and were escorted back into Israel territory by armed UAR soldiers to collect information. They had been arrested in Mar. (*Ha'aretz*, 18 Mar, 5 June, 3 Nov, 5 Dec; *Jer. Post*, 5 June, 5 Dec)

In Jan 1961 a 17-year-old Israeli Arab youth was sentenced in Jerusalem to ten years' imprisonment for espionage for the UAR. He had crossed into the Gaza strip twice in 1960 to contact the UAR intelligence and receive pay. The first time he was escorted back into Israel by an armed guard; the second time he was landed in Israel by a motor-boat. (*Ha'aretz*; *Jer. Post*, 9 Jan 1961)

[For a survey of Arab intelligence activities in Israel, see articles by Z'ev Shiff in *Ha'aretz*, 13, 15 May.]

**Reported Israeli Espionage in the Arab Countries.** In Dec 1959 a group of Lebanese, including Jews, accused of espionage for Israel, were brought to trial in Beirut.



Much publicity was given to the detailed charges against them (e.g. *Nahar*, 17, 20 Dec 1959; *Kifah*, 20 Dec 1959; *Ahram*, 24 Dec 1959), but they were acquitted. Two of them were found guilty of violating the Arab boycott regulations. (*R. London in Arabic*, 9 Apr-IMB, 10 Apr)

Thirteen men were placed on trial in Damascus—ten of them *in absentia*—and accused of having worked for the Israeli intelligence, their contact being an Israeli agent in the north of Israel. Most of them came from the village of Majd ash-Shams, located according to one source near Damascus, and according to another in the Lebanon. (*R. London in Arabic*, 13 July, 4 Sept-IMB, 13 July, 5 Sept)

In Oct a group of UAR (Egyptian) and foreign nationals, said to have consisted of several rings, was found guilty by a Cairo court of espionage in Egypt for Israel, though they said they had believed that they were working for NATO. They were stated to have been recruited and trained by Israeli agents posing as NATO agents in certain West European capitals. The prolonged trial, which was given wide Press and radio coverage in the UAR, ended with three death sentences and heavy prison terms. (*R. Cairo*, 21 Apr-IMB, 21 Apr; *R. Sawt al-Arab*, 20 Apr-IMB 21 Apr; *R. Cairo*, 13 Oct-IMB, 14 Oct; *R. Cairo*, 25 Oct-IMB, 26 Oct) (See also detailed accounts in the UAR Press during this period.)

## JAN-FEB 1960. ISRAEL-UAR BORDER RELATIONS: THE TAWAFIQ INCIDENT AND ITS AFTERMATH

### NOTES:

1. Published information on the incident related below is rather fragmentary.
2. On special source: In addition to public sources, use has been made in this chapter of a report by the Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) dated 16 Feb, on the incidents of Jan and Feb 1960, which was sent to the UN Secretary General. Since both parties treated it as private and confidential, neither commented on its findings or the views expressed therein. The report was appended to Staff Study No. 13 prepared for the use of the Committee of Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 9 June 1960. This source is referred to below as: (UNTSO Report).
3. The following report is concerned mainly with direct Israeli-UAR relations. For a fuller covering of UNTSO's role and views—see the UNTSO Report.

### SYNOPSIS

On 1 Feb units of the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) demolished the abandoned village of Lower Tawafiq in the southern Demilitarized Zone (DZ) on the Israeli-Syrian frontier. This was the climax of the tension which had developed over the cultivation rights of Arab and Jewish villagers in the Zone; the basic problem, however, was the question of the political status of Israel and Syria in the area. A third factor involved was the UNTSO.

Tension started to mount in the sowing season, in Dec 1959. The dispute centred mainly on some parcels of land of mixed Jewish-Arab ownership in the South of the Zone, approximately midway between the kibbutz of Tel Katzir and the village of Lower Tawafiq (see map).

In this area a 350-metre drainage ditch had been dug by Israelis in Oct 1958, in a north-south direction, to drain off the water from the hills to the east. The Chief of UNTSO stated at the time that the ditch would not be regarded as a limit up to which Israelis could extend cultivation. Israelis did not cultivate up to the ditch (although according to the UNTSO report they were closer to it in 1960 than in 1958), but they denied the right of Arabs to cultivate land to the west of it, not cultivated by them in previous years. The UAR, on the other hand, seemed determined to establish Arab cultivation rights west of the ditch. The uncultivated strip of land between the ditch and the eastern limit of Israeli cultivation was originally from "50 to 200" metres wide, according to the UNTSO Report.

Attempts by UNTSO to delimit cultivation zones proved unsuccessful. The Chief of UNTSO proposed on 20 Jan a delimitation which would accord the Arabs cultivation rights west of the ditch. UAR and Israeli sources also stated that UNTSO explicitly sanctioned Arab cultivation in this zone on 28 Jan and subsequent days, after the armed clashes over the issue had already started.

Armed clashes, which had already started in Dec 1959, intensified on 26 Jan, when armed Arabs crossed the ditch to cultivate lands which they had not cultivated before. Syrian armed detachments and armed detachments of the Israeli frontier police entered the DZ, the first to cover the Arab cultivators, the second to drive them off. On 29 Jan the Syrians, from positions on the border, opened artillery fire on an Israeli patrol. On 30-31 Jan, armed clashes became even more frequent.

Starting on 28 Jan, clear warnings were issued in Israel that the firmest possible measures would be taken by Israel to deal with further Syrian attempts to change the status quo. UAR official spokesmen said that, starting on 29 Jan, the First (Syrian) Army had assumed the responsibility of defending the Arab cultivators.

The tactical objective of the Israeli forces on 1 Feb was to demolish Lower Tawafiq, which had been fortified by the Syrians and turned into a stronghold. This was the largest military action since the Sinai campaign, and was similar in scope to the large-scale IDF reprisal raids in 1955/56. In this case, however, the Israeli forces were acting in the DZ, on the Israeli side of the international border, which UAR First Army (Syrian) forces had crossed. Though the Syrian forces were obviously expecting a raid, the Israeli forces overcame the opposition and attained their objective. Both sides suffered casualties.

The UAR command and government were convinced, however, that Israel had been defeated at Tawafiq and that the next morning two Israeli jet fighters were downed by Syrian jets, because—according to authoritative Israeli sources—they were misled by false reports from local commanders. They therefore expected an Israeli revenge attack on Syria. To forestall this the UAR Second (Egyptian) Army was secretly concentrated in Sinai, starting on 18 Feb, reserves were called up, and the tension assumed a war-like character. However, the attitude of both sides was defensive. No authoritative reports of Israeli military countermeasures were published, but Israel was said to be "alert," and initiated diplomatic activity to forestall war.

The treatment of this episode by UAR leaders and mass-media was ambivalent. On the one hand, the Ta-



wafiq raid was said to be connected with the question of the diversion of the Jordan waters (see p 204 ff) and the reaffirmation of the validity of the Tripartite Declaration by the Western powers (which was prompted by the tension—see pp 93–4). A new “Western-Israeli collusion” to attack Arab nationalism was anticipated. On the other hand, the visit of Israeli Ministers to Western countries during this period, especially that of PM Ben-Gurion starting at the end of Feb, were also interpreted as a drive to obtain help for Israel in the face of the growing power of the UAR, which was said to have defeated Israel twice: first at Tawafiq and later when Israel designs to attack Syria were frustrated by the concentration of forces in Sinai.

Tension eased toward the end of February, and in Mar the Egyptian forces withdrew from Sinai. The conflict in the southern DZ remained unsolved, however, and tension there increased again sporadically later in the year. (For incidents after Feb, see *Border Relations*, p 194 ff.)

### BACKGROUND NOTE

The demilitarized zones along the Israel-Syrian border were legally defined in the Armistice Agreement concluded between Israel and Syria on 20 July 1949. They constitute territory which had been part of Palestine and was occupied by Syrian forces in 1948. Israel's basic contention was that Syria had no legal right to these lands and that the international border was legally binding upon Syria. On the other hand, Syria refused to hand over these lands to Israel. Hence the formula of demilitarization, which was not thought to confer any rights of international purport. (*Article IV of Armistice Agreement*)

The Armistice Agreement provided for the resumption of normal life in these areas, which were previously inhabited by Jewish and Arab villagers. In article V of the agreement, the Chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commission (MAC) was entrusted with responsibility for general supervision of the DZ. Para. 5(a) of Article V provided for the employment of limited numbers of locally recruited civilian police in the zone for internal security purposes.

In effect the spirit of this article could be adhered to only on the assumption that the Agreement would be speedily replaced by a permanent peace as envisaged in Article I. Since this did not take place, the zones developed into a political and economic vacuum, which speedily drew the opposing forces into intermittent conflict. Israel took the Jewish inhabitants under its wings as of right; Syria did the same with the Arab inhabitants—in Israeli eyes without justification.

The basic contentions of the parties to the dispute are as follows:

**Israel's Case on the DZ.** 1. Some of the DZs west of the Syria-Palestine international frontier were held, before the signing of the Armistice Agreement, by Syrian troops as a result of the use of force in circumstances defined by the Security Council of the United Nations as a threat to the peace. Such occupation by force could not originate any legitimate rights whatever. Accordingly, any claims on the part of Syria with respect to the DZs must be considered inadmissible, being based on armed conquest of territory beyond Syria's established international frontier.

2. Israel, as successor of the Palestine Mandatory Government with respect to the areas in question, has the right to exercise sovereignty in the DZs west of the Syria-

Palestine international frontier. The relevant provisions of the Armistice Agreement are concerned only with the exclusion of military forces from the DZs and the restoration of normal civilian life therein, and do not relate to questions of sovereignty.

3. The above arguments are borne out by the Agreement, which entrusted the Chairman of the MAC (Article V-5(c)), and not the MAC as a whole, with “ensuring full implementation of this Article.” Syria had no *locus standi* in the DZ outside its borders. Hence Israel's refusal to attend meetings of the MAC which claimed to deal with such questions.

4. Israel sovereignty in the area entitled her to utilize it as she thought fit; she was legally entitled to develop water projects (such as diversion of the Jordan waters, see p 204 ff).

5. The rights of the local inhabitants were not transferable. Syria had no *locus standi* as regards inhabitants of Arab extraction. Any negotiations on their behalf should be conducted between their own representatives and Israel.

As a result of the discussion in the Israel-Syrian MAC of questions related to the DZ, Israel boycotted the Commission. A UN SC decision in 1957 considered refusal to participate in meetings inconsistent with the Armistice Agreement.

**Syrian Case on the DZ.** 1. The withdrawal of Syrian forces from areas occupied by them during the fighting in 1948 should not and could not be interpreted as intended to transfer the land to Israel.

2. The Armistice Agreement did not preclude Syria from participating in discussions on these areas. Article V-5(c), which entrusted the Chairman of the MAC with the implementation of these provisions, did not preclude the MAC plenary from “interpreting” this Article as envisaged by Article VIII of the Agreement.

3. Neither Israel nor Syria had sovereign rights in the area. Syria was entitled to represent Arab residents in the zone just as Israel represents Jewish inhabitants.

4. In effect Israel was not in control of all the areas concerned. Those in Arab hands were in fact under Syrian jurisdiction.

**The UN Attitude.** United Nations decisions and actions were taken by various organs at different junctures, mainly as matters developed in the various DZs. General Riley, Chief of UNTSO, presented a memorandum (Doc. S/2049 Part IV) on 28 May 1951 to the MAC on the zones in general which stated, *inter alia*, that:

1. “Neither party to the Armistice Agreement therefore enjoys rights of sovereignty within the demilitarized zone.”

2. “Any occupancy of lands either temporary or permanent without the full consent of the landowners is... a violation of Article V, para. 2 of the Armistice Agreement.” (*UNTSO Report, Annex 3*)

In pursuance of this ruling, UN efforts in the Southern DZ have been concentrated on delimiting the areas of Israeli and Arab cultivation. This has been exceedingly difficult, because (in the words of the *UNTSO Report*, para. 4):

“According to a cadastral plan of the area the land (in the area in question) ... is approximately half Arab, half Jewish, but it is divided into narrow parallel strips, oriented generally west to east, and which are either Arab-owned or Jewish-owned or mixed property predominantly Arab or Jewish.”

Resulting from this situation (again in the words of the Chief of UNTSO):

"This intricate land apportionment has not been respected and land has been used irrespective of property limits by the Israelis of Tel Katzir to the West and the Arabs of Tawafiq to the East." (*UNTSO Report, para. 4*)

"Successive Chairmen of the MAC tried to arrange a delimitation of the lands which would be used by the Israelis and the Arabs respectively. The efforts of the Chairmen failed." (*UNTSO Report, para. 3*)

Since then UNTSO has been mainly concerned with preserving the status quo in the areas concerned.

**1957-1958: Previous Clashes Over Cultivation Rights.** [For the Chief of UNTSO's version of the developments in the southern DZ, since 1949, see *UNTSO Report, paras. 2-20*.] The incidents in the southern DZ were, according to the UNTSO report, the result of events dating from Nov 1957. On 6 Nov 1957 Israeli workers attempted to dig a drainage ditch through Lower Tawafiq, which is within the zone. The attempt was resisted by force, one Israeli being killed and one wounded by Arab fire. After an emergency meeting of the MAC an agreed statement was issued: "...It was agreed by the Parties that any legitimate work in the area concerned should not be interfered with and differences of opinion should be solved by peaceful means. It was also agreed that the Parties should comply fully with the General Armistice Agreement." (*UNTSO Report, para. 18*)

Twelve months later Israeli workers began digging a ditch 350 metres west of that previously planned. After Syrian complaint, the Chief of UNTSO investigated and on 4 Nov 1958 issued his findings, which concluded with the following ruling:

"I accordingly find the digging of the ditch legitimate on the assumption that it is, as explained, only a drainage ditch and will not be considered also as a limit up to which Israelis could extend cultivation.

"I should add in this connection that there has been no indication that such an intention may exist. The explanations given to me on 30 Oct have dismissed any possible doubt on this point." (*UNTSO Report, paras 19, 20*)

#### DEC 1959-JAN 1960: DISPUTE OVER LAND WEST OF THE DRAINAGE DITCH

With the advent of the 1959/60 winter ploughing season, further activities in the zone gradually led up to the events in Feb 1960.

The Chief of UNTSO remarked later: "It was more and more clear that the narrow no man's land between the eastern limit of Israeli cultivation and the 1958 drainage ditch would be the subject of serious incidents, if no solution of the problem of cultivation proved possible." (*UNTSO Report, para. 25*)

In Dec 1959 the Syrian delegation to the MAC complained that Israeli settlers were digging a ditch for an irrigation pipeline east of Tel Katzir up to a place close to the north-south drainage ditch dug in 1958. A UN survey team sought an alternative site for the pipeline, with Israeli approval. A simultaneous UN proposal to establish an eastern limit for Israeli cultivation did not meet with Israeli approval. Israel proposed the maintenance of the status quo including the prohibition of encroachment by the Arabs on areas they had not used during the past year. (*UNTSO Report, para. 21*)

Israeli cultivation did not reach the drainage ditch, but according to the Chief of UNTSO was now closer to it than before. (*UNTSO Report, para. 22*)

**Dec 1959: First Israeli Fatal Casualty.** On 24 Dec 1959 an exchange between the Israel border police and Syrian forces in the Tawafiq area resulted in one Israeli being killed. His evacuation was delayed because of Syrian refusal to agree to an early cease-fire. (*Ha'aretz, 25 Dec 1959*) Syrian sources claimed that three Israelis had been killed. (*R. Damascus, 24 Dec 1959-IMB, 25 Dec 1959*)

**Dec 1959: Arabs Cross the Drainage Ditch.** On 28 Dec 1959 Arabs crossed the drainage ditch and set fire to some land known as the "Yellow Field," which they had never cultivated before. (*UNTSO Report, para. 24*)

**Jan: UN Attempts to Solve Cultivation Problems.** A UN proposal to bring about a meeting between the villagers of Tel Katzir and Tawafiq was not accepted by Israel. (*UNTSO Report, para. 25*) [The UNTSO Report does not make clear the reaction, if any, of the Tawafiq villagers.] Fruitless exchanges between the UN and Israeli representatives continued till 19 Jan. (*UNTSO Report, paras. 30-38*)

**16-19 Jan: Cultivation in Disputed Area Resumed.** The following is reported by UNTSO only: On 16 Jan, an Israeli tractor ploughed a parcel of land close to the ditch. This was regarded by the Arabs as a provocation and a breach of the status quo. Israeli settlers continued cultivation on 17-18 Jan despite the request of the Chief of UNTSO to desist. [The Report does not specify where this was done.] On 18 Jan the Arabs crossed the drainage ditch "to resume their cultivation." [The Report does not, however, mention previous Arab cultivation in this area.] (*UNTSO Report, paras. 25, 26, 27*)

The Israeli Press reported briefly that cultivation by "Syrian villagers" of land in the "area of Israel" had taken place on 18 and 19 Jan. (*Ha'aretz, 20 Jan; Ma'ariv 21 Jan*)

On 20 Jan both Syria and Israel complained to the UN of activities by armed detachments of the other side in the DZ; Syria also complained about unlawful ploughing by Israelis. (*UNTSO Report, paras. 31, 32, 33*)

**20-21 Jan: UN Proposals, Syrian Reactions.** On 20 Jan, failing a fruitful outcome of UN-Israeli talks held the day before, the Chief of UNTSO issued findings "of a practical character." He proposed "that the present eastern limits of Israeli cultivation should be, subject to some reservations, the limits of Arab use of lands west of Tawafiq." The reservations included a provision for a 10-metre strip of uncultivated land between the areas cultivated by Israelis and Arabs respectively. (*UNTSO Report, paras. 29, 82, 85, 90, Annex 5*) The commander of the First Army of the UAR requested a revision of the findings which were, however, to be respected [in the meantime?]. (*UNTSO Report, para. 63*)

**Israel: No Right of Syrian Intervention in the DZ, UN Responsibility in Zone Limited.** Israel apparently made no direct reply to the UN proposal. In a letter to the UNTSO Chief of Staff dated 29 Jan, the Israeli official responsible stated that Israel would allow the Arabs to cultivate their lands in the zone "provided that, in respect of such cultivation as in every other respect within the Zone, there is no entry or intervention on the part of the Syrian Authorities." It also directed attention to "the authoritative definition of Dr Bunche... [on the authority of the Chief of Staff in the Zone]: 'He will not assume responsibility for direct administration of the Zone.'" (*UNTSO Report, para. 64*)

**UNTSO Views.** In reply, the Chief of Staff stated that he was given "the responsibility for the general supervision of the DZ" by the Armistice Agreement.

He also stated that Arab farmers in the southern DZ "had been progressively prevented from exercising rights to cultivate in an area where the properties of Arabs and Israelis are intermingled, but where they respectively owned half of the land."

He also stated that Dr Bunche's comment excluded "the possibility for either party to the Agreement to directly intervene or dictate in the DZ." (*UNTSO Report, para. 65*)

**UNTSO Sanction for Arab Cultivation West of Ditch.** According to UAR and Israeli sources, the Arab attempts at cultivation west of the ditch were carried out with UNTSO sanction. The spokesman of the UAR First Army said that on 28 Jan [after armed clashes over cultivation rights in the area had already started—see below] it was agreed between the UN Chairman of the MAC and the First Army commanders that Arab farmers would continue work "in the area permitted by the Chairman" [a reference to the "findings" of the Chief of Staff?]. The Arab farmers were accompanied by UN observers. (*R. Damascus, 29 Jan-IMB, 31 Jan*) A Syrian communiqué, broadcast by Damascus Radio on 30 Jan, stated that on the same morning "Arab farmers, accompanied by UN observers, continued to cultivate their lands in the DZ in the vicinity of Tawafiq village, in accordance with the decisions of the Chief of Staff of UNTSO." (*IMB, 31 Jan*) In a commentary on the same date, Cairo Radio said that the First Army command had agreed with UNTSO on the continuation of cultivation in the DZ and so prevented Israel from posing as the attacked party. (*IMB, 31 Jan*) [The UNTSO Report does not mention such an agreement or the accompanying of Arab cultivators by UN observers.]

Israeli sources reported that on 31 Jan "UN circles" affirmed that the UN Chairman of the Israeli-Syrian MAC had told the inhabitants of Tawafiq that "they may continue to cultivate their land." The UNTSO observers in the area were accompanied by Tawafiq villagers. Israel maintained, however, that these were not farmers but Syrian soldiers. (*Ha'aretz, 1 Feb*)

#### 26-31 JAN: MOUNTING ARMED CLASHES

[Between 21 and 25 Jan the area was apparently quiet, with no complaints by either side of unlawful cultivation. There were Israeli complaints, however, that Syrian soldiers were seen daily in Tawafiq village and other locations in the DZ. (*UNTSO Report, para. 33*) Also, in the UNTSO Report's chronology of events no incident is mentioned in this period.]

**26 Jan: Arabs Cross Ditch.** The quiet was broken on the morning of 26 Jan, when Arabs, carrying rifles, crossed the drainage ditch to till land west of it. Movements of an Israeli armed patrol (which did not open fire) did not deter the Arabs from continuing work. In the afternoon, however, the last Arab farmer left the disputed area and so did the Israeli patrol. (*UNTSO Report, paras. 32, 33*) Syria complained about the patrol.

**27 Jan: Syrian Soldiers Cross Ditch; First Armed Clash.** On 27 Jan UNTSO observers for the first time saw Syrian soldiers in the area west of the drainage ditch. They were three National Guards in uniform. Syria complained to the MAC that on this date an Israeli armoured car had opened fire to frighten away the Arab cultivators. Israel

complained of Syrian armed activities in the Zone, including the opening of rifle fire on an Israeli police car. (*UNTSO Report, para. 34*) Israeli sources said that after the Israeli patrol had driven the intruders back over the ditch the Syrians opened automatic fire, which lasted over an hour. (*Ha'aretz; Davar, 27 Jan*) UN observers saw Israelis fire in the direction of the Arab farmers and the Israelis fired upon in turn from "the Tawafiq area." (*UNTSO Report, para. 34*) UNTSO requested the withdrawal of the Syrian soldiers and the Israeli border police. (*UNTSO Report, para. 33*)

**UAR Warns of Military Intervention.** On 27 Jan also Syrian sources reported for the first time on the renewed tension in the DZ. (*R. Damascus, 27 Jan-IMB, 28 Jan*) They said that UN intervention had been requested, but if hostilities did not cease, the First (Syrian) Army Command would take the necessary measures to protect the inhabitants of the area. (*R. Damascus, 27 Jan-IMB, 28 Jan*)

**28 Jan: Arabs Continue Work West of Ditch.** UN observers saw Arabs continuing work west of the ditch, and reported an Israeli armoured car [apparently a carrier] patrolling the area. They heard the men in the car shouting at the cultivators, and later fire was opened in their direction; the cultivators left the area. Syria complained. (*UNTSO Report, para. 35*)

**29 Jan: Open Intervention of UAR Army.** On 30 Jan the spokesman of the UAR's Syrian Army announced that starting at 1600 hours on 29 Jan, the Syrian forces began to defend the Arab cultivators; they opened fire upon Israeli positions and silenced them. (*R. Damascus, 30 Jan-IMB, 31 Jan*)

According to statements by the Israel Army spokesman on 30-31 Jan: "On 29 Jan as from 1245 hours armed Syrians entered Israel territory in the southern DZ east of Tel Katzir; they were covered by Syrian troops who mounted positions within the DZ. Israeli patrols repelled the Syrians several times."

On the same day, "at 1515 hours Syrian forces opened machinegun fire on an Israel patrol. The patrol returned fire and was in turn bombarded by artillery fire from Syrian positions; the Israel patrol suffered no casualties." (*Ha'aretz; Jer. Post, 31 Jan*) On the same day, UAR and Israeli fighter aircraft were active over the area and in the vicinity. UN observers reported Israeli rifle and LMG firing at the farmers. The Syrians replied with fire from heavy mortars. (*UNTSO Report, para. 36*)

**30 Jan: Armed Clashes Continue.** UN observers again reported firing "in the general vicinity of Arab farmers" and exchanges of fire between Syrians and Israelis. The Syrians again employed heavy mortars. Both sides lodged complaints with the MAC. Cease-fires were repeatedly arranged by the UN and repeatedly broken. A fire ignited by Syrian bullets broke out in one of Tel Katzir's fields. (*UNTSO Report para. 37*) (See *Ha'aretz; Jer. Post, 31 Jan* for statements by the Israeli Army spokesman.)

**31 Jan: Israel Fatal Casualty.** According to Israeli complaints, renewed exchange of fire followed the crossing of the ditch by three Syrian armed soldiers disguised as civilians who pretended to plough. Syrian military positions in Lower and Upper Tawafiq, as well as across the international border, opened artillery and other fire on Israeli policemen in the area, who, according to the UN observers, had been firing at the farmers. During the ex-



## THE TAWAFIQ INCIDENT

changes an Israeli was killed and two wounded. Both sides lodged complaints with the MAC, including allegations of incursions by fighter planes. (*UNTSO Report, para. 38*)

**27-30 Jan: UAR Warnings.** (On 27 Jan the UAR had warned that its First Army would intervene and on 30 Jan it announced that it had done so—see above.) On 30 Jan Cairo Radio warned Israel in Hebrew of war if it continued its provocations. The same day the Sawt al-Arab station said that the First Army would continue to fulfil its task until Israel retreated and the UN proved its effectiveness. (*IMB, 31 Jan*) Cairo Radio (on 29 and 30 Jan) and Damascus Radio (on 30 Jan) said (again in Hebrew) that the First Army artillery was bombarding Israel because of the latter's aggressive policy. It was in its power to bombard and destroy all settlements in the vicinity, but the time for such action was "not appropriate." The UAR forces had been ordered to act with restraint. (*IMB, 31 Jan*)

UAR sources saw several motives for "Israeli aggression": the wish to dominate the DZ, the need to steal agricultural produce from the Arabs because of the economic crisis in Israel, the importance of Tawafiq village—near which, it was alleged, Israel intended to divert the Jordan—, the wish to create a situation which would permit it to frustrate the Arab boycott, etc. The Western Powers were behind Israel. (*R. Cairo; Damascus; Sawt al-Arab, 31 Jan-IMB, 1 Feb*)

**28-30 Jan: Israeli Warnings.** Warnings of the serious consequences of continued provocation were voiced by the Israeli Press and spokesmen starting on 28 Jan.

The mounting tension was the subject of consultations between Ben-Gurion and senior foreign office and defence officials on 28 Jan.

The *Jerusalem Post* stated: "It is understood that further trespassing by the Syrians and attempts to change the status quo in the DZ will be dealt with by Israel with the firmest possible measures." (*Jer. Post, 28 Jan*)

"Israel is determined to maintain the status quo in the Tel Katzir area and defend her sovereign rights in the DZ which is an integral part of Israeli territory." (*Ha'aretz, 31 Jan*)

On 31 Jan Aluf Zore'a, OC Northern Command (Israel) stated at a Press conference reported on the same day by evening newspapers: "We have good reason to suppose that what is going on at Tel Katzir is in full line with the UAR's policy and that orders for it have been given by Abdel-Nasser or Field-Marshal Amer. It is soldiers who in the past week have cultivated the land previously tilled by the villagers of Tawafiq. They were armed and wore clearly visible puttees. At other times soldiers were seen trying to force villagers to plough the land in question."

"The Syrians have completely ignored the international border and have converted the DZ opposite Tel Katzir into a series of fortified strongholds. [The UNTSO Report later confirmed that Lower Tawafiq was fortified—see below.]

"By his actions Field-Marshal Amer apparently aims at diverting attention from internal troubles in the Syrian Army and wishes to gain the sympathy of other Arab states." (*Ma'ariv, 31 Jan*)

Political correspondents in the evening papers intimated that "Israel is expected to react sharply in the event of any further acts of Syrian aggression in the Tel Katzir area, in view of UNTSO's reluctance to halt Syrian work

in the disputed zone." (*Ma'ariv; Yediot Aharonot, 31 Jan*)

An extraordinary Israel cabinet session was held on the afternoon of 31 Jan. (*Ha'aretz, 1 Feb*)

### 1 FEB: IDF DEMOLISHES LOWER TAWAFIQ

In the early hours of 1 Feb, the IDF demolished the abandoned fortified village of Lower Tawafiq in the southern DZ.

**The Military Operation—Synopsis.** The whole action took place inside the DZ, except for artillery mounted outside it. According to both the Israeli and the UAR versions, Lower Tawafiq was abandoned and Syrian ambushes were placed in the lines of approach to the village. Both sources agree that the IDF units entered the village and demolished it. The UAR sources omitted, however, to mention that the Israeli units first surmounted Syrian ambushes, where, according to Israeli sources, the only actual engagements took place. UAR sources said that the village was retaken by Syrian forces after defeating IDF units in it; the Israelis said that after demolishing the village their forces withdrew as planned without meeting any opposition. This Israeli version was borne out by the findings of the UN observers in the village. (UN observations in the destroyed village also bore out the Israeli claim that it had been turned into a military stronghold by the Syrians and that for a long time it had not been inhabited.) Both sides were also agreed that the Syrians trained heavy artillery fire on Lower Tawafiq while the IDF detachment was operating there and on Israeli settlements in the vicinity; Israeli sources stressed the effectiveness of the IDF counter-artillery fire.

**Israeli Version.** An IDF statement read: "Israeli forces purged the DZ of the positions which the Syrians set up and from which they opened fire, obstructing normal life in this zone. The Israeli forces blew up all the buildings in the abandoned village of Tawafiq—which the Syrians had converted into a military base—suffering losses of three dead and seven wounded. The Israeli forces made their attack on Tawafiq after returning Syrian fire which had started at 0040 hours local time. The exchange of artillery fire continued until 0400 hours... Soldiers participating in the Israeli force reported that there were no traces of agricultural work in the village, which consisted mainly of fortified military positions." (*Ha'aretz, 2 Feb*) Israeli spokesmen estimated Syrian casualties at over 50 dead and many injured. (*Ha'aretz; Jer. Post, 2 Feb*)

The Israeli forces had accomplished their mission quickly and successfully, despite obvious strategic disadvantages. UAR forces held hilly positions dominating the whole area and the Israeli forces had to conduct an uphill battle under extreme exposure. (*Jer. Post, 2 Feb; Lamerhav, 3 Feb*)

The operation was executed by units of the Golani infantry brigade. On the approaches to the village they overcame two Syrian ambushes. At one of these two of their men were killed, while three Syrians were killed and the remainder of the ambushing force fled. The other ambush was outflanked. (The number of the ambushes does not emerge clearly from the reports.) Following the breakthrough, the infantry entered the abandoned village, in which it found traces of soldiers who had just left it. Meanwhile, another infantry detachment intercepted Syrian soldiers fleeing towards Upper Tawafiq. The IDF infantry blocked the approaches to the village, which was entered by half-tracks bearing explosives and by a demolition detachment. The Syrians trained heavy artillery fire on the village, but the Israeli artillery opened effective



tive counter-artillery fire. The Israeli units withdrew from the village after placing the explosives, and detonated them from a distance at 0330. The great majority of the buildings, approximately 50, were blown up. Afterwards, Syrian artillery bombarded Israeli settlements in the vicinity, but damage was light (*Bamahaneh*, 2, 9 Feb)

The adoption of Russian military doctrines by the UAR was indicated by the heavy artillery barrage, carried out with the aid of a giant searchlight projector, which lit up the whole area. Israeli artillery succeeded in extinguishing the projector after the beginning of the battle. (*Jer. Post*, 2 Feb; *Lamerhav*, 3 Feb)

Soviet and Czech military equipment captured from the Syrian Army was in most cases the first of its kind to be taken by Israeli troops and not of the types found in Sinai with the Egyptian Army. It included automatic rifles, medium machineguns on wheels and various types of shells. (*Jer. Post*; *Ha'aretz*, 4 Feb)

**UAR Version: "Shameful Defeat" of Israel.** On 1 Feb the Syrian First Army spokesman said: "The criminal Zionist forces carried out a concentrated attack last night on the Arab village of Tawafiq. The guns bombarded the southern Zone and fired at villagers across the border. Our artillery opened fire and the exchange lasted over four hours, after which the traitors captured the village, which had been evacuated of its inhabitants previously. The village was taken by tanks and infantry; our forces executed a night counter attack, during which they retook the Arab village and the surrounding hills. The Jews were forced to flee after these forces of evil and aggression drew most intensive fire from our forces. Our forces suffered two dead and four wounded. The Jews suffered many casualties." (*R. Damascus*, 1 Feb-*IMB*, 1 Feb)

During the following days this version was reiterated many times and commented upon by UAR Press, radio and spokesmen. (See *UAR Press*; *IMB*, 1-7 Feb.)

General Faisal, the Syrian Army Chief of Staff, said later that to take an abandoned village Israel had mobilized a battalion and two companies of tanks and armoured cars. "We drove them away with an infantry company." (*R. Damascus*, 21 Feb-*IMB* 22 Feb) On the other hand, the Cairo Radio commentator had said earlier that Israel's Army had expected to find 50-60 soldiers in Tawafiq, but had been confronted by "thousands of heroic soldiers." (*IMB*, 3 Feb)

**Various Explanations of UAR "Victory."** The UAR "victory" was said to be due to a fundamental change of military doctrine by the First Army. (*R. Cairo*, 3 Feb-*IMB*, 4 Feb) The UAR command had expected an Israeli raid, executed by the "known method" with the aim of killing as many villagers as possible. An ambush was therefore laid and the village evacuated on the eve of the attack. After the Jews entered the village, they were effectively bombarded by Syrian artillery and it was retaken by the Syrian forces. (*Sawt al-Arab*, 1 Feb-*IMB*, 2 Feb)

However, on the same day Cairo Radio, quoting the First Army spokesman, said that the village consisted only of ruins and had, in any case, been abandoned. Arab cultivators only entered it from time to time. (*IMB*, 1 Jan) Again, *al-Gumhuriyah* reported that "when the Jews began attacking, the inhabitants of Tawafiq rushed to their bunker-posts, took up their rifles and fought out the battle." (*Gumhuriyah*, 4 Feb)

**UNTSO Report: Village Abandoned, Fortified, No Signs of Fighting in It.** The UNTSO Report refers specifically

to the question of whether Lower Tawafiq was a stronghold (as alleged by Israel) and whether it was inhabited or deserted when attacked. It confirms that the village "was encircled by a trench with éring slots at every 15 metres, as well as by two barbed-wire entanglements." (*Para. 44*) "There were no signs that the buildings had been used for human occupancy for several months." (*Para. 45*) "Two sleeping quilts were found... and had the appearance of having been placed after the explosion." "No evidence of any fighting was found in the village." (*Para. 45*—see also Annex 2.)

**UAR Celebrates Victory in Air Battle.** On 1 Feb an encounter between Israeli and Syrian fighter planes took place. The Israel Army spokesman announced that four Syrian MIG fighters had been chased off by two Israel jets after a brief air battle over Metulla at 1100 on 1 Feb. (*Ha'aretz*, *Jer. Post*, 2 Feb)

The UAR stated: "Four UAR Air Force aircraft engaged four Israeli Super-Mystères which violated Syrian airspace over the south-western front. Two of them were hit, one was seen to crash inside occupied Palestine. The other is also thought to have crashed." (*Ahram*, 2 Feb) This was officially denied by the Israel Army spokesman. (*Ha'aretz*, 3 Feb)

The UNTSO Report (*para. 47a*) corroborates the Syrian complaint of the violation of Syrian airspace.

Field-Marshal Amer awarded high military medals to airforce officers who had displayed courage "in recent aerial battles with the Israel Air-Force." (*R. Damascus*, 2 Feb-*IMB*, 3 Feb)

This incident was reported in a light vein in the Israel Press. (*Ha'aretz*, 3 Feb)

Authoritative Israeli sources attributed UAR victory claims to false reports by Syrian local commanders on the "reconquest" of Lower Tawafiq (see below).

**Ben-Gurion's Statement on the Operation.** On 1 Feb the Israeli PM said in a statement in the Knesset: "We shall make every attempt to preserve quiet, but we shall on no account allow Syrian forces to enter any area where they have no right to be. And if the UN is unable to evict them, we shall have to take measures to evict them ourselves... We recognize the right of the owners of the lands to cultivate them but we do not recognize any right of the Syrians to interfere in the affairs in the area on this side of the international frontier."

"After our approach to the UN proved of no effect and the UN did not demand that the Syrians stop working after the last incident, when they tried to cultivate the areas on the other side of the channel [the ditch], which they had no right to cultivate, and after one of our guards was killed in an attempt to evict them, we found it essential to liquidate the post in Tawafiq village in which Syrian soldiers had entrenched themselves in disguise, appearing by day in the guise of peasants..." (*Divrei Haknesset*, 1 Feb; *Jer. Post*, 2 Feb)

**Arab States' Reaction.** The Iraqi Press and radio ignored the episode. (*IMB*, 1-4 Feb) (For Iraq-UAR propaganda exchanges on this subject see p 145.) Lebanese newspapers connected it with Israel's intention to divert the Jordan waters. (*Hayat*, 2, 3 Feb) The Lebanese Ministry for Foreign Affairs maintained contact with other Arab states in order to formulate a common policy. (*Hayat*, 3 Feb) (For reactions in the Arab League Council see p 127.)

According to later reports, King Hussein telephoned the Syrian military authorities during the Tawafiq battle

## THE TAWAFIQ INCIDENT

and informed them that the Jordanian national army was ready to come to their aid (*Akhbar al-Ushu'*, Jordan, 12 Feb), but earlier Official Press releases informed only that he maintained constant contact with his officers and men. (*Difa'*, 3 Feb) The radio relegated the story to fourth place in the news broadcasts. (*IMB*, 1 Feb) (See also p 127.)

### FEB: AFTERMATH IN DEMILITARIZED ZONE

**1 Feb: Arabs Continue Ploughing West of Ditch.** Early on 1 Feb, following the Tawafiq raid, two Arabs were seen ploughing for some time west of the ditch. (*UNTSO Report*, para. 42) Cairo Radio (1 Feb) saw in this a further sign of the UAR "victory"; the Arab cultivators were working under the cover of the Arab forces, it said. "Justice, the UN and the UN observers are with us." (*IMB*, 2 Feb) UN observers reported sporadic ploughing by Arabs west of the ditch until 8 Feb. (*UNTSO Report*, paras. 48-55)

**1-2 Feb: Armed Clashes.** Exchanges of fire in the southern DZ were reported in Israeli and Syrian complaints to the MAC and by UN observers, between 1-6 Feb. Both Israelis and Syrians held positions in the Zone. One Israeli fatal casualty and two wounded were reported. (*UNTSO Report*, paras. 47-53)

From 9-14 Feb, UNTSO sources found nothing to report from the southern DZ. However, on 12 Feb two Israelis were killed by Syrian fire in the Huleh area (in the north) (see also p 190), and on 14 Feb the UN reported "four jet aircraft over Quneitra" (in Syria) on which AA fire was opened. (*UNTSO Report*, paras. 55-58)

[For renewed incidents in the southern DZ, see *Israeli-UAR Border Relations*, p 190.]

**"Efforts to Restore Tranquillity."** In chapter VI of his report (headed as above), the Chief of UNTSO surveys his contacts with Israel and Syria before and after the Tawafiq raid.

[The main issues after the raid were the withdrawal of forces from the DZ and from the "defensive areas" (where the deployment of forces is limited by the Armistice Agreement), and the convening of a MAC meeting to discuss the situation.]

On 5 Feb UN representatives visited the above areas on the Israeli side and found that the Israeli forces had been withdrawn. They found no Syrian build-up in the DZ, but up to 14 Feb they were not allowed to visit the Syrian defensive area (into which reinforcements had been moved following the Tawafiq raid). (*UNTSO Report*, para. 62) [There is no published report as to whether the visit was permitted at a later date.]

**Positions on Competence of MAC Regarding DZ.** Both sides agreed in principle to a MAC meeting. Israel restated its position that the agenda could not cover the administration of the DZ and related questions. Israel was prepared "to discuss peace, complete peace" and "means to preserve quiet... along the international boundary."

The Syrians, on the other hand, maintained that both sides had the same rights in the DZ and that, to ensure tranquillity in the area, matters relating to the DZ must be discussed.

There was an exchange of views between the Chief of UNTSO and Israel on the matter; he did not accept the Israeli position. (*UNTSO Report*, paras. 68-78)

The UAR and Israeli delegations circulated memo-

randa to Security Council members on the border situation, restating their fundamental views; no action was called for by either party. (*Ahram*, 5 Feb; *Jer. Post*, 26 Feb)

**MAC Condemns Israel; Israel Contests Validity of Decision.** On 16 Feb the Chairman of the MAC convened an emergency meeting on a Syrian request dated 4 Feb. The UN Chairman and Syrian representatives (Egyptian officers) were present. The Commission adopted a declaration and two resolutions condemning Israel for the Tawafiq incident and the subsequent encounter in the area. (*UNTSO Report*, Annex 4) The Israel Press reported the "rump" session together with the reaction of the Foreign Ministry spokesman, who reiterated that the DZ was Israel sovereign territory. "The discussion at the meeting took place unilaterally and ignored basic factors and took into consideration only part of the evidence collected by the UN military observers." (*Jer. Post*; *Ha'aretz*, 17 Feb)

Commenting on Israel's reaction on 18 Feb, Hammar-skjold said, "What is and what is not permissible in detail is something which, I think, I would prefer to see studied and discussed by the MAC itself, which is the first guide in the question." (*Jer. Post*, 19 Feb)

It was reported that the Israeli Cabinet was to consider the UN's "apparent support for the UAR." (*Jer. Post*, 21 Feb)

### FEB: UAR MOBILIZATION AND MILITARY BUILD-UP IN SINAI

[The UAR mobilized reserves on (or before?) 18 Feb, and concentrated the main striking power of the Second (Egyptian) Army in northern Sinai, in the vicinity of the Israel border, on and after 19 Feb. However, there were no UAR reports on these moves, which were secret. Lebanese papers reported on them only on and after 21 Feb, and this at first from European sources.]

**State of Emergency in UAR Army.** On 1 Feb the UAR cancelled all leaves for Southern Command soldiers and proclaimed a state of emergency in the Second (Egyptian) Army. (*R. Sawt al-Arab*, 1 Feb-BBC, 2 Feb-*IMB*, 2 Feb) Lorry loads of troops heading east rolled through Cairo and were said to be heading for the Sinai peninsula. (*Jer. Post*, 4 Feb)

On 12 Feb *al-Akhbar* reported that the UN SG had requested the UAR to refrain from any military initiative till the UN had completed the study of the MAC reports. (*Akhbar*, 12 Feb)

**Israel "Revanche Attack" on Syria Expected.** On 18 Feb *as-Sayyad*, the pro-UAR Lebanese weekly, reported that Israel was concentrating forces in the vicinity of the Sinai border. Lebanese "defence circles" had received reports that this was in preparation for a "revanche attack," which the Ben-Gurion circles found necessary in order to regain the honour lost in the Tawafiq defeat and bolster up sagging morale. (*Sayyad*, 18 Feb)

*Al-Hayat* wrote later that Israel was capable of calling up reserve forces without the fact being known. Israel's mobilization system was unique because the various units were recruited from settlers near the border areas, and mobilization was carried out without recourse to motor vehicles. Moreover, Israel's military bases were less than 100 km. from the border, facilitating rapid and unnoticeable movements. (*Hayat*, 28 Feb)

It was also reported on 18 Feb that the Arab League Council, then in session in Cairo, was informed on Is-

raeli army concentrations on both the Syrian and Egyptian frontiers. (*Hayat*, 26 Feb)

Israeli sources were reported to have stated that around 15 Feb the Russians warned the UAR of an imminent Israeli attack (see below).

**UAR Mobilization and Troop Concentrations in Sinai.** On 18 Feb, according to *al-Hayāt*, mobilization of large numbers of personnel and transport, public and private, was started and continued throughout the night and the early hours of 19 Feb. On 19 Feb, the UAR informed the Arab League of the mobilization. An "authoritative source" in Cairo said that he was proud that the concentration of troops on both fronts of the UAR was executed "inside a few hours." They were the largest since 1956 and their aim was defensive. (*Hayat* 24, 26 Feb)

Israeli Press reports estimated the strength of the Egyptian force at three divisions, including an armoured division equipped with hundreds of Russian-made tanks. Egyptian forces were massed in north-eastern Sinai, near the Israeli border: in El-Arish, Gaza, Abu Ageila and Quseima. (*Jer. Post*, 25 Feb)

**Israeli Reaction.** [There were no published reports on Israeli counter-measures, except for the above Arab reports of troop concentrations previous to the UAR concentrations. However, there was obvious tension in the country.] On 26 Feb the Minister of Justice, Mr Pinhas Rosen, stated: "There is nothing to fear. The government is convinced that there will be no war, because we have no intention to attack anyone and our neighbours will not care to attack us." (*Ha'aretz*, 28 Feb)

Israel publicly accused Egypt of "open incitement to war." The Foreign Minister, Mrs Golda Meir, met the US and UK Ambassadors. Israel was understood to have called upon the great powers to restrain Abdel-Nasser from adventurous action. (*Jer. Post*, 25 Feb) On 26 Feb the Israeli Press commented widely on the UAR military build-up. Most papers emphasized the responsibility of the powers for peace in the ME, but said that Israel had to be ready to defend itself. Israel was said to be "alert to any eventuality, but would not be easily drawn by Arab provocation." (*Jer. Post*, 26 Feb)

**Interpretation of Egyptian Motives.** [The Egyptian military build-up was apparently motivated by Abdel-Nasser's belief that Israel would attack Syria on or about 17 Feb after having "suffered the Tawafiq defeat." The southern build-up intended to deter or offset an anticipated Israeli initiative in the North.] The reasons for this "mistaken chain of thought" were commented on widely by the Israel Press (*Ha'aretz*; *Ma'ariv*, 3, 4, 5 Mar); the comments appeared to emanate from well-informed circles. The US weekly *The Reporter* summed up the story on 31 Mar: "To the UAR it appears that the Tawafiq

incident grew into something more. Though routed in the action, the local Syrian Army commanders are known to have sent back glowing accounts of their resounding victory. The falsehood grew in proportion the higher it was passed up the chain of command, until decorations for Tawafiq heroes were handed out in Damascus and stirring accounts of '200 Israelis dead' (the real number was three!) were officially spread in Cairo. The Israeli intelligence staff knew from Egyptian headquarters documents captured during the 1956 fighting that misrepresentations of this sort were the order of the day for army commanders and that they went unchallenged at higher levels. It was therefore assumed that Abdel-Nasser might easily fall to his subordinates' lies over this particular action and that in consequence he might truly fear a major Israeli counter-blow in Syria to efface the memory of the Tawafiq defeat.

"The initial troop concentrations that took place in Egypt behind the Suez Canal during the first days of Feb were largely interpreted in this light.

"But a totally new factor appears in the story on 15 Feb. The Israelis claim they have "cast-iron" evidence that on about that date the Soviet embassy in Cairo delivered a spurious warning that Israel was mobilizing for war twenty-four hours later. Abdel-Nasser ordered the general advance of his forces across the Suez Canal and up the Sinai peninsula along the lines of approach to Israel." (*Reporter*, 31 Mar)

**UAR Forces Withdrawn.** [During the month of Mar the Egyptian forces gradually withdrew from the Sinai peninsula.] The announcement of the Israel Prime Minister's impending visit to the US was seen as a factor in the easing of the tension. (*Jer. Post*; *Ha'aretz*; *Ma'ariv*, 29 Feb) Mr Ben-Gurion left for the US on 7 Mar.

**UAR Summing Up: Israeli Designs Frustrated.** On the one hand, the UAR Press and radio claimed that because Israel was beaten at Tawafiq she had sent her Ministers to Paris and London to ask for help. The Arabs were determined to reconquer Palestine and the UAR would act as the spearhead of the attack. (*Sawt al-Arab*, 26 Feb-*IMB*, 28 Feb) All Israel's designs had been defeated by the UAR. Ben-Gurion wanted to force the Arabs into peace with Israel, but UAR steadfastness had frustrated this design; Israel had been defeated on the issue of free navigation in the Suez Canal, at Tawafiq, and again when the UAR counter-concentration of troops had defeated the aim of Israeli concentrations. (*R. Cairo*, 29 Feb-*IMB*, 1 Mar)

On the other hand, UAR sources claimed that the tension was created by Israel to provide a background for the visits to the West of Ben-Gurion and other Ministers, to obtain Western guarantees for the status quo in the Middle East and to align the West against the UAR. (*IMB*, 29 Feb, 1 Mar)


## DIVERSION OF JORDAN WATERS—POLITICAL ASPECTS

[This section deals only with the political events connected with the subject.]

### BACKGROUND NOTE

**Watershed and Boundaries** (see map). The headwaters of the River Jordan lie in the foothills of the Lebanon and Hermon mountains. They are: the Banias in Syria, the Dan in Israel and the Hasbani in Lebanon. These

unite to form the River Jordan in the south of the Huleh Valley in Israel. From this point, the river flows southwards west of the international border, crossing "demilitarized zones" (DZ) (on which see p 198), until it enters the Sea of Galilee, which is entirely in Israel territory. Emerging from the lake, the river passes through the Israeli "Jordan Valley" region to a point in the neighbourhood of Naharayim; from there until south of





the Beisan Valley the middle of the river forms the boundary between Israel and Jordan. Thence until it enters the Dead Sea, the river flows entirely in Jordan territory. In Jordan it receives two main tributaries: the Yarmuk, whose source is in Syria and which constitutes the boundary between Jordan and that country and—at its southern end—the boundary between Israel and Jordan; and the Zarqa, which rises in Jordan. Watercourses (*wadis*) on both banks of the Jordan supplement the flow with seasonal rainwater.

Following is the estimated average annual flow in million cub. ms. (according to the TVA plan. UNRWA Bulletin of Economic Development, No. 14, July 1956):

Hasbani	157
Banias	157
(according to the figures of Israel	
Water Planning Authority: Hasbani	
141; Banias 114)	
Dan	258
<b>TOTAL Jordan headwaters</b>	<b>572</b>
Add: rainwater and local sources	
(between Huleh and Sea of Galilee)	328
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>900</b>
Less: Evaporation in Huleh and Sea	
of Galilee	—362
Jordan (at outlet from Sea of Galilee)	538
Yarmuk	475
Perennial wadis between Sea of Galilee	
and Dead Sea	505
Less: present irrigation use of wadis	—268
Jordan at entry to Dead Sea	1,250
<b>TOTAL evaporation losses and irrigation</b>	
<b>use of perennial wadis above Dead Sea</b>	<b>630</b>
<b>TOTAL estimated flow of Jordan river</b>	
<b>Watershed</b>	<b>1,880</b>

**The Problem.** Although the waters of the Jordan are scanty in comparison with those of other rivers (the annual flow is 1,880 million cubic metres, in comparison with, e.g. 84,000 million in the Nile), they are of the highest importance in the economy of the arid area through which the river flows. Plans for the coordinated regional utilization of the Jordan waters have been proposed ever since the thirties, but up to 1956 only about 14 per cent was used for irrigation in the adjoining areas of Israel, Syria and Jordan. The main obstacles, apart from finance, are political: the hostility between the Arab countries and Israel and, to a lesser extent, disagreements between the Arab countries themselves.

**The Israeli Project.** The Jewish community in Palestine proposed plans for the utilization of the Jordan waters even in the days of the British Mandate. Israel's plan is to transfer the waters to the South and the Negev, where most of the agricultural soil is to be found but there are insufficient water resources. Israel started work on the diversion of the river in autumn 1953. For engineering reasons the starting point of the diversion canal was fixed in the DZ. Syria objected, mainly on the ground of the special status of the DZ, and submitted the matter to the Security Council. Israel agreed to postpone further work in this sector and these operations were suspended. In Dec of the same year, Israel restarted the work outside

the DZ. Later, she altered her plan so as to draw the water from the Sea of Galilee at some distance from the border. Details of this change were first published in 1959. During the same year, the growing urgency of the project was widely felt in Israel, owing to three consecutive winters of drought, starting with that of 1957/58, which intensified the shortage of water and compelled her to utilize her underground reserves more rapidly.

**The Jordanian Project.** The Jordanian plans, which had also been initiated before the Palestine War, are mainly concerned with the irrigation of the Jordan Valley. The latest comprehensive plan (the Baker-Harza Plan) is based on the utilization of the waters of the Yarmuk, without making use of Israel territory, and its purpose is the irrigation of both banks of the Jordan.

In 1958, Jordan began the execution of a minor part of the project, including the construction of a diversion dam and tunnel at Adasiyah (which enables Israel territory to be bypassed) and a channel on the eastern side of the Jordan Valley only. This is known as the Eastern Ghor project. It is financed by the US Government and will cost \$12 million.

**Regional Project.** In 1952/53 UNRWA carried out a study of a regional project without regard to political boundaries. During 1953–1955 technical and political negotiations with Israel and the Arab countries for the coordinated execution of this project were conducted by Eric Johnston, the personal representative of President Eisenhower. During these negotiations the original plan was modified. In Johnston's last proposals in 1955, the Jordan waters were allotted as follows:

Jordan	— 794 million cubic metres per annum
Israel	— 394 million cubic metres per annum
Syria	— 45 million cubic metres per annum

Israel's right to convey her share to the Negev (i.e. outside the Jordan watershed) was recognized. However, the Arab governments refused to accord political approval to the Johnston plan and to cooperate in its implementation. Since 1955 no further negotiations have been conducted.

During these negotiations the Arab countries made their first efforts to devise a unified Arab plan but dropped this matter as well in 1955.

In 1959, when the issue came up again politically the only projects in execution were those of Jordan and Israel. Both fitted into the last Johnston plan.

## SYNOPSIS

In the autumn of 1959, the question of the Jordan water was brought back into the limelight by a discussion of the issue in the Arab League; declarations by Israel of her determination to carry out her project; and a call by the Jordanian Premier to prevent her from doing so.

The main question discussed by the Arabs throughout 1960 was how to prevent Israel from executing her project. Both military action and diversion of the headwaters of the Jordan were proposed.

In Dec 1959 the issue made the headlines in the UAR. A special ministerial committee was appointed to study the issue and submitted political and technical plans to President Abdel-Nasser. In 1960, however, relatively little attention was paid to the issue in the UAR. In Dec 1960, it was announced that a plan for diverting the Banias river in Syria had been completed, but nothing was said of its execution.

Lebanon made much of a project to divert the Hasbani river and its tributary, the Wazani (the latter project,

like those of Jordan and Israel, could be fitted into the Johnston plan), but by the end of the year no action had yet been taken to carry it out.

Jordan demanded action to prevent the execution of the Israeli project but also expressed apprehension lest the UAR and Lebanese plans should affect her water supply.

The issue was discussed by the Arab League and an inter-Arab technical committee was set up to work out a unified diversion scheme. In the Council's resolutions both military and technical aspects were mentioned, but no definite decisions were adopted until the end of the year.

Israel issued warnings that a threat to the water resources was a threat to peace.

#### 1959: THE ISSUE COMES UP ANEW

**Sept 1959: In the Arab League.** At the Arab League Council in Casablanca (Sept 1959), the question of the diversion of the Jordan was raised by the Saudi Arabian delegate. After a brief discussion, the Council decided to establish a committee (of the UAR, Jordan, and Lebanon) to study the problem and present its recommendations to the next meeting. (*Hayat*, 24 Aug, 2 Sept, 27 Dec 1959)

**Oct–Nov 1959: The Issue in Israel** was publicly raised by Moshe Dayan (formerly Chief of General Staff and Mapai candidate to the 4th Knesset). He declared (on 4 Oct 1959) in an election campaign speech, that the next government would divert the Jordan waters to the Negev, with or without the Arabs' agreement. (*Ha'aretz*, 5 Oct 1959)

In another speech (on 17 Oct 1959), Dayan was reported to have declared, "If the Arabs will not cooperate in solving the Jordan waters' issue, we shall act as we did in the Gulf of Aqaba, and take the water by force." (*Ha'aretz*, 18 Oct 1959) In a letter to the Editor, Dayan denied this version: "I said that if the Arabs do not consent to an agreed system for distributing the Jordan waters and try to deny us our share we shall take our waters even if we have to overcome their opposition by force." (*Ha'aretz*, 19 Oct 1959)

On 18 Nov 1959, Mr. Levi Eshkol, designated Minister of Finance in the new government, said that the diversion of the Jordan waters had become a top priority project and that its first stage (costing about IL150 million) would be completed within five years. (*Ha'aretz*, 19 Nov 1959)

**Nov: Jordan Calls for Action.** On 17 Nov 1959, the Jordanian Premier called for concerted Arab action to prevent the execution of the Israeli project. (*Difa*, 18 Nov 1959) The *Economist* described his speech as a challenge "clearly intended for Cairo" and regarded the subsequent activities of the UAR as a response to it. (*Economist*, 12 Dec 1959)

**Dec 1959: UAR Plans Unilateral Diversion.** *Al-Ahrām* reported that the Jordan waters issue was prominent in the current deliberations of the UAR Ministers with President Abdel-Nasser. It was decided to summon a special Arab League Council meeting to discuss the "Israeli threats" to divert the Jordan waters. (*Ahrām*, 2 Dec 1959)

On 29 Nov 1959 Abdel-Nasser published a decree appointing a ministerial committee headed by Abd al-Latif al-Baghdadi, Deputy President, to deal with the issue. (*Ahrām*, 2 Dec 1959)

On 8 Dec 1959, two reports on this subject were sub-

mitted to the President: one political prepared by al-Baghdadi and one technical, prepared by Nur ad-Din Kahalah, chairman of the Syrian Executive Council. (*Ahrām*, 5, 6, 7, 8 Dec; *Hayat*, 9 Dec 1959)

[Up to the time of writing there has been no authorized report of the "technical" proposals referred to. *Al-Ayyam* (Damascus) reported on 9 Dec 1959 from Beirut that an Arab plan (it was not stated that this was the UAR plan) had been worked out in two stages. In the first, the water would be diverted westwards from southern Lebanon so as to deny it to Israel and would flow into the Mediterranean in the neighbourhood of Tyre. In the second stage, which would require very large funds, the Jordan would be diverted into Syria and would no longer flow through the Sea of Galilee. Possibly, the "second stage" refers to the "Arab Plan" of 1955, which proposed the diversion of the Hasbani from Lebanon into the Baniyas in Syria, and the pumping of the water from there into the Yarmuk—a very complicated and expensive plan. (See *UNRWA Bulletin of Economic Development* No. 14, Beirut, July 1956.)]

[On the UAR plans published in Feb, 1960, see below.]

Threats were also heard in the UAR that military measures might be taken to deny the water to Israel.

*Al Gumhuriyah* justified Arab military measures to prevent Israel from "executing its filthy plots" on the basis of self-defence. (*Gumhuriyah*, Cairo, 2 Dec 1959)

**Dec 1959: Inter-Arab Activities.** On 26 Dec 1959 the three-state committee (UAR, Jordan and Lebanon) set up by the League Council in Casablanca concluded its meetings in Cairo (19–26 Dec 1959) by urging the Arab states to adopt all necessary measures to prevent Israel from proceeding with its "aggressive plans." (*Hayat*, 24, 27 Dec 1959)

It was reported that Lebanese political circles suspected a possible effort to revive the Johnston plan. (*Jaridah*, 12 Jan)

On 27 Dec 1959, an Iraqi Foreign Ministry spokesman, commenting on the issue, affirmed his government's "close cooperation . . . and its united stand" with the Arab states "in order to frustrate the new Israeli aggression." (*Zaman*, 28 Dec 1959)

**Dec 1959–Jan 1960: Western Comments.** The issue drew the attention of the world Press.

*The Times* commented: "The immediate alternative to complete anarchy can only be some international guarantee that all the riparian countries take water for their individual projects only up to certain defined limits." (*Times*, 22 Dec 1959) *The New York Times* warned: "A new and potentially dangerous dispute is simmering over the old problem of how to utilize the water resources of the Jordan River basin." (*NYT*, 2 Jan)

#### JAN 1960: LEBANESE INITIATIVE

During Jan 1960, Lebanon showed increasing interest in the issue, while the UAR radio and Press almost entirely dropped it.

On 15 Jan, the Lebanese Foreign Minister informed the Chamber of Deputies of his government's intention to request a special budgetary allocation of about LL12 million (about \$4 million) in order to start diverting into Lebanon "the Lebanese waters flowing into the Jordan's tributaries." (*Hayat*, 16 Jan) ["Lebanese waters" means the Hasbani and its tributary, al-Wazani.]

[Up to the end of 1960 no such request was actually submitted to the Chamber.]

The Lebanese Press showed much interest in the legal

aspects of a possible Hasbani diversion. (For a detailed exposition—see *Orient*, 31 Jan.)

**Jan: Israel Warns Lebanon.** Golda Meir, Israel Foreign Minister, commented (in a Press conference in Paris on 20 Jan) that any Arab diversion of the Jordan's tributaries would constitute "an outright attack on one of Israel's means of livelihood" and expressed her hope that the Lebanese decision would remain no more than an oral threat. (*Ha'aretz*, 21, 22 Jan)

**Jan: Lebanese Reaction.** A Lebanese Foreign Ministry spokesman said that Mrs Meir's statement would not affect the attitude of Lebanon or any other Arab country. Lebanon's decision, he added, was based on its clear right to the waters of a river rising in its own territory and on international law. (*Hayat*, 22 Jan)

**Jan: US and USSR Attitudes.** The US was reported to have counselled moderation to the Lebanese Government. (*Hawadith*, 29 Jan) The Russian Ambassador was reported to have discussed the issue with the Lebanese Foreign Minister. (*Sahafah*, 21 Jan)

Moscow Radio later attacked the Johnston plan as an American-Israeli imperialistic design which the Arabs had rightly rejected. (*R. Moscow*, 14 June—*IMB*, 15 June)

**Jan: Foreign Comment.** *The Economist* wrote: "Probably the Lebanese will not get around to putting the scheme into practice, possibly they never even intended to do so. The threat alone is enough to help Beirut, commonly suspected of half-heartedness towards Israel, to hold its head high at the coming conference of Arab Foreign Ministers in Cairo." (*Economist*, 30 Jan)

The *Christian Science Monitor*, commenting on Abdel-Nasser's reserved attitude, said: "Mr Nasser has just reached an agreement with the Sudan to assure against too great diversion of waters from the Nile River before it flows into Egypt. Ethiopia, Uganda and Kenya might make claims for water from its tributaries. Diversion of water from tributaries of the Jordan without Israel's consent would set a precedent in their favour which might embarrass the UAR." (*Christian Science Monitor*, 15 Feb)

#### JAN: JORDAN'S ATTITUDE

[Jordan showed interest in concerted Arab action to foil the Israeli project, but because of the possible damage to her own project also expressed anxiety about the Lebanese and UAR diversion plans.]

*Ad-Difa'* proposed that the Arabs should call for a special meeting of the UN General Assembly to discuss the Israeli project. (*Difa'*, 2 Dec 1959)

King Hussein said on 20 Jan: "There is a definite danger as a result of this attempt [to divert the Jordan River] by Israel. All the Arab states should consider this question their own responsibility. They should also take a unified stand in regard to it, and should draw up a firm plan of approach." (*R. Amman*, 20 Jan—*BBC*, 22 Jan)

On 11 Feb, Suwaylim Haddād, chief engineer in charge of the Eastern Ghor project, declared: "Any individual project to divert the Hasbani and the Baniyas without considering Jordan's needs will cause Jordan great and direct damage." (*Difa'*, 12 Feb—see also *Falastin*, 21 Jan)

#### JAN-FEB: ARAB DEMARCHE AT UN

*Al-Ahrām* reported that Dr Fawzi, the UAR Foreign Minister, had told Hammarskjöld, then on a short visit

to Cairo, that Israel's attempt to divert the Jordan was a flagrant violation of the UN resolution and the truce agreements. (*Ahrām*, 22 Jan)

On 5 Feb representatives of five Arab states (the UAR, Jordan, Iraq, Lebanon and Yemen) called on the UN SG in New York to express their opposition to Israel's plans to trap the waters of the Jordan. (*NYT*, 6 Feb)

#### FEB: THE ISSUE AT THE ARAB LEAGUE COUNCIL

The issue was discussed at the Arab Foreign Ministers' Council which met in Cairo between 8–29 Feb (see pp 127–8.)

**Disagreement on Arab Diversion Plans.** According to *al-Hayāt*, the UAR and Lebanon informed the Council that they had already prepared plans to divert the Jordan tributaries: the Baniyas in Syria and the Hasbani in Lebanon. The Jordanian delegate demanded that they should be diverted into the Yarmuk River; otherwise "Jordan will incur very serious damage." (*Hayat*, 12 Feb)

During the deliberations "it became clear" (according to *al-Hayāt*) that the various "Arab diversion plans lacked depth and extensive study." The Arab experts (invited to take part) differed on the practicability of the plans, the cost as compared with the potential benefits, the sources of funds, and the possible harm to Jordan's economy. (Source—see below.)

**Military Action Instead of Diversion?** These difficulties, said *al-Hayāt*, induced the members of the Council "to freeze all these projects" and instead "to obtain the advice of the military experts." (*Hayat*, 25 Feb) The latter said that "Israel would react to any Arab plan to divert the tributaries of the Jordan... which would in the end oblige the Arabs to take military measures... So why should we not react militarily to any Israeli action to divert the Jordan?" This "logical analysis" received general support and the discussion closed with the adoption of "the stand presented by the Arab military experts." (*Hayat*, 13, 14, 25 Feb)

**29 Feb: The Council's Resolution.** The resolution adopted at the final meeting of the Council (on 29 Feb) reflected in its first paragraph the emphasis on the military approach: "Israel's attempts to divert the Jordan River waters are an aggressive action against the Arabs—an action that justifies legitimate self-defence by all the Arab states acting in solidarity."

Para. 2 stated: "The waters of the Jordan River basin must be exploited for the benefit of the Arab countries and the Arabs of Palestine... The Arab states should unilaterally and collectively hasten to realize this."

Consequently, the Council recommended that a special technical committee, attached to the Arab League, be formed: "The committee will co-ordinate activities in this respect and follow up their implementation." (*Hayat*, 1 Mar)

**Feb: Ben-Gurion: "Arab threats are Bluff."** In an interview with the *Sunday Times*, the Israel PM said that "the threats of President Nasser or the League [on the diversion of the Jordan's water] are bluff." He added: "If they really intend to attack us, let them try, we are ready to give them a welcome." (*Sunday Times*, 21 Feb)

**Foreign Comment.** *The Times* wrote: "Once again the Arabs' own rivalries and suspicions have prevented them from adopting a coherent policy. True, the resolution...



says that Israel's diversion of the waters would be regarded as an act of aggression... but it is not clear what the resolution means. Israel proposes to pump water from the Sea of Galilee, which is entirely surrounded by her own territory. To stop her by force would mean attacking across her borders, and a preventive war seems to have been ruled out. The alternative is to divert the head-waters of the Jordan which rise in Arab lands. This would be costly and wasteful and there is no indication how such an act of spite would be financed. It would also damage Jordan." (*Times*, 2 Mar)

**Mar-June: Issue Neglected.** [Following the League Council meeting the issue disappeared from the headlines of the Arabic Press until July.]

#### JULY-NOV: FURTHER INTER-ARAB DELIBERATIONS AND AN ISRAELI WARNING

**July: Lebanon to Conduct a Technical Survey.** It was reported that the Lebanese Government had approved the expenditure of LL120,000 (about \$38,000) on an extensive survey of the possibilities of diverting the Hasbani River inside Lebanon. (*Anwar*, Beirut, 27 July)

**Aug: Arab League Foreign Ministers' Conference in Shtura, Lebanon.** During the Arab Foreign Ministers' conference at Shtura (see p 129 ff), the issue was again brought up. [However, the members were occupied with other urgent questions and it drew little attention. The Arab Press did not mention it, although it covered the conference extensively.] The following resolution was adopted:

1. To invite the special technical committee to resume its technical activities and submit its report to the Secretariat before the meeting of the Foreign Ministers to be held after the forthcoming UN session.
2. To charge the permanent Military Committee attached to the Joint Defence Council with laying down an overall plan to meet all possibilities arising from Israel's intention to divert the river, and taking into consideration the Arab League resolution of Feb 1960 in the matter. Arab League member states which were not members of the joint defence pact were entitled to delegate military representatives to the committee. (*Hayat*, 29 Aug)

**Oct: UAR National Assembly Discusses Diversion of Jordan River.** In answer to a question in the National Assembly, the Minister for Military Affairs, Lt.-General Muhammad Ibrahim, declared on 24 Oct that the UAR "was giving and would continue to give the most careful attention to the Jordan River issue." He promised to submit to the National Assembly "a complete report giving steps taken and contemplated in the matter." (*Eg. Gaz.*, 25 Oct)

In his report, on 31 Oct, he discussed extensively the historical background of the issue, stating that Israel intended to use the waters not only for the settlement of an additional three million Jews but also in order to strengthen the imperialistic base in the heart of the Arab

lands. The only UAR measures he mentioned were the appointment of the Baghdadi Committee in 1959 (see above) and its participation in the inter-Arab technical committee. In reply to members' questions, Field Marshal Abdal-Hakim Amer said that "the UAR had completed the study of the Baniyas River project," and that the inter-Arab committee of experts would discuss recent developments. (*Eg. Gaz.*, 1 Nov)

**Nov: Technical Committee Proposes Outline of Arab Plan.** On 5 Nov the Arab Technical Committee met in Cairo, with representatives from the UAR, Jordan, Lebanon and the League participating. (*Hayat*, 6 Nov; *BBC*, 9 Nov) On 10 Nov it adopted an Arab Plan to exploit the Jordan tributaries in the Arab countries. (*Hayat*, 11 Nov) The decisions were kept secret, but *al-Hayat* reported that the plan called for the diversion of the Hasbani inside Lebanon, the channelling of its surplus waters to the Baniyas in Syria, and the diversion of the surplus waters of the Baniyas to the Yarmuk for the benefit of Jordan. The cost of diverting all the tributaries of the Jordan was estimated at about LL20 million (about \$6.35 million); LL12 million to divert the Hasbani; LL6 million to divert the Baniyas and LL2 million to divert the Dan River [which is entirely in Israel territory]. (*Hayat*, 10, 12 Nov) The report was to be discussed at the Arab Foreign Ministers' Conference at the beginning of 1961. (*R. Cairo*, 22 Nov-*IMB*, 23 Nov)

**Arab Comments.** *Al-Hayat* wrote: "The committee succeeded in reaching an agreement in principle on the need for joint action by all Arab states concerned, with any eventual expenses to be shared by the Arab League member states... Now it is up to the League members, especially Iraq and Saudi Arabia, to say whether they are ready to contribute funds to such an important scheme and thus demonstrate their solidarity." (*Hayat*, 12 Nov)

According to *al-Hayat*, the Lebanese Government had approved the Committee's plan and would cooperate with the UAR in speeding up the diversion work. (*Hayat*, 12 Nov)

[No official comment on the proposals by the UAR and Jordan was reported.]

The Ba'ath Party in Beirut issued a statement on 19 Nov attacking the plan to divert the tributaries and urging the Arab states to take military measures to prevent Israel from diverting the Jordan. (*Sahafah*, 19 Nov)

**Nov: Israel's Warning.** Golda Meir, the Foreign Minister, declared at a Press conference on 20 Nov that any move by the Arab countries to divert the head waters of the Jordan to prevent the implementation of Israel's irrigation project would be regarded as "a threat to peace." "Cutting off the water resources of any country must be regarded as a threat to peace," she said. (*Ha'aretz*, 21 Nov)

[No further political developments on this issue were reported until the end of the year. Meanwhile, Jordan and Israel continued work on their respective projects inside their own territories.]



## THE ARAB REFUGEES—POLITICAL ASPECTS

NOTE: The question of the Arab refugees was discussed on two main levels:

1. At the UN General Assembly, on the presentation of the annual report of the Director of UNRWA (text below; Synopsis pp 170-71);

2. As an issue between the Arab governments, involving plans to establish a Palestinian Entity and a Palestinian Army (for references see below under The Arab Countries and the Arab Refugees).

### AT THE 15TH SESSION OF THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY

#### BACKGROUND: 1959: THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S REPORT

[Each year since 1950, the UN General Assembly has occupied itself with the refugee problem, discussed the report of the Director of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for the Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) and approved the Agency's annual budget. UNRWA was established by the General Assembly in 1949 and commenced work in May 1950.]

**SG Recommends Development for Reintegration of Refugees.** At the 14th General Assembly in Dec 1959 the SG submitted a report [first distributed in June 1959] containing recommendations for the continuation of UNRWA's activities pending the reintegration of the refugees into the economic life of the Near East. The report included a general analysis of the situation.

While discussing the psychological, political and economic factors in the refugee problem, the SG paid special attention to the economic aspect, i.e. "the reintegration of close to one million Palestine refugees into the productive life of the Near East," in the framework of the general economic situation and prospects of the area as a whole. He concluded that provided large-scale investments in agriculture and industry were available, and certain other economic conditions were met, the area as a whole was economically viable and the reintegration of the refugees into productive life was "perfectly within reach." The refugees should be regarded not as an economic liability but as an asset for the future, a desirable reservoir of manpower for the development of the area.

On the question of "where the integration of the refugees can or should come about," he stated that there was "no immediate danger of overdevelopment in any particular part of the area." On the political aspect of the question, he cited the UN resolution 194(III) [for text see below], and said that its implementation would involve the integration of the refugees into the productive life of Israel as well as of the Arab countries, in accordance with the choice of the refugees.

**Political Problems Involved.** The SG mentioned three

political problems which were hampering full-scale economic development, on both a regional and a national basis: the Palestine problem, inter-Arab relationships, and the problem of Arab economic cooperation. There had been progress in regard to the last two aspects, but none was in view towards the solution of the Palestine problem. "In these circumstances," the SG concluded, "it is not adequate to direct attention primarily to the relationship which exists between these political problems and the question of the refugees. In fact, a solution of those political problems should be sought, *inter alia*, in order to create conditions for a sound general economic development in the area, irrespective of its significance for the reintegration of the refugees. If the problems are solved sufficiently well to provide for such conditions, the proper political setting would probably *ipso facto* be created also for a solution of the refugee problem in its political aspects."

**The Refugees as a Human Problem.** Turning to the third factor, the refugees as a human problem, the SG said that reintegration must be freely accepted if it was to yield lasting results. There were indications that the refugees were not ready to accept integration "unless they have been given freedom of choice in accordance with the UN resolution or in some other acceptable way..."; however, he continued, "a *de facto* economic integration... would not prejudice any rights established by the resolution." The SG concluded that "the perspective is not a discouraging one, provided that the world is willing to assist the region in its economic development and provided, further, that, step by step and as economic conditions permit, progress regarding the political and psychological obstacles is sought in a constructive spirit and with a sense of justice and realism." (*UN General Assembly, A/4121, 15 June 1959*)

**UNRWA Mandate Extended.** [The upshot of the debate at the General Assembly was, as in previous years, a resolution to approve funds for relief activities, to extend the mandate of UNRWA for another three years and review its status after two years (i.e. in 1961), to instruct it to continue its relief operations and, in so far as financially possible, to expand its programme of refugee self-support and vocational training.]

**Palestine Conciliation Commission Asked to Take Action.** It was also decided to request the Palestine Conciliation Commission (PCC) to make further efforts to secure the implementation of paragraph 11 of the GA resolution No. 194 (III) of 1948, calling for repatriation or compensation for the refugees.

[The PCC was established in 1948 to bring about conciliation between the Arab countries and Israel. All its efforts during 1949-1952 proved fruitless and since 1953 it confined itself to the recording and evaluation of Arab abandoned properties in Israel, and the release of blocked Arab accounts in Israeli banks.]

#### SEPT 1960: ANNUAL REPORT OF UNRWA DIRECTOR FOR 1959-1960

On 9 Oct Dr John H. Davis, Director of UNRWA, submitted to the GA the Agency's annual report, for the period July 1959-June 1960.

**NOTE:** The following deals only with the general observations on the refugee problem which are included in the introduction. The report also includes a survey of UNRWA's activities, budget and programmes, and statistics on the refugees and refugee camps. It was published as Supplement No. 14 A/4478 to the Official Records of the 15th Session of the UN GA, New York, 1960.

**Number of Registered Refugees.** According to UNRWA's statistics, the number of registered refugees had risen since June 1952 by approximately 238,000 to a total of 1,120,889 in 1960—an average annual net increase of some 30,000. The report noted that these statistics were "based on the Agency's registration records which do not necessarily reflect the actual refugee population owing to factors such as the high rate of unreported deaths, undetected false registrations, etc." (*Report, pp 1, 13*)

**No Progress on Rehabilitation.** The report stated that though UNRWA had been charged to carry out functions "broadly identified as relief and rehabilitation," relief had continued to absorb most of its funds and efforts, whereas in rehabilitation, which was intended to render a substantial number of refugees self-supporting and thereby achieve a gradual diminution of the burden of relief, it had failed to achieve any appreciable results. (*Report, p 1*)

**UN Resolution Not Implemented.** Rehabilitation through repatriation or compensation according to UN resolution 194(III) of Dec 1948, which had been reaffirmed annually thereafter, had not been implemented.

The relevant paragraph (11) of this resolution reads as follows: "The General Assembly... resolves that the refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their neighbours should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date, and that compensation should be paid for the property of those choosing not to return and for loss of or damage to property which, under principles of international law or in equity, should be made good by the governments or authorities responsible."

For the refugees, the report stated, the "promise" made in this paragraph, continued to be "the one acceptable long-term solution to their problem and they are embittered because it still stands unfulfilled." (*Report, p 1*)

**Political, Economic and Educational Obstacles to Rehabilitation.** Speaking of the "stagnation" of the refugee

problem, Davis wrote: "While certain much emphasized political factors also have tended to retard progress on the refugee problem, in the director's opinion economic and educational limitations have been dominant."

A major problem was a lack of skills on the part of the majority of the refugees. "Over two thirds of the urban refugee population (i.e. 20 per cent of the total populace) almost immediately became selfsupporting in other Arab countries because they possessed skills which are useful in those countries. The remaining 75-80 per cent were farmers, unskilled workers, the children, the aged and the sick." The farmers and unskilled had proved to be unemployable in their host countries and the maturing youth lacked the opportunity to acquire the necessary skills. The report particularly emphasized the plight of the refugee youth—"unskilled and therefore unemployed, restless and frustrated." (*Report pp 1, 2, 5*)

**No Quick Solution in Sight; Solution Does Not Rest With Arab Governments.** Davis concluded that for political as well as for economic reasons there was no quick solution of the refugee problem in sight. An early political settlement of the Palestine issue seemed improbable. The refugees' desire to return to their homeland was as strong as ever; they were not prepared to accept any other answer, and they were supported in this by the people and the governments of the host countries. Equally important was the fact that the refugees, lacking skills and education, "were not readily employable in an era characterized by technological progress." Davis also warned against "facile assumptions" that it rested with the Arab host governments to solve the refugee problem; "in their own strenuous efforts to achieve technological progress" they were "already struggling against great odds." He praised the Arab countries for their assistance to UNRWA, for bearing the burdens of the refugees "with patience and courage," and for "demonstrating deep fraternal sympathy for the refugees." (*Report, pp 2, 3, 4, 5*)

**UNRWA's Role: Relief and Education, not Resettlement.** UNRWA, stated Dr Davis, could not solve the refugee problem. "Any general solution to the complex Palestine problem, of which the refugee problem is a part, will be brought about by... forces which will govern and shape the future of the Middle East. UNRWA can and should work in harmony with these forces. Ten years of UNRWA history bear out the fact that major development projects designed with the specific purpose of resettling refugees are unacceptable to refugees and host governments alike... Major development projects should proceed without direct reference to the resettlement of refugees..."

"In the Director's opinion, the Agency should concentrate its efforts during the new mandate period on: (1) administering relief (including food, shelter assistance and health services); (2) providing general education, both elementary and secondary; (3) teaching vocational skills, and awarding university scholarships; and (4) offering small loans and grants to individual refugees who have skills and want to become self-employed."

Davis laid special stress on education and vocational training with a view to alleviating the problem of unemployability. In conclusion, he urged the GA to approve a three-year programme (up to June 1963) for relief and education, detailed in his report, requiring a yearly expenditure of approximately \$40 million. (*Report, pp 2, 4*)

**Gravity of Problem.** "With the passage of time," Davis wrote, "the task of solving the refugee problem grows ever more complex," because of the scarcity of jobs and the lack of skills, and even more so if the refugee youth did not receive timely specialized training.

"To the Director it appears certain," Davis concluded, "that some responsibility for international assistance will continue for a decade or longer. Not to recognize this fact and act accordingly would without doubt prove far more expensive than to provide such assistance in an appropriate and timely manner. The Palestine refugee problem has a bearing on the stability and peace of the Middle East and hence on the stability and peace of the world."

**Arab Comment.** Jordanian and Lebanese comment showed satisfaction with the report. Commentators underlined two points: Davis' warning against the assumption that the solving of the refugees problem rested with the host governments, and his assertion that the refugees regarded the UN resolution 194 (III) as the only acceptable solution. The Jordanian commentator declared that the final solution was an Arab Palestine, and that this solution would be achieved on the soil of Palestine itself. (*Falastin*, 11 Oct; *R. Beirut*, 11 Oct-BBC, 13 Oct)

**Israel Comment.** The Israeli Press was sharply critical of the report; it declared that Davis had not proposed any constructive solution, and that, by his failure to suggest a plan for a permanent settlement, he helped to obstruct such a plan. Several papers stated that it was difficult to avoid the impression that the report indicated submission to the Arab governments—which they explained on the ground that the UNRWA Director depended for the fulfilment of his limited task on the goodwill of the Arab rulers in whose countries he was working.

Other points of criticism were: The report ran counter to the SG's conclusion in 1959, advocating absorption of the refugees through development in their host countries (see p 210). The Clapp Committee, appointed by the UN more than 11 years before, had proposed plans for the settlement of refugees in Syria, Jordan and Lebanon. Experience had shown that it was possible to settle the refugees in the Arab countries. The numbers of refugees given by the report were exaggerated; according to another report they numbered 700,000, of whom 200,000 had already found permanent livelihoods. The opinions expressed by Davis were apt to strengthen the illusion of the refugees that they might one day return to Israel. The Arab rulers were determined to exploit the failure to solve the problem as a political weapon against Israel. (*Ha'aretz*; *Davar*; *Herut*; *Hatsofeh*; *Jer. Post*; *Haboker*, 11 Oct, according to *Kol Israel*, 11 Oct-BBC 13 Oct; *Al Hamishmar*, 12 Oct)

#### NOV: DISCUSSION OF THE REFUGEE PROBLEM AT THE SPECIAL POLITICAL COMMITTEE OF THE UN GA

Notes: 1. For views on the refugee problem voiced during the general debate, see pp 177-9.

2. The official records of the Special Political Committee include only a précis of the speeches; when these are used as a source, quotation marks therefore indicate a quotation of the précis and not of the full speech.

The debate on the annual report of the Director of UNRWA in the Special Political Committee of the UN GA was opened on 14 Nov by Dr Davis, who reiterated the main points of his report (see above).

**Shukairy Proposes Appointment of Custodian for Refugee Property and Enlargement of PCC; Threatens War.** The main speaker on behalf of the Arab countries was Ahmad Shukairy, a Palestinian Arab representing Saudi Arabia at the UN (15 Nov).

He reiterated his views on the responsibility of Zionism and imperialism for the creation of the refugee problem and the basic Arab attitude that the refugees could be satisfied only by their return to Palestine; meanwhile UN relief must continue. He demanded the implementation of the GA resolutions on the refugees, especially resolution 194 (III) (see above), and made two additional proposals: (1) the appointment of a "UN General Administrator" for property abandoned by the Arab refugees [in Israel]; (2) the expansion of the PCC by the addition of three members "representing the Eastern bloc headed by the Soviet Union" and three from uncommitted nations from Asia, Africa and Latin America. [The PCC consists of three members, from France, the US and Turkey.]

"If we fail to act as we should act, a solution to the problem would be sought outside the UN," Shukairy declared. The refugees would take the law in their hands, which "simply means rising to arms. It means war and all the misery and sorrow of war." (*A/SPC/SR 200*, 15 Nov; *NYT*, 16 Nov)

**Attitude of Other Arab Representatives.** All Arab representatives demanded the implementation of resolution 194 (III), and all—except Lybia—also demanded measures to protect the refugees' property in Israel and administer it for their benefit. The representatives of Lebanon, Morocco, Sudan, Tunis and Yemen explicitly proposed the appointment of a custodian; the Lebanese and Tunisian representatives mentioned Davis for this post. The UAR representative quoted GA resolution 394 (V) on the establishment of an office for this purpose. The Iraqi representative proposed the setting up of an administration for refugee property. The Jordanian delegation proposed that a rental from the refugees' property should be paid and placed into a special fund for their benefit, pending their return to their former homes.

The Arab representatives generally criticized the lack of purposeful activity on part of the PCC; but only those of Morocco, Tunisia, Sudan and Yemen followed Shukairy's lead in proposing its enlargement. The Iraqi representative said that the PCC did not serve any purpose. (*A/SPC/SR 201*, 16 Nov (UAR); 205, 22 Nov (Tunisia); 208, 25 Nov (Lebanon); 209, 28 Nov (Jordan, Morocco); 210, 28 Nov (Lybia, Yemen); 211, 29 Nov (Iraq, Sudan))

On 9 Nov the Arab representatives requested the Special Political Committee to permit a four-man delegation of the Palestinian Arabs to attend the debate. (*Hayat*, 10 Nov) Israel, supported by France, the Netherlands, the UK and the US, objected to the attendance of refugee representatives in an official capacity. The chairman ruled that they would not be accorded an official status and agreed to them addressing the Committee on an informative basis only. (*Ha'aretz*, 18 Nov) Emil Al-Ghūri and Izzāt Tannūs addressed the committee on 17 and 29 Nov respectively. (*Hayat*, 18, 30 Nov)

**Israel: No Repatriation Before Peace Negotiations; Conditions for Compensation; Custodian Unacceptable.** Michael Comay, the Israeli representative speaking on 28 Nov, stated that Israel refused to consider any general return of Arab refugees in the present circumstances. He added that peace negotiations must come first; the refugee problem could not be separated from the general



question of Arab-Israeli relations. "We cannot now contemplate," he said, "a fresh influx of Arabs who have been nurtured in hatred toward Israel for eleven years." Referring to UN resolution 19 (III), he declared that "it gives no unqualified right of return."

He challenged the authority of the Assembly to confer any such right "on any individuals to enter the territory of any sovereign state." He added that the resolution included "two express, built-in qualifications which many speakers had been ignoring: one was that returning Arabs must be 'willing to live at peace with their neighbours.'" This was not the fact at present; Qassim and Abdel-Nasser had been stating that the Arabs were still at war with Israel and must destroy her. The other reservation was that the resolution should be carried out "as soon as practicable," i.e. when normal and peaceful conditions had been restored.

Comay said that Israel was prepared to pay compensation for the refugees' property, even in advance of peace negotiations, on three conditions: if the refugees were integrated into the Arab world; if international financial aid offered in 1955 was available; and if payment was balanced against Jewish losses in Palestine and Jewish property left behind in Arab countries by half a million Jews who had settled in Israel. (*A/SPC/SR 209, 28 Nov*; quotations from *NYT, 29 Nov*)

On the proposal to appoint a custodian, Comay said: "No provisions of the UN Charter could possibly authorize the appointment of an outside custodian of such property and there is not the slightest prospect that the Israeli Government would accept one." (*NYT, 30 Nov*)

**Countries Supporting Arab Demands on UN Resolution 194 (III).** The representatives of the following countries gave their unqualified support to the Arab demand to implement UN resolution 194 (III), quoting the UNRWA Director's conclusions (see above) in support of their attitude: Eastern Bloc: USSR, Bulgaria [there were no speakers on behalf of other countries of this bloc]; Muslim countries: Afghanistan, Guinea, Indonesia, Malaya, Pakistan; other countries: Cyprus, Greece, India, Yugoslavia.

However, only the representatives of Guinea, Indonesia, Pakistan and Yugoslavia supported the Arab proposals to appoint a custodian for refugee property and to enlarge the PCC. (*A/SPC/SR 203, 18 Nov* (Greece); *205, 22 Nov* (Yugoslavia); *206, 23 Nov* (Afghanistan); *207, 24 Nov* (Malaya, USSR); *208, 25 Nov* (Bulgaria); *210, 28 Nov* (Indonesia, India, Pakistan); *211, 29 Nov* (Guinea); *213, 30 Nov* (Cyprus))

**Soviet Attitude.** The Soviet representative, Morozov, stated that Israel and its allies were responsible for the refugee problem because they resisted implementation of the GA's resolutions on the issue. This situation was intolerable, he said, and the refugees should be permitted to choose between repatriation and compensation.

Comay repudiated this statement, saying that Israel was willing to enter into direct negotiations with the Arab states on all outstanding issues. If the Soviet Union considered the situation intolerable, he continued, it would be more constructive if it used what influence it had with the Arab states to induce them to settle these disputes. (*Jer. Post; Ha'aretz, 25 Nov*)

**Ireland and New Zealand Propose Limited Repatriation.** The representative of Ireland proposed that "Israel should be urged to allow a limited number of refugees who were willing to live at peace with their neighbours to return to their homes."

The representative of New Zealand supported this proposal [which had been brought up by Ireland the year before], in order to make possible a better assessment of the dimensions and the various aspects of the problem. He added, however, that "without agreement between the parties principally concerned nothing could be done." (*A/SPC/SR 205, 22 Nov* (New Zealand); *210, 28 Nov* (Ireland))

**Representatives Who Abstained from Dealing with Political Implications.** The representatives of Belgium, Canada, China, Iran, Japan, UK, US and Turkey concerned themselves only with the activities of UNRWA and abstained generally from taking a stand on the Arab proposals or other political issues.

The representative of the US urged all member states to submit their ideas about the refugees to the PCC. He called on the Arab states and Israel to make "reasonable proposals" to remedy the situation in the ME and to take a greater initiative in solving the refugee problem. (*A/SPC/SR 201, 16 Nov* (US); *203, 18 Nov* (Canada, China, Iran); *206, 23 Nov* (Belgium, UK); *207, 24 Nov* (Japan); *210, 28 Nov* (Turkey))

**Argentina, Australia and Liberia: Arab-Israeli Cooperation Essential to Settlement.** The representative of Argentina stated that "peaceful coexistence in the Palestine region was an essential prerequisite for the satisfactory implementation of that provision" [UN resolution 194 (III)].

Similarly, the representative of Australia said that the "implementation of resolution 194 (III) needed the full co-operation of the governments in the area, and such co-operation might in time be achieved."

The Liberian representative said that peace negotiations and an international guarantee for Israel's borders would make it possible to implement the resolution. (*A/SPC/SR 203, 18 Nov* (Australia); *207, 24 Nov* (Argentina); *210, 28 Nov* (Liberia))

**Countries Calling for Arab-Israeli Negotiations.** The representatives of the following countries called on the Arabs and Israel to negotiate for a peace settlement: NATO countries: France, Italy, the Netherlands; Latin American countries: Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, El Salvador, Honduras, Panama, Peru. Some of them at the same time called on the Arabs to recognize the existence of Israel as an established fact.

The representative of the Netherlands also said that self-support and resettlement offered the best possibility for the refugees' future. (*A/SPC/SR 206, 23 Nov* (Colombia, France, Peru); *208, 25 Nov* (Bolivia, Ecuador, Italy, Netherlands, Panama); *210, 28 Nov* (El Salvador, Honduras))

**Dec: No Resolution Reached.** The debate in the special Political Committee (30 Nov) ended on 30 Nov. Several delegations endeavoured to obtain support for a draft resolution to be submitted to the Committee.

The Arab countries were interested in a draft resolution including their three demands, for which they enjoyed Communist support. The Western countries, US, UK, France, Canada, Australia and New Zealand rejected the demands for the appointment of a custodian and the enlargement of the PCC; they were interested in a resolution approving the annual report and the budget of UNRWA.

Consequently, no draft resolution was submitted, and on 20 Dec the Committee decided to defer the debate until the Mar 1961 session of the GA. (*Ma'ariv, 7 Dec; Ha'aretz, 9 Dec; Falastin, 10, 13 Dec; Jer. Post, 21 Dec*)



## OCT: THE UNRWA BUDGET

On 20 Oct the UN *ad-hoc* Political Committee held a special meeting to hear financial pledges by the member states for UNRWA and for the UN High Commissioner for refugees. The Soviet bloc and the Latin American delegations boycotted the meeting. Davis "made a pathetic plea to save a small section of Arab refugee youth from a life of idleness and despair." He called on the member states to contribute generously to UNRWA's relief and vocational training budget, totalling \$40.6 million for the 1961 calendar year. Actually, however, the member states pledged \$29.5 million including \$23

million by the US alone. Sixty-eight out of 99 member states did not contribute.

The US delegate, stated: "It is regrettable that some members have given little in proportion to their capabilities..., while others whose resources are such that they could donate generously, and who purport to be greatly concerned about the satisfaction of human needs, have given nothing whatsoever." (*NYT; Jer. Post, 21 Oct*)

A Lebanese daily, commenting in similar vein, complained especially about the USSR's abstention from any aid to UNRWA. (*Dustur, 8 Dec*)

## THE ARAB COUNTRIES, ISRAEL AND THE ARAB REFUGEES

### POLITICAL ASPECTS

**REFERENCES:** The Arab League's resolutions on the Arab refugees, p 126 ff. Political reorganization of the Palestinian refugees: The Palestinian Entity and Army, p 132 ff; see also: Internal Affairs, Jordan, p 316 ff.

#### CITIZENSHIP AND PASSPORT DOCUMENTS FOR THE PALESTINIAN REFUGEES

**Background Note.** The status of the Arab refugees in the various Arab host countries differs considerably. In Jordan they are citizens, with equal rights and obligations. In the UAR, as well as in the Gaza strip, they retain their Palestinian nationality, while in Lebanon most of the refugees carry UNRWA identity cards, classifying them as Arab refugees. In Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait and other Sheikdoms, their official status is that of Arab refugees. Only a few have obtained citizenship in these countries.

**Feb: Jordan Invites Refugees to Accept Jordanian Citizenship.** On 3 Feb the Jordanian Government, in its campaign against the Palestinian Entity, announced its readiness to grant Jordanian citizenship "to all Palestinians wherever they may be" (see p 322). [For reaction in the Arab countries see p 134.] It was reported that many refugees had applied to the Jordanian embassy in Lebanon for Jordanian citizenship because it would facilitate travel between the Arab countries in search of work. The embassy "had replied politely to these applications, explaining at the same time that it had received no directions on this matter." (*Siyassah, 12 Feb*)

**Feb-June: Conflicting Statements on Citizenship Offer.** On 12 Feb Talhūni, Chief of the Royal Cabinet, explained in Beirut that the Jordanian offer referred mainly to refugees living in countries where UNRWA did not operate [e.g. Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and other Sheikdoms, Libya, Sudan]. (*Hayat, 13 Feb*)

Three months later a Jordanian source reported that Palestinian refugees living in Arab countries and wishing to move to other Arab countries to obtain work would be able to obtain Jordanian passports to facilitate their journeys. (*Falastin, 24 June*) A week later, it was officially stated that these facilities were meant for refugees living in the Persian Gulf area or coming from the Gaza Strip. (*Falastin, 1 July*)

According to *as-Sahāfah* 50,000 Palestinian refugees were granted Jordanian citizenship up to the end of June. (*Sahāfah, 18 July*)

**UAR Accuses Jordan of Trying to Settle Refugee Problem.** *Al-Ahrām* accused the Jordanian Government and UNRWA of trying to transfer refugees to the Persian Gulf principalities and resettle them there. Those refugees "are receiving Jordanian passports, which are later replaced by identity cards of the principalities where they are resettled." (*Ahrām, 25 July*) *Al-Gumhuriyah* accused King Hussein of trying "to force the refugees" to emigrate and resettle in South America. If the refugees signed a document agreeing to emigrate and work on the land, they received all facilities to emigrate. (*Gumhuriyah, 10 Nov*)

**UAR Travel Facilities for Refugees.** During the second part of May the UAR Central Minister of the Interior issued new regulations entitling Palestinian refugees in the UAR to apply for a UAR temporary passport, valid for one year, to facilitate travel abroad. (*Ahrām, 22 May*)

*Al-Hayāt* reported that the military governor of the Gaza Strip was negotiating with the Kuwaiti Government to obtain permission for refugees from Gaza to enter Kuwait without entry visas. (*Hayat, 9 June*)

#### QUESTION OF CENSUS OF REFUGEES

**Background Note.** Following its establishment in 1950, UNRWA carried out a census of the Palestinian refugees. For the purpose of the census a refugee was defined as "a person eligible for relief whose normal residence was in Palestine for a minimum period of two years preceding the outbreak of the conflict in 1948 and who, as a result of this conflict, has lost both his house and his means of livelihood."

During the years 1950-1961 UNRWA failed to keep its record up to date. The refugees, while reporting new births, rarely reported deaths. Consequently UNRWA stopped issuing ration cards to new-born refugees; however, it continued to supply them with services, such as medical care and education.

Frequent UNRWA demands for a new census were rejected by both the refugees and the Arab host governments.

**Jan-Apr: Jordan Refuses Permission for Census.** On 6 Jan the Jordanian Minister of the Economy declared that the government would not allow UNRWA to carry out a general census with the intention of reducing the number of refugees receiving monthly rations. He said that the government itself would carry out the census. (*Falastin, 7 Jan*)

**Discussions Between Davis and the Jordanian Authorities.** In Apr Dr Davis, the Director-General of UNRWA, discussed the census with the Jordanian authorities. The local Press reported that he suggested the re-registration of refugees born since 1951 and the deduction of the deceased—the figures to be supplied by the Jordanian Government. No conclusion was reached. (*Jihad*, 14, 17 Apr; *Akhbar al-Ushu'*, 22 Apr; *Jihad*, 10 May)

During July–Nov mass rallies were held in several refugee camps in protest against the proposed census and petitions were sent to the Jordanian authorities and the Director of UNRWA. (*Manar*, 25 July, 7 Nov; *Jihad*, 23 Aug)

**July: UNRWA's Compromise Proposal.** In the annual report to the UN General Assembly, Davis said that UNRWA was investigating 9,757 cases where there were specific grounds for re-examining the eligibility of particular refugee families, but added: "It is clear that they have only a marginal impact on the general problem of correcting the known inaccuracies in the ration rolls. Some more comprehensive action is required if this problem is to be dealt with effectively." UNRWA had therefore worked out a plan for eliminating the names of nonexistent persons from the rolls, while at the same time admitting the children who had been registered for medical and health services but had not been receiving rations. He expected the outcome to be much to the advantage of the refugees in general, since the number of newly-born children considerably exceeded the estimated number of nonexistent persons. "The success of this new approach will depend on the extent to which the host governments are in a position to co-operate in carrying it out," the report said. (*UNRWA Annual Report*, July 1960)

**Nov: Jordan Accepts UNRWA Plan.** On 19 Nov it was announced in Amman that the Jordanian Government had decided to permit UNRWA to implement this plan. (*Mid. Mirror*, 26 Nov)

On 22 Nov a parliamentary committee appointed on 5 Nov endorsed the government's decision. It proposed that no investigation into refugees' earnings should be made without the consent of the government, and that no ration card should be withdrawn on the grounds of a refugee's income from any source. (*Mid. Mirror*, 26 Nov; *Falastin*, 25 Nov) Meanwhile the UNRWA and the Jordanian Government opened a propaganda drive to explain to the refugees the importance of registering family changes. (*Difa'*, 19 Nov)

**May: Reports on Census in Lebanon Denied.** On 28 May

the Director of UNRWA categorically denied reports which had appeared in the Lebanese Press that UNRWA intended to carry out a census of the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon and other Arab countries. (*Hayat*, 28 May; *Mid. Mirror*, 29 May)

### AN ISRAELI VIEW ON THE REFUGEE PROBLEM

**Dec: President Ben-Zvi: A Question of Population Exchange.** In an interview with a *Washington Post* correspondent, President Ben-Zvi proposed that the Arab refugees be regarded as a fair exchange of population for the Jews expelled from Muslim countries and settled in Israel. He pointed out that Israel had assimilated over half a million Jews from Muslim countries, including 50,000 from Yemen, 150,000 from Iraq, 200,000 from North Africa and 35,000 from Egypt. Since only about half a million Arabs had fled the country, this amounted to an exchange of population.

The President pointed out that Israel anticipated some 300,000 additional immigrants from Muslim countries in future years.

Citing precedents of peaceful population exchanges, President Ben-Zvi noted the exchange between Turkey and Greece (in 1923–1924), involving 2.5 million persons, and the exchange of over 15 million persons between Pakistan and India.

The President went on to say: "The Arabs must accept the fact that Arab refugees should be resettled in their respective countries just as Jews were resettled in Israel." The UN must understand that this was the only way of solving the problem, even if it required financial support. "Israel is certainly prepared to assume its proportionate share of burden. We must, however, not forget that Israel has claim on behalf of Jewish refugees from the Arab countries, who were forced to leave all their property behind them."

*The Washington Post* commented: "Although the proposal that the Arab refugees be resettled in Arab countries has been a long-standing Israel position, President Ben-Zvi's comparison of the numbers of Arab and Jewish refugees adds a new dimension to the discussion." (*Jer. Post*, 5 Dec)

**Arab Reactions.** MENA's political commentator rejected President Ben-Zvi's proposal as a violation of the UN resolutions. He declared that the Arabs had been kicked out of their homes, whereas the Jews had left for Israel under the influence of Zionist propaganda, with which they were now disillusioned. (*R. Cairo*, 5 Dec–*IMB*, 6 Dec; *BBC*, 7 Dec—see also *Nasr*, *Damascus*, 8 Dec)

## IRAN, THE ARAB COUNTRIES AND ISRAEL

### IRAN'S DE FACTO RECOGNITION OF ISRAEL AND ARABS' REACTIONS

#### SYNOPSIS

On 23 July the Shah of Iran, answering a question at a Press conference, stated according to Iranian sources that Iran had recognized Israel in the past and that "there has been nothing new" in this matter. According to another version he had said that an envoy had been appointed to Tel Aviv.

The UAR, ignoring subsequent Iranian explanations, began a propaganda offensive against the Shah and his regime, inciting the Iranian people to rise in revolt. This was only to a small extent directed at Iran's recognition of Israel, and centred on the theme of the Shah as a reactionary instrument of Western imperialism. Diplomatic relations between the two countries were broken off, on the initiative of President Abdel-Nasser. In their attacks, the UAR authorities utilized their religious institutions, thereby lending the issue a pan-Islamic aspect and presenting the Shah as a traitor to Muslim principles.

The affair soon became an inter-Arab issue. The UAR tried to rally the other Arab countries to its side, arguing that Iranian policy was endangering them by strengthening Israel. However, the Arab countries, with Iraq foremost, accepted Iran's explanations and refused to follow the UAR in breaking off relations. The UAR thus remained isolated in the Arab League on an issue relating to Israel, but disagreement within the League did not develop into an open quarrel.

There was no official Israeli reaction. Except for Press comment, Israel remained outside the course of developments.

The USSR Press and radio supported the UAR line (p 67).

In the West, there was no official reaction.

Towards the end of Aug, the attack in UAR Press and radio subsided. On 28 Aug a resolution of the Arab League urged the member states to continue their efforts to enable Iran to strengthen its relations with the Arab world, and the issue faded out. Diplomatic relations between Iran and the UAR were, however, not renewed.

#### THE SHAH'S STATEMENT AND FIRST ARAB REACTIONS

On 18 July, *Farman* of Tehran published a "rumour" that Iran would soon establish a political mission in Israel. The same day, *Kayhan* commented in detail on this information. On 19 July, *Ettela'at*, quoting the Iranian Foreign Minister, Abbas Aram, gave "certain clarification" contradicting these statements. (*Farman*; *Kayhan*, 18 July; *Ettela'at*, 19 July)

**The Shah's Statement.** Requested (at a Press conference on 23 July) to comment "on rumours regarding the possibility of Iran recognizing Israel," the Shah said, "Iran has already recognized Israel. Nothing new has

happened in this respect. But because of certain events, and perhaps for reasons of economy, our envoy to Israel was recalled several years ago and he has not so far returned. Anyhow, there is nothing new in this question of recognition." (*Kayhan*, 24 July; *Echo Reports*, 2 Aug)

**Reuter's Version of Shah's Statement.** Reuter (later on widely quoted in Arab countries) gave the following version: "The Shah of Iran told a Press conference that his country had recognized Israel. He added that the recognition was not new since *de facto* recognition had been extended several years ago and an envoy, whose subsequent recall was due to a budget deficiency, had been appointed to Tel Aviv." (*Reuter*, 24 July)

**Arab First Reactions.** In their comments of 24 July, Beirut, Cairo and Amman radios gave the impression that the Shah's statement represented a new departure in Iranian policy towards Israel. (*BBC*, 26 July)

In Jordan, Premier Majāli declared (on 24 July): "We had hoped that Iran, being a Muslim and a friendly state, would have refrained from taking such a step until the legitimate rights of the people of Palestine were recovered." (*Jihad*, 25 Apr)

UAR radio stations, however, outdid all others in launching a violent attack on Iran, accusing it of being "pro-Western" and "anti-Arab," and describing Iran as "an imperialist base." They also cited "Arab political circles" on the "deep effect" the Shah's statement would have on Iranian-Arab relations, and predicted (on 24 July) that the Arab League would take "a joint and firm Arab stand in this respect." (*BBC*, 26, 27 July)

On the other hand, Radio Baghdad entirely ignored the whole issue for two days; its first comment came on 25 July. It expressed pain and regret, but refrained from assailing the Shah or the Iranian Government. (*IMB*, 26, 28 July)

**Arab Envoys Turn Down UAR Proposal.** Envoys of the Arab League member-states convened in Cairo (on 25 July) at the League headquarters, and "heard the SG report on Iran's recognition of Israel, which they unanimously condemned." (*Ahram*, 26 July)

*Al-Hayāt*, however, quoting the Lebanese Ambassador to UAR, revealed that the envoys had turned down a UAR proposal "that all the Arab countries should jointly sever their diplomatic relations with Tehran" and decided instead to refer the matter to their respective governments. (*Hayat*, 27 July)

#### THE UAR VERSUS IRAN

**UAR Attacks the Shah and Breaks off Diplomatic Relations with Iran.** For a fortnight beginning 26 July, the UAR radio and Press made daily attacks on the Shah and his regime, also inciting the Iranian people to revolt.

Thus *al-Gumhuriyah* wrote: "The relationship between the Emperor of Iran and the struggling people of Iran is similar to that between the hangman and his victim. It is the relationship of a traitor, who does not scruple to present the wealth of his country to the imperialist and to massacre the country's leaders, personalities and youth on his altars. It is the relationship of a traitor with a people who are constantly struggling and making sacrifices to get rid of the shackles of slavery imposed upon them by this Emperor through the might, support and arms of the imperialists." (*Gumhuriyah*, 26 July) The Shah was also described as "frightened," "awe-stricken," "cowardly" and "effeminate" (*Akhbar*, 27, 29, 31 July, 3, 6 Aug); as a "tyrant," "imperialist agent," and "world Zionist agent." (*Ayyam*, 29, 31 July; 4, 8 Aug) (See also *BBC*, 26 July-15 Aug.)

The Foreign Minister, Dr Mahmūd Fawzi, described the Shah as an "inferior and babbling creature... whose face has been deformed through committing sin upon sin." (*Ahram*, 29 July)

The climax in UAR's offensive was provided by President Abdel-Nasser on 26 July. In a public speech he described the Shah as "suffering from a Moussadeq complex" which drove him "to sell himself to imperialism at a cheap price." He denounced Iran's membership in the Baghdad Pact, which "aimed at undermining the Arab nations' independence." He added: "We will close our embassy in Iran... We await the day when Iran will be liberated from reaction, corruption and the domination of imperialism and Zionism and then we will reopen our embassy to the free, proud and noble Iranian people. This is our answer to this provocative act... We will support the Iranian people in its struggle to free itself from feudalism and foreign rule, so that it will become its own master instead of a tool in the hands of imperialism or Zionism." He concluded: "In 1953, the Shah took a plane and fled to Nūri as-Sa'īd. Where is Nūri as-Sa'īd now? Where are Adnan Menderes and Suhrawardy? No one is left but this Shah, who has already executed 600 army officers... but he will not be able to slay or deceive all the people of Iran." (*Ahram*, 27 July)

On 26 July, the Iranian Ambassador in Cairo was asked to leave the UAR together with the embassy's staff. (*R. Cairo*, 27 July-IMB, 28 July)

The Ambassador left Cairo on 31 July. (*R. Cairo*, 31 July-IMB, 1 Aug)

**Iranian Reaction: Expulsion of the UAR Ambassador.** In Iran surprise was expressed at the severe assault of the UAR radio and Press services. (*Iran News Agency*, 25 July)

On 27 July, the UAR Ambassador in Tehran was ordered to leave the country within 24 hours. He left on 28 July.

The same day the Iranian Foreign Minister, Aram, announced: "Iran will send no envoy to Egypt as long as no national and legal regime, which is in accordance with the interests of the Egyptian nation, is established in that country." He described Abdel-Nasser as a "light-headed Pharaoh who based his illegal power on ambition, hues and cries, imperialism, assassination and the creation of rifts and dissension." (*Echo Reports*, 2 Aug)

**Iranian Explanations.** On 27 July the Iranian Foreign Minister summoned all Arab and Muslim envoys in Tehran and assured them that Iran had not changed her policy towards Israel. (*Hayat*, 28 July) The next day General Qassim revealed that Aram had shown the

envoys two documents: a letter dated 1950, addressed to the then Israeli Foreign Minister, Moshe Sharett, regarding Iran's *de facto* recognition of Israel, and a document issued in 1952 affirming the withdrawal of the Iranian Consul-General from Israel. Attached to the latter document was a circular to Iranian representatives abroad signed by Moussadeq's Foreign Minister in 1952, to the effect that for the sake of the Arabs and the Muslim world Iran would not accord legal recognition to Israel but would leave it *de facto*. (*Zaman*, 29 July; *BBC*, 30 July) Subsequently, the Iranian Government persevered in these lines of argument. Thus, at Press conferences in Amman and Beirut, the respective Iranian Ambassadors stressed that there was nothing new in Iran-Israel relations, and that Iran had never considered the possibility of granting Israel *de jure* recognition. (*Jihad*, 1 Aug; *Hayat*, 3 Aug)

#### COMMENTS ON THE UAR CAMPAIGN AGAINST IRAN

**UAR Explanations: Combating an Imperialistic Conspiracy.** The UAR Press presented the issue as an "imperialistic conspiracy to strengthen the position of Israel against Palestine and the Arab people." "Iran is a Middle East country and its close relations with Israel would create a gap in the diplomatic blockade imposed on Israel." Because of this, "speedy and firm action had to be taken immediately by the UAR in order to combat the conspiracy in its early stages." (*Akhbar*, 27 July; *Eg. Gaz.*, 9 Aug)

*Al-Ahrām* wrote that "the recognition of Israel by a large Islamic country would have a psychological effect reaching far beyond the limits of mere recognition." (*Ahram*, 9 Aug) The UAR stated its position at a special meeting of the Arab League Council on 8 Aug as follows: "The essence of the dispute is the role chosen by the Government of Iran, which is aimed at strengthening Israel from the international, regional and economic points of view at the expense of the rights of the Palestine Arabs." (*Eg. Gaz.*, 9 Aug)

*The New York Times* also saw the possible explanation of "President Nasser's vitriolic personal attack on the Shah" in the development of friendly relations between Israel and many African and Asian countries—"a pattern which is too favourable to Israel to suit President Nasser and he is trying to break it up." (*NYT*, 29 July)

**Iranian Comment: Keeping the People of the UAR Preoccupied.** The Deputy Premier of Iran said on 30 July that Abdel-Nasser's "object was to distract attention at home from economic difficulties and loss of freedom and to conceal expansionist designs abroad." (*R. Tehran*, 30 July-BBC, 3 Aug) Premier Eghbal said on 2 Aug that Abdel-Nasser's possible motives were: "failure to examine the facts, plain hatred, an attempt to create a breach between Iran and the Arab and Muslim countries, or an attempt to keep the Egyptian people preoccupied." (*Kayhan*, 3 Aug)

**Various Comments: Serving Moscow's Interests.** The Turkish paper *Ulus* suggested that Abdel-Nasser had acted on "Moscow's invitation." (*Ulus*, Ankara, 8 Aug)

*Haboker*, Tel Aviv, concluded that Abdel-Nasser had created this crisis intentionally in accordance with an order from Moscow, for the purpose of undermining the West's positions in the Persian Gulf. (*Haboker*, 31 July; see also *Ha'aretz*, Tel Aviv, 1 Aug)

Joe Alex Morris Jr., reporting from Beirut, commented:



"Abdel-Nasser's move fits in nicely with the Soviet Union's continuous campaign to topple the Shah and is but one of many incidents recently reflecting growing UAR support of the Soviet Stand vis-à-vis the West." (NYHT, 2 Aug)

#### THE ISSUE IN INTER-ARAB RELATIONS

Following the severance of diplomatic relations, UAR leaders, the radio and the Press, fostered the impression that concerted Arab measures against Iran were in the offing.

Dr Abd al-Karim al-A'idi, the Egyptian Commissioner General for the Arab Offices for the Boycott of Israel, urged the Arab states to ban Iran from attending the Arab Oil Conference in Beirut to be held on 17 Oct. (Mid. Mirror, 30 July)

*Al-Ahrām* wrote: "It is only natural that all the Arab states should break off their relations with the Shah." (Ahrām, 27 July)

On 28 July, Dr Fawzi, the UAR Foreign Minister, addressing the UAR National Assembly, threatened: "All the Arabs will have their say in the coming days," which "will be but the beginning of the flood." (Ahrām, 29 July; BBC, 30 July) The Assembly passed resolutions supporting the UAR's action against Iran; calling on Arab governments to follow the UAR's lead in breaking off relations with Iran; urging Arab organizations to take action that would induce their governments to do so, and urging the Iranian people to "oppose the tyranny which exposed them to theft by imperialism and Zionism." (Ahrām, 29 Aug; BBC, 30 July)

Popular demonstrations—attended by "hundreds of thousands"—were held in Damascus and other Syrian cities. UAR public and semi-public organizations took part in cabled protests to the Iranian authorities. Wide publicity was given to these activities by the Egyptian "Voice of the Arabs" station. (IMB, 28 July, 4 Aug)

**Arab Collective Action Fails to Materialize.** The efforts of the UAR failed to raise a response from other Arab states. The general reaction was, as *al-Hayāt* expressed it, that "too much harshness towards Iran is liable to rouse that country from its moderate position and impel it to do the very thing that the Arabs, with this desperate move of theirs, want to prevent happening." (Hayat, 27 July; see also *Jaridah*; *Orient*, Beirut, 28 July, 3 Aug; *Manar*, Jordan, 31 July, 1, 4 Aug; *Sha'ab*, Jordan, 27 July; *Zaman*, Baghdad, 28, 30 July, 3 Aug)

**Jordanian Moderation Provokes UAR Attacks.** On 27 July, King Hussein sent a personal message to the Shah, requesting him "to postpone the decision to establish diplomatic relations with Israel until the Arab nation finds an outlet from this impasse and until right has been restored." The Shah replied that "there has been no change in Iran's relations with Israel, which have been from the very beginning a *de facto* recognition..." (Jihad, 2 Aug)

Jordanian editorial comments refrained from attacking the Shah or his government, instead expressing the hope that Iran would maintain the *status quo* in regard to recognition of Israel. There was severe criticism, however, of Arab disunity and the negligence of the Arab League. (Manar, 24, 31 July; Falastin, 26 July; Sha'ab, 28 July)

Jordanian moderation resulted in a sharp reaction from the UAR which had already been conducting a campaign against Jordan for some time (see p 151).

From 1 Aug, Cairo and Damascus radios combined

their attacks on the Shah—for recognizing Israel—and King Hussein—for supporting the Shah. They were accused of having come together with Israel in a common hatred of Arab nationalism because they both served imperialism, feared revolution and coveted certain Arab territories: Jordan the West Bank and Iran "some parts of the Arab Gulf" [i.e.: the Persian Gulf]. But "even the protection of imperialism will not save an agent from the fate that awaits all traitors." (Voice of the Arabs, 3 Aug; BBC, 1-12 Aug; IMB, 1-15 Aug)

**Qassim Accepts Official Iranian Stand.** General Qassim declared on 28 July: "We should not rely on statements broadcast here and there... We received the official text of the Shah's statement and accordingly we took our wise steps that safeguarded the interests of the Arabs without rashness. We should not allow rashness to make us lose our senses and thus injure our interests." He explained that Iraq had concentrated her efforts on dissuading Iran from recognizing Israel *de jure* and establishing diplomatic relations with it. The Iraqi demarche had been successful, and the Iranian Foreign Minister had told the Arab and Muslim Ambassadors in Tehran (on 27 July) that "there would be no change in Iran's attitude." (Zaman, 29 July; BBC, 30 July)

General Qassim was criticized by the editor of *al-Ahrām*, Hassanein Haykal, as "simply reiterating the vague arguments" of the Iranians. (Ahrām, 4 Aug)

The Saudi Arabian Ambassador in Teheran was requested (on 28 July) by his government to return to Riyadh for consultation. A Saudi Arabian embassy spokesman in Tehran strongly denied allegations that the Ambassador had been recalled from Tehran. He stressed that "the good relations between Iran and his country had not changed and would not be affected by any kind of propaganda." (BBC, 31 July, 3 Aug)

**Lebanese Press Comment.** Sa'ib Slām's new Cabinet (appointed on 1 Aug) made no official pronouncement on the issue. The Lebanese newspapers' attitude varied as usual according to their political colouring. Thus the pro-UAR papers welcomed President Abdel-Nasser's action, and urged the Arab states to follow suit. (Beirut al-Masa', 27, 29, 31 July, 4 Aug; Sayyad, 28 July; Si-yasah, 26, 29 July, 3 Aug) On the other hand *al-Hayāt*, stressed Lebanon's national interests: "It is quite inconceivable that Lebanon should expel the Iranian Ambassador, or for that matter any other Ambassador or diplomatic representative, in connection with any non-Lebanese problem." (Hayat, 27 July; see also *Nahar*, 28 July) *An-Nahār* criticized the UAR's "hasty step" in severing diplomatic relations with Iran, which had created "a real split in the Arab world and caused much embarrassment in many Arab circles." (Nahar, 27, 30 July. See also *Jaridah*, 28, 31 July.)

The Sudan had no diplomatic, economic or cultural relations with Iran (Eg. Gaz., 9 Aug), so that the question of severing relations did not arise.

On 28 July, the official Sudanese Government spokesman, Major-General Tal'at Farid, declared that "the Arabs will not let Iran's recognition of Israel pass unnoticed." He added that "the Sudan will follow any collective Arab decision in this respect." (R. Cairo, 28 July-BBC, 30 July)

However, the joint communiqué issued by President Abdel-Nasser and General Abbud on 28 July at the end of the latter's visit to the UAR and after Abdel-Nasser's

public attack on the Shah, in the presence of the General, made no reference whatsoever to the issue. (See p 155.)

Imam Ahmad of the Yemen expressed (on 29 July) his great resentment at Iran's recognition of Israel, but he hoped "that the matter will become normal and that God will unite the ideas of the Muslim." (*R. San'a*, 29 July-BBC, 2 Aug)

On the other hand, a statement issued in Cairo (on 4 Aug) by the United Arab States Executive Council (UAR-Yemen Federation) described the Shah's action as "strange, abnormal, grossly unjust and contrary to Islamic concepts." (*Ahram*, 5 Aug)

The Libyan Government, according to a UAR source, decided to stop "all discussions and arrangements" under way to establish diplomatic relations between Libya and Iran. (*Eg. Gaz.*, 9 Aug, quoting the Libyan Representative at the League of Arab states)

### OTHER REACTIONS

Israel. [No official statement was issued in Israel. However, comments and news pertaining to the development of the issue received wide publicity in local newspapers.]

The West. No official western reactions were reported.

The USSR. [See p 67.]

CENTO-Members' Reaction. [The Turkish newspapers backed the Iranian attitude; official circles refrained from commenting on the issue. See also below, *Cumhuriyet* comment.]

On 2 Aug President Ayub Khan of Pakistan, referring to the issue, declared that his country's policy towards Israel would remain unchanged, being in sympathy with the attitude of the Arab countries. (*NYHT*, 5 Aug)

### ATTITUDE OF ISLAMIC INSTITUTIONS IN THE UAR

Islamic institutions in the UAR took part in the anti-Iranian campaign. The Rector of al-Azhar, Shaykh Mahmūd Shaltūt, cabled the Shah on 27 July, requesting him "to rescind his decision to recognize Israel... since it had hurt the feelings of all Muslim people in the world..." In his reply of 3 Aug the Shah denied any new development in Iran's attitude towards Israel and saw "no reason why this issue should be the subject of any new comment by the Muslim countries or Muslims elsewhere." He concluded: "It should also not remain unsaid that statements which create rifts and increase dissension, which are based on selfish motives or are against the teaching of Islam, should also be subjected to criticism." (*BBC*, 4 Aug)

Syrian Ulama' (Muslim religious functionaries) met on 4 Aug and denounced the Shah's action, describing it as being "contradictory to Islam and the Qur'an." (*R. Damascus*; *R. Cairo*, 4 Aug-BBC, 6 Aug)

Islamic Congress. An Islamic Congress, convened at al-Azhar in Cairo on 7 Aug, declared that the recognition of Israel was in violation of the teachings of the Qur'an, and urged all Arab and Muslim peoples to condemn the Shah's attitude. The Congress further resolved to remain in session until the Shah withdrew his recognition of Israel. (*Eg. Gaz.*, 8 Aug; *BBC*, 9 Aug)

The Turkish paper *Cumhuriyet* saw in the deliberations of the Congress "a clear example of what demagoguery can do to ignorant people." It wrote: "Egypt is not a country administered by democratic principles. That is why this Islamic Congress, which was convened because the dictator so ordered, adopted its decision. The aim is not at all to win over the Egyptian people (as Nasser has no need of his citizens for the decisions he takes) but the other Muslim states, and thus to put Iran in a difficult position and force it to accept Egypt's policy against Israel..." The paper concluded: "Those who respect their God will on no account allow attacks on the God of others..." (*Cumhuriyet*, 13 Aug)

Outlawing of Bahai Sect not in Connection with Issue. On 1 Aug a UAR paper published a Presidential Decree outlawing the Bahai religious sect in both regions of the UAR and confiscating the sects' financial assets. (*Ayyam*, 1 Aug) Some foreign news agencies and foreign newspapers (*Haboker*, *Tel Aviv*, 2 Aug; *NYT*, 3 Aug) saw a possible connection between the Decree and the tension in UAR-Iranian relations. However, Presidential Decree No. 263, dissolving the Bahai Organizations in the UAR, was published in the Official Gazette No. 161 of 19 July (pp 1141-1412) and thus could not be related to the current issue.

### AUG: ISSUE FADES OUT

Arab League Council Postpones Discussions of the Issue. On 8 Aug, the Council of the Arab League was convened at the request of the UAR to discuss the issue. All the permanent representatives attended except the Tunisian.

The UAR representative quoted the Shah's statement of 23 July as follows: "We saw that time necessitates that we announce our recognition of Israel. That is to say resuming our contact with it in a clear, open and free way." (*Eg. Gaz.*, 9 Aug)

[This version has no foundation at all; see above.]

He urged "all the Arabs to side with the UAR and to stand firm in the face of this 'deluge' so as to reap the fruits of solidarity. It is up to the Arab countries to have a unified attitude towards Israel..., an attitude which would block her way..." (*Eg. Gaz.*, 9 Aug) [However, no mention was made in the Press to any motion tabled by the UAR.]

The Iraqi delegate described Iraq's efforts in this matter and added that his government was in favour of adopting a "peaceful method" of settling the dispute.

The Libyan, Sudanese, Saudi Arabian and Yemeni delegates expressed their government's readiness "to approve any measures or resolutions taken by the Arab states in this matter."

The Moroccan delegate emphasized his government's backing for "any resolution," but suggested that the whole issue should be discussed at the forthcoming meeting of the Arab Foreign Ministers in Beirut on 22 Aug.

The Council unanimously adopted the Moroccan proposal. (*Hayat*, 9, 10 Aug; *Eg. Gaz.*; *Ahram*, 9 Aug)

The UAR delegate said after the meeting that "he was very happy because of the remarkable solidarity and enthusiasm of the members of the Council." (*Eg. Gaz.*, 9 Aug)

The UAR Claims: Goals Attained. By the middle of Aug, the UAR radio and Press showed signs of gradual accommodation to the attitude of the other Arab countries.

*Al-Hayāt*, quoting UAR official circles, revealed that

the UAR had agreed not to press the other Arab countries for a unified attitude. (*Hayat*, 17 Aug)

On the other hand Damascus Radio commented that "the UAR's goal in severing diplomatic relations was attained since this step roused Arab and Islamic public opinion against the Shah, who was subsequently obliged to retreat by affirming time and again that his country's attitude towards Israel will not change." (*R. Damascus*, 17 Aug-*IMB*, 18 Aug)

*Al-Ahrām*, referring to a Press conference given by Aram on 28 Aug (again affirming his country's attitude towards the recognition issue) described the Iranian Foreign Minister's denial that *de jure* recognition had been extended to Israel "as a half-way retreat, calculated to

calm indignation in his own country and placate Arab opinion." (*Ahrām*, 21 Aug)

**The Arab Foreign Ministers' Conference in Shtura.** The issue was included in the agenda of the Conference (see Arab League), but attracted little attention. The final resolution urged the member states to "continue efforts to enable Iran to put her relations with the Arab states on a sound basis." The delegates decided to reconsider the question at the next meeting of the Arab Foreign Ministers. (*Hayat*; *Eg. Gaz.*, 29 Aug)

[Though by the end of Aug, the issue faded out of the news, diplomatic relations between Iran and the UAR were not reestablished.]

PART THREE

THE COUNTRIES  
OF THE MIDDLE EAST

INTERNAL POLITICAL AFFAIRS  
AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS



# THE REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS

**NOTE:** This chapter, unlike the other sectors of the Middle East Record, is mainly a general summary of developments during 1959 and 1960.

## NEGOTIATIONS PRIOR TO INDEPENDENCE

[The deadlock in the four-year dispute over Cyprus was broken in Feb 1959. Between 5–11 Feb 1959 the PMs and Foreign Ministers of Greece and Turkey, meeting in Zurich, negotiated an agreement by which Cyprus would become an independent state. At the same time they laid down the principles to be incorporated in the Constitution: cooperation and the safeguarding of the interests of the Greek and Turkish communities. This was immediately followed by the London Conference attended by the PMs and Foreign Ministers of Greece and Turkey and the UK, as well as a Cypriot Greek delegation headed by Archbishop Makarios and a Cypriot Turkish delegation headed by Dr Küçük.

On 19 Feb the following documents were signed or initialled in London:

1. A Declaration (initialled by the Greek and Turkish PMs at Zurich on 11 Feb) stating that Cyprus would become an independent republic with a Greek-Cypriot President and a Turkish-Cypriot Vice-President, and detailing the "Basic Structure of the Republic of Cyprus."

2. A Treaty of Guarantee by which the Republic of Cyprus undertook to maintain its independence, territorial integrity and security, as well as respect for its Constitution, while Greece, Turkey and the UK undertake to guarantee these objectives.

3. A Treaty of Alliance between Greece, Turkey and Cyprus, whereby the three countries undertook to "co-operate for their common defence" and to "resist any attack or aggression, direct or indirect, against the independence and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus." For this purpose a tripartite headquarters would be established on Cypriot territory, and 950 Greek and 650 Turkish troops stationed in the Republic.

4. A Declaration by the British Government accepting the Zurich Agreement as "the agreed foundation for the final settlement of the problem of Cyprus," and stating that Britain would relinquish sovereignty over the island to the Republic of Cyprus with the exception of two areas to be retained as sovereign British military bases.

5. Declarations by the Greek and Turkish Foreign Ministers, by Archbishop Makarios and by Dr Küçük accepting the above documents and declarations as "the agreed foundation for the final settlement of the problem of Cyprus."

6. A statement on agreed measures to be taken to bring the new arrangements into force. The Constitution and the Treaties would come into full effect not later than 19 Feb 1960. A Joint Committee would be established in Cyprus to draft the Constitution, as well as a Transitional Committee in Cyprus to draw up plans for the transfer of authority, and a Joint Committee in London to prepare

the final treaties. The latter would also draft agreements on the British bases in the island.

These agreements were ratified by the Greek Parliament on 28 Feb and by the Turkish Grand National Assembly on 4 Mar 1959.

On 28 Oct 1959 the Treaty of Alliance between Greece, Turkey and Cyprus was initialled in Athens and was to be signed after the proclamation of the Republic of Cyprus. (In fulfillment of the agreement, Greek and Turkish troops arrived in the Republic in Aug 1960.)

As the year 1960 began, the negotiations leading to the final independence of Cyprus appeared to be far from finality. The London Joint Committee, which had been sitting continuously since the Zurich and London Agreements were signed, appeared to be making little headway. The main difficulty was disagreement on the size of the two areas, at Dhekelia and Akrotiri, which the UK Government was to retain as sovereign bases: The British minimum demand was 120 sq. miles, but Archbishop Makarios, pointing out that three Cypriot villages would be included, would not agree to more than 36 sq. miles.

On 5 Jan Archbishop Makarios and Dr Fazil Küçük, leader of the Turkish Cypriot community, left for London, where a conference aimed at breaking the deadlock was held. The Foreign Ministers of the UK, Greece and Turkey, as well as Sir Hugh Foot, the Governor of Cyprus, also took part. Owing to the basic disagreement on the size of the base areas, the conference did not break the deadlock, and it was announced that independence would be postponed to 19 Mar, 1960.

A new phase started on 4 Feb when Julian Amery, Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies, arrived in Cyprus, and the negotiations were transferred to Nicosia. Dr Küçük proposed that the base areas should cover 80 sq. miles, but the British position remained unchanged. Taking part in the negotiations were Mr Amery, Sir Hugh Foot, Archbishop Makarios, Dr Küçük, Zenon Rossides representing the Greek Cypriots and Osman Örek representing the Turkish Cypriots on the London Committee, the Greek Consul-General, G. Christopoulos, and the Turkish Consul-General, V. Turel. As the deadlock continued, Amery went back to London. On 23 Feb he returned to Nicosia and negotiations were started again.

After ten days of negotiations, an agreement on a secondary question, namely Britain's use of training areas outside the two sovereign bases, was reached. The remaining three problems—the administration and civil status of the bases, the UK's financial assistance to Cyprus, and the size of the base areas—remained unsolved.

In the meantime, the Constitutional Committee, which had been meeting in Nicosia regularly under the chairmanship of Professor Bridel of Switzerland, announced the completion of its work.

On 1 Apr, addressing a large crowd commemorating the beginning of the EOKA struggle Archbishop Makarios announced that unless agreement was soon reached, he

would summon the people of Cyprus to civil disobedience. On the following day Dr Küçük made a new compromise proposal, suggesting that the size of the base areas should be reduced to 100 sq. miles. Archbishop Makarios had indicated his willingness to concede 80 sq. miles.

While the differences over the base area question seemed to be quickly narrowing, a new problem arose. Archbishop Makarios demanded that if and when the UK Government decided to relinquish its sovereignty over the base areas, these should be automatically returned to the Republic of Cyprus. The British position was that since these areas would be under British sovereignty there could be no discussion or guarantee as to their future. (*Ethniki*, 5 May)

In the meantime, pressure of time began to play an important role, because unless agreement was reached by the end of June or, at latest, early in July, the UK Parliament could not ratify the Treaty in time, and independence could not be proclaimed before Nov or Dec. By the end of June, however, negotiations were proceeding at a feverish pace, and before the month was out agreement was reached on two important points. The UK agreed to stipulate that if and when it decided to relinquish its sovereignty over the bases they would revert to the Republic of Cyprus. It also agreed to issue a declaration, not to be included in the Treaty, stating that the base areas would be under Cypriot civil administration.

On 6 July agreement was reached on the two outstanding issues. UK financial aid to Cyprus was to be £12 million over a period of five years and another £2½ million for the construction of Nicosia Airport and several roads. It was agreed that the base areas would cover 99 sq. miles.

On 29 July the Cyprus Bill, providing for the establishment of the sovereign independent Republic of Cyprus, went into force, having been passed by Parliament without opposition. It provided for British sovereignty over the base areas on the island and for the treatment of Cyprus as if she was "with but not of" the Commonwealth for an unspecified period; the decision whether to join the Commonwealth was to be made by the Cyprus Parliament and approved by the Commonwealth Governments.

Independence day was fixed for 16 Aug.]

(For text of documents mentioned above see *Cmd* 679, 1093; also *Keesings*, p 16657.)

### THE INTERNAL SITUATION PRIOR TO INDEPENDENCE

Immediately on the signing of the Zurich and London Agreements, in Feb 1959, a transitional Government of Cyprus, composed of ten Ministers (seven Greeks and three Turks) was set up and the gradual transfer of power and authority from the British colonial administration to the new Ministries was started.

A political party called EDMA, composed mainly of former EOKA fighters, was formed to provide Archbishop Makarios and his new Cabinet with political support. It started its work with a great show of enthusiasm, with branches all over the island.

The main rival to EDMA—in fact, one of the main reasons for its establishment—was the substantial Communist strength in the island, which was concentrated mainly in the 35,000-member Pancyprian Federation of Labour, PEO, and the youth movement, EDON. It remained, however, without its political wing, as the Communist Party of Cyprus, AKEL, was proscribed.

The Communists had, however, already initiated a vigorous campaign hailing liberation from imperialist rule

and generally supporting Archbishop Makarios. This campaign was particularly effective in Famagusta, Limassol and Larnaca where they enjoyed majority support. The EG of AKEL, E. Papaioannou, said in a statement issued on 13 Aug 1959: "Ideally, AKEL wants Cyprus to be completely demilitarized, so that no country can accuse us of being a threat to peace... Our policy is full independence. We have given up the idea of Enosis, which we called for at our 1954 congress... Obviously we recognize the Archbishop as the leader in Cyprus."

By the end of July 1959, the general mood of unity and constructive cooperation, which had prevailed in Cyprus since the signing of the London and Zurich Agreements, seemed to be changing.

General Grivas, leader of the four-year EOKA struggle, who had returned to Athens after the signature of the Agreements, issued a communiqué denouncing Archbishop Makarios for signing them, claiming that they had not been fully brought to his attention.

Public opinion in general, expressed through the Cypriot Press, had definitely been in support of the Archbishop, and there had been a strong feeling against renewal of hostilities, but Grivas' statement had immediate repercussions, and a group calling itself the Cyprus Fighters' Association (KEM) circulated leaflets calling for the continuation of the struggle for Enosis, i.e. union with Greece. This call was supported by the Bishop of Kyrenia, who, in an attack on the Agreements, said: "I denounced the Zurich and London Agreements from the start as a national tragedy because they create a regime worse than colonialism and place the Greek population at the mercy of the Turkish minority. Only the return to the Enosis line would restore the unity of the people."

F. Papaphotis, who voiced his support of this dissident group, was expelled from the EDMA Executive Committee. *Ethniki*, which was previously pro-Makarios, criticized the expulsion, and its editor was kidnapped and beaten-up. The Mayor of Nicosia, Dr T. Dervis, blamed EDMA for the kidnapping.

A small arms workshop was discovered, and arms were stolen from British camps almost daily. The economic situation showed signs of uncertainty: unemployment reached 6,000, and transfer of funds abroad assumed alarming proportions.

On 13 Sept 1959 the Archbishop, replying to General Grivas' accusations, disclosed that a letter had been sent by the Bishop of Kyrenia's brother to Papafotis calling for the establishment of a militant organization at the Bishop's disposal. Griva's handwritten comments, the Archbishop claimed, appeared on the letter.

This caused a further split in EDMA, and the Minister of Communications, A. Georgiades, who had been Grivas' aide-de-camp during the EOKA period, voiced support for the General. On 1 Oct 1959, Georgiades left for Athens to facilitate a meeting between Makarios and Grivas.

The meeting took place on 7-9 Oct 1959, in Rhodes, and the following joint communiqué was issued, in which Grivas expressed his support for the Archbishop:

"We met in a spirit of full understanding and sincere trust and examined the whole Cyprus question and its difficulties. The securing of the paramount interest not only of Cypriot Hellenism but also of the Cypriot people as a whole, at this delicate phase of the history of the island, dictates unshakeable unity, accord, brotherhood and cooperation. The wonderful spirit of resistance of the last four years must never cease to inspire the Cypriots. Continued efforts must be made by all for the safeguarding of the paramount ideals of freedom to place the

foundations of the Cyprus Republic on a sound basis for the sake of peace and stability in the entire region.

"In this spirit we send to the Cypriot people our common greeting of love and honour and we address to them our message of hope and faith."

The reaction in Cyprus was general relief that unity had at last been achieved. (See, e.g. *Eleftheria*, 9 Oct, 1959.)

In the meantime, the Constitutional Committee in Nicosia was making slow progress. This Committee, composed of representatives of Greece, Turkey, Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots, had been holding regular sessions since June, under the chairmanship of Professor Bridel of Switzerland. The main difficulty facing it was the question of the rights and privileges of the Vice-President. According to Greek circles, the Turks would not agree to the concept of a Vice-President, but visualized his position as that of co-President.

The prevailing mood of cooperation between the Greek and Turkish communities was shattered when on 18 Oct 1959, a small Turkish vessel, the *Deniz*, was captured off the coast of Cyprus carrying 75 cases of ammunition. One paper wrote: "The *Deniz* case shows that the delaying tactics of the Turks in the various committees were calculated to win time for the Turks to arm themselves and launch a blood bath like that of St. Bartholomew night." (*Ethniki*, 23 Oct 1959)

Another paper declared: "The Greek Cypriot people will face the situation with iron determination." (*Eleftheria*, 23 Oct, 1959)

While mutual accusations were being hurled, Archbishop Makarios called off the meetings of the Constitutional Committee. Only after a meeting called by the Governor, Sir Hugh Foot, after which the Archbishop and Dr Küçük issued appeals to all Cypriots to hand over all arms, were the negotiations resumed.

There was a new political development at the end of Oct 1959, when the Mayor of Nicosia, Dr Dervis, called in the mayors of the other five towns of Cyprus and a joint communiqué was issued attacking the Archbishop for his support of EDMA, denouncing the Zurich and London Agreements, and demanding their revision. Dr Dervis declared that, as the Archbishop had taken a partisan position, he no longer represented Cyprus as a whole, and therefore could not be the only candidate at the forthcoming presidential elections.

On the same day EDON, the left-wing youth movement, held a mass rally which showed increased membership and efficient organization.

By early Nov 1959, considerable progress had been made in the Constitutional Committee, and agreement was reached on the problem of the Vice-President. It was then decided to hold the presidential elections on 13 Dec 1959.

On 15 Nov 1959, a new political party, the Democratic Union, was formed under the leadership of Dr Dervis and John Clerides, a prominent lawyer. Clerides was nominated as the new party's candidate for President.

The reaction of the Communists was favourable and the extreme ex-EOKA group joined in.

On 20 Nov 1959, the Minister of Communications, A. Georgiades, resigned his post and left the island.

The negotiations between the Archbishop and the left wing on the presidential elections ended in disagreement, and the Communists announced their support for Clerides.

On 3 Dec 1959, Dr Küçük, the only candidate for the post of Vice-President, was automatically elected.

The presidential elections, which were held on 13 Dec 1959, aroused great interest, and out of 238,879 eligible voters, 216,254—or 91 per cent—voted. Archbishop Makarios received 144,501 votes, 67 per cent of the total, Clerides 71,753, or 33 per cent of the votes.

The main support for the Archbishop came from the rural areas, while Clerides derived most of his strength from the towns. This was considered to be due mainly to the efficient organization of the left wing trade union, PEO.

As 1960 opened, independence was still held up by the continuance of the deadlock in the deliberations of the London Committee, though negotiations in the Constitutional Committee appeared to be progressing satisfactorily. Thus the original date of independence, 19 Feb, could not be kept, and it had to be postponed by a month.

While attention was generally focussed on the progress of these negotiations, talks were held between Archbishop Makarios and the Communists on the elections to the House of Representatives. By the end of Jan it was announced that the Communists would support the Archbishop, and be allotted five out of the 35 Greek seats.

The economic situation deteriorated further, as the number of unemployed reached 10,000. Industries were closing down and no new projects were undertaken. A drought year further worsened the situation in the rural areas.

In Apr the Constitutional Committee reached final agreement and attention was now concentrated on the negotiations over the future of the base areas (see above).

EDMA, which had ceased to exist as an effective political force, was replaced by the Patriotic Front, a mass movement composed of all non-Communist groups who supported the Archbishop. However, the Front was not called upon to show its full strength as, following the agreement between the Cypriot leaders and the UK Government, and the previous arrangements between the Archbishop and the Communists, the Democratic Union announced that it would not submit candidates for the House of Representatives. A list prepared by the Patriotic Front was opposed only by several independents.

The elections to the House of Representatives took place on 31 July. Of the 35 Greek-Cypriot seats, 30 went to the Patriotic Front, and five to AKEL, according to the election pact between the two bodies. All of the 15 Turkish-Cypriot seats went to Dr Küçük's National Front.

The elections for the two Communal Chambers took place on 7 Aug. Of the 26 seats in the Greek Chamber 20 went to the Patriotic Front, three to AKEL and one each to the Maronites, the Armenians and the Latins. All the seats in the Turkish Chamber went to the National Front.

The road was thus clear for independence, and at midnight, 15/16 Aug 1960, Cyprus became an independent republic.

## THE CONSTITUTION

The Constitution was drawn up by a Joint Commission, on which Greece, Turkey, the Greek-Cypriot community and the Turkish-Cypriot community were represented, Professor Marcel Bridel of Switzerland acting as Legal Adviser. The text was made available to the British Government, which informed the other parties that it had no comments to make. The Constitution was signed at Nicosia on 6 Apr 1960, and went into effect with the



attainment of independence on 16 Aug. The following is a summary of its provisions:

**Part One: General Provisions.** "The State of Cyprus is an independent and sovereign Republic with a presidential régime, the President being Greek and the Vice-President being a Turk elected by the Greek and the Turkish Communities of Cyprus respectively..." (Art. 1).

Article 2 defines the membership of the Greek and the Turkish Communities and provides that members of smaller communities shall elect, for the purpose of the Constitution, to be considered as members of either the Greek or of the Turkish Community.

"The official languages of the Republic are Greek and Turkish" (Art. 3), but "for a period of five years... the English language may be used in any proceedings before any court in the Republic" (Art. 189).

"The Republic shall have its own flag of neutral design and colour..." but Communal authorities as well as private citizens of the Republic shall have the right to fly the Greek or Turkish flag, subject to certain specifications set out in this article (Art. 4).

**Part Two: Fundamental Rights and Liberties.** This part guarantees the fundamental human rights as conceived in Western tradition.

**Part Three: President, Vice-President and Council of Ministers.** The President and the Vice-President of the Republic do not deputize for each other;—if either is temporarily absent or incapacitated, the President or the Vice-President of the House of Representatives shall act for the President or the Vice-President of the Republic respectively (Art. 36). "The election of the President and the Vice-President of the Republic shall be direct, by universal suffrage and secret ballot..." (Art. 39). They shall hold office for five years (Art. 43).

"The President and the Vice-President of the Republic in order to ensure the executive power shall have a Council of Ministers composed of seven Greek Ministers and three Turkish Ministers. The Ministers shall be designated respectively by the President and the Vice-President of the Republic [i.e. Greek Ministers by the President and Turkish Ministers by the Vice-President] who shall appoint them by an instrument signed by them both... One of the following Ministries, that is to say the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Defence or the Ministry of Finance, shall be entrusted to a Turkish Minister... The decisions of the Council of Ministers shall be taken by an absolute majority..." (Art. 46).

The President and the Vice-President of the Republic, *acting separately*, each have the right of final veto on the decisions of the Council of Ministers and on laws and decisions of the House of Representatives concerning foreign affairs, defence or security (Arts. 48, 49). "The President or the Vice-President of the Republic shall have the right to exercise the prerogative of mercy with regard to persons belonging to their respective community who are condemned to death"; this provision is qualified in cases when the person injured and the offender are members of different communities (Art. 53).

"The agenda of any meeting of the Council of Ministers is prepared by the President of the Republic... The Vice-President of the Republic may propose to the President any subject for inclusion in the agenda..." (Art. 56).

"The office of a Minister shall be incompatible with

that of a representative or of a member of a Communal Chamber" or of a member of the armed or security forces of the Republic or with a public or municipal office (Art. 59).

The appointment of Greek Ministers is terminated by the President, and that of Turkish Ministers by the Vice-President (Art. 59).

**Part Four: The House of Representatives.** "The legislative power of the Republic shall be exercised by the House of Representatives in all matters except those expressly reserved to the Communal Chambers under this Constitution" (Art. 61).

"The number of Representatives shall be fifty" (provisions for altering the number follow): 70% elected by the Greek Community, and 30% by the Turkish Community, by universal suffrage and by direct and secret ballot (Art. 62).

"The term of office of the House of Representatives shall be... five years" (Art. 65). "The House of Representatives may dissolve itself only by its own decision carried by an absolute majority including at least one-third of the Representatives elected by the Turkish Community" (Art. 67).

The President of the House of Representatives shall be a Greek, and its Vice-President a Turk (Art. 72).

"The laws and the decisions of the House of Representatives shall be passed by a simple majority vote of the Representatives present and voting." Modifications of the Electoral Law, and laws relating to the municipalities or to the imposition of duties and taxes require a separate simple majority of the Greek and of the Turkish representatives (Art. 78).

**Part Five: The Communal Chambers.** "The Greek and the Turkish Communities respectively shall elect from amongst their own members a Communal Chamber" (Art. 86). These shall have legislative power with regards to religious, educational and cultural matters, personal status, institutional matters of purely communal interest, and the imposition of taxes and fees on members of their respective Community arising from the subjects mentioned above (Art. 87). In addition to these taxes and fees the House of Representatives shall include in the Budget sums to be paid each year to both Communal Chambers, amounting to not less than £1,600,000 to the Greek Communal Chamber, and to not less than £400,000 to the Turkish Communal Chamber (Art. 88). Power of constraint with regard to matters connected with laws and decisions of the Communal Chambers shall lie solely with the public authorities, who may be applied to for this purpose by the Communal Chambers (Art. 90).

"The elections for both the Communal Chambers shall be by universal suffrage and by direct and secret ballot" (Art. 93). Their term is for five years; each Chamber may dissolve itself only by its own decision carried by an absolute majority (Arts. 96, 98).

**Part Six: Independent Officers.** The Attorney-General and his Deputy, the Auditor-General and his Deputy, the Governor of the Issuing Bank and his Deputy, shall not belong both to the same Community (Arts. 112, 115, 118).

**Part Seven: The Public Service.** "The public service shall be composed as to 70% of Greeks and as to 30% of Turks" as far as possible, throughout the various grades. "In regions or localities where one of the two Com-



munities is in a majority approaching 100% the public officers... shall belong to that Community" (Art. 123).

"There shall be a Public Service Commission consisting of a Chairman and nine other members appointed conjointly by the President and the Vice-President of the Republic. Seven members of the Commission shall be Greeks and three members shall be Turks" (Art. 124).

The Accountant-General and the Deputy Account-General shall not be members of the same Community (Art. 126).

**Part Eight: The Forces of the Republic.** "The Republic shall have an army of two thousand men of whom 60 per cent shall be Greek and 40 per cent shall be Turks. Compulsory military service shall not be instituted except by common agreement of the President and the Vice-President of the Republic" (Art. 129). The security forces of the Republic shall be composed as to 70 per cent of Greeks and as to 30 per cent of Turks (Art. 130).

"The Heads and Deputy Heads of the army, the police and the gendarmerie of the Republic shall be appointed jointly by the President and the Vice-President of the Republic. One of the Heads of the army, the police and the gendarmerie shall be a Turk"; the Deputy Head of a force shall not belong to the same Community as the Head of that force (Art. 131).

**Part Nine: Supreme Constitutional Court.** The Supreme Constitutional Court shall be composed of a neutral judge (to be a subject or citizen of neither Greece, Turkey or the UK and Colonies) as President, a Greek-Cypriot and a Turk-Cypriot, to be appointed conjointly by the President and the Vice-President (Art. 133).

**Part Ten: High Court and Subordinate Courts.** The High Court of Justice shall be composed of a neutral judge (disqualifications as above) as President, possessing two votes, two Greek-Cypriot judges and one Turkish-Cypriot judge, all appointed conjointly by the President and the Vice-President (Art. 153).

When plaintiff and defendant in a civil case, or accused and victim in a criminal case, belong to different communities, the court shall be composed of such judges belonging to both communities as the High Court shall determine (Art. 159).

The Communal Chambers shall provide for courts to deal with civil disputes arising out of matters within their competence (Art. 160).

**Part Eleven: Financial Provisions.** This section provides, *inter alia*, for the establishment of the Consolidated Fund of the Republic and Consolidated Funds of the Communal Chambers (Art. 165).

**Part Twelve: Miscellaneous Provisions.** The Republic shall accord most-favoured-nation treatment to Greece, Turkey and the UK (Art. 170).

Directives are given for the allocation of sound and vision broadcasts to each Community (Art. 171).

Separate municipalities shall be created for the Turkish inhabitants of the five largest towns, with a co-ordinating body for municipal matters of common concern (Art. 173).

**Part Thirteen: Final Provisions.** The Treaties of Guarantee and of Military Alliance are to be of constitutional force (Art. 181).

The Articles or parts of Articles of the Constitution

designated as "basic" in Annex III of the Constitution cannot be amended in any way. (These include the provisions determining and safeguarding the relative status and rights of the Communities and the state of affairs established by them are guaranteed by Greece, Turkey and the UK) Art. 182).

"The territory of the Republic is one and indivisible. The integral or partial union of Cyprus with any other State or the separatist independence is excluded" (Art. 185).

**Part Fourteen: Transitional Provisions.** Annex I: The Treaty guaranteeing the independence, territorial integrity and Constitution of the Republic concluded between the Republic, Greece, Turkey and the UK.

Annex II: The Treaty of Military Alliance concluded between the Republic, Greece and Turkey.

Annex III: List of Basic Articles of the Constitution. (*Cyprus, Cmd 1093*)

## THE INTERNAL SITUATION AFTER INDEPENDENCE

The transfer of governmental functions to the newly independent republic was smooth and well organized, mainly because Cypriot Ministers had been heading the ten Ministries since Apr 1959 and there was no interruption in their work on 16 Aug, 1960.

There were, however, a number of changes in the Cabinet immediately before and after Independence Day. Spyros Kyprianou became Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mrs Stella Souliotou Minister of Justice, Andreas Arouzos Minister of Commerce and Industry, and Andreas Papadopoulos Minister of Communications and Works. In addition, Polycarpus Georghadjis, previously Minister of Labour, changed posts with Tassos Padadopoulos, Minister of the Interior.

The first Cabinet of the republic, finally constituted on 22 Aug, was composed as follows:

### *Greek-Cypriot Ministers*

Spyros Kyprianou, Foreign Affairs  
Polycarpus Georghadjis, Interior  
Andreas Arouzos, Commerce and Industry  
Mrs Stella Souliotou, Justice  
Andreas Papadopoulos, Communications and Works  
Tassos Papadopoulos, Labour and Social Services  
Reghinos Theocharous, Finance  
Andreas Azinas, Deputy Minister for Agriculture

### *Turkish-Cypriot Ministers*

Osman Örek, Defence  
Fazil Plumer, Agriculture  
Niyazi Manyera, Health  
Mehmet Nazim, Deputy Minister for Health

The work of the House of Representatives, duly sworn in on 17 Aug, began to take shape and proceeded according to a well-regulated routine, tackling a large volume of urgent legislation. The House was composed of 35 Greek and 15 Turkish members. The Greeks included five representatives of the Communist Party, AKEL.

The proceedings are conducted in Greek and Turkish, and are somewhat hampered by the lack of simultaneous translation.

In the economic field, there was no sign of improvement. Unemployment, by now a permanent feature, stood at 15,000, with no obvious prospects of imminent relief. On 28 Aug President Makarios announced that £350,000 would be allocated to public works as an emergency measure. This was ratified by the Cabinet on 31 Aug. As the situation did not improve considerably, demon-

strations of unemployed took place, and the government was criticized for not implementing the decision and promoting a comprehensive plan for combating unemployment. (*Ethniki, Haravghi, 8 Sept*)

The proposed establishment of an army also came under criticism, in view of the situation, and demands were voiced that the budget allocated for the purpose should be spent to alleviate unemployment. (*Eleftheria, 11 Oct*)

The situation in the rural areas also remained difficult. Farm surpluses from the previous year were still unsold, and the 1960 winter drought drove many smallholders into debt. As an emergency measure, the House of Representatives passed a bill on 29 Sept prohibiting foreclosure of farmland for debt.

Emigration assumed alarming proportions. On 22 Oct it was officially stated that over 8,000 had left during the first eight months of the year, as compared with 2,600 in the previous year. The deterioration in the economic situation was generally regarded as the main cause of this rapid increase, and the opposition put the blame squarely on the Zurich Agreements. (*Ethniki, 24 Oct*)

A United Nations Economic Survey Team, under the chairmanship of Dr Willard Thorp, arrived in early Sept to make a comprehensive study of all aspects of the Cypriot economy; it presented its report and recommendations to the President and to the UN SG in early Dec.

Acts of terrorism, partly stemming from unsettled private feuds, and partly as an aftermath of the four years of underground struggle, became widespread: in four months twelve people were shot dead. The President, strongly condemning the shootings, emphasized the government's determination to enforce law and order. (*Athens News Agency, 31 Aug*)

Both the Communists and the opposition Democratic Union Party continued to strongly criticize the Zurich and London Agreements; the latter blaming Archbishop Makarios for betraying the aspirations of the Greek Cypriot community. (*AKEL Statement, 16 Aug; Ethniki, 23 Aug*)

The relationship between the two communities showed no marked signs of improvement after independence.

The two communities were still obsessed with mutual distrust, each accusing the other of stockpiling and smuggling arms. The Greek Press accused the Turks of continuing to work for a partition of the island. (*Eleftheria, 9 Sept*) In reply, Rauf Denktaş, President of the Turkish Communal Chamber, reiterated the determination of his community to safeguard the Zurich Agreement and Turkish minority rights. (*Necak, 22 Sept*) The Greek Cypriots retorted that they would never renounce their inherent right to self-determination. (*Eleftheria, 23 Sept*)

The general trend towards the centralization and consolidation of the Turkish community continued. A *Halkin Sesi* editorial declared: "Economic co-operation between Greeks and Turks is inadvisable, because it would lead to the economic subjugation of the Turks." (*Halkin Sesi, 27 Sept*)

The outstanding points of friction remained the question of the municipalities and the implementation of the 70:30 ratio in the Civil Service.

The Zurich Agreement clearly stipulated that Nicosia, Famagusta, Limassol, Larnaca and Paphos should have separate Turkish municipalities, but these were not established as no agreement could be reached on the demarcation lines.

The Civil Service problem was even more difficult.

According to the Zurich Agreement 30 per cent of the civil servants should have been Turks by Independence Day, but on 16 Aug the percentage was only 16. An agreement was reached between Archbishop Makarios and Dr Küçük to introduce more Turks gradually over a period of three months, but as there was no apparent progress, Turkish public opinion demanded immediate implementation. The Greeks, especially their trade unions, stigmatized this as a demand for racial discrimination. (*Independent Trade Union Federation Statement, 28 Sept*) All the Greeks supported the protest, and papers called for the establishment of action committees to prevent the installation of additional Turkish officials. (*Ethniki, 29 Sept; Eleftheria, 7 Oct*) It was even argued that the severe economic situation was the direct effect of this clause in the Zurich Agreement. (*Eleftheria, 9 Nov*)

In the meantime, the Public Service Commission, which was responsible for the implementation of the 70:30 ratio, did not make much progress, and on 23 Nov its three Turkish members (out of ten) walked out.

These disputes had a direct effect on the political situation. Dissension in the loosely organized Patriotic Front led to the nomination of rival candidates at a by-election to the House of Representatives, and there were several leadership changes in the SEK trade union organization, an important component of the Front.

Sporadic efforts were made to turn the Front into a political party centred on the former resistance fighters, which would provide steady organizational support for the President and his government. None of these efforts materialized, however. (*Kypros, 6 Nov*)

The demand for a continued struggle for Enosis, i.e. union with Greece, was by no means abandoned, and one of its most vocal proponents, the Bishop of Kyrenia, made it the central theme of his Christmas message. (*Ethniki, 27 Dec*)

The Communists benefited from these developments. Their opposition to the Zurich Agreement and the maintenance of the British bases had been consistent throughout the period, and was intensified after the Press reported that nuclear weapons were being stockpiled in the bases. While the five Communist members of the House of Representatives displayed outstanding co-operation and initiative on questions of unemployment and farm relief, the various Communist-led organizations continued to build up their organizational strength. By the end of the year PEO, the left-wing trade union organization, could point to considerable achievements, and the left-wing youth organization, EDON, announced a membership of 18,000, with branches in many villages throughout the island.

The internal political situation in the Turkish community remained relatively unchanged. The establishment of an opposition party to Küçük and Denktaş did not noticeably affect public opinion in the community, particularly in view of the continued call by its leaders for unity and concerted effort. (*Halkin Sesi, 18 Sept*)

## FOREIGN RELATIONS

**References.** The Arabs, Israel and the Republic of Cyprus pp 181-2; the Arab Boycott, p 187; the Arab League Council, p 128 and p 131; the Arab Refugees, p 131; Foreign Trade, pp 57-8; Cyprus in the UN, p 6; Relations with Israel, p 306; Jordan, p 340; Lebanon, p 365; the UAR, p 552; Turkish Policy Statement, pp 440-1; British Bases in Cyprus, p 94 ff.

As early as Mar 1959, on his return from exile after the signing of the Zurich and London Agreements, Archbishop Makarios, in a speech to the Cypriot nation,

outlined the main foreign policy principles of the future Cyprus Republic. He declared that Cyprus wished to maintain friendly relations with all nations, particularly those of the region, and because of her geographical position might serve as a golden bridge of understanding between East and West.

A similar forecast came from Dr Küçük, leader of the Turkish community. This was particularly significant, as according to the Agreements and the Constitution, the Vice-President has a right of veto on all matters of foreign policy.

In an interview, Archbishop Makarios said that Cyprus would request UN membership immediately after attaining independence, and would seek aid from other countries, provided no political conditions were attached. (*Eleftheria, Athens, 9 Dec 1959*)

As far as the Cyprus position in the international struggle was concerned, Archbishop Makarios emphasized that Cyprus would pursue a policy of neutrality, and would not join any military bloc. (*Nova Makedonija, 9 Apr*)

These points were also included in the platform of the Patriotic Front during the election campaign to the House of Representatives. (*Patriotic Front Policy Statement, 25 July*)

As the date of independence approached, the post of Foreign Minister remained vacant, as during the transitional period it was held by Archbishop Makarios himself. It was widely speculated that the choice would fall on George Chrysafinis, a prominent Nicosia lawyer (*Ethnos, 7 Aug*), but on 14 Aug Archbishop Makarios announced the nomination of Nicos Kranidiotis, who had been his special envoy in Athens for the past year. However, Kranidiotis would not accept, and the appointment was finally made only after Independence day, the post going to Spyros Kyprianou, former Ethnarchy representative in London and member of the executive committee of EDMA.

On Independence Day, 16 Aug, the basis was laid for the new republic's foreign relations: Telegrams were sent to all member-states of the UN—as well as Switzerland and West Germany—announcing the establishment of the Republic, and requesting recognition. Replies came from most countries, and several countries that officially requested agreement to the establishment of embassies in Cyprus received favourable replies. The Ambassadors of Greece and Turkey and the representative of the UK presented their credentials to President Makarios.

President Makarios cabled the SG of the UN on the same day applying for admission to the UN. (*Public Information Office, 17 Aug*)

On the same day, President Makarios issued the following statement on foreign affairs: "The people of Cyprus are today taking their first steps in the space of free nations imbued with the ideas of freedom and democracy, and firmly orientated towards the principles of the United Nations Charter. It will be our object to

cultivate friendly relations with all peoples of the globe within the framework of these principles, in particular with our neighbours, and to safeguard international progress and peace through sincere co-operation with them. We shall follow a policy of equal friendship with all countries, and we shall seek, within the framework laid down by the Agreements signed, to promote the interests of the people of Cyprus through sincere co-operation with all states of the world.

"Coming out of a hard liberation struggle, we forget hatred and passion, and extend a hand of friendship and co-operation to all without exceptions—those who had found themselves in our camp or in the opponents' camp. The new State is today tracing out its course without prejudice, guided only by the promotion of the common interests in the safeguarding of international co-operation and peace." (*Public Information Office, 17 Aug*)

One problem confronting immediately the new republic was its relations with Israel and the Arab states.

On Independence Day, Cyprus firmly maintained its previously declared policy, despite Arab pressure, and agreed to enter into full diplomatic relations with both Israel and the Arab states. Lebanon, the United Arab Republic and Israel opened embassies in Nicosia (see reference above).

Cyprus was admitted to the UN on 24 Aug.

By the end of 1960, the following countries maintained embassies in Nicosia: France, Greece, Israel, Lebanon, Nationalist China, Turkey, UAR, UK, USA, USSR, West Germany, Yugoslavia; in addition, Belgium, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Hungary, Rumania, Sweden, and Switzerland had accredited non-resident Ambassadors. Cyprus maintained five embassies: in Greece, Turkey, UK, USA and West Germany. (The Cypriot embassy in Cairo was opened in Feb 1961.)

The Cypriot Ambassador to Washington was also named head of the delegation to the UN.

A noticeable trend in the foreign policy of Cyprus was the attempt to follow a policy of neutrality and non-alignment. An association with the Afro-Asian group had been first formed during the Afro-Asian Solidarity Conference in Bandung, to which Archbishop Makarios had sent a Greek-Cypriot delegation. The Greek-Cypriot Community was also represented at the Afro-Asian Solidarity Youth Conference in Cairo (Jan 1959), the Afro-Asian Economic Conference in Cairo, and the Afro-Asian Solidarity Conference in Conakry.

Since independence, the new republic has maintained a similarly neutralist policy, and voted together with the Afro-Asian countries on most issues in the UN, particularly on Algeria and the Congo.

This policy, however, did not prevent Cyprus joining the British Commonwealth. On 16 Feb 1961 the House of Representatives resolved by 41 votes to nine to approve the accession of Cyprus to the Commonwealth, and in Mar the republic was officially admitted.

# THE REPUBLIC OF IRAQ

(Al Jumhuriyah al-Iraqiyah)

## INTERNAL AFFAIRS

### SYNOPSIS AND ECONOMIC SURVEY

#### SYNOPSIS

By the beginning of 1960 PM Abd al-Karim Qassim had largely neutralized the Communists and the Nationalists, both of whom had threatened to become decisive political factors. The Nationalists had been broken as a serious threat to his government (barring assassination) with the suppression of Shawwāf's mutiny in Mar 1959. The Communists' attempt to gain power had been repulsed in the summer of 1959, but at the end of that year they were still considered the strongest political group.

The main political event in the first half of 1960 was the passing of the "Associations Law," which was supposed to reactivate party life in preparation for a return to proper constitutional conditions. The law contained safeguards which enabled the government to control closely the development of party life. Qassim was thus able to mount a complicated operation to deprive the Communists of the gains which they had hoped—and their enemies had feared—they would reap from the law. Its main feature was the boosting of a rival "Iraqi Communist Party," headed by Da'ud as-Sā'igh, a dissident Communist with a small following, thus depriving the "true" Communists of the use of their name. Henceforth they were known as the *Ittihad ash-Sha'ab* ("Union of the People"), the name of their daily paper. The Communists were not ready to come out in open opposition to Qassim on this issue.

The number of parties allowed under the Associations Law was small: apart from Da'ud as-Sā'igh's Communist Party, only Barazāni's Kurdish Democratic Party and the National Democrats, as yet undivided and considered loyal, were regarded as established by law (the National Progressive and the Islamic Parties followed later in the year). The extreme nationalist groups—Istiqāl, Ba'ath and various splinter groups—did not even apply.

In May came the final split in the National Democratic Party over the question of continued support for Qassim, as more and more liberals had come to despair of his intention or capacity to restore civic liberties. The "pro-Qassim" offspring of the split was the National Progressive party, headed by Muhammad Hadid, while the residual National Democratic Party under Chadirchi turned to an outspoken, though strictly non-violent, opposition. Muhammad Hadid, the last National Democratic Minister in the government, had resigned in Apr.

Meanwhile the Communists were ousted from one position of strength after another, especially within the trade unions and professional associations, reverting almost to an underground existence. The regime, however, took care not to drive them to extremes, and capital sentences against their followers were not carried out. Colonel Mahdawi's People's Court, long considered almost a Communist institution, went into limbo, after having held two trials of Qassim's would-be assassins and defecting nationalist politicians and officers.

Public security was seriously disturbed by recurring clashes between Communists and Nationalists, which claimed a heavy toll in lives.

By Nov, the last Communist sympathizers had been ousted from the government, together with the only remaining Minister who could yet be regarded as being close to the Nationalists. At the end of 1960 the government was composed entirely of "Qassim's friends" and senior civil servants—a situation which made the task of government easier, but which was regarded by observers as politically disadvantageous.

Qassim's alliance with the Kurdish leader Mustafa al-Barazāni had broken down, and the Kurds were becoming restive. Nationalist and religious groups were engaging in clandestine propaganda, violently hostile to the regime. The Nationalist Press had reappeared in force. Even the National Progressives, the one remaining political body loyal to the regime, was growing visibly disillusioned.

The army had, in fact, become the only mainstay of the regime.

#### ECONOMIC SURVEY

During 1960 the Iraqi economy showed some signs of a gradual recovery from the stagnation which had characterized it since the 1958 Revolution. The outstanding negative features of the year—the failure of the crops, the lack of progress in carrying out agrarian reform, and the increasing trade deficit—were counterbalanced by a number of encouraging developments, particularly financial stabilization and an increase in oil output, resulting in greater oil royalties.

A provisional four-year development plan for 1959/60 to 1962/63 was published at the beginning of the year. It was intended to serve as a link between the previous six-year development plan, inaugurated by the old regime in 1955, and a new, comprehensive and permanent plan in keeping with the policy of the new regime.

While the provisional plan included several projects begun before the Revolution, notably the building of the Dokan and Deir-Bendi Khan dams, it emphasized the intention of the new regime to give less weight to investments in large-scale irrigation schemes, giant dams and other long-range projects. Instead, it gave higher priority to undertakings offering social benefits in the short run, such as investments in roads, housing, schools, etc. to complement the large projects already completed. Total investment for the four-year provisional plan was set at 393 million dinars, of which 39 per cent was to be spent during the 1960/61 financial year. Although some development credits were received from the Eastern bloc, and half of the oil royalties were officially earmarked for development purposes, these sources of finance were still far short of satisfying the expenditure envisaged.



Dams and irrigation projects now accounted for only 12 per cent of the total expenditure, while the relatively large proportion of 19 per cent was allocated to housing, compared with only 5 per cent under the previous six-year plan. Expenditure on transportation projects remained high, 25 per cent, the same as before. The new plan also put much more emphasis on expenditures for education and health.

The £50-million economic credit extended to Iraq by the Soviet Union in Mar 1959 served to encourage the development of a number of new enterprises, especially in the field of light industry, during 1960. This credit was augmented in Aug 1960, when a new £16-million agreement was signed for the construction of a standard-gauge railway line between Baghdad and Basra, to replace the old narrow-gauge line. Additional Soviet bloc aid was given to Iraq during the year in the form of a £12-million industrial credit from Czechoslovakia.

The regular budget for 1960/61 estimated expenditure at ID116 million, compared with ID95 million in the previous budget. About half the income was provided by half the oil royalty revenue, while most of the remaining income came from customs receipts, direct taxes playing only a very minor role.

On the expenditure side, in addition to the heavy cost of military security and police forces (together about ID45.5 million) higher priority was given to education, for which ID19 million was allocated, twice as much as under the old regime. Since Qassim rose to power, the number of registered pupils in the Iraqi school system has risen from 520,000 to 930,000.

On the other hand, the relatively modest sum of ID5.4 million was allocated for the regular expenditure of the Ministries of Agriculture and Agrarian Reform, compared with ID2.4 million for the Ministry of Agriculture alone in the last pre-Revolution budget. These small allocations reflect the relatively low priority attached to agriculture.

In agriculture, 1960 was noteworthy for the failure of most crops, the harvests falling even lower than in the previous lean years. The barley crop totalled 804,000 tons, insufficient to allow for any export. The worst failure was that of the wheat harvest which totalled 591,000 tons, necessitating imports of wheat and flour at an expense of ID16 million. The only encouraging agricultural development was the increase in the date crop to 400,000 tons, representing the principal item in Iraq's exports (excepting oil). While unfavourable weather conditions during the past few years were partially to blame for this state of affairs, the great difficulties encountered in enacting the Agrarian Reform Law had much to do with the failure of agricultural production. Administrative deficiencies, delays in providing credit facilities, and political instability, were among the factors that led disillusioned farmers to abandon their lands and disrupted the relations between landowners and tenants.

In the industrial sector, cement production was stable, an increasing proportion being exported following the recession in the domestic building industry during 1959 and 1960.

Oil output increased in 1960, reached 47.3 million tons

as compared with 41.5 million tons in 1959 and 35.4 million tons in 1958. Owing to the 14 per cent expansion over 1959, royalties were higher in spite of the reduction of posted prices in Aug 1960; they amounted to £95.1 million, compared with £86.6 million in 1959. Most of the increase in output came from the northern IPC fields in the Kirkuk area, while the Basra Petroleum Company limited its production because of the dispute over Iraqi demands for increased port fees. Plans were announced for the erection of a new government oil refinery in Basra, to be built possibly with Czech technical and economic assistance. Other oil industry plans included the more extensive utilization of natural gas for electric power generation and industrial purposes.

Another round of negotiations for a revised oil concession agreement was opened in mid-Aug between IPC officials and the Iraqi Government. No agreement had been reached by the end of the year.

The failure of agricultural production on the one hand and the expansion of oil output on the other hand, influenced the Iraqi balance of trade and the country's foreign currency reserves. Imports in 1960 reached the record figure of ID140 million compared with ID116 million in 1959, while exports and re-exports (not including oil) reached ID11 million—ID3 million lower than in 1959. The trade deficit of ID129 million was due mainly to the drop in all agricultural exports except dates, and furthermore to the urgently required imports of wheat and capital equipment. The need for foreign currency to finance imports was reflected in a drop in the Central Bank's foreign currency reserves during the second half of the year, and in a slight fall in gold reserves during Nov to a level of ID35 million, although these had shown continual growth until then. Total foreign currency reserves held by the Central Bank and commercial banks at the end of Dec 1960 amounted to ID106.2 million, ID22.9 million lower than at the end of Dec 1959.

Notwithstanding the shortcomings in agriculture and international trade, a general tendency towards improved economic stability could be discerned, particularly in the latter part of the year, especially in the fields of finance and commerce. For the first time since the revolution, Western companies showed an increased confidence in the Iraqi market and showed greater interest in doing business with Iraq. At the same time the government retreated from its previous policy of giving commercial preference to the Eastern bloc. There were instances of Eastern and Western companies cooperating in common projects.

Perhaps the most important improvement took place in the financial sector. Bank deposits and currency circulation fell during the second half of 1960, for the first time since the revolution; currency in circulation totalled ID80 million at the end of Dec 1960 compared with ID83 million at the end of 1959. In view of the rapid increase in the means of payment following the revolution, the 1960 decrease could be interpreted as a deflationary trend, this impression being reinforced by a rise of stocks and by the relative stability of prices some of which even fell.

## VIEWS AND POLICIES—INTERNAL AFFAIRS

### PEOPLE AND LEADER

**A Noble People.** Qassim, Baghdad, 21 Apr: "O sisters and brothers, we have to characterize ourselves with co-operation and tolerance and with solid and lofty character which, undoubtedly, are inherent in our souls. Gentleness, generosity, nobility and chivalry are of the nature and character of the triumphant Iraqi people." (*INA; SS, 21 Apr*)

Qassim, Baghdad, 18 July: "Our country is the home of blessing, dignity, chivalry, nobility and of love, affection and co-operation amongst ourselves, the sons of the triumphant people." (*INA, 18 July*)

**The Leader—Son of the People.** Qassim, Baghdad, 19 Dec: "I am the son of the victorious Iraqi Army and the son of the generous noble Iraqi people the great triumphant people. And I am the son of the whole Arab nation..." (*INA, 19 Dec*)

Qassim, Baghdad, 19 Jan: The leader mentioned that he was hit with four bullets in the left shoulder and one in the right. "But now I have recovered and am in full health. I have grown more faithful in working incessantly, and it is from you that I derive my strength, O victorious people!..." (*INA, 19 Jan*)

Qassim, Baghdad, 8 Oct: "...The only word, the first and last word, is for the people and I am integrated with the people..." (*INA; SS, 8 Oct*)

**The Leader Represents the Whole People.** Qassim, Baghdad, 21 Apr: "...I am with the whole. I am not with any specific group. I am with the entire people, and all will in the near future be sure that this idea is the sound and just one..." (*INA; SS, 21 Apr*)

**The Leader—Instrument of Providence.** Qassim, Baghdad, 19 Dec: "...God has helped me and given me strength, will and determination. God has enabled me to serve my people, country and nation and provided for me the favourable circumstances which made me take part in this great honour and that is serving our country and freeing our people and country..." (*INA, 19 Dec*)

**The Leader Shuns Flattery.** Qassim, Baghdad, 19 Dec: "...I loath... the flattery, untruth and hypocrisy which some show towards me in the streets, social gatherings or in other places. I want loyalty, pure hearts that work in the way of God for our people, country and nation..." (*INA, 19 Dec*)

**Leader Unmoved by Outside Forces.** Qassim, Baghdad, 6 Oct: "...I am working, sons of the people, with sedate and quiet steps, and am serving this victorious people... I am working with sure and prudent steps and this people shall triumph and has already triumphed..." (*INA; SS, 8 Oct*)

### THE POLITICAL REGIME

**The Permanent Revolution.** Qassim, Baghdad, 14 Feb: "...Ever since our immortal victorious Revolution," the leader said, "we thought of carrying out successive revolutions for the honour of the homeland." (*INA, 14 Feb*)

Qassim, Baghdad, 14 July: "...You have discerned that we are in a continuous revolution such as turning poverty into richness and getting rid of disease, to have the sons of the country healthy and strong..." (*INA; SS, 15 July*)

Qassim, Baghdad, 6 Oct: "...We rose up against imperialism and we still are in continuous revolution. The spies and the puppets which imperialism spreads in our country shall be of no avail, for the people has been awakened and everyone is alert..." (*INA; SS, 8 Oct*)

**Revolution Brings National Unity.** Qassim, Baghdad, 15 Aug: "...We, the triumphant Iraqi people, which consists of the fraternal and loving nationalities—the Arab nationality, Kurdish and Turkmani nationalities and the other minorities in this homeland form the triumphant and loving Iraqi people..." (*INA; SS, 15 Aug*)

**Iraq—a True Democracy.** Hāshim Jawād, Beirut, 21 Aug: "...Democracy cannot be gained at once... but it imposes slow and radical changes, and it has several aspects. Premier... Qassim primarily wanted to give back the Press freedom and that all opinions be made public freely, from the extreme left to the extreme right... I must draw your attention to the great importance we pin on the unions and all professional organizations. We encourage union activity as it is a means for us to prepare and educate the working class. Moreover, union activity in our country closely follows the development of union movement in the world... So you can see that Iraq enjoys true democracy which is evident before all, even the most suspicious. I do not believe that you can imagine how much intellectual work we have done..." (*INA, 21 Aug*)

**Revolution Means Order and Organization.** Qassim, Baghdad, 19 Dec: "...I appreciate full independence and sovereignty for our people, country and nation. This freedom and independence must be based on order and organization inside the country and must be connected with the interest of our people, country and nation..." (*INA, 19 Dec*)

**Revolution Means the Rule of Right.** Qassim, Baghdad, 21 Apr: "We are with the entire people and we work for the good of this homeland. I bid the men of the authority and the men of justice and law to be neutral and just and to hold accountable only he who commits a crime or crimes against the people, and for specific crimes, and not because of an idea, inclinations, objectives, religion or race. I demand the prevalence of law in justice. But I ask of the whole to work for the interest of the whole and not for their own personal interest." (*INA; SS, 21 Apr*)

**A People's Army.** Qassim, Baghdad, 28 Mar: "You [the Army] are a force that is merged with the structure of the sons of the people..." (*INA; SS, 28 Mar*)

Qassim, Baghdad, 19 Dec: "...When I speak with the loyal soldiers, officers and all those working in the 19th Brigade, I am at the same time speaking with the whole people..." (*INA, 19 Dec*)

**Army Indispensable to the Revolution.** Qassim, Baghdad, 14 July: "...the army] would not have launched this Revolution had our brothers outside the army been able to wring their rights by force of peace. But they had been overcome and were enfeebled... We, therefore, found it unavoidable and that there is no radical solution except to intervene with force and deliver our people and homeland..." (*INA; SS, 15 July*)

Qassim, 21 Apr: "The army has become of great

strength, and this strength protects and preserves the country from the evil of the avaricious and imperialists..." (INA; SS, 21 Apr)

**Army's Task—Internal Security and Defence.** Qassim, Baghdad, 3 Aug: "...We have trained this army not for purpose of committing aggression on anyone but in order to be a support for us and in order to crush any treacherous imperialist or covetous seeking domination over the people or wanting to violate the sanctity of the Arab fatherland..." (INA, 3 Aug)

**Foreign Subverters Will Be Foiled.** Qassim, Baghdad, 21 Apr: "Let the enemy leave us alone. If we stumble, we will rise up. We do not want anyone to interfere in our affairs, we the sons of the triumphant Iraqi people." (INA; SS, 21 Apr)

Qassim, Baghdad, 2 Jan: Elements of treason and plotting were scheming against Iraq from abroad.

"We have made preparations to protect the fabric of the immortal Iraqi Republic by dividing the homeland into sectors to be the graveyard of the covetous..." (INA, 2 Jan)

Qassim, Baghdad, 19 Jan: He pointed out that there were forces who plotted against them and against Lebanon and that the world was aware of who was planning plots and sowing the seeds of discord.

He added, "We shall keep chasing imperialism and its lackeys and the covetous and their agents, and we will work to strip them naked and bring the people to see them as they really are..." (INA, 19 Jan)

Qassim, Baghdad, 6 Oct: "...All the sons of the people are sincere... and if they are ever cheated, we must guide them to the straightforward path and acquaint them with the true character of those agents..." (INA; SS, 8 Oct)

**Islam Religion of the State, but All Faiths Protected.** Qassim, Baghdad, 15 Aug: "...Ours is a Muslim state. Islam is our official religion and is fixed in the constitution. But we protect the other religions in this country as they are free and prosperous..." (INA; SS, 15 Aug)

**Parties Necessary.** Qassim, Baghdad, 6 Jan: "...I am overwhelmed with joy and pride to see the light of freedom for associations and parties issuing forth on the glorious Army Day the 6th Jan, 1960..." (INA, 6 Jan)

Qassim, Baghdad, 27 May: "...At no time can we ever take but the stand of a supporter of the necessity of the existence of parties in a country which pursues a sound democratic line. This does not mean that we compel the sons of the people to be members of parties. Every individual of the sons of the people has absolute freedom whether to join any party or to remain free of party affiliation. This is the sound democracy on which we build the interest of the sons of the people..." (continued)

**Objective of Parties: National Unity** (continued: "Parties are supposed to exist in order to gather the ranks and not create confusion in the ranks of the people and in order to guide them to the general objectives, namely long live the immortal Iraqi Republic, long live genuine Iraqi unity and long live the glorious Arab nation, as well as to have the people follow the healthy democratic line." (INA, 28 May)

**Freedom of Press to be Safeguarded.** Qassim, Baghdad, 27 May: "...I want more freedom for the newspapers.

Maybe some or all of them deviate from the right course. But I do not regard this deviation as resultant from ill-intention but as an error and a mistake. We shall not be the ones to blame if there are among our brothers, the pressmen those who deliberately make a mistake, for we have given freedom to our people and newspapers and such a pressman alone has to bear the blame and feel remorse. But nevertheless it hurts me to know that such a pressman exists..." (INA, 28 May)

**Presidential System Foreshadowed.** Qassim, Baghdad, 12 Oct: "...We shall hold elections in the near future... It will be a Presidential System in which the authority will be vested in the PM... The people shall have the first and the final say..." (INA, 15 Oct)

**Permanent Constitution to be Adopted by Plebiscite.** Qassim, 9 Apr: "...The forthcoming stage will witness a thorough study for the purpose of arriving at sound bases for the permanent Constitution of the Republic of Iraq. This Constitution will replace the interim one we declared on the day of the Revolution. We have pledged to conduct a nation-wide plebiscite on the articles of the Constitution: As we have fulfilled previous promises, we will fulfil this one truthfully, honestly and strictly..." (INA, 9 Apr)

**Need for Patience.** Qassim, Baghdad, 6 Oct: "...The people triumphs, we have only to work with prudence and patience and must reject rashness for you are all brothers in this country..." (INA; SS, 8 Oct)

Qassim, Baghdad, 15 Aug: "...Our patience will never run out. We are people who exhort one another with right and patience. Patience is the key to every problem and he who is patient is the victor..." (INA; SS, 15 Aug)

## SOCIAL CONDITIONS

**Success Through Work.** Qassim, Baghdad, 18 July: "...The country is not built with empty talk, intrigue, clowning and dissension but is built with gathering the ranks and exerting efforts and devotion to this homeland..." (INA, 18 July)

Qassim, Za'afaraniya, 8 Apr: "...now is the time for deeds and not words... the time for words was gone when in the exterminated regime the wide masses of the people used to say words and not act... we will defeat our enemies and imperialism by culture, knowledge, deeds and mighty efforts..." (INA, 18 Apr)

**Classes to Live in Harmony.** Qassim, Baghdad, 8 Mar: "...We are endeavouring to raise the standard of the poor to the level of the well-to-do. At no event whatsoever will we attempt to bring down the suitable standard of the rich..." (INA, 8 Mar)

Qassim, at Celebration of Land Distribution, Baghdad, 17 July: "...I ask you to remove from your hearts all anger and rancour against the citizen who in the past was a feudalist and today has become a cultivator like yourselves. Nowadays, cultivators and peasants work in one hand for the sake of production and the service of this homeland..." (INA, 17 July)

Qassim, Inaugurating the Army Sports Week, Baghdad, 21 Apr: "I ask that competition among the sons of the victorious people and among the groups be for the people's interest... that competition be for the interest of the whole." (INA, SS, 21 Apr)

**Home and Family.** Qassim, Baghdad, 17 July: "...I am sure that our sisters cannot serve society sincerely unless



every one of them enter such [vocational] institute and train herself on the basis of housekeeping and on how to offer chance for building up a prosperous and happy family with its household, the members of this family, its guests, its friends and every modern facilities existed in home. A home should hold a modern library and other facilities contributing to the development and progress of the child according to the society requirements and in accordance with the public service in this life after the victorious and triumphant Revolution..." (INA, 17 July)

**Equal Rights and Duties for Women.** Qassim, Baghdad, 17 July: "...The Iraqi girl has become equal in rights and duties to her brother the man.

We are very proud that the immortal Iraqi Republic is the first republic and the first Arab country to offer freedom to the woman, the girl and the man on par. Therefore, society is expecting from your sisters determination, faith and persistence to build society good..." (INA, 17 July)

**Social Services to be Developed.** Qassim, Baghdad, 18 July: "...All projects in our homeland will include schools, social services, gardens and stadiums. Thus we will secure a comfortable living for the sons of the people besides their national independence..." (INA, 18 July)

**Housing For All.** Qassim, Baghdad, 18 July: "...No individual of this country's sons will remain without a modern, comfortable and sanitary house. This is among the objectives of the triumphant Revolution..." (INA, 18 July)

Qassim, Baghdad, 14 July: "The comfortable house will be spread all over the country and we have accomplished building 25,000 houses during the last two years for the limited-income people and for our poor brothers, which have been already distributed among them. We are going to distribute another 3,000 houses,

which are allocated in the distribution programme during 14th July's week..." (INA, 15 July)

**Higher Learning Needed.** Qassim, Baghdad, 14 July: "...We have to eliminate ignorance in order to have scientists, experts and scholars by whom we could handle our matters and help the other states and nations who still help us..." (INA, 15 July)

**Peasants' Interests Promoted.** Qassim, At-Tarmiyah, 17 July: "...The Revolution has come to distribute a comfortable living on you, my brother peasants..." (INA, 17 July)

Acting Minister of Agrarian Reform, Brigadier Ahmad Muhammad Yahya, 1 Oct: "...It is known that peasants are the majority of this glorious people. This majority needs organization which may be in the form of various cooperative societies... These associations, which were formed under the name of Peasants Association and whose elections will take place, are working for the benefit of the peasant..." (INA, 1 Oct)

**Working for Coming Generation.** Qassim, Baghdad, 21 Apr: "...I am of you and I hope, in the near future, to see the children wearing clean clothes and living comfortably and are not aggressed upon. If we ever depend on anything, we depend on this strong and rising generation, and you must give them your care..."

"...This generation works, endeavours and burns away for the sake of coming generations. It forms a strong pillar for the coming generations on whom we rely in the future..." (INA; SS, 21 Apr)

**Bright Future Forecast.** Qassim, Baghdad, 14 Mar: "...In three years, if you return to Baghdad you will see a higher standard of living, factories turning out the country's needs, irrigation well organized, the peasants owning their own land, transportation facilities organized to cover the whole country and the new university of Baghdad as well. We will be well on our way for heading with the rest of the civilized world." (INA, 16 Mar)

## THE REGIME'S STRUGGLE FOR SURVIVAL

### BACKGROUND AND SYNOPSIS

While most of Qassim's policies throughout 1960 can fairly be classified as part of the regime's struggle for survival, certain measures stand out particularly as direct responses to the mounting lack of public support of Qassim, or even active hostility from a growing variety of quarters.

These included:

1. Progressive purges in the government, administration and army, the general intention being to replace political appointees or persons with strong public backing by non-political professionals or Qassim's personal confidants;
2. Attempts to curry public favour, such as special gratuities to civil servants and others, extra holidays, remission of prison terms, etc.;
3. The projection of "Qassim image" of the benevolent and all-powerful father of his country;
4. The work of the security services, which carried on, or even strengthened, their preventive and corrective activities in a state of watchfulness which reached its climax towards the Anniversary of the Revolution in July.

### CHANGES IN GOVERNMENT

**Jan-May: Resignation of National Democratic Ministers.** The Minister of Agriculture, Hudaib Hajj Hammud (National Democratic Party), was released from his post at his own request in order to devote himself to party activity following the resumption of party life. Brigadier Abd al-Wahab Amin was appointed acting Minister of Agriculture. (Zaman, 6 Jan)

On 23 Apr the Minister of Finance, Muhammad Hadid (National Democratic Party), handed in his resignation because of differences within his party. Qassim finally accepted his resignation, praising Hadid as "a founder of our National Government." (Zaman, 27 Apr, 4 May) [Until the definite appointment of a successor the Ministry was headed first by Hashim Jawad and then by Abd al-Latif ash-Shawwaf as acting Ministers.]

**Feb-May: Leftist Ministers Ousted.** On 16 Feb a Republican Decree pronounced the dismissal of Dr Ibrahim Kubbah, Minister of Agrarian Reform and of Oil Affairs, "in the public interest and by the wish of the PM." He was replaced by Ahmad Muhammad Yahya. (Zaman, 17 Feb) [Dr Kubbah was a doctrinaire Marxist, who



## THE GOVERNMENT

Ministry	Government on 1 Jan 1960	Changes Introduced During the Year	Government on 31 Dec 1960
PM	Maj-Gen Abd al-Karīm Qassim		Maj-Gen Abd al-Karīm Qassim
Defence	Maj-Gen Abd al-Karīm Qassim (acting)		Maj-Gen Abd al-Karīm Qassim (acting)
Interior	Brig Ahmad Muhammad Yahya		Brig Ahmad Muhammad Yahya
Foreign Affairs	Hāshim Jawād		Hāshim Jawād
Justice	Mustafa Ali		Mustafa Ali
Health	Brig Ahmad Abd al-Malik ash-Shawwāf		Brig Ahmad Abd al-Malik ash-Shawwāf
Planning	Tal'at ash-Shaybāni		Tal'at ash-Shaybāni
Communications	Dr Hasan at-Talabāni		Dr Hasan at-Talabāni
Without Portfolio	Brig Fu'ād Arif	3 May, Dr Nazīhah ad-Dulaymi; 20 Oct Brig Fu'ād Arif	Brig Fu'ād Arif
Education	Brig Muhi ad-Dīn Abd al-Hamīd	3 May, Brig Isma'īl Arif	Brig Isma'īl Arif
Guidance	Faisal as-Sāmīr		Faisal as-Sāmīr
Commerce	Abd al-Latīf ash-Shawwāf	15 Nov, Nāzīm az-Zahāwī	Nāzīm az-Zahāwī
Agrarian Reform	Dr Ibrāhīm Kubbah	16 Feb, Brig Ahmad Muhammad Yahya (acting)	Brig Ahmad Muhammad Yahya
Oil Affairs	Dr Ibrāhīm Kubbah	16 Feb, Brig Ahmad Muhammad Yahya (acting) 9 Dec, Muhammad Salmām	Muhammad Salmām
Housing, Works	Awni Yūsuf	15 Nov, Hasan Rif'at	Hasan Rif'at
Municipalities	Dr Nazīhah ad-Dulaymi	3 May, Abbās al-Baldāwī	Abbās al-Baldāwī
Social Affairs	Brig Abd al-Wahāb Amīn	20 Oct, Hassan at-Talabāni (acting)	Hassan at-Talabāni (acting)
Finance	Muhammad Hadīd	26 Apr, Abd al-Latīf ash-Shawwāf (acting); 15 Nov, Dr Muzaffar Hussein Jamīl	Dr Muzaffar Hussein Jamīl
Agriculture	Hudayb Hajj Hammūd	5 Jan, Brig Abd al-Wahāb Amīn (acting) 20 Oct, Brig Fu'ād Arif (acting)	Brig Fu'ād Arif (acting)
Industry	Muhammad Hadīd (acting)	3 May, Brig Muhi ad-Dīn Abd al-Hamīd	Brig Muhi ad-Dīn Abd al-Hamīd

had been appointed Minister of Economic Affairs at the time of the Revolution. In July 1959 he was demoted to less important posts "for failing to carry out the trade agreements he had negotiated with the Eastern Bloc." His final dismissal may have been due in part to dislike of his agrarian views; in any case it was in line with the government's general anti-Communist policy at the period.]

On 3 May a Republican Decree announced the transfer of the Minister of Municipalities, Dr Nazīhah ad-Dulaymi, to the [lesser] post of Minister without portfolio. The Director General of the Ministry, Abbās al-Baldāwī, was appointed Minister of Municipalities. (*Zaman*, 4 May) An anti-Communist comment was: "We are in possession of irrefutable documents which confirm that she [Dr Dulaymi] was giving support to a narrow party line." (*Thawrah*, as quoted in *Iraq Times*, 6 May)

The same Republican Decree also announced the transfer of the Minister of Education, Muhi ad-Dīn Abd al-Hamīd, to the post of Minister of Industry, and his replacement by Brigadier Isma'īl Arif, till then OC 25th Brigade. (*Zaman*, 4 May) [Without being an active sympathizer himself, Abd al-Hamīd had done nothing to

prevent Communist influences from permeating his Ministry. His successor, a man of strong anti-Communist views, was expected to remedy this state of affairs.] An anti-Communist comment was: "The Ministry of Education has become a centre of gravity to blind party affiliations and anarchism... [it was hoped] that the new Minister of Education would promptly commence removing the corrupt elements." (*Thawrah* as quoted in *Iraq Times*, 5 May)

**Oct: "Nationalist" Minister Resigns.** On 20 Oct Brigadier Abd al-Wahāb Amīn, Minister of Social Affairs and Acting Minister of Agriculture, resigned at his own request. (*Iraq Times*, 23 Oct) [He was reputed to have "nationalist" sympathies, and his resignation was rumoured to be in protest over the difficulties placed in the way of the Islamic Party—see p 249 Hassan at-Talabāni was appointed Minister of Social Affairs, and Fu'ād Arif acting Minister of Agriculture.]

**Nov: Leftist Ministers Ousted (continued).** On 15 Nov Dr Nazīhah ad-Dulaymi, Minister without portfolio, Awni Yūsuf, Minister of Works and Housing, and Abd al-Latīf

ash-Shawwāf, Minister of Commerce, were released from their posts. Nāzim az-Zahāwī, formerly Governor of the Central Bank, was appointed Minister of Commerce; Hasan Rif'at was appointed Minister of Works and Housing; Dr Muzaffar Hussein Jamil was appointed Minister of Finance. (*Zaman*, 16 Nov) [The three new Ministers were professionals known to be without party affiliation. There had been no definite appointment to the Ministry of Finance since the resignation of Muhammad Hadīd, see above.]

**Dec: Minister for Oil Affairs Appointed.** On 9 Dec Muhammad Salman was appointed Minister of Oil Affairs, and resigned his post with the Arab League Secretariat on 10 Dec. (*Zaman*, 10, 11 Dec) [Muhammad Salmān, originally a career officer in the Iraqi Army, had served with the Arab League Secretariat since 1948 and had been responsible for oil affairs. He was reputed to be one of the foremost authorities on oil affairs in the Arab world. He was not known to have any party affiliation either.]

### ADMINISTRATION AND ARMY— POLITICAL CHANGES

**Background and Synopsis.** [Throughout 1960 many senior officials and army officers were either dismissed or transferred to less sensitive posts because of their political affiliations—usually pro-Communist, but occasionally “nationalist” or explicitly pro-UAR. The reasons were rarely, if ever, stated officially, or permitted to be published in the local Press. Only a few examples, in which the past character and activities of the person concerned speak for themselves, or where foreign comments seem sufficiently authoritative, therefore can be given.]

**Foreign Ministry.** The Cultural Attaché at Ankara, Rafiq Hilmi, was recalled to Iraq and replaced by Mustafa Tharwāt. (*Bilad*, 24 Mar) [Rafiq Hilmi was a noted pro-Communist journalist.]

The Commercial Attaché at Washington, Dr Fawzi al-Qaysi, and the Press Attaché there, Kāzim Jawād, were recalled to Iraq, together with the Military Attaché (see below under Army).

Al-Qaysi claimed that the reason was the government's policy of eliminating “nationalists,” though this was later denied by the Iraqi Ambassador in Washington. (*Eg. Gaz.*, 25 Mar)

**Ministry of Education.** The Director-General of Education, Dr Saddīq al-Atrūshi, was transferred from his post and appointed to the staff of Baghdad University. (*Ahali*, 1 Aug) He had been one of the sponsors of the pro-Communist Republican Party.

The Director of Elementary Education, Najīb Muhi ad-Dīn, was transferred to the post of Inspector of Education for the Risafa quarter of Baghdad. (*Iraq Times*, 2 Aug) [He was Chairman of the Teachers' Federation, at that time under Communist influence. These and other postings in the Ministry of Education were the direct outcome of the appointment of Brigadier Isma'il Arif as Minister. See p 235.]

**Ministry of Guidance.** The Director of Broadcasting and Television, Dhu-Nūn Ayyūb, was appointed Press Attaché at the embassy in Vienna. (*Bilad*, 22 June) [He was an author and playwright and known for his pro-Communist views.]

**The Army.** Brigadier Saddīq Hasan, OC 4th Division, was retired on pension. (*Al Waqā'i al-Iraqiya* No. 445,

22 Nov) [He was reputed to hold “nationalist” views.]

The Military Attaché in Moscow, Lt-Colonel Ghad-bān as-Sa'ad, was recalled to Iraq. (*Zaman*, 8 Apr) [He was widely known as a Communist.]

Hasan an-Naqīb, Acting Military Attaché in Washington, was recalled to Iraq. A UAR source called him a victim of the regime's anti-nationalist policy. (*Eg. Gaz.*, 25 Mar)

### INTERNAL PROPAGANDA AND RELATED MEASURES

**Adulation of the “Sole Leader.”** The cult of Qassim was pushed to new heights after the unsuccessful attempt on his life was made in Oct 1959, and continued thus through 1960. Following are a few typical examples.

Colonel Abd al-Karīm Jeddah published a booklet called “*Thawrat az-Za'im al-Munqidh*” (“The Leader-Saviour's Revolution”), extensive excerpts from which were published in the Press. (*Akhbar*, 1 July; *Bilad*, 2 July)

After an audience with Qassim, the Iraqi Honorary Consul at Dakar, Jamil Harb, called him “one of the greatest of the great in Islam, one of the first caliphs.” (*R. Baghdad*, 29 July—*IMB*, 30 July)

An American journalist noted: “There are dozens, if not hundreds, of new songs praising the new leader... Most of them follow the line of: ‘O Abd al-Karīm, I give my life to you’.” (*NYHT*, 26 Jan)

On 6 Jan monuments to Qassim were dedicated in Najaf and Karbala. (*Zaman*, 7 Jan)

A memorial was to be erected in the centre of Baghdad, on the spot of the attempt on Qassim's life. (*Hayat*, 3 Jan)

Licenses were given for the import of goods bearing the image of Qassim. (*Bilad*, 13 Feb, 26 Mar)

(See also Views and Policies, p 232.)

**Jan-Aug: “Guidance Centres.”** The Ministry of Guidance decided to set up “Guidance Centres” in every village in Iraq—each to be provided with a reading-room, radio, television, and a projector; the reading-room was to contain official publications. As a first step four centres were to be opened: in Sulaymaniya, Ramadi, Ba'quba and Amara. (*R. Baghdad*, 5 Jan—*BBC*, 7 Jan) The government approved the project and allotted it ID20,000. (*Zaman*, 5 Apr) The first Guidance Centre was opened in Ba'quba on 1 Aug. (*Zaman*, 3 Aug) [By the end of 1960 no news had been received of the opening of further centres.]

**Bonuses and Free Gifts on 14 July.** The Council of Ministers decided on 9 July on a bonus, equal to half the basic salary, for all civil servants in honour of the second anniversary of the revolution. The Ministry of Social Affairs would distribute 21 houses to junior officials and employees. This Ministry also decided to distribute one Dinar to each inmate of its institutions throughout Iraq, on the morning of 13 July. (*INA*, No. 156, 11 July)

**Mar-Apr: Death Sentence on Monarchists Commuted.** On 27 Mar a decree was published bearing Qassim's signature announcing that the death sentences imposed in 1958 on a number of politicians and army officers of the old regime had been commuted to various prison terms. Prominent among these were two former Prime Ministers, Fādīl al-Jamālī and Ahmad Mukhtār Babān; the last royal CGS, General Rafiq Arif; his deputy, General Ghāzi ad-Daghīstāni; and the GOC 1st Division at the eve of the Revolution, General Umar Ali. (*Zaman*, 28 Mar) Ghāzi Daghistāni was released from

prison soon after. (*Zaman*, 29 Apr) (Other long term prison sentences against leaders of the old regime were shortened, and various forms of police supervision and sequestration of property lifted, later in 1960. (*Bilad*, 13 July; *Ahali*, 12 Sep, 10 Oct; *Zaman*, 6 Dec)

**General Amnesty.** Three times in 1960. Qassim ordered that all prison terms be reduced by 10 per cent: first in honour of Army Day (6 Jan); then in honour of Revolution Day (14 July); and lastly in honour of "Safety Day" (3 Dec) [the anniversary of his own release from the hospital after the attempt on his life]. (*Zaman*, 6 Jan, 8 July, 1 Dec)

#### INTERNAL SECURITY—GENERAL MEASURES

**Curfew Eased, but Maintained.** The nightly curfew, which had been imposed in Baghdad after the attempt on Qassim's life, 7 Oct, 1959, was maintained, though in Feb it was reduced to two and a half hours "because of Ramadan." (*Zaman*, 29 Feb) The curfew was raised for the nights of Christmas and New Year. (*Zaman*, 25 Dec) [On 6 Jan, 1961, it was lifted entirely.]

**Freedom of Assembly not Restored.** [The ban on assemblies without previous authorization by the Military Governor-General was maintained, but] in Jan business meetings of companies were permitted. (*Ahali*, 18 Jan)

**Freedom of Inland Travel Restricted.** A group of secondary school students complained in a letter to the editor that they had been attacked [by the military?] while on an outing to Hilla, although they had obtained a permit from the Directorate of Military Intelligence, as required. (*Zaman*, 16 Feb) [There is no evidence that these restrictions were removed during 1960.]

**July: The Authorities Decide on Demonstration Slogans.** All streamers, placards, etc., intended for 14th July celebrations were subject to the approval of Major-General Ali Ghālib Azīz, Chairman of the National Festival Committee. General Azīz had already announced that he would not tolerate slogans "increasing divisions among the people." (*Hayat*, 1 July) Similar measures had been

taken by the Military Governor-General prior to "Safety Day." (*Ahali*, 4 Dec)

**Aug: Penalties for Offences Against the State Increased.** On 17 Aug a decree was published in the Official Gazette increasing the maximum penalty to ten years' imprisonment for an attempt on the life of the Chairman of the Sovereignty Council or the PM, or for a libel on either of them; a written insult to "the honour of the government or of the army" was to be punished by three years in prison. (*Hayat*, 18 Aug)

**Aug: Sale of Explosives Prohibited.** On 11 Aug an order by the Acting Military Governor-General prohibited the sale of explosives and fireworks. (*R. Baghdad*, 11 Sept-*IMB*, 12 Sept)

**Sale of Typewriters Controlled.** The Director of General Security, Colonel Abd al-Majid Jalīl, published a decree compelling dealers in typewriters, mimeograph machines, etc. to give detailed accounts of their stock and their customers back to the 1958 Revolution. Future sales were to be subject to a permit from the Directorate of Security. (*Istiqlal*, 17 Dec) [This decree was an obvious reaction to the wide-spread clandestine propaganda of various illegal organizations.]

#### SUMMARY—QASSIM'S STANDING IN 1960

[While there was no unanimity on this point, a reading of the foreign Press indicated a consensus of opinion well represented in these observations:] "Qassim's survival... is largely due to his cunning, his secretiveness, his ability to dominate those around him... and to his careful avoidance of taking sides... But there is no organized civilian political base to his regime. Most organized political groups, from extreme left to extreme right, fragmented by inter-party strife, look on General Qassim with deep suspicion as the man responsible for their predicament... The weakness of General Qassim's political position is that, having lost the support of the Communists, he has not yet gained the confidence of the Nationalists, nor is he likely to gain it as long as they put Arab unity first and Iraqi independence second." (*Economist*, 30 July)

### THE GOVERNMENT AND THE PARTIES:

#### THE ASSOCIATIONS LAW (KANUN AL-JAM'İYAT)

##### BACKGROUND

[The formation of political parties was forbidden by law in Iraq in Oct 1954. After the 1958 Revolution a number of political parties set up their organizations openly, but their activities had no legal basis. On the eve of the first anniversary of the Revolution Qassim promised that the following Army Day, 6 Jan 1960, would see the reintroduction of political parties, preparatory to a return to constitutional government. In fulfilment of this promise a new "Associations Law," regulating the constitution, organization and activities of political parties, was promulgated on 1 Jan 1960.]

##### THE ASSOCIATIONS LAW

**Jan: Operative Clauses.** The law, which came into force on 6 Jan, was to be administered by the Minister of the Interior.

Ten Iraqi citizens could found a party, if they could rally 50 "supporters." The founding members must notify the Minister of the Interior of their addresses, the names and addresses of at least 50 supporters, the proposed party's platform and organizational set-up ("Articles of Association"), and its sources of finance. They would also have to satisfy the Minister on compliance with Articles 3 and 4 of the law.

Under Article 3, each member should be: an Iraqi citizen of age; not have been deprived of his civic rights; not have been convicted of an offence involving dishonourable behaviour; and have accepted the association's constitution in writing.

Under Article 4, the association's objective should not be incompatible with the country's independence and national unity; with the republican regime, or with the requirements of democratic government. They should not

aim at sowing discord among the different Iraqi nationalities and faiths, be concealed or veiled by pretended objectives, or be contrary to public order and morals.

The Minister could on the above grounds ask for explanations, make suggestion, demand specified amendments to the Articles of Association, or reject the application altogether, within 30 days of its submission. If no reply had been received within 39 days, the association was to be considered established in law. There was a right of appeal to the Court of Cassation (*Mahkamat al-Tamyiz*), which would have to pass judgment within 15 days of the lodging of the appeal. Its decision was final.

A party convention for the election of officers was to be held within three months of the party being considered legally established.

Government officials, army officials and other persons in any public service were prohibited from engaging in political activities in their places of work, or in activities contrary to the spirit of neutrality required by their duties. Students must not carry on political activities within the school precincts. Affiliation with any organization whatsoever outside Iraq was forbidden; so was the receipt or dispatch of monies to and from abroad without the Minister of the Interior's prior consent. The maintenance of any military or para-military formations was forbidden.

Parties might co-operate among themselves to realize common goals, and such co-operation should not be considered as forming a new legal entity.

In order to set up district (*liwā'*) branches, the organizers of the branch should notify the District Governor (*Mutasarrif*), who was, however, not empowered to prevent the setting up of the branch, except in case of non-compliance with all the conditions demanded by law, or if its establishment was contrary to the party's Articles of Association. In case of opposition by the Mutasarrif,

notice should be given within 15 days of the application, and the organizers had the right to appeal to the Court of Cassation.

The law replaced the Law of Associations No. 63 of 24 Oct 1954, and came into force on 6 Jan 1960. (*Waqa'i al-Iraqiyah*, No. 283, 2 Jan)

**Feb: Additional Interpretation.** In Feb the Minister of the Interior published regulations in accordance with the interpretations of the law given by the Legal Drafting Department, under which no party could set up more than one branch in any one district. The Minister also instructed the District Governors to supervise political activities in their areas. (*Bilad*, 10 Feb)

### THE LAW IN ACTION

**Jan-July: Applications to Form Parties.** [During 1960 there were eight applications to found political parties, five of which were finally allowed and three rejected.

Two of the eight parties were Communist, and two, the Republican Party and the Democratic Party of Kurdistan, were pro-Communist. The dissident Communist party of Da'ud as-Sāigh and the Democratic Party of Kurdistan were allowed, while the Communist party proper (Ittihad ash-Sha'ab) and the Republican party were refused recognition.

The two parties considered "centre"—the National Democratic and the National-Progressive—were allowed, the former after an appeal to the Court of Cassation at a later stage.

Two parties stressed their Islamic and anti-Communist character—the Islamic Party and the Liberation (*Tahrir*) Party. The former was allowed after an appeal to the Court of Cassation, while the latter was rejected by the Minister, and had its appeal rejected by the Courts.

The Ba'ath party had gone underground in 1959; the Istiqlāl was considered dead.]

(For details, see the respective parties.)

### SUMMARY OF PROCEEDINGS UNDER THE ASSOCIATIONS LAW

	<i>Date of Application</i>	<i>Considered Allowed</i>	<i>Finally Rejected</i>
Iraqi Communist Party (ICP) (Al-Hizb ash-Shuyū'i al-Iraqi), headed by Zaki Khayri; later called Hizb Ittihad ash-Sha'ab (IS)	9 Jan	—	22 Feb
Iraqi Communist Party (ICP) (Al-Hizb ash-Shuyū'i al-Iraqi), headed by Da'ud as-Sāigh	9 Jan	10 Feb	—
National Democratic Party (NDP) (Al-Hizb al-Watani ad-Dimuqrāti), headed by Muhammad Hadid; later taken over by Kāmil Chadirchi (see below)	9 Jan	10 Feb	—
The Democratic Party of Iraqi Kurdistan (DPK) (Al-Hizb al-Dimuqrāti li-Kurdistan al-Iraq), headed by Mustafa al-Barazāni	9 Jan	10 Feb	—
Islamic Party (IP) (Al-Hizb al-Islāmi), headed by Ibrahim Abdullah Shihāb	2 Feb	26 Apr	—
Liberation Party (LP) (Hizb at-Tahrir), headed by Abd al-Jabbār Abd al-Wahāb al-Hajj Bakr	2 Feb	—	26 Apr
The Republican Party (RP) (Al-Hizb al-Jumhūri), headed by Abd al-Fattāh Ibrahim	11 Feb	—	27 Mar
National Progressive Party (NPP) (Al-Hizb al-Watani at-Taqqaddumi), headed by Muhammad Hadid	29 June	29 July	—



## THE GOVERNMENT AND THE PARTIES— COMMUNIST AND COMMUNIST-LEANING PARTIES

### BACKGROUND AND SYNOPSIS

(See Internal Affairs, p 230.)

### THE COMMUNISTS AND THE ASSOCIATIONS LAW

**Jan: Two Communist Parties.** On 9 Jan three days after the Associations Law had come into force, notifications were handed to the Minister of the Interior of the founding of two parties, both bearing the same name: the Iraqi Communist Party (ICP) (*al-Hizb ash-Shuyū'i al-Iraqi*). The leader of one party was Zaki Khayri and of the other Da'ud as-Sā'igh. [The first represented the overwhelming majority of the party; the latter had left the party some months previously and represented no more than a tiny fraction of it. (For particulars see below.)]

**Feb: Minority Party Approved; Majority Party Rejected.** On 6 Feb the Ministry of the Interior informed Zaki Khayri that the organizers must revise their statement of policy: the word "revolutionary" was to be struck out wherever it appeared, and the terms "Marxist-Leninist" and "The National Congress of the Party" must be defined. (*Hayat*, 9 Feb) On 8 Feb Zaki Khayri's list presented an amended statement.

The following day, 9 Feb, more than 30 days having elapsed since the presentation of its application and no public announcement having been made to the contrary by the Minister of the Interior, Da'ud as-Sā'igh's party was legally constituted.

On 15 Feb, Zaki Khayri informed the Ministry of the Interior that the organizers intended to change the name of the party to *Hizb Ittihad ash-Sha'ab* (IS) ("The Unity of the People Party"), the name of its official daily, since the Iraqi Communist Party headed by Sā'igh had already been approved. (*Bilad*, 16 Feb)

On 22 Feb, the Ministry of the Interior rejected this application on the following grounds: one party whose objects were similar had already been approved; the notification of the change of name was not legal, as it had been handed in after the application for the forming of the party had been lodged and the name of a party could not be divided from its statement of policy; furthermore, according to information reaching the Ministry of the Interior from reliable sources, the objects of the party did not conform with the stipulation of Article 4 of the law (see above). (*Sawt al-Ahrar*, 24 Feb)

On 7 Mar Zaki Khayri informed the PM that his party had decided not to appeal against the Ministry's decision, and that it was now considering other legal measures to enable it to be active. (*Ittihad ash-Sha'ab*, 8 Mar) [No such legal steps were taken during 1960.]

**Sā'igh Aided by Government.** Sā'igh's party was aided by the authorities. It was reported that he received a substantial loan from Qassim to finance his newspaper, *al-Mabda'*. (*Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, 10 Feb) The party enjoyed preferential treatment from the Ministry of the Interior, which allowed it to hold a party convention six months later than the date defined in the law; Sā'igh had requested a nine-month postponement as his party was new and not yet fully organized. (*Iraq Times*, 29 Apr; *Zaman*, 11 May)

The *Ittihad ash-Sha'ab* party publicly charged that

Sā'igh's party did not have the 50 supporters required by law. On the evidence of one of the founders of Sā'igh's party, who later broke away, they alleged that the Ministry of the Interior had, on 24 Jan, requested it to amend its statement of policy [details of the alterations were not specified], and that the amendment was handed to the Ministry only on 27 Jan. Sā'igh's party could therefore be legal only as from 27 Feb. (*Ittihad ash-Sha'ab*, 10, 22 Feb; *Sawt al-Ahrar*, 24 Feb) [These allegations were not accepted, as this would mean that the first two reasons for disqualifying Khayri's party (see above) would be unfounded.] The *Ittihad ash-Sha'ab* also protested that the authorities prevented circulation of the Lebanese [Communist] newspaper *an-Nidā'*, as it denounced Sā'igh's party. (*Hurriyah*, 22 Feb)

**Foreign Comment.** At first it seemed to foreign observers that Qassim's splitting of the Communists was of dubious value, as they still controlled strategic organizations. One British newspaper expected strikes and demonstrations against the regime. (*Scotsman*, 12 Apr) An American weekly claimed that Qassim did not want to suppress the orthodox Communists completely and, while not permitting their activities, was yet willing to accept their support. (*Time*, 11 Apr)

Shortly afterwards, however, observers saw the step as a political victory for Qassim. *The Scotsman* reported: "Da'ud Sā'igh, who is a personal friend of Qassim, is regarded as such a mild Communist as to be harmless. Many Iraqis say that he is no longer a Communist at all and to have him as head of the official Iraqi Communist Party is an achievement." (*Scotsman*, 28 May)

*The Daily Telegraph* reported that the orthodox Communists had accepted the law as Qassim wanted, and had dropped their opposition to his policy on instructions from Moscow, Khrushchev being interested in avoiding tension in the Middle East as this was likely to foil his policy of coming to terms with the West. (*Daily Telegraph*, 1 July)

### FOUNDERS AND PLATFORM OF COMMUNIST PARTY (ITTIHAD ASH-SHA'AB)

**Jan: Prominent Founding Members.** [Prominent names among the sponsors of the party's application were: Zaki Khayri, the reputed national leader and SG of the (orthodox) ICP, lawyer and political editor of *Ittihad ash-Sha'ab*; Abd al-Qādir Isma'īl al-Bustāni, who had returned to Iraq in 1958 after the Revolution after 20 years in exile, the (official) owner and editor-in-chief of *Ittihad ash-Sha'ab*; Muhammad Hussein Abu al-Is, the (official) owner of the daily *Sawt ash-Sha'ab*; Amir Abdullah, lawyer; Hussein Rādi, teacher, both members of the ICP's Central Committee.]

**Jan: Original Platform.** [The platform was presented to the Minister of the Interior in accordance with the Associations Law on 9 Jan. The following is a summary from the platform as given in an Iraqi monthly on 19 Feb. It should be noted that the expressions to which the Minister of the Interior had in the meanwhile objected do not appear in this version.]

The party's proposed name is "the Iraqi Communist Party." The platform affirms the party's loyalty to the "Revolution of 14 July and its principles." In the fo-

reign field it demands close cooperation with the Socialist states and others that respect "the principles of non-intervention, positive neutralism and peaceful co-existence," and opposes "imperialism, reaction, feudalism and Zionism." The Arab League is to be freed from "despotic methods and reactionary manoeuvres," so that it may become a true aid to Arab solidarity. Within Iraq preparations for a democratic constitution are to be intensified, and an election law based on proportional representation is to be promulgated. Freedom of speech, of printing, of protest and of party organization is to be safeguarded. The ethnic minorities, though "constituting an inseparable part of Iraq," are to be granted facilities to further their cultural life, while the Kurds are also to be given special administrative rights. The settlement of Bedouin tribes on the land is to be promoted. In the economic field, the party demands that private capital be "guided" towards national development; rapid industrialization is to be furthered. The Agricultural Reform Law is to be amended, and the amount of land which may be retained by a private owner is to be fixed at an unstated lower maximum [under the law as it stood the maximum was 1,000 Iraqi dunums of irrigated, or 2,000 dunums of unirrigated, land]. The administration of agricultural reform is to be strengthened to ensure its execution with greater speed and efficiency. (*Ath-Thaqafah al-Jadida*, Feb 1960)

**Feb: Later Developments Regarding Platform.** [During Feb the Minister objected to various points, such as the term "revolutionary," in the platform as submitted, and asked for the clarification of others; finally he denied the party the right to adopt its proposed name. The party complied with all the requests, but did not obtain legalization. Since mid-Feb it was unofficially known to the public as *Ittihad ash-Sha'ab*—see also Associations Law, pp 237-8.]

**Jan-Mar: Special Agrarian Programme.** An agrarian programme was evolved by Zaki Khayri with the aid of a specially appointed committee and was approved by the party. It criticized the Agrarian Reform Law as too lenient towards landowners, arguing that the present "bourgeois-democratic leadership" was incapable of carrying out its provisions. The party proposed larger benefits for the individual peasant—whose right to property was recognized for the present—but they demanded rights for the [Communist-led] peasant societies, which would make these bodies in practice the decisive factor in disposing of expropriated lands. The programme called for the development of a fully co-operative agrarian system in defined stages, leading to a practically wage-earning peasant on a "co-operative" farm.

The rural population was described as composed of four classes: the "poor peasants," the "moderately situated peasants," the "rich peasants," and the "big landowners." (Full text—*Ittihad ash-Sha'ab*, 21-29 Feb, 1, 2, 5 Mar; see also Rony Gabbay—*Communism and Agrarian Reform in Iraq*, Hamizrah Hehadash, No. 1-2, 1961)

**Feb: New Name—Old Party.** Zaki Khayri declared that the adoption of the new name (*Ittihad ash-Sha'ab*) did not mean a change in the party's platform or internal set-up, nor did it signify the abandonment of Marxist-Leninist principles. (*Ittihad ash-Sha'ab*, 22 Feb)

#### ITTIHAD ASH-SHA'AB'S STRUGGLE WITH THE GOVERNMENT

**Feb: Estimates of General Strength.** The Communists were reputed to be about 10,000 strong, and theirs was

the only proper political organization in Iraq. (*Hayat*, 5 Feb) The *Ittihad ash-Sha'ab* Party claimed 180,000 members. (*Jewish Observer*, 26 Feb) [The latter figure seems to be exaggerated, bearing some relation to truth only if fellow-travellers, etc., at the time of the party's apogee in 1959 are included; the former figure may be realistic, but there is reason to assume that there has never been an accurate definition of "membership."]

**Disavowals of Communism.** Throughout 1960 the anti-Communist Press published letters from citizens asserting that they had never been Communists, or that they had left the movement once they had realized its "destructive" or "anti-patriotic" character. These statements were particularly frequent towards the end of the year. (*Hurriyah*, 6 Apr; *Watan*, 17 Dec; *Fajr al-Jadid*, 16, 30 Dec)

**Mar: Communists Claim to be Defenders of the Republic.** [The *Ittihad ash-Sha'ab* Communists attempted to strengthen their position by emphasizing their role as defenders of Qassim's regime against the intrigues of the UAR.] They alleged that there was a danger of a revolt organized by the UAR—pointing to Abdel-Nasser's stay in Syria in Feb as confirmation of this, as Nasser had also stayed in Syria at the time of the Shawwāf revolt of Mar 1959. They claimed that the Communists had warned the authorities prior to Shawwāf's revolt, and had been proved right. (*Ittihad ash-Sha'ab*, 7 Mar; *Sawt al-Ahrar*, 3 Mar)

**Communist Papers' Criticisms.** The following are some of the criticisms and demands voiced in the Iraqi Communist papers:

The Iraqi Broadcasting Service employed "imperialist" news-agencies like UP, AP and Reuter's, which presented world events in a Western perspective. (*Bilad*, 13 Mar)

The "transition period" should be brought to a speedy end, and the military regime abolished. (*Ittihad ash-Sha'ab*, 23 May, 10 July; *Sawt al-Ahrar*, 16, 19 Dec)

Two commissions, composed of members of the public, and officials should be convened to formulate a permanent constitution and an election law, the former to be ratified by plebiscite. (*Ittihad ash-Sha'ab*, 13 July; *Insaniyah*, 15 Dec)

Senior civil servants were sabotaging the consolidation of a democratic regime. (*Sawt al-Ahrar*, 21 Feb, 28 Apr)

The Press ordinances of Nūri Sa'īd were still in force. (*Ittihad ash-Sha'ab*, 26 May, 7 June, 12 Aug, 29 Sept)

The authorities permitted the activities of a party without followers, and forbade those of one strongly backed by the public. (*Ittihad ash-Sha'ab*, 10 Feb)

The authorities unlawfully influenced elections to trade unions, particularly in government-owned enterprises, workers being dismissed or threatened with dismissal for union activities. (*Ittihad ash-Sha'ab*, 27 May, 7 Aug, 5 Sept, see Government and Trade Unions, p 251 ff) Conditions in prisons were wretched. (*Ittihad ash-Sha'ab*, 5 Sept) Police and security personnel belonged to the old regime and used strong-arm methods both inside and outside prison. (*Sawt al-Ahrar*, 21 Apr; *Ittihad ash-Sha'ab* 8, 25 Aug)

[As for the apparent endurance of the Communists in spite of government persecution, the party organ summed up its beliefs when it put into the mouth of an imaginary youth the words:] "Never mind... The will of the people shall in the end decide the fate of every intrigue against the people's security, liberty and independence." (*Ittihad ash-Sha'ab*, 25 Mar)

**Communist Anti-Government Demonstrations.** [Consider-

ing the circumstances, few Communist demonstrations against the restrictions imposed on them seem to have taken place, and it is not unlikely, in view of the general Communist line of restraint, that those that did take place were not ordered by higher party echelons.] In Feb a demonstration was held in Baghdad against the Minister of the Interior for not permitting the formation of the party. The demonstrators clashed with the police and there were a number of killed and wounded. (*Falastin*, 17 Feb) In Mar the Communists organized demonstrations and disturbances in Basra, which were forcibly dispersed by the army. (*Hayat*, 5 Apr) There was a further demonstration in Baghdad on 15 July, when demonstrators clashed with the police, one policeman was killed and many civilians wounded. (*Akhbar*, 18 July)

[For workers' strikes and clashes with the army—see Workers' Organizations, p 251 ff.]

**Communists Going Underground?** It seemed towards the end of 1960 that members of the *Ittihad ash-Sha'ab* had started to adjust themselves afresh to underground existence. (*Fajr al-Jadid*, 22 Dec; *Watan*, 24 Dec) One of the anti-Communist papers, describing this development, said that as the Communists had not complied with the request of the authorities "to merge with the rest of the people, this group had no alternative to going back to its cells, which seem to fit with its temperament and the nature of its work... This group delights in its cells' life where rotten air and poisoned ideas prevail." (*Ahd al-Jadid*, 22 Dec; in *Iraq Times*, 23 Dec)

**June-Dec: Clandestine Propaganda by Communist Radio.** [In June a pro-Communist clandestine Radio Station calling itself *Sawt ash-Sha'ab* (Voice of the People) started broadcasting to the Iraqi public. No authoritative information on its location has been published.]

The *Sawt ash-Sha'ab* station denounced persecution of the "democratic youth organization," the teachers' organizations and the "democratic" newspapers. (*R. Sawt ash-Sha'ab*, 23, 28 June-BBC, 27, 30 June)

On 14 July, the anniversary of the revolution, it appealed to Qassim, "hero of the 14 July Revolution and faithful son of the people," to grant the requests of "the sons of the people and the sweating masses": abolition of the military courts and release of those who defended the Republic against the Shawwāf (Mosul) revolt; a purge of the administration; freedom of political organization, publication, the Press, trade unions and peasants' associations; a democratic constitution and a freely-elected national assembly (*majlis watani*); instructions to security departments and police to protect all citizens and to punish those endangering security. (BBC, 16 July)

After an interval, broadcasts from this station were renewed at the end of Nov, when it attacked "the feudalists and the reactionaries" who were still active in Iraq. (BBC, 1, 3 Dec) It called on Qassim to stop the campaign against "patriotic" newspapers, release the imprisoned newspapermen, reinstate the exiles, and grant full freedom of the Press. (*R. Sawt ash-Sha'ab* 8 Dec-BBC, 10 Dec)

The *Ittihad ash-Sha'ab* newspaper did not identify itself with *Sawt ash-Sha'ab*, and wrote that the operating of this station, "which seemingly broadcasts in the name of the Progressive [Communist] Movement, is something which at the present time we deplore." The paper demanded that the authorities locate the station, a task not technically difficult. (*Ittihad ash-Sha'ab*, 30 June) On the other hand, an anti-Communist paper alleged that

the station belonged to the [*Ittihad ash-Sha'ab*] Communists. It recalled that the embassy of one of the Eastern countries ran a broadcasting station and asked if this was the station over which *Sawt ash-Sha'ab* was transmitting. (*Hurriyah*, 1 July)

### ITTIHAD ASH-SHA'AB'S STRUGGLE WITH CENTRE AND NATIONALIST PARTIES

**June: Attack on the Centre.** The editors of the National Progressive daily *al-Bayān* were accused of hypocrisy for having a "Worker's Page," thus recognizing the existence of a class in the "classless Iraqi nation," in contradiction to their previous propaganda, while slanderously accusing workers' organizations of being non-democratic. (*Ittihad ash-Sha'ab*, 12 June)

**Communists and Nationalists.** [The relations between orthodox Communists and Nationalists were characterized by violence, which took a high toll in lives throughout 1960. Mar stood out in this respect.]

In Mar bloody clashes occurred in Baghdad, Mosul and Kirkuk (*Hayat*, 22, 23 Mar), and "throughout the country from Mosul in the North to Basra in the South. (NYT, 29 Mar) At the same time the Communist and pro-Communist Press complained of a wave of assaults, some fatal, on their followers. (*Sawt al-Ahrar*, 2 Mar; *Ittihad ash-Sha'ab*, 21 Mar) These reports were denied by the Iraqi Ambassador in Beirut, but were reasserted. (*Hayat*, 24 Mar) Indirect confirmation came from Qassim himself in a speech on 22 Mar, in which he warned of troublemongers (*Zaman*, 23 Mar), and from the Military Governor-General in two decrees prohibiting the bearing of arms within town limits. (*Zaman*, 24 Mar; *Ahali*, 27 Mar)

The Baghdad Radio news commentator blamed "imperialists" for causing dissension among the Iraqi people. (*R. Baghdad*, 28 Mar-IMB, 29 Mar)

Qassim strongly deprecated assaults on political opponents and averred that 95 per cent of the people were non-partisan. (*Bilad*, 1 Apr)

The Military Governor-General announced that clashes had taken place on 1 May, without mentioning casualties (*Zaman*, 6 May); according to information received abroad, however, 35 people were killed and over 80 wounded on this occasion. (*Hayat*, 7 May)

According to the UP correspondent in Baghdad, the weekly toll of clashes between Communists and their opponents was two to three dead. (*Hayat*, 20 July)

Pro-Communist sources complained that "traitors" had infiltrated a demonstration held on 3 Dec in honour of the anniversary of Qassim's recuperation, and that a number of persons had been killed in the resulting clash (*Istiqlal*, 4 Dec); one further person was later reported to have died of wounds. (*Insaniyah*, 15 Dec)

### ITTIHAD ASH-SHA'AB VS. THE LEGAL ICP AND THE REPUBLICAN PARTY

**Feb-Mar: Orthodox Communists Denounce Legal ICP.** The Communists accused Sā'igh of not representing the working class, and of megalomania and self-worship; they quoted extensively Communist opinions from abroad to the same effect (see below). (*Ittihad ash-Sha'ab*, 21 Feb, 10 Mar) He was denounced for letting himself be used by the authorities to the detriment of the Communist movement (*Ittihad ash-Sha'ab*, 1 July), while the authorities were blamed for upholding a man of straw against a genuine political party. (*Ittihad ash-Sha'ab*, 10 Feb) It was further claimed that in his application Sā'igh had forged—or at least improperly used—signa-



tures to make up the required number of supporters, and declarations from the persons concerned were quoted. (*Ittihad ash-Sha'ab*, 21, 23, 26, 28 Feb)

**Feb-Aug: Legal ICP's Denunciations of Ittihad ash-Sha'ab.** Sā'igh claimed that it was he who had been the true representative of Iraqi Communism ever since the party's inception in 1934, and that Khayri and his followers had infiltrated it later to its great detriment. (*Mabda'*, 25 Feb) He asserted that in a declaration published on 3 Aug 1959 this group had itself confessed to serious deviations from the principles of Leninism, but he held that confession was not enough, and that the three persons named as responsible for the party's mistakes should be expelled (see also below). (*Mabda'*, 28 June) Sā'igh called on all Communists to join his party (*Mabda'*, 14 May, 7 Aug) and claimed that hundreds had already done so. (*Mabda'*, quoted in *Iraq Times*, 3 Aug)

**Jan-Nov: Legal ICP's Moves for Unification.** On the other hand, Sā'igh repeatedly stated his readiness to negotiate unification of the two parties, and claimed that talks to that effect had been started; as a condition for the merger he demanded, however, that three prominent members of *Ittihad ash-Sha'ab*—Hussein Rādi, Amir Abdulla and Jamāl Haydari—be expelled [apparently in connection with their alleged misdeeds in 1959, see above]. (*Mabda'*, 23 Jan; *Akhbar al-Yaum*, 23 Feb; *Mabda'*, 10 May, 10 Nov)

The Iraqi Ambassador in Moscow, Abd al-Wahāb Mahmūd, had tried, during a stay in Baghdad, to reconcile the two groups, and had actually brought about a meeting between the rival leaders, but his efforts had failed. (*Taqqadum*, 9 Mar, quoted in *Time and Tide*, London, 2 Apr)

Qassim told a *Times* reporter, McDonald, that he had no objection to a merger of the two Communist groups; it was not for him to say who should join a recognized party [meaning that he was not ready to swerve from his support for Sā'igh as the sole representative of Iraqi Communism]. (*R. Baghdad*, 12 June—BBC, 14 June)

**Mar: Legal ICP's Advances Rejected.** The orthodox Communists in general, and Zaki Khayri, in particular, categorically denied the reports of talks with Sā'igh. (*Ittihad ash-Sha'ab*, 9, 10 Mar)

**Feb-Mar: Legal ICP Condemned by Foreign Communists.** Foreign Communism was outspoken in its support for the "true" Communist Party of *Ittihad ash-Sha'ab* and Zaki Khayri, and strongly condemned Sā'igh as a renegade and a stooge; the Iraqi Government was criticized for assigning the title of "Iraqi Communist Party" to "a little group of fractionists." (*NYT*, 28 Feb; *NYHT*, 8 Mar, quoting broadcasts from Moscow, Peking and Sofia, see also pp 70–71)

**Mar: Orthodox Communists Defend Republican Party.** The Communist daily condemned the refusal of the Minister of the Interior to allow the application for recognition of the Republican Party, which the paper described as "progressive." (*Ittihad ash-Sha'ab*, 31 Mar)

### TRIALS OF COMMUNISTS

**Trials of Rioters During the Aftermath of the Shawwāf Munity.** [The trial of groups of Communists and their supporters, accused of rioting and murdering civilians in and around Mosul after Shawwāf's mutiny had been crushed in Mar 1959, continued all through 1960.]

In Jan eight men from Tel-Kif were condemned to death for killing two civilians, and seven others were sentenced to various terms of imprisonment. (*Hayat*, 19 Jan)

On 26 Dec 17 civilians and 22 soldiers were given death sentences, 28 of which were commuted to life imprisonment; 38 more were sent to prison for various terms. All had been found guilty of participating in a massacre in Mosul after the attempted rebellion. (*Ahali*, 27 Dec) On 28 Dec a further 13 were condemned to death, three of them *in absentia*, and five were sentenced to imprisonment; seven of the death sentences were commuted to life imprisonment. (*Fajr al-Jadid*, 29 Dec)

[No death sentences had been carried out by the end of Aug 1961.]

The Communists claimed that the rioters in Tel-Kif had been provoked by the tense situation in the area (*Sawt al-Ahwar*, 23 Feb), and that the authorities were discriminating against them, while those responsible for the death of 80 of Shawwāf's victims had not been brought to trial. (*Ittihad ash-Sha'ab*, 7 Mar)

**Trials of July 1959 Rioters ("Kirkuk Riots").** [During 1960, many adherents of the orthodox Communists or the Communist-permeated Popular Resistance Organization (*al-Muqāwamah ash-Sha'abiyah*) were brought to trial for the massacres which had taken place in July 1959 in Kirkuk and other places, such as Ana, Baghdad and Basra. Some of the accused were soldiers.]

In Feb six soldiers were sentenced to imprisonment. (*Hayat*, 19 Feb) On 29 June one man was given a five-year prison term. (*Zaman*, 30 June) On 15 Oct a Sergeant was sentenced to death and a Corporal to life imprisonment with hard labour. (*Zaman*, 16 Oct) On 3 May, two civilians were imprisoned for life and three others for ten years with hard labour. (*R. Amman*, 3 May—IMB, 4 May) On 15 Nov, three people were sentenced to fifteen, ten, and five years respectively for murdering a man in Kirkuk. (*Zaman*, 16 Nov)

**Mar-Aug: Trials for Inciting Workers and Peasants.** A number of Communists were sentenced to terms of imprisonment for inciting peasants to withhold payment due to landowners as defined under the Agrarian Reform Law. (*Falastin*, 22 Mar) Similarly accused was the Chairman of the Teachers' Association in the Amara District. The Association's secretary and a teacher in the same district were sentenced to two and a half and three years imprisonment respectively. (*Hayat*, 2 July; *Thawra*, 25 July) Six people were sentenced to from eight to eleven months' imprisonment for agitating against the government in a Ministry of Defence enterprise in Baghdad. One of the leaders was accused of insulting Qassim, organizing meetings and strikes, and inciting the workers to demand wage increases. (*Hayat* 18 Aug) See also below: The Government and Associations p 251 ff.

**May-Dec: Trials for Possession of Communist Publications.** The owner of a library was sentenced to two years' hard labour for selling a booklet entitled "The Task of the Communist Party after Political Independence." (*Nasr Syria*, 26 May) This booklet was at first permitted by the Censor, but "after further consideration it was decided that the booklet touches upon subjects which are contrary to the instructions of the Censor, and is against the public interest," and its distribution was banned in June 1960. (*Hurriyah* 30 June)

A student was arrested at the end of July and three others in Aug for being in possession of leaflets of the *Ittihad ash-Sha'ab* party. (*R. Beirut* 1, 24 Aug—IMB, 1,



25 Aug) In Oct, a Kirkuk farmer was sentenced to three months in prison, for possessing a book banned by the Censor and an application form for membership in the illegal Communist Party. (*Zaman* 30 Oct) In Dec the Military Governor-General, in a Military Court, charged two people with being in possession of banned Communist publications and books. (*Al Fajr al-Jadid*, 16 Dec)

**Feb-June: Other Trials.** A number of Communists were charged in Feb with organizing disturbances in Basra and sentenced to long terms of imprisonment. (*Zaman*, 2 Feb) In May a lawyer, Fawzi al-Ahmar, received a three-month prison sentence for contempt of court while defending a Communist. (*Thawrah* 24 May) In June eight members of the Popular Resistance Movement were sentenced to prison for periods of one to two years for attacking the police station in Kefri on 14 June 1959. (*Zaman* 24 June)

### CLOSURE OF COMMUNIST NEWSPAPERS

[During 1960, especially in the second half of the year, most of the papers belonging to, or leaning towards, the *Ittihad ash-Sha'ab* Party were closed by the authorities, and their editors and/or proprietors were put on trial.]

**Mar-Dec: Closure of Ittihad ash-Sha'ab Newspaper.** As of Mar, circulation of the *Ittihad ash-Sha'ab* newspaper was forbidden in seven districts of Southern Iraq by order of the GOC First Division (stationed in this area), Brigadier Sayyid Hamid Sayyid Hussein. [This daily, published in Baghdad, was the party's main political organ.] The Communists protested several times to Qassim and to the Military Governor-General, al-Abdi. (*Ittihad ash-Sha'ab* 15 Mar, 8, 18, May, 11 June) The editor-in-chief of the paper, Abd al-Qadir Isma'il al-Bustani, was sentenced, in Sept, to three months' imprisonment, and his paper was closed down for ten months; he was found guilty of having published, on 11 Aug, unsubstantiated details of a murder case. (*Zaman*, 2 Oct) He was released the following day, however, on Qassim's instructions. (*Zaman*, 4 Oct) Another member of the editorial board, Abd al-Jabbār Wahbi, was sentenced to forced residence in Ramadi. (*Iraq Times*, 10 Nov) On 27 Dec Bustani was summoned before a civic court in Baghdad and accused of spreading libels; when he did not appear, the judge issued a warrant for his arrest. (*Zaman*, 29 Dec) [By the end of Aug 1961 there was no intimation of his arrest; his paper was still closed at that time.]

**June-Aug: Closure of Sawt al-Ahrar.** [This Baghdad daily serves as the mouthpiece of the trade unions under the influence of the *Ittihad ash-Sha'ab* Party.] In June, the Editor of *Sawt al-Ahrar* was fined 150 dinars and the paper was closed down for nine months for publishing secret correspondence between the Iraqi Foreign Ministry and the Iraqi mission in New York on 2 Mar. (*ANA*, 15 June-BBC 17 June) The proprietor Nasif al-Hajjaj was arrested at about the same time and was fined in Aug for having published an article offensive to the General Manager of Ports and to religious leaders. [The paper had accused the Ports Manager of oppressing and persecuting workers inclining towards the Communist factions; see p 252] Al-Hajjaj was released on payment of the fine, but was re-arrested at the end of Sept and released on bail. In Oct he was acquitted. (*Thawra* 13 June; *Akhbar*, 31 July; *Ittihad ash-Sha'ab*, 12 Aug; 30 Sept; *Zaman*, 25 Oct) Judgment against the paper was

rescinded on Qassim's order in Aug 1960. (*Reuter's*, 22 Aug) [From then until the end of the year it appeared regularly.]

**Aug: An Ar-Ra'y al-Amm Correspondent** was sentenced to 15 months in prison for publishing an article derogatory to the authorities. (*Ittihad ash-Sha'ab*, 12 Aug) [The proprietor of this paper is the well-known poet al-Jawahiri, one of the founders of the Republican Party; see also p 244.]

**Oct: Ash-Shabibah Closed Down.** This [Communist] daily, published in Mosul, was closed down in Oct. (*R. Amman*, 25 Oct-*IMB*, 25 Oct) In Dec it was reported that its editor Lt. Colonel Ahmad al-Hajj Ayyub was to be tried for publishing an article in defence of people sentenced by military court on charges of complicity in the Kirkuk incidents. (*Times*, 23 Dec) [The paper had not reappeared by the end of the year.]

**Nov: Sawt ash-Sha'ab Closed Down.** This [Communist] daily was closed down on 7 Nov by the Military Governor-General for disregarding his orders. (*Zaman*, 8 Nov) [*Sawt ash-Sha'ab* was founded in Aug 1959, but was closed down shortly afterwards. It did not reappear until 1 Nov 1960, but was closed down a week later.]

**Nov: Al-Hadarah Proprietor and Editor Arrested.** In Nov Hasan as-Suri proprietor of the [pro Communist] weekly *al-Hadarah*, and chief editor, Abd al-Ghani Matar, were arrested for publishing an article offensive to the Ministry of Health. The editor was released on bail and later fined 30 dinars. (*Ahali*, 28 Nov) The proprietor was released on Qassim's intervention. (*Bilad*, 30 Nov) The paper was closed down for six months. (*BBC*, 30 Nov)

**Nov: Ath-Thabat Closed Down.** [This [Communist] weekly became a daily on 17 Oct, possibly following the closure of Communist newspapers.] *Ath-Thabat* was closed in Nov, its owner, Mahmud Shawkat, and its chief editor, Diya' ash-Shaykh Taha, being banished at the beginning of the month by order of the Military Governor-General. (*Zaman*, 10 Nov)

**Mar-Dec: Al-Insaniyah Closed Down.** In Mar the Ministry of Guidance ordered the editor to cease publication of this pro-Communist newspaper. (*Bilad*, 15 Apr) It re-started on 31 Oct (*Zaman*, 1 Nov) but closed down again in Nov. Its proprietor Kazim as-Samawi, and the editor, Tawfiq Munir-Alusi, were to be put on trial, according to a decree by the Military Governor-General, on 26 Dec before the Second Military Tribunal, but neither of them appeared. The Court adjourned pending the arrest of the accused. (*Ahali*, 23, 29 Dec) [They were arrested on 4 Jan 1961. (*Zaman*, 5 Jan 1961)]

**Pro-Communist Press at End of 1960.** [At the end of 1960 the pro-Communist dailies known to be still in circulation were: *Khabat*—organ of the Democratic Party of Kurdistan, but consistently friendly to the Communist course—and *Sawt al-Ahrar*.]

### THE LEGAL IRAQI COMMUNIST PARTY

**Background.** [The founder and the sole moving spirits of the legal ICP, Da'ud as-Sa'igh, was an old Communist with a flair for non-conformism.] He was expelled from the party in 1943 and set up the dissident Iraqi Communist Brotherhood (*Ukhwah ash-Shuy'iyah al-Iraqi-yah*). He was readmitted in 1957, having recanted his

errors, but expelled again in 1958. (*Ittihad ash-Sha'ab*, 12 Jan) On 21 Nov 1959 he started his daily *al-Mabda'* ("The Principle"), aided, according to rumours, by Qassim, who had begun to groom him for his role as standard-bearer of official Communism in Iraq.]

**Jan-Feb: Sā'igh's Claim to Represent ICP Recognized.** See p 239.

**Jan-Mar: Resignations and Disavowals.** In the second half of Jan and throughout Feb there were repeated notices in various papers announcing resignation from, or disavowal of the ICP (Sā'igh's party) by founding members and original supporters. These included two editorial secretaries of *al-Mabda'*, Kāzim Shāwī and Abd al-Amīr Hassūn al-Haddād. (*Bilad*, 16 Jan; *Istiqlal*, 19 Jan; *Bilad*, 5 Feb; *Hayat*, 3 Mar) [More resignations became public later in the year; the central committee elected at the party's Nov convention did not include a single name, except Sā'igh's, on the founders' list.]

**Sept-Nov: Local Branches of ICP.** Local branches of the ICP were reported to exist in Irbil, Diwaniya, Kirkuk. (*Mabda'*, 14 Sept) An editorial published in the party organ asserted that it had branches in eight of the 14 districts of Iraq. So far the party had not succeeded in opening branches in the remaining six, but it hoped to do so soon. (*Mabda'*, 3 Nov, as quoted in *Iraq Times*, 4 Nov)

**Nov: The Party Convention.** [The party convention should have assembled at the end of May, at the latest, according to the Associations Law, but by special dispensation of the Minister of the Interior it was postponed till Nov.] The party convention took place in Baghdad on 9-11 Nov, in the presence of 160 members. In his opening speech, Sā'igh outlined the history of the ICP since its beginnings in 1934, and stressed the advantage of overt existence over clandestine activity. He said that he had tried "nine times" to heal the breach in the Communist movement—his last terms to the *Ittihad ash-Sha'ab* group had been sent out on 22 Oct, but he had as yet received no reply. The convention then elected, from a single list presented to it, a central committee, which included Da'ud as-Sā'igh, Abd as-Samad Hamīd, Ibrahim Abd al-Hussein, Abd al-Jabbār Ghafūri and 13 others. (*Mabda'*, 10 Nov)

**Nov: Al-Mabda' Closes Down.** Towards the end of Nov the party daily, *al-Mabda'*, closed down. No reasons were then offered, but on its reappearance as a weekly in Feb 1961 an editorial said the main cause had been a desperate lack of funds. (*Mabda'*, 4 Feb 1961)

#### MAHDAWI'S PEOPLE'S PARTY

**Jan-Apr: Al-Mahdāwī Announces Intention to Found Party.** After publication of the Associations Law, Colonel

Abbās Fādīl al-Mahdāwī several times announced his intention of forming a party called *Hizb ash-Sha'ab* (People's Party), if Qassim approved. (*Hayat*, 17 Jan; *Bilad*, 29 Jan, 16 Feb)

[Mahdāwī, who is Qassim's brother-in-law, became notorious as the President of the "People's Court" which tried many of the members of the old regime and Qassim's pro-Nasser opponents. He is known to have pro-Communist tendencies. He did not apply to set up a party, presumably owing to Qassim's disapproval.]

#### THE REPUBLICAN PARTY

**Feb: Prominent Founding Members.** Among prominent founding members of this party were: Abd al-Fattāh Ibrahim [Director-General of Oil Administration]; Muhammad Mahdi al-Jawāhīrī, [poet-laureate of Iraq and Chairman of the Journalists' Association]; Saddīq al-At-rūshī, [Director-General of Education]; and Abbud Zal-zalah, [Inspector-General of Education and Chairman of the Sino-Iraqi Friendship League]. [Azīz Sharīf, SG of the Partisans of Peace, should have been included on the founders' list, but it was claimed that he was omitted owing to his recent return from abroad.]

[All the above-mentioned were known to be Communist sympathizers, although it seems certain that none belonged to the inner circle of the party proper.]

**Feb: Party Platform—Kurd's and Minorities' Rights Advocated.** According to the party's platform it stands for positive neutralism and Arab cooperation, fights imperialism and demands a directed economy. The party advocated a centralized national administration and a separate primary and secondary education system for the "Kurdish people," within "the Unity of Iraq"; the rights of "Turkomans and all other minorities should also be safeguarded." (*Ittihad ash-Sha'ab*, 21 Feb)

**Feb-Apr: Republican Party Rejected.** The application of the Republican Party, made on 11 Feb, was rejected. The Ministry of the Interior at first demanded the amendment of its platform, particularly the clauses relating to minorities. (*Zaman*, 3 Mar) Though the platform was amended as requested, the Ministry of the Interior informed the applicants on 27 Mar that he had forbidden the formation of the party after it had become known to the authorities that the founders did not comply with the provisions of Article 4 of the Associations Law. [The same charge had been made against Khayri's party.] (*Akhbar*, 20 Apr) On 5 Apr Abd al-Fattāh Ibrahim, who headed the party list, sent a memorandum to Qassim claiming that his party's statement of policy was in no way contrary to the Associations Law and that in view of the freedom promised to citizens it must be granted permission to engage in political activity. (*Sawt al-Ah-rar*, 20 Apr) [However, the Republican Party, like that of Khayri, did not appeal to the Court of Cassation as was its right under the law.]

### THE GOVERNMENT AND THE PARTIES—THE PARTIES OF THE CENTRE

#### THE NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY (NDP)

**Jan: Founders' List.** Muhammad Hadīd, Nā'il Samhīrī, Salmān Azzāwī, Arāk az-Zakam, Khaddūri Khaddūri, Muhammad Sa'adūn, Hasan Zakariyah, Abdullah Abbās, Hussein Jamīl, Hudayb Hajj Hammūd, Awād Ali an-Najm, Muzhar al-Azzāwī, Ja'far al-Badr, Yūsuf Hajj Aliās. (*Zaman*, *Bilad*, 10 Jan)

[The spiritual father and central figure of the party (which dates back to the 1930's) Kāmil al-Chadīrchī, was not active in party work at the time of the submission of the founders' list. The first seven of the names given were later among the founders of the National Progressive Party. Abdullah Abbās left at the time of the split without joining the new party. Yūsuf Hajj Aliās

seems to have left soon after the National Democrats' application for recognition. The remaining founding members stayed with Chadirchi (see also below).]

**Jan: The Party Platform.** In the field of foreign affairs the party supports the UN Charter and the Bandung principles, favours positive neutralism and allies itself with the anti-colonialist struggle; strives for an Arab federation, the constitution of which is to be determined by its member states, while minority rights are to be fully safeguarded. At home the party demands a speedy return to parliamentary democracy and the separation of the judiciary from the executive and legislative powers. It strives for social justice; favours industrialization and the encouragement of private investment in the service of the national economy; and stands for agrarian reform and improvements in agricultural methods. The party supports the right of workers and peasants to organize. (*Thaqafah al-Jadidah*, Feb)

**Apr-May: General Strength.** The party had branches in the districts of Hilla, Kerbala, Diwaniya, Amara, Kut and Basra. (*Shu'ālāt al-Ahali*, Kerbala, 27 Apr); but in spite of its wealth of personalities it was considered to be weak organizationally. (*Economist*, 2 Apr) It was said to have had 2,178 registered members [before the split]. (*Ahali*, 12 May)

**Jan-Apr: The Split Within the NDP.** On 9 Feb the NDP was regarded as approved with Muhammad Hadīd, Hudaib Hajj Hammūd and Hussein Jamīl heading its list, but Kāmil Chadirchi was not included.

Chadirchi, ex-President of the party retired temporarily in Sept 1959 because he opposed participation in the government by two of its members, Hajj Hammūd and Hadīd. Hadīd had been leader of the party since then, but in the spring of 1960 Chadirchi was again struggling for its control, supported by Hajj Hammūd and Hussein Jamīl.

[Apart from the important question of personalities], the overriding issue was whether the party's aims could be achieved only through cooperation with, and in, the government—which was the view of Hadīd and his followers (*Bayan*, 5 May)—or whether it was not high time to oppose the regime's growing tendency to military autocracy by fighting for parliamentary democracy and the accountability of the government to a national assembly. (Jamīl in *Ahali*, 29 Apr) At the party convention in May, Chadirchi's faction won a majority, and Hadīd with his followers seceded (see below).

**May: The Authorities and the Elections.** Hadīd claimed that the elections at the party convention were illegal as there had been no quorum during the voting. Leaders of the majority faction insisted that the elections were legal as 1,100 out of a total of 2,178 registered party members had been present at the beginning of the convention; only 789 had taken part in the voting because a group of Hadīd's followers had left the hall prior to the vote. (*Bilad*, 7 May; *Ittihad ash-Sha'ab*, 9 May; *Ahali*, 12 May; *Bayan*, 12 May) The judge who headed the elections committee ruled that the elections were illegal as there had been no quorum. (*Bilad*, 7 May) The Minister of the Interior granted the request of Hadīd and 43 of his followers for the annulment of the elections. (*Bayan*, 10 May; *Hayat*, 18 May)

The Hammūd-Jamīl group accused Hadīd and his followers of attempting to have the party declared illegal. (*Ahali*, 12 May) After an appeal by the majority faction

to the Court of Cassation, the elections were sanctioned on 23 May as legally valid. (*Ahali*, 24 May)

[As a result of this judgment the NDP came firmly under Chadirchi-Jamīl-Hammūd leadership. In June Hadīd's faction founded the NPP, which became legal on 29 July.]

**May: Party Leadership After the Split.** The main party offices, as filled at the May convention, were: Kāmil al-Chadirchi—President; Hudaib Hajj Hammūd—Vice-President; Hussein Jamīl—Secretary-General; Muzhar al-Azzāwī—Deputy Secretary-General; Ali Awād an-Najīm—Treasurer. (*Ahali*, 9, 10 May)

**May-Dec: The Party After the Split—Opposition to Government.** Since the split the rump NDP was uniformly critical of the most important facets of government home policy. The central theme of attack was the continuation of military government, particularly in its juridical aspects, and the lack of progress towards a permanent constitution ensuring civil liberties and parliamentary rule. The censorship, a vexatious and arbitrarily applied system of exit permits, the harrasing of trade unions, malicious arrests unauthorized even by the military authorities, were extensively cited in support of the main thesis. Bureaucratic waste and inefficiency and the alleged breakdown of agrarian reform were analyzed and decried as evils resulting from the lack of public control. (*Ahali*, 27 May, 2 June, 3, 26, 31 July, 18 Aug, 25 Sept, 7 Oct, 13, 18 Dec) Of special weight in this respect are the leading articles by the party secretary, Hussein Jamīl. (*Ahali*, 2, 3 Aug, 10 Oct, 23 Nov) A definitive summary of the party's attitude to Qasim's government is Chadirchi's speech at its seventh Congress on 23 Nov (see below).

**May-Dec: The Party's Line in Foreign Affairs.** The NDP demanded efforts to improve Iraq's relations with the UAR in the general Arab interest, and in particular the restoration of normal diplomatic ties, the revival of trade between the two countries, and the lifting of the ban on UAR publications. (*Ahali*, 15, 18 May, 16 June, 8 Aug, 11 Dec) In the inter-bloc struggle, the party demanded disengagement and friendly relations with all, subject to an uncompromising fight against colonialism. (*Ahali*, 1 Sept)

**Nov: The Seventh Congress; Chadirchi's Account.** The Seventh Congress of the NDP convened on 23 Nov. [The sixth Congress had been held in Nov 1953; the convention of May 1960 was held to conform with the Associations Law.] Seven hundred and seventy-nine delegates were present, who were claimed to constitute five per cent of the party membership. The President Kāmil al-Chadirchi, delivered the main address in which he outlined the party's history since the previous congress, and its attitude towards the present government. Chadirchi said that he had known about the plot against the old regime as early as 1956; although conspiracies were repugnant to him, he had assented to the coup d'état on condition that the officers turn their power into civilian hands as soon as possible. Indeed, at the outset the National Democrats, the Ba'ath, the Istiqlāl and persons believed to speak for the Communists had all sat in the government, so that the entire "National Front" of 1952 against Nūrī Sa'īd was represented. But in Feb 1959 six Ministers were forced to resign, and therefore he asked the two NDP Ministers, Muhammad Hadīd and Hudaib Hajj Hammūd, to follow suit. Qas-



sim had refused to accept their resignation, and Hadid had tried to convince Chadirchi of the need for patience.

Chadirchi had left the country in Apr 1959 for health reasons, and on his return in Sept had resigned from the party. He had joined it again at the request of his friends after its official reestablishment in Jan 1960; as a result Hadid, who was by then the only NDP Minister in the government, resigned from the party himself. After Hadid had "failed in his attempt to destroy the party," he had founded a party of his own.

In his attitude towards the government, Chadirchi was critical of the application of agricultural reform, which he claimed, had bogged down, and of a host of alleged other failures. He gave as the party's unswerving aims the formulation and enactment of a permanent constitution, general elections, and an overall return to democracy; as a means to this end he called for the co-operation of all democratically-minded bodies of public opinion. After Chadirchi's address a central committee of nine (headed by Chadirchi himself) and a legal committee of five were elected. (*Ahali*, 24 Nov)

**May-Dec: Authorities Appear Tolerant of NDP Opposition.** [Little is known of any hostile reaction by the authorities to the NDP's criticism]. NDP members in the Basra area were allegedly victimized by dismissal and arrest. (*Ahali*, 23 Aug, 11 Sept) An enquiry was held against the editor of *al-Ahali* on the subject of an editorial published by that paper in May. (*Ahali*, 5 Oct [sic])

#### THE NATIONAL PROGRESSIVE PARTY (NPP)

**June-July. NPP Founded.** On 29 June an application was made to the Minister of the Interior for the registration of a political association named The National Progressive Party (*Al-Hizb al-Watani al-Ta'addumi*). The founders' list was headed by Muhammad Hadid and contained 11 other names; 257 supporters were named. The daily *al-Bayān*, which had appeared since 28 Apr as Hadid's mouthpiece within the NDP, was to serve as the organ of the new party. (*Akhbar*, 30 June) Since the Minister raised no objections, the party became established in law on 29 July. (*Bilad*, 29 July)

**June: Prominent Founding Members were:** Muhammad Hadid, Salmān Azzāwi, Nā'il Samhūrī, Arāk az-Zakam, Khaddūri Khaddūri, Muhammad Sa'adūn, Hasan Zakariyah. [All these had been among the founding members of the NDP in Jan, and they constituted a majority of its nationally known leadership. Arāk az-Zakam, soon to become Chairman of the Peasants' Federation brought into the fold—at least for publicity purposes—the peasants' societies hitherto under NDP influence.]

**June: The Party Platform.** [The party platform as presented to the Minister of the Interior was in no important way different from that presented by the NDP in Jan,—which is not surprising, since Muhammad Hadid

had at that time been acting chairman of the latter during Chadirchi's voluntary retirement.] For particulars of the NPP platform, see *Ittihad ash-Sha'ab*, 3 July

**Oct: The Party Convention.** The first convention of the NPP took place on 27 Oct [in accordance with the requirements of the Associations Law]. A single list was presented by the conveners for elections to the Central Administrative Committee, headed by Muhammad Hadid, Khaddūri Khaddūri, Abbās Hasan Jum'ah and Arāk az-Zakam. (*Iraq Times*, 28 Oct) Hadid said in his opening address that he would offend truth if he pretended that all was right with the Republic, but did not elaborate on the statement. He promised the party's full support to the government in its current negotiations with the IPC. (*Zaman*, 28 Oct)

**July-Dec: NPP Criticism of the Government.** [True to its original *raison d'être*, the NPP adopted a generally positive attitude towards the government, especially where Hadid's own part in its activities was concerned. Even in its criticisms it tried to be fair and constructive. However, towards the end of the year a tone of exasperation crept into the editorials of its organ, and at times its observations were outspokenly derogatory.]

The following are samples of editorial opinion in line with government policy: New labour legislation was necessary to eliminate political influence from trade unions (*Bayan*, 21 Dec); the strike of the tobacco workers was not inspired by economic and social motives but was a purely political affair. (*Bayan*, 7 Nov)

Anti-government criticism included the following: The government apparatus was inflated, and corruption rampant. (*Bayan*, quoted in *Iraq Times*, 12 Oct, 28 Nov) The present military regime was no longer justified (*Bayan*, 6 Oct); the permanent constitution should limit the power of the executive. (*Bayan*, 14 Dec) On the other hand, the transfer of government into purely civilian hands was bound to take a long time. (*Bayan*, 28 Nov) [This assertion came in reply to Chadirchi, see below.] Relations with the UAR should improve. (*Bayan*, 29 June) The economic agreements with the USSR were imperfect and should be re-examined. (*Bayan*, 5 Sept)

**June-Dec: Controversy Between NDP and NPP.** On 2 June 35 members [the more prominent of Hadid's group], including Khaddūri Khaddūri and Arāk az-Zakam, were expelled from the NDP. (*Ahali*, 3 June) [Hadid had already resigned.] In reaction, 250 more members tendered their resignations. (*Bayan*, 9 June)

Chadirchi's address at the seventh Congress of the NDP (see above) gave rise to a controversy between Chadirchi and Hadid through their respective party organs; Hadid's main points, which were rejected by Chadirchi, were a defence of the NDP's participation in the government in 1959–1960 and an attempt to demonstrate the widespread approval of this line within all ranks of the party. (*Bayan*, 28 Nov, 1 Dec; *Ahali*, 30 Nov, 5 Dec)

### THE GOVERNMENT AND THE PARTIES—NATIONALIST AND RELIGIOUS GROUPS

#### THE BA'ATH PARTY—GENERAL

**Background and Synopsis.** [During the second half of 1959 the Ba'ath had become the symbol of nationalist opposition to Qassim's government. The attempt on Qassim's life by Ba'ath activists on 7 Oct 1959 (see below),

and the subsequent flight of Fu'ād ar-Rikābi and other Iraqi Ba'ath leaders to the UAR had made this image vivid and convincing. Throughout 1960 the mutual hostility did not flag, and the government did not relent in its policy of repression, though the lives of the con-



victed assassins were spared. In the second half of the year the first, uncertain reports of a split within the Iraqi Ba'ath appeared on the question of loyalty to Abdel-Nasser. (More information on this began to be available early in 1961.)]

**Dec 1959–May 1960: The Assassination Trial.** See below.

**Mar: Ba'ath Leaflet Distributed.** In Mar a Ba'ath leaflet was distributed in Iraq attacking the government for deviation from the principles of the Revolution, accusing it of terrorist practices and blaming it for the general decline of the country. The overthrow of the regime was declared to be the only way to save the country. (*Sahafah, Beirut, 31 Mar*)

**July: Aflaq's Writings Banned.** *Studies in Socialism*, a collection of essays by Aflaq, the Syrian Ba'ath leader, and others, was banned from Iraq. (*Zaman, 21 July*)

**Aug: Reported Split in Iraqi Ba'ath.** The Iraqi Ba'ath Party, like its Syrian counterpart, was reported to be split into a pro-Nasser and an anti-Nasser faction. (*Hawl al-Alam, Jordan, 4 Aug*)

### THE BA'ATH—THE ASSASSINATION TRIAL

**Background and Synopsis.** On 26 Dec 1959 76 persons (including 19 *in absentia*) were brought to trial before the Special High Military ("People's") Court, Colonel Fādil Abbās Mahdāwī presiding, on charges connected with the attempt to assassinate PM Qassim. They were accused of conspiring against the life of the PM, and collaborating for this purpose with a foreign power, from which they had received money, arms and other aid—thus committing high treason. Some of the accused were charged with carrying out the attempt on 7 Oct 1959, during which the PM's chauffeur was killed, and Qassim himself, his ADC and several bystanders were wounded. Only four of the accused pleaded guilty; these had belonged to the task group entrusted with the attempt. Several of the accused gave evidence on the regional organization of the Ba'ath and its relations with UAR authorities. The Court gave its verdict on 26 Feb. Seventeen of the accused were sentenced to death, eleven of them *in absentia*; eight were acquitted for lack of evidence and the remainder were sentenced to prison terms. None of the capital sentences were carried out.

**Points from the Prosecution's Case.** According to the Prosecution, a plan to assassinate Qassim and forthwith have the UAR annex Iraq was first conceived after the failure of Shawwāf's mutiny. (*Mar 1959*) The central figure in the plot was Iyād Sa'īd Thābit, a member of the Ba'ath Regional (i.e. Iraqi) Command, who also headed the actual assassination group. The UAR authorities were kept fully informed at all times, the Second Secretary at the UAR embassy in Baghdad, Tawfiq Abāzah, acting as liaison officer in Baghdad and Muhammad al-Misri, Muhammad Kabūl and Colonel Abd al-Majīd Farīd, former UAR diplomats in Baghdad (expelled for their part in the Shawwāf mutiny), acting in this capacity in Cairo and Damascus. Another member of the Regional Command, Sālih ash-Sha'bān, was sent to Damascus, where he discussed the project with Abd al-Hamīd Sarraj. Abdel-Nasser himself sent a telegram to the plotters via the UAR embassy in Baghdad approving of the plan and its objectives. The plotters received from the UAR embassy the sum of ID4,000 with which they bought the arms for the attempt; an earlier intention to smuggle

the arms into Iraq from Syria was not carried out, except for detonators. A task force under Thābit trained at al-Haswah near Baghdad. (*Iraq Times, 29, 30 Dec 1959, 1–31 Jan*)

**Evidence as to Developments Expected After Qassim's Murder.** The accused Shākir Hilewah said that he was told that Fu'ād ar-Rikābi (SG of the Iraqi Ba'ath Command, who escaped to the UAR after the assassination attempt) would be a member of the government to be formed after the assassination; the army would force the President of the Sovereignty Council to sign an appeal to the UAR for help, and UAR "liberation forces," poised on the borders, would march in. (*Iraq Times, 18 Jan*)

**Rubay'i Abdi Implicated.** The accused Kāzim al-Azāwī said that Colonel Mid'hat al-Hajj Sirri (a Ba'ath leader who fled to the UAR after the attempt) had told him that Najīb ar-Rubay'i (President of the Sovereignty Council) and Sālih al-Abdi (Military Governor-General) knew of the plan, and that Rubay'i was to appeal to the nation over Baghdad Radio after its successful execution. Mahdāwī, after a day's silence, denounced this information as "an imperialist intrigue." (*Hayat, 26, 27 Feb*)

**Sentences.** The six accused present at the trial who received capital sentences were: Iyād Sa'īd Thābit, Samir Abd al-Azīz an-Najīm, Khālid Ali Sālih, Hamīd Mar'i, Salīm Isa az-Zibāq, Ahmad Tāha al-Azzūz. The most prominent among those sentenced to death *in absentia* were Fu'ād ar-Rikābi and Hilāl Nāji. Prison sentences ranged from six months to life. (*Zaman, 26 Feb*)

**Death Sentences Commuted.** The six condemned to death were to be hanged at dawn on 31 Mar, but in the small hours, shortly before the scheduled time, Qassim announced over the radio and television that he had decided to postpone the execution of five of them, "in view of the approaching feast," while the sentence on the sixth, Samir Abd al-Azīz an-Najīm, was commuted to 15 years' imprisonment. (*Bilad, 1 Apr*) At a Press conference on 27 May Qassim announced that the death sentences would not be carried out as long as the situation remained quiet. (*Bilad, 28 May*)

### "NATIONALIST" REFUGEES IN THE UAR

**Background and Synopsis.** Two groups can be roughly distinguished:

One consists of rightist politicians and officers connected with the Istiqlāl, or sympathizing with it, who deserted to the UAR about the time of the Shawwāf mutiny (Mar–Apr 1959); prominent in this group were: Fā'iq as-Samarra'i; SG of the Istiqlāl and the Iraqi Republic's first Ambassador in Cairo; Qassim's erstwhile Press councillor, Colonel Na'mān Māhir al-Kan'āni; Major Mahmūd Azīz (IAF); Major Midhat al-Hajj Sirri [brother of Mustafa al-Hajj Sirri, who was later executed for his part in the Shawwāf mutiny, when he was serving as Director of Military Intelligence]; and Major Mahmūd Durrah.

The second group fled from Iraq later in the year, after the failure of the attempt on Qassim's life (7 Oct 1959); it consisted of Ba'ath leaders and sympathizers. Prominent in this group are Fu'ād ar-Rikābi, Jābir Umar and Nāji Tālib.

These groups engaged in anti-Qassim propaganda through the facilities placed at their disposal by the UAR; particulars of their internal organization abroad

and their clandestine activities in Iraq are not known.

The Iraqi regime reacted chiefly by means of two public trials before Colonel Maḥdāwī's "People's Court"—the earlier in connection with the attempt on Qassim, the later against the group headed by Fā'iq as-Samarra'i. In this trial all the accused were tried *in absentia*.

**Jan-Mar: Anti-Qassim Propaganda from UAR.** On 6 Jan, Army Day in Iraq, an appeal was sent over Sawt al-Arab and Damascus Radio by Colonel Na'mān Māhir al-Kan'āni and Major Maḥmūd Azīz calling on all Iraqi Army personnel to prepare for the "real struggle." (*Falastin, Jordan, 7 Jan*) On 1 Mar, Fu'ād Rikābi described Qassim over Sawt al-Arab as a traitor to the Revolution, declaring: "If Qassim dreams of destroying us, he digs his own grave." On 8 Mar Colonel Na'mān Māhir and some of his associates broadcast over Damascus station in honour of the Shawwāf mutiny anniversary, describing it as an uprising against imperialism and Communism. (*R. Damascus, 8 Mar-BBC, 10 Mar*) (On anti-Qassim broadcasts from the UAR see also pp 145-6.)

**Mar-May: Trial in Absentia of Fā'iq as-Samarra'i and his Associates.** On 6 Mar nineteen Iraqi citizens, civilian and military, were requested to return to Iraq forthwith to stand trial on various charges of subversion and high treason. Prominent among them were: Fā'iq as-Samarra'i (former Iraqi Ambassador in Cairo); Major Na'mān Māhir al-Kan'āni; Major Maḥmūd ad-Durrah; and the brothers Muḥsin and Ajayl al-Yāwir [Shaykhs of the Shammar tribal association.] (*R. Baghdad 6 Mar-BBC, 8 Mar*) [All the accused had been associated directly or indirectly with the Shawwāf mutiny, and were at this time refugees in the UAR.]

The trial opened before the "People's Court" on 19 Mar in the absence of all the accused. (*Zaman, 20 Mar*) Sentence was passed on 12 May, and 18 of the accused were sentenced to death. (*R. Baghdad, 12 May-IMB, 13 May*)

**Feb-Mar: Appeals Against Execution of Plotters.** Appeals were sent by Iraqi refugees in the UAR to various Arab and international personalities, including the SG of the Arab League, the Speakers of the Lebanese, Moroccan, Libyan and Tunisian parliaments, and the SG of the UN, demanding intercession with Qassim for the lives of the six condemned to death for plotting to kill Qassim. The condemned men were referred to as "the free Iraqi youths," and the appeals were signed by "the standing Committee in Aid of the Free Iraqi Youths." (*Hayat, 1 Mar; Ahram, 3 Mar*)

**Apr-June: Iraqi Exiles in UAR Reported Disappointed.** Lieutenant Abbud Sālīm Hasan the former Iraqi pilot, (see below) reported that the Iraqi nationalist exiles in UAR felt themselves badly treated, and no longer believed in Abdel-Nasser's ability to advance their cause. (*Falastin, Jordan, 5 July*) (See also below.)

**Apr-July: UAR Subversion—"The Pilot's Tale."** On 2 Apr an Iraqi Air Force pilot, Lieutenant Abbud Sālīm Hasan, absconded with his aircraft to Syria, where he asked for political asylum, claiming to have escaped from Communist domination in the air force. (*R. Damascus, 5 Apr-BBC, 7 Apr*) On 4 July Lieutenant Hasan fled to Jordan. There he said that he had left Iraq for the UAR, "the centre of Arab nationalism"—as he had then believed—on a mission for Iraqi "free officers," whose names were not published. In Damascus he met General

Jamāl Fayṣal, commander of the 1st Army, and was flown to Cairo, where he delivered a personal message from the free officers to Marshal Amer. He then returned to the Iraqi frontier to meet a Brigadier and a Colonel of the Iraqi Army, who told him that a revolt against Qassim was to break out before 14 July, with Nāji Tālib as its proclaimed leader; the ultimate aim was union with the UAR. They wanted to know what effective aid the UAR would render to the plotters. Thereafter Hasan had further meetings with Amer, various UAR intelligence officers. Nāji Tālib and Fu'ād Rikābi. When it became clear to him, Hasan continued, that Abdel-Nasser did not care how much blood was spilled in pursuit of his aims, he decided to flee to Jordan and warn the Iraqi authorities. (*Falastin, Jordan, 5 July*) Tālib and Rikābi denied their part in Hasan's story (*Hayat, 6, 8, July*), but Hasan reiterated it. (*Falastin, 7 July; Bilad, 23 July*)

### THE "NATIONALIST" PRESS

**Background and Synopsis.** [By the early summer of 1959 there was no longer a paper in Iraq which dared to publish anti-Communist views, but after the setback dealt to the Communists the anti-Communist Press started to revive. Throughout 1960 these papers grew stronger and bolder, though they did have some difficulties with the authorities. They could not proclaim too openly their sympathies for "Arab Unity" and Arab nationalism, as this line would have been understood as an affront to Qassim, but the virulence of their anti-Communism served to identify them before the public, together with cautious criticism of the authorities and enthusiastic comments on any improvement in Iraqi-UAR relations, when the occasion warranted. The Ba'ath line of "Socialist Arabism" found no expression in any licensed newspaper.]

**Mar: Nationalist Editors Freed.** Tāha al-Fayādh, editor of *al-Fajr al-Jadīd*, Fādīl Shākīr an-Nu'aymi, editor of *al-Hiyāḍ*, and Muḥammad al-Anī, editor of *ash-Sharq*, were released from the house arrest which had been imposed upon them after the attempt on Qassim's life. (*Reuter's, 26 Mar*)

**Apr-July: "Nationalist" Dailies Re-appear.** *Al-Hurriyah* renewed its appearance on 7 Apr, after a suspension of two months (*Falastin, Jordan, 8 Apr*); *al-Hiyāḍ* on 16 May (*Difa', Jordan, 16 May*); *al-Fajr al Jadīd* on 18 May (*Zaman, 19 May*); *ash-Sharq* on 23 July (*Difa', 24 July*) [This paper appeared as a weekly during 1960.]

**Aug-Nov: "Nationalist" Dailies Suspended.** On 23 Aug *al-Hiyāḍ* was suspended by order of the Military Governor-General, "for having repeatedly, and despite personal remonstrances to the editor, disregarded the Press ordinances, and for having published on 23 Aug material disturbing the peace of the army." (*Bilad, 24 Aug*)

On 1 Oct *Baghdad* was closed for ten months by order of the courts, and its editor, Abd al-Majīd Maḥmūd, sentenced to three months in prison, for "having published material derogatory to public morals," and for having insulted the chairman of the Journalists' Union, al-Jawāhiri. (*Zaman, 2 Oct*) The editor was soon released by order of Qassim, but the ban on the paper remained in force. (*Zaman, 4 Oct*)

*Al-Hurriyah*, was suspended in Oct for "being a source of jealousy, hatred and dissension among the sons of the Fatherland." (*Bilad, 5 Oct*)

*Ath-Thawrah* suspended its appearance "voluntarily"

on 20 Sept for a period of five months. (*Thawrah*, 16 Feb 1961) The paper's editor, Yūnis at-Tā'i, had been arrested on 19 Sept, for an article attacking Awni Yūsuf, Minister of Public Works, as a pro-Communist. (*Hayat*, 23 Sept)

**Samples of Opinion in the "Nationalist" Press in 1960.** "We demand ministerial programmes, which are a pledge on record from the government to the people." (*Fajr al-Jadid*, 12 Oct, according to *Iraq Times*, 13 Oct)

"Freedom of criticism is of supreme importance, and the incarnation of true democracy." (*Fajr al-Jadid*, 13 Dec)

The *Ittihad ash-Sha'ab* group [the orthodox Communists] were described as "vile, lowly and criminal." The people were reminded of the atrocities committed by this group, and the authorities exhorted to hit hard "at these saboteurs who are bent on spreading anarchy in the country." (*Watan*, quoted in *Iraq Times*, 25 Dec)

Communist ideology represents in practice "the worst type of reaction and retrogression." (*Fajr al-Jadid*, quoted in *Iraq Times*, 23 Nov)

"The UAR has firmly stood in support of our nationalist causes at the UN... The talks and meetings undertaken by the [Iraqi] Foreign Minister have been genuinely expressive of the wishes of the Arab people. Shaking hands with the UAR, solidarity with Jordan and the collective backing of the peoples of Algeria, Palestine and Oman form the genuine force reinforcing the structure of the Arabs everywhere." (*Sharq*, quoted in *Iraq Times*, 1 Nov)

## THE ISLAMIC PARTY

(Al-Hizb al-Islami)

**Efforts to Achieve Legal Status.** On 2 Feb a group of persons hitherto unknown in political life applied for recognition of the Islamic Party. The Ministry of the Interior requested the founders to amend their Statement of Policy, in particular to replace the words "the constitution of the party" (*dustūr al-hizb*) with the word "regulations" or "platform" (*nizām or minhāj*). [The underlying reasons for this request are not clear.] They were also requested to supply missing personal details of some of the founders. (*Akhbar*, 25 Feb)

The corrections were handed in on 1 Mar (*Zaman*, 3 Mar), but the Ministry of the Interior notified the founders that the party had been disqualified on the grounds that some of the clauses in the Statement of Policy were not in accord with the "principles of the times" (*arkān al-Asr*) and were contrary to Islamic precepts. [The offending clauses were not specified.] The Ministry also claimed to have discovered that a number of the founders had contacts with "elements" abroad [apparently an allusion to the Muslim Brotherhood]. (*Thawrah*, 1 Apr) The founders appealed to the Court of Cassation (*Hurriyah*, 19 Apr; *Zaman*, 28 Apr), which accepted the party's claim on 26 Apr and annulled the decision of the Ministry of the Interior. (*Zaman*, 28 Apr)

**Feb: Prominent Founding Members.** The first three names on the founders' list were: Ibrāhīm Abdullah Shihāb; Nu'mān Abd ar-Razzāq as-Samarra'i; and Fālih Hasan as-Sālih. (*Zaman*, 3 Feb)

**July: The Party Convention.** On 29 July the party convention demanded by the Associations Law took place, with delegates from apparently all parts of the country,

and Abd ar-Razzāq as-Samarra'i as chairman. [Ibrāhīm Abdullah Shihāb seems to have left the party soon after its inception.] The resolutions adopted included: support for the Arab and Muslim peoples in their struggles for liberation everywhere; a call for the militant purge of "criminal Zionism" from Palestine; denunciation of Iran's recognition of Israel on the ground that it is opposed to the precepts of Islam; war on heresy and atheism. (*Zaman*, 31 July)

**Apr-Dec: The Islamic Party Against the Regime.** The party was said to have "strong links with the pro-UAR nationalists, though its fanaticism and its taste for violence—not unlike that of the Muslim Brotherhood—have alienated many intellectuals." (*Scotsman*, 9 Nov)

Although the party had been recognized as legal, it was not granted a licence to issue an official publication. (*Zaman*, 4 Apr)

At the end of May, the party handed Qassim a memorandum requesting that the laws of the state be redrawn in accordance with the principles of the Islamic faith. (*Hayat*, 1 June; *Masa'*, Jordan, 1 June) In June it sent a memorandum to Abdi, the Military Governor-General, demanding the release of two religious leaders, Muhammad al-Khalisi and Abd al-Aziz al Badri who had been in prison for over five months. (*Jihad*, Jordan, 9 June) It also demanded, in a petition published in a right-wing paper, that Qassim pardon Rashid Ali al-Kaylani in recognition of his "momentous deeds" in the past, and Abd as-Salām Arif in recognition of his "brotherly co-operation with Qassim in carrying out the Revolution." (*Hayat*, 5 June) [Both had been sentenced to death in Dec 1958, for attempts to overthrow the regime.]

On 16 Oct the party published a proclamation against the regime in *al-Fayha'*, a paper sympathetic to its views. According to a summary in *al-Hayāt*, 22 Oct, the statement declared that the government had not done its duty in establishing social equality in accordance with the tenets of Islam. Qassim had spurned the Islamic creed under which the people have the right to criticize a ruler. Communism was atheist, yet the government protected the Communists and fought the Islamic Party. The country's economic position was appalling. The people were starving. "Responsibility for this state of affairs is laid at your door, as you are Prime Minister and the other Ministers only carry out your orders," the proclamation said. The government must put an end to its liaison with the Communists and bring their leaders to justice. It must nationalize the Iraq Petroleum Company; if that was too difficult, it must create the necessary conditions for carrying out this step in the future. (*Hayat*, 22 Oct) [The paper *al-Fayha'* ceased to appear as from that date.]

**Oct: Suppression of the Party.** As a result of this proclamation, 11 of the leaders of the Islamic Party were arrested and a committee appointed to investigate the publication of the statement. (*Ahali*, 19 Oct) On 25 Oct the party's headquarters in Baghdad and, several days later, its branch office in Mosul were closed. (*Zaman*, 26 Oct, 2 Nov)

**Other Religious Opposition.** During the year, and particularly during the first half, many religious leaders launched vigorous attacks against the Communists and the authorities which permitted their activities.

Muhsin al-Hakim, the outstanding Shi'i leader, published a *fatwah*, photostatic copies of which were distributed



in the streets of Baghdad, denouncing Communists as atheists. (*Hayat*, 26 Mar, 3 Apr) He was subsequently placed under house arrest.

In May the nationalistic newspaper *al-Fajr al-Jadid* published many petitions to Qassim for the release of al-Hakim and Shaykh al-Badri, a fellow religious leader.

Another religious leader, the Shi'i Muhammad Baha ad-Din, left for Iran. The Shi'i Muhammad Mahmud as-Sawwaf on his release from prison had fled to Lebanon at the end of 1959. In Jan 1960, preaching in the Mosque in Tripoli, he described the "Communist regime in Iraq" and the consequent suffering of the Iraqi people. He claimed that thousands of Iraqis had fled to neighbouring countries, leaving behind wives, children and livelihood. (*Hayat*, 3 Jan) In Jan as-Sawwaf crossed into Syria (*Falastin, Jordan*, 24 Jan), where he broadcast several appeals for an uprising against the regime. (See also Minorities—Shi'i.)

#### THE LIBERATION PARTY

(*Hizb at-Tahrir*)

Notice of request for permission to form this party was given on 2 Feb. Its sponsors, like those of the Islamic Party, were unknown in political circles. The Ministry of the Interior demanded amendments to their platform, which were handed in on 5 Mar. (*Zaman*, 25 Feb; *Ahali*, 28 Mar)

However, the Ministry disqualified the party on 27 Mar, on the grounds that, after investigation, it was found that it was "connected with a party outside Iraq." It was also claimed that several clauses of the platform were contrary to the "spirit of the times" (*ruh al-asr*)

and to the "principles of the revered Islamic law" and that, "from information reaching responsible quarters, it was found that the party did not fulfil the requirements of Article 4 of the Associations Law." (*Ahali* 28 Mar) The Court of Cassation rejected the appeal of the founders on 26 Apr. (*Zaman* 27 Apr)

#### THE PARTY OF THE ARAB STRUGGLE

(*Hizb al-Kifah al-Arabi*)

**Background and Synopsis.** Not much is known of this "party," except that it was illegal and pro-Nasserite. It may be conjectured that it was more in the nature of a coterie of conspirators than a party in the accepted sense.

**July: Party of Arab Struggle Calls for Revolt.** Travelers coming from Iraq reported that leaflets signed by this party had been distributed in Iraqi towns, calling for revolt against the "dictatorial" regime. (*Akhbar al-Ustu'*, Jordan, 8 July)

**June-July: Measures Taken Against the Party.** Thirty members of the Party of Arab Struggle were arrested for distributing subversive propaganda. Thirteen were subsequently released for lack of evidence; the remainder were to be put on trial. (*Hayat*, 14 June) Qassim announced at a Press conference that he had instructed the courts to publish the sentences on "this clique of spies, this scum of mankind, who succeeded in seducing a few of the simple-minded under the guise of Arabism, nationalism and religion." (*Bilad*, 30 July) [As far as is known, the sentences were not published.]

### THE GOVERNMENT AND THE PARTIES—THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF IRAQI KURDISTAN—DPK (AL-HIZB AL-DIMUQRATI LI-KURDISTAN AL-IRAQ)

#### FOUNDERS, PLATFORM AND ORGANIZATIONAL ACTIVITY

**Background and Synopsis.** The central figure of this party was Mulla Mustafa al-Barazani, who fled with hundreds of his followers to the USSR in 1946, after leading a unsuccessful revolt for Kurdish autonomy. He returned after the 1958 Revolution, when Qassim chose to treat him as the plenipotentiary, as it were, of the Kurdish minority, organized politically in the Democratic Party of Kurdistan. However, co-operation between Qassim and Barazani, and between the government and the party in general, broke down during 1960 as the result of the Communist leanings of a predominant section of the party, Kurdish aspirations which Qassim had no wish and no power to fulfil, and intertribal jealousies.

**Prominent Founding Members** were: Mulla Mustafa al-Barazani; Ibrahim Ahmad, advocate, editor and official owner of the party organ *Khabat*; Umar Mustafa, lawyer; Ali Abdullah, engineer; and Nuri Shawis, engineer. (*Iraq Times*, 11 Jan)

**Jan: The Party Platform.** According to the party's platform it represents the interests of the revolutionary peasants, workers, artisans and intellectuals in Iraqi Kurdistan. Its political understanding and struggle will be founded on the scientific doctrine of Marxism-Leninism. It supports guided democracy, and seeks to strengthen co-

operation with the Communist Party, the NDP, and other democratic and progressive organizations.

The party strives for friendship between the Arab and Kurdish peoples and the ethnic minorities, and for the achievement of Kurdish rights within the Iraqi state; these rights should be safeguarded in the proposed constitution. It demands equal representation for Kurds in the administration and other official bodies, and the furtherance of development projects in the Kurdish districts. It fights for an independent Kurdish educational system, as a means to bring about a Kurdish cultural renaissance, and demands a full-fledged university in Kurdistan as a branch of Baghdad University, a chair of Kurdish studies at Baghdad University, the establishment of a Kurdish Academy, and a Kurdish broadcasting station.

The party supports the struggle of Kurds everywhere against imperialism and reaction, and it wishes to have a provision in the proposed constitution granting the right of asylum to all Kurds who may flee to Iraq in consequence of the struggle for national freedom. (*Ath-Thaqafah al-Jadidah*, Feb)

**May: The Party Convention.** The party convention required by the Associations Law took place on 5 May, with 168 delegates, who were declared to represent more than 7,000 members. The convention elected Mustafa al-Barazani as President, Ibrahim Ahmad as secretary,



and Umar Mustafa, Ali Abdullah and Nūri Shawīs as members of the central committee. (*Iraq Times*, 11 May)

**June Dec: DPK Versus the Government.** [During the first half of 1960 the DPK was absorbed in its internal affairs, but relations with the central authorities deteriorated during the second half of the year.] The party organ complained that members had been dismissed from work because of their political views, and that the civil service had become undemocratic and was due for reform. (*Khabat*, quoted in *Iraq Times*, 15 June)

On 1 Sept the same paper published an editorial demanding special rights for the Kurds. As a result its editor, Ibrahim Ahmad, was charged with an attempt "to stir up national dissensions and instigate fanaticism," but was cleared by the court. (*Iraq Times*, 17 Nov; *Fajr al-Jadid*, 13 Dec)

In particular, the party asked for the recognition of the Kurdish language in schools and publications, and for the implementation of public works projects in Kurdistan. (*NYT*, 28 Dec) It called for the drawing up of a permanent constitution with all speed, with the participation of all parties, but objected to a referendum on the constitution, since this might be detrimental to minority rights. (*Khabat*, quoted in *Iraq Times*, 20, 28 Dec)

The DPK strongly criticized censorship of the Press, as being both undemocratic and ineffective. (*Khabat*, 24 Nov) The Kurdish weekly *Deh Nagi Kurd* (licensed in Feb 1960—*Ahali*, 5 Feb) was closed for ten months,

and its editor, Umar Huwayzi, was fined ID100 for attacking the local authorities of Kirkuk. (*Fajr al-Jadid*, 15 Dec; *ANA* 22 Dec)

The party cautiously summarized its negative attitude towards the government by stating that they "did indeed reveal no secret when they made it known that the leadership of the party had repeatedly tried to establish contact with the government on some matters pertaining to Kurdistan, but in vain." (*Iraq Times*, 22 Nov) [It was probably due to this deterioration that] Mustafa al-Barazāni left Iraq for the USSR on 5 Nov, [ostensibly] to attend the October Revolution anniversary. (*Iraq Times*, 6 Nov) [He returned only in mid-Jan 1961—*Ahram*, 15 Jan 1961.]

Qassim on his part established contact with Barazāni's tribal rivals of the Zubāri and the Baradosth tribes, and refrained from prosecuting those responsible for raids on Barazāni communities in Oct. (*NYT*, 28 Dec) About the same time the Minister of Education told a teachers' conference at Sulaymaniya that in future Arab teachers' could learn Kurdish at seminars, and Kurdish teachers Arabic, for "I do not want provincialism in Kurdish studies." (*Iraq Times*, 21 Dec) [For all its apparent promise of co-operation this statement in fact implied that the government was not eager to accede to the DPK's request for Kurdish autonomy, even in cultural affairs.] Qassim himself repeatedly stressed the unity of the Iraqi nation—and at least once, on 21 Mar, before an audience of DPK members. (*Ahali*, 23 Mar)

## THE GOVERNMENT AND SEMI-POLITICAL ASSOCIATIONS

### THE GOVERNMENT AND THE GENERAL FEDERATION OF LABOUR UNIONS

(*Al-Ittihad al-Amm li-Niqabāt al-Ummāl*)

**Background Note and Synopsis.** [This federation was set up in the early days of the revolutionary regime, and, from the beginning, the Communists succeeded in wielding great influence in it. It was led by Ali Shukur, a Communist, who was also leader of the Union of Railwaymen until May 1960.]

Throughout the year the regime strongly opposed Communist influence in the trade unions; the local authorities were particularly active in this drive. In the union elections the authorities helped anti-Communists, thus causing the Communists to lose control. Strikes organized by the Communists were broken up; branches were closed, and activist members arrested or deported. Complaints to Qassim by the workers' leaders were occasionally accepted, but this did not effect any change in general policy. Elections to the General Federation were not held in 1960 and Ali Shukur continued as its leader.]

**Mar: Authorities Prepare for Elections.** The Ministry of Social Affairs published an order annulling the decision of the trade unions to disqualify members who had not paid union dues to date from taking part in the elections. Members were to be allowed to pay their arrears up to the date of the elections. (*ANA*, 15 Mar—*BBC*, 17 Mar)

[Many workers who, whether through antagonism to the Communists or through apathy, had become inactive

were thus enabled to vote, thereby lowering the percentage of Communist supporters.]

**Mar-May: Arrests and Dismissals.** In Mar Ali Shukur, Chairman of the Federation, sent a memorandum to Qassim enumerating cases of discrimination in the trade unions, particularly in the Oil Workers' and Port Workers' Unions in Basra, and protesting against the arrest of hundreds of active members. (*Itihad ash-Sha'ab*, 10 Mar) In Apr Ara Khachadur, Secretary of the Federation, sent a similar memorandum to Qassim. (*Itihad ash-Sha'ab*, 17 Apr)

According to a report of the Basra District Office of the Federation, 131 union members, including members of the Workers' Committees, were arrested there; some 500 workers were dismissed. (*Itihad ash-Sha'ab*, 17 May)

A number of workers from Mahmoudiya (Diwaniya) who had gone to take part in the First of May March in Baghdad were arrested, and the rest were dismissed on their return. Workers families protested against this action in a memorandum to Qassim. (*Itihad ash-Sha'ab*, 17 May)

**Mar-Nov: Strikes.** Among the strikes purported to be organized by the Communists were those in the vegetable oil factories (Mar) (*Sawt al-Ahwar*, 16 Mar), the match industry (Oct) (*Bilad*, 12 Oct) and the cigarette factories (Nov). (*Ahali*, 15 Nov)

**Mar: Dismissal and Reinstatement of Ali Shukur.** In Mar Zaki Tawfiq, Director-General of the Railways, dismissed Ali Shukur from his job on the grounds that

he devoted too much of his working hours to union affairs, and that the law did not permit payment of salary to anyone who did not carry out his duties. (*Thawrah*, 15 Mar) Qassim reinstated Ali Shukur, allowing him to continue his activities on behalf of the Federation during his working hours. (*BBC in Arabic*, 17 Mar-IMB, 18 Mar)

**May-June: Director-General of Railways Active Against Unions.** The Communist *Ittihad ash-Sha'ab* and the General Federation's organ *Ittihad al-Ummal* accused the Railway Management of arbitrarily dismissing and causing the arrest of workers, falsifying union elections, etc. (*Ittihad al-Ummal*, 6 May; *Ittihad ash-Sha'ab*, 8 May)

The Director-General of the Railways denied these charges, stating that in dismissing workers he was only acting in accordance with the law. He had dismissed four workers, whom Qassim had pardoned and reinstated. (*Zaman*, 11 May) The Communist organ then issued a warning that the railway workers could defend their organization. (*Ittihad ash-Sha'ab*, 26 May)

On 26 May Zaki Tawfiq issued instructions that, as about 25 persons of the railway personnel were redundant, a worker would be dismissed if he was negligent in his work, did not regularly report for duty, or was engaged in political activity during working hours. Departmental managers were instructed to report such people to Tawfiq himself, who would personally judge their cases. (*Ittihad ash-Sha'ab*, 7 June)

**May-June: Elections to Railwaymen's Union.** In the elections to the Railwaymen's Union in May, Ali Shukur lost the leadership. The Communists claimed that the elections had been fixed. (*Ittihad al-Ummal*, 27 May) Welcoming the newly-elected members of the workers' committees, Tawfiq declared that the elections had taken place "in a healthy, democratic atmosphere, free of pressure, coercion or threat, such as had existed at the previous elections." The previous committee members, Tawfiq said, "had incited the workers to vandalize state property, and had wasted their time provoking demonstrations and protests instead of spending their time in fruitful and useful service." (*Thawrah*, 9 June) In an interview on 30 June Tawfiq again emphasized that the elections had been democratic. (*Thawrah*, 1 July)

**July: Continuation of Struggle between Director of Railways and Union.** In July Tawfiq accused the pro-Communist paper *ar-Ra'y al-Amm* and the Communist *Ittihad ash-Sha'ab* and *al-Mabda* of running a campaign against the Management of the Railways for dismissing workers. He explained that the workers had been dismissed because they hampered the work of the railways: in a period of one month 140 locomotives had been strike-bound and the cargo of 13 ships had remained unloaded owing to lack of locomotives. At the instigation of the unions, workers had started working only three hours a day. (*Al-Fajr al-Jadid*, 12 July)

Shortly afterwards, the General Federation of Labour sent a complaint to Qassim about the elections to the Railwaymen's Union. (*Ittihad ash-Sha'ab* 18 July) A delegation of railway workers who had been dismissed or had suffered arrest was received by al-Abdi, the Military Governor-General, who promised to consider their demands and immediately ordered the release of a number of workers. (*Bilad*, 29 July)

**Aug-Sept: Basra Port Workers' Union.** Active members of the Basra Port Workers' Union were arrested (*Ittihad*

*ash-Sha'ab*, 6 May) and some of them were banished. (*Ittihad ash-Sha'ab*, 1 Sept) In the elections of 14 Sept the Communists lost the leadership of this union. *Ittihad ash-Sha'ab* described the atmosphere in which the elections took place:

"The Port Director, a government employer, decided that the elections would be held within the precincts of the port itself, which is government property and entry to which is controlled by permits granted by the Port Management. On the day of the elections, many of these entry permits belonging to those loyal to the unions were invalidated. The Port Management printed the voting slips for the Independent list (non-Communist) and on the day of the elections anyone not having such a slip was ejected from the port area." (*Ittihad ash-Sha'ab*, 27 Sept)

**May-Nov: Oil Industry Unions.** The authorities tightened their control over the oil workers' union committees and several of the leaders were arrested shortly before the elections. Four active members of the union were arrested in Daura on 5 May and eight others on 12 May. Earlier, two active members of the union had been arrested in Khanaqin. (*Ittihad ash-Sha'ab*, 17 May) The Central Office of the union reacted by calling on the oil workers to rally to the union's representatives. (*Ittihad ash-Sha'ab*, 18 May) In a telegram to the Military Governor-General, the union demanded the release of the arrested workers so that they could participate in the elections. (*Ittihad ash-Sha'ab*, 19 May)

In Basra and Ayn Zala the Iraq Petroleum Co. (IPC) dismissed many workers who were subsequently reinstated by Qassim, which earned him the thanks of the Federation. (*Ittihad ash-Sha'ab*, 24 May)

In the elections of 2 Sept to the Refineries Trade Union in Daura, the Independent list defeated the pro-Communist list by 719 votes to 576. (*Hayat*, 7 Sept)

On 8 Sept the Independent list (anti-Communist) received 712 votes in the elections to the Oil Distributors' Union, against 13 votes for the pro-Communist Workers' Union.

On 8 Sept *Ittihad ash-Sha'ab* claimed that the elections in both cases had been fixed. (*Amal*, Beirut, 9 Sept) Addressing a delegation of oil industry workers, the Minister of Social Welfare denied this charge. (*Ittihad ash-Sha'ab*, 11 Sept) In Sept in the elections to the Oil Industry Workers' Union in Fao, the United list (pro-Communist) lost to the Independent list (anti-Communist) by 71 votes to 199. (*BBC/W*, 29 Sept, 6 Oct)

The Communists also lost the leadership of the General Union of Oil Industry Workers in elections held in mid-Nov. The new leadership publicly announced that when it had taken over the assets of the union on 19 Nov, the entire capital had proved to be ID 33,460, although it was known that the previous executive had received membership dues and donations of more than 40,000 dinars. (*Zaman*, 22 Nov)

**Jan-Nov: Struggle for Control of Cigarette Workers Union.** (*Niqabat Ummal wa-Mustakhdami Sina'at as-Sajayir*). The pro-Communist list won the elections to the Executive of the Cigarette Workers' Union held on 17 June, but the elections were annulled by the authorities "as they had been corrupt," and in the elections of 28 Oct the pro-Communists lost. The Communists now claimed that the elections had been fixed and on 30 Oct announced strikes in the tobacco factories at al-Ahaliya and ar-Rafidayn. The same day, the Military Governor-General

ral annulled the elections and the strikers returned to work. (*Bilad*, 1 Nov; *Ahali*, 8 Nov) Members of the successful Independent anti-Communist list, in a memorandum to Qassim, claimed that the committee they had appointed was legal, as the elections had been legal. (*Sharq*, 3 Nov)

On 3 Nov the Military Governor-General issued an order postponing the elections indefinitely. (*Zaman*, 4 Nov) As a result, the workers in the two factories went out on strike on 5 Nov, and returned to work on 14 Nov after violent clashes with the police. (*Ahali*, 8, 15 Nov, (*BBC in Arabic*, 10 Nov-IMB, 11 Nov)

In the new elections held on 28 Nov, the Independents were again successful, gaining 1,186 votes against 208 of the pro-Communist list. (*Zaman*, 30 Nov)

**June-Dec: Failure of Communist Supporters in other Labour Unions.** From the middle of June onwards the Communists also lost their ascendancy in other trade unions. In the elections to the Executive Committee of the Mosul Branch of the Construction Workers' Union on 26 June, the Independents defeated the pro-Communist United List by 128 votes to eight. (*Thawrah*, 28 June)

In the elections on 20 Nov in the Painters' Union, in Baghdad, the Independents defeated the pro-Communists by 89-45. (*Ahali*, 1 Dec) Elections to this union were to have taken place in Sept, but were postponed by the authorities. The Communist supporters, who had a majority in this union until Nov, alleged that the Directorate of Labour had cancelled the union cards of about 650 [Communist-inclined] members, while distributing cards to 45 children or paint dealers, granting them status as workers in the painting industry so that they could take part in the elections. (*Ittihad ash-Sha'ab*, 25 Sept)

**Sept-Dec: Ali Shukur's Complaints to Qassim.** On 18 Sept Shukur wrote in an open letter to Qassim: "I regret to inform you, our Leader, that the whip has come down on our own backs—ours, the workers." He accused the authorities of denying the legal rights of the workers' organizations to hold and organize elections, and determine the date and place. This was being done by government circles to deprive these organizations of their true representatives. Ali Shukur specifically accused the Ministry of Social Affairs of using a system of multiple and revised elections where the Independent (non-Communist) lists had failed, as in the cases of the Cigarette Workers' unions, Printing Workers', Oil Workers' and others. He asked if this was the neutrality to be expected of government officials and if this could be called lawful government. Ali Shukur accused the General Manager of the Port Administration of personally supervising the elections, an action unbecoming a senior servant of the Republic of 14th July. (*Ittihad, ash-Sha'ab*, 18 Sept)

In another memorandum to Qassim, Ali Shukur complained that the federation had not been asked to take part in organizing the demonstration celebrating Qassim's leaving the hospital on 3 Dec 1959. He also claimed that assaults had been committed against workers who participated. He demanded that Qassim take steps against those responsible. (*Ra'y al-Amm*, 11 Dec)

## THE GOVERNMENT AND THE GENERAL FEDERATION OF STUDENTS

(*Ittihad at-Tullāb al-Amm*)

**Background Note.** [Since its inception on 16 Nov 1958, this organization had been led by Mahdi Ahmad al-

Hāfiz.] At the third Convention of the federation, held in Baghdad on 2 Jan, 1960, al-Hāfiz was re-elected. (*Ahali*, 6 Jan) [It included university students and secondary school pupils. Communist influence had prevailed in it from the beginning.]

**Sept-Dec: Government Measures to Limit Federation's Power and Neutralize it Politically.** [Up to Sept no special measures were apparently taken in connection with the federation but] in Sept the Ministry of Education considered the possibility of liquidating the Union of Secondary School Pupils (*Ittihad ath-Thanawiyāt*), which would deprive the federation of a majority of its members. The General Federation of Students thereupon set up a Temporary Committee for the Defence of the Secondary School Pupils' Associations and handed a protest to the Minister of Education, stressing the danger to their organization inherent in such a proposal. (*Bilad*, 6 Sept; *Mabda'*, 7 Sept)

The Minister of Education [seeking grounds for severing the secondary School Pupils' Union from the Students' Federation] requested the latter to formulate its Articles of Association under the Associations Law. The federation replied that its Articles of Association had been approved by the government and that the law applicable to it was the same as for teachers and newspapermen, neither of whom were bound by the Associations Law. The federation saw no need, therefore, to draft new articles.

Nevertheless, the Ministry of Education set up a commission to examine the federation's Articles of Association. (*Bilad*, 18 Nov) Elections in the Students' Federation were due to take place in both university and secondary schools on 24 Nov, but by order of the Military Governor-General issued on 22 Nov the elections were postponed "until further notice." (*Zaman*, 23 Nov)

The Director-General of Education, Dr Abbās Taha an-Najm, announced that "the forthcoming Students' Union elections will be conducted on the basis of individual nominations and not on the basis of lists and groups... The purpose of this measure is to keep the Students' Union away from political and party strife." (*Iraq Times*, 18 Nov)

The Ministry of Education forbade, on pain of heavy penalties, the dissemination by teachers of any views or propaganda on the students' elections. (*Zaman*, 13 Dec)

The General Federation of Students, in its greetings to Qassim on the occasion of "Safety Day" (in celebration of his escape from assassination) on 3 Dec, requested the release of arrested and exiled students, as well as sanction for the reopening of its district offices (*Bilad*, 30 Nov), [all of which had been closed by the strongly anti-Communist local authorities].

## THE GOVERNMENT AND THE TEACHERS' UNION

(*Niqābat al-Mu'allimīn*)

**Background Note and Synopsis.** [This organization had also been under strong Communist influence since its inception in 1958, shortly after the Revolution. Its president, Najīb Muhi ad-Dīn, Director of Primary Education in the Ministry of Education, was one of the would-be founders of the pro-Communist Republican Party. The Union exerted strong influence in the Ministry of Education throughout the period when the portfolio was held by Muhi ad-Dīn Abd al-Hamīd (though he was not an active sympathizer himself). When Brigadier Is-



ma'il Arif was appointed Minister in May 1960, a different policy was adopted.]

**Feb: Pro-Communist Leadership Confirmed.** Najib Muhi ad-Din was re-elected President of the Teachers' Union on 27 Feb. (*Bilad*, 28 Feb)

**June: Separation of Education from Politics.** At a Press conference on 18 June, the newly appointed Minister of Education declared that henceforth teachers would not be permitted to introduce politics into teaching, and that "the only party permissible within class walls was knowledge." Offenders would be restrained by law. (*Zaman*, 19 June)

**Jan-Apr: New Peasants' Societies Refused Licence.** The Union Protests. By Aug active members of the union had been ousted from the Ministry, and others had been penalized by transfers. In a memorandum to the Minister the union stigmatized these measures as "unconducive to calm and stability." (*Bilad*, 11 Aug) A month later a leftist daily complained in the leading article that 120 headmasters and their assistants had been transferred from their posts in the Baghdad quarter of Risafa. (*Bilad*, 20 Sept) Towards the end of Nov the union decried these transfers in another memorandum to the Minister as "illegal and harmful to the interests of education." (*Bilad*, 25 Nov) Shortly afterwards the union asked in a memorandum to the Military Governor-General that cases of teachers' arrests and transfers be dealt with more speedily. (*Bilad*, 2 Dec; *Insaniyah*, 15 Dec) Nevertheless, further arrests among teachers were soon reported. (*Istiqlal*, 19 Dec)

**Murders of Teachers Alleged.** At about the same time the union addressed a memorandum to Qasim himself, alleging that there was "a policy of persecuting teachers by every means, to the point that some of our best members have been murdered, while the authorities failed to apprehend the culprits in most cases." Furthermore, the memorandum stated that administrative transfers did not serve the pacification policy advocated by Qasim, and that they were harmful to the interests of education and of the union. Qasim was asked to order the release of teachers who had been arrested. (*Istiqlal*, 8 Dec)

## THE GOVERNMENT AND THE JOURNALISTS' UNION

(*Niqabat as-Sihafiyyin*)

**Background and Synopsis.** [This union was founded in 1958, shortly after the Revolution. From the outset, and throughout the period under review, its president was the celebrated poet Muhammad Mahdi al-Jawāhiri, a reputed Communist. Communist or strongly pro-Communist influence prevailed in the union from its inception, though it was by no means unchallenged from within. This challenge grew stronger during 1960, with the active though cautious, support of the authorities.]

**Apr-June: Union's Leadership Challenged but Upheld.** In view of the impending elections a group of anti-Communist journalists demanded that the Executive strike off the roster those members whose principal occupation was not journalism, and who were therefore, according to regulations, disqualified from voting. [Communists and fellow-travellers posed as "journalists" to ensure the party's hold on the union. No action is known to have been taken by the Executive in response to this demand.]

At the elections on 8 Apr Jawāhiri was again elected chairman. (*Zaman*, 9 Apr) The Juridical Committee of the union, headed by Abd ar-Razzāq Shabīb, the anti-Communist chairman of the Lawyers' Union (see p 255), allowed the appeal of 27 anti-Communist journalists against the election results and declared them void. (*Zaman*, 20 May) The Executive thereupon appealed to the Minister of the Interior, protesting that the results were valid, and that Shabīb had no right to continue as chairman of the committee, to which he had been appointed in the past for one single occasion only. (*Bilad*, 25 May) The Legal Drafting Department accepted the Executive's claim, and the results were declared valid. (*Sawt al-Ahrar*, 15 June)

**Apr: National Democrats Attack Partisan Character of Union.** The NDP organ *al-Ahālī* strongly attacked the union after the elections of its Executive, claiming that it could not fulfil its national mission because of its partisan [i.e. Communist] bias. (*Ahālī*, 12 Apr) The union countered that the NDP politician Muhammed as-Sa'adūn had been a member of the outgoing Executive, and had been elected as deputy chairman of the new one. (*Bilad*, 13 Apr)

**July-Nov: Authorities Attempt to Oust Communists.** Qasim told members of the union on 31 July that they would have to elect a new chairman soon, since the present one was about to be appointed to "an important office." (*Zaman*, 1 Aug) In this connection Jawāhiri announced the close-down of his own paper *Ar-Ra'y al-Amm* as of 3 Sept in anticipation of his new functions (*Hayat*, 4 Sept) but when these functions failed to materialize he reopened his paper on 30 Nov. (*Zaman*, 1 Dec) Meanwhile, the Ministry of Guidance had passed a new regulation definitely limiting membership in the union to full-time journalists; a commission was formed to designate members to be expelled under this regulation. (*Mabda'*, 13 Sept) At the beginning of Nov the union published the names of 67 members who were struck off its list. (*Bilad*, 5 Nov)

**July-Nov: The Union Struggles for "Freedom of the Press."** In the latter half of 1960 Jawāhiri addressed at least three memoranda to Qasim complaining about serious infringements of the freedom of the Press, arbitrary closing-down of newspapers by the authorities, and arrests of journalists and editors. (*Bilad*, 1 Apr; *Mabda'*, 11 Nov) [It was during this period that the authorities stepped up their campaign against Communist and pro-Communist newspapers—see p 243.]

## THE GOVERNMENT AND THE GENERAL FEDERATION OF PEASANTS' SOCIETIES

(*Al-Ittihad al-Amm lil-Jam'iyat al-Fallahiyah*)

**Background and Synopsis.** [This federation was founded very soon after the Revolution and was then under predominant Communist leadership. Its president was the Communist Kāzim Farhūd, and the NDP politician Arāk az-Zakam filled the post of deputy. The growing determination of the authorities to wean the federation from communist influence was first expressed in the Peasants Societies Law (No. 139) of 9 Sept 1959, which permitted local peasants societies to be established only with the District Governor's approval, regardless of the opinion of the (Communist-inclined) federation's Executive upon the matter. The non-Communist (or rather anti-Communist) element came to the fore, when the deputy



president organized a mass demonstration of peasants in Baghdad on 18 Dec 1959, separate from the Communist-led general demonstration held on 4 Dec in honour of Qassim's discharge from the hospital. Throughout 1960 the anti-Communist offensive, from within and without, gathered strength, and by the end of the year the Federation had ceased to be a Communist stronghold.]

**Feb: Licensed Peasants' Societies in Iraq, by Districts**

Diwaniya	779	Hilla	131
Kut	530	Basra	72
Mosul	469	Nasiriya	60
Kirkuk	437	Amara	60
Baghdad	342	Ramadi	54
Diyala	225	Karbala	48
Irbil	198		
Salaymaniya	172	Total	3,577

(*Zaman*, 14 Feb)

**Jan: Peasants Societies Law Interpreted to Detriment of Existing Peasants' Societies.** The Department of Legal Drafting in the Ministry of Justice decided that in accordance with the Peasants' Societies Law of 1959 (see above) previously existing societies were to be considered illegal, if they had not appraised the District Governor of their existence within 30 days of its promulgation. (*Ahali*, 20 Jan)

**Jan-Apr: New Peasants Societies Refused Licence.** The federation complained that District Governors had refused to licence new peasants' societies "on false pretexts," such as that the founding members were not peasants or local residents, or that they were minors. (*Ittihad ash-Sha'ab*, 20 Jan, 22 Feb; *Sawt al-Ahrar*, 24 Apr)

**Feb-Aug: Active Members Deported.** The chairman of the federation, Kāzim Farhūd, delivered a memorandum to the Military Governor General containing the names of peasants who had been banished by administrative order to places unknown because of their activities on behalf of peasants' societies; Farhūd "personally vouched for the deportees as faithful sons of the Republic." (*Sawt al-Ahrar*, 24 Feb) Similar items appeared in later months. (*Ittihad ash-Sha'ab* 16 May, 17 Aug) [In view of the facts given in the last three paragraphs, and the sources for them it is safe to conclude that the common denominator of these measures was the official policy of fighting Communist influence in the federation.]

**May-Sept: Anti-Communists Victories in Elections to District Committees of Peasants' Societies.** Three lists were put up for the elections to the Baghdad District Committee—one headed by Arāk az-Zakam [by now a member of Hadīd's National Progressive Party], one by Rashīd Sulaymān [pro-Communist], and one by Ibrāhīm Muḥammad ash-Shallāl. Before the voting Rashīd Sulaymān withdrew, "in the interest of peasant unity." At the polls Zakam received 517 votes, against 179 for Shallāl. (*Ittihad ash-Sha'ab*, 5, 8 May) At the elections in Diyala district on 10 June two lists were proposed: that of Radām al-Kaytān (NDP) and that of Shihāb Ahmad (pro-Communist). Kaytān was returned by a big majority. (*Ahali*, 12 June) At the elections in Kut district on 26 June the Communist-supported list lost "because of interference by the authorities." (*Ittihad ash-Sha'ab*, 30 June)

**Sept-Oct: Elections to Executive of Federation.** After

district elections had been held, delegates of peasants' societies demanded the holding of elections for the General Executive, which, under the Law of 1959, was to consist of 29 active members (three for Baghdad and two for each other district) and 14 reserve members. (*Ahali*, 19, 20 Sept) The elections took place on 9 Oct. The two opposing lists were headed by Arāk az-Zakam and Radām al-Kaytān respectively. [Kaytān's party, the NDP, had by then joined the opposition to the government and was more friendly to the Communists than the authorities liked.] Zakam's list received 88 votes and 25 members on the Executive, while Kaytān's got 59 votes and four members (for Kirkuk and Irbil). Immediately afterwards Zakam was elected President of the federation. (*Iraq Times*, 10 Oct) Kaytān appealed against the results to the Minister of the Interior, mainly on the ground that secrecy of the ballot had been grossly violated. (*Ahali*, 13 Oct) The Minister rejected the appeal and declared the elections valid. (*Zaman*, 21 Oct) [Kāzim Farhūd, the Communist president of the federation until Zakam's election, seems to have become completely inactive after Feb 1960.]

## THE GOVERNMENT AND THE LAWYERS' UNION

(*Niqābat al-Muḥammīn*)

**Background and Synopsis.** [At the beginning of 1960 this was the only professional or trade organization not under Communist control, its chairman being the well-known lawyer Abd ar-Razzāq Shabīb, a prominent member of the former Istiqlāl party, noted for his pro-UAR views, who had been in prison since Dec 1959 (see below). The union's anti-Communist line grew even more pronounced in 1960, and it seems that its leadership was regarded with suspicion by Qassim for its nationalist inclinations.]

**Mar: Union's Chairman Released.** Abd ar-Razzāq Shabīb, chairman of the Iraqi Lawyers' Union, was released from prison, having been arrested in Dec 1959 in connection with the attempt to assassinate Qassim. (*Difa'*, 7 Mar)

**July: Delegation to Visit West Germany.** A delegation consisting of the chairman and ten other members was to leave on a month's visit to Western Germany as guests of the Federal Government. (*Hayat*, 4 July)

**Oct: Elections Confirm anti-Communist Leadership.** Results of elections held on 21 Oct for the Central Committee of the union showed a victory for the outgoing chairman, Abd ar-Razzāq Shabīb, who was re-elected by 577 votes against 191 for his opponent, Abd ar-Razzāq az-Zāhir. (*Zaman*, 22 Oct) Az-Zāhir, at that time in Vienna for medical purposes, claimed by letter that he had not been consulted on his candidacy. (*Zaman*, 30 Oct)

**Nov: Members of Union Under Arrest.** The union handed a memorandum to the Military Governor-General demanding the release of its arrested members. (*Ahali*, 21 Nov)

## THE GOVERNMENT AND THE UNION OF DEMOCRATIC YOUTH

(*Shabībat ad-Dimuqratiyah*)

**Background and Synopsis.** [This Communist front organization was established soon after the Revolution, with branches in the more important centres. Its SG was the Communist Nūri Abd ar-Razzāk Husseīn. Like other front

organizations, the union suffered as a rule at the hands of the authorities during 1960, though here too this rule had its exception.]

**Measures Against the Union by the Authorities.** In Mar, the Court of Cassation rejected an appeal by the union against the closing of two of its branches. (*Akhbar*, 27 Mar) In May the District Governor of Baghdad shut down the union's branches in Baghdad, claiming that it had contravened the official interpretation of the Association Law, according to which an association could not open more than one branch in each district. The union demanded that the Minister of the Interior rescind this measure, since this interpretation did not have the force of law. (*Bilad*, 20 May) The union addressed Qassim on the same subject, when it conveyed its congratulations on the "Day of Safety" [3 Dec]. (*Bilad*, 3 Dec)

In a memorandum to the authorities the union mentioned by name 226 of its members who were held prisoner, though 30 of these had been freed in honour of 14 July. (*Bilad*, 4 Aug) Abd ar-Razzāk Hussein, the SG and two members of the administrative committee, Hussein al-Hurmāni and Sāmi Mahjūb, were arrested on 26 Oct, the former was freed two days later, while the latter two were banished to Amara and Kut respectively. (*Zaman*, 28 Oct) A letter from the union to the Military Governor-General dated 12 Dec requested the release of these two prisoners and permission for opening the union's headquarters and six branches which had been closed. (*Ahali*, 19 Dec)

The District Governors of Nasiriya and Diwaniyah prohibited the openings of branches in their districts. (*Sawt al-Ahrar*, 1 Mar)

**Feb-Mar: Leave to Open Branches in Certain Districts.** The union was permitted to open branches in Kut, Mosul, Sulaymaniya and Diyala. (*Zaman*, 26 Feb, 24 Mar; *Sawt al-Ahrar*, 1 Mar)

**June: Qassim's Friendly Gesture.** Qassim made a speech at the second congress of the union on 15 June, in which he declared that "the union guarded the people's interests and represented freedom and democracy." (*Hayat*, 16 June)

## THE GOVERNMENT AND THE IRAQI WOMEN'S ORGANIZATIONS

**Background and Synopsis.** [The League for the Protection of Women's Rights was founded towards the end of 1958 under the leadership of Dr Nazīhah ad-Dulaymi, a Communist sympathizer, who headed the organization throughout the period under review. Owing to the mounting hostility of the authorities, its activities were increasingly hampered, and rival organizations encouraged. Dr Dulaymi herself was demoted from her cabinet office as Minister for Local Authorities to that of Minister without portfolio (May 1960), and later she was ousted from the government altogether. (Nov 1960)]

**Mar: League Adopts Less Militant Name at Qassim's Suggestion.** The organization changed its name from League for the Protection of Women's Rights (*Rābitat ad-Difā' an Huqūq al-Mar'ah*) to Iraqi Women's League (*Rābitat al-mar'ah al-Iraqiyah*), in response to a suggestion by Qassim at its congress on 8 Mar. (*Sawt al-Ahrar*, 11 Mar)

**Dr Dulaymi Re-elected.** Dr Dulaymi was re-elected as chairman of the League on 13 Mar. (*Ittihad ash-Sha'ab*, 14 Mar)

**League Shows its Pro-Communist Orientation.** Resolutions adopted at the League's congress in mid-Mar included a call to renew the training of the Popular Resistance Movement (militant Communist front organization responsible in part for the Kirkuk massacres in July 1959) and a request to terminate Point Four assistance. (*Ittihad ash-Sha'ab*, 14 Mar) In Nov the League cabled the UN SG in support of "Cuba's struggle against foreign subversion." (*Bilad*, 27 Nov)

**Authorities Act to Curb Women's League.** A delegation met the Minister of the Interior on 29 May to complain of assaults by police and security agents on members of the League. (*Bilad*, 1 June) Another delegation complained to the Minister of Education of the persecution of members active in the struggle against illiteracy; this was alleged to be a reason for the small number of persons studying that year under its auspices. (*Ittihad ash-Sha'ab*, 26 Sept) In a memorandum to Qassim the League complained that members had been beaten by "enemies of the people" during the demonstration held on the anniversary of Qassim's leaving the hospital, on 3 Dec; no arrests had been made, and an investigation was demanded. (*Istiqlal*, 8 Dec)

Amara was among the branches shut down by the authorities. (*Istiqlal*, 8 Dec)

**Government Encourages Rival Organizations.** The poetess Aminah Nūr ad-Dīn was given a licence by the authorities to found the Republican Women's Organization (*Munazamat Nisā' al-Jumhuriya*), to counteract Nazīhah ad-Dulaymi's league. (*Hawadith, Lebanon*, 22 Apr) In July it was reported that this organization was headed by Dr Samīrah al-Badri. (*Zaman*, 2 July) [Both these ladies were known for their opposition to Communism.] The Ministry of Health licenced it to open a centre for mother-and-child care. (*Thawrah*, 13 May) It had branches in Kirkuk and Mosul. (*Fajr al-Jadid*, 14 Dec)

Mrs Nihāl Amjād az-Zahāwī was licenced by the authorities to found the Muslim Sisters' Society (*Jam'iyat al-Akhawāt al-Muslimāt*). (*Fajr al-Jadid*, 8 July)

## THE GOVERNMENT AND THE PARTISANS OF PEACE

(Ansār as-Salām)

**Background and Synopsis.** [This Communist front organization operated underground in Iraq before the Revolution, and came out into the open soon afterwards. Like other Communist and near-Communist bodies it complained about the increasing hostility of the authorities since the autumn of 1959. The chairman of the organization throughout the period was Aziz Sharif, a noted Communist sympathizer.]

**Not Recognized Under the Association Law.** Qassim stated at a session of the Teachers' Congress on 23 Feb that the Partisans of Peace need not register under the Associations Law, since they were not properly an "Association," but a mere sector of the "peace-loving Iraqi people." (*Bilad* 25 Feb)

**Complaints of Authorities' Hostile Attitude.** In Apr, arrests of active members were reported. The local authorities at Kerbala arrested members to prevent them from taking part in a demonstration planned for 3 Apr. (*Ittihad ash-Sha'ab*, 5 Apr) The movement sent a letter to the Military Governor-General complaining that some of its members had been beaten when they took part in a demonstration on 3 Dec to celebrate Qassim's recovery. (*Bilad*, 13 Dec)

## POLICY TOWARDS RELIGIOUS AND ETHNIC GROUPS

## BACKGROUND AND SYNOPSIS

**General.** [The population of Iraq comprises a veritable mosaic of nationalities and religions, which have, as a rule, kept apart socially, economically and politically. From the outset the new regime stressed that it regarded all the communities as integral parts of the Iraqi people—with special emphasis on the Kurds. The year 1960 was uneventful, except for Kurdish affairs.]

**Ethnic and Religious Composition of Iraqi Population.****Main ethnic minorities:**

Kurds	1,000,000
Turkomans	75,000
Lurds (Persians)	60,000

**Main religious minorities:**

Chaldeans	100,000
Assyrians	30,000
Other oriental churches	20,000
Yazidis	30,000
Sabeans	20,000
Jews	5,000–10,000

(*The Middle East, Europe ed., London, 1961; Worldmark Encyclopedia of Nations, Harpers, New York, 1960*)

[It must be stressed that the above figures are approximations; moreover, the "religious" minorities are in many cases "ethnic" minorities as well.]

## THE (ARAB) SHI'IS

(See also National Religious Groups—Other Religious Opposition, pp 249–50.)

**Background Note.** [The Shi'is constitute about half the population, and considerably more than half of Iraq's Arabic-speaking inhabitants. As a community, they have traditionally been considered backward, and their share in office has been small in proportion to their numbers; hence a general sense of resentment towards the state and the government. They live in the south and the centre of Iraq.]

**Nov–Dec: Political Trends among the Shi'is.** The political influence of the Shi'is in Iraq had reportedly been increasing. Until recently there had few "nationalists" among them, but the number had been growing (*Jaridah*, 30 Nov, 3 Dec)

**Mar: Anti-Communist Decree by Shi'i Divines.** The leading Shi'i divines Muhsin al-Hakim, Abd al-Hadi ash-Shirazi and Abu al-Qasim al-Khuli, published *fatwahs* [religious legal opinions] in which Communism was declared to be absolutely incompatible with Islam. (*Jihad*, 3 Apr)

**Nov: Shi'i Schools Closed.** The Military Governor-General ordered the closing of secondary schools maintained by the Ja'fari (Shi'i) sect. (*Ahali*, 6 Nov)

## THE KURDS

(See also Democratic Party of Kurdistan, pp 250–51.)

**Background Note.** [The Kurds of Iraq, rather less than 20 per cent of the population, live in the North and North-East; their chief urban centres are Arbil and Sulaymaniya. Their society is as yet largely tribal, and they

are considered socially and economically backward in comparison with the Arabs. Their national consciousness is, however, strong, both as regards their claims on the Iraqi state, and their solidarity with their fellow Kurds beyond its frontiers.]

**Kurds as Equal Partners in the Republic.** The danger appearing in the new Iraqi coat-of-arms stands for the Kurds, who, together with the Arabs, make up the nation of Iraq (official description, quoted in *Thawrah*, 6 Jan). The Minister of State Fu'ad Arif, a Kurd, declared that the Kurds in Iraq had obtained their rights. (*Ahali*, 5 Jan) [For Qassim on Arab-Kurdish partnership—see pp 232, 251.]

**Government Stresses Arabic Studies Among Kurds.** Pupils of Kurdish primary schools would in the future be required to obtain the grade of 50 instead of 40, to receive a pass in Arabic. (*R. Baghdad*, 15 Jan—BBC/W, 21 Jan) The authorities had rejected the suggestion of a Kurdish Scientific Council, as unnecessary and prejudicial to national unity. (*Zaman*, 9 Mar) In the future, Kurdish teachers would also study at Arab seminaries, and vice versa. (*Iraq Times*, 21 Dec)

**Jan: Political Migration of Tribes Between Iraq and Persia.** A number of Kurdish tribes from Iraq had recently taken refuge in Persia. (*Jihad*, 11 Jan, quoting *French News Agency*) Kokha Aram and Kokha Mahmud, two Kurdish shaykhs from Persia who had fled to Iraq, declared their loyalty to Qassim. (*Akhbar*, 25 Feb)

**Government Discourages Kurdish Nationalism.** The Minister of the Interior demanded that the sponsors of the Republican Party amend their platform to exclude the word "people" (*Sha'ab*) with respect to the Kurds, since "Arabs and Kurds together made up the Iraqi people." (*Zaman*, 3 Mar) The national committee for the 14 July celebrations did not sanction any slogan referring to the Kurds, despite Kurdish requests. (*Khahat*, quoted in *Iraq Times*, 12 July)

## THE TURKOMANS

**Background Note.** [In 1959 the Turkomans suffered heavily from communal riots in the wake of the Shawwaf mutiny and the Kirkuk disturbances in July. The year 1960 passed quietly, on the whole.]

**Jan: Turkoman Language Broadcasts Extended.** Baghdad Radio extended its broadcasts in Turkoman, in response to requests from Turkoman circles. (*Zaman*, 30 Jan; *Thawrah*, 1 Feb)

## THE JEWS

**Background Note.** [The once important Jewish community, numbering some 150,000, was virtually dissolved in 1950–1951, when the vast majority emigrated, the greater part to Israel. Since then the number of Jews in Iraq had fallen below 10,000, almost all concentrated in Baghdad.]

**Jan: Anti-Jewish Regulation Rescinded.** The paragraph of Law No. 12, 1951, which deprived of his Iraqi nationality any Jew who exceeded the time-limit of his exit permit, was repealed. The explanation offered was

that discrimination among Iraqi citizens on grounds of religion was inadmissible, and that in any case Jews might be justifiably prevented from returning to Iraq in time. (*Zaman*, 21 Jan)

**Nov: Jewish Situation in General.** There were about 5–6,000 Jews in Iraq. Though they suffered no persecution, they felt extremely insecure. (*Ma'ariv*, *Israel*, 2 Nov)

#### CHRISTIAN AND OTHER SMALL MINORITIES

**Mar-Dec: Assyrians Advance Cultural Demands.** Assyrians were demanding regular broadcasts in their lan-

guage over Baghdad Radio (*Sawt al-Ahrar*, 14 Mar); the same request was made in letters to the editor of *al-Bilad*. (*Bilad* 13 Dec)

**Apr: Clashes between Assyrians and Kurds.** Communal disturbances took place between Assyrians and Kurds near Mahalah; there were killed and wounded. (*MENA*, 4 Apr–BBC, 6 Apr)

**Mar: Yazidi Rights Recognized.** The religious feasts of the Yazidis were recognized by the authorities as official holidays [entitling members of this community to stay away from work]. (*Zaman*, 1 Mar)

## INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

### SYNOPSIS

During the period under review, Positive Neutralism continued to be the declared policy of Iraq in its international relations; Iraq's independent attitude to world problems, the non-aggressive character of her policy and her desire for friendship with all were emphasized. Anti-imperialism and Afro-Asian solidarity also figured largely in Iraqi pronouncements, and towards the end of the year the Foreign Minister made several strongly worded anti-Western statements.

Economic and cultural contacts with the West were more frequent than during the first 18 months after the revolution. At the beginning of 1960, Iraq and Denmark concluded a trade agreement, the first since the revolution with a Nato country. More agreements with Western countries soon followed, notably the cultural agreements with the US and the UK. (The latter, signed in Dec 1959, was ratified in Feb.) Negotiations which opened in Aug with the IPC on the Iraqi demand, among other things, for a greater share in control and profits were still inconclusive at the end of the year.

While the Qassim government's close cooperation in the economic, cultural and military fields with the Communist bloc, particularly with the USSR, continued, the latter showed some concern over Iraq's newly developing contacts with the West, and occasionally criticized the harassing of the country's leftist elements. An important contribution towards the clarification of Iraqi foreign policy was A. J. Mikoyan's visit to Baghdad in the first half of Apr. The official purpose of the visit, which took place on Moscow's initiative, was the inauguration of the Soviet Industrial Exhibition in Baghdad; the context suggested that the true object was to clarify Iraq's attitude on all questions of interest to the USSR—including its policy towards the Iraqi Communists. Qassim, and even more directly the inspired Press, made it clear that Iraq intended to reserve full freedom of action in all respects. [For relations with the Communist countries, see p 70 ff.]

At the UN and on other occasions, Iraq came out

strongly against imperialism, usually aligning herself with the Eastern bloc; an exception was the Congo question, where she supported the UN SG. However, apart from voting and general statements, Iraq refrained from involvement in international affairs in which she had no direct stake, though she accorded important material aid to the Algerian Provisional Government.

The crisis which had flared up with Iran towards the end of 1959 over the Shatt al-Arab abated during the first weeks of 1960. Relations with Turkey, Iraq's other non-Arab neighbour, were described by PM Qassim as friendly. As for other Asian countries, President Sukarno of Indonesia's visit in Apr deserves special mention.

Iraq made some efforts in 1960 to establish ties with African countries. A commercial mission was sent in Mar on a tour of Africa, and the government decided to open diplomatic missions in African countries, though it showed no haste in doing so. Some scholarships were awarded to Africans, and students from Somalia and Guinea were accepted in Iraqi military schools. Missions from Guinea, Somalia and Cameroun visited Iraq during the year.

On the inter-Arab scene, 1960 saw Iraq emerging from her relative isolation. She adopted a common attitude with most other Arab countries in rejecting the UAR concept of Arab political union in favour of cooperation without interference in each other's internal affairs.

On this basis there was a rapprochement with Jordan, and friendly relations further developed with Morocco and Tunisia. In addition to her aid to the Algerian Provisional Government, Iraq supported other Arab causes. At the same time there was an improvement in relations with the UAR; although these remained cool, the mutual propaganda campaign subsided. Iraq's changed position on the Arab scene also found expression in her renewed participation in the Arab League's activities, starting in Aug. (For Iraq's inter-Arab relations, see p 115 ff.)



## IEWS AND POLICIES

### IRAQ IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

#### IRAQ'S ROLE IN THE WORLD

**The World's Debt to Iraq.** Qassim, Baghdad, 25 Apr: "All countries, Communist, Western, neutralist and others, are indebted to us... The admiration of these countries for the Iraq Republic is caused by their indebtedness to us. They are indebted to us because after demolishing the biggest imperialist base we were able to break through the barrier which stood between us and some countries. This also resulted in keeping off the danger of the shadow of war. We became the factor in the rapprochement between the countries, and the cold war started to be alleviated." (*INA*, 25 Apr)

Hāshim Jawād, Baghdad, June: "In spite of our being a small country with limited capabilities, we hope to give the world what we can give at present of our living nationalist heritage which can bring benefit to it." (*INA*, 27 June)

#### IMPERIALISM AND THE STRUGGLE FOR FREEDOM

**Imperialism Everywhere.** Qassim, Baghdad, 8 Oct: "When we say imperialist we do not mean certain actions in a limited place, for the imperialist has infiltrated in all parts of the world. You see him in Africa, in America, in Asia, and in Europe itself, besides Australia." (*INA*, 8 Oct)

**Economic Imperialism.** Hāshim Jawād, in the General Debate at the UN General Assembly, 6 Oct: "Constant endeavours are made by certain powers to maintain their colonial domination in the economic field. Experience has shown that under such conditions the general problem of under-development in the new states cannot be solved..."

"Political independence, which is the exercise of the right of separation, will be devoid of its essence if pre-liberation economic relationships continue to operate between the colonial powers and the new states in their traditional institutional forms... Economic exploitation can be achieved without political annexation." (*A/PV*, 890, 6 Oct)

**Support for All Who Struggle For Freedom.** Qassim, Baghdad, 8 Oct: "The Immortal Iraqi Republic supports every people struggling for its freedom and emancipation and the guaranteeing of the human rights." (*INA*; SS, 8 Oct)

**Every People Ready For Self-Rule.** Hāshim Jawād, Baghdad, 29 Oct: "From now on we do not approve of the allegation that any people is not yet ready for self-rule. Indeed we say that it is a natural right for this people to become independent... Thus we support the UN's being a mediator for preparing the peoples as early as possible to exercise their right to rule and independence." (*INA*, 29 Oct)

**Small States Must Unite to Fight Imperialism.** Hāshim Jawād, Baghdad, 28 Dec: "The small states must unite their efforts, and I think they are, to combat imperialism for we cannot subdue strong imperialism in a short time and with scattered disunited powers. So we have to unite our forces and form a strong front at the UN and outside

it to fight imperialism. The peoples are realizing these facts gradually." (*INA*, 28 Dec)

#### POSITIVE NEUTRALISM

**Revolution Has Enabled Iraqi People to Cooperate With All Others.** Qassim's message to Afro-Asian Solidarity Conference, Baghdad, 16 Apr: "Our National Revolution of 14 July has shattered the old citadels of slavery and opened the way for a backward and static society to step out into the world to join hands with other nations fighting for freedom, progress and peace. The emergence of the Iraqi people from the old social and political order into the modern arena of freedom and liberty has been strengthened by their belief in the right of all nations to freedom and independence, by their respect of the human rights and by their determination to co-operate with all peace-loving nations in their endeavour to save subjugated people from foreign domination." (*INA*, 16 Apr)

**National Dignity Achieved Through Revolution.** Hāshim Jawād, Baghdad, 28 Dec: "I feel now that I represent an honourable, free and independent country; but in the exterminated regime I had been bound and exposed to pressure; orders used to be sent to me for adoption of attitudes in favour of what the imperialists want. Now I tell you with all faithfulness and loyalty that I had never felt my dignity and the dignity of the state I represented, in a way similar to my feelings since the 14 July Revolution. Despite being small, Iraq has become respected and an example for many countries for we adopt sound world attitudes..." (*INA*, 28 Dec)

**Non-Affiliation with World Blocs.** Hāshim Jawād, on first anniversary of Iraq's withdrawal from Baghdad Pact, Baghdad, 24 Mar:

"The policy of positive neutralism, ... which constitutes one of the main pillars on which the structure of our young republic was built up, necessitates that the Iraq Republic do not affiliate to any international camp, keep aloof from all kinds of alliances..."

"Thus, the Leader of the 14 July Revolution... decided to unfasten the chains which bound Iraq in its foreign relations with conditions that reduced its independence and sovereignty to nil..."

"Thus, and in pursuance of the logic of our liberation Revolution, Iraq withdrew from the former Baghdad Pact." (*INA*, 24, Mar)

**Participation in World Affairs.** Jawād continued: "Neutralist policy... does not... mean that liberated Iraq is standing outside, just observing what is taking place around it... The policy of neutralism is fundamentally a dynamic progressive policy that pays much care to the problems and happenings of the world... It makes the Iraq Republic support the states and peoples which endeavour for the liberation of humanity and for subduing the unjust, evil force which blocks the way towards development and spiritual and material progress." (*INA*, 24 Mar)

**Positive Neutralism and Peaceful Coexistence.** Qassim's message to Afro-Asian Solidarity Conference, Baghdad, 16 Apr: "In order that positive neutrality become an active

policy it should be linked to the principles of peaceful coexistence, which are the only principles in keeping with the interests and liberty of all nations... The policy of positive neutrality... could also be instrumental in paving the way for bringing about understanding between the two contending world powers." (*INA, 16 Apr*)

**Hāshim Jawād, in General Debate at UN GA, 6 Oct:** "However true the picture of the division of power in the world at the present time, the fact remains that the development of the two blocs has not reached the point of collision, as there still exists space separating them, which could be occupied by other powers. The time has come for the non-committed nations to hasten to occupy this space and to bridge the gap which separates East and West. We have in mind those states which follow the policy of positive neutrality and other nations of Asia, Africa and Latin America." (*A/PV, 890, 6 Oct*)

**Iraq's Neutralism Non-Aggressive.** Qassim, Baghdad, 31 Mar: "It [Iraq] is a neutralist and peace-loving state which is never aggressive to anybody. We do not want aggression. We fought against aggression in the past. We have prepared the means and forces not for the sake of aggression, but in order to fight aggression and destroy it when anybody wages aggression against us. We secure our rights inside the homeland and the rights of our brothers outside of it. We support the peace movement in the world." (*INA, Supplementary, 31 May*)

**Iraq Friendly with East and West.** Qassim, Baghdad 27 May: "We are friends with the world and it is the duty of every friendly country not to make the situation disturbed." (*INA, 28 May*)

**Hāshim Jawād, in General Debate at UN GA, 7 Oct:** "With a spirit of neutrality and guided by the desire for peaceful co-operation with nations, our relations with states of different social and political systems have been developing favourably. Our policy of positive neutrality helped us to promote good relations with the East and the West, and with our neighbours and a number of other Asian and African states." (*A/PV, 890, 6 Oct*)

**Small States More Secure as Their Number Grows.** Hāshim Jawād, Baghdad, 10 Sept: "As a small state, our survival and progress depend on peace and understanding in the world. But we feel stronger at this time for the numbers of small states has increased rapidly." (*INA, 10 Sept*)

**Against Massive Armaments.** Jawād, Baghdad, 10 Sept: "We denounce the spending of enormous sums of money for the manufacture of destructive weapons at the time when hundreds of millions of people desire the requirements of decent living. We do not approve of the threats between the powers." (*INA, 10 Sept*)

**Fidelity to Bandung Principles.** Qassim's message on Bandung Conference anniversary, Baghdad, 25 Apr: "I am overwhelmed with happiness in announcing to the world that the Iraqi Republic has beyond any doubt abided by the Bandung Conference's sublime resolutions and worked with all strength in international fields for the realization of the objectives of the Bandung Conference." (*INA, 25 Apr*)

#### UNITED NATIONS

**UN a Necessity.** Hāshim Jawād, in General Debate, at UN GA, 6 Oct: "Experience has shown that in spite of

all criticism of the UN and its weaknesses, its presence is imperative and its support by all nations is a major historical necessity." (*A/PV, 890, 6 Oct*)

**UN Should Back Weak Peoples.** Qassim, Baghdad, 8 Oct: "We say and agree that the UN should be an active force backing up the weak peoples."

**UN's Faults Must Be Corrected.** Qassim, continued: "We say that if the UN blundered in the past we have at present to remedy its faults so as to be in a position strong enough to compel France to withdraw from Algeria. Unless the UN is developed and effective and supported by all the peoples, it cannot be able to discharge its duties thoroughly in the service of justice, freedom, democracy and human rights." (*INA, 8 Oct*)

**Assistance Through UN.** Hāshim Jawād in General Debate, at UN GA, 6 Oct: "We have strongly and consistently advocated the channelling of both capital and technical assistance to the less-developed countries through the UN. This position rests on two primary considerations: In the first place, unlike bilateral aid, UN assistance does not arouse the political and psychological sensitivities of the recipient countries and is by its nature more closely related to their actual needs. On the other hand, if the basic principles and purposes of the Charter are to be fully implemented, this organization must be provided with the means to play a major role in the rapid development of the less developed countries..." (*A/PV, 890, 6 Oct*)

#### NATO STATES

**No Causes of Friction With West.** Qassim, Baghdad, 25 Apr: "The leader pointed out that the causes of dispute no longer existed even with the Western countries." (*INA, 25 Apr*)

[The following pointedly anti-Western statements were made by Hāshim Jawād during the last quarter of 1960. They have no parallel in Qassim's statements or in Jawād's own made earlier in the year.]

**The West Exposed.** Hāshim Jawād, Baghdad, 28 Dec (on abstention by US, UK, France, Belgium, Portugal Spain, Australia and South Africa during vote at UN GA on draft resolution for liquidation of imperialism):

"This voting has exposed the imperialistic countries and nothing else. All their allegations and propaganda on the liberation, independence and support of peoples are part of the imperialistic comprehensive operation." (*INA, 28 Dec*)

**West's Responsibility for Tension.** Hāshim Jawād in General Debate at UN GA, 6 Oct: "These problems (contributing to world tension) include the denial of membership to the People's Republic of China in the UN; the continued occupation of West Irian by the Netherlands; the attempt at the separation of Mauritania from Morocco by France; the war in Algeria; the fighting in Oman; the Palestine question; and the question of the Congo." (*A/PV, 890, 6 Oct*)

**West's Crime in Algeria.** Hāshim Jawād: [The] US, UK and other imperialistic countries are the ones who worked for foiling the Algerian cause in the UN as they are accomplices in this persistent crime against the Algerian people; in another word, the Algerian people is not fighting France alone but it is also fighting US, UK,

Belgium and all the member countries of NATO." (*INA*, 28 Dec)

**US Capitalist, Imperialist and under Zionist Influence.** Jawād, continued: "I believe that parties which come into office are based on the existing system of rule... I frankly say that I do not expect anything from the American Democratic party. Both the Democrats and the Republicans are under Zionist influence... and the system is capitalist and it was reflected in the voting in the UN... They did not support the liberation of peoples and the abolishing of imperialism. Therefore, they are on the side of imperialism." (*INA*, 28 Dec)

**Great Britain's Contribution to Iraq.** Hāshim Jawād, on exchange of instruments of ratification of Anglo-Iraqi Cultural Agreement, speaking to the British Ambassador, Baghdad 13 June: "You have been very modest about the great contribution which Great Britain has done in the cultural and other fields to the Iraqi people.

"Great Britain came to Iraq at the very dawn of the renaissance in this country and we feel that the line of cultural development in this country owes a great deal to the efforts, endeavours and sincere contribution of Great Britain to Iraq.

"We feel very happy that we should be associated with the country which speaks a language which has become an international language at least since the end of the second World War. The ideals which are carried by the English language as a symbol of a culture we stand for as well as you do... We are happy to confirm that increasing numbers of students are going and staying in England and there is an increasing interest on your side in the development of culture, democracy and freedom in this country." (*INA*, 30 June)

**France an Enemy until Liberation of Algeria.** Qassim on second anniversary of Revolution, Baghdad, 14 July: "Arab solidarity obliges us, O brothers, to boycott France politically and economically until France shakes her hand off Algeria... Some countries may incur loss in their boycott of France but as they boycott France they enjoy the ripe fruits that will be plucked by the Algerian people." (*INA*, 15 July)

**Ties of Friendship With Turkey.** Qassim at Press Conference, Baghdad, 27 May: "We consider the move that took place in Turkey [the military coup d'état] as an internal event that concerns the interest of Turks themselves... Turkey is a friendly country with which we are bound by ties of neighbourliness and friendship for a long time now. The move that took place in Turkey concerns the Turks themselves." (*INA*, 28 May)

#### THE EASTERN BLOC

**Neutral Iraq Admires Friendly USSR.** Qassim's cable to Khrushchev on the occasion of October Revolution celebrations, Baghdad, 7 Nov: "The October Revolution represents, indeed, a turning point in modern history as well as a colossal social development...

"I feel confident that the neutral policy pursued by our Republic since the glorious 14 July Revolution has been a potent factor in the cementation of the ties of the close friendship existing between our two countries...

"I should like to offer my good wishes for the success of your peaceable policy." (*INA*, 8 Nov)

**Russian Initiative at UN Overcame Western Opposition.** Hāshim Jawād, Baghdad, 22 Oct: "The important thing is to observe that the way in which the Socialist Camp states presented the international question [at the UN GA] has steered international relations to a new stage. And that the opposition to the course which Mr Khrushchev took, the opposition by many of the Western Camp states, will not have an effect on restoring matters to their old level. We believe that the world has taken a new step to tackle the international issues." (*INA*, 29 Oct)

**Soviet Union and Socialist Countries Champions of Freedom.** Hāshim Jawād, Baghdad 28 Dec: "The Soviet Union and the Socialist states have been defending the freedom of the peoples and their emancipation from the yoke of imperialism. This backing appeared clearly and seriously during the discussion of the Algeria question. I would like to express thanks for these stands because they are momentous and encouraging stands which make us believe that so long as such a power as the Soviet Union takes the course of fighting imperialism our efforts in this connection will surely be backed." (*INA*, 28 Dec)

**Support for Chinese People's Republic.** Qassim 8 Oct: "The Chinese People's Republic and its great people which amounts to hundreds of millions constitutes by its population, its former civilization and its present efforts, the biggest nation in the world. Yet some states of the world did not recognize its efforts. So the Chinese People's Republic still needs support from the other peoples to help it to attain victory." (*INA*; *SS*, 8 Oct)

**Iraq Cherishes Friendship for German Democratic Republic.** Qassim, Baghdad, 6 Oct: "It does please me today to attend the opening ceremony of the Industrial Exhibition of Democratic Germany, the friendly Republic whose friendship with our people and Republic will grow and flourish as time goes by." (*INA*, *SS*, 8 Oct)

#### AFRO-ASIAN STATES

**Hopes for True Emancipation of Former French Colonies.** Hāshim Jawād, Baghdad, 28 Dec: "France has gained some strength in the UN after the admission of some of these [French Community African] states into the international organization; but I believe that it will not take more than two years when these states will quickly realize their entities." (*INA*, 28 Dec)

**Appreciation for Indian Aid.** Qassim, Baghdad 14 July: "We have co-operated with India. I state that India has during these two years facilitated a great many things and has helped our Republic to go ahead in its projects and production." (*INA*, 15 July)

### FOREIGN RELATIONS BY COUNTRIES

(For Foreign Trade, see pp 57-8, Foreign Aid, pp 48-9, Relations with Communist Countries, pp 70-7.)

#### INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

**Iraq at the UN General Assembly.** See p 4 ff.

**UN Agencies.** Iraq was represented at the Arab Education Conference which took place at Beirut, 9-13 Feb, under UNESCO auspices. (*Ahali*, 15 Feb; *Zaman*, 27 Feb) Maurice Pate, Director of UNICEF, visited Iraq and conferred with Qassim on the fight against various



endemic diseases. UNICEF's contribution to Iraq had so far amounted to \$1,765,371. (*Bilad*, 13 Apr) On 19 June two agreements were signed in Baghdad by the Iraqi Foreign Minister and UN representatives: the Standard Agreement on behalf of nine UN agencies active within the Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance, and an agreement concerning the UN Special Fund. (*Iraq Times*, 20 June) On 29 Dec the Official Gazette (*al-Waqa'i' al-Iraqiyah*) announced that Iraq had joined the Special Development Fund; her contribution was fixed at \$760,000. (*Bilad*, 30 Dec)

### NATO COUNTRIES

**United States.** On 24 Feb talks on a cultural agreement started between Muhi ad-Din Abd al-Hamid, the Minister of Education, and the US Ambassador. (*Akhbar*, 25 Feb) On 1 July the government ratified the agreement, which was to run for an indefinite term, and which provided for the exchange of students, teachers and scientists, scholarships, etc. (*Bilad*, 2 July)

It was reported from a "reliable source" that American Point Four assistance to Iraq consisted only of scholarships in subjects determined by the Iraqi authorities, and constituted no interference in the country's internal affairs. (*Zaman*, 17 Mar)

On 31 May a commercial delegation arrived in Baghdad from the US to strengthen economic ties. (*Zaman*; *Iraq Times*, 1 June)

(For Iraq and the *Cleopatra* Affair, see p 39 ff, the US election campaign—p 108 ff.)

**United Kingdom.** Leslie Marsh, a British subject of Jamaican extraction, a merchant living in Baghdad, was accused of complicity in the plot to assassinate Qassim by a witness for the Prosecution at the trial of those charged with the attempt. Colonel Mahdawi, the President of the Court, thereupon denounced Britain as a confederate of Abdel-Nasser's in the plot. (*Zaman*, 31 Jan) However, no formal charges were proffered against Marsh, who had been under arrest since 9 Oct 1959 [two days after the attempt], and, after repeated intervention by the British Ambassador, Marsh was reported in May to have been freed, and to have left Iraq for Britain. (*Hayat*, 5, 9 Jan; *Times*, 27 Jan; *Ahram*, 19 Mar; *Jer. Post*, 5 May—see also p 247).

On 2 Feb the Iraqi Government ratified the cultural agreement with the UK, which had been signed in Baghdad on 14 Dec 1959. (*Zaman*, 3 Feb) A committee of six members, to meet at least once in two years, was to be set up to supervise its execution. (*Zaman*, 19 Jan) In June, when the instruments of ratification were exchanged, Hashim Jawad, the Iraqi Foreign Minister, praised Britain's contribution to modern Iraqi society and the freedom and democracy exemplified in the British way of life. (*Zaman*, 14 June; *INA*, 13 June)

At the end of Apr, Frederic Errole, Minister of State, Board of Trade, came to Baghdad on a week's visit to explore possibilities of improving commercial relations, and conferred with PM Qassim. He was the first member of the British Government to visit Iraq since the 1958 Revolution. (*BBC in Arabic*, 30 Apr—*IMB*, 3 May; *Times*, 10 May)

**France.** [There were no diplomatic relations between Iraq and France, and Iraqi leaders denounced France violently on various occasions in connection with Algeria.—See *Views and Policies* p 261.]

At the beginning of 1960, 334 Iraqis were studying in France. (*Bilad*, 6 Apr) Iraq's imports from France in

1959 were reported to have totalled 250,000 dinars. (*Thawrah*, 18 Apr)

**German Federal Republic.** Von Eckhardt, head of the Press Office in the Federal Government, arrived in Iraq in Jan and was received by PM Qassim. (*Hayat*, 26 Jan)

On 19 Dec Hikmat Sulayman, Director-General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, drew the German Ambassador's attention to Iraq's point of view on the Algerian problem and Western Germany's support of Israel. (*R. Baghdad*, 22 Dec—*IMB*, 23 Dec; *Iraq Times*, 22 Dec) According to the German Ambassador, more than 750 Iraqis were studying in Western Germany and relations were developing steadily. (*Iraq Times*, 29 June)

**Italy.** The governments of Iraq and Italy decided to raise their legations in Rome and Baghdad to the status of embassies. (*R. Baghdad*, 18 Jan—*IMB*, 19 Jan) An Iraqi trade delegation visited Italy for three weeks in Mar—Apr. (*Iraq Times*, 23 Mar; *Sawt al-Ahwar*, 25 Apr) On 30 Oct an Italian trade delegation arrived in Baghdad. (*Iraq Times*, 31 Oct)

**Denmark.** On 14 Jan a commercial agreement with Denmark, coming into force on 17 Feb, was signed in Baghdad. (*R. Baghdad* 14 Jan—*IMB*, 15 Jan; *Waqai' al-Iraqiyah*, 17 Feb) This was the first such agreement concluded between Iraq and a non-Communist country since the 1958 Revolution. (*NYHT*, 10 Jan) On 4 Apr the Danish Minister of Commerce and Industry arrived in Iraq on a three-day visit, and conferred with PM Qassim. (*Sawt al-Ahwar*, 5 Apr; *Zaman*, 7 Apr)

In Jan it was reported that the missions in Copenhagen and Baghdad would be raised to the rank of embassies. (*Zaman*, 21 June)

Towards the end of July, Awni Yusuf, the Minister of Public Works, visited Denmark. (*R. Baghdad*, 31 July—*IMB*, 1 Aug) Hasan Rif'at, his successor, repeated the visit in Nov. (*Iraq Times*, 11 Nov)

### ASIAN COUNTRIES

**India.** An Indian commercial delegation visited Iraq in Sept. In a joint communiqué, an increase in trade between the two countries was envisaged. (*Mabda'*, 27 Sept; *R. Baghdad*, 25 Sept—*IMB*, 26 Sept)

**Indonesia.** President Sukarno paid Iraq a four-day official visit (2–5 Apr), accompanied by members of his government. In a joint communiqué Qassim and Sukarno stressed the adherence of both governments to the policies of Positive Neutralism and the Bandung principles, and their devotion to the struggle against imperialism. They denounced imperialist rule in West Irian and South Africa's apartheid policy; advocated a solution "satisfactory to the Arabs" of the Arab refugee question, negotiations to end the fighting in Algeria, and French recognition of the Algerians right to independence; and affirmed the friendship between the two countries. Qassim accepted President Sukarno's invitation to visit Indonesia; no date was given.

A cultural and a trade agreement were concluded between the two countries. (*R. Baghdad*, 5 Apr—*BBC*, 7 Apr)

**Iran.** The long-smouldering dispute between the two countries about rights over the Shatt-al-Arab, which had burst into the open in Dec 1959, abated in Jan with the Foreign Minister's declaration that Iraq would respect her international obligations and resolve disputes by peace-



ful means, followed by the return of the troops of both sides to their peace-time cantonments. (*R. Baghdad*, 25 Jan-*IMB*, 26 Jan; *Journal de Tehran*, 28, 30 Jan, according to *Cahiers de l'Orient Contemporain* 1960, 1)

**Japan.** In Jan Japan named her first Ambassador to Baghdad, after the two countries had decided to raise their missions to the rank of embassies. (*Iraq Times*, 13 Jan)

The Iraqi Minister of Trade was expected to visit Japan shortly. (*Iraq Times*, 13 Jan)

On 19 Sept Faisal Samir, the Minister of Guidance, left for Tokyo on a week's visit as guest of the Japanese Government. (*Iraq Times*, 19 Sept; *R. Baghdad*, 22 Sept-*IMB*, 25 Sept; *R. Baghdad*, 16 Oct-*IMB*, 17 Oct)

**Pakistan.** Qassim accepted an invitation to visit Pakistan, at a date as yet not fixed. (*Ahali*, 21 June; *R. Baghdad*, 22 June-*IMB*, 13 June)

**Turkey.** For declaration of friendship with Turkey, see Views and Policies, p 261.)

### AFRICAN COUNTRIES

**Commercial Mission.** A commercial mission left Iraq in Mar on a tour of Sudan, Ethiopia, Liberia, Cameroun, Ghana, Guinea, Nigeria and Morocco, returning in Apr. Its purpose was to find markets for Iraqi products, especially in Ghana, Ethiopia, Guinea and Liberia, and to try "to repulse Israeli commercial penetration into Africa." No concrete results were reported. (*R. Baghdad*, 21 Jan-BBC, 23 Jan; *R. Beirut*, 8 Mar-*IMB*, 9 Mar; *Ittihad ash-Sha'ab*, 17 Apr)

A committee was established to review commercial relations with Africa. (*Akhbar*, 3 Sept)

**Priority for Relations with West Africa.** In Apr the government approved a Foreign Ministry proposal to establish diplomatic relations with the African countries, primarily those of West Africa. (*Zaman*, 14 Apr)

**Scholarships for Africans.** In Aug the Ministry of Education announced the grant of 15 scholarships for Mali, ten for Mauritania, and five for the Congo. (*Iraq Times*, 14 Aug)

In Oct it was reported that students from the following African countries would study in Iraq in 1960/61: Mauritania—10; Zanzibar—5; Chad—5; Somalia—5; Guinea—5; Uganda—5; Mali and Senegal—10. (*Zaman*, 16 Oct)

**Teachers for Africa.** The Foreign Minister stated in Aug that Iraq would send teachers of Arabic and Muslim affairs to African countries and finance a teachers' training course in Africa. (*Iraq Times*, 14 Aug)

**Cameroun.** Iraq was represented at Cameroun's independence celebrations. (*Zaman*, 13 Jan)

A Cameroun parliamentary delegation visiting Arab countries arrived in Iraq in Dec. It held talks with the authorities on strengthening the relations between the two countries. (*Zaman*, 24 Nov, 10 Dec; *Iraq Times*, 11 Dec)

**Congo.** See pp 35, 37-8.

**Ethiopia.** On 15 Dec, on the morning following the outbreak of the revolt in Ethiopia, Qassim said: "This coup will be nipped in the bud, as it is far from ethical

and because it is based on the self-interests of imperialism and its lackeys." (*R. Baghdad*, 15 Dec-BBC, 16 Dec)

After the suppression of the revolt, an Iraqi paper hailed Qassim's "prophecy," and ascribed the failure to the fact that its instigators had sought personal gain and had been supported by foreign imperialist powers. (*Akhbar*, 18 Dec)

**Ghana.** In Apr it was reported that Ghana and Iraq would exchange Ambassadors. The Iraqi embassy staff left for Ghana in Oct; it was stated that the Ambassador would be non-resident, his permanent residence being Rabat. (*R. Baghdad*, 20 Apr-*IMB*, 21 Apr; *Hayat*; *Zaman*, 24 Oct)

**Guinea.** A delegation from Guinea visited Iraq for the Revolution Day Anniversary in July and discussed political and cultural cooperation. Both sides expressed readiness to sign agreements of friendship and cooperation. (*Zaman*, 20 July)

It was agreed that cadets from Guinea should attend the Iraqi Military College and Air College. (*Zaman*, 20 July)

**Sierra Leone.** Jibril Sisi, SG of the Sierra Leone Islamic Congress, wrote to the Iraqi Government requesting aid in setting up schools for Arabic and Islamic culture. He warned that Israel had offered to establish schools for Arabic, and if the Arabs did not act quickly, she might do so. (*Zaman*, 29 Sept) (For Sisi's visit to Lebanon—see p 371.)

**Somalia.** A Somali delegation led by the Finance Minister, visited Iraq in July for the Revolution Day Anniversary. The Minister declared that the two nations were united by Islam, and requested Iraq's support for "the unity of the five parts of Somalia." (*Zaman*, 20 July; *Iraq Times*, 21 July)

Seven Somalis were accepted for the Iraqi Military College in Baghdad. (*Zaman*, 25 Oct)

### OTHER COUNTRIES

**Cuba.** On 5 Apr it was officially reported from Baghdad that Iraq and Cuba had decided to establish diplomatic relations. The Iraqi Ambassador in Washington was designated as Minister in Havana (*Zaman*, 6 Apr), and presented his credentials on 28 June. (*Bilad* 1 July) Dr Antonio Curriras was appointed Cuban Minister in Baghdad. (*Iraq Times*, 15 Aug)

**Spain.** Preliminary talks on a cultural agreement were held in Baghdad between Iraqi and Spanish representatives. (*Zaman*, 27 Nov)

### OIL—NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE IPC

**Synopsis.** The spectacular rise in the production and export of Iraqi oil, which was made possible by the partial completion of additional pipeline outlets, did not satisfy the government, which felt that it was entitled to more control over the country's most valuable asset and a greater share in the profits arising from it. Negotiations with the oil companies were opened on 15 Aug on all points in dispute, the government standing by its declared policy not to demand the nationalization of the oil industry. By the end of the year, the talks were still inconclusive.

In July the unilateral imposition of the full new rate of port dues on oil shipments from Basra led the Basra Oil Company (BOC) to lodge a very strong protest and

to reduce exports. In Dec, however, shipments were resumed at near their former level, the company paying the full rate under protest.

**Delegations to the Talks.** The Iraq Petroleum Company (IPC) delegation was led by G.H. Herridge [the managing director], with N.M. Ekserdsan, and F.C. Ryland [executive directors] and a team of experts.

The Iraqi delegation was led by Tal'at ash-Shaybāni, the Minister of Planning and acting Minister of Oil Affairs; it included the Minister of Trade, the Governor of the Central Bank, representatives of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defence and the General Board of Oil Affairs, as well as M. Hadid, former Finance Minister. (*MEED*, 12, 26 Aug)

**Points at Issue.** One outstanding issue was the Iraqi claim for the return of those parts of the concessionary areas that had been left unexplored. The government demanded the return of 60 per cent of the total area, with a minimum of 100,000 sq.m., at her own choice, while the companies offered a total of 90,000 sq.m. chosen by them.

Another major issue was the division of oil royalties, Iraq demanding a larger share than the present 50 per cent of the profits on production. She based her claim on a clause of the 1952 agreement allowing for revision if other countries obtained better conditions. The companies' view was that the cases of Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Iran, cited by the Iraqi delegation, did not as yet apply. (*MEED*, 23 Sept, 7 Oct)

The government's demand for partnership in the companies' capital was voiced by PM Qassim, who reiterated that Iraq had a right to be offered up to 20 per cent of the companies' shares.

A further demand was that the companies either utilize the natural gas from the oilfields, or give up their claims

to the gas in the government's favour. In the former case, compensation would be claimed for wastage only from the present time until utilization started, and not for past wastage. The chairman of the companies' delegation declared that the shareholders would not agree to this. (*MEED*, 7 Oct)

Further items concerned the proposed establishment of a joint committee "to supervise the expenses of using oil tankers which Iraq proposes to build, the cost of drilling productive and unproductive wells" and sales rebate on oil. (*Financial Times*, 17 Oct)

Another keynote in the negotiations was the refusal of the companies to accept the government's decision to increase port dues on oil exports from Basra from 23.4 fils to 280 fils per ton. They held that the increase was a breach of the 1955 agreement with the Ports Administration, and that the subsequent decrease in shipments from Basra was a direct commercial consequence of the government's action, as it led to the cessation of production at the Rumaila field by raising the cost of Basra oil. (*MEED*, 29 July; *Financial Times*, 12 Aug) The BOC paid the increased port dues towards the end of the year, though under protest, and shipments from Basra returned to near their former level. (*MEED*, 23 Dec)

**Timetable.** Negotiations started on 15 Aug. (*Petroleum Times*, 13 Jan 1961) On 31 Aug a long interview took place between the two delegations and Qassim. (*MEED*, 7 Oct) On 8 Nov the head of the IPC delegation left for London for consultations, accompanied by other members of his team; he returned to Baghdad on 24 Nov. (*Iraq Times*, 25 Nov) The negotiations were adjourned a third time on 20 Dec, when four members of the IPC delegation returned to London for further consultations. The IPC delegation was expected to return to Baghdad early in 1961. (*MEED*, 23 Dec; *Petroleum Times*, 13 Jan 1961)

# THE STATE OF ISRAEL

(Medinat Yisrael)

## INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

### SYNOPSIS

The main determinant of Israel's foreign policy continued to be the security problem derived from the Arab-Israel conflict. Her chief concern was still the declared intention of her Arab neighbours ultimately to destroy her and their endeavour to weaken her as much as possible in preparation for the final armed encounter. This concern was translated into such objectives as: the reinforcement of defensive strength, the consolidation of the economy, the continuance of immigration, and the consolidation of Israel's status among the nations. However, the leaders did not regard these objectives as mere expedients to ward off a threatened attack; they believed that they held out the only real prospect of achieving peace with the Arabs. Only if the latter became convinced, it was argued, that Israel had become an established reality which they could not eliminate, a member of the family of nations accepted by all as a fact and by most as a friend, could the groundwork be laid for an Arab-Israeli understanding.

Specific objectives were: to secure sources of armaments; to win political support in this Middle East "cold war" (for details see: *The Arab-Israel Conflict*, p 169 ff); to develop economic ties; and to extend cooperation in the international field, both with individual countries and with international bodies. Particular emphasis was laid on cooperation with the newly emergent nations of Asia and, especially, Africa; for Israel, as for the peoples of the Black Continent and the world at large, 1960 was "the year of Africa."

A further concern continued to be the position of world Jewry; the interdependence of Israel and world Jewry is an axiom accepted by both Israel and the Zionist movement (p 268 ff). This concern was demonstrated during the outbreak of anti-Semitic incidents in many countries in Dec 1959-Jan 1960. Special attention was focussed on the fate of the Jews in Communist countries—particularly in Soviet Russia—and in North Africa, where the question of the freedom to emigrate and settle in Israel also arose.

Israel's leaders were always careful to point out that her policy of aid to other countries was justified in her own interests, as well as being beneficial to the recipients. At the same time, however, there was strong emphasis, especially on the part of PM Ben-Gurion, on Israel's mission in the world as the bearer of the prophetic heritage, the Messianic vision of redemption. The people of Israel were exhorted to live up to this mission at home, to carry out a peaceful revolution by building a model society, and to preserve the pioneering tradition in all fields of endeavour, so as to enable Israel to make her contribution to the progress of mankind—especially in the realm of the spirit. This ideology, in addition to Israel's well-defined interests, may also have influenced her foreign policy, especially in her relations with the African and Asian peoples.

The concern for world peace which Israel shared with

the great majority of nations was reinforced by special interests. In the words of the Foreign Minister: "Because of the dispersion of the Jewish people among all the nations... in both East and West, and because of the particular position of the State of Israel, our need for world peace and a reduction of inter-bloc tension is perhaps greater than that of any other people."

The inter-bloc struggle concerned Israel particularly because of its effects in the ME. It was regarded as the cause of the flow of modern arms from both the Eastern and Western blocs to the countries of the area. In Israel's view, it was the tension between East and West that enabled the UAR "to engage in blackmailing manoeuvres in both blocs."

Israel therefore cherished the hope that the planned Summit Conference might bring about some measure of understanding between the world powers on the prevention of war in the ME, and it was reported that PM Ben-Gurion advocated such a policy in his meetings with Western leaders in Mar and June.

Relations with the two power blocs remained rather onesided, though Israel's leaders insisted that such was not their choice.

The USSR continued to reject all bids to improve relations, refusing to agree to Ben-Gurion's request for a meeting with the Soviet Premier, on the ground that Israel was not a peace-loving state. Israeli attempts to renew trade relations, which were broken off by the USSR in 1956, met with no response. The USSR continued to denounce Zionism and Israel as collaborators with Western imperialism, and these criticisms were occasionally accompanied by attacks upon the Jewish religion and Jewish culture. At the same time the USSR continued to arm the UAR, Iraq and Yemen, and to support the Arabs against Israel at the UN and elsewhere.

Of the other European Communist countries, Czechoslovakia followed the USSR's policy towards Israel most closely. Normal trade relations were maintained with Bulgaria, Hungary, Rumania and Poland. Friendly relations with the latter were further developed, and many contacts were established in the cultural and commercial fields.

The Western powers, while working to improve their relations with the Arab countries, continued to develop their friendly relations with Israel. The most important point where their interests and policies coincided on the whole with Israel's was support for the independence and territorial integrity of all the countries of the ME and the preservation of peace in the area. The West, moreover, continued to be Israel's only source of vital arms, of economic aid and other flow of capital needed to develop the economy and to offset the adverse balance of payment, and the Western countries were the major customers of Israeli goods and services. Also, the majority of Jews in the diaspora reside in Western countries where

they are free to live a Jewish life and to develop their ties with Israel.

The primary aim of PM Ben-Gurion's visits to the US,—where he also met Chancellor Adenauer—Britain, France, Belgium and the Netherlands was to discuss ME affairs against the background of this general understanding; Israel's specific needs and world affairs in general were also discussed.

Relations with the US continued along the traditional lines of friendship and cooperation. American aid, though declining in scope *pari passu* with the development of Israel's economy continued to be of importance. American Jewry, the largest and most important Jewish community in the diaspora, continued to be of considerable assistance to Israel in many fields. In the US election campaign, both Republicans and Democrats advocated efforts toward a settlement of the Arab-Israel conflict and emphasized American interest in Israel's independence and integrity. Israel's case in regard to the Arab boycott and the closure of the Suez Canal to Israeli shipping and trade received strong backing from public bodies and members of Congress. At the same time, US policies towards the Arab countries, and especially the wish to improve relations with the UAR, led the US Government sometimes to adopt attitudes on these questions which were not in harmony with what Israel considered her legitimate interests.

In Dec, the US expressed concern over the possibility that the second atomic reactor being built in Israel might be intended to prepare the way for the manufacture of atomic weapons. The issue lapsed after assurances were given that the reactor was intended for peaceful purposes only.

Israel's relations with France were described as an "unwritten alliance." She continued to rely on France as a major supplier of the military equipment she sought in order to match the ever more modern types of armament supplied to her antagonists by Soviet Russia. In equipping her air force she relied exclusively on France, and other French equipment is standard in her forces. In 1960 the first Fouga Magister military jet trainer built in Israel under French license was supplied to the Israel Air-Force. Because of the nature of the subject, no reliable information on arms supply in 1960 was available. It was reported, however, that Ben-Gurion had received "highly important defence and security assurances, during his visit to Paris in June." In the field of science, cooperation between the two countries was exemplified by French participation in the construction of an atomic reactor in the Negev. Cultural relations grew closer following the conclusion of a cultural agreement. Trade also developed, though French exports to Israel vastly exceeded imports, and Israel tried to persuade France to redress the balance. In addition to these practical aspects of the relationship between the two governments, there was on the part of leaders and people a widespread feeling of friendship and goodwill, demonstrated on many occasions. Israel's dependence on French arms supplies, however, led the Press and the public to show some anxiety as to the possibility of a change in France's official policy.

Israel's understanding with Britain was based on a common desire to preserve the independence of all ME countries. Ben-Gurion's aims on his visit to London were reported to have been connected with the maintenance of the balance of power in the area. To help offset the effect of the Soviet flow of arms to the UAR, Britain had in previous years supplied Israel with two destroyers, two submarines (the second was put into service in

1960), and Centurion (heavy) tanks (while continuing to supply arms to Arab states). There was no reliable news of any fresh arms shipments in 1960, and reports that Britain was considering the release of new weapons were denied. British-Israeli trade expanded and scientific, parliamentary and other contacts were developed.

Israel's relations with the Benelux and Scandinavian countries developed on lines of friendship and cooperation, a fact which she regarded as contributing significantly to her international standing. Relations with the other countries of Western Europe, as well as with Greece and Yugoslavia, were also friendly, though there were some outstanding issues. For example, West Germany, while continuing to implement the reparations agreement, was reluctant to establish diplomatic relations with Israel for fear of Arab retaliation in the form of establishing such relations with Eastern Germany. Austria had not yet met the restitution claims of Austrian Jews, of whom there are a number in Israel. Yugoslavia, co-operating with the UAR in a policy of positive neutralism, backed Arab demands on the refugees. Greece, though she maintained diplomatic relations with Israel on semi-formal level, still hesitated to establish full diplomatic relations, mainly because of the interests of the Greek community in Egypt. At the same time, many new ties were established with these countries.

Notwithstanding her good relations with all the partners in the European Economic Community, Israel was not successful in the efforts she made in the year under review to arrive at some arrangement with the EEC which would safeguard her vital trade interests in the Common Market area.

Relations with the Commonwealth countries, Canada, Australia and New Zealand, were also marked by understanding and friendship; the otherwise normal relations with South Africa were somewhat overshadowed, however, by the apartheid policy, of which Israel disapproved.

Israel further developed her traditionally friendly relations with the countries of Latin America.

An outstanding incident was the capture in Argentina and transportation to Israel of Adolf Eichmann, who held a central position in the Nazi organization that murdered six million Jews. Argentina, feeling that her sovereignty had been severely infringed, demanded the return of Eichmann, brought the matter before the Security Council, and declared the Israel Ambassador *persona non grata*. Shortly afterwards, however, the incident was officially declared closed and normal relations were restored.

In Asia, existing ties were extended and new ties developed. The especially close cooperation between Burma and Israel continued. Friendly relations and cooperation in various fields were established with Nepal and were developed with Japan, the Philippines, Cambodia, Laos, Thailand and Singapore.

On the other hand, three Muslim countries, Pakistan, Afghanistan and Indonesia, maintained their hostile attitude, and there were no relations of any kind between them and Israel. India maintained her policy of not establishing diplomatic relations with Israel despite her full *de jure* recognition (1950), and PM Nehru declined invitations to visit the country; unofficial links were, however, extended, in addition to relations existing on the consular level. Ceylon, whose first (non-resident) Minister to Israel presented his credentials in Jan, withdrew him later in the year following Arab pressure. No contacts at all were reported with the Asian Communist countries.



Since Ghana gained her independence in 1957, Israel has been devoting growing efforts to Africa. When, in 1960, 17 African countries became independent, these efforts were greatly intensified and relations were established with all the new states except Somalia and Mauritania, both of which are Muslim countries maintaining close ties with the Arab world. Other predominantly Muslim countries, such as Mali and Chad, nevertheless maintained friendly relations with Israel.

Burma in Asia and Ghana in Africa had been the first countries with which Israel established close cooperation in the fields of technical assistance and joint development enterprises. Since then, such cooperation had become a major feature of Israel's foreign policy, and in 1960 Israel maintained active relations of international cooperation with 46 developing countries: 20 in Africa, nine in Asia, nine in Latin America and eight in the Mediterranean Basin and other places. There were 750 trainees from these countries in Israel during the year, most of them attending special seminars and courses, and over 150 Israeli experts abroad.

Agriculture and the cooperative movement were the principal themes studied; others were: education, work among women, vocational and industrial training, public administration, transport, civil aviation and shipping, housing and building, hygiene and health, and the tourist industry. An international conference on the role of science in the new states was held at the Weizmann Institute of Science in Rehovot.

This cooperation was facilitated by the fact that, as a small country, Israel did not arouse apprehensions of domination, and as a young state she had developed original methods of tackling economic and social problems. Moreover, because of her smallness her methods of applying science and modern techniques seemed to many newly emergent countries more relevant to their own problems than the experience of the large industrial powers.

Many countries found Israel's socialist, cooperative and pioneering experiments especially suitable for study and application; in this context, the Histadrut (The General Federation of Labour), the moshavim (cooperative smallholders' settlements) and the army's Nahal units (which combine army service with agricultural training) attracted particular interest.

In joint enterprises in the developing countries, Israeli public and private companies mainly supplied know-how and equipment; if there was participation in capital, the Israeli company was always the minor partner.

Though Israel undoubtedly hoped that these efforts would result in growing trade relations, her main interest was to win the friendship and goodwill of the developing countries, in order to strengthen her international standing, and thus to contribute, as she understood it, to an ultimate peaceful solution of the conflict with her Arab neighbours.

The Arabs went to considerable pains to combat Israel's efforts in the Afro-Asian countries. Their achievements in individual countries were limited, but they succeeded in securing the passing of some anti-Israeli resolutions at African and Afro-Asian conferences (p 186).

Israel's relations with the non-Arab countries of the ME continued to develop. There was closer cooperation

with Ethiopia and trade ties were further developed with Turkey. Relations with Iran were described by Israel's PM as "friendly . . . unofficial but also unconcealed" and "founded on mutual advantage." A remark by the Shah of Iran that his country had recognized Israel in the past and that there had been no new developments in this respect led Abdel-Nasser to break off relations and launch a propaganda campaign against the Shah, though Iran denied that the Shah had added that diplomatic relations would be established. [Israel's relations with these three countries do not receive much publicity; it may be surmised, however, that each of them, for its own reasons, had like Israel as well as the West (and the majority of Arab countries) an interest in the continued stability of the ME. The UAR's claims on the Turkish province of Hatay may be mentioned in this connection (pp 531-2).]

Israel's relations with Cyprus had developed favourably, even before the island gained its independence, in trade, tourism, cultural exchanges, labour relations, technical assistance, etc. When the Republic was proclaimed, strenuous efforts were made by the Arab countries to prevent the establishment of diplomatic relations between Israel and Cyprus, and to undermine Israel's position in the island. This interference was possibly the reason for the postponement of the accreditation of Israel's Ambassador to Cyprus until the beginning of 1961; otherwise relations were scarcely affected.

Notwithstanding her close relations with the majority of nations, Israel remained unaffiliated with any of the world blocs and groupings. This isolation was, in the words of PM Ben-Gurion, not of her own choosing; in certain cases at least this was due to the Arabs' advantages in the international field owing to the sheer weight of their number and their strategic and economic assets. Thus, in spite of her situation on the Asian continent and her excellent relations with the majority of non-Arab Asian and African countries, she was excluded from Asian and Afro-Asian groupings.

Though formally neutral in the world conflict, in consequence of this absence of any formal alliance, Israel's orientation was in fact Western and she was not, in the words of Ben-Gurion, "morally neutral." This orientation, which was maintained in 1960, had developed following the adoption by Soviet Russia of a hostile attitude towards Israel and the attitude of the Eastern bloc countries toward their Jewish communities and, in contrast, the cooperation which had developed with the West and the latter's vitally important aid to Israel.

Israel's voting record at the UN (p 14 ff) presents a picture of her international orientation, particularly her links with the West, her support for a UN capable of action, and her identification with the aspirations of the Afro-Asian countries. At times Israel had to choose between the policies of the West and those advocated by the majority of the Afro-Asian countries (which did not include Israel in their counsels); as the record shows, a middle road was adopted.

In conclusion, 1960 saw no drastic change in Israel's international position. On the other hand, she believed, in the words of her Foreign Minister, she had "broken through into the international spaces beyond the Arab political siege."

## VIEWS AND POLICIES: THE JEWISH PEOPLE, ISRAEL AND THE WORLD ZIONIST ORGANIZATION

### SYNOPSIS

[NOTE: The views of Dr Nahum Goldmann, who combines the posts of President of the World Zionist Organization and the Jewish Agency, and President of the World Jewish Congress, have been included in this section. He is an American citizen.]

Both the leaders of Israel and those of the World Jewish organizations regard the problems of Israel and those of world Jewry as basically one problem: the future of the Jewish people. The diagnoses of PM Ben-Gurion and Dr Goldmann are in the main identical in all the principal points.

The survival of the Jewish people is believed to be in danger. Ben-Gurion enumerates the following main events in the Jewish history during the last fifty years: on the one hand, the isolation and paralysis of Russian Jewry under Communist rule and the murder of six million Jews by Nazi Germany, involving the extinction of the great traditional centres of creative Jewish civilization and, on the other, the establishment and expansion of the large and influential Jewish centre in the US, and the founding of the Jewish State.

There can be no complete certainty, Ben-Gurion says, that what was done by Nazi Germany, with the world standing by, only a few years ago, could not happen again, and the fate of Russian Jewry shows that there are forces in the modern world able and willing to impose "spiritual silence and extinction on millions of Jews under their control," while the Jewish people can do nothing about it.

Both world Jewry and Israel are in danger and must face grave challenges if they are to survive and develop. While Jewry faces the "danger of strangulation" in certain totalitarian and Muslim countries it faces extinction through assimilation in the free and prosperous ones. As for Israel, the security problem is a matter of life and death; she is still far from economic independence, and has many fundamental tasks to tackle.

The survival of the State of Israel and of Diaspora Jewry are completely interdependent. First, the unity of the Jewish people everywhere must be strengthened. Diaspora Jewry, to survive, must provide Jewish education for the younger generation and foster attachment to Jewry and Jewish values. Since the traditional centres of Jewish cultural life have been destroyed, this is possible only through the closest ties with Israel, the only centre where Jews live a full Jewish life and can revive the traditional values of Judaism. On the other hand, Israel needs *aliyah*—pioneering and productive immigration from the Diaspora—to measure up to the challenges facing it.

While this diagnosis was in the main generally accepted, a discussion has developed in recent years on the question of whether the Zionist Organization still constitutes an effective means of rallying the Jewish people in pursuance of these aims.

Ben-Gurion argued that the Zionist Organization was incapable of accomplishing this task, and that this could be done only through direct ties between Israel and the Diaspora, on the basis of the unity of the Jewish people and the personal attachment of the great majority of Jews—whether formally Zionists or not—to the State of Israel. There was now no practical difference between

a Zionist in the Diaspora and any other Jew, he argued; before the establishment of the state the Zionist—even he who stayed in the Diaspora—was the exponent of an idea to which other Jews were indifferent or opposed; today, however, no Jew objected to another Jew settling in Israel, and there was scarcely a Jew who was not attached to the state and prepared to assist it. The Zionists of today could not effectively foster *aliyah* and Hebrew education as they themselves did not believe in them and carry them out in person. Moreover, the Zionist Organization could not unite the Jewish people; as it comprised only part of the people it was actually a factor for disunity. True Jewish unity was anchored in the historical heritage of the Jewish people and lived in the heart of every Jew. The State of Israel was a creation of the entire Jewish people, not of the Zionist Organization, though the latter had played a most important part. It was also vital to educate the youth of Israel in the concept of the unity of the Jewish people, and this was hampered by the artificial distinction between Zionists and other Jews.

Only the State of Israel, through the magnetism and authority derived from its creative Jewish life, could unite the Jewish people and rally it to the tasks of *aliyah* and Jewish education. Direct ties should therefore be established between the state and world Jewry.

At the beginning of 1961 Ben-Gurion proposed that the Zionist Organization should become the "Jewish Organization," by name and content, fostering attachment to the heritage and values of Judaism and to the Jewish State.

Dr Goldmann's views, cited below, do not relate to Ben-Gurion's 1961 proposal but to the view that the Zionist Organization should be replaced by direct ties between Israel and world Jewry, and that a new organization should be set up to bring all Jewish public bodies under one roof. This proposal for a new organization was expressed by supporters of Ben-Gurion's views.

Dr Goldmann argued that an organizational framework was still needed to achieve the agreed aims—which were only the contemporary expression of the basic aims of Zionism. Moreover, though the links of the Diaspora Jews with Israel were of course vital, communication between the various centres of world Jewry also made an important contribution to Jewish consciousness and unity and this could not be maintained without a world wide organization. Though he too was critical of the effectiveness of the Zionist Organization [his specific criticisms have not been quoted below], he contended that it was much easier and safer to work with the existing organization, and to try to bring other Jewish bodies under its roof, than to attempt to put up a new one, which might involve confusion and create a vacuum.

A debate on the future of the Zionist Organization took place at a Mapai Central Committee meeting in June. The majority supported the continued existence of the Zionist Organization, a major speech in this sense coming from Moshe Sharett, a former PM and Foreign Minister, later elected Chairman of the Zionist Executive. A week before, it had been decided at a joint meeting of the Cabinet and the Zionist Executive that the Government of Israel would continue to give its full support to the endeavours of the Zionist Movement.

## STATE OF THE JEWISH PEOPLE

Following are extracts from Ben-Gurion's speech at the 25th Zionist Congress, Jerusalem, 28 Dec (*Bulletin of the 25th Congress*):

**Warning Against Blind Confidence.** "We are one of the most ancient peoples in the world... Since we became a people, we have been engaged in a prolonged, desperate and unremitting struggle for our individuality and our mission.

"These historical facts might well implant in us the blind confidence that we can face any conditions, and that there is no danger to our survival in the future. Against this dangerous and misleading illusion I consider it my duty to warn you...

"This confidence grew and developed in a world that has passed away, never to return. With its disappearance the basis for this confidence has also vanished, except for the faith in God—but no one knows today the will and intentions of our Father in Heaven...

**The Changed World.** "During the last forty or fifty years the history of humanity has undergone a complete change... and things that were impossible two generations ago are eminently possible now...

"Jewish history... is part of world history..., and what could not have happened to us previously, is definitely possible now." [Ben-Gurion then went on to enumerate the "world events that have changed the face of human history": the world wars; the rise of totalitarian regimes; the spreading of modern means of communication; the growing interdependence of all countries; the liberation of peoples under colonial rule; the urgent problem of the gap between the rich, developed countries and the poor, undeveloped ones; the spreading world struggle; the establishment of the UN, which—though rent by dissension and often arriving at arbitrary decisions—could not be ignored; the new and dreadful weapons, which in the end—because of the enormity of the danger—might, paradoxically, strengthen world peace.]

**Four Fateful Events in Jewish History.** "In this momentous era there have occurred in our lives four events of fateful significance [the like of which the Jewish people has not seen for thousands of years]. Never before has the Jewish people been faced with such vital, momentous and difficult tasks, and with such grave and deadly dangers, involving the possibility of absolute destruction and at the same time such promising and glorious prospects. I will mention the events in the order in which they happened:

**Isolation of Russian Jewry.** "The isolation and paralysis of Russian Jewry for the last forty years. This Jewry... played the leading role in the Jewish renaissance in the Diaspora since the 19th century... [Its lot] means that there are forces in the world that have not only the capacity but also the desire to impose spiritual silence and extinction on millions of Jews under their control, without the Jewish people in the world being able to do anything about it...

**The Destruction of the Six Millions.** "...The most terrible and appalling holocaust in our history: six million Jews were destroyed by the Nazis and their allies... Moreover, Hitler's adversaries... are not completely free of moral responsibility.

"Not only were six millions led to slaughter but also

the bearers of the Jewish spirit, the intellectual leaders of the Jewish people...

"I make bold to say that the future of the Jewish people was grievously affected, more than by the appalling numbers of those who were slaughtered and burnt to ashes, by the loss of their superior talents and abilities... There can be no substitute for the creative potentialities, the pioneering resources, the spiritual wealth, and the Jewish and human cultural treasures... Can it happen again?... Was this a unique event which cannot possibly be repeated... Perhaps these are unduly pessimistic thoughts, but can any one of us say with complete certainty that they are without foundation?

**The Jewish Centre in the US.** "Beginning in the 19th century, a large, new, rich and influential Jewish centre was established and has grown in the United States of America. No such Jewish community has existed throughout the annals of the Diaspora... In the main this centre was populated by Jews from Russia and Eastern Europe, but other Jewries played their part in building this new centre, which is unparalleled not only for size, wealth and influence, but also in its specific character and the fact that it is surrounded by other immigrants.

**The Establishment of Israel.** "Finally, in the same decade in which the worst holocaust in our history took place, so did the great miracle—the Jewish State was re-established. The State of Israel is an end in itself, because the independence of every people is a great and sacred aim and it is certainly a precious goal to a people that has been dependent on the mercy of strangers for some two thousand years... But... there is no 'final' goal; there is no ultimate peak of progress and development. The State of Israel is still very very far from meeting the needs and realizing the ideals of the Jewish people. The hopes and aspirations of the Jewish people and its prophets have not yet been fulfilled in Israel, and it is therefore even less to be considered a final and complete goal than other states.

**The Dangers to World Jewry: Strangulation in the East, Assimilation in the West.** "The State of Israel... is the foremost bulwark for the survival of the Jewish people in our generation. The face of Diaspora Jewry has changed completely in the twentieth century. Only 25 years ago nine million Jews in Eastern Europe, the United States and South America spoke their own distinct language, Yiddish. This Jewry no longer exists... Assimilation in practice, without the ideology of assimilation... is growing. Except for the Orthodox minority... the Judaism of the Jews of the United States and similar countries is losing all meaning...

"Those who are devoted to Judaism must see the danger facing Diaspora Jewry courageously and with open eyes. In several totalitarian and Muslim countries, Judaism is in danger of death by strangulation; in the free and prosperous countries it faces the kiss of death, a slow and imperceptible decline into the abyss of assimilation."

## ISRAEL AND THE DIASPORA

(From speeches at 25th Zionist Congress—continued)

**Duality in Diaspora Jewish Life.** Ben-Gurion: "In the Diaspora..., the Jew is subordinate to a non-Jewish authority in all his material, political and cultural life... Specifically Jewish life, in so far as it exists, is compressed into a small corner, without roots in the reality surrounding it. It draws all its inspiration, in so far as it comes from Jewish sources, only from the past and the traditional



spiritual heritage. An all-pervasive duality is created in the lives of those Jews who try to maintain their Jewishness, because of the tremendous gulf between the Jewish sphere and the civic one. In several countries there is also a conflict between the two, for example behind the iron curtain and in some Muslim countries. And since culture is the totality of the human and social, there cannot possibly be a full and complete Jewish culture in the Diaspora, even in those free countries which grant every right.

**Religious Jews Violate Judaism by Remaining in Diaspora.** Ben-Gurion: "The Jewish religion, unlike any other, is a characteristic product of the Land of Israel, and is bound up in its existence and duties with the land of its birth. A large part of the Jewish religious laws cannot be observed in the Diaspora, and since the day when the Jewish State was established and the gates of Israel were flung open to every Jew who wanted to come, every religious Jew has daily violated the precepts of Judaism and the Torah of Israel by remaining in the Diaspora. Whoever dwells outside the land of Israel is like one who does not have God, the sages said.

**Unity of Life in Israel.** Ben-Gurion: "In Israel there are not two spheres, a special Jewish one for matters of tradition and religion and a general human sphere covering economic life, science, labour and cultural affairs. Here everybody is both Jewish and universal: the soil we walk upon, the trees whose fruit we eat, the roads on which we travel, the houses we live in, the factories where we work, the schools where our children are educated, the army in which they are trained, the ships we sail in and the planes in which we fly, the language we speak and the air we breathe, the landscape we see and the vegetation that surrounds us—all of it is Jewish."

**Israel Vital to Survival of Jewry in the Diaspora.** Goldmann: "The Jewish people's whole mechanism of defence and survival which we have developed for hundreds of years was based on reaction and defence against attacks and menaces. This mechanism has to change... We have learned in our past history to survive bad days, we have to learn now to maintain ourselves in good days.

"This cannot be done without Israel. The great centres of Jewish civilization in Europe have been destroyed. They came into existence because of our separate form of life, and therefore Jewish communities in the countries where we live as fully emancipated citizens, cannot replace them. The one new great centre and basis of our existence as a people can only be Israel. This does not mean that Jewish communities all over the world cannot live their own life, create Jewish values, develop institutions and organizations and make contributions to what one may call Jewish civilization. But, in my opinion, they cannot do it in the long run, from the point of view of future generations, unless they are connected with Israel and centred around Israel."

**Israel Needs Help of World Jewry—Through Aliyah.** Ben-Gurion: "The other side of the question is the great problems that we have not yet solved and the fundamental tasks that we have only just begun to tackle. This is really the most important aspect of the picture for our very survival—which involves the survival of Jewry in the world and depends on it.

"We are still far from economic independence. [To achieve it] we will need skilled workers, technicians,

engineers, foremen and scientists;... We must populate the Negev... We still face grave security problems... Our qualitative superiority is playing... an important role but we cannot disregard the quantitative aspect... and the growth of our young forces is becoming a matter of life and death.

"All these tasks add up to one great, central, vital and fateful demand: *aliyah*—immigration...

**Answer to Problem: Aliyah, Education and Personal Attachment to Israel.** Ben-Gurion: "For the survival of the Jewish State and the survival of Diaspora Jewry—and each depends for its survival on the other—two things are essential: growing immigration to Israel—pioneering and productive immigration—and Jewish education for the younger generation in the Diaspora, to strengthen their personal attachment to Jewry and to Israel... In Israel too, Jewish consciousness must be intensified among the youth... Their moral attachment to world Jewry [must be fostered]...

"But the radiating influence of Israel alone will not sustain Jewry in the Diaspora and ensure its continued existence, unless it develops its own forces to strengthen its roots in Jewish consciousness and its devotion to our historical heritage—by giving a Hebrew education to the youth and increasing their personal attachment to Judaism and to Israel."

Goldmann: "There are two obvious conditions for finding a solution for [the] main problems of our generation... education and *aliyah*. Jewish education must occupy the number one position in Jewish Galut [Diaspora] life and replace in the order of priorities philanthropy and all other kinds of activities... It means, among other things, the Hebraization of the Diaspora, the aim to make Hebrew the second language for Jews... The second great task is increased *aliyah*. There is, if I may say it, as an ideal, no more effective and permanent way of tying up a Jewish family with Israel than if one at least would live in Israel."

## BEN-GURION ON THE ZIONIST ORGANIZATION

Following are extracts from Ben-Gurion's address to the Mapai Central Committee, 2 June:

**Who is a Zionist?** "When I hear the argument about the Zionist Organization, I want to know: What is the meaning of the word 'Zionist.' I need ask for no definition of the word 'Jew'... We all know what it means...

"Is there really a Jew who does not want another Jew, who so desires, to go and settle in Israel? Nobody is against it. So, if the American Zionist leaders do not object to some Jew, who wishes to do so, going to Israel, should we call that Zionism?

**No Practical Difference Now Between Zionists and Other Jews.** "Before the creation of the state an American Zionist could be distinguished from a non-Zionist... A Zionist Jew was the proponent of an idea in which other Jews did not believe, or which they opposed... Today, however, as a result of Israel's existence, the overwhelming majority of the Jewish people support the Zionists. They are Zionists and he is a Zionist... And as long as there is no clear definition of the personal duty of every Zionist, which distinguishes between him and any other Jew, Zionism is an empty word.

**The Zionist Organization in America Cannot Solve the Major Problems of Jewry and Israel.** "There are two main problems: the problem of the survival of the state,



namely the problem of *aliyah*; and the problem of the survival of Jewry, namely the problem of Hebrew education... The future of the State of Israel and the future of Jewry as well depends on these two things. Who can do it? The Zionist Organization in America does not believe in *aliyah*—so how can it carry it out? It does not believe in Hebrew education—so it does not provide Hebrew education.

Only the State of Israel has the Dynamic Power to Cope with *Aliyah* and Jewish Education. "Only the Jewish State can cope [with Hebrew education], because here there is a state where Hebrew is spoken... I say that the dynamic power of the State of Israel can prevent the deterioration of American Jewry towards complete assimilation. It can be done only by means of the state, and not by means of a name that has become void of content [i.e. Zionism]..."

"I believe in the strength of the state, in that feeling that has not weakened throughout the twelve years of the state's existence, love for the state, pride in the state, financial support for the state, the visits that grow ever more frequent—I do not believe that the masses cannot be organized for *aliyah*... We cannot in one day bring them all here and teach them Hebrew, but by means of the state we can develop Hebrew education. It does not have to be done by emissaries of the state, but every embassy must have its cultural attaché who should pay attention to this point..."

"Some resources should be devoted to setting up a pioneering movement—I do not say 'Zionist' or 'non-Zionist'—that is unimportant. But it will not be done by the Zionist Organization..., even if we unanimously carry a resolution in favour of pioneering *aliyah*..."

**The Word "Jew" Unites—the Word "Zionist" Divides**  
"Jewish unity resides in the heart of every Jew..."

"The first paragraph of the [Zionist Organization] Status Law [adopted by the Knesset in 1952] says that the State of Israel was created by the Jewish people, and not by the Zionist Organization... It must be implanted deeply into the mind of the young generation growing up in Israel that Jewish history does not start sixty years ago [i.e. with the founding of the Zionist Movement]... When I tell a Jew anywhere in the world, 'I am a Jew'—that is something we have in common; when I say 'Zionist'—no, that is not something in common, that is a dividing line... Our youth must know our Jewish, and not merely our Zionist, antecedents... We must deepen Jewish consciousness among the youth of our country, the consciousness that unites us with all the generations back to Abraham, and with Jews throughout the world..." (*Minutes of Mapai Central Committee meeting, Tel Aviv, 2 June*, made available by the Mapai Secretariat)

**A "Jewish Organization" Proposed.** "If the 'Zionist' Organization wants to continue to exist—although it has divorced itself from the true Zionist context—and to be of value to Jewry, it should give up the name that does not fit it, is devoid of content and carries no obligations; it should become a Jewish organization and be called by this name, and hoist the banner of Judaism..."

"What is the banner of Judaism? It is the unity of the Jewish people; the knowledge of its history; the study of its language, in which it has created for thousands of years; devotion to the Bible; devotion to the ideals of the prophets, which are the ideals of redemption for the Jewish people and for all mankind, peace and brotherhood among the nations, and social justice;

devotion to the Jewish State, where the Jewish people had its beginnings and where a full Jewish life, in matter and in spirit, is being formed anew..."

"The change of name—from Zionist Organization to Jewish Organization... will not only eliminate the artificial dividing line between 'Zionist' and 'non-Zionist'... but will also elevate the old name, which connects us with all generations and all parts of the Diaspora, namely the Jewish name." (*Article in Davar, 28 Apr 1961*)

## DR GOLDMANN ON THE ZIONIST ORGANIZATION

**International Organization Needed to Preserve Affinity with Diaspora Jewry.** "Sometimes I feel Israeli representatives think that the wonderful cordiality, that sense of affinity, which they find in the Diaspora... is guaranteed for ever... I say that if we want to keep up this relationship, so long as there is a Diaspora there must be an international organization..."

**Importance of Attachment to Jewish People, Not Only to Israel.** "The Prime Minister has said that it may be worth while that each community should be bound to Israel... To destroy, or to weaken, the feeling of the unity of the Jewish people would be a disaster for the Jews of the Diaspora... You cannot grasp what it means to them to be able to appear on an international forum, to sit with other organizations, to be in continual contact with the Jews of America, Colombia and Canada, to feel that we are part of a great people. Of course the link with Israel is no less important; but if the link will be with Israel alone, and not with each other... that will do grave harm to their Jewishness..."

**Instead of Taking the Risk of Establishing a New Organization it is Worth While to Continue with the Old.** "There are those... including Golda [Meir]... and the PM, who maintain that this international body should not be the Zionist Organization..."

[An attempt to establish a new organization] would create a vacuum and much confusion... I say that so long as there is an alternative, let us try that alternative: to do it through the existing instrument, through the Zionist Organization..."

"Since most of the people are ready in principle to accept the idea of national unity, of strengthening the state, the ingathering of exiles and Jewish education,—let us try and bring them into the [Zionist] Organization as full or associate members, or as observers for the time being, for here we must show flexibility. It will be easier, for the instrument already exists, and there is within it a definite place for the State of Israel, so that it can influence affairs within the general organization." (*Minutes of Mapai Central Committee meeting, Tel Aviv, 2 June*; made available by the Mapai Secretariat)

## RESOLUTION ON COOPERATION BETWEEN ISRAEL AND THE ZIONIST ORGANIZATION

On 26 May the Cabinet and the Executive of the World Zionist Organization met in joint session at the PM's office in Jerusalem. All members of both bodies took part, and the resolutions were unanimously adopted, after a ten-hour debate. The following joint communiqué was issued:

"The Government of Israel and the Executive of the World Zionist Organization declare their unshaken determination to maintain close mutual relations according to the Covenant of 1954 and in accordance with the spirit of the Zionist Organization Status Law of 1952,

stipulating that the State of Israel regards itself as the creation of the entire Jewish people, and expects from the Jewish Agency to unite the nation for the upbuilding of the state.

"The joint meeting regards the plan to expand the Zionist Organization as outlined by the Zionist General Council as a step in the right direction.

"The Government of Israel will give its full support to the implementation of this plan and to the endeavour of the Zionist movement to unite the Jewish people behind the state, to expand Hebrew and Jewish studies among the younger generation, to strengthen personal bonds with Israel, and foster immigration." (*Jer. Post*, 27 May)

## VIEWS AND POLICIES ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

**NOTE:** When no source is given, the material is taken from the Israel Government Press Office Bulletin, of the same date as the statement.

### ISRAEL'S CHARACTER AND PLACE IN THE WORLD

**Attached to its Origins, But a World People.** Ben-Gurion, 22 Nov: "Israel is a unique people. Its family feelings and its profound attachment to the land of its origin are deeply implanted in its blood and emotions, its traditions and culture. But at the same time we are a world people, and nothing human is alien to us. We have mingled with all the peoples of the five continents, old and new, rich and poor. These two characteristics, which might seem to be contradictory, are in fact complementary..."

Ben-Gurion, Tel Aviv, 24 Mar: "The Jewish people—through whose will and capacity, and for whose sake, the State of Israel has been resuscitated—is dispersed throughout all countries, so that we cannot be indifferent to any of the world's affairs."

**Israel's Resurgence Based on Messianic Vision.** Ben-Gurion, at Zionist Congress, Jerusalem, 28 Dec: "The State of Israel is the result of the return to Zion. ... The vision of the Return to Zion lived in the hearts of the Jewish people throughout the generations, and like all historic ideals it changed from time to time in accordance with the circumstances. But through all these changes there was a continuity, a basic nucleus that did not change, and this nucleus is the Messianic vision of redemption, the vision of redemption for the Jewish nation and all mankind." (*25th Zionist Congress, Bulletin*, 28 Dec)

**Israel's Dual Mission: Self-Redemption and a Light to the Gentiles.** Ben-Gurion, Jerusalem, 3 Aug: "We are returning to our homeland first of all in order to redeem ourselves from exile, dependence, servitude and the distortion of our personality as human beings and as Jews. ... But the prophetic heritage, which has inspired us with the strength to achieve this miraculous transformation, has enjoined us to be both a people of the Covenant and a light to the Gentiles. We must therefore cherish the dual mission in this compelling heritage."

**Every People is a Chosen People.** Ben-Gurion, Brandeis University, Boston, 9 Mar: "The Jewish people is a small one, and today Israel numbers only a little more than 15 per cent of the Jews of the world, so that the claim that Israel in its Land might be a light to the Gentiles may be regarded as exaggerated and chauvinistic. ... I do not hold that we are a chosen people. Every people, to some extent, is a chosen people—in its own eyes, at any rate, and just as there are shadows in the life of every people, so we know that, in the past as in the present, light radiates from many peoples. ... Every people has a share in the heritage of the human race, just as every man, without distinction of race, religion or birth-

place, is equal in rights and duties, and of equal worth. The relations of men and of peoples must, therefore, be set firm upon equality of rights and duties." (For source, see below.)

**Faith in the Supremacy of the Spirit.** Ben-Gurion, Brandeis University, Boston, 9 Mar: "Israel cannot endure without strength and power, but we still hold fast to the faith... in the supremacy of the spirit. Not the spirit opposed to matter and divorced from it—the duality of matter and spirit was foreign to the Jewish outlook in biblical times, and it is foreign to the science of our present. We believed and still believe in the supremacy of the spirit that pervades matter and rules it. On this faith is founded the historic mission and destiny of the State of Israel."

Ben-Gurion, Rehovot, 15 Aug: "In the realm of material resources, wealth and power, we shall remain a small and modest people, but we believe that... our people—like any other people—will not lag behind the rest of the world in the spiritual, social and scientific contribution that it will make to the common treasury of mankind. In any case, we shall play our part, as far as it lies within our modest capacity."

**Tranquil Island of Democracy.** Ben-Gurion, at Zionist Congress, Jerusalem, 28 Dec: "Although for centuries we were a people without a country or the opportunity to be our own masters, we have established in a short time a firm and stable democratic regime... and in the heart of a tempestuous sea of dictatorship, military rule, feudal regimes, and revolts fomented by subversion and assassination, the State of Israel is a tranquil island founded on human liberty and the free choice of the people." (*25th Zionist Congress, Bulletin*, 28 Dec)

**Involvement in World Events.** Ben-Gurion, Tel Aviv, 24 Mar: "In considering our status and international future, we must not limit our vision to the narrow framework of the area in which we live; we are living today in a new world—a world which is one, though it is not united. Whatever takes place throughout the world: the relations between East and West, what is happening in Asia and Africa, the various and sometimes conflicting tendencies that appear in the free world, even in the US itself; and, above all, the growing mutual dependence in the world—of nations great and small, of rival alliances, of rich, highly developed nations that have ruled the world for centuries and peoples who have only recently emerged from bondage into freedom, or are to become independent only in the next few years—all these directly and indirectly affect our situation and our future."

**External Relations Depend on Internal Progress.** Ben-Gurion, Tel Aviv, 24 Mar: "During the second decade of the State we shall face great tests in our external relations and tremendous tasks in our creative work. By grave tests in our external relations I do not mean

only the design of the Middle East Hitlers for our destruction, but also our friendly relations with the peoples of Europe and America, Asia and Africa... Both the enemies and friends make it necessary for us to undertake tremendous efforts, not only in security and international relations, but also in the sphere of pioneering achievement: in the creation of a model society and the institution of revolutionary changes in the landscape and economy of the country." (See also: *Israel as Model for Countries of Asia and Africa*, p 276.)

**Negative and Positive Factors in International Position.** Golda Meir, Jerusalem, 23 May: "Two opposing factors bear on our political situation—one entirely negative and the other entirely positive.

"The negative factor has its centre in Cairo and is aimed at crippling our development and subjugating our State. It feeds on armaments that stream into the Arab countries, and it is fanned by words of incitement and vainglory from the Arab rulers. The constructive factor is the consolidation of the status of Israel in the family of nations, with expansion and strengthening of the network of our international relations, side by side with the reinforcement of our defensive strength and the consolidation of our economy.

"We have now come to a point where it is possible to say that Israel has broken through the political siege that was imposed upon her and out into the international scene." (*Israel Foreign Ministry, Translation, no date*)

#### SECURITY AND PEACE IN THE ME

**Gravity of Israel's Security Position.** Ben-Gurion at Zionist Congress, 28 Dec: "The great and extremely dangerous change that has occurred in our situation in comparison with the biblical period is that for the first time in our history the Jewish State is surrounded on all sides by peoples with one language and one religion—though not united: the Arab peoples.

"It was the five Arab countries in the Middle East—Egypt, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and Jordan—that declared war on us on the renewal of our independence, and their armies invaded our country in full strength as soon as the State was established. In ancient times we had controversies and wars with each one of these countries, but the period between 1948 and the beginning of 1949 was the first time in our history that we were at war with all of them at one and the same time. They have an area of 615,000 square miles, which is 84 times greater than that of Israel, and a population of some 39 million, 60 times more than Israel's at the time of the establishment of the State and 20 times more than she has now. In Egypt alone there is now a population of 26 million, which is growing by almost a million every three years, and in recent years Egypt has gained control of Syria as well, so that she threatens us from the North and the South at the same time.

"Twice we emerged victorious from trials of strength because of our qualitative superiority, and it will still stand by us in the future. But we must not assume that the Arabs—particularly Egypt—are standing still. Tens of thousands of Arab students are studying [at home and abroad]. Hundreds of Soviet instructors are working for the improvement of the Egyptian Army, and Soviet arms are flowing unceasingly into Egypt and Syria. Our qualitative superiority is playing—and will continue to play—an important role, but we cannot disregard the quantitative aspect, particularly as in addition to the enormous quantities of armaments there is also an improvement in organization, training and weapons. And the growth

of our young forces is becoming a matter of life and death." (25th Zionist Congress, *Bulletin*, 28 Dec)

**Physical Existence Threatened.** Ben-Gurion, Jerusalem, 1 May: "Our enemies' attacks are aimed not only at our independence, but at our very physical existence, for they know that so long as there is a Jewish community in Israel, they will not be able to overcome the Jewish State." (*Israel Digest*, 13 May)

**Basis of Army's Strength.** Ben-Gurion, 24 Oct: "The strength of our army depends on three things: the quality of its equipment, the thoroughness of its training, and its moral stature. Only through constant improvement in all these spheres will the Israel Defence Forces be able to maintain their deterrent power, and Israel dwell in peace."

**Security Will Not Be Achieved By Army Alone.** Ben-Gurion, 31 Oct: "Security will not be achieved by the army alone. Without settlement, without industry, without education, without sympathy among the nations, the army alone will not safeguard our peace."

**Strengthening of Israel Only Road to Peace.** Golda Meir, 20 Mar 1961: "The annihilation of Israel continues to be the specific aim of official Arab policy... As in former years, then, peace in the region depends upon the deterrent capacity of Israel, and that capacity is first and foremost its military and security strength. But there is also a deterrent capacity in the political and economic stability of Israel... Only when the Arab leaders in their heart of hearts become convinced that there is no longer the least vestige of a possibility that aggression against Israel can succeed, only then will the knowledge penetrate their consciousness that they must reconcile themselves to the existence of Israel and conclude a peace settlement with her for the good of all..."

**Strong Israel Helps to Assure ME Stability (continued).** "Our reinforcement in security, in politics and in economy is also a guarantee of peace throughout our region. The stability and progress of Israel indirectly assure the existence of other little countries in the region which are exposed to the threat of Nasserism, whether they realize it or not, and the fact that those countries compete with the UAR in sterile measures against Israel does not detract from that truth."

#### ISRAEL AND THE WORLD GROUPINGS

**Israel's Forced Isolation From International Groupings.** Ben-Gurion (in essay: *Israel's Security and Her International Position After the Sinai Campaign*): "The little State of Israel does not belong to any alliance or bloc—and this is not of its own choosing. There are indeed doctrinaires who regard Israel's isolation as a blessing. If this is a 'blessing,' it is a 'blessing' forced upon us. Those who congratulate themselves on our isolation proclaim their allegiance to the principle of neutrality; Nehru too claims allegiance to neutrality, but he is a member of the British Commonwealth. He is not even neutral in regard to the Arabs..." (For source see below.)

**No Support for Aggressive Alliance (continued).** "Ever since its establishment, the State of Israel has adopted the policy... that 'Israel will not lend her support to any aggressive design or alliance directed against any country, and will contribute to the best of her ability towards the relaxation of international tension...', not only out of loyalty to the heritage of peace that has come down to us from Israel's prophets, but also be-



cause... Israel cannot and must not give its support to any aggressive design against any country where Jews live—and there are Jews in both the Eastern and the Western blocs..." (For source see below.)

**Need for a Defensive Alliance** (continued). "Why should Israel be prohibited from doing what is permitted to Poland, Czechoslovakia, Belgium, Turkey, Denmark and France—namely being a partner in a defensive alliance with friendly nations? Israel would undoubtedly agree to the neutralization of the entire Middle East area; she would agree to the prohibition of all war within the region and against it from any quarter; and she would cooperate in the giving of effective guarantees for the territorial integrity of all Middle East countries, just as she is willing to conclude peace treaties with all her neighbours for economic, political and cultural cooperation. But this cannot be carried out by the will of Israel alone, and all the other countries on whom it depends refuse to agree. In the meantime, the Soviet Union continues to arm Egypt... and Syria and Iraq; America continues to arm Jordan and Saudi Arabia, and Britain too sends arms to Jordan and Iraq. It is true that the UN Charter promises peace and security to all its members. [But, Ben-Gurion continued, neither the USSR nor the US rely on the Charter; they maintain arsenals of nuclear weapons and guided missiles and maintain military alliances.] Can Israel, small and isolated as she is, rely on the Charter of the UN, which was in existence at the time when she was invaded by the Arab armies without any hindrance from the Charter in the hour of her birth?..." (For source see below.)

**No Moral Neutrality** (continued). "Certainly no one can demand that Israel should adopt an attitude of moral neutrality. Israel is neither able nor obliged to admire a regime that deprives Jews of the right to Jewish education, the right to emigrate, and even the right to cherish spiritual ties with the Jewish people and its ancestral homeland; nor is Israel able and obliged to refrain from distinguishing between a regime that maintains human liberty and selfrespect and one that denies them. In Israel the Communists are free to tell lies about the US and the Soviet Union, and no one has the right to demand that we should forbid non-Communists to tell the truth about the US and the Soviet Union..." (For source see below.)

**Israel Not Neutral Towards Fate of Jewry** (continued). "India is not neutral with regard to what goes on in South Africa, for there are thousands of Indians living in that country. Nor can we be neutral in our emotional and ideological attitude to what is happening in any country in the world, for we are a world people..."

"If a particular country has a totalitarian regime, that means that its Jewish community is deprived of human rights, and we are not neutral about that, although those Jews are not subjects of Israel and the Israel Government does not represent Jews who live beyond its borders..." (For source see below.)

**Israel and Internal Regimes of Other Countries** (continued). "At the same time we distinguish between one country and another... also on account of the national needs of the State of Israel and the attitudes of these countries to Israel. If a totalitarian state adopts an unfavourable attitude towards one of Israel's vital interests, we cannot attempt to change its attitude by explaining our point of view to its public opinion... In a country where there is freedom of speech, debate and

criticism, it is possible to appeal to public opinion by means of all the channels through which it finds expression. While, however, inevitably distinguishing between various regimes, Israel does not determine her relations with various countries according to the character of their internal regimes..." (For source see below.)

**Israel Entitled to Seek Friends and Allies** (continued). "Israel has adopted a policy of fostering friendly relations and mutual assistance with every peace-loving country, irrespective of its internal regime and without injuring the interests of any other country. But what moral principle or practical reason forbids Israel to seek friends and allies who, like her, want peace throughout the world and a relaxation of international tension, and who will strengthen her security and deter her enemies in the Middle East from planning to destroy her?" (*IGYb*, 1959/60)

**Bonds of Friendship and Interest with Both Afro-Asian and Western Countries.** Ben-Gurion, Jerusalem, 24 Oct: "Our aid to the new countries is not a matter of philanthropy. We are no less in need of the fraternity and friendship of the new nations than they are of our assistance. This will not take the place of our friendship with the peoples of America and Europe—almost the entire Jewish people in the Diaspora, over ten million Jews, live in these two continents; about four million in Europe and six in the Americas.

"We must not forget, even for a moment, that we cannot obtain the equipment for the Israel Defence Forces from Asia or Africa, for it does not exist there, and for a long time to come we shall be unable to manufacture most of the equipment required by ourselves."

## THE COLD WAR AND OTHER WORLD PROBLEMS

**Israel a Victim of the Cold War.** Ben-Gurion, 3 Jan: "[The] two leading powers are conducting in the world a competition known as the Cold War, and [many] nations... are attached to one of the two powers by security and defensive alliances... Israel is not a member of any of these alliances, but she is a victim of this antagonism."

**Jewry and Israel Need Peace.** Golda Meir, 23 May: "Because of the dispersion of the Jewish people among all the nations, because its scattered communities are to be found in both East and West, and because of the particular position of the State of Israel, our need for world peace and a reduction of inter-bloc tension is perhaps greater than that of any other people..." (For source see below.)

**Dangers of Cold War in ME** (continued). "We live in one of the regions of the world where inter-bloc tension manifests itself very concretely. One of its most dangerous consequences is the flow of modern armaments in tremendous quantities into the Arab countries, Egypt especially; and this in spite of the fact that Egypt does not conceal in any way the purpose for which she is acquiring these arms. Moreover, inter-bloc tension enables Egypt to engage in blackmailing manoeuvres in both blocs. To the extent that Egypt succeeds in exploiting this tension, the day of peace is put off." (*Israel Foreign Ministry, Translation, no date*)

**Israel's Security Depends Upon Unity of Nations.** Ben-Gurion (in essay: *Towards a New World*): "Today, when



the United Nations is mentioned, the 'United,' not without cause, is put in quotation marks... Unity of all nations is a paramount necessity, and unity... will come when all the peoples are free, internally and externally. That it will come, even if it be slow in the coming, history decrees.

"Israel must fight for this, for her security depends on the unity of nations, on the unity, freedom and equality of all men." (*IGYb*, 1960/61)

**Israel's Policy: World and ME Disarmament.** Golda Meir, 23 May: "The position of the Government of Israel on the question of disarmament is defined in the Basic Principles of the Government Programme, where it is stated that Israel 'will support every step calculated to bring about a general and final disarmament in the world and a complete abolition of armies, subject to an effective and continuing international supervision of that disarmament,' and that 'until general disarmament is accepted and carried out in the whole world, the Government of Israel will propose to all her Arab neighbours an agreement for complete disarmament and abolition of armies in Israel and the Arab countries, on condition that mutual, continuing and free supervision of its implementation is guaranteed and that the boundaries and sovereignty of each of these countries are not impaired.' The Prime Minister has reiterated this view on several occasions." (*Israel Foreign Ministry, Translation, no date*)

**Against "Troika" Proposal for UN Secretariat.** Golda Meir, 20 Mar 1961: "A deplorable upshot of the Congo involvement was the criticism launched by the Soviet bloc upon the work of the UN in Congo, criticism in the train of which they put forward a proposal to alter the structure of the Secretariat of that Organization. The proposal included the division of the UN into three, the appointment of three Secretaries—each representing one of the blocs—and the grant to each of them the right of veto. In our opinion the proposal is impractical, for its object was to create a veto in respect of implementation over and above the veto which, as it is, already exists in the Security Council in respect of resolutions. Moreover, we do not accept the division of the world into blocs, certainly not under the auspices of the UN."

#### THE COMMUNIST BLOC

**USSR Discriminates Against Israel.** Golda Meir, Foreign Minister, Jerusalem, 23 May: "There have been no appreciable changes in the context of Israel's relations with the USSR. While normal diplomatic relations are maintained I must with regret observe that, in spite of our efforts, the USSR will not permit relations of substance... In this respect the USSR manifests towards us, conspicuously, an attitude of discrimination which is contrary to its declared policy of readiness to maintain commercial and cultural relations with all the countries of the world..." (For source, see below.)

**USSR Attacks on Israel, Judaism and the Jewish People (continued).** "The USSR does not properly appreciate Israel's wish for peace with her Arab neighbours, and from time to time, especially at times of crises and tension, condemns Israel in advance as responsible. This standpoint, expressed in the UN, is also reflected in the Soviet Press, which has continued relentlessly to direct criticism, sometimes deadly, against the State of Israel and its people. I am sorry to say that this criticism is occasionally accompanied by attacks upon the religion of Israel, the Jewish people and its culture..." (For source, see below.)

**Israeli Attempts to Improve Relations Rejected (continued).** "Our attempts to have talks with the heads of government in the USSR have, to our sorrow, met with no encouragement. The reason given by the government of the USSR in the reply in which it made known its refusal to arrange for a meeting between the PM of Israel and Mr Khrushchev is that statements have been made in Israel that are not peace-loving... The last sentence in the reply states that 'The USSR wishes good relations with all countries in the ME if mutual aspiration and mutual interest of that kind exist...' I can only stress once again that on our part both aspiration and interest exist. It only remains for us to hope that the USSR will reveal the same aspiration and interest..." (For source, see below.)

**Problem of Divided Families (continued).** "In the relations between Israel and the other countries of Eastern Europe, no material changes have occurred.

"The Government of Israel pursues its efforts to find a solution for the tragic human problem of divided families..." (For source, see below.)

**Contracting Trade with Eastern Europe (continued).** "Trade relations with Poland, Hungary, Rumania and Bulgaria are based on commercial agreements. The introduction of the policy of liberalization in our imports has limited the possibility of balancing our trade with 'clearing' countries, and, consequently, our trade with the countries of Eastern Europe has contracted to a certain degree... In our aim to improve commercial relations, we shall continue to do our utmost..." (For source, see below.)

**Developing Relations with Poland (continued).** "Cultural and public relations with Poland are developing and progressing encouragingly." (*Foreign Ministry, Budget Speech, stencilled translation, no date*)

**Fate of Jewry in Russia.** Ben-Gurion, at Zionist Congress, Jerusalem, 28 Dec. [Speaking of "four events of fateful significance" in the life of the Jewish people during the last 40-50 years, Ben-Gurion mentioned as the first, in chronological order]: "The isolation and paralysis of Russian Jewry for the last 40 years. This Jewry, which despite its suffering and distress, played the leading role in the Jewish Renaissance in the diaspora since the 19th century, produced great Jewish scholars, ...[and] stood at the head of ... the Zionist movement, ... has for 40 years been condemned to silence and bereavement; its creative powers have been crushed by a foreign hand, ... and an iron curtain has been erected between it and World Jewry, between it and the renascent homeland.

"What does all this teach us? There are forces in the world that have not only the capacity but also the desire to impose spiritual silence and annihilation on millions of Jews under their control, without the Jewish people in the world being able to do anything about it. The Soviet Union has recognized in theory and in large measure realized in practice the principle of self-determination and the development of its language, literature and culture for every community and tribe within its borders. But—*Khromei Yevreiyev*—all except the Jews." (*25th Zionist Congress, Bulletin, 28 Dec*)

#### THE WESTERN POWERS

**US: Friend and Supporter of Israel.** Golda Meir, Jerusalem, 23 May: "Now, as in all the years since the establishment of the State, we may consider the US as

a friend and supporter of Israel, although it is only natural that we should not at all times and in all respects see eye to eye. The declared policy of the US towards our region is support of the independence and territorial integrity of all the countries. This policy is an influential factor for regional stability. Another aspect of US policy is the economic aid which continued to reach us last year. From different American funds we continued to receive substantial sums for the development of our economy and for our progress towards economic independence..." (For source see below.)

**Friendship with France (continued).** "The pattern of friendship woven between France and Israel ever since our independence and even previously, becomes wider and deeper as time goes on. We greatly value the interest of France in the security, integrity and prosperity of Israel. This goodwill is rooted deep in the hearts of the French people, just as goodwill and admiration towards France are deeply entrenched in the heart of the people of Israel. On those foundations rests the wide cooperation between the two countries..." (For source see below.)

**Mutual Understanding with Britain (continued).** "The existing and deepening mutual understanding between Great Britain and ourselves is also based in that country on the aim of preserving the independence of all the countries in the Middle East..." (For source see below.)

**Vital Trade Interests in Western Europe (continued).** "The vital concern of Israel in Western Europe, with which we conduct 60 per cent of our foreign trade, obliges us to work for a free and non-discriminatory access to this region. We are entitled to expect that the countries involved will show understanding for this concern and that a way will be found for fruitful cooperation between us to mutual advantage." (*Budget Speech, 23 May, Foreign Ministry Translation, no date*)

## RELATIONS WITH ASIA AND AFRICA

**Aid in Development of Asia and Africa a Historic Mission.** Ben-Gurion (in essay: *Towards a New World*): "Can Israel assist in the progress and development of Asia and Africa? For Israel, it is both a moral and political issue, and from both aspects there is no doubt that Israel must look upon such aid as a historic mission, as necessary for Israel as it is beneficial to those we help." (*IGYb 1960/61*)

**Friendships in Asia and Africa May Lead to Peace with the Arabs.** Ben-Gurion, Jerusalem, 28 Dec: "We cannot compel our neighbours to make peace with us... Only if we can win friends in Asia and Africa, while strengthening our friendship with the peoples of Europe and the Americas, shall we be able to breach the wall of hatred by which we are encompassed and ultimately achieve peace and cooperation with the Arab peoples." (*25th Zionist Congress, Bulletin, 28 Dec*)

**Economic Interests.** Ben-Gurion, at Zionist Congress, Jerusalem, 28 Dec: "Our economic independence also depends largely on closer economic ties with the Asian and African continents. The peoples of these continents are at the beginning of their development, and Israel, which is situated at the crossroads of Europe, Africa and Asia, is already fulfilling a growingly important function in assisting them." (*25th Zionist Congress, Bulletin, 28 Dec*)

Golda Meir, 20 Mar 1961: "Our economic links with the countries of Africa are still modest. At the same

time, the year 1960 has seen a substantial deepening and widening of our economic activity in the new African states. In that year we doubled our exports to them in comparison with the year before. And if we examine the period from 1957 to 1960 we will find that our exports have increased almost fourfold.

"Together with their political independence these countries enjoy freedom of economic action and are replacing traditional trading arrangements. At the same time new horizons in the spheres of economic and social development are opening up for them, and they are looking for partners for themselves, partners who are not intent on political dominated and exorbitant profits."

**Cooperation with Afro-Asian Peoples Based on Fraternity.** Ben-Gurion, Tel Aviv, 24 Mar: "The hearts of the Asian and African peoples can be won not only with material and scientific aid, but through an approach as members of one family, the family of mankind, as equals to equals, in profound and sincere human brotherhood and solidarity, without the boastfulness and arrogance of philanthropists and 'big brothers,' but as peoples bound together by a common destiny, like our approach in Israel to members of the different communities from all parts of the globe who are assembling in our country. This approach is perhaps one of the main conditions for the consolidation of world peace—the central task of our generation."

Levi Eshkol: "We must bear in mind that aid must be mutual, for we have much to learn as well as to teach in Africa." (*Jer. Post, 1 Aug*)

**Israel as Model for Countries of Asia and Africa.** Ben-Gurion (in essay: *Towards a New World*): "Why, during the past few years, has Israel attracted the finest of the younger leaders of Asia and Africa... to study cooperation and agricultural settlement, military organization, development areas, the labour movement, scientific institutions? It is not because she is powerful and great, rich and generous, but because the new states regard her as a very suitable and instructive specimen of a country that is trying, with no little success, to solve problems that concern old and new in Asia and Africa. The changes we have produced in the economic, social and cultural structure of our ingathered people and the landscape and economy of the land are those that most Asian and African nations want. From us, more perhaps than from any others, they can learn how feasible such changes are, and how profitable, and how to bring them about at home..." (For source, see below.)

**Israel Must Accommodate More Afro-Asian Youth (continued).** "To ensure that they derive utmost benefit from that example, we must find room for more of their youth in our institutions of higher learning and special seminars, and facilitate practical training in our agricultural, cooperative and educational undertakings..." (For source, see below.)

**Israeli Experts Should Show Fraternity (continued).** "We shall have to send them as many of our experts and instructors as we can spare, as we have begun to do in Burma, Ghana, Ethiopia, Nigeria and elsewhere. A *sine qua non* is their awareness of performing a pioneer mission, not just a job for hire. This should be manifest in an attitude of humanity and fraternity, with no arrogance or self-depreciation, towards the peoples among whom they work, and an all-out effort to pass on the best of our knowledge and experience. Representatives of this type, and to our good fortune we have had them so far,

will benefit both those they serve and Israel." (*IGYb*, 1960/61)

**Israel's Job: Train, Hand Over and Go Home.** Golda Meir, 20 Mar 1961: "In all these activities [economic cooperation and technical aid], we have set one clear and agreed principle before us: we do not seek vested interests. We have come to help, and we are taking pride when our contribution makes it possible for local professionals to take upon themselves the management of this or that enterprise."

Dr Wydra, Director of Zim, Israel shipping line, on Zim's management of Ghana's Black Star line. "Our job is to train [the Ghanaians] effectively, hand over and go home." (*Ha'aretz*, 11 Aug)

**Need for Modesty.** Ben-Gurion, Jerusalem, 24 Oct [Mentioning statements by Western visitors that "the question in Africa is: China, Russia—or Israel"]: "We must avoid such pleasant illusions as regards ourselves. Israel is a small, poor country... burdened with difficult tasks..."

"We must recognize our drastic limitations. We are few but our needs are many, and we cannot—even if we are asked—send hundreds of experts and instructors to scores of new countries." [See also statements by Eshkol and Josephthal exhorting Israel to "discretion and modesty in her relations with Africa," p 310.]

## DEC 1959–JAN 1960: ANTI-SEMITIC OUTBREAKS

**Anti-Semitic Outbreaks.** A wave of anti-Semitic incidents, which started in Cologne on 25 Dec, quickly spread through West Germany and Europe, and by the end of the first week of Jan countries in all the continents had been affected.

Swastikas and anti-Semitic slogans were plastered on the walls; Jewish cemeteries were desecrated; synagogues, institutions, homes and shops, and the buildings of some Israel missions, were defaced. Churches and various non-Jewish institutions were also defiled. There were hardly any instances of physical attack, but harm was done to private property.

In the second half of Jan the incidents subsided, but a few were recorded at the beginning of Feb. (See world Press, last week of Dec 1959 till first week of Feb 1960.)

**World Reaction.** These acts were unreservedly denounced by official and public opinion. Governments, parliaments, religious and public leaders, intellectuals, organizations and parties, the Press, radio and television, without exception condemned the resurgence of anti-Semitism and vigorous steps were taken to apprehend the culprits and bring them to justice. (*Ha'aretz*, 13, 15, 16, 17 Jan; *Jer. Post*, 17, 18, 19 Jan)

In Germany, public bodies conducted inquiries into the extent of the problem and tried to reappraise educational methods. (*Ha'aretz*, 4, 6, 7 Jan; *Jer. Post*, 17, 18 Jan)

**Israel Reactions.** On 5 Jan, in a statement in the Knesset on behalf of the government, Pinhas Rosen, the Minister of Justice, stated i.a.: "The government and the people of Israel are sensitive and alert to anything that affects our brethren in the lands of the dispersion. The Ministry for Foreign Affairs immediately instructed Israel's representatives abroad to keep a close watch on the details and character of the anti-Semitic acts and the reactions of the

**Against Racial Discrimination.** Golda Meir, Jerusalem, 23 May: "We are all deeply distressed by the tragic happenings [in South Africa]. I have already had the opportunity of expressing the firm opposition of the Government of Israel to all racial discrimination, and to point out that Israel's concern for the full preservation of the rights of man everywhere has been demonstrated on every occasion on which that issue has been raised in the UN." (*Israel Foreign Ministry, stencilled translation, no date*)

**Abdel-Nasser's Activities Against Israel in Asia and Africa.** Ben-Gurion, Jerusalem, 24 Oct: "Our ties with the new lands will do more to strengthen our position in the world than anything else. That is the reason why desperate and not always unsuccessful efforts are being made by the Egyptian dictator to blacken our name among the Asian and African peoples by the false slogan that we are an imperialist base... a large part of black Africa is Muslim, and the Egyptian dictator is calling to his aid the factor of religious fanaticism, which he has crushed in his own country."

Golda Meir, Jerusalem, 23 May: "In our relations with [the countries of Africa and Asia] we place the emphasis on constructive work. We shall refrain, as far as feasible, from being provoked into barren arguments with Nasser on the soil of those lands." (*Israel Foreign Ministry, stencilled translation, no date*)

governments and public opinion in the major countries. The Government of Israel will act on the basis of the reports that reach it in analyzing the events and their character...

"Although there are no definite proofs, there are some grounds for the suspicion that an international organization, whose centre is in Germany or elsewhere and which in any case uses the German language even in other countries, is active in this matter..."

"The latest outbreaks... should convince the nations, the governments, the parliaments, the Press and the leaders of the political parties, in whose countries the plague of Jew-hatred exists, that it is not enough to disclaim the inciters to oppression and genocide."

"History shows that these loathsome phenomena must be treated with all due seriousness and radically extirpated by all possible means, before they develop from isolated acts of hooliganism into disasters for entire peoples and for the whole of humanity..."

Israeli Press comment, echoing the concern and the warnings expressed in this statement, also referred to the state of world Jewry, concluding that "Exile will always remain Exile." At the same time it was remarked that the fact that a warning against the resurgence of Nazism was sounded from the Knesset "symbolizes the basic change that has occurred in the position of the Jewish people since the establishment of the State... The Jews of the Diaspora now have a spokesman." (*The Israel Digest*, 22 Jan)

**Israel Note.** Following the above statement, a formal communication was handed by Israel's representatives to all governments concerned, expressing shock and concern at the anti-Semitic manifestations. The note included passages from the government statement in the Knesset.

The replies, written and oral, expressed understanding



of Israel's solicitude and sympathy with her attitude, condemning the outbreaks and promising measures to root out the plague. (*Ha'aretz*, 8, 14, 15, 19, 27 Jan; *Jer. Post*, 15, 17 Jan)

**At the UN and Other International Forums.** In Jan Israel submitted a note to the UN Sub-committee for the Prevention of Racial Discrimination, demanding vigorous steps by the countries concerned to stem the rising tide of anti-Semitism, so that it could be halted before it brought disaster to entire nations, even to entire mankind. A resolution in that sense was unanimously adopted. (*Ha'aretz*, 12, 29 Jan; *Jer. Post*, 17 Jan)

This resolution was substantially confirmed in Mar by the Committee for the Rights of Man. It condemned anti-Semitism as contrary to the Charter and the Declaration of the Rights of Man, and called on governments and UN bodies to take steps to prevent such acts and punish their perpetrators, and to take appropriate action to educate public opinion. (*Ha'aretz*, 29 Jan; *Jer. Post*, 17 Mar)

In Jan, at the Assembly of the Council of Europe in Strasbourg, the first item was a resolution, unanimously adopted, condemning racial hatred and the recent anti-Semitic outbreaks in particular, and calling on member states to be constantly alert in defence of the honour and freedom of man. (*Ha'aretz*; *Jer. Post*, 19 Jan)

At the Apr Assembly of the Council of the Inter-Parliamentary Union in Athens, a resolution condemning anti-Semitism was unanimously adopted. (*IGYb*, 1960/61)

Following up the resolution of the Committee for the Rights of Man, the UN SG asked member states for information and opinions on local outbreaks. (*Ha'aretz*, 18 Sept; *IGYb*, 1960/61)

**Arab Involvement Hinted At.** On 13 Jan Jacques Soustelle, Minister-Delegate, said at a protest meeting against anti-Semitism in Paris that "anti-Semitism and anti-Zionism are the two sides of the same coin." He declared that the sources of current anti-Semitism were "the Arab League and Pan-Arabism," adding that the Egyptian Government—particularly its secret police, intelligence, Press and radio—were staffed with German SS members who had assumed Arab names. (*Jer. Post*, 15 Jan)

In Jan it was reported that the Bolivian Police had charged "agents of the UAR" with the responsibility for anti-Jewish outbreaks. (*Ha'aretz*, 19 Jan)

The Bolivian Government was reported to have warned the UAR embassy in La Paz to stop anti-Semitic incitement. The official *El Dario* accused Arab diplomats in various parts of the world, and particularly the UAR embassy in La Paz, of having provoked recent anti-Semitic outbreaks. The Bolivian Ministry of the Interior subsequently issued a formal statement warning foreign representatives to abstain from provocative acts. (*Jer. Post*, 22 Jan)

**Arab Involvement Denied.** Earlier, UAR missions in Latin America issued declarations stating that the Arabs had no interest in anti-Jewish outbreaks, as it was in the interest of the Arabs that the Jews remain in the countries where they reside. (*Ha'aretz*, 14 Jan)

In an interview with German journalists on 26 Jan, Abdel-Nasser denied that the Arabs were involved, as they themselves were Semites. He said that the Jews did not constitute a people but a religious group, adding that it was necessary to differentiate between Judaism as a religion and Zionism, which constituted a political, imperialistic, racist and militarist movement. It was against aggressive Zionism that the Arabs fought, he declared. (*R. Cairo in Hebrew*, 27 Jan—*IMB*, 27 Jan. No mention of this statement was made in the report of the interview in UAR Arabic broadcasts; see *IMB* 27 Jan; *BBC*, 28 Jan)

**Other Arab Reactions: "Outbreaks Organized by Israel and Zionists."** The general tenor of Arab Press and radio comments was that the outbreaks had been organized by Israel and the Zionist movement to encourage immigration and discourage emigration, to gain aid for Israel, to divert attention from Israel's internal and external failures, to gain the sympathy of the American public on the eve of the elections, and so forth. (See *Hayat*, 6 Jan; *Hawl al-Alam* 14 Jan; *Ahram*, 4, 6, 7 Jan; *Mas'ad*, 7 Jan; etc.)

The following is a typical example of other Arab comment. The outbreaks, wrote a Jordanian commentator, were not anti-Semitic—there were Semites other than the Jews—but anti-Jewish, because of Jewish domination of the economy of many countries. "While we do not approve of the persecution of the Jews, we are for the liberation of the governments of Europe from Zionist domination." (*Falastin*, 6 Jan; see also *Musawwar*, *Cairo*, 8 Jan)

## THE CAPTURE OF ADOLF EICHMANN

### SYNOPSIS

On 23 May PM Ben-Gurion announced in the Knesset that Adolf Eichmann, the SS officer who played a central part in organizing the extermination of six million Jews during World War II, had been found, was under arrest in Israel and would be placed on trial in Israel.

Eichmann's capture had the deepest emotional impact on the Israel public; it brought again to life the memory of the holocaust; hundreds of thousands whose closest relatives had been murdered by the Nazis, or who had themselves been victims of Nazi persecution, were personally affected.

The fact that Eichmann was being brought to justice by and in Israel, the State of the Jews for whose extermination he had worked, was regarded by Israeli, Jewish and world public opinion alike as of profound historical significance.

At the same time opinions were expressed in the world Press that Eichmann should not be tried in Israel, but by an international court or in Germany. Israeli opinion unanimously supported PM Ben-Gurion's view that Eichmann must be tried by an Israel court: it was Israel's duty, as well as her right, as the "only sovereign authority in Jewry," to bring to justice the man who had played such a central part in the execution of the Nazi plan to exterminate the Jewish people. PM Ben-Gurion stated that the main importance of the trial lay in the full exposure of the facts of the holocaust, so that both the younger generation in Israel and world public opinion should know the truth. The Israel attitude, in both general and legal aspects, also met with much support in the world Press.

Eichmann's capture and transfer to Israel involved a temporary crisis in Israel-Argentine relations. When re-



ports appeared that he had been captured in Argentina, the Argentine Government demanded an explanation. The Israeli reply confirmed that Eichmann had been seized in Argentina, stating that a "group of volunteers" was responsible (later, in the joint declaration closing the incident, they were identified as "Israeli nationals.") With his own written consent, the Israeli reply said, the group had taken him abroad, and handed him over to the Israel security services. Israel expressed regret for any violation of Argentine law involved and asked the Argentine Government to take into consideration the extraordinary circumstances of the case. In reply, Argentina protested against the infringement of her sovereignty, and demanded, as appropriate reparation, Eichmann's return to Argentina and the punishment of his captors; his extradition could then be requested in accordance with accepted procedures.

When no agreement was reached, Argentina submitted the case to the Security Council. Following a two-day debate, the SC resolved that such acts might if repeated, endanger international peace and security, requested Israel to make "appropriate reparation," and expressed the hope that the friendly relations between Argentina and Israel would be advanced. The Council adopted this resolution on the express understanding, stated by the US, British and French delegates before the vote, that adequate reparation had been provided by its proceedings and Israel's expression of regret. When Argentina subsequently asked Israel for adequate redress in the light of the SC's deliberations, Israel replied in this sense. Argentina, not satisfied, declared the Israel Ambassador in Buenos Aires *persona non grata* (the Argentine Ambassador in Israel had been recalled earlier). Negotiations were already under way, however, for a settlement of the dispute, and a joint declaration was issued on 3 Aug declaring the incident closed. At the end of the year the two countries exchanged new Ambassadors.

Meanwhile, preparations were started in Israel for the trial. A special bureau was set up by the Israel Police to collect and sift evidence for the prosecution. Many governments and institutions provided documents at the request of the Israel Foreign Ministry; only from the USSR and Rumania was no reply received. Eichmann selected a German lawyer to defend him at the forthcoming trial, which was to take place in 1961.

### EICHMANN'S CAPTURE

Statement by PM Ben-Gurion in the Knesset on 23 May 1960: "I have to inform the Knesset that a short time ago one of the greatest of the Nazi war criminals, Adolf Eichmann, who was responsible together with the Nazi leaders for what they called 'the final solution of the Jewish question,' i.e. the extermination of six million of the Jews of Europe, was found by the Israel Security Services.

"Adolf Eichmann is already under arrest in Israel, and will shortly be placed on trial in Israel under the terms of the Law for the Trial of Nazis and their Collaborators, 5710-1950." (IGPB, 23 May)

**Facts on Eichmann.** [Karl Adolf Eichmann was born in Mar 1906 in Linz, Austria. In 1927 he joined the German-Austrian Front Fighters. In 1932 he became a member of the Nazi Party and the SS and subsequently moved to Germany. After undergoing military training in SS camps in 1933, he served in 1934 as a corporal in the Dachau Concentration Camp. In Sept 1934 he joined the Security Services of the SS, with the rank of Sergeant,

and moved to Berlin. He first dealt with intelligence matters in the Freemasons Department.

In 1935 he started dealing with Jewish affairs, working in the Jewish Section of the SD in close cooperation with the Jewish Department of the Gestapo. He studied Hebrew and Yiddish. In 1937 he was sent on a mission to the ME, including Palestine. In the same year he was commissioned.

In Mar 1938, after the conquest of Austria, he was sent to Vienna, where he devoted himself to the task of forcing the Jews to emigrate. By now he was beginning to be regarded as an expert on Jewish affairs, and his system was noted and copied throughout the Reich.

On the conquest of Czechoslovakia in 1939, Eichmann was responsible for the same policy in that country, and opened an office in Prague. When, in 1941, he was promoted to the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel, he was cited for his "exceptionally fine services," the excellent results he had achieved in the de-judaization of Austria and his "work in the Protectorate, which was carried out with commendable initiative and necessary firmness."

In the autumn of 1939 Eichmann returned to Berlin and was appointed chief of the central authority for Jewish emigration under Heydrich, the chief of the Reich Security Head Office (RSHA). He started to organize the deportation of the German Jews and their concentration in ghettos and camps. He was also in charge of Jewish affairs in the German-occupied territories of Poland and had direct contact with the Einsatzgruppen of the SS, which in 1939 started the extermination of the Jews; he received their reports and later also transmitted orders to them.

In 1941 Eichmann was appointed head of the Section IV B/4 of the RSHA of the Gestapo, which was charged with emigration and deportation. He held this office until the final liquidation of European Jewry and was at the same time Heydrich's "Referent" or special plenipotentiary for the "final solution of the Jewish question."

In 1941, the plans for the "final solution," the extermination of the Jews, took shape. In Jan 1942 he took part in the notorious Wannsee conference, where the heads of the Gestapo and other Nazi officials adopted the plan for the "final solution." Eichmann was personally responsible for collecting the Jews from all German-occupied territories and, as far as possible, the allied countries, and transporting them to transit- and extermination camps, especially Auschwitz.

He had his personal representatives in all the countries concerned: France, Greece, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, the Czech Protectorate, Slovakia, Serbia, Croatia, etc., and received regular reports on the numbers transported and killed.

His position in the RSHA was unique in all that pertained to Jewish affairs. He operated with the power of Himmler and Heydrich behind him, came into direct contact with Ministers of the Reich, heads of governments in the conquered countries, and gave orders to men of higher rank even in the German Army.

The Nuremberg judgement stated: "Adolf Eichmann, who had been put in charge of this programme by Hitler, has estimated that the policy pursued resulted in the killing of six million Jews, of which four million were killed in the extermination institutions."

Rudolf Hoess, the commander of the Auschwitz extermination camp, wrote in his memoirs that Eichmann "showed that he was completely obsessed with the idea of destroying every single Jew that he could lay his hands on."

Wisliceny, an SS officer working with Eichmann, quoted Eichmann at his own trial to the effect that "he would leap laughing into the grave because the feeling that he had five million people on his conscience would be for him a source of extraordinary satisfaction."

In May 1945 Eichmann was captured, but not identified, by US forces in Austria. After one and a half years detention as a member of the SS, he escaped and became a forest warden. In 1950 he left Germany with false papers, obtained a refugee passport, and went to Argentina. There he settled, using the name of Ricardo Clement, and was joined by his wife and three children.]

#### SIGNIFICANCE OF THE EICHMANN TRIAL—ISRAELI REACTIONS

**The Impact of Eichmann's Capture.** "It is difficult to remember another example of such excitement and shock as we felt this week when we heard of Adolf Eichmann's capture... Hundreds of thousands of citizens... felt that this event affected them directly. Everyone who had escaped from the Nazis and everyone whose dear ones were killed by the Nazis felt the importance of the event—not only from a public and political viewpoint, but from a personal one." (*Ha'aretz*, 27 May)

**Ben-Gurion: Trial Should Reveal Entire Story of Holocaust.** "In my opinion, the importance of the capture of Adolf Eichmann and his trial in Israel lies... in the privilege... of having the entire story of the holocaust revealed in an Israel court, so that the facts may be known and remembered by the youth in Israel who have grown up and received their education after the holocaust... and so that world public opinion too should learn the truth. I have no doubt that in the service of the dictators in the neighbouring countries there are scores and hundreds of Nazis—Germans and Arabs—who played their part in the slaughter of the Jews in days gone by, and who now harbour similar designs against the people of Israel in their own land. World public opinion should be reminded whose disciples these men are who plot the destruction of Israel, and who give them knowing or unknowing assistance." (*Davar*, 27 May)

**Ben-Gurion on Israel's Right and Duty to Try Eichmann.** (Excerpts from a letter by the PM in reply to a public proposal by Dr Nahum Goldmann, President of the World Zionist Organization, that an international court be set up in Israel, headed by an Israel judge, to try Eichmann.) "The calamity that the Nazis inflicted on the Jewish people is not merely a part of the crimes they committed in the world as a whole—for that they suffered retribution in the Second World War. It is a specific and unparalleled act—an act designed for the utter extermination of the entire Jewish people, which Hitler and his collaborators did not dare to commit against any other people.

"It is therefore the duty of the State of Israel, the only sovereign authority in Jewry, to see that the whole of this story, in all its terror, is fully exposed, without in any way ignoring the Nazi regime's other crimes against humanity, but as a unique and unexampled crime, unparalleled in the annals of mankind, and not as one particular crime out of many. All honour to the group of men whose extraordinary skill and unbounded devotion have enabled them to bring one of the chief murderers of European Jewry before the bar of Israeli justice.

"It is perhaps the first act of historic justice of this

kind in human history that a small nation, beset by many forces, should be able on its sovereign territory to try one of its chief enemies for atrocities against hundreds of thousands of its sons and daughters. It is not the penalty to be inflicted on the criminal that is the main thing—no penalty can measure up to the magnitude of the offence—but the full exposure of the Nazi regime's atrocious crimes against our people; it is not Eichmann's acts alone that are the main thing in this trial.

"Historic justice and the honour of the Jewish people demand that this should be done only by an Israeli court in the sovereign Jewish State. This was the decision of the Government of Israel and the opinion of the entire Jewish people in its land." (*ICPB*, 2 June)

**Historic Significance of Eichmann's Trial in Israel.** (Excerpts from the Israel Press.)

"Since Eichmann succeeded, at the end of the Second World War, in escaping the Allied Armies and was not tried as a war criminal at Nuremberg, all of us felt that it was the duty of the State of Israel—which did not exist... in 1945—to catch this criminal and bring him to justice...

"There is historic recompense in the fact that Adolf Eichmann will have to account for his deeds to a court in the State of Israel. There is no court in the world which has so great a moral right to try Eichmann as an Israeli court." (*Ha'aretz*, 24 May)

"In the days when Eichmann was in charge of the death marches and the extermination camps, it certainly did not occur to this monster that the 1000-year Reich would fall, that the people sentenced to extinction would establish its state through the blood of its best sons, and that he would be tried in a state which has a greater right to try him than any other in the world." (*Herut*, 24 May)

"If proper help had been given, Eichmann and company would have been caught long ago. Thousands of murderers, big and small, live as free men in both parts of Germany, in the Baltic states, in every place where masses of Jews were slaughtered, and very powerful elements protect them... The State has fulfilled its duty to the Jewish people and to all mankind. The security services have proved their constant vigilance, their devotion to one of their historic tasks, and their ability." (*Hatzofeh*, 24 May)

"If history decided to bring vengeance and recompense upon the head of one of the leading persecutors and exterminators, this is vengeance and recompense—to be placed in the hands of Jewish justice, on sovereign Jewish soil, in the State of Israel, which has assembled and given new life to hundreds of thousands of holocaust survivors." (*Al Hamishmar*, 24 May)

#### WORLD OPINION ON THE EICHMANN CASE

The world Press commented extensively on Eichmann's arrest and his forthcoming trial in Israel. There was a general understanding of the feelings aroused in Israel by Eichmann's capture, accompanied in many cases by sympathy. At the same time, many papers questioned Israel's right to try Eichmann and proposed his trial by an international or a German court; other papers supported his trial in Israel.

**Enormity of Eichmann's Crimes.** "In appealing to the Argentine Government to show understanding, the Israeli Note rightly pointed out that this was an 'extraordinary episode.' So it is, because it dealt with an extraordinary case.

"Adolf Eichmann was more deeply involved in the terrible crimes of the Nazi regime than any other person still alive. He was its murder manager and carnage clerk. He worked out the plans which, after unspeakable miseries, sent millions of European Jews to a horrible end in the Nazi extermination camps." (*Guardian, Manchester, 8 June*)

**Emotional Involvement of the Jews.** "To measure the depth of human emotion that must necessarily surround the forthcoming trial of Eichmann, one would have to be able to measure depths of grief and suffering, depths of yearning and bereavement evoked by the memory of six million Jews for whose fate he is charged with being directly responsible. It would be, in fact, to measure the immeasurable; just as adequate punishment for him would actually be beyond reach for the hand of man." (*NYT, 8 June*)

"The immense sufferings of the Jews at the hands of the Nazis invest Eichmann's capture with an emotionalism which puts normal conduct quite out of focus." (*News Chronicle, London, 8 June*)

"To us, perhaps, the war seems far away and the episode of the Nazis like a meaningless fairy-tale. But in the eyes of the Jews in Israel, who suffered themselves or through their families, this was an enormity they can never forget. It is necessary to regard the seizure of Eichmann against that background." (*Reynolds News, London, 12 June*)

**Gratitude to Eichmann's Captors.** "Thousands of survivors of the Nazi death camps, and the friends and relatives of millions who did not survive, must feel deeply grateful to the nameless and faceless operatives who—on a dedicated mission of high adventure—tracked down this gas-chamber degenerate through the years and brought him to book." (*Washington Post, 26 May*)

**The Jewish State Fulfills a Historic Task.** "The Jews of the world have a rightful and powerful incentive to track down this brutal mass murderer. Had there been no Israeli State, Eichmann would still be at large, mocking the process of justice. Credit for his capture goes wholly to the implacable perseverance of Israel's Security Police..."

"How appropriate that he should be brought from his hiding-place by a newly created Israel." (*Washington Post, 12 June*)

"What may be the trial of the century will soon take place in the State of Israel..."

"In a sense, Israel itself is now on trial. It was born to give justice to millions who carried the brunt of the injustice and brutality of Hitlerism. It has done so. Israel has taken the despised and given them status; the stateless and given them nationhood; the unwanted and given them human dignity. Now it is called upon to bring to justice the man who is a symbol of terror and tyranny. This is the crowning act of justice on behalf of the refugees, Israel will also mirror the quality of justice for which it stands in the eyes of the world."

"Understandably in the hearts and minds of the refugees lurks vengeance. But the persecuted cannot imitate the persecutor. Those who suffered oppression must bear the agony of meting out scrupulous justice to their oppressors." (*Toronto Telegram, 25 May*)

"There is a touch of Old Testament justice about the fact that Adolf Eichmann will now be tried in an Israeli Court." (*Guardian, Manchester, 26 May*)

"Eichmann, who once openly and arrogantly boasted

that he had sent five million Jews to their deaths, is now a prisoner in the hands of the Government of Israel."

"The State of Israel has come into existence through battle, siege, grief and soldierly victory. One of this state's fundamental laws expounds its right and its duty to punish, with death if necessary, those who outside its borders committed gross crimes, including that of genocide, against the Jewish people."

"And as he [Eichmann] looks around at the orderly, decent, patient men who have brought him to justice, the loving kinsfolk of those who died, will he be capable of realising that his ultimate crime was his denial of his and their shared humanity?" (*Yorkshire Post, Leeds, 26 May*)

**Historic Justice Has Been Satisfied.** "In judging the rights and wrongs of his (Eichmann's) removal from Argentina, one comes squarely against an unpleasant dilemma of having to make choice between rules and legality and the demands of justice. The most important thing is that Eichmann should be tried. Justice, like God Himself, sometimes moves in a mysterious way." (*NYHT, 11 June*)

"Historic justice has been satisfied." (*Trybuna Ludu, Warsaw, 25 May*)

"All the world is grateful for the opportunity afforded to humanity to mete out justice to this monster. Fate willed it that the German Aryan Eichmann should be tried by judges of a people whose millions he put to death... This court will be composed not only of citizens of the young State of Israel but also of the millions slaughtered at Auschwitz, Theresienstadt, Warsaw and all the ghettos of Europe." (*Arnhems Dagblad, the Netherlands, 25 May*)

**Ever-Present Danger of Anti-Semitism.** "The universal sense of shock which resulted from the exposure, after the war, of the horrors of Germany's anti-Semitic policy seemed to ensure that the persecution of the Jews never again would be entertained as a conscious individual or national policy. That hope seems to be receding. It is, perhaps, as well, therefore, that the Israeli security people have succeeded in laying hands on the infamous Adolf Eichmann." (*Irish Times, Dublin, 30 May*)

**Arguments Against Eichmann's Trial in Israel.** Following are the major arguments which appeared in the world Press against Eichmann's trial in Israel:

Israel had no authority to speak for Jews elsewhere. (e.g. *Washington Post, 27 May; Boston Herald, 9 June*)

Israel's jurisdiction over crimes committed in other territories and not against its citizens was questioned. (e.g. *Times, 26 May; Washington Post, 27 May; NY Post, 2 June*)

Other objections were based on the *ex post facto* nature of the Israeli law of 1950 on the trial of Nazis and their collaborators (*Washington Post, 27 May*) and on the ground that Eichmann had been illegally brought to Israel. (*NY Post, 2 June*)

Fear was expressed that Israel intended to stage an "international spectacle." It was also argued that one man's guilt should not be merged with the history of the holocaust. (e.g. *Boston Herald, 9 June; Observer, 12 June*)

The crimes of which Eichmann was accused were committed against humanity, and the international community "should profit from his capture." (*NYT, 8 June*)

The formation of an international *ad hoc* tribunal was suggested, or alternatively Eichmann's trial by a German



court. (e.g. *Washington Post*, 27 May; *NY Post*, 2 June; *NYT*, 8 June; *Observer*, 12 June)

**Support For Eichmann's Trial in Israel.** Many papers regarded Eichmann's trial in Israel as an example of historic justice leaving no room for argument (some examples of this approach may be found in the excerpts above). The Polish and Yugoslav Press generally expressed this attitude. (e.g. *Trybuna Ludu*, Warsaw, 25 May; *Borla*, Belgrade, 10, 18 June)

So did French papers (e.g. *Populaire*, Paris, 25 May; *Monde*, 11 June) and Turkish papers. (e.g. *Journal d'Orient*, Istanbul, 14 June)

Israel's authority to speak for the whole Jewish people was maintained by some papers (e.g. *Tygodnik Powszechny*, Warsaw, 10 June; *Dagens Nyheter*, Stockholm, 31 May; *Telegraaf*, Amsterdam, 28 May)

The opinion that Israel as a sovereign state was entitled to try any person physically within its territory was often stated (e.g. *Times*, 25 May; *Guardian*, 26 May; *Christian Science Monitor*, 31 May; *Monde*, 11 June)

Many papers pointed out that an international tribunal no longer existed, and argued that international law does not prohibit a state from exercising jurisdiction in respect of acts committed abroad. (*Guardian*, 26 May; *Christian Science Monitor*, 31 May; *Letter to the Editor*, *NYT*, 6 June)

It was also stated that the *ex post facto* argument was not applicable to the 1950 Israel law on the trial of Nazis; murder had been a recognized crime in every age, and it would be absurd to suggest that the law was creating a "new" crime, *ex post facto*. Besides, the enormity of the crimes committed by the Nazi regime had produced a revolution in international law, resulting in the Nuremberg trials (against which exactly the same *ex post facto* arguments had been adduced), the UN's endorsement of the Nuremberg principles, the Genocide Convention and the adoption of national statutes for the trial of war criminals in a number of countries, of which the Israel law is only one example. (*Letter in NYT*, 6 June)

A West German view was expressed by Schaeffer, the Minister of Justice, who said that the basis for a demand for extradition was lacking; however, "German justice will do everything possible to contribute to the just punishment of Eichmann's deeds." Germany would, "on request, render Israeli justice legal assistance and place available material at Israel's disposal." (*Neue Ruhr-Zeitung*, Essen, 2 June)

For detailed legal opinions in favour of Eichmann's trial in Israel see *Le Figaro*, Paris 14 June.

## THE LEGAL BASIS FOR EICHMANN'S TRIAL IN ISRAEL

Excerpts from *Nazis and Nazi Collaborators (Punishment) Law, 5710-1950*

### Section 1

(a) A person who has committed one of the following offences—

- (1) done, during the period of the Nazi regime, in an enemy country, an act constituting a crime against the Jewish people;
  - (2) done, during the period of the Nazi regime, in an enemy country, an act constituting a crime against humanity;
  - (3) done, during the period of the Second World War, in an enemy country, an act constituting a war crime,
- is liable to death penalty.

(b) In this section—

"crime against the Jewish people" means any of the following acts, committed with the intent to destroy the Jewish people in whole or in part:

- (1) killing Jews;
- (2) causing serious bodily or mental harm to Jews;
- (3) placing Jews in living conditions calculated to bring about their physical destruction;
- (4) imposing measures intended to prevent births among Jews;
- (5) forcibly transferring Jewish children to another national or religious group;
- (6) destroying or desecrating Jewish religious or cultural assets or values;
- (7) inciting to hatred of Jews;

"crime against humanity" means any of the following acts: murder, extermination, enslavement, starvation or deportation and other inhuman acts committed against any civilian population, and persecution on national, racial, religious or political grounds;

"war crimes" means any of the following acts; murder, ill-treatment or deportation to forced labour or for any other purpose, of civilian population of or in occupied territory; murder or ill-treatment of prisoners of war or persons on the seas; killing of hostages; plunder of public or private property; wanton destruction of cities, towns or villages; and devastation not justified by military necessity. (*IGPB*, June 1960)

**Israel's Legal Case.** The legal case for the trial of Eichmann in Israel was summed up by Shabtai Rosenne, Legal Advisor to the Israeli Foreign Ministry, in an interview with *The New York Herald Tribune* on 14 June:

"The Nazis and Nazi Collaborators (Punishment) Law corresponds to a number of international and national instruments forming the basis for the trial of all war criminals and their like after the Second World War and which, in their turn, follow on earlier precedents, especially from the First World War, for dealing with the problem of war criminals. The well known London Agreement and Charter of 8 Aug 1945 for the punishment of war criminals gave effect to the Moscow Declaration of 30 Oct 1943. One of the basic elements of these documents was that Nazi war criminals could be tried and punished 'by the people they have outraged.'

"There has been some talk to the effect that Eichmann ought to be tried by an international tribunal. This is purely academic. The International War Crimes Tribunals were disbanded over ten years ago. The United Nations has made repeated efforts to establish a permanent International Criminal Court, but the General Assembly found that the international situation was unpropitious for the completion of this effort. However, an international tribunal is not, and never has been, an essential part of the mechanism for dealing with war criminals. National tribunals have always been fully competent.

"Can Israel try Eichmann even though it was not in existence at the time the crimes were committed? The present Government of Germany itself has recognized, in the words of the Reparations Agreement with Israel in 1952, that 'unspeakable criminal acts were perpetrated against the Jewish people during the National Socialist regime of terror.' It should also be remembered that the violent upheavals of war do not fit easily into peacetime legal categories and classifications. After both World Wars peoples who did not have their own states during the



war, but who nevertheless had been victims of outrageous war crimes, were entitled to and did prosecute war criminals. Israel too has already prosecuted a number of minor war criminals who have found their way here." (See also above, World Opinion on the Eichmann case.)

#### INTERNATIONAL AID IN COLLECTING EVIDENCE

[The Israel Police set up a special unit—Bureau 06—to obtain, analyse and verify evidence for the prosecution.

The governments or official institutions of the following countries forwarded documents or statements pertaining to the case on Israel's request through the Foreign Ministry, or on their own initiative. The list also includes states where depositions of witnesses were taken on commission on behalf of the Jerusalem District Court: Austria, Belgium, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, France, Greece, German Democratic Republic, German Federal Republic, Hungary, Italy, Luxembourg, Norway, Netherlands, Poland, Sweden, UK, US and Yugoslavia.

Approaches were made to some other governments. Bulgaria and Finland informed the Ministry that no relevant material was in their possession. The USSR and Rumania did not reply.]

#### JUNE: ARGENTINA-ISRAEL EXCHANGES OVER EICHMANN'S REMOVAL FROM ARGENTINA

**Eichmann Reported Captured in Argentina.** [Soon after PM Ben-Gurion's announcement regarding Eichmann, Press reports started to appear that he had been captured in Argentina and brought from there to Israel.] At a later stage, an Argentinian note to Israel on the incident, released in Buenos Aires on 20 July, quoted Press reports that Eichmann had been removed from Argentina in an El Al Israel Airlines plane which had brought an Israeli delegation to Argentina to attend the 150th anniversary celebrations, and which the Government of Israel had asked leave to send back on 16 May with a group of infirm persons. (*Jer. Post*, 22 July)

**Argentina Requests Clarification.** On 1 June the Foreign Minister, Diogenes Taboada, announced that he had requested the Israel Ambassador in Buenos Aires to ask his government for "a concrete and official declaration in connection with the Eichmann case." He added, "I also told the Ambassador that if it is proved that an act violating international law and national laws was committed within Argentine territory, my government will adopt measures in accordance with the nature of the case." (*Jer. Post*, 3 June)

**Israeli Denial Expected.** On 3 June, *The Jerusalem Post* reported that Israel was expected to deny that Israeli security agents had been directly involved in the kidnapping of Eichmann in Argentine territory.

Observers in Buenos Aires and Jerusalem assumed that Argentina would be satisfied with an official denial by Israel; it was believed that the Argentine Government had no desire to create a diplomatic incident. (*Jer. Post*, 3, 5 June)

**Israeli Reply.** On 6 June the Israel Ambassador in Buenos Aires submitted to the Argentine Foreign Minister a *note verbale* which included the following points: The Government of Israel "had no knowledge whatsoever that Eichmann came to Israel from Argentina" until, having received a cable from its Ambassador in Buenos Aires on 2 June, it clarified the details with the Security Services which had detained Eichmann [in Israel—see below]. The circumstances elucidated were the following:

Ever since the end of the Second World War, Jewish volunteers, including Israelis, had been searching for Eichmann. Some months ago information was received that Eichmann was hiding in Argentina under a false name, and the fact was also established that "numerous Nazis" were residing there. The "group of volunteers" contacted Eichmann, who, realizing that he had been recognized, agreed after deliberating for 24 hours to come to Israel and to stand trial; he had stated so in writing.

The volunteers then removed Eichmann from Argentina with his consent and delivered him to the Israel Security Services. When the Israel Government ordered the preparations for Eichmann's trial it had as yet no knowledge that Eichmann had come from Argentina.

The text of Eichmann's statement was then quoted (see immediately below). The note continued:

"Should it be that the group of volunteers violated Argentine law or infringed the sovereign rights of Argentina, the Government of Israel expresses its regret. The Government of Israel requests that the extraordinary significance of bringing to trial a person who bears the responsibility for the murder of millions of our people be taken into consideration... The Government of Israel is fully confident that the Government of Argentina will reveal understanding for these historical and moral values."

**The Eichmann Statement.** The text of his statement was quoted in the above note as follows (Official translation from German):

"I, the undersigned, Adolf Eichmann, state herewith of my own free will: Since my true identity has now been revealed, I realize that there is no point in my continuing to try to evade justice. I declare myself willing to proceed to Israel and to stand trial there before a competent court.

"It is understood that I will receive legal counsel and I shall try to give expression, without any embroidery, to the facts relating to my last years in service in Germany, so that a true picture of the events may be transmitted to future generations. I am submitting this declaration of my own free will, I have not been promised anything and I have not been threatened. I want at last to achieve inner peace.

"As I am unable to remember all the details and may also mix things up, I request that I be helped by the putting at my disposal of documents and testimonies to assist me in my endeavour to establish the truth.

"(Sgd) Adolf Eichmann  
Buenos Aires, May 1960"  
(IGPB, 6 June)

**PM Ben-Gurion's Letter to President Frondizi.** On 7 June the above note was followed by a letter from PM Ben-Gurion to President Arturo Frondizi, of Argentina. He stated the background of Israel's case, expressed regret for the violation of Argentinian law, and expressed the hope that the friendly relations between the two countries would not be impaired. Speaking of Eichmann's responsibility "for the execution of Hitler's orders for the murder of the Jews in Europe," Ben-Gurion said:

"Never, even in the age-old annals of our martyrdom, has there been such a fiendish atrocity. Not only were millions murdered—including a million infants—but the cultural and spiritual centre of our people, which until World War II had its seat in Europe, was extirpated. There is hardly a Jew in the world who does not have a member of his family among the victims of the Nazis. Hundreds of thousands of the survivors are living in our

midst, and hundreds of people in Israel and abroad would not rest since the end of the war until they had found the man who had been in charge of this appalling campaign of extermination. They regarded it as their mission in life to bring the man responsible for this crime, without precedent in history, to stand trial before the Jewish people. Such a trial can take place only in Israel."

Ben-Gurion stated that he did "not underestimate the seriousness of the formal violation of Argentine law committed by those who found Eichmann" but added that "these events cannot be approached... from an exclusively formal point of view."

He concluded: "I am convinced that your Excellency will give full weight to the transcendental moral force of these motivations, for you yourself have fought against tyranny and shown your deep regard for human values. I hope you will understand our feelings, accept the expression of our sincere regret for the violation of your country's law, which was the result of an inner moral imperative, and associate yourself with all the friends of justice in the world, who see in the trial of Adolf Eichmann in Israel an act of supreme historic justice, and that the friendly relations between Israel and your country will not be impaired." (*IGPB, 8 June*)

**Argentina Demands Eichmann's Return.** On 8 June, the Argentine Foreign Minister replied to the Israel note of 6 June in a note handed to the Israel Ambassador in Buenos Aires, requesting the return of Eichmann.

Expressing the Argentine nation's "most vehement repudiation" of the Hitlerite crimes against the Jewish people and others, the note went on to say that while it recognized that Eichmann's residence in Argentina under a false name was "evidently irregular and not in conformity with the basic principles of asylum or territorial refuge," the Argentine Government took exception to the "gratuitous affirmation" that many Nazis reside in Argentina.

Summarizing the Israel communication of 6 June, the Argentine Foreign Minister noted that the Israel Government had in fact assumed responsibility for the act in question.

The note continued that Israel had announced that Eichmann would be tried in Israel; however, if he was accused of genocide, according to the Convention on Genocide he should be tried by an international tribunal or by a tribunal of the state in whose territory the act was committed.

The note continued that while Argentina understood the feeling of the Jewish people in the case, Israel should have respected the sovereignty of a friendly state. The Government of Argentina made a most formal protest and expected "adequate reparations" in the form of the restitution of Eichmann "in the course of the present week" and the punishment of individuals who had violated Argentine territory. Once this has been done, Israel could request Eichmann's delivery "by the methods contemplated in international law." [On 9 May Argentina and Israel had signed an extradition treaty, which, however, did not cover cases of military, political or related crimes.] "If not, the Argentine will refer the case to the United Nations," the note said. (*IGPB, 9 June*)

The *New York Times* reported that the hardening of the Argentine position was attributed in Buenos Aires to the Israel note. Officials said that Israel's admission of responsibility left Argentina no alternative but to protest and demand the return of Eichmann. (*NYT, NY, 9 June*)

Subsequently, Argentina recalled her Ambassador to

Israel, Dr Rodolfo Garcia Arias, who left on 12 June. (*Jer. Post, 10, 13 June*)

**Israel Not To Return Eichmann.** On 9 June it was reported from Jerusalem that Eichmann would not be returned; no immediate reply to the Argentine note was expected. PM Ben-Gurion, at the time also acting Foreign Minister, was said to be seeking a way to turn down the Argentine request without wrecking good relations with that country. Foreign diplomats in Israel commented that even "if Ben-Gurion were in a mood to send Eichmann back" he would not be able to do so because of the strong feelings that have been aroused in Israel. (*NYT, 11 June*)

The Israeli Press was unanimous in rejecting the Argentine demand. (*Davar; Ha'aretz; Herut; Al Hamishmar; Haboker; Lamerhav, 10 June*)

**Argentina Requests Security Council Meeting.** On 10 June, Argentina notified the UN that she would bring the case of Eichmann before it unless he was soon returned. (*NYT, 12 June*)

On 14 June Mrs Golda Meir, the Israel Foreign Minister, met Dr Amadeo, the Argentine delegate to the UN, at the New York home of Dr Fabregat, representative of Uruguay at the UN, who was acting as mediator. (*Jer. Post, 15 June*) Mrs Meir confirmed Israel's refusal to return Eichmann and reportedly rejected a compromise suggestion that the International Court of Justice should decide what court should try Eichmann, who in the meantime would be kept in custody at the Argentine embassy in Tel Aviv. (*NYT, NY, 16 June*)

On 15 June Argentina requested an urgent meeting of the Security Council, complaining that "the illicit transfer" of Eichmann was creating "an atmosphere of insecurity and mistrust incompatible with the preservation of international law." The memorandum noted that the one-week time-limit fixed in the note to Israel had expired without a reply, and that Argentina's efforts to reach a satisfactory solution through normal diplomatic channels had met with no success. It expressed the hope that the SC decision would involve "just reparation for the rights violated" but gave no indication of the type of restitution desired.

The meeting was set for 22 June, as some members of the Council hoped that in the meantime a settlement could be reached. (*Israel Press, 16 June; NYT, 17 June*)

**President Frondizi's Reply.** On 16 June, the Israel Foreign Ministry was handed the reply (dated 15 June) of the President of Argentina to PM Ben-Gurion's letter of 7 June. President Frondizi assured the Prime Minister of his understanding of the feeling of the Jewish people in the case and stated that justice demands the punishment of those responsible for genocide. Nevertheless, he continued, the Government of Israel should appreciate the motives which impelled Argentina "to protest an act which signified the violation of its sovereignty." The President drew attention to the Argentine note of 8 June, proposing to deal with any Israel request concerning Eichmann after he was returned to Argentina "within the framework of existing juridical procedure." (*IGPB, 17 June*)

**Ben-Gurion-Frondizi Meeting Fails to Materialize.** Following the exchange of notes between Argentina and Israel, it was reported that efforts were being made to arrange a meeting between President Frondizi and PM Ben-Gurion during their simultaneous European visits in mid-June. (*Jer. Post, 14, 17, 21 June*)

On 21 June Israel informed the Security Council that such a meeting had been arranged, to take place in the course of the week.

On 22 June, during the debate in the Security Council (see below), the Argentine representative stated that the meeting could not take place as it had been "vitiating in advance" by a statement of PM Ben-Gurion on 21 June, according to a UPI report. Ben-Gurion was said to have told the Press in Brussels of the forthcoming meeting, stating that friendly relations between Argentina and Israel would continue "provided Eichmann remains in Israel." Mrs Meir, the Israel Foreign Minister, replied that PM Ben-Gurion's statement had been reported out of context and that he had not mentioned the word "conditions." She quoted an Argentine *note verbale* according to which "the President of Argentina considers that the meeting would not be possible until after the UN had dealt with this question." If the meeting did not take place, the responsibility lay with the Government of Argentina, she said. (NYT, NY, 23 June)

#### THE ISSUE AT THE SECURITY COUNCIL

The debate in the Security Council on the Eichmann case began on 22 June and was concluded on the following day.

The Argentine Case was presented to Dr Mario Amadeo. Referring first to the relations of "cordial friendship" that had developed between Argentina and Israel up to the present time and "the absolute equality" of Jews living in Argentina, he went on to review the facts on which Argentina's complaint was based. He said that as all possibilities of direct negotiations had been exhausted, with Israel still refusing to provide the reparation requested, Argentina felt obliged to appeal to the UN. Dr Amadeo emphasized that Argentina was in no way defending Eichmann and had made it clear that she would not oppose a solution which would "allow justice to follow its course." Argentina could not, however, tolerate a violation of her sovereign rights, which, he stressed, compromises the principle of "absolute respect which states owe to each other and which excludes the exercise of jurisdictional acts in foreign territory." If this principle were to become obsolescent, he continued, "international law would rapidly become the law of the jungle." Argentina, he said, in defending her sovereignty, was also defending the rights of all refugees to a safe asylum. Argentina had afforded such asylum to tens of thousands between the years 1938-1949 even if it had not always been possible "to separate the ore from the pure metal."

Dr Amadeo submitted a draft resolution, the operative part of which stated that acts such as the one under discussion were liable, if repeated, to endanger international peace and security and requested Israel to make appropriate reparation. (See below for text of resolution, paras. 1-2.)

The Israel Case. Mrs Golda Meir, the Foreign Minister, speaking on behalf of Israel, expressed regret that the Argentine Government had brought the case before the Council; she disagreed with the Argentine view on "the failure of diplomatic representations" and said that if the meeting between President Frondizi and PM Ben-Gurion had not materialized, the responsibility lay with the Argentine Government. Mrs Meir denied that the State of Israel had violated the sovereignty of Argentina; there was nothing in the record to enable the Council to come to such a conclusion. Israel recognized that the

persons who removed Eichmann from Argentina had broken the laws of that country; for this Israel had apologized, and Mrs Meir again expressed her government's regret. However, the act which might have been committed by Israeli nationals was done by individuals, not by the state.

The Israel Government believed, Mrs Meir stated, that "this isolated violation of Argentine law must be seen in the light of the exceptional and unique character of the crimes attributed to Eichmann... and the motives of those that acted in this unusual manner." In this connection, she quoted from the findings of the Nuremberg Tribunal on the extermination of the Jews, including evidence on the part played by Eichmann. In conclusion, Mrs Meir asked for a definition of the meaning of the expression "adequate reparation" in the Argentine draft resolution.

The Soviet Union's Attitude. Arkady A. Sobolev, the Russian representative, criticized Argentina for not having arrested Eichmann and extradited him for trial, in accordance with international agreements and UN decisions to which Argentina was a party. He declared that "as is well known," war criminals had found sanctuary in Argentina, and accused the West of a policy of toleration with regard to these individuals. At the same time he supported the position of Argentina in so far as the violation of her sovereignty was involved.

United States Attitude. Henry Cabot Lodge, the US representative, said that three considerations should be uppermost: that nothing said or done in the Council should impair the otherwise good relations between Argentina and Israel; that international law and practices should be upheld; and that the whole matter could not be "considered apart from the monstrous acts with which Eichmann is charged." He expressed understanding of both the Israel and the Argentine positions. He endorsed the Argentine draft resolution, which he termed moderate, but proposed two amendments, one to the preamble, asking that Eichmann should be brought to "appropriate justice"; the other, as an additional operative paragraph, expressing the hope that the friendly relations between Argentina and Israel would be advanced. (See below, text of resolution, para 3.)

Britain, Italy, Ecuador, Ceylon, Nationalist China, Tunisia. The representatives of these countries endorsed the Argentine draft resolution. They emphasized their desire for the punishment of war criminals, and expressed understanding of the motives that had prompted the act in question, while insisting on respect for Argentine sovereignty.

France, Poland. The French delegate, Armand Berard, and the Polish representative, Bohdan Lewandowski, were critical of Argentina's demand for the return of Eichmann. Berard declared that Israel's action did not threaten international peace and security and was therefore not a matter for the Security Council. Lewandowski said that Poland's soil "is soaked with the blood of 6,000,000 victims of Nazi cruelty," and made it clear that he would not vote for the Argentine resolution. (SC/865-868, 22-23 June; NYT, NY, 23, 24 June)

Council Resolution and Israel's Apologies Constitute Adequate Reparation. According to *The New York Times*, none of the statements cited above materially weakened Argentina's hopes of using the SC resolution as an argument to support her demand for Eichmann's return; it



was understood that neither France nor the Soviet Union would veto it. These hopes were defeated, however, by a "radical shift" in the US position on the second day of the debate. The American representative had received instructions to follow up Mrs Meir's question about the meaning of "adequate reparation." The US considered, Lodge stated in the Council, "that adequate reparations will have been made by the expression of views by the Security Council in the pending resolution taken together with the statement of the Foreign Minister of Israel making apologies on behalf of the Government of Israel." When the pending resolution was adopted, Lodge added, the incident would then be closed; it was on this understanding that he endorsed it.

The representatives of Britain and France endorsed the US attitude.

The Russian representative asked Dr Amadeo for "a yes or no answer" to the question whether the Argentine resolution called for the return of Eichmann.

The Argentine delegate avoided a direct reply, stating that once the resolution had been adopted it was for the parties concerned to interpret it faithfully.

After the vote, the Soviet representative said that the word "reparation" could never be interpreted as a basis for claiming the return of Eichmann to Argentina. (NYT, NY, 24 June)

**The Resolution.** The resolution cited below was adopted by eight votes to nil. Poland and the Soviet Union abstained on the ground that Israel's action did not, as charged by Argentina, threaten international peace and security. Poland also contended that the resolution might make it more difficult to bring other war criminals to trial.

Argentina did not participate in the voting, as a party to the dispute. The Argentine delegate said that he refrained out of "courtesy."

The operative part of the resolution reads as follows: "The Security Council . . .

"1. Declares that acts such as that under consideration, which affect the sovereignty of a Member State and therefore cause international friction, may, if repeated, endanger international peace and security;

"2. Requests the Government of Israel to make appropriate reparation in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the rules of international law;

"3. Expresses the hope that the traditionally friendly relations between Argentina and Israel will be advanced." (SC/865-868, 22-23 June)

#### JUNE-AUG: FURTHER ARGENTINA-ISRAEL EXCHANGES—SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTE

**Argentina Rejects Israel's Apologies as Inadequate.** On 28 June Argentina sent a note to Israel asking for "ade-

quate redress . . . in the light of the deliberation of the Security Council." In Jerusalem this was reportedly interpreted as meaning that Argentina no longer sought Eichmann's return. (Jer. Post, 30 June)

Israel replied on 4 July quoting the Security Council statements of the US, UK and French delegates to the effect that the views expressed in the Council, together with the Israeli apology, provided adequate reparation. The note concluded: "The Government of Israel feels confident that the Government of Argentina, in the spirit of mutual respect and harmony which have always characterized the relations between the two countries, will now be agreeable to see these relations maintained in the same spirit." (IGPB, 5 July)

It was reported from Jerusalem that Israel was contemplating an additional conciliatory and more demonstrative gesture should Argentina accept her note as a step towards a final settlement of the dispute. (Jer. Post, 14 July)

On 20 July Argentina, in another note, rejected the Israeli reply and all other Israel suggestions as inadequate and reserved the right to take whatever action she might consider adequate. (Jer. Post, 22 July)

**July: Israeli Ambassador Expelled.** On 22 July the Argentine Government declared the Israel Ambassador in Buenos Aires, Aryeh Levavi, *persona non grata*. Israel officially denied that the Ambassador or the embassy had acted in any way "contrary to diplomatic usage." (Jer. Post, 24 July) [The Ambassador left Argentina on 26 July.]

**Aug: Incident Closed.** Even before the Israel Ambassador had been declared *persona non grata*, Shabtai Rosenne, Legal Adviser to the Israel Foreign Ministry, had been sent to Buenos Aires at the suggestion of Dr Pardo, his opposite number in Argentina, to draft a joint declaration to close the matter. Negotiations proceeded satisfactorily, and it was assumed that the expulsion of the Israel Ambassador was meant by Argentina as part of the final settlement of the dispute. (Jer. Post, 29, 31 July)

On 3 Aug the following statement was published simultaneously in Jerusalem and Buenos Aires:

"The Government of Israel and the Republic of Argentina, animated by the wish to comply with the resolution of the Security Council of 23 June, 1960 in which the hope was expressed that the traditionally friendly relations between the two countries would be advanced, have decided to regard as closed the incident that arose out of the action taken by Israel nationals which infringing fundamental rights of the State of Argentina." (IGPB, 4 Aug)

[At the end of the year, Argentina and Israel interchanged new Ambassadors, see p 300.]

## QUESTION OF ISRAEL'S NUCLEAR CAPACITY

**US Requests Information on Reports of "Secret" Israeli Reactor.** According to Western Press reports on 17-20 Dec, the US Government had been informed by its intelligence services that Israel was building in the Negev, with French assistance, a plutonium-producing reactor, which would eventually enable her to produce atomic weapons. US suspicions were said to have been roused by the secrecy associated with the project, which had reached the attention of US officials only recently, when large-scale construction had been observed in the Negev. On

inquiry, the US representatives had been led to believe that the project was a textile plant, but long-range photographs had revealed its true nature. (Daily Express, 17 Dec; Washington Post, 18 Dec; NYT, 20 Dec)

On 9 Dec, on the eve of his departure for the NATO conference US Secretary of State Herter asked Harman, the Israel Ambassador to the US, for clarification of the reports that Israel was constructing a second nuclear reactor. He also asked, it was reported, whether Israel intended to produce atomic weapons. On 19 Dec, no



reply having yet been received from Israel, the State Department made Herter's request public. (*Times; Ha'aretz*, 21 Dec)

[The Israeli reply was given on 20 Dec, see below.]

**American Leaders Informed.** On 9 Dec, the Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy was informed by the Central Intelligence Agency that Israel might be developing atomic weapons. The President-elect Kennedy was briefed on the subject by the Director of the CIA. On 10 Dec, the Israeli project was discussed at a White House briefing, dealing primarily with NATO, at which President Eisenhower, and senior defence, State Department and CIA officials were present. (*Washington Post*, 18 Dec; *Times; NYT*, 20 Dec)

**19 Dec: Israeli and French Denials.** On 19 Dec, the Israel Atomic Energy Commission stated that Israel was not engaged in the production of atomic weapons, and that her atomic research was devoted to the needs of industry, agriculture, medicine and science. (*Jer. Post*, 20 Dec)

On 19 Dec, a Quai d'Orsay spokesman formally denied Press reports that France had assisted Israel in an atomic military programme. He confirmed the Israel AEC statement, and stated that France had been helping Israel to build an atomic research pile using heavy water and natural uranium, similar to the one for which India had received assistance from Canada. All necessary measures had been taken to ensure that the installations would be utilized for peaceful purposes only. (*Monde*, 20 Dec)

**American Suspicions Not Allayed.** *The Times* reported that Washington officials remained sceptical. It was suggested in Washington that suspicion could be allayed if Israel put the project under the inspection of the International AEC. (*Times*, 21 Dec) It was recalled in Washington that Nehru, the Indian PM, had rejected an appeal by the AEC for inspection of the reactor being built in India. Apparently, it was thought, Ben-Gurion, like Nehru, preferred to decide only at a later stage to what purpose to use the reactor. (*Ha'aretz*, 20 Dec) According to *The Times*, too, the most sober assessment in Washington was that "Israel was probably not really planning a rapid armoury of nuclear weapons, but wanted to be in a position to produce them if the general situation seemed to warrant it." (*Times*, 21 Dec)

**Israeli Reply to US.** On 20 Dec the Israel Ambassador handed the Secretary of State Israel's reply to his question of 9 Dec. The reply was believed to contain more details than Ben-Gurion's statement in the Knesset on the subsequent day [see below].

The delay was due, according to an Israeli spokesman, to Herter's absence from Washington since 9 Dec. (*Jer. Post* 22 Dec)

The Israeli Press pointed out that Israel's agreement with the US on cooperation in nuclear research did not oblige Israel to supply the US with full information on all nuclear development work in Israel. In fact, there was a clause providing that restricted information would not be handed over. (*Ha'aretz*, 22 Dec)

**Ben-Gurion Statement on Negev Reactor.** On 21 Dec PM Ben-Gurion stated in the Knesset that the report that Israel was producing an atomic bomb was either a deliberate or an unwitting falsehood. The Government of Israel, as was well known, had proposed general and total disarmament in Israel and the neighbouring Arab states, on condition that there would be mutual right of inspection. The origin of the false report was evidently the atomic research being undertaken by Israeli scientists.

Israel's first nuclear reactor at Nahal Rubin with a capacity of 1,000 thermal kilowatts had been established with the assistance of the US, he continued. A second research reactor was being constructed, in the Negev, with a capacity of 24,000 thermal kilowatts, and would be completed within three to four years. It would serve the needs of industry, agriculture, health and science, and would be used to train Israeli scientists and technologists for the future construction of an atomic power station within a presumed period of ten to fifteen years.

When the reactor was finished it would be open to trainees from other countries and would be similar to the reactor the Canadian Government helped to construct in India, with the difference that the Israeli reactor was smaller. [The capacity of the Indian reactor was 40,000 thermal kilowatts.] (*Jer. Post*, 22 Dec)

Ben-Gurion associated the building of the new reactor with Israel's efforts to develop the Negev.

[It was reported later that US officials admitted that when the reactor would be completed it would produce only enough plutonium for a single atomic bomb every ten to eleven months. It was pointed out that Canada, India, Sweden, the Netherlands and Switzerland had reactors larger than Israel's or of about the same size.] (*Jer. Post*, 23 Dec)

*The Jerusalem Post* reported that the reason for secrecy was that raw materials had to be obtained abroad and it was not considered wise to run the risk of Arab boycott action. (*Jer. Post*, 22 Dec)

[The Israel Press also published extensive reports on the reactor, its site, the progress of the work and the French experts who helped.] (See, for example, *Ha'aretz; Jer. Post*, 22 Dec)

**American Reaction to Israel's Reply.** Israel Foreign Ministry circles reported that there were no signs of dissatisfaction on the part of the US Government with Israel's reply. (*Jer. Post*, 23 Dec) On the other hand, *The Times* reported from Washington that American anxieties had not been stilled and that the State Department had refused to declare itself satisfied with Israel's assurances. Concern was expressed that the Arab countries might be panicked into some kind of defence agreement with Soviet Russia. (*Times*, 23 Dec) However, on 22 Dec the State Department announced that "it was gratifying to note that, as made public, the Israel atomic energy programme does not represent cause for special concern." (*Jer. Post*, quoting *Reuters*, 25 Dec)

On 22 Dec the Israel Foreign Ministry spokesman stated, in reply to a question, that so far no demand had been made by the US for inspection of Israel's nuclear research. (*Ha'aretz*, 23 Dec)

On 11 Jan 1961, the Israel Ambassador in Washington told reporters he did not think the reactor would ever make the front pages again. He indicated that the issue was closed. (*Jer. Post*, 13 Jan 1961)

**Abdel-Nasser's Reaction.** In his speech in Port Said on 23 Dec, Abdel-Nasser referred to the reports that Israel was producing an atom bomb. He declared that if Israel could make an atom bomb, so could the UAR, and hinted that Israel was spreading the report as propaganda to frighten the UAR. The UAR would under no circumstances permit Israel to be its superior. She would always have land and air superiority. If the UAR became certain that Israel was making an atom bomb, it would mean the beginning of war between the UAR and Israel, because the UAR could not permit Israel to manufacture an atom bomb. She would have to attack the base of aggression, even if she had to mobilize four million to

destroy it. There was another probability: that the imperialist states were preparing the ground for arming Israel with atomic weapons, while pretending that Israel had produced them herself. Abdel-Nasser did not think this unlikely. If it happened the UAR would obtain atomic weapons at any price. (*R. Cairo, 23 Dec-BBC, 28 Dec*)

Similar statements appeared in the UAR Press and radio.

**Other Arab Reactions.** The Lebanese Prime Minister stated on 20 Dec that the reports that Israel was producing an atom bomb had caused profound anxiety. The Lebanese and other Arab governments were endeavouring to adopt an appropriate line. As long as Israel existed no Arab could live in peace. (*R. Beirut, 20 Dec-IMB, 21 Dec*)

The Jordanian radio criticized Arab indifference and quarrels while Israel was making serious advances in the military and scientific fields. While Israel was turning her arms against the Arab countries, the UAR was turning her arms against the Arabs. (*R. Amman, 22 Dec-IMB, 23 Dec*)

The Jordanian PM said on 27 Dec that he was certain that Arab countries would pay serious attention to the matter. (*R. Beirut, 27 Dec-IMB, 28 Dec*)

Beirut Radio reported that the problem of the Israeli atom bomb would be discussed at the Arab League's emergency session in Jan 1961. (*R. Beirut, 26 Dec-IMB, 27 Dec*)

**Soviet Reaction.** Soviet reactions were confined almost entirely to Moscow Radio's Arab broadcasts. On 17 Dec, following the first report in *The Daily Express*, Moscow Radio maintained that Israel was producing the bomb with the help of the US. This was the first time that the US was making nuclear arms available to a foreign country, which was not surprising as Israel was the only mainstay of the US in the Middle East. (*R. Moscow, 17 Dec-IMB, 18 Dec*) On subsequent days Moscow's Arab broadcasts repeated this charge and maintained that US anxiety was only a pretence. The US had been the first to know of the matter and now she was laying the responsibility on France. (*R. Moscow, 27 Dec-IMB, 28 Dec*) [The USSR's Russian Press and broadcasts made hardly any reference to the entire affair.]

## WESTERN COUNTRIES: PM BEN-GURION'S VISIT TO US, BRITAIN AND WESTERN EUROPE

### ARRANGEMENT AND PURPOSE OF THE TRIP

**Feb: "Private Visit" to US.** On 28 Feb the Israel Cabinet approved PM Ben-Gurion's voyage to the US to receive, on 9 Mar, the honorary degree of Doctor of Laws from Brandeis University, Waltham, Massachusetts, in response to an invitation received about a month earlier. (*Jer. Post, 29 Feb*) The Press reported that he would not be a guest of the US Government, his visit would be strictly private. (*Ha'aretz, 29 Feb; Jer. Post, 29 Feb, 2 Mar*)

According to Dayan, the Minister of Agriculture, Ben-Gurion had told him on 20 Feb of his plan to go to the US, ostensibly to receive an honorary degree, but actually to meet President Eisenhower and his aides, Adenauer, and—on his way back—Macmillan and de Gaulle, in order to discuss Israel's political, economic and defence position. He did not want premature publicity. (*Ma'ariv, 11 Apr*)

**"Diplomatic Offensive" Meant to Prevent Hostilities in ME.** Official sources remained silent on the objectives of the journey, but the Press speculated on them extensively. The voyage was regarded as "part of a broad diplomatic offensive designed to bring Israel's case before the Western world" on the eve of the May Summit Conference. An outbreak of hostilities in the ME could be prevented only if the Western powers understood that the USSR, by heavily arming the UAR, was seriously threatening the balance of power. Only appropriate counteraction by the West could curb Abdel-Nasser's aggressive attitude. (*Jer. Post, 4 Mar*)

**Feb-Mar: Invitations and Arrangements.** On 29 Feb, the UN SG cabled inviting Ben-Gurion to be his guest during his visit. The PM accepted on 1 Mar. (*Jer. Post, 2 Mar*)

On 3 Mar the UK Foreign Office announced that Ben-Gurion would arrive in London on 17 Mar for a three-day private visit and that he was expected to have talks

with PM Macmillan and the Foreign Secretary, Lloyd. (*Ha'aretz, 4 Mar*)

On 6 Mar the Press reported that the projected tour would not include France, as Khrushchev was visiting that country at the time. Ben-Gurion would pay a separate visit to France later, certainly before the Summit Conference. (*Ha'aretz; Jer. Post, 6 Mar*) (For visit to France see pp 292-3.)

On and after 3 Mar there were rumours in the Press that during his US visit Ben-Gurion might meet Chancellor Adenauer, who was scheduled to arrive there on 12 Mar. (*Jer. Post, 3 Mar*)

The Press reported that, according to diplomatic sources in Washington, Ben-Gurion had requested to see President Eisenhower and Secretary of State Herter. (*Ha'aretz; Jer. Post, 3 Mar*)

### MAR: VISIT TO US

**Feb-Mar: Reserved Response From Washington.** On 28 Feb a White House spokesman said that he knew nothing of Ben-Gurion's intended visit.

On 1 Mar it was reported from the White House that the meeting would probably take place, although no arrangements had yet been made. (*Ha'aretz, 2 Mar*) On 3 Mar a White House Press officer stated that she "supposed" that "if Mr Ben-Gurion visited Washington he would certainly meet with President Eisenhower." It was reported that arrangements for Ben-Gurion's meetings with US leaders would be made after President Eisenhower's return from his visit to Latin America. (*Ha'aretz, 4 Mar*)

**"Official Washington" Concerned as to Effect on US-UAR Relations.** *Ha'aretz* reported that "official Washington" was privately unenthusiastic about the visit. This applied mainly to middle and lower official echelons, which maintained that it would upset the US's policy of friendship towards the UAR. The paper believed, however, that such views should not be given undue impor-

tance, as they probably reflected the excessive professional sensitivity of diplomats. (*Ha'aretz*, 4 Mar)

**Why a "Private Visit"?** *The Jerusalem Post* wrote that since the Sinai campaign in 1956, and the subsequent short period of divergent Israeli and US policies, a face to face talk between Eisenhower and the PM was considered advisable. The White House was understood to have agreed in principle as early as summer 1957, but the date had to be postponed several times. Ultimately a private visit was decided on, as a state visit might have obliged the US to issue a similar invitation to Abdel-Nasser. (*Jer. Post*, 4 Mar)

**Speculation on Ben-Gurion's Intentions.** *Ha'aretz* wrote that there was reason to suppose that the discussions would not centre on concrete subjects or attain "concrete results." According to "informed circles," Ben-Gurion intended to discuss general aspects of Western and Communist bloc policies in the ME. As a realist, he would not complain about recent improved relations between the US and the UAR. (*Ha'aretz*, 8 Mar)

A report in *The New York Times* that Ben-Gurion was expected to seek a promise of US support if Israel should be invaded was "firmly" denied by the Israel Government Secretary on 6 Mar. (*Jer. Post*, 7 Mar)

*The New York Times* quoted diplomatic and Israeli sources as saying that the purpose of the visit was to "urge President Eisenhower to use US influence to keep the peace in the ME. According to Israeli sources, the UAR now possesses more and better arms than it did in 1956, and Abdel-Nasser might be tempted to launch a sudden attack against Israel if he thinks he can get away with it." (*NYT*, 9 Mar)

*Ha'aretz* quoted US "observers" to the effect that the visit could give Eisenhower an opportunity to be personally impressed by the gravity of Israel's anxieties; for he was "above all a man of personal impressions." Secondly, it might allay Israel's anxieties, as Ben-Gurion could be personally impressed by the sincerity and seriousness with which the US President would repeat his promises to support Israel. (*Ha'aretz*, 4 Mar)

[The announcement of Ben-Gurion's voyage came at a time of acute military tension between Israel and the UAR, following the Tawafiq incident. The announcement of the trip was regarded in Israel as contributing to the relaxation of the tension.] (See p 204.)

**Mar: Ben-Gurion Arrives in US.** Ben-Gurion left by air on 7 Mar. Before leaving, he said: "I know that Israel's security is in good hands, and I believe that the peace that now reigns will still prevail on my return." In a statement on his arrival in Boston on 8 Mar, he said that Israel "looks to the future with confidence, though not without concern, being fully conscious of the difficulties... We in Israel deeply reciprocate the friendship extended us by the great American Republic. We fully appreciate what the US is doing to preserve peace, buttress liberty and assist other countries in their development."

On the same day, the White House announced that on 10 Mar Ben-Gurion would make "an informal call upon the President." (*Jer. Post*, 8, 9 Mar)

On 9 Mar Ben-Gurion received the degree of Doctor of Laws at Brandeis University and delivered a non-political address on "Science and Ethics—the contribution of Greece, India and Israel." (For full text see *Jer. Post*, 10 Mar.)

**Mar: Meeting with Eisenhower.** On 10 Mar Ben-Gurion conferred with Eisenhower at the White House for two hours. There was no agenda. Most of the time was taken up by Ben-Gurion's exposition of his views.

The following were, according to the Press, the main views he expressed:

(a) **ME and Israeli problems:** Ben-Gurion stressed Israel's desire to live in peace with her neighbours, explained how the cold war intensified Arab hostility to Israel and described how the Soviet build-up of the UAR's armaments was changing the balance of arms in the ME. Defence needs imposed a heavy economic burden on Israel, he said, and she would prefer to devote her efforts to more constructive ends.

(b) **East-West relations:** While present Soviet moderation was only a tactical manoeuvre, Israel fully supported the aim of strengthening peace in the world, and in the ME in particular, by means of the Summit Conference. While he had his own reservations about the results of a Summit discussion of Arab-Israeli problems, he was interested in an East-West effort to reduce the tension. He doubted, however, the efficacy of an arms embargo which, he feared, might be violated by the USSR.

(c) **Afro-Asian problems:** Cooperation with Afro-Asian countries must be based not merely on money, but on spiritual values. Above all the new nations should be given the feeling that they were being treated as equals. He described Israel's experiences with those countries, and her efforts to expand her contacts with them.

(d) **Jews and Zionism:** He explained that the aim of Zionism was to establish in Israel a sanctuary for the Jewish people, where it could renew its spiritual life and make its contribution to humanity.

(e) **Economic efforts:** Ben-Gurion described Israel's efforts to develop her economy and her foreign trade. Israel was interested in cooperating with the EEC.

The Press stated that Ben-Gurion made no specific requests, nor were any concrete proposals, such as the supply of arms or a military alliance, discussed. (*NYT*, 12 Mar; *Ha'aretz*, 11, 13 Mar)

Sources acquainted with the White House warned against exaggerated expectations, and pointed out that political discussions with the President always remained very general. At the same time there was no doubt that it was to Israel's advantage that on the eve of the Summit Conference Eisenhower was given a direct and personal impression of the problems that preoccupied Israel. (*Ha'aretz*, 11 Mar)

**Mar: Meeting with Dillon.** Owing to Secretary Herter's indisposition, Dillon, the Under-Secretary, represented the State Department at a meeting with Ben-Gurion. A State Department communiqué reported that a general discussion was held "on world problems and US-Israel relations." (*Jer. Post*, 11 Mar)

**Mar: Ben-Gurion Tells Foreign Relations Committee: West Could Assist a Peaceable Egypt.** On 11 Mar Ben-Gurion met members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and expressed his views on Israel-Arab relations, inter-Arab relations, the Egyptian boycott in Suez, the refugee problem and Israel's economic development. (*Ha'aretz*, 13 Mar)

Summarizing the discussion at a Press conference after the meeting, he said that "if Egypt will be satisfied to live in peace with its neighbours—not only its Jewish neighbours, but its Arab neighbours as well—it might do a great deal to persuade the West to help their country and to change their country to a healthy, edu-



cated country." This could be done if Egyptian leaders applied their energies to that purpose and not to negative objectives such as making war and dominating other peoples. Peace was the key to all the problems of the area: the settlement of the dispute over the Palestine refugees, the division of waters for irrigation purposes, and the development of Arab countries and Israel alike. "We are willing to make our contribution to that end," he declared. (*NYT*, 13 Mar)

**Meeting with Other US Leaders.** Ben-Gurion also met in Washington: Senator Fulbright on 11 Mar; General Bedel Smith and Supreme Court Justice Frankfurter on the 12th; Vice-President Nixon, Senators Kennedy, Johnson and Symington, and Secretary of State Herter, on 13 Mar. (*Ha'aretz*, 14 Mar) According to the Press, Nixon accepted Ben-Gurion's invitation to visit Israel and said he might come in either an official or an unofficial capacity. (*Jer. Post*, 15 Mar)

**Meeting with Hammarskjöld.** On 14 Mar Ben-Gurion met the UN SG for a general review of ME problems concerning Israel—principally the Suez blockade and the demilitarized zones. There was no agenda. It was reported that they did not reach full agreement, though they diverged less on principles than on methods and timing. (*Ha'aretz*; *Herut*, 16 Mar)

A reception in honour of Ben-Gurion was held later by the SG. The head of the Soviet delegation and the Tunisian delegate (the only Arab representative invited) did not attend. (*Ha'aretz*, 16 Mar)

**Meetings with Jewish Leaders and Youth.** Ben-Gurion spent the last two days of his visit to the US (15–16 Mar) in private talks with Jewish leaders, whom he urged to continue their support of Israel, strengthen Zionist education and encourage the immigration of Jewish youth to Israel. (*Ha'aretz*, 16 Mar) He repeated the last theme in an address in Hebrew to students on 16 Mar at Yeshiva University. (*Ha'aretz*, 17 Mar)

### MAR: MEETING WITH ADENAUER

On 14 Mar Ben-Gurion met Chancellor Adenauer of West Germany in New York for two hours.

**German Economic Assistance to Israel?** *Ha'aretz* reported from New York that Ben-Gurion had requested a \$500 million loan from Germany. Adenauer's reply had been neither negative nor expressly affirmative, and the two leaders had not gone into details. (*Ha'aretz*, 22 Mar) (See also pp 296–7.)

On 23 Mar, however, *The Jerusalem Post* reported from "an authoritative source" in London [Ben-Gurion stayed in Britain from 17–23 Mar] that Adenauer had promised Israel \$500 million in long-term loans and investments over the next ten years. (*Jer. Post*, 23 Mar) On 24 Mar a spokesman of the German Foreign Ministry commented: "We have been informed by the Chancellor on his talk with Mr Ben-Gurion and we have not the slightest information that such an aid offer has been made." (*Reuters*, in *Jer. Post*, 24 Mar) *Ha'aretz* reported from London that there had apparently been a calculated Israeli leak intended to commit Adenauer publicly to this promise. (*Ha'aretz*, 25 Mar)

**Ben-Gurion on the Meeting.** In a statement to the Press after the meeting Ben-Gurion said he had been glad to meet Adenauer. He belonged to a country which could not forget the past, but "we remember the past not in

order to go back to it, but so that it shall never recur." He had said in the Knesset that the Germany of today was not the Germany of yesterday and after his meeting with the Chancellor he was sure his judgement was correct. Ben-Gurion told a *Jerusalem Post* correspondent that the honour of the Jewish people was uppermost in his mind and he felt he was fulfilling his duty in meeting the German Chancellor. (*Jer. Post*; *Ha'aretz*, 15 Mar)

**Adenauer on Relations with Israel.** After paying compliments to Ben-Gurion, Adenauer told the Press that the German people drew deep satisfaction from the fact that through restitution to the victims of Nazism a contribution was being made towards rehabilitation in Israel. "The German people as well as my government are convinced that our mutual cooperation with, and support for, Israel will continue to bear fruit in the future," he said. This last sentence was understood to refer to Germany's readiness to continue economic assistance to Israel. (*Jer. Post*; *Ha'aretz*, 15 Mar)

**Meeting Criticized in Israel.** Ben-Gurion's meeting with Adenauer drew criticism in Israel from opposition parties as well as from Mapam and Achdut Ha'avoda. (See *Kol Ha'am*, 15 Mar; *Herut*; *Lamerhav*; *Al Hamishmar*, 16 Mar)

### MAR: VISIT TO UNITED KINGDOM

**Statement upon Arrival.** On arrival in London on 17 Mar [on his first visit to the UK since 1950], Ben-Gurion said that recent years had seen "a growing mutual understanding and cordiality" in the relations between the UK and Israel. "Britain occupies a special place in the historic memories of the people of Israel and we shall always remember with profound gratitude Britain's contribution in the first stages of our national reorganization in our homeland." (*Jer. Post*, 18 Mar)

Ben-Gurion's visit had been prepared by the appointment of Arthur Lourie as Israel Ambassador, a visit to London by Eban, Minister without Portfolio, who discussed atomic research, and a recent visit by Peres, the Deputy Defence Minister. (*Times*, 23 Mar) (See p 338.)

**Mar: Meeting with Macmillan.** On 17 Mar Ben-Gurion met PM Macmillan and Lloyd, the Foreign Secretary, for talks which were reported to have covered ME and world problems. *The Times* reported that "he did not come with particular requests for arms." (*Times*, 18, 23 Mar)

However, his aims in London were reported to be more specific than in Washington and to be connected with the maintenance of the ME balance of power. (*Jer. Post*, 18 Mar) Macmillan and Ben-Gurion were said to be agreed in most points in their estimate of the ME situation. (*Ma'ariv*, 18 Mar)

**Macmillan Declines Invitation to Israel.** According to a Foreign Office spokesman, Ben-Gurion invited Macmillan to visit Israel, but the latter said that he did not see how he could at present fit the visit into his timetable. Diplomatic observers in London quoted by *Ha'aretz* interpreted this as a refusal; acceptance, they said, would have complicated Britain's relations with the Arab countries. (*Ha'aretz*, 20 Mar)

**Reported Agreement to Release Arms to Israel.** On 20 Mar *The Observer* reported that, according to authoritative sources in the Foreign Office and Defence Minis-



try, the British Government was thinking of releasing new weapons to Israel, notably for anti-aircraft defence. It was reported that Ben-Gurion had left his "shopping list" in the hands of the Israel purchasing mission in London.

According to this report, Britain's permanent policy in the ME was to try to maintain some kind of balance. In the present positions of the UAR and Israel, this meant more aid for the latter, as, according to estimates accepted by the British military authorities, the UAR had a slight edge over the Israeli forces, particularly in the air, even allowing for what the British considered the superior technical training and combativeness of Israeli troops. *The Observer* speculated that the Israel Air Force might receive from Britain air-to-air missiles of the Firestreak type [better than the American Side Winder]. The paper suspected that this type of missile was in the government's mind when the Under-Secretary to the Foreign Office declined several days earlier to give assurances in the House of Commons that the government would not give missiles to Israel. (*Observer*, 20 Mar)

On 20 Mar a Foreign Office spokesman declared that there was no truth in *The Observer* report, saying: "This has come as a complete surprise to us. There has been no pronouncement about arms sales to Israel." (NYT, 21 Mar) Earlier, an Israel spokesman in London also denied that Ben-Gurion had come to Britain to conduct talks about arms supplies. (*Hatzofeh*, 18 Mar)

**Meeting with Gaitskell.** On 18 Mar Ben-Gurion met the leader of the Labour party, Hugh Gaitskell, for the first time. *Davar* reported that apparently a certain change had taken place in Labour's attitude, which had been inflexible since the Suez affair. It appeared that their talk eliminated many misunderstandings which had hampered Labour's relations with Israel. (*Davar*, 20 Mar)

**Meeting with Jewish Leaders.** On 17 Mar, Ben-Gurion met Jewish leaders from the Board of Deputies and the Zionist Federation.

### MAR: VISITS SUMMED UP

**Ben-Gurion Statement on Return.** In a statement on his return to Israel on 23 Mar, Ben-Gurion said that in his meetings with the US President and Secretary of State he had discussed "the great problems facing the world, the affairs of Asia and Africa," the situation in the ME, Israel's attitude, "and above all the consolidation of the peace in our area and the whole world." He stated there were almost no differences of opinion between the heads of the US Administration and himself.

Of his talk with Adenauer he said he had reason to believe it would have "beneficial results for Israel."

Of his meeting with the UN SG he said, "We had a friendly and candid discussion of our differences of opinion."

In his meeting with the British PM and Foreign Secretary, he said, they discussed the problems of the world and the ME, and the consolidation of peace.

Summing up his visits and meetings, he said he had reason to believe that his journey had not been in vain. (*IGPB*, 23 Mar)

At the Mapai Conference on 24 Mar, Ben-Gurion said that any conclusion about the practical results of his talks would be premature, "though the practical aim of some of them—not all, of course—lay in the discussions themselves, and these were almost all favourable." (*ICPB*, 24 Mar)

**Results of Visits Believed Favourable.** *The Times* reported from Washington that apparently Ben-Gurion had been encouraged by his visit to the US. He had come more to put over a general point of view than to make specific requests, but he had been given some grounds for hoping that Eisenhower would drop hints to his allies, such as Britain and France, that they ought to increase arms deliveries to Israel. Eisenhower's concern had been aroused by Ben-Gurion's account of the massive build-up of arms in the Arab countries, and he had been made to feel that there were dangers in a growing imbalance of power. He was also reported to have responded with kindred feelings to descriptions of the difficulties of balancing Israel's budget under such a heavy defence burden. (*Times*, 14 Mar)

Later, *The Times* reported that Ben-Gurion was said to be well satisfied with his talks in both capitals. Presumably he now believed that an East-West détente after the Summit Conference would not include a ME agreement without consultation with Israel and at her expense. Presumably, also, he considered that Israel could rely on support, if attacked, and on assistance over defensive weapons—jet aircraft or anti-aircraft missiles—if the armaments of her Arab neighbours were sizeably increased. (*Times*, 23 Mar)

**Question of ME at the Summit.** *The Scotsman*, however, reported that Ben-Gurion had left with one big disappointment, for he had found Macmillan lukewarm towards his idea that the ME should be discussed at the Summit Conference. Macmillan apparently told Ben-Gurion that there was unlikely to be time for such a discussion after the more pressing problems, such as disarmament, Berlin and East-West relations had been dealt with. He thought this would be a more suitable subject for later Summit conferences, when there would be more international confidence. (*Scotsman*, 23 Mar)

**"Important Promises," but "No Immediate Results Expected."** *Ha'aretz* wrote that Ben-Gurion had succeeded in dispelling the tension caused by the Egyptian troops concentrations in Sinai and had regained the political initiative for Israel. However, the public should not expect any immediate results. These—in so far as they materialized—would become apparent only after some time, and perhaps not for a fairly long time. It was reported that Ben-Gurion had received two important promises, which, however, were of such a character that they could receive no immediate publicity. (*Ha'aretz*, 21, 23 Mar)

### MAR: REACTIONS TO BEN-GURION'S TOUR

[While Ben-Gurion's journey received little publicity in the West it became a major preoccupation of the Arab countries. Their Press and radio, representatives abroad, and nationals in Western countries, expressed concern about the purpose of the visit and joined in official and unofficial protests, demonstrations and severe criticism of the West.]

**UAR Anxiety.** As soon as the visit was announced, it became the principal subject of UAR Press and radio comment, and continued to hold pride of place during the entire duration of the visits and for some time afterwards.

The following were some of the statements made: Ben-Gurion was seeking to revive tripartite support of Israel. He was seeking arms. He was preparing a Zionist imperialist plot like the 1956 aggression. The West was

joining Israel in murdering the Palestine nation. Ben-Gurion would remain a war criminal even though he was awarded a university degree. The US had again fallen into the trap Israel had prepared for it. Friendship with Israel was tantamount to hostility towards the Arabs. (BBC; *IMB*, 1-28 Mar; *Gumhuriyah*, 12, 16, 17 Mar; *Ahram*, 7, 9 Mar; *Akhbar*, 16 Mar)

**Arab Envoys in US Express "Deep Concern."** On 7 Mar the envoys of ten Arab countries in Washington jointly expressed to the US Secretary of State "deep concern" over Ben-Gurion's imminent visit. While not suggesting that the visit be cancelled, they told Herter that they feared the PM would use his visit to worsen relations between the US and the Arab countries. Mustafa Kāmil, of the UAR, was the spokesman at the meeting.

A State Department spokesman said later that Herter had assured the Arab envoys that Ben-Gurion's visit would in no way affect the friendly relations between the Arab countries and the US.

The Arab envoys later released a statement declaring that "recent Israeli and Zionist declarations and activities made it clear that the deterioration of Arab-American relations seems to be one of the main objectives of Zionist policy." (NYT, 8 Mar)

**UAR Embassy Statement on "Grand Design of World Zionism."** On 8 Mar, the UAR embassy in Washington issued a statement describing the visit as "the first part of a grand design drawn by world Zionism to effect a deterioration in the relations between the Arab people and the American people; to aggravate tension in the ME; to bring the stability and peace of the area to the edge of danger and to prepare in Western minds a spurious justification for further expansion by Israel." The statement cited an alleged Israel Foreign Ministry caution to Western governments that "there are definite limits they should consider in concluding agreements and arrangements in Cairo"; the "organized campaign" against the World Bank's loan to the Suez Canal authority; Zionist "exploitation" of recent demonstrations of "so-called anti-Semitism" to foster immigration to Israel; the "latest Israeli aggression against the Arab village of Tawafiq"; and what was termed the campaign to ascribe actions by "American agencies for their own purposes" to the Arab economic boycott. (NYT, 9 Mar)

**Arab Protest in London.** On 17 Mar the heads of the Arab diplomatic missions delegated the Lebanese Ambassador to call at the Foreign Office on their behalf. In his meeting with John Profumo, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, according to *The Times*, "he expressed great anxiety on behalf of the Arab states regarding recent 'concerted and engineered incidents...' [presumably the Tawafiq incident p 197 ff] [and] their implication in view of Ben-Gurion's visit." Profumo stated that Ben-Gurion was paying a private visit only. *The Times* commented that evidently there was much "anxiety lest some agreement with Israel might encourage Israel aggression." (Times, 18 Mar)

**Arab Students Demonstrate.** [Arab students in the US and Britain organized demonstrations on Ben-Gurion's arrival.]

**Abdel-Nasser on the Effects of Tour.** On 22 Mar Abdel-Nasser said in a statement to American journalists that the UAR's relations with the US, which had been improving, were now disturbed by an Israeli campaign to

influence the US and other Western powers, and convince Western peoples and governments that Israel was exposed to a military threat from the UAR. In certain Western countries there was talk of supplying more arms to Israel. This would definitely result in the UAR obtaining more arms too. The relations between the UAR and the US could not be based on friendship if US policy was always partial to Israel.

Ben-Gurion's visit reminded Abdel-Nasser of the events of 1948, when "Zionist aggression took place against the Palestinian people." Britain was then "plotting against Arab rights," and the President of the US gave the support of his country to "Zionist aggression." Everyone believed, he said, that the tragedy might be repeated, and that "under Zionist pressure, the US might maintain an attitude permitting aggression." (R. Cairo, 22 Mar-BBC, 24 Mar)

### SOVIET REACTION TO BEN-GURION'S TOUR

**Mar: Accused of Trying to Forestall Summit Conference Success.** On 18 Mar, *Pravda* wrote that it was no coincidence that Ben-Gurion, like Adenauer, had visited the US on the eve of the Summit Conference. Like the German Chancellor, he was doing all in his power to forestall its success, the paper said. *Pravda* quoted the foreign Press as saying that Ben-Gurion did his utmost, during his stay in Washington, to cast doubts on the USSR's peace efforts and preached the continuation of the armament race. Governing circles in Israel were again acting as an instrument in the hands of the Western powers, who did not intend to give up their colonialist ambitions in the ME. (UP; *Hatzofeh*, 20 Mar)

### JUNE: BEN-GURION'S VISITS TO FRANCE, BELGIUM AND THE NETHERLANDS

In June Ben-Gurion completed his tour of Western countries by official visits to France, Belgium and the Netherlands.

**Purpose of Voyage.** Ben-Gurion explained the purpose of his tour after his return to Israel. On July 6, answering a Communist motion in the Knesset, he said that there were three objectives:

1. To strengthen Israel's defence as much as possible, in view of Abdel-Nasser's persistent claim that he would eliminate Israel;
2. To strengthen commercial, cultural and scientific ties with the nations of Europe, which absorbed more than 60 per cent of Israel's foreign trade;
3. To explain the modest though fruitful beginnings of Israel's activities among the nations of Asia and Africa. (*Ha'aretz*, 7 July)

**Paris: Limited Publicity for Visit.** Ben-Gurion arrived in Paris on 13 June for a one-day official visit, though he was to stay in Paris for a week. According to *Ha'aretz*, while the French Government wished to give him the reception that was his due, publicity had to be limited for political reasons. (*Ha'aretz*, 14 June) It was reported, however, that Ben-Gurion was satisfied, as he did not think publicity was needed to improve Franco-Israel relations. (*Ha'aretz*, 17 June)

**Discussion with de Gaulle on World and ME Problems.** Ben-Gurion had a talk with President de Gaulle on 14 June, and a second meeting was held at de Gaulle's request on 16 June. The subjects discussed were, according to the Israeli Press, the problems of peace after the

failure of the Summit Conference, the ME, Asia and Africa.

*Ha'aretz* reported that, according to Elysée and Quai d'Orsay spokesmen, Ben-Gurion had expressed his anxiety for Israel's position after the failure of the Summit Conference. (*Ha'aretz*, 15 June)

According to *The Jerusalem Post*, Ben-Gurion expressed Israel's desire for France's continued presence in the ME. According to French sources, de Gaulle assured him that Israel could count on France's opposition to any change in the status quo in the ME.

Israel's experience in economic cooperation with many African countries seemed—according to *The Jerusalem Post*—to have aroused de Gaulle's special interest in view of the problems of the African members of the French Community. (*Jer. Post*, 17 June)

In their second talk, the paper said, the two leaders continued to discuss Asia and Africa, and—according to French sources—dealt with the effects of increasing Arab economic pressure and possible counter-measures, as well as the possibility of Israel's association with the European Common Market. (*Jer. Post*, 19 June) *Le Monde* repeated that the mode of payment for arms constituted one of the main points to be discussed. (*Monde*, 18 June)

**Other Meetings in Paris.** While in Paris Ben-Gurion also held separate talks with PM Debré, de Murville, the Foreign Minister, and Messmer, the Defence Minister.

The discussions with Debré apparently included Israel's defence problems, but mainly concerned economic questions and possible ties with European economic organizations. Cultural relations were among the subjects discussed with de Murville, while the talks with Messmer centred on current arms problems.

Ben-Gurion also met Guy Mollet, Mendes-France and Bourges-Maunoury. (*Ha'aretz*, 16 June)

**Important Assurances Received on Security.** *The Jerusalem Post* wrote that the most vital point of the unwritten Israel-French alliance undoubtedly remained France's continued realization that for Israel to fulfil her important national and international obligations she must maintain her strength, which was the only effective deterrent against the constant threats of Arab aggression. In this respect the Fifth Republic seemed to continue the tradition of the pre-Sinai days, and the highly important defence and security assurances that Ben-Gurion had received in Paris seemed to be a logical consequence of France's ME policy. France showed an understanding of Israel's position which was likely to have

more far-reaching effects in the future. This could also apply to Israel's future integration with the European community and joint scientific research projects. (*Jer. Post*, 17 June; see also *Monde*, 15 June)

**Visit to Belgium.** Ben-Gurion paid a state visit to Belgium from 20 to 22 June, meeting King Baudouin, PM Eyskens and other Belgian leaders. One of the main subjects discussed was possible Israeli aid to Africa, particularly to the Congo, which was to become independent on 30 June. (For details see pp 36-7.) Another was association with the European Common Market. *The Jerusalem Post* reported authoritative quarters in Jerusalem as saying that Ben-Gurion had received definite assurances in this respect. (*Jer. Post*, 22 June)

**Visit to the Netherlands.** Ben-Gurion paid a state visit to the Netherlands from 22 to 27 June, meeting Queen Juliana, PM de Quay and other Dutch leaders.

Here too he discussed the problem of Israel's association with the European Common Market. According to *The Jerusalem Post* it was reliably learned that Dutch officials had shown full understanding of Israel's problems in this respect and were expected to sponsor her admission to association with the Common Market. (*Jer. Post*, 24 June)

**Statement on Return: "We Are Not Alone."** On his return to Israel, on 27 June, Ben-Gurion said: "We are not alone. We have devoted friends and their friendship is not dependent on material advantages."

In his talks with de Gaulle, he continued, they had "found a common language in regard to the world problems... and to the special needs of Israel. I was particularly glad that it was he who raised certain questions affecting us, showing a profound understanding and goodwill." In Belgium he had found the same goodwill on the part of all government leaders he had met. In Holland he had been impressed to see "how a determined, creative and pioneering nation is conquering the sea and turning it into land." (*Jer. Post*, 28 June)

**UAR Reaction to Ben-Gurion's Second Tour.** UAR Press and radio reactions to Ben-Gurion's second tour were not so extensive as to the first. They dwelt principally on Franco-Israeli cooperation and an alleged agreement by France to supply Israel with more jet aircraft. France was thus said to be trying to compensate for her frustration in Algeria, which she sought to blame on UAR aid to the rebels. (*BBC*, 17 June)

## EUROPE, THE UNITED STATES AND COMMONWEALTH COUNTRIES

(For Countries of the Eastern Bloc, see p 88 ff)

### THE EUROPEAN COMMON MARKET

**Background Note.** The process of economic union in Europe—especially the creation of the European Economic Community (EEC) and the Free Trade Organization (The Seven)—has had a direct bearing on Israel's foreign trade. About 60 per cent of Israel's exports and 90 per cent of her imports are conducted with the countries belonging to these two organizations (see Table of Foreign Trade, pp 57-8). In 1959 Israel started to work for association in some form with the EEC. During

1960 efforts in this direction continued, although it would seem that no definite request for formal association was made. At the end of the year, the EEC Council of Ministers postponed the discussion of the issue.

**Jan: Israel Should Associate With Europe's Economic Organizations.** Moshe Bartur, Deputy Director-General of the Israel Foreign Ministry, said in a lecture on 11 Jan that Israel must arrive at an effective arrangement with the European economic organizations in order to con-



solidate and expand her foreign trade, the bulk of which—both imports and exports—was conducted with their member countries. Israel should try to establish relations with these large trading regions, so as to achieve free entry into their markets and obtain lower customs duties for Israeli goods. (*Ha'aretz*, 12 Jan)

**Mar: EEC Study Group Visits Israel.** A three-man delegation of the Social Affairs Group of the EEC arrived in Israel on 21 Mar for a week's visit. Its main purpose was to study social welfare conditions and to compare them with those prevailing in the EEC countries. (*Jer. Post*, 23 Mar)

**May: "Time Not Yet Ripe For Agreement."** In May it was reported that, while most European governments favoured in principle the conversion of Israel's bilateral trade agreements with European countries into a multilateral agreement, they believed that the time was not yet ripe for a new relationship, before the framework and methods of the new organizations had been clarified. (*Ha'aretz*, 4 May)

**June-July: Ben-Gurion's Reported Request for Support.** During PM Ben-Gurion's visit to France, Belgium and Holland in June, he was reported to have asked the leaders of those countries to sponsor Israel's association with the EEC and to have received favourable replies.

Ben-Gurion declared afterwards that such an association would come about by a stage-by-stage process. On 30 June he told the Israel correspondent of AFP that Israel was at least as much a European state as Turkey. The question of cooperation between Israel and the various European economic organizations could not be settled, he added, until the internal negotiations within them had been completed.

On 6 July Ben-Gurion told the Knesset that one of the purposes of his visit to Europe had been to strengthen Israel's commercial and scientific ties with the nations of Europe, which now took over 60 per cent of her exports. (*Jer. Post*, 24, 30 June, 7 July)

**Oct: EEC Foreign Ministers Postpone Discussion of Issue.** It was reported that at the Foreign Ministers' meeting on 31 Oct, de Murville, the French Foreign Minister, proposed that Israel be admitted to some measure of association with the community. This met with immediate opposition, mainly from Segni, the Italian Foreign Minister, and discussion was postponed until Dec.

According to *The Jerusalem Post*, the opposition was based on the following points. The Common Market Treaty was originally open only to European countries and their African associates; some countries were reluctant, following the negotiations [which were then taking place] with Greece and Turkey, to admit countries that had not reached the economic and industrial development of the other members; certain countries, especially Italy, were influenced by their close economic relations with the Arab countries; finally, a number of members feared competition from Israel's exports, especially citrus. (*Jer. Post*, 2 Nov)

(Several weeks before the Foreign Ministers' meeting, Israel had replied to questions submitted by a committee of the EEC on her economic position and foreign trade.) (*Ha'aretz*, 25 Dec)

#### AUSTRIA

**Question of Restitution.** Replying to a parliamentary question on 6 Apr, Mrs Meir, the Foreign Minister, ex-

pressed the government's hope that the Government of Austria and the powers linked to her by a Treaty of State would regard it as their duty to bring the question of restitution to victims of the Nazis to a speedy conclusion. She noted with regret that the claims of Jews who had suffered in Austria between 1938 and 1945 had not yet been satisfied. (*Jer. Post*, 7 Apr)

On 17 May the World Association of Austrian Jews, whose headquarters is in Haifa, rejected as entirely inadequate the sum of \$35 million which the Austrian Government was reported to be setting aside as compensation for all victims of Nazi persecution. It claimed that, according to Nazi sources, property looted from Austrian Jews amounted to no less than \$1,000 million, apart from losses through impairment of health, loss of pensions and interruption of education. (*Jer. Post*, 19 May) [The Association represents 75,000 survivors of the community, which numbered 200,000 at the time of the Anschluss.]

On the same day, Chancellor Julius Raab received Nahum Goldmann, President of the Jewish Material Claims Conference, who presented the Jewish demands. According to Austrian Government sources, the Chancellor promised to do the utmost possible within Austria's financial capacity. (*INA; Jer. Post*, 19 May)

*Ha'aretz* reported on 2 Dec that the Austrian authorities had rejected a West German proposal to set up a joint co-ordination and control commission, which would deal with Austrian restitution payments and a German contribution towards them. (*Ha'aretz*, 2 Dec)

On 7 Dec an Austrian Government spokesman announced that additional individual payments would be made to Jewish victims of Nazism. He said that Austria had already paid out \$22 million to non-resident victims, and would pay another \$8.8 million to those whose bank accounts and savings had been confiscated by the Nazis. He added that discussions were continuing between Austria and West Germany and Israel. (*Ha'aretz*, 8 Dec)

#### BELGIUM

**June: PM Ben-Gurion's Visit to Belgium.** See p 293.

**Economic Cooperation.** On 12 May, Pinhas Sapir, the Israel Minister of Commerce and Industry, opened the Metapic Israel textile factory in Ashdod, in the presence of the Belgian Ambassador. The Director-General of the firm, which had been set up by joint Belgian-Israeli capital, said that Israel had offered more favourable terms for the establishment of the factory than any other country considered. (*Jer. Post*, 13 May)

In Mar an agreement was concluded between the Israel Finance Ministry and a group of Belgian bankers for a credit of 250 million Belgian Francs (\$5 million) to be extended to Israel for the purchase of Belgian goods. (*Ha'aretz*, 9 Mar, 20 Apr)

In July an Israel-Belgium chamber of commerce was constituted in Tel Aviv. (*Ha'aretz*, 14 July)

**May: Diplomatic Representation Raised.** In May the governments of Israel and of Belgium decided to elevate their diplomatic missions to the status of embassies. The announcement said the decision attested "to the importance that the two countries attach to the friendly relations that exist between them and to the further development of their economic and cultural ties." (*Jer. Post*, 23 May)

**Sept: Agreement with Belgian Diamond Syndicate.** M. Tsour, Director-General of the Israel Ministry of Com-



merce and Industry, headed a delegation in talks with the Belgian Diamond Syndicate at Antwerp on 27-28 Sept. Agreement was reached: (1) To market the output of polished diamonds in accordance with the world market's absorptive capacity for the benefit of both industries; (2) To establish a permanent joint committee to advise on and implement a common policy on the production, importation and marketing of diamonds. (*Jer. Post*, 2 Oct)

#### EIRE

**Apr: Trade Relations with Eire.** *Ha'aretz's* London correspondent reported on 20 Apr that trade relations had been established between Eire and Israel, as a result of a visit by Israel's Commercial Attaché in London. It was estimated that trade between the two countries could reach \$5 million. Eire would be interested in importing tomatoes, melons, citrus fruits, phosphates, potash and cotton yarn, while Israel could buy wool, leather and perhaps fishing boats. Another project mooted was a joint Israel-Eire exporting agency for the American market. The idea was to tailor Irish tweed in Israel for export to the US. (*Ha'aretz*, 20 Apr)

#### FRANCE

(References: Views and Policies, p 276, PM Ben-Gurion's visit to France, pp 292-3; France and the Tripartite Declaration, p 94; Trade, pp 57-8; French cooperation in the construction of Israel's second atomic reactor, pp 286-8.)

**Background Note.** The friendship between France and Israel has been one of the mainstays of Israel's foreign policy. While the US was her principal source of economic aid, she relied mostly on France for aid in strengthening her defences. Israeli public opinion was therefore sensitive to any hint of a change in France's policy of friendship. The reaction to the El-Al-Air France affair is typical of this attitude.

**Jan: El-Al-Air France Affair.** In 1959 there were negotiations between El-Al, the Israel National Airline, and Air France on joint operations on the New York-Paris-Lod (Tel Aviv) route. On 1 Jan it was reported that at the last moment, in mid-Dec, Air France had cancelled the initialled agreement. The cancellation was attributed to Air France's commitment to Air Union, the continental air group, but the Press speculated on political motives. *The Jerusalem Post* wrote that reports that the Quai d'Orsay was opposed to the agreement had not been denied and that Israeli diplomatic circles in Paris seemed convinced of the Quai d'Orsay's responsibility. (*Jer. Post*, 1 Jan; see also *Ha'aretz*, 1 Jan)

On 4 Jan the Israel Chargé d'Affaires was summoned by the French Foreign Ministry, which denied that it had intervened, and expressed surprise and displeasure that such reports had spread in Israel. (*Ha'aretz*, 5 Jan) Official circles in Jerusalem stated that no political significance should be attached to the incident. It was understood that the Israel Government regarded it as a purely commercial affair, the significance of which had been exaggerated by circles close to El-Al. (*Jer. Post*, 4 Jan) [The affair subsequently lapsed.]

**Jan: Visit of Israel Foreign Minister; Friendship Reaffirmed.** On 12 Jan, a Quai d'Orsay spokesman, commenting on the forthcoming visit to France of Mrs Golda Meir, the Israel Foreign Minister, said that relations between the two countries were excellent and that not

a single fundamental question divided them, despite certain misunderstandings created by the Press. (*Jer. Post*, 13 Jan)

On 19 Jan, Mrs Meir arrived in Paris on her way back from a tour of West African countries. At a Press conference, she stated that she did not know of anything that could spoil Franco-Israel friendship. She added that even in relations between friendly countries there were normal ups and downs, but such fluctuations must not give rise to panic. (*Ha'aretz*, 20 Jan)

On 20 Jan Mrs Meir conferred with M. Couve de Murville, the French Foreign Minister, on the ME situation and problems of interest to both countries. De Murville reportedly showed much interest in Mrs Meir's account of Israel's relations with Africa. (*Jer. Post*, 21 Jan)

**Jan: Renewal of Trade Agreement.** A French mission arrived in Israel on 7 Jan for talks on the renewal of the bilateral trade agreement between the two countries. (*Jer. Post*, 8 Jan) Israel demanded the elimination of all restrictions on her exports, and equal status, vis-à-vis France, with member-states of the OEEC, but France was reluctant to create a precedent by granting such a status to a non-member of the organization. The agreement, signed on 21 Jan, represented a compromise. Israel Foreign Ministry circles expressed the hope that the agreement would increase exports to France, which had fallen from \$7 million in 1958 to \$4 million in 1959, mainly as a result of the devaluation of the franc and the difficulty of competing with French-produced goods. (*Jer. Post*, 22 Jan)

**Jan: Ben-Gurion's Message to de Gaulle.** After de Gaulle's speech to the French nation on 31 Jan (following the attempted mutiny of the European settlers in Algeria), Ben-Gurion sent him a message of congratulation. He expressed the hope that de Gaulle's programme would be fully accomplished "for the benefit of France and Algeria and for the peace of the world." (*Jer. Post*, 1 Feb) De Gaulle replied thanking the Israel PM for his expression of solidarity. (*Ha'aretz*, 15 Feb)

**Feb: De Gaulle on Relations with Israel.** On accepting the credentials of Walter Eytan, Israel's new Ambassador to France, on 11 Feb, de Gaulle said that France's friendly relations with Israel were firmly based on their common world outlook as well as on practical considerations in the political, economic and cultural fields. (*Jer. Post*, 12 Feb)

**Feb: Dayan and Peres in Paris.** On 21 Feb Dayan, the Israel Minister of Agriculture, arrived in Paris on his way to the US. Peres, the Deputy Defence Minister, arrived at the same time. [He is generally credited with having played a central part in the establishment of Israel's special links with France in defence matters since 1955.] Peres met the French Foreign Minister, Defence Minister and Minister-Delegate at the PM's office, Dayan [who had been Chief of Staff of the Israel Defence Forces from 1953 to 1958] met the French Chief of Staff. (*Jer. Post*, 22 Feb)

Dayan wrote later that his general impression (as well as Peres's) was that France's policy of friendship towards Israel was still in force, and it appeared to have found new spheres of expression after the changes that had taken place. (*Ma'ariv*, 11 Apr)

**Mar-Nov: French and Israeli Towns Exchange Gestures of Friendship.** On 5 Mar the President of the Paris Mu-

nicipality formally named an intersection in the western part of the city "Place d'Israel." The Jerusalem Municipal Council decided to name a "Place de Paris" in Jerusalem. (*Jer. Post*, 6 Mar)

On 19 Nov the towns of Holon, Israel, and Suresnes, France, formally adopted one another at a ceremony in Holon. The Mayor of Suresnes was present. (*Jer. Post*, 20 Nov)

**June: Inauguration of Cultural Agreement Commission.** On 22 June the Franco-Israel Joint Committee for the Application of the Cultural Agreement met for the first time at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem [the agreement was concluded in Nov 1959]. The following were the main recommendations adopted:

Establishment of Chairs of Hebrew at the Universities of Montpellier and Toulouse. The teaching of Hebrew in French secondary schools would be encouraged wherever the students showed interest.

French would be taught in Israel as the first foreign language in secondary and some elementary schools, wherever there was sufficient student interest. (The French delegation was reported to have been dissatisfied with the rate at which French was being introduced into Israel schools—of the 1,250 elementary schools, only 12 taught French.)

France agreed to grant 25 scholarships to Israelis for study in French universities, and Israel promised eight.

The Israel Research Council and the French Committee for Scientific Research would establish direct contact. No reciprocity would be required in the number of scientists exchanged.

Arrangements were made for the distribution of films and the exchange of radio programmes.

The next session of the Committee was to be held in Paris in 1961. (*Jer. Post*, 1 July)

**July: First French Jet Training Aircraft Assembled in Israel.** On 7 July, the first Fouga Magister jet trainer plane assembled in Israel under French licence was handed over by Israel Aircraft Industries to the Israel Air Force. (*Jer. Post*, 7 July)

**Dec: Speculation on Influence of Algerian Settlement on Relations with Israel.** *Le Monde* of 28 Dec published an article warning of the danger of a French settlement with the FLN at Israel's expense. According to the author, Alfred Fabre-Luce, the FLN might blackmail France into accepting "concerted action against Israel" in the diplomatic field. Fabre-Luce told *The Jerusalem Post's* Paris correspondent that he had learnt during a visit to Algeria that local moderate FLN elements, unofficially contacted by the French, had laid down an anti-Israel policy as an indispensable condition of a working arrangement with France. (*The Jerusalem Post* correspondent added, however, that he himself had been assured by moderate FLN elements in Algeria that they would heartily welcome an Israel-Arab peace.)

Official circles in Paris were reported to have rejected the supposition that France, under de Gaulle, would ever allow her foreign policy to be dictated by Algeria. Israeli circles in Paris also remarked that Franco-Israel friendship was based on constant common interest, both ideological and material, not only in the ME, but also in Africa and elsewhere. (*Jer. Post*; *Ha'aretz*, 29 Dec)

#### GERMAN FEDERAL REPUBLIC

**General:** In Mar, PM Ben-Gurion, while on a visit to the US, met Chancellor Adenauer in New York. After

the meeting it was reported that Adenauer had promised Israel \$500 million in long-term loan, but the reports were denied by official German sources (see p 290). An outstanding problem was the reluctance of the GFR to establish diplomatic relations with Israel because of German interests in the Arab countries (see pp 180-1).

The Reparations Agreement concluded in Sept 1952, providing for compensation by West Germany (mostly in kind) for Jewish assets confiscated, damaged or destroyed during Nazi rule in Germany and other European countries, continued to be "implemented according to plan." (*IGYb*, 1960/61)

**Israeli Attitudes Toward Germany.** The Herut Movement and the Israel Communist Party presented motions on 20 Jan for a debate in the Knesset on arms sales to Germany. A Herut MK said that although the last arms deal had not won Israel the friendship of Germany, PM Ben-Gurion's hand was still outstretched towards Bonn. A Communist MK called for the cancellation of the arms deal with Germany and a ban on future sales.

Replying, PM Ben-Gurion said that he would not retract one word of his statement in the Knesset in July 1959, in which he had distinguished between the Germany of Hitler and that of Adenauer. The recent manifestations of anti-Semitism were cause for concern, but there was no connection between them and the arms deal or with Israel's relations with the Germany of today. While there were still undoubtedly anti-Semites and Nazis in Germany today, he added, Germany was not now a nation of murderers, and the younger generation could not be called Hitlerites.

The Communist motion was supported only by that party, with Mapam, Achdut Ha'avoda and M. Nurock (National Religious Party) abstaining. The Herut motion was supported by Herut and Nurock, while Mapam, Achdut Ha'avoda, Agudat Israel and the Communists abstained. [Mapam, Achdut Ha'avoda and the National Religious Party were all members of the coalition.] (*Jer. Post*, 21 Jan)

In Jan representatives of the Israeli cinema owners protested to the Deputy Minister of the Interior against the Ministry's proposal to ban all films of which German firms were co-producers. [There was already a ban on films produced solely by German companies.] The Deputy Minister promised to consider the owners' arguments in making a final decision. (*Jer. Post*, 20 Jan)

In Sept the Jerusalem City Council unanimously approved a motion not to establish "any cultural relations with Munich," after two emissaries from the Mayor of Munich had come to Jerusalem with a proposal to establish cultural relations between the two municipalities. (*Jer. Post*, 26 Sept) On 26 Sept the Munich Municipality expressed its regret at the Jerusalem Council's decision. (*Ha'aretz*, 27 Sept)

**German Personalities Visiting Israel.** On 4 May Professor Theodor Heuss, the former German President, arrived in Israel for a three-week private visit as the guest of the Israel Reparations Mission in Germany. He met PM Ben-Gurion, Mrs Golda Meir and other Ministers and toured the country. On 9 May he delivered a lecture in German on "The Self-formation of Democracy" before a large audience at the Hebrew University. Professor Martin Buber presided. (*Jer. Post*, 10 May)

On 14 Nov Willy Brandt, Mayor of West Berlin, arrived to attend the Congress of the International Union of Local Authorities in Tel Aviv. He also toured the

country and met prominent personalities. He told the Press on 17 Nov that he had discussed "certain aspects of cooperation" between Germany and Israel with PM Ben-Gurion. They also "talked international politics and socialist questions." He would support the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries, he added, but future cooperation should not be interpreted as being directed against anyone else. (*Jer. Post*, 18 Nov)

In an interview published in *The Jerusalem Post* on 16 Nov, Brandt stated that he fully understood "the heavy shadow of the past" and the difficulty of the older generation in building a bridge between the two countries. He believed, however, that Germany's youth, particularly the students, would build a "strong tie" with Israel and he hoped for a considerable exchange of students. (*Jer. Post*, 16 Nov)

**Jan-Sept: Bonn to Buy More Israel Ammunition.** Reuter reported on 19 Jan from Bonn that a Defence Ministry spokesman had said that West Germany would soon place another large order for mortar ammunition with Israel; negotiations in Bonn for the purchase of 170,000 mortar shells were nearly completed. He also said that the previous year's order for 250,000 shells was worth about DM 12 million. (*Jer. Post*, 20 Jan)

On 9 Sept a GFR Defence Ministry spokesman said that the arms and munitions deliveries from Israel were progressing smoothly and that "they have fully satisfied our expectations." He added: "We would not have signed the contract in the first place if preliminary tests had not proved that they were the best to be had." (*INA; Jer. Post*, 11 Sept)

**Apr: Restrictions on Israeli Citizens Visiting the GFR.** On 7 Apr a Foreign Ministry spokesman stated in the West German Parliament that Israeli citizens wanting to visit West Germany must either obtain a visitor's visa from the authorities of the town or village which they wanted to visit or have a return ticket in their possession. These regulations were necessary because "we have to take into account the possibility of illegal immigration." He added that in 1959 the British Consulate in Haifa had been empowered by the West German Foreign Ministry to grant entry visas to West Germany without obtaining Bonn's approval in every case. His Ministry was negotiating with the Israel Mission in Cologne regarding further improvements in this matter. (*Ha'aretz*, 8 Apr)

**July-Aug: German Groups Visiting Israel.** A group of 50 German youths spent three weeks in a tour of Israel organized by the Bavarian Ministry of Education. (*Jer. Post*, 2 Aug) A 15-man delegation representing the West German Trade Union Federation arrived on 7 Aug for a four-week visit as guests of the Histadrut. This was the first official trade union delegation to visit Israel. (*Ha'aretz*, 7 Aug)

**Commercial Relations.** Israel exported \$11.65 million worth of goods to West Germany in the first four months of 1960, compared with \$8.25 million in the same period in 1959, it was reported on 8 Aug. West Germany was now Israel's third largest customer. Agricultural products, industrial products and diamonds were the main items exported. (*Reuter; Jer. Post*, 9 Aug)

Israel was to be one of 30 countries represented at the International Grocery and Delicatessen Exhibition in Munich. An exhibition announcement said that this would be Israel's first participation in an exhibition in West Germany. (*Reuter; Jer. Post*, 20 Mar)

## GREECE

**Feb: Greek MP's Visit.** Gregorios Cassimatis, MP, a former Minister of Public Works, spent ten days in Israel as guest of the Foreign Ministry and the Israel-Greece Friendship Society. He was the first active Greek politician to visit Israel. (*Jer. Post*, 15 Feb)

**Sept: Abdel-Nasser Rebuffs Greek Peace Bid.** In Sept it was reliably reported in Paris that Greek leaders had tried discreetly to broach ways of improving Israel-Arab relations during Abdel-Nasser's recent visit to Athens but were told it was none of their business. The report followed the talks between PM Karamanlis and Averoff, the Foreign Minister, with President de Gaulle and PM Debré.

The Greek statesmen informed their hosts that their country's mildness towards Egypt was motivated by the desire to protect the interests of the large Greek colony there, whose fate was the main subject of their conversations with Abdel-Nasser. While disagreeing fundamentally with Abdel-Nasser's foreign policy, they were anxious to avoid open discord and desirous of extending their influence in the Arab world. (*Jer. Post*, 19 Sept)

## ITALY

**Jan: Italo-Israel Friendship League.** Senator Luigi Einaudi, former President of Italy, was named Honorary President of the Italo-Israel Friendship League at its inaugural meeting in Rome on 27 Jan.

Over 300 persons attended. Professor Arangio Ruiss, a former PM, President of the Christian Democratic Party, was elected chairman, and Senator Ferruccio Parri, another former PM, was also on the committee. Four Cabinet Ministers expressed their support for the League, which was to organize lectures, exhibitions and other cultural exchanges. (*Jer. Post*, 29 Jan)

**Italo-Israel Bank Opened in Milan.** The Italo-Israel Bank was established in Milan on 18 Sept to "encourage commercial exchanges between Italy and Israel and promote Italian initiative in Israel." Its initial capitalization was 300 million Italian lire [about \$500,000], two-thirds invested by Italians, and the remainder by Israelis. Dr Carlo Shapira, a leading Milanese textile manufacturer, was Chairman of the Board. (*INA; Jer. Post*, 16 Sept)

## THE NETHERLANDS

**May: Former Netherlands PM's Visit.** Dr Willem Drees, former PM of the Netherlands, arrived in Israel with his wife on 21 May for a fortnight's visit as guests of the government. They met the President, the PM and other leaders and toured the country.

Dr Drees said that one of the reasons for his visit was to investigate the achievements of labour. "It is unfortunate," he added, "that the Arab states so much resent the existence of Israel and do not see the good which Israel can contribute to their own development."

At a tree planting ceremony in the Netherlands Forest, Mrs Meir asked Dr Drees to convey to Queen Juliana of the Netherlands and her people Israel's deep feelings of friendship. Israel would never forget the sympathy, hospitality and aid of the Dutch people. (*Jer. Post*, 22, 28, 29 May)

Ben-Gurion's Visit to the Netherlands. See p 293.

## SCANDINAVIAN COUNTRIES, ICELAND

**Finland:** Israel's first resident Minister was accredited in Helsinki [in Aug 1960]. (*IGYb*, 1960/61)



**Iceland.** Gudmundoor Gudmunson, the Foreign Minister of Iceland, paid an official visit to Israel [in Aug]. (*IGYb*, 1960/61)

A new trade agreement, to come into effect on 1 Jan 1961, was signed between Israel and Iceland in Geneva in Oct, to replace the agreement signed in 1953. (*Jer. Post*, 26 Oct)

**Norway.** In Dec 1959 the Israel mission in Norway was raised to the rank of embassy. Israel's first resident Ambassador presented his credentials on 14 June 1960. (*IGYb*, 1960/61; *Ha'aretz*, 6 Dec 1959, 15 June 1960)

**Sweden.** In Jan Sweden and Israel signed an agreement in Stockholm to prevent double taxation. (*INA*; *Jer. Post*, 4 Jan)

On 7 Mar an Israel-Swedish Chamber of Commerce was founded in Tel Aviv. (*Jer. Post*, 8 Mar)

On 7 Apr the Swedish Transport Workers' Federation decided to boycott all loading and unloading of UAR ships, in support of a similar boycott recently announced by the Finnish Seamen's Union. These actions were in protest against repeated interference in the Suez Canal with Scandinavian ships sailing to and from Israel. (*Jer. Post*, 8 Apr) (See also p 41.)

### THE UNITED KINGDOM

(References: Views and Policies, p 276; the UK and the Tripartite Declaration, Feb, pp 93-4; Ben-Gurion's Visit to the UK, Mar, p 290-1; Trade, p 57-8).

**Feb: Arab Boycott Not Condoned.** In an address in Tel Aviv on 16 Feb, the British Ambassador stated that his government did not condone the Arab boycott of Israel. The booming trade between the UK and Israel was an indication of how the British felt about Arab economic warfare against Israel, he said. [Trade between Britain and Israel had reached £18 million in 1959, almost double the figure for 1958.] (*Jer. Post*, 17 Feb)

**Feb-Mar: Israel Ministers Visit Britain.** In Feb, Abba Eban, Minister without Portfolio, visited Britain. (*Ha'aretz*, 11 Feb) On 3 Mar Shimon Peres arrived in London for a two-day visit and held meetings with senior British officials, including the Under-Secretary for Defence, Sir Edward Playfair. (*Ha'aretz*, 4 Mar) (See also p 290.)

**Apr: Extradition Treaty.** On 4 Apr the first extradition treaty was signed between the UK and Israel. (*Jer. Post*, 5 Apr) Ratifications were exchanged on 26 July. (*Jer. Post*, 27 July)

**July: Various Contacts.** A Knesset delegation visited Britain in July, at the invitation of Parliament. (*Jer. Post*, 7 July)

On 2 June Admiral Bingley, the C-in-C. of the British Mediterranean Fleet, arrived in Israel in his despatch ship for a five-day visit. (*Jer. Post*, 3 June)

On 5 July the Fourth Frigate Squadron of the British Mediterranean Fleet arrived in Haifa for a five-day visit. (*Jer. Post*, 6 July)

**Nov: Laskov's Visit Postponed.** The Israel Chief of Staff, Major-General Laskov, was due to arrive in Britain in Nov on a private visit, to lecture to the Military Commentator's Circle. Late in Oct it was announced that the visit would be postponed at Britain's request. This raised speculations that a change had taken place in

British policy towards Israel. The Israel Press reported that the reason for the postponement was almost certainly the susceptibility of the British Foreign Office to UAR reactions. It was suggested, however, that this might pass once the UAR and Britain had agreed on the exchange of Ambassadors. (*Jer. Post*, 31 Oct; *Ha'aretz*, 8 Nov) (See p 534 ff.)

On 23 Nov the Lord Privy Seal, answering a question on this matter at the House of Commons, said that there was no question of conciliating Cairo. The Israel Government had announced that discussions of an informal kind had taken place on this matter and he thought the position was perfectly well understood. (*Hansard*, 23 Nov)

### YUGOSLAVIA

**Apr: Tito Blames "Great Powers" For Israel-Arab Dispute.** Marshal Tito accused the "great powers" of preventing a settlement between Israel and the Arab states, in a speech at the opening of the fifth postwar congress of the Yugoslav Socialist Alliance, on 18 Apr. "Outside influences are artificially creating a dispute between Israel and the Arabs," he said. After saying that some great powers "have been trying to right the wrongs and to honour and implement UN resolutions on Palestine," he continued: "If this is achieved, and if the results of the aggression against Egypt are corrected, I am convinced that it will be possible to find a *modus vivendi* and to normalize relations between the Arab states and Israel." (*Reuter*; *Jer. Post*, 19 Apr)

Arab delegates to the congress walked out of the hall when the representative of Mapam [the left-wing United Workers' Party of Israel] brought greetings to the Congress. (*AFP*; *Jer. Post*, 20 Apr)

**Apr-June: Commercial Protocol Ratified.** In Apr and June respectively, the governments of Yugoslavia and Israel ratified the commercial protocol between the two countries, which lays down the conditions for an exchange of goods amounting to \$6.3 million in both directions. It was drawn up in accordance with the commercial agreement of Dec 1958. (*Ha'aretz*, 27 June)

**Various Contacts.** Israel regularly takes part in the Zagreb Trade Fair and the Industrial Exhibition in Belgrade. Sport and youth organizations in the two countries are in cordial contact; representatives of Israeli pioneer youth movements join the Yugoslav Friendship Road Project each year, and leaders of the Yugoslavia Youth Movement visited Israel in May 1960. Regular touch is maintained between Yugoslav and Israeli scientists.

Yugoslavia and Israel interchanged student scholarships. (*IGYb*, 1960/61)

### THE UNITED STATES

(For synopsis of Israeli-US relations, see pp 265-6; Views and Policies, pp 275-6; US and the Tripartite Declaration, p 94; US and the Arab Boycott, pp 188, 106; US and Freedom of Navigation in the Suez Canal, p 39 ff; Israel and the Arab-Israel conflict in the US election campaign, p 108 ff; US views on the Arab-Israel conflict, p 122 ff; PM Ben-Gurion's visit to the US, p 288 ff; US aid to Israel, pp 48-9; US reactions to the building of Israel's second nuclear reactor, p 286 ff; Trade, pp 57-8.)

**Jan: US Attitude to Anti-Semitic Outbursts.** [In 1959 the outbreak of anti-Semitic incidents in various parts of the world prompted the Israel Government to send notes



to several governments expressing alarm at such open manifestations of hatred for the Jewish people.]

On 26 Jan the State Dept replied to the Israeli note, stating that the US Government noted the Israel Government's concern and agreed with its views on this matter. It quoted a statement by President Eisenhower on 12 Jan on the danger to liberty and decency everywhere involved in racial bigotry. (*Jer. Post*, 27 Jan)

**US Military Assistance.** Israel was included in the list published on 23 Feb by the Pentagon of friends and allies of the US who had received military assistance during the preceding ten years. The total aid received by Israel was \$936,000. (*Maariv*, 24 Feb)

**Feb: Israel to Get Special Assistance.** In a statement before the Foreign Affairs Committee on 18 Feb, Dillon, the Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, said that Israel was specifically included among the nations to receive special assistance in 1960. (*Jer. Post*, 19 Feb) [In 1959 it was thought that Israel would not receive special aid in the future.]

**Apr: US Embassy to Remain in Tel Aviv.** In submitting its budget estimates to Congress, the State Dept reported that the US embassy would move to a new building in Tel Aviv, which had been rented on a long-term lease, (*Ha'aretz*, 6 Apr) [This was in line with the policy of not recognizing Jerusalem as the Capital of Israel and maintaining the embassy in Tel Aviv, although the Foreign Ministry and a number of other embassies and legations were in Jerusalem.]

**Mar-Sept: World Bank Activities in Israel.** In Mar-Apr a World Bank survey group visited Israel to study investment plans, for which loans were being sought from the Bank. These were:

Expansion of the Dead Sea Works to raise potash output by 700,000 tons a year [the current annual output is 140,000 tons]; about \$50 million would be required;

Some \$45 million for construction of the new port at Ashdod;

\$9 million for extension of Haifa port;

\$9 million for extension of Eilat port. (*Ha'aretz*; *Jer. Post*, 11 Apr)

The President of the World Bank, Eugene Black, visited Israel in May, and discussed Israel's request for these loans.

As a condition of approval for the loan for port development, the Bank required the establishment of an independent port authority. An inter-ministerial committee was set up to examine the question. [It was subsequently announced that the Authority would be established.]

As for the Dead Sea Works, it appeared that the Bank's policy was to grant loans only to public or privately-owned enterprises. Bentov, the Minister of Development, reportedly told Black that he "would not be dogmatic" about the ownership of the Dead Sea Works, and that he would be prepared to transfer them from government to public ownership. (*Ha'aretz*, 10 May; *Jer. Post*, 9 May)

**Sept: \$27.5 Million Loan for Ashdod Port.** On 9 Sept it was announced that the World Bank had approved a \$27.5 million loan for the development of Ashdod Port, on condition that Israel set up a port authority (see also p 49). [The new port, with an annual capacity of 900,000 tons, was scheduled to be completed in 1965. It would make it possible to close the in-

adequate Jaffa and Tel Aviv ports and reduce the pressure on Haifa port.] (*Reuter*; *Jer. Post*, 11 Sept)

[Negotiations with the World Bank on a loan for the development of the Dead Sea Works continued during the rest of the year into 1961.]

**June: Foreign Minister's Visit to US.** On 1 June the Israel Foreign Minister, Mrs Golda Meir, arrived in the US for a five-week visit on behalf of the United Jewish Appeal and the Israel Bonds organization. On 27 June she held separate talks with Secretary of State Herter and Under-Secretary of State Dillon. The talks were described as an exchange of views. She also met Senator Fulbright, chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. (*Ha'aretz*, 27, 28 June)

**July: Nuclear Energy Agreement Amended.** It was reported in July that Israel was one of 11 countries with whom the US had signed an amendment to the Agreement on Cooperation on Nuclear Energy for Peaceful Purposes, permitting limited amounts of nuclear material (U 233, U 235 and plutonium) to be handed over to signatory countries for special research. (*Ha'aretz*, 26 July) (See also p 286 ff.)

**Aug: Visit of US Secretary of Agriculture.** On 12 Aug the US Secretary of Agriculture, Ezra Benson, arrived in Israel on a four-day visit. [He had previously visited Egypt and Jordan.]

Dayan, the Israel Minister of Agriculture, requested at a meeting with him on 15 Aug that the US reconsider the export quota for eggs and poultry, which had been fixed by agreement, in view of the supply of American surplus food to Israel. Benson promised to submit the request to his government. (*Jer. Post*, 17 Aug)

**Nov: US Technical Assistance to End in 1962.** On 27 Nov it was announced that the Israel Government and the US Operations Mission had agreed on the termination of the US technical assistance programme in Israel on 30 June 1962. The decision was taken in the light of Israel's steady advance in technical skills over the past decade. The programme had been reduced year by year, and stood at \$1 million for 1960/61.

The US aid programme in Israel, comprising food surpluses and grant-in-aid, would not be affected.

Since the inception of the programme in 1951, 198 American experts had come to Israel and 525 Israelis had been sent to Europe and the US for study. (*Jer. Post*, 28 Nov; *Ha'aretz*, 30 Nov)

**\$41 Million Israel Bonds Sold in US in 1960.** Out of a total of \$51.9 million of State of Israel Bonds sold during 1960, \$41.4 million were sold in the US. [\$4.2 million were sold in Canada; \$3.5 million in Latin America; \$2.6 million in Europe.] (*Jer. Post*, 15 Jan 1961)

## CANADA

**Friendship with Israel.** "The traditional amity [between Canada and Israel] was maintained," an official Israeli source stated. In the debate on Foreign Affairs in the Canadian Parliament in Feb, the Foreign Minister asserted that Israel had no stauncher friend than Canada. (*IGYb*, 1960/61)

**Apr: New Visa Arrangement for Canadian Tourists.** A new arrangement under which Canadian tourists could obtain visas for Israel at the point of entry went into effect on 1 Apr, Interior Ministry officials reported. Ca-

nadian tourists who arrived at an Israel point of entry without visa would not be required to pay an extra fee if they came from a country where they could not obtain a visa owing to the absence of an Israel consular representative. (*Jer. Post*, 11 Apr) [Such an arrangement exists with five other countries.]

**Canadian Senators Visit Israel.** Mark Drouin, President of the Canadian Senate, and Senator William Barnett visited Israel in Oct as guests of the government. (*Ha'aretz*, 20 Oct)

#### AUSTRALIA, NEW ZEALAND

**Australia.** The diplomatic ties between Australia and Israel were raised to embassy rank. (*Ha'aretz*, 29 Sept)

In June the Australian Acting Foreign Minister stated in Parliament that his country would again demand at

the UN free navigation in the Suez Canal, with special emphasis on ships trading with Israel. (*Ha'aretz*, 10 June) [At the 1959 UN GA the Australian and New Zealand delegates unequivocally supported Israel's right to free passage through the Canal.] (*IGYb*, 1960/61)

In Aug the Australian Minister to Israel stated that his country would be prepared to buy Israeli potash and cement. Any expansion in trade between the two countries depended, however, almost entirely on the development of Eilat harbour. He added that while trade was still quite modest, it had doubled in 1958/59, when Australia had bought £247,000 worth of Israeli goods. (*Jer. Post*, 10 Aug)

**New Zealand.** See under Australia, second para; see also New Zealand's attitude on Arab Refugee Question, p 213.

## LATIN AMERICA

### GENERAL

**Mar: UAR Launches Propaganda Campaign Against Israel in Latin America** (see p 542). *Ha'aretz* reported that the UAR had stepped up its diplomatic and propaganda activities in Latin America, which combined attacks on Israel with nationalist incitement, especially in Cuba, Panama and Venezuela. The Egyptian Deputy Foreign Minister used every opportunity, during a goodwill tour of Latin American countries to attack Israel. (*Ha'aretz*, 22 Mar)

**Dec: Friendship with Latin America Stressed.** The strong ties of friendship between Israel and the countries of Latin America were stressed at a dinner in Jerusalem in honour of the Latin American diplomatic envoys in Israel. Mrs Meir, the Foreign Minister, said that were it not for the support of the Latin American countries, the 1947 UN decision (on the establishment of a Jewish and an Arab state in Palestine) would not have been adopted. "We know," she said, "that in the natural course of things and without any negotiation, the countries of Latin America will support us in our just struggle."

Replying for the diplomats, the Brazilian Ambassador declared that the Latin American peoples had strong feelings of respect and friendship for Israel. (*Jer. Post*, 1 Dec)

**Latin American Countries' Attitude to the Arab-Israeli Conflict.** See pp 179, 213.

### ARGENTINA

**Apr: Argentine Parliamentarians' Visit.** Benjamin Guzman, Acting President of the Argentine Senate, and Rodolfo A. Weidman, Member of the Argentine Parliament, spent three days in Israel as guests of the Knesset. (*Jer. Post*, 15 Apr)

**May: Israel Delegation for Argentine Celebrations.** Abba Eban, Minister without portfolio, headed a delegation at the celebrations of the 150th anniversary of the May 1810 Revolution. (*Jer. Post*, 19 May)

**June-Dec: Israeli-Argentine Relations under Shadow of Eichmann Affair.** See p 283 ff.

**Dec: New Diplomatic Representatives.** [In the wake of the Eichmann case, the Argentine Ambassador in Israel had been recalled and the Israel Ambassador in Buenos Aires declared *persona non grata*.]

On 15 Dec Yosef Avidar presented his credentials as Israel Ambassador to President Frondizi, and on 21 Dec Rogelio Rafael Tristany presented his credentials as Argentine Ambassador to President Ben-Zvi. Relations between the two countries thus returned to normal. (*Jer. Post*, 16, 22 Dec)

### BOLIVIA

**Aug: Israel Proposes Technical Aid to Bolivia.** On 20 Aug Michael Simon, Israel's Envoy to Bolivia, announced that Dr Paz, Bolivia's new President, intended to send a delegation of experts to Israel to discuss with the government the proposals for technical aid which the Envoy had submitted to the government of Bolivia. He suggested that Israel could help Bolivia in the afforestation of the Alpi Plano region, establishing agricultural co-operatives, developing fish ponds, and the establishment of border settlements by the Bolivian Army. A delegation of Israel experts would come to Bolivia after the visit of the Bolivian delegation to Israel, he added. (*Ha'aretz*, 30 Aug)

**Bolivian Visit to Israel.** In Dec Senator Federico Alvarez Plata, head of the Bolivian delegation to the UN, came to Israel on a ten-day visit as the guest of the government, and met PM Ben-Gurion. He stated that he would propose in La Paz an exchange of know-how in irrigation and water development, and the strengthening of trade ties. (*Jer. Post*, 9 Dec)

### BRAZIL

**May: Protest Against Ali Sabri's Attacks.** The Israel Ambassador to Brazil handed a strong protest to the Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs against the anti-Israeli attacks made by Ali Sabri, UAR Deputy FM, during his visit to Brazil, and demanded that it take steps in the matter. (*Ha'aretz*, 18 May) (For Sabri's visit—see pp 541-2.)

**July: Israel Supported on Eichmann Affair.** The National Assembly of the state of Guanabara (formally

Rio de Janeiro) passed a resolution on 22 June in support of Israel's attitude on the capture of Eichmann in Argentina and in favour of his trial in Israel. (*Ha'aretz*, 23 June)

**Israeli Commerce Minister's Visit.** In Dec Pinhas Sapir, the Israel Minister of Commerce and Industry, on a tour of Latin America, visited Brazil. He met Horacio Lafer, the Foreign Minister, Paes de Almeida, the Finance Minister, and several businessmen. After these meetings he said that Israel would extend technical aid to Brazil. (*Jer. Post*, 7 Dec)

#### CHILE, COLOMBIA, ECUADOR

At the end of Nov, Pinhas Sapir, the Israel Minister of Commerce and Industry, visited Chile and Colombia on a tour of Latin American countries. (*Ha'aretz*, 27 Nov)

**Chile.** In June an Israeli expert was invited to Chile as consultant on town planning. (*Ha'aretz*, 27 June)

In Sept it was reported that the Chile University's Institute for Political Science had opened a post-graduate class for Israeli studies. (*Ha'aretz*, 27 Sept)

Israel sent medical supplies to the victims of the Chilean earthquake. (*IGYb*, 1960/61) Chile accepted Israel's offer of aid in the reconstruction and development of the affected areas. (*Ha'aretz*, 27 Sept)

**Colombia.** In Aug Israel's first Ambassador to Colombia was accredited in Bogota. (*IGYb*, 1960/61)

**Ecuador.** In Sept Ecuador and Israel agreed to raise their diplomatic missions to embassies. At the same time a technical aid agreement was signed, under which Israel was to send experts to Ecuador to help it reclaim its waste regions. (*Ha'aretz*, 18 Sept)

#### URUGUAY

**May: Israel-Uruguay Farm Exchange.** A 23-member agricultural study mission from Uruguay's Rural Youth Club spent a month visiting Israel. A spokesman for the delegation said that they intended to draw up plans to import goats from Israel and breed them according to Israeli methods. (*Jer. Post*, 20 May)

**Dec: Uruguayan Foreign Minister Visits Israel.** The Uruguayan Foreign Minister, Homero Martinez Montero, and the Secretary of the Uruguayan Government, Manuel Sanchez Morales, spent six days in Israel as guests of the government.

Speaking at a Press conference in Jerusalem, Montero promised that on his return to Montevideo he would make suggestions for implementing the Israel-Uruguayan cultural agreement. He felt that it would be in his country's interest to benefit from Israel's experience.

Speaking on ME disputes, Montero stressed that his country would support any UN resolution that would promise a solution based on justice, law and consideration for the interests of the parties concerned. (*Jer. Post*, 14 Dec) (See also p 179.)

He said that there was room for the closest technical co-operation between Uruguay and Israel, particularly in agriculture. In his discussions with Mrs Meir he had raised the idea that some Uruguayan families should spend a few years in Israel in order to study her new agricultural methods. Concerning Israel's international position, he said: "I have no doubt that the fact of Israel's revival is already being felt throughout the world, particularly in the cultural field." (*Ha'aretz*, 15 Dec)

**Dec: Israeli Minister Visits Uruguay.** Pinhas Sapir, the Israel Minister of Commerce and Industry, on a tour of Latin America, visited Uruguay in Dec, and met the Ministers of Labour and Foreign Affairs. He told reporters that he hoped to lay the groundwork for increased trade between Israel and Uruguay. (*Jer. Post*, 2 Dec)

#### VENEZUELA

Dr Sanabria, a former acting President, V. G. Landinez, Minister of Agriculture, and G. Navarro, trade union leader, visited Israel.

On the 150th anniversary of Venezuela's independence a street in Jerusalem was named after the national hero, Simon Bolivar.

Venezuela established its legation in Jerusalem. [The majority of the diplomatic missions have been established in Tel Aviv and vicinity in order to withhold official recognition of Jerusalem as Israel's Capital, following the UN decision in 1947 to internationalize the city. In 1960, the missions of Greece, Guatemala, the Netherlands, Uruguay and Venezuela were located in Jerusalem.] (*IGYb*, 1960/61)

Pinhas Sapir, Israel Minister of Commerce and Industry, visited Venezuela in Nov. During his visit it was decided to open a Venezuelan-Israel Chamber of Commerce. Several groups of investors showed interest in investments in Israel. (*Ha'aretz*, 22 Nov)

#### CENTRAL AMERICA AND THE CARRIBEAN

**Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua.** The Israeli Legations in these countries were raised to the rank of embassies. The resident Ambassador to Guatemala was confirmed as Ambassador to the four other states. (*IGYb*, 1960/61)

El Salvador's first Minister to Israel presented his credentials on 23 Mar. (*Jer. Post*, 24 Mar) An "El Salvador Forest" was planted in Israel and a school in San Salvador named after Israel. (*IGYb*, 1960/61)

In Nov Pinhas Sapir, Israel Minister of Commerce and Industry, visited Guatemala on a tour of Latin American countries. (*Ha'aretz*, 8 Nov)

**Panama.** Panama's Foreign Minister, Miguel J. Moreno, and the UN representatives of Panama and Costa Rica visited Israel in Mar, as guests of the government. (*Ha'aretz*, 18 Mar)

On 26 July Panama's first (non-resident) Minister to Israel presented his credentials. (*Jer. Post*, 27 July)

The Panamanian Minister of Trade and Industry, Amilcar Tribaldos, visited Israel in Apr and Ernesto de la Guardia, a former President, in Dec—both as guests of the government. (*Ha'aretz*, 22 Apr; *Jer. Post*, 7, 9 Dec)

**Cuba, Haiti.** An Israel legation was set up in Cuba in Dec 1959 and in July 1960 the first resident Minister to Cuba was appointed. (*IGYb*, 1960/61) The Cuban Minister to Israel presented his credentials in Aug. (*Ha'aretz*, 30 Aug)

Israel's mission in Haiti was raised to the rank of embassy. (The Ambassador is non-resident.) (*IGYb*, 1960/61)

**Mexico.** A Mexican parliamentary delegation visited Israel in Mar and invited Knesset representatives to attend the 150th anniversary of Mexican independence in Sept. (*Jer. Post*, 7 Mar)

In Mar an Israel-Mexico cultural agreement, initialled

the year before, was ratified in Mexico City. (*Jer. Post*, 1 Apr)

On 18 Aug Mr Jorge Daessle-Segura presented to President Ben-Zvi his credentials as Mexico's first Ambassador to Israel, after diplomatic representation had been

raised to embassy level. (*Ha'aretz*, 17 Aug, announcing the forthcoming event)

Levi Eshkol, the Israel Minister of Finance, headed a delegation at the Mexican independence celebrations. (*Ha'aretz*, 18 Sept)

## AFRICA AND ASIA IN GENERAL

REFERENCES: See also Views and Policies, pp 276-7; Africa, General Activities.

### THE AFRO-ASIAN INSTITUTE

**Oct: Afro-Asian Institute Opened.** The Afro-Asian Institute for Labour Studies and Cooperation opened its first six-month course in Tel Aviv on 10 Oct. It was co-sponsored by the American Federation of Labour Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO) and the Histadrut. The co-chairmen of the Board of Governors were Eliahu Elath [Israel's former Ambassador to Britain] and George Meaney, President of the AFL-CIO.

The first course was attended by 64 students, including 40 government officials and leaders of trade unions and cooperative movements, from 15 African and Asian countries. Most of the lecturers at the Institute were Israelis, but several were invited from abroad. Graduates receive diplomas. (*Davar*, 14 Oct; *Jer. Post*, 20 Nov)

**Objections to Cooperation with the American Co-sponsors.** The organ of the Achdut Ha'avoda party objected to the appointment of Meaney as co-chairman, "in view of the false interpretations to which this might lead." (*Lamerhav*, 19 Oct) It was reported that Ben-Gurion, too, had objected to the co-sponsorship on the grounds that the Afro-Asian countries were suspicious of anything American. Elath commented that the only complaints had been "home-produced." (*Jer. Post*, 20 Nov)

Invitations to candidates for the second term, beginning in May 1961, went out in Dec.

### AFRO-ASIAN TRAINEES IN ISRAEL; ISRAEL EXPERTS ABROAD

**Growing Number of Trainees.** Mrs Meir, the Foreign Minister, told the Knesset that the number of trainees coming to Israel from developing countries in Africa, Asia, Latin America and the Mediterranean Basin [the great majority from Africa and Asia] had jumped from a few score in 1959 to over 750 in 1960. There had also been a rise in the number of instructors, experts and advisers sent out to these countries to more than 150. This two-way traffic was speeded up still more in the first months of 1961; it was planned to increase the number of trainees in Israel to 1,000, and to send over 400 Israelis abroad, in 1961. (For source, see below.)

**Personal Friendships Needed** (continued). Mrs Meir called on the Israeli public, and particularly the youth, to make these trainees "feel at home in our midst." The work of the government and of public institutions was not enough, she said. "Genuine friendship," she declared, "cannot be won by passive tolerance. It needs active performance, and to discharge that duty there must be positive acts in the form of invitations, the formation of personal friendships and shared social lives." (*Knesset Records*, 20 Mar 1961; *Davar*, 21 Mar 1961)

**July: "Histadrut Lesson Applicable in New Asian, Afri-**

**can States."** Victor Reuther, assistant to the President of the United Automobile Workers of America, and head of its International Department, said at the end of a 15-day visit to the country that Israel had an important role to play as a bridge between the modern industrial world and the newly arising nations of Africa and Asia. This applied particularly to the Histadrut, since its combination of public ownership and trade union organization was especially applicable to the labour movements of these new nations. Reuther recalled a statement by the Burmese Premier, U Nu, that he preferred Israel's economic aid to that of the US, because "America gives what it wants, Israel gives what we need."

Because of what Israel had to teach, he said, he looked forward to the opening of the Afro-Asian Institute later in the year. (*Jer. Post*, 13 July)

### AUG: INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON THE ROLE OF SCIENCE IN THE ADVANCEMENT OF NEW STATES

**Composition of Conference.** Delegations from 15 African and Asian countries—including a Head of State, President Youlou of Congo (Brazzaville), Prime Minister Koirala of Nepal and 15 Cabinet Ministers—and 30 eminent scientists from four continents took part in the International Conference on the Role of Science in the Advancement of New States, which was held between 15 and 25 Aug at the Weizmann Institute in Rehovot (see also under separate country headings). Subjects discussed included: economic and social problems; energy; medicine and health; food, nutrition and eugenics; science and education; water and agriculture; science, politics and economics. PM Ben-Gurion, Abba Eban, the Minister of Education and Culture (President of the Weizmann Institute, which convened the conference), and other Israeli leaders spoke.

**Future of Conference.** The Finance Minister of Eastern Nigeria, Dr Samuel Efem Imoke (see also Nigeria), proposed that the conference "should become a regular feature in world affairs." He also addressed an appeal to the Soviet Union to participate in the future work of the conference, expressing his regret at the absence of one of the two powers which held the destiny of mankind in their hands [delegates from the USSR and East European countries had been invited but had not come].

At the closing session on 25 Aug, Eban submitted the Rehovot Declaration, which called for greater emphasis on science and technology by the governments of developing states; more attention by scientifically advanced countries to fields relevant to the problems of new states; and the setting up of a permanent body to channel requests from new states for scientific aid. The declaration was adopted unanimously, though some delegates said that the clauses on financial aid should have been more strongly worded. (For full text, see Israel Press on 26 Aug.) (*Davar*; *Ha'aretz*, *Jer. Post*, 16-26 Aug)



## ASIA

## BURMA

**Burmese Study Missions and Visits.** Representatives of a 16-man delegation from the Burmese armed forces told a Press conference that they were in Israel for a year's study of arms manufacture. They would be taking specialized courses in ammunition testing, metallurgy, etc. (*Jer. Post*, 1 Jan)

A senior Burmese economist studied for three months in Israel. (*Ha'aretz*, 8 Feb)

On 4 Apr a second group of ten soldiers left Burma for special training in the Israel armaments industry. (*Ha'aretz*, 5 Apr)

Burma's Assistant Attorney-General visited Israel in June. (*Jer. Post*, 8 June)

In July the Deputy Inspector-General and an inspector of the Burmese Police arrived in Israel for a three months' study tour. (*Ha'aretz*, 4, 11 July)

Three Burmese army officers, including the head of Training Department, came for a week's visit as guests of the Israel Defence Forces. (*Ha'aretz*, 1 Aug)

In Oct five senior Burmese army officers spent ten days in Israel as guests of the Ministry of Defence. They met the Chief of Staff, and visited defence installations. They also took an interest in fishing and fish-breeding, which are included in the activities of the Burmese Navy. (*Jer. Post*, 3, 14 Oct)

In Oct U Tun Win, Chairman of the All-Burma Co-operative Union and member of the Burmese Parliament, visited Israel as guest of the Histadrut. (*Jer. Post*, 3 Nov)

**Burmese Farmer-Soldiers and Technicians for Study in Israel.** A group of Burmese soldiers, eight families and 42 bachelors, which arrived in Israel in Nov 1958 to study co-operative farming, left for home on 23 Jan. (*Jer. Post*, 24 Jan)

A second group of 103 Burmese Army personnel and their families arrived in Apr for a year's study. The contingent comprised 42 men, 23 wives and 38 children. First, they went to a training farm to study Hebrew. Later they were to be split into small groups, which would live in different agricultural settlements and study cooperative farming methods. (*Jer. Post*, 24 Apr)

**Israeli Activities in Burma.** Four Israeli instructors left for Burma on 17 Feb to help the Burmese soldier-farmers, who had spent 14 months in Israel villages, to set up their new homes in the Namsang area, on the Chinese border. (*Jer. Post*, 18 Feb)

The first village constructed under Israeli guidance was dedicated in June. (*Ha'aretz*, 7 June)

**Joint Ventures.** On 13 Jan Captain B.O. Barber, a director of the Burmese Ministry of Defence, and U Soe Myint, SG of the Burmese Armaments Industry, visited Israel. They met Ministers and Ministry of Defence officials, and discussed with Zim, the Israel Navigation Company, the expansion of the operations of the Burmese Five Star Shipping Line (of which Captain Barber was a director). Zim had a five-year contract to manage the Burmese company, which still had three years to run. (*Jer. Post*, 14, 15, 18 Jan)

The Burmese Army's Defence Services Institute was to enter into a partnership with an Israel firm to supply

coal to Burma, according to a Rangoon report. The new firm would be owned on a 55-43 basis by the Institute and the Israel Coal Company Ltd. (*Jer. Post*, 13 Jan)

**Apr: Israeli Firm to Build Super-Phosphate Plant near Rangoon.** The Burmese Government awarded the Fertilizers and Chemicals Ltd. of Haifa a contract by international tender to build a super-phosphate plant near Rangoon. The plant was to take two years to build and Fertilizers and Chemicals experts were to supervise all stages of the project. Three Burmans were in Israel for training as key operators of the plant. (*Jer. Post*, 6 Apr) [The plan was later shelved by the Burmese Government.]

**Knesset Delegation Visits Burma.** An eight-member Knesset delegation arrived at Rangoon on 16 Sept for a five-day official visit. (*Ha'aretz*, 18 Sept)

## CEYLON

**Accreditation of First Ceylonese Minister to Israel and Cancellation Following Arab Pressure.** See p 180.

**Apr: Israeli Frigate for Ceylon.** The Israeli frigate *Miznak*, manned by an Israel crew, left Djibouti on 14 Apr and sailed into the Indian Ocean, heading for her new home port, Colombo. [It had been sold to the Ceylonese Navy together with its sister ship, the *Mivtach*, which had been transferred to Ceylon several months earlier.] (*Jer. Post*, 10, 15 Apr)

**May: Israeli Expert in Ceylon.** An Israel expert spent three weeks in Ceylon lecturing and advising on management problems on the invitation of the Ceylon Institute of Industrial Research. On his return he stated that his lectures on problems of industrialization had been well received mainly because he discussed Israel's difficulties in this field and the ways devised to meet them. (*Ha'aretz*, 22 May)

**Ceylonese Visitors in Israel.** S. Thondaman, President of the Ceylon Workers' Congress and member of the ILO Governing Board, spent a week in Israel studying labour conditions. He stated that on his return he would recommend that the Congress should learn from Histadrut experience in organizing farm and marketing co-operatives, economic enterprises and building societies. (*Ha'aretz*; *Jer. Post*, 4 Aug)

In Nov M. P. de Zoysa, Member of Parliament and leader of the Sri Lanka Freedom Party, visited Israel as the guest of Mapai. (*Jer. Post*, 3 Nov)

## INDIA

(See also joint statement of Nehru and Abdel-Nasser on Arab-Israeli conflict, p 182; India's attitude on question of the Arab refugees, p 213; Interception of Nehru's plane over Israeli territory, pp 193-4.)

**India's Refusal to Establish Full Diplomatic Relations.** [The Indian Government has never agreed to the establishment of diplomatic relations with Israel. There is an Israel Consul-General in Bombay but no Indian Consul in Israel.]

In Oct an Israeli daily quoted a correspondent of *The*

*Times of India* on the views of PM Ben-Gurion and Mrs Golda Meir, the Israeli Foreign Minister, as follows: India is "less than neutral" in her official attitude towards Israel and does not implement the high moral standards of behaviour she advocates in international relations. Ben-Gurion told the correspondent that PM Nehru's solicitude for the sensitivity of the Arabs ran counter to his desire not to increase tension between the Arab countries and Israel. While India continued to submit to Arab pressure the prospects of peace in the ME declined. Only the recognition of Israel as an established fact could provide a basis for the attainment of normal conditions in the Middle East.

The correspondent also reported that Ben-Gurion had stated that he had several times "attempted to invite" PM Nehru to visit Israel. The last attempt had been made only a short time before, but Nehru had declined. (*Ha'aretz*, 11 Oct)

PM Nehru told Parliament on 22 Dec that while India formally recognized Israel, she declined to establish a diplomatic mission there or to have an Israel mission in New Delhi because such an exchange "obviously is very much entangled in important and rather dangerous international issues." (*Jer. Post*, 23 Dec)

**Jan-Dec: Indian Study Groups in Israel; Interest Centres on Cooperation.** In Dec 1959 and Jan 1960, a five-man Indian Government mission, the first to come to Israel, spent five weeks in the country, studying the co-operative movement. The mission discussed with PM Ben-Gurion the applicability of Israel's co-operative experience to India's social and economic development schemes. He told them that the main question was whether the Indian people could form a nucleus of pioneers to develop co-operative living and co-operative enterprise. He also expressed great interest in India's religious, social and educational problems. (*Jer. Post*, 19 Jan)

In its report to the Indian Government which was presented to Parliament, the mission stated that the Israeli movement had grown to its present stature because of a group of selfless workers with high idealism. Some of its experience was of little relevance to present Indian conditions, but some of its practices could be borrowed by India with profit. (*Jer. Post*, 26 Apr)

On 29 Feb twenty members of the Bhoodan movement arrived in Israel for a six-month visit to study the co-operative movement, as guests of the Foreign Ministry and the Histadrut. The visit was inspired by Jayprakash Narayan, a leader of the movement, who had established close ties with the Histadrut during a visit to Israel two years before. Smaller groups of Bhoodan members had visited Israel in the past.

The group attended a seminar on co-operation at the Histadrut Workers' School in Tel Aviv and then worked in agricultural settlements. (*Jer. Post*, 1 Mar)

On completion of the tour, the leaders of the group stated that the kibbutz could not be adopted by India as a model; the moshav, the smallholders' cooperative village, was much more suitable. (*Jer. Post*, 5 Aug)

In Dec a delegation of 16 leading members of the Young Farmers Association of India arrived for a three-weeks visit, as guests of the Israel Council of Youth Movements. They visited cooperative and other agricultural settlements, bases of Nahal (Army agricultural units), and the Lachish development area. (*Ha'aretz*, 28 Dec)

**Other Indian Visitors.** In Apr Raja Hutheesing, the Indian author and economist, a leading member of the opposition right-wing Swatantra Party, spent five days in

Israel on a private visit to promote trade relations. "India is interested in Israel potash, bromine and phosphates and could offer Israel iron, steel, sugar and tobacco," he said. (*Jer. Post*, 19 Apr) He met Eshkol, the Finance Minister, to discuss trade relations. (*Ha'aretz*, 25 Apr)

In an interview Hutheesing declared: "Israel should distinguish between the official policy which the Indian Government has been forced to adopt towards Israel, and which has been shaped by its internal and external problems, and its genuine sympathetic intentions towards it." (*Ha'aretz*, 17 Apr)

In Apr Ashok Mahata, H. V. Kamath and Mrs Limaya represented the Praja Socialist Party at the Socialist International Conference in Haifa. Kamath and Mrs. Limaya stayed on for an extended visit.

In May-June Mrs Rajkumari Amrit Kaur, President of the Indian Red Cross, a former Minister of Health and a close friend of Gandhi, visited Israel. (*IGYb*, 1960/61)

**Israeli Visits to India.** In Mar, Colonel Yosef Carmel, ADC to President Ben-Zvi, arrived in India on a goodwill mission to the Jewish communities. (*Ha'aretz*, 22 Mar)

In Sept, a delegation of six students of the Hebrew University in Jerusalem left for a two-month tour of Indian universities. (*Ha'aretz*, 27 Sept)

The Israel Philharmonic Orchestra visited India in Dec. PM Nehru attended the premiere in New Delhi. (*Jer. Post*, 22 Dec)

## JAPAN

**Economic and Commercial Contacts.** Two Japanese engineers arrived in Dimona [a new development town in the Negev] on 20 Oct to supervise the mounting of a complete "direct spinning plant," using a revolutionary textile process. (*Jer. Post*, 26 Oct)

Long-term agreement on the sale of phosphates to Japan was being held up by the absence of a regular Eilat-FarEast shipping line. It appeared that the Japanese were prepared to buy all the phosphates that Israel could deliver—estimated at 100,000–150,000 tons a year—provided regular shipments were guaranteed. The Japanese explained that they would have to adapt their plants to the quality of the Israel product, which would be justified only by a guaranteed supply. (*Jer. Post*, 12 Dec)

A 46,400-ton tanker built in Japan for an Israeli-Libyan firm sailed for her maiden voyage in July. (*Ha'aretz*, 9 Aug) [Several Israeli orders for freighters were placed with Japanese shipyards.]

[In mid-1960], discussions were proceeding between the governments of Japan and Israel on the investment of Japanese capital and know-how in industrial development in Israel. (*IGYb*, 1960/61)

**Various Contacts.** Many Japanese economists, scientists and professors came to Israel during the year. There was an exchange of students, on scholarships granted by the two governments. (*IGYb*, 1960/61)

In Apr Dr Tomi Kora, a former member of the Upper House of the Japanese Diet and a member of the Japan-Israel Women's League, spent four days in Israel as the guest of WIZO (Women's International Zionist Organization). (*Jer. Post*, 3 Apr)

In July, Professor Yoshihiko Seki, a leader of the Japanese Socialist Party, paid a five-day visit as the guest of the government and Mapai. (*Jer. Post*, 31 July)

At the end of the year the Israel Philharmonic Orchestra visited Japan. (*IGYb*, 1960/61)

An eight-member Knesset delegation left for Tokyo

in Sept to attend the ninth Interparliamentary Conference. (*Jer. Post*, 14 Sept)

### NEPAL

**June: Establishment of Diplomatic Relations.** In June official statements in Katmandu and Jerusalem announced the establishment of diplomatic relations, and the exchange of Ambassadors. For the moment, however, it was reported that resident Ambassadors would not be appointed. This came after almost four years of contacts between the Israel labour movement and the leaders of the Nepal Congress Party. (*Ha'aretz*, 2 June) [On 7 Sept, the Israel Ambassador in Rangoon presented his credentials as non-resident Ambassador in Katmandu. A First Secretary serves as Chargé d'Affaires.]

**Aug: Nepalese PM Visits Israel.** Mr B.P. Koirala, PM of Nepal, arrived in Israel on 12 Aug for a nine-day official visit. He attended the International Conference on Science in the Advancement of New States in Rehovot, called on the President, had several talks with the PM, the Foreign Minister, the Minister for Agriculture and high ranking officials, and addressed a meeting of the Mapai Central Committee.

Before leaving he issued a joint communiqué with PM Ben-Gurion, which stated that "while in Israel, Mr. Koirala acquainted himself with the work being done in the development of agriculture and other fields."

The two PMs noted "that Nepal and Israel were both determined to develop their respective countries in a democratic way and approached their plans and problems in a similar, kindred spirit." PM Koirala hoped "that Israel, using her unique experience, could make available extremely valuable cooperation and assistance to Nepal, which was determined to telescope into one or two decades the economic development of centuries." They also "agreed that the Government of Israel would be sending to Nepal, at an early date, a group of experts to determine and draw up concrete plans of technical and other assistance and joint enterprises with Nepal in the field of agriculture, industry and construction works, and also to explore possibilities of further cooperation." Israel also agreed to provide scholarships for Nepalese in Israel. In conclusion, "the two PMs reviewed the growing friendship between Nepal and Israel," and "asserted their determination to make still greater efforts for the ever growing friendship between Nepal and Israel." (*Jer. Post*, 22 Aug)

PM Koirala stated on 30 Aug in Katmandu that Israel and Yugoslavia were "the two countries in the world most fascinating in their socialist achievements—beating all Communist progress." He also stated that Israel's voluntary organizations were more successful than Communist China's compulsory communes, and announced that he would soon send an army delegation to Israel to study its military system, which he declared was "most suited to Nepal." Nepal's close relations with Israel did not affect its cordial relations with the Arab states, he added. (*Jer. Post*, 31 Aug)

**Apr–Nov: Various Contacts.** [In Apr Sri P.N. Chaundari, Minister of Education, visited Israel as guest of the government. He studied the possibilities of Israel aid to Nepal in the field of education.]

[In May Mr Sresta, Director of the Nepalese Authority for Industrial Development, visited Israel.]

David Hacohen, MK, represented Mapai at the convention of the Nepal Congress Party in May 1960. (*Ha'aretz*, 2 June; *Jer. Post*, 3 June)

[In July Mr Lohani, Director of Development of Nepal, visited Israel.]

In Sept, the Israel Ambassador in Nepal presented PM Koirala with 40 Uzi submachine guns flown to Katmandu as a special gift from PM Ben-Gurion and the Deputy Defence Minister, Shimon Peres. (*Ha'aretz*, 12 Sept)

In Nov a three-man Israel survey mission left for Nepal at the invitation of PM Koirala to study water and settlement development problems. (*Jer. Post*, 21 Nov)

In Nov four members of the Nepalese Parliament spent four days in Israel on an unofficial visit. (*Jer. Post*, 4 Nov)

In Nov, the Nepalese Minister of Health spent some time in Israel as the guest of the government. (*Jer. Post*, 4 Nov)

[In Dec Professor Khanal, member of the Nepalese legation to UN, visited Israel.]

### PHILIPPINES

**Mar: Treaty of Friendship with Israel Deferred.** In Mar, President Garcia recommended to the Philippine Senate the ratification of the treaty of friendship with Israel signed on 26 Feb 1957. Congressional sources reported that Muslim leaders from the Southern Philippines had urged deferment "until more propitious times." (*Jer. Post*, 8 Mar) [Until the end of 1960 no further developments in this respect were reported.]

**June: Israel's First Resident Minister in the Philippines** presented his credentials in June. (*IGYb*, 1960/61)

**Philippine Visits.** In Apr, Diosdado Macapagal, Vice-President of the Philippines, spent a day in Israel, visiting Christian shrines in Nazareth and Galilee. (*Jer. Post*, 26 Apr)

In May a group of eight Philippine economic and development experts spent a week in Israel studying light industry, after a tour of other countries organized by the US Operations Mission. (*Jer. Post*, 4 May)

In Aug Dr Manuel Lim, the Philippine Minister of Commerce and Industry, visited Israel. Before leaving, he expressed the hope that trade between the two countries would amount to \$2 million in the current year, despite difficulties caused by the closure of the Suez Canal to Israel shipping. Israel would supply the Philippines with minerals and chemical fertilizers in exchange for copra, meat, and perhaps tobacco. (*Jer. Post*, 24 Aug)

**Technical Assistance.** Israeli cotton experts and equipment were sent to the Philippines. A Philippine agricultural engineer was accepted for post-graduate studies in Israel. (*IGYb*, 1960/61)

### SOUTH-EAST ASIA

**Israeli Aid For Mekong River Project.** The Israel Ambassador to Thailand announced Israel's readiness to help in the execution of the Mekong River project, at a meeting in Bangkok of the UN Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East. As a first step, she would contribute 1,000 tons of cement.

[The Mekong River Project is the largest development project in South-East Asia. It is being undertaken jointly by South Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia and Thailand.] (*Ha'aretz*, 22 Mar)

**Cambodia.** Diplomatic relations were established in June. [The Israel Ambassador in Bangkok presented his cre-

dentials as non-resident Ambassador in Phnompenh in Aug.] (*IGYb*, 1960/61)

**Laos.** On 11 Jan, Prince Souvanna Phouma, Laos' Ambassador to Paris, presented his credentials as his country's first Minister to Israel. (*Jer. Post*, 12 Jan)

**Malaya.** Tan Phock Kin, SG of the Malayan Labour Party, arrived on 20 Nov for a week's stay as the guest of Mapai. Before leaving, he said that the Lachish Area development project could serve as a workable idea to foster the integration of his country's various races into one nation. (*Jer. Post*, 28 Nov)

On 1 Dec the Malayan House of Representatives rejected an opposition demand that Malaya should withdraw its recognition of Israel. PM Tengku Abdul Rahman, strongly defending Malaya's independent foreign policy, said: "We do not belong to the Arab League. Our only connection is religion... What we have done for the Arabs is enough, we have no diplomatic relations with Israel. We don't even have transport relations or play football with them." (*Reuter*; *Jer. Post*, 2 Dec) [When the independent Federation of Malaya was es-

tablished on 1 Sept 1957, Israel was one of the nations asked for recognition, which it granted.]

**Singapore.** [In May] a delegation from Singapore visited Israel to study vocational training. (*IGYb*, 1960/61)

In Aug a delegation from Singapore attended the Rehovot Science Conference (p 302). It was headed by Yong Nyuk Lin, the Minister for Education, who was also a guest at the session of the Mapai Central Committee. (*Ha'aretz*, 14, 18 Aug)

In Sept final arrangements for the sending of several Israeli doctors to work in Singapore's hospitals and lecture at the University of Singapore's Faculty of Medicine were discussed in Jerusalem. (*Jer. Post*, 26 Sept)

**Thailand.** In Mar Thailand's first non-resident Ambassador presented his credentials. (*Jer. Post*, 30 Mar)

[Several high ranking Thai officials, especially in the field of agriculture and irrigation, health and education, visited Israel.]

**South Vietnam.** In Sept, the Israel Ambassador to Burma visited South Vietnam as a guest of the government. (*IGYb*, 1961/62, *Hebrew Ed.*)

## NON-ARAB COUNTRIES IN THE MIDDLE EAST

### CYPRUS

**Diplomatic Relations; Arab Measures Against Israel-Cyprus Commercial Relations.** See: The Arabs, Israel and the Republic of Cyprus, pp 181-2.

**Commercial Relations.** On 24 Jan an Israel-Cyprus Chamber of Commerce was established in Jerusalem to foster economic and cultural relations. (*Jer. Post*, 26 Jan)

On 22 Mar a parallel body, the first of its kind to be set up in the island, was established in Nicosia. (*Jer. Post*, 24 Mar)

A mission from the Cypriot Chamber visited Israel in Aug, mainly, according to its leader, to find ways of redressing the balance in their country's trade with Israel, which sold Cyprus eight times more than she bought from her. (*Ha'aretz*, 4 Aug; *Jer. Post*, 8 Aug)

The *Jerusalem Post* wrote that Cyprus had as much trade with Israel as with all the Arab countries combined. Israeli tourists visiting Cyprus did much to redress the balance of trade; during the previous year they had spent nearly IL3 million in the island. This, the paper added, should be encouraged. Israel could also help Cyprus in expanding water supplies and developing fisheries and agriculture. (*Jer. Post*, 12 Aug)

Several Israeli companies were active in the island, prospecting for minerals with Cypriot partners. (*IGYb*, 1960/61)

**Various Contacts.** Cypriot mayors, students and educators visited Israel. Cypriots trained in Israel in fishing, housing and music and took part in various symposia and seminars. There was an interchange of students and sport delegations. (*IGYb*, 1960/61)

In the last week of Jan the Israel Philharmonic Orchestra gave a series of concerts in Cyprus, and it was announced that it would be followed by Israeli musical ensembles. (*Jer. Post*, 26 Jan)

A Cyprus Democratic Youth delegation visited Israel in Apr, at the invitation of the Israel pioneering youth movements. It announced that Israel, the UAR, Iraq

and Lebanon were among 14 countries invited to send delegations to the Festival of Democratic Youth in Cyprus. Israel and the Arab countries had been invited together to demonstrate the Cypriots' desire for cordial relations with all their neighbours. (*Jer. Post*, 15 Apr)

### ETHIOPIA

**New Consul-General.** On 16 Mar the new Consul-General of Ethiopia in Jerusalem, Tekle Sadik Mecouria, holding the personal rank of Minister, arrived in Israel. (*Ha'aretz*, 17 Mar)

**Distinguished Ethiopian Visitors.** On 19 Apr Abebe Aregai, Chairman of the Ethiopian Council of Ministers and Minister of Defence, and Ras Imeru Haile Selassie, cousin of the Emperor, arrived in Israel accompanied by the Ethiopian Ambassadors to the US and Greece, Ras Michel Imeru and Lij Araia. Although their short stay was described as a private visit and part of the Easter pilgrimage, they were received by Israeli leaders, including the PM and the Foreign Minister, "in view of the cordial and close relations between the two countries." (*Jer. Post*, 21 Apr)

**Technical Assistance.** In May two members of the Egged transport cooperative, invited to Ethiopia as advisers on the planning of public transport and vehicle maintenance, were received by the Emperor. (*Ha'aretz*, 30 May)

Two Israeli physicians managed the Government Hospital in Massawa. (*Ha'aretz*, 3 Nov)

In Nov an Israeli expert left for Ethiopia to serve for a year as an adviser to the Ministries of Commerce, Industry and Agriculture. (*Ha'aretz*, 3 Nov)

In Nov a special course in agriculture was opened at the Ruppin Institute for twenty graduates of the Faculty of Agriculture and Ethiopian agricultural schools. (*Ha'aretz*, 22, 23 Nov)

In Nov two graduates of the Technion, Israel Institute of Technology, left for Ethiopia to lecture at the Im-



perial College of Engineering, the dean of which was Professor Spira, of the Technion. (*Ha'aretz*, 14 Nov)

**Trade.** Israeli tyres, refrigerators, radio sets, textiles and conserves were to be found in Ethiopian markets, an Israeli correspondent reported. (*Ha'aretz*, 1 Nov)

**Economic Cooperation; Joint Enterprises.** Construction work by Solel Boneh (the Histadrut contracting company) in Ethiopia included roads, buildings and military camps. (*Ha'aretz*, 6 Nov)

An Israeli fishing company, Yotvat, based on Massawa, was operating in the Red Sea, employing Ethiopian and Israeli fishermen, and shipping frozen fish to Eilat, on the Red Sea. (*Ha'aretz*, 23, 25 Oct)

The Israeli firm of Einav Bros, co-owners of Incode, the Ethiopian-Israeli meat processing firm, signed a contract with the Ethiopian Government for the lease of land for farming. They were to receive for the purpose a loan of 250,000 Ethiopian dollars from the Ethiopian Bank of Development. (*Ha'aretz*, 27 Oct, 30 Nov)

**Planning of Further Economic Cooperation and Technical Assistance; Ministers Exchange Visits.** On 5 Sept economic cooperation between the two countries was discussed by the Director-General of the Ethiopian Ministry of Interior, Mekuria Worku, during a visit to Jerusalem. (*Jer. Post*, 18 Sept)

On 16 Sept Moshe Dayan, the Israel Minister of Agriculture, arrived in Addis Ababa for a week's visit. He was received by Emperor Haile Selassie. (*Jer. Post*, 18-21 Sept)

On his return to Israel on 25 Sept, Dayan said that, following his meetings with the Emperor and talks with Ethiopian Ministers, cooperation with Ethiopia would be developed in three main spheres: the dispatch of Israeli advisers to various Ethiopian Ministries; the dispatch of Israeli experts in specific fields, such as water drilling, medical services and engineering; and the establishment of joint industrial and agricultural enterprises in arid zones. Following specific requests by the Ethiopian Government, the number of Israeli experts was expected shortly to exceed that from any other country, Dayan said. The possibility of expanding Israeli fishing in the Red Sea had also been discussed with Ethiopian Ministers. (*Ha'aretz*; *Davar*, 26 Sept)

In Dec a proposal for the establishment of two farms in Ethiopia for the growing of industrial crops was being examined by the Israel authorities. Two-thirds of the capital required was to be invested by Ethiopians and one-third by Israelis. Israeli experts would provide the knowhow, and part of the produce would be exported to Israel. (*Ha'aretz*, 12 Dec)

**Gestures of Friendship.** In Feb, the Government of Israel sent citrus juice to Ethiopia for drought-afflicted areas. The Ethiopian Minister of the Court conveyed the thanks of his Government and the Ethiopian Red Cross to Israel and its government. (*Ha'aretz*, 27 Feb)

In Dec President Ben-Zvi cabled congratulations to Emperor Haile Selassie on the occasion of his return to his capital following the liquidation of the insurrection. (*Ha'aretz*, 21 Dec)

**Arab Anti-Israel Activities in Ethiopia.** See p 184.

## IRAN

**Diplomatic Relations.** See Iran, the Arab Countries and Israel, p 216 ff.

**Ben-Gurion: Friendship and Cooperation with Iran.** On 24 Oct Ben-Gurion said in a Knesset survey of foreign affairs: "The Egyptian dictator broke off relations with Iran because of the friendly relations, unofficial but also unconcealed, that exist between Israel and that country, and that friendship continues to exist because it is founded on the mutual advantage that the two countries derive from their cooperation." (*IGPB*, 24 Oct)

**Scientific Cooperation.** In Apr three scientists from the University of Tehran spent a week in Israel as guests of the Foreign Ministry, visiting academic institutions. (*Ha'aretz*, 21 Apr)

In July Major-General Defteri, Deputy Minister for Physical Education, and H. Azimi, Director of the Physical Education Department, visited Israel. (*Ha'aretz*, 11 July)

In Aug a delegation of five scientists, headed by Professor Ali Azad, Rector of Tehran University, attended the Rehovot Science Conference (see p 302). Professor Azad expressed Iranian interest in atomic energy for peace, and stated that the Israeli Atomic Energy Commission and the University of Tehran had held preliminary talks on the training of Iranian students at the [Nebi Rubin] atomic reactor and engaging Israeli scientists to operate an atomic reactor in Iran. (*Ha'aretz*, 15 Aug)

**Various Contacts.** According to Iranian official sources, Iran rejected an Arab protest against the participation of Israeli representatives in the International Women's Conference in Tehran in July. (*Ha'aretz*, 7 July)

An Iranian sport team visited Israel in June. (*Ha'aretz*, 26, 28, 30 June)

An Israeli delegation took part in the third Iranian National Jamboree. It was reported that the Pakistani delegation was ordered by President Ayub to return home in protest; it remained in camp, however, but boycotted the official ceremonies. The Shah was reported to have said that the Pakistani delegation could either stay or go away, but he would not ask the Israelis to leave. (*Ha'aretz*, 1, 5 Aug)

A scroll of greetings, containing sentences from the Bible concerning King Cyrus, was to be sent by President Ben-Zvi to the Shah on the celebration of the 2,500th anniversary of Cyrus. (*Ha'aretz*, 2 Nov)

**Economic and Commercial Ties.** In Mar it was reported that Israeli textiles, conserves, refrigerators, ovens and sweets were to be found abundantly in Iranian markets. (*Ha'aretz*, 28 Mar)

Solel Boneh (the Histadrut contracting firm), which had been active in Iran for a year, won a contest for the construction of a part of the Abadan road.

Another Israeli contracting group, which had formed the "Rah-Bana" building company, won big building contracts. (*Ha'aretz*, 13 Apr)

In Oct, eighty cows were sent from Israel to Iran by air, as part of an Iranian programme to improve its cattle herds. (*Ha'aretz*, 11, 20 Oct)

In Oct it was announced that Israel had established in Iran a station for advice on the use of Israeli fertilizers. (*Ha'aretz*, 20 Oct)

**Arabs and Iranian Oil Supplies.** According to a statement by the Secretariat of the Arab League on 22 Aug, to be forwarded to the Arab states' Foreign Ministers' meeting, relations between the UAR and Iran had de-

teriorated after the Suez conflict, when the USSR had stopped oil supplies to Israel and Iran had sent more than eight million tons of petrol to Eilat [Israel's Red Sea port]. It was also stated that 750,000 tons of this oil had been supplied by Israel to Western countries, allowing the West to circumvent the Suez Canal, and affecting the Arab monopoly on oil transferred from the Persian Gulf. (*Ha'aretz*, 28 July)

The conference of Arab oil experts in Kuwait in Nov recommended that the Arab governments contact Iran to prevent Iranian petrol being supplied to Israel. (*Ha'aretz*, 4 Dec)

## TURKEY

**Mar 1960–Jan 1961: Trade Agreement.** In Mar a new trade agreement between Turkey and Israel was signed in Ankara covering an annual exchange of \$16 million of goods (compared with \$9 million covered by the previous agreement). Israel was to import mainly agricultural products, and Turkey manufactured goods. This was the largest trade agreement ever signed between the two countries. (*Ha'aretz*; *Jer. Post*, 21 Mar)

On 2 Jan 1961, after three weeks of negotiations in Ankara, the agreement was extended for another year. The annual exchange was fixed at \$12.5 million for Israeli exports to Turkey and \$13.5 million for Turkish exports to Israel. It was maintained that since the full figure had not been attained in 1960, the new agreement was more realistic. (*Ha'aretz*, 4, 18 Jan 1961; *Jer. Post*, 4 Jan 1961)

**Good Relations with Gürel Government.** On 30 May, following the coup d'état in Turkey, Israel recognized the new government. (*Ha'aretz*, 31 May)

In Sept Selim Sarper, the Turkish Foreign Minister, stated in an interview with an Israeli correspondent that Turkey's efforts to improve relations with the Arab countries would not influence her attitude towards Israel. "Turkey wants the Arab-Israeli conflict to be justly settled by the UN, in accordance with the principles of the UN, so that the ME may enjoy peace, security and

stability," the correspondent quoted Sarper as saying. (*Ma'ariv*, 18 Sept)

**Mar–Nov: Sentencing and Release of Israeli Fishermen.** In Sept 1959 an Israel fishing vessel, *Snunit*, and its crew of five were detained by a Turkish coastguard ship for alleged fishing within Turkish territorial waters.

On 6 Mar a Turkish court sentenced the fishermen to a year's imprisonment and ordered the confiscation of the ship. On appeal, a retrial was ordered, but on 1 Nov the sentence was increased to five years' imprisonment and three years' exile in Turkey. The severity of the sentence roused sharp criticism in Israel.

On 22 Nov, however, a general amnesty led to the fishermen's release. (*Ha'aretz*; *Jer. Post*, 3, 27 Nov) [Early in 1961 the ship, too, was returned to Israel.]

**Dec 1960–Jan 1961: Chargé d'Affaires' Ranks Raised.** [After the Sinai Campaign in 1956, Turkey recalled her Ambassador from Israel, and was represented only by a Chargé d'Affaires. Israel too came to be represented in Turkey by a Chargé d'Affaires.] On 4 Dec it was reported that the Turkish Government had decided to grant the Chargé d'Affaires in Israel, Rifat Ayandar, the personal rank of Minister. (*Ha'aretz*, 5 Dec)

In Jan 1961 Israel announced that her Chargé d'Affaires in Turkey, Moshe Sasson, had been accorded the personal rank of Minister. (*Jer. Post*, 9 Jan 1961)

**Joint Enterprises and Technical Cooperation.** In Feb, the Turkish authorities ratified an agreement between the Turkish company "Arçelik" and the Israeli company "Amcor" (producing i.a. refrigerators) for cooperation in manufacturing electric refrigerators [in Turkey]. (*Ha'aretz*, 1 Mar)

Solel Boneh, the Histadrut contracting company, continued to be active in Turkey.

In May, Turkish-Israeli talks on the planning of water supply to Ankara and to Istanbul were reported to proceed satisfactorily. Talks were also held on the planning of an irrigation system in Anatolia in which aluminium pipes of Israeli make would be used. (*Ha'aretz*, 20 May)

## AFRICA

(See also: Synopsis p 265 ff, Views and Policies pp 276–7, Africa and Asia in general p 302, Arab anti-Israel activities in Africa p 182 ff, Israel and Congo (Leopoldville) (pp 36–7.)

### GENERAL ACTIVITIES

**Apr–May: Against Apartheid.** While relations with South Africa remained normal throughout the year, Israel disapproved of the apartheid policy. On 24 Apr the Histadrut Executive unanimously expressed its solidarity with the struggle of Africans for equal rights in that country. Pinhas Lavon, the Secretary-General, declared that the Histadrut, as an organization based on equal rights and obligations for all workers regardless of race, sex and religion, supported all nations and races in their aspirations for independence and equality. (*Davar*, 24 Apr)

On May Day, the Histadrut announced that it had joined the boycott of South African foodstuffs called by the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions for May and June. (*Davar*, 3 May)

(The Foreign Minister's declaration against Apartheid, see p 277.)

**Broadcasts to Africa.** On 7 Jan Kol Israel inaugurated regular nightly broadcasts to West Africa: half an hour in English and half an hour in French. The programmes included news, music, talks and readings from the Bible and the Qur'ān. (*Ha'aretz*; *Davar*; *Jer. Post*, 8, 12 Jan)

On 5 Dec Kol Israel inaugurated a daily half-hour broadcast to East Africa in Swahili, the *lingua franca* of the area. The two announcers were East Africans. [Previously, there were only three foreign stations broadcasting in Swahili: the BBC, Moscow Radio and Cairo Radio.] (*Jer. Post*, 5 Dec)

**Special Courses for Africans.** A Histadrut-Government Seminar for Agricultural Cooperation and Rural Development was held in Tel Aviv for 54 students from 11 French-speaking African countries, including 37 senior government officials (participation is mentioned under the appropriate headings below). (*Jer. Post*, 21 Nov)

The Government Productivity Institute announced in Oct that the first four-month course in housing for construction foremen from Africa would open in Jan 1961. It was financed by the government. Twenty-five students from Ghana, Nigeria, Liberia, Sierra Leone and Ethiopia were selected for the first term. (*Davar*, 26 Oct)

### CAMEROUN

Foreign Minister Golda Meir represented the Government of Israel at the independence celebrations on 1 Jan and presented the Cameroun Government with a number of scholarships for advanced studies in Israel (ICYb, 1960). It was reported on 15 Sept that an Israel diplomatic mission would be established in Yaounde, the capital of Cameroun. (*Jer. Post*, 16 Sept)

The Cameroun Minister of Health, Pierre Kamdem-Ninyim, and three of his advisers took part in the Rehovot Science Conference in Aug and visited the Hebrew University-Hadassah Medical Centre, Jerusalem. (*Davar*, 16, 19 Aug)

Students from Cameroun took part in the three-month Histadrut-Government Seminar for Agricultural Cooperation and Rural Development (see p 308). (*Jer. Post*, 21 Nov)

### CHAD

Israel officially recognized the Chad Republic on 10 Aug, the day it was proclaimed, and extended greetings to François Tombalbaye, Head of State and PM (who had visited Israel the previous year). (*Ha'aretz*, 11 Aug)

In mid-Aug, the Vice-Premier of Chad, Gabriel Lisette, participated in the Rehovot Science Conference. He met President Ben-Zvi and PM Ben-Gurion, with whom he discussed, among other things, arid zone farming. A joint statement was issued saying that cultural and technical cooperation, as well as the gradual establishment of training courses for Chad instructors, had been discussed. (*Davar*; *Ha'aretz*, 18, 25 Aug)

On 25 Aug, Lisette cut short his visit to Israel because of political difficulties at home. (*Jer. Post*; *Ha'aretz*, 26 Aug, 18 Nov)

[Students from Chad attended a number of courses in Israel.]

### REPUBLIC OF CONGO (BRAZZAVILLE)

Aug: President Youlou Visits Israel. Abbé Fulbert Youlou, President of the Republic of Congo (Brazzaville), arrived in Israel on 21 Aug as a guest of the government. He was accompanied by his Minister of Information, Appolinaire Bazinga, and the Director of his Office, Robert Maurage. (This was the first official visit by a foreign Head of State to Israel.)

On his arrival, Youlou said that he had heard glowing reports on Israel from the Chad Premier, François Tombalbaye. He added that, except for Italy and France, this was the first time he had set foot in a foreign country. Replying, PM Ben-Gurion expressed the hope that the visit would form a basis for fruitful cooperation in the interests of international peace. (*Davar*, 22 Aug)

On the following day, President Youlou bestowed on President Ben-Zvi his country's highest honour, that of Commandant de l'Ordre de Mérite Congolais. He presided at one of the sessions of the Rehovot Science Conference. (*Davar*, 23-26 Aug)

**Communiqué Stresses Cooperation.** On 27 Aug, after talks between the visitor and Israeli leaders, President Youlou and President Ben-Zvi stated, in a joint com-

muniqué: "In these talks there were discussed, among other things, cultural and technical cooperation in various fields, as well as the organization of courses for training Congolese leaders. The talks . . . resulted in complete mutual understanding, and expression was given to the confidence of both the Congolese and the Israel leaders that the forging of closer ties in all fields between the two peoples and the two governments expresses the aspirations of both the Congolese and Israel nations, which regard peaceful cooperation and friendship between peoples as the necessary conditions for their happiness, progress and prosperity." (*Jer. Post*, 28 Aug)

At the beginning of Nov, Yerahmiel Ram Yaron was appointed first Israel Ambassador at Brazzaville. (*Davar*, 9 Nov)

### ENTENTE COUNTRIES:

#### DAHOMEY, IVORY COAST, NIGER, UPPER VOLTA

The Israel mission to be established in the capital of the Ivory Coast was also to be accredited to the three other states of the Entente—Dahomey, Niger and Upper Volta. (*Jer. Post*, 16 Sept)

During the year, students from Dahomey, Upper Volta and Niger took part in the Histadrut-Government Seminar for Agricultural Cooperation and Rural Development (see p 308). (*Jer. Post*, 21 Nov)

**Ivory Coast.** Golda Meir, the Foreign Minister, was an unexpected visitor to the Ivory Coast on 2 Jan, when the plane in which she was travelling from Cameroun to Liberia landed at Abidjan owing to a technical defect. Later she met Premier Houphouët-Boigny. (*AFP*; *Davar*, 3 Jan)

At the end of Feb, Michael Comay, the head of the Israel delegation to the UN, Ehud Avriel, the Israel Ambassador to Ghana and Moshe Perlman, the Adviser on Public Affairs to the Israel PM, visited the Ivory Coast. (*Jer. Post*, 23 Feb) Levi Eshkol, the Finance Minister, paid a short visit to Abidjan on 4 July and discussed with PM Houphouët-Boigny the broadening of economic ties and the establishment of diplomatic relations after the attainment of independence. (*Davar*, 5 July)

Alcide Kacou, the Ivory Coast Minister of Technical Education, took part in the Rehovot Science Conference in Aug. (*Ha'aretz*, 30 Aug)

**Upper Volta.** A three-man government delegation from Upper Volta arrived in Israel on 26 Sept for a ten-day visit. The visitors were: Sibiri Salembere, the Minister of Agriculture and Cooperation, Michel Lajus, the Minister of State in charge of Public Information, and Abdoulaye Konate, Director of the Office of Cattle Raising, Water and Afforestation. Speaking at a reception given by Pinhas Lavon, the Histadrut SG, Salembere said that close relations could be expected between the Labour movements of the two countries. Upper Volta planned to establish a network of producers' cooperatives and wished to obtain the services of Israeli experts. Lavon replied that the Histadrut was prepared to train a group of men from Upper Volta in cooperation, and that later on an adviser could go out there to help organize the cooperative movement. (*Davar*, 29 Sept)

**Finance Minister's Visit.** In Nov, the Dahomey Minister of Finance, François Aplegan, came to Israel on an "exploratory" visit, at the invitation of Foreign Minister Golda Meir, extended to him at the UN General Assembly. (*Jer. Post*, 21 Nov)



**GABON, CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC**

In Nov, the Israel Ambassador at Brazzaville, Yerahmiel Ram Yaron, was also appointed non-resident Ambassador at Libreville, the capital of Gabon. Students from Gabon came to Israel for various courses.

Walter Eytan, the Israel Ambassador in Paris, represented Israel at the independence celebrations in Bangui, the capital of the new Central African Republic (formerly Ubangi-Shari). (*Davar*, 15 Nov)

**GHANA**

**Jan: Mrs Meir's Visit.** On 15 Jan, Golda Meir, the Foreign Minister, arrived in Accra for a four-day visit to Ghana. Her meeting with Dr Nkrumah was described as "most cordial." A communiqué stated that plans for joint development projects were reviewed. Mrs Meir also conferred with K.A. Gbedemah, the Finance Minister. During her tour she called at the Ghana Air Force School, headed by an Israel Air Force officer; the Ghana Nautical College, which also had been set up in cooperation with Israel and staffed by Israeli instructors; and the headquarters of the Builders' Brigade, Ghana's labour force, which was being reorganized on the lines of Israel's Nahal units [which combine army service with agricultural training]. (*Ha'aretz*; *Davar*, 17, 18 Jan)

**Israel's Role in Black Star Line.** On 21 Jan, Ghana signed a contract, worth over £9 million, with a Dutch firm to build eight ships for the Black Star line, owned jointly by the Ghanaian Government (60 per cent of the shares) and Zim, the Israel Navigation Co. (40 per cent). At the signing ceremony, Krobo Edusei, the Ghanaian Minister of Transport, stressed the debt of gratitude that the Black Star line owed Zim. (*Jer. Post*, 22 Jan)

**Apr: Israeli Naval Instructors.** At the end of Apr, it was announced in Accra that three Israel naval officers would serve as instructors in the three-year maritime officers' course at the Ghana Nautical College. (*Jer. Post*, 27 Apr)

**June: Visit of Israel Minister of Labour.** Giora Josephthal, the Israel Labour Minister, arrived in Accra at the end of June to represent Israel at the celebrations of the proclamation of Ghana as a republic, and was received by President Nkrumah on 2 July. Nkrumah said Israel was the most suited of all nations to help and advise states that had just achieved independence and had to develop rapidly. Plans were discussed for additional Israel activities in Ghana, particularly in agriculture and advanced education. Josephthal also met several Ghanaian Ministers. (*Ha'aretz*; *Davar*, 3, 4 July)

**Ghana Neutral in Middle East Disputes.** On his return to Israel, Josephthal told the Press that despite increasing Arab propaganda in Africa, particularly that of the UAR among the more extreme religious elements in Muslim-populated territories, Ghana was not inclined to take sides in ME disputes, either in the Arab-Israeli conflict or in the various inter-Arab differences. President Nkrumah had indicated that the Ghanaian Government appreciated the work of the Israel Government and various Israeli organizations. However, he said, Israel should be modest about her African ventures and refrain from excessive self-praise. (*Jer. Post*, 10 July)

**July: Visit of Israel Finance Minister.** Immediately after Josephthal's departure, Levi Eshkol, the Israel Finance Minister, arrived in Accra on his way from Dakar to

Lagos, and conferred with his Ghanaian colleague, K.A. Gbedemah. At a Press conference he stated: "We want to help newly-independent states, but at the same time we could also use help, particularly in the way of raw materials." (*Ha'aretz*, 10 July) On his return he said that he expected exports to Ghana to reach almost IL5 million during the year. (*Jer. Post*; *Ha'aretz*, 1 Aug)

Earlier, Eshkol had echoed Josephthal's warning. While stating that he had been received in Ghana and other places with "extreme friendliness," Eshkol urged discretion and modesty as the key to Israel-African co-operation. Where other nations had failed, he said, Israel—having taken in exiles from all parts of the world, of all shades of colour, former victims of persecution and discrimination—was in a position to understand the complex peoples of Africa. "But we must go about it the right way," he added, "bearing in mind that cooperation must be mutual, for we have much to learn as well as to teach in Africa." (*Ha'aretz*, 17 July)

**July: Volta River Contract.** It was reported that the Ghana Government had promised the contract for additional work on the Volta River project, worth several million pounds sterling, to the joint Ghana Government-Solel Boneh Construction Company. In two years, the company has carried out projects worth £4.5 million. (*Jer. Post*, 8 July)

**Aug: Zim Relinquishing Share in Black Star Line, Continuing Management.** On 10 Aug it was announced that the Black Star shipping line would pass into exclusive Ghanaian ownership, the government taking over Zim's 40 per cent interest. From now on, Zim would be connected with the firm solely in a managerial capacity, under a five-year contract. (*Ha'aretz*, 11 Aug)

Dr N. Wydra, Director of Zim, told a Press conference in Haifa that, with the change of status, the Black Star would refund Zim its £500,000 investment plus its share of profits over the past three years—about £30,000. Henceforward, the Black Star line would be operated along the lines of the Burmese Five Star line, which was also managed by Zim. Dr Wydra pointed out that for a newly-founded shipping line to show a profit in its very first year of operation—and that during a serious shipping slump—was a remarkable feat. "It has greatly enhanced our prestige in Africa," he said, "and the new management contract with Ghana shows that the government is satisfied with our work and trusts us." Zim felt that its mission was to train Ghanaians to take over in all departments in the shortest possible time. "Our job," he said, "is to train them effectively, hand over and go home."

Wydra added that of the 170 men now serving on Black Star ships, 120 were Ghanaians and 15 Israelis in positions of command. Referring to the officers' course at the Israeli-run Ghana Nautical College, he said: "I shall consider it a great achievement when Ghanaian masters take over from our captains."

The Black Star line had netted £10,000, in its first year and £32,000 in its second while the figure for 1960 was expected to be £40,000. Dr Wydra revealed that several other newly independent countries had expressed interest in establishing shipping lines under Zim's guidance. (*Ha'aretz*, 11 Aug)

At the end of Oct the Black Star line formally bought out Zim's interest and extended the appointment of Zim as its managing agent until Dec 1967. Expressing his hope that Zim would continue to render advice and assistance, President Nkrumah thanked Wydra, adding: "I



never expected such far-reaching achievements in so short a time, and I credit Zim for them." (*Davar*, 19, 21 Oct)

**Sept: Nkrumah on the ME Dispute.** The Israel-Arab issue was touched upon by President Nkrumah on 30 Sept, at a luncheon given by the UN Correspondents' Association in New York.

Previously, Nkrumah had proposed, in the UN Assembly, that all states in the ME recognize "political realities" in the area (see p 178). At the luncheon, when asked to enlarge on his proposal that the UN should devise methods to keep the Arab states from attacking Israel and vice versa, he replied: "That is a very thorny question, where so much emotion is involved, and we must be very careful... The situation in Palestine between Israel and the Arabs is bad. But the realities are that there is an Israel, and they have established themselves—but also that the refugees are out there, in no-man's-land. But if they are going to use force to get Israel out, they are headed for war—and global war at that. The most pressing problem is the refugee problem, and here we do not want to step on the toes of anyone; but it could lead to world war." Nkrumah called for the establishment of a separate Palestine state outside of Israel, where the Arab refugees would rule themselves. (*Jer. Post*, 2 Oct) (See also p 184.)

**Ghanaian Finance Minister's Visit.** On 8 Sept, Gbedemah, the Ghanaian Finance Minister, arrived in Israel for a week's visit, during which he held talks and toured development areas. He said that Ghana was looking forward to Israel's help and advice in agriculture. (*Ha'aretz*, 11 Sept) He was received by PM Ben-Gurion, Mrs Meir, the Foreign Minister, and Pinhas Sapir, the Minister of Commerce and Industry. (*Jer. Post*, 13 Sept)

**Oct: Ghanaian Defence Official in Israel.** In the first half of Oct, Francisco Ribeiro Aye, the Director-General of the Ghanaian Ministry of Defence, visited Israel as the guest of the government and met Shimon Peres, the Deputy Defence Minister, and Major-General Laskov, the Chief of Staff. This was his fourth visit to Israel. (*Davar*, 12 Oct)

At the same time, it was reported from Accra that the government had asked Bitan, the Israel Ambassador, for nine more Nahal officers to train Ghana's labour units—the Builders' Brigade. (*Ha'aretz*, 14 Oct)

**Oct: Ghana Not to Renew Air Force Contract; British Pressure Reported.** The Government of Ghana would not renew its contract with the Israel Air Force for the training of pilots at the Ghana Air Force School when the contract expired in Mar 1961, an Israel Foreign Ministry spokesman stated on 13 Oct.

The first report to this effect had been broadcast by Cairo Radio at the beginning of Sept, alleging that the Israel instructors would shortly leave Ghana. It was stated now, however, that the Israelis would continue with their duties until the termination of the contract, after which British Air Force personnel seconded to the Ghanaian Government would take over.

Reuter reported from Accra: "It is understood that this decision had been taken under increasing British pressure to obtain control over the flying school. Now that British officers have taken over the command of the Air Force, they are also expected to direct the flying school when the Israelis leave." (*Jer. Post*, 14 Oct)

*Davar* commented: "This incident fits into the more

general pattern of British conduct towards Israeli activity in Africa as well as Asia," adding that the non-renewal of the contract "has not influenced and should not influence overall relations between Israel and Ghana." (*Davar*, 28 Oct) Another paper ascribed the move to "Arab pressure and the persuasions of our British 'friends,'" but declared also that this "should not lead Israel to abandon her efforts to establish friendly relations with the peoples of Africa, but should make her aware of her limitations." (*Hatzofeh*, 28 Oct)

In the meantime, the first training course organized by the Israelis had been completed. On 30 Oct President Nkrumah presented ten graduates of the Air Force School with their "wings," expressing gratitude to Israel for her help in setting up and operating the school.

C. de Graft Dickson, the Ghanaian Defence Minister, paid tribute to the Israeli unit for producing, out of 15 cadets who had started the course, 10 pilots who would serve as the nucleus of the Ghanaian Air Force. (*Davar*; *Ha'aretz*, 2 Nov)

**Nov: Ghanaian Newspaper Attacks Histadrut.** On 15 Nov *The Ghanaian Times*, organ of the ruling party, published an article entitled "Africa, Beware of Trade Union Imperialism." The article opposed the establishment of relations between African trade unions and the labour movement in the US, and included a veiled attack on the Histadrut (see p 302). The paper wrote: "We are convinced that the Jewish and Christian advisers who have come to Africa have brought more jungle with them than they found here, and that the trade union theories they bring will cause more exploitation than they will prevent." (*Davar*, 27 Nov)

**Israel Experts Sent to Ghana.** It was reported in Nov that an Israeli ten-man medical team was to be dispatched to Ghana to work in the Accra and Kumasi hospitals. (*Ha'aretz*, 30 Nov)

In the course of the year, some scores of Israel experts in the educational, health and agricultural fields had gone to Ghana in advisory capacities, while Ghanaian students had come to Israel for practical instruction in these subjects. (*Jer. Post*, 15 Mar 1961)

(For Ghanaian participation in courses held in Israel, see also p 303. See also Arab anti-Israeli activities in Africa, p 184.)

## GUINEA

Israel's relations with Guinea remained normal; there were no developments of outstanding significance. (*IGYb*, 1960/61)

(For Guinea and the Arab-Israel Dispute at the UN, see p 178; for Guinea and the Arab refugees question, see p 213.)

**Israel Foreign Minister Visits Conakry.** In Jan, Mrs Golda Meir, the Foreign Minister, visited Conakry and met President Sekou Touré. She broadcast a message of greetings over Conakry Radio. (*Ha'aretz*, 13 Jan)

**Conakry Incident.** A diplomatic incident occurred on 13 Apr, when Ismail Touré, the Guinean chairman of the Afro-Asian Solidarity Conference held in Conakry, asked the Israel Ambassador to Guinea, Shlomo Hillel, to leave the conference hall (see p 186).

The Ambassador brought the incident to the attention of President Touré, who expressed regret and assured the Ambassador that it was not in line with Guinea's attitude towards Israel. (*Jer. Post*, 17 Apr)

**Study Groups and Technical Assistance.** In Feb a ten-member Guinean Government training group arrived in Israel at the invitation of the Foreign Ministry for a six months' study tour of the cooperative movement and the agricultural settlements. This was the first official Guinean mission to visit Israel. (*Davar*, 4 Feb) Before leaving, in Aug, the group was received by the PM and the Foreign Minister. (*Jer. Post*, 11 Aug)

In May a group of ten Guinean students completed a seven-month seminar on land settlement and cooperatives, which they had attended as guests of the Histadrut. (*Davar*, 20 May)

In Sept an Israeli water engineering expert left for Conakry, under the auspices of the UN Technical Assistance programme, to help the government organize a hydro-geological survey. (*Jer. Post*, 8 Sept)

### KENYA

During the year there were numerous contacts with Kenyan African leaders. Some of these took place in London.

**Visits to Israel.** At the end of Apr, the Haifa session of the International Socialist Executive was attended by an African delegation from Kenya, including Henry Warithi (representing Tom Mboya, who had repeatedly expressed a friendly attitude towards Israel), and Masido Molino, Vice-Chairman of the Kenya African Democratic Union (KADU). (*Jer. Post*, 29 Apr)

In Aug the Minister of Social Welfare, Yosef Burg, was the first member of the Israel Government to visit Kenya, where he had talks with government officials and community leaders. (*Jer. Post*, 25 Aug)

In the same month, Gikonyo Kiano, Kenya Minister of Commerce and Industry, and Ronald Ngala, Minister for Labour, Social Security and Adult Education, attended the Rehovot Science Conference. (*Davar*, 22-27 Aug)

In Sept James Gichuru, President of the Kenya African National Union (KANU), came for nine days as a guest of the government and held talks with Ministers and Foreign Ministry officials. (*Ha'aretz*, 7 Sept)

The first students from Kenya arrived to study in Israel (no date). (*IGYb*, 1960/61)

### LIBERIA

**"Friendly Relations."** Israel's relations with Liberia remained friendly. (*IGYb*, 1960/61)

The Liberian Ambassador to Israel, Ernest Jerome Yancy, said on 11 July: "Liberia is working behind the scenes to achieve peace between Israel and her neighbours." (*Jer. Post*, 12 July)

**Ministerial Visits.** On 4 Jan, Mrs Meir, the Foreign Minister, represented Israel at the swearing-in of President William V.S. Tubman for a fourth term. President Tubman, President Sekou Touré of Guinea and Mrs Meir attended the inauguration ceremony of the Ducor Palace Hotel in Monrovia, which had just been completed by the Israeli firm of Mayer Bros. (*Ha'aretz*, 5 Jan)

In Apr the Liberian Minister of Public Works, Thomas Buchanan, visited Israel and was received by PM Ben-Gurion and Cabinet Ministers. (*Ha'aretz*, 6 Apr)

Levi Eshkol, the Israel Finance Minister, visited Monrovia at the beginning of July. On his return he said, that he had discussed a number of projects, including another luxury hotel. (*Jer. Post*, 1 Aug)

In Apr, on his return from home leave, the Liberian Ambassador said that President Tubman would pay an

official visit to Israel in Aug or Sept, barring unforeseen delays. (*Ha'aretz*, 24 Apr) [By the year's end the visit had not materialized.]

**Israeli Experts and Technicians in Liberia.** Following the visit of an Israel eye specialist, an ophthalmological clinic headed by an Israeli doctor was opened in Monrovia in Apr. Government stipends for advanced studies in Israel were granted to a doctor and two nurses from Liberia. (*IGYb*, 1960/61)

The reorganization of the engineering courses at the University of Liberia was proposed by a staff member of the Haifa Technion, on loan to the university. *The Liberian Age* of Monrovia reported that he had impressed his students so deeply with the need for intensive study, that they had asked him to continue lecturing during the holiday period. (*Jer. Post*, 2 Feb)

An Israeli sent to Liberia as a UNESCO expert in science instruction served on a committee preparing a four-year plan for the advancement of education, and conducted method courses for over 600 teachers. (*Jer. Post*, 25 Feb)

According to the Liberian Ambassador in Israel, there were 100 Israeli technicians working in Liberia. (*Jer. Post*, 12 July)

Four Israeli employees of Mayer Bros., who had been carrying out building projects in Liberia, were among those cited for "outstanding effort" by President Tubman on Independence Day, 26 July. (*Jer. Post*, 9 Aug)

In July a group of Liberians arrived in Israel for a year's study of cooperation and agriculture. (*IGYb*, 1960/61)

In Dec an Israeli lecturer took up the post of Medical Coordinator of the Liberian Ministry of Health. (*Davar*, 4 Dec)

### MALAGASY REPUBLIC

At the end of July Yosef Burg, the Israel Minister for Social Welfare, and Eytan Ruppin, Ambassador-Designate, attended the independence celebrations of the Malagasy Republic at Tananarive.

Dr Burg presented President Philibert Tsiranana with 25 scholarships for advanced study in Israel and formally invited him to visit the country. The President stated that Israel would serve as an example to the new republic. He added that he planned to visit the country and to send young people to study there, and said that the opening of a Malagasy mission in Israel was only a question of funds. (*Davar*, 1 Aug)

### MALI FEDERATION, REPUBLIC OF MALI, REPUBLIC OF SENEGAL

**Background Note.** Jan: Israel Consul in Dakar. In Jan, Yehuda Ben-David was appointed Consul-General in Dakar, then the capital of French West Africa, which in June was to become the capital of the Mali Federation of Sudan and Senegal.

The first contact had been established in Aug 1958, when Modibo Keita, leader of the French Sudan and later Premier of the new Federation, had visited Israel with a delegation of high-ranking French-Sudanese officials. Contacts had been developed since, and in Feb, after talks between Keita and Ben-David in Paris, it was reported that Israel would grant the Mali Federation immediate recognition and establish close economic and technical ties. (*IGYb*, 1960/61; *Davar*, 5, 31 Jan)

**Government Delegation From Senegal; Exchange of Experts Envisaged.** On 6 Mar a delegation of senior

government officials from Senegal, headed by Marie Gueye, arrived in Israel for a ten-day tour as guests of the government. They evinced particular interest in the moshav type of settlement, cooperative and trade union practices, and projects for irrigation, water desalination and the exploitation of solar energy. On their departure Israel promised an exchange of experts and close cooperation. (*Davar*; *Jer. Post*, 16 Mar)

**June-July: Embassy Established; Israel Minister of Finance Visits Dakar.** On 20 June PM Keita gave formal approval to Ben-David's appointment as Ambassador; he was the third envoy, after those of France and West Germany, to present his credentials in Dakar. At the independence celebrations Israel presented the Federation with 25 scholarship grants. (*Ha'aretz*, 21, 22 June)

At the beginning of July, Levi Eshkol, the Finance Minister, visited Dakar, where he met his Mali colleague. (*Davar*, 10 July) On his return, he reported widespread appreciation of Israeli aid. There was special praise of Israeli varieties of sorghum and peanut seeds, which had increased crops threefold. (*Jer. Post*, 18 July)

A survey of agricultural development prospects in the Sudanese part of Mali was made by an official of the Israel Ministry of Agriculture. (*IGYb*, 1960/61)

**Sept: Recognition of Senegal and Republic of Mali.** Following the dissolution of the Mali Federation, Israel was one of the first states to extend recognition to its newly-independent component parts. Cables to this effect were sent on 26 Sept by PM Ben-Gurion to Mamadou Dia, PM of Senegal, and Modibo Keita, President of the Republic of Mali. (*Jer. Post*, 27 Sept)

**Nov: Israel-Mali Agreement Signed.** On 16 Nov, an official delegation from Mali arrived in Israel for a nine-day visit as guests of the government. It was headed by Jean-Marie Koné, the Vice-President, and included the Directors-General of the Ministries of Defence, the Interior, Agriculture and Planning, Education, Commerce and Industry, Health, Youth and Sports, and Public Works and Telecommunications. (*Davar*, 17 Nov)

The delegation met Ben-Gurion and other Cabinet members, toured the country, and were the guests of the army. (*Jer. Post*, 20-24 Nov)

On 24 Nov Vice-President Koné and Foreign Minister Golda Meir signed agreements on technical aid, cultural relations and civil aviation. Israel undertook to make available an unspecified number of scholarships in agricultural development, public health, exploitation of natural resources, industrial development, etc., and to send to the best of her ability, experts, advisers and workers on Mali's request. Another agreement, for the establishment of a jointly-owned radio factory in Mali, was signed by the Mali Commissioner for Information with the President of the Israel Electronics Manufacturers' Association for Research and Development. (*Davar*, 25 Nov)

At a Press conference Koné said that the exchange of full diplomatic representation had been discussed, but for the time being Mali had embassies only in Paris and Washington, and would meanwhile be represented in other countries "by friends." (*Davar*, 27 Nov)

It was reported that the agreements also provided for the sale of Israel small arms to Mali. (*Jer. Post*, 27 Nov)

**Visits, Technical Assistance.** A delegation from Mali including three Cabinet Ministers, attended the Rehovot Science Conference in Aug. (*IGYb*, 1960/61) [On 15 Nov a group of 14 professional men, including several

physicians and a veterinarian, arrived for advanced training on Foreign Ministry scholarships.]

**Israel Mission in Mali.** In Nov an Israel delegation, headed by Moshe Carmel, MK, visited Mali and Senegal, and discussed Israeli assistance in aviation and cooperation in aerial crop spraying. (*Ha'aretz*, 27 Nov)

## MAURITANIA

The only former French colony that did not establish relations with Israel was the Islamic Republic of Mauritania, which attained statehood at the end of the year. On 18 June PM Mokhtar Ould Daddah said that his country's attitude was the same as that of "all Muslim and Arab countries, namely, refusal to enter into any relations with Israel." (*Ha'aretz*, 19 June)

Israel voted for the admission of Mauritania to the World Health Organization at its conference in New Delhi at the end of Feb 1961. The admission was opposed by the Arab League states which, with the exception of Tunisia, had also objected to the granting of independence to Mauritania, supporting Morocco's demand for its annexation. The Israel Minister of Health, Israel Barzilai, who explained his vote at the New Delhi conference, was later thanked by the Mauritanian delegates. (*Davar*, 13 Mar 1961)

## NIGERIA

**Background Note.** Cooperation with Nigeria was established and developed well ahead of the formal grant of independence in Oct. At the end of 1959, a contract for a five-year building programme was signed between the government of the Western Region and a joint West-Nigerian-Israeli company. After a visit to Israel by the West-Nigerian Minister of Agriculture, 20 cooperative villages on the lines of the moshav were established in Western Nigeria. In the Eastern Region, two Israeli (*Histadrut*) firms, Vered (water development) and Solel Boneh (contracting) started building and development works jointly with local firms. The Dizengoff-West-Africa Trading Company was also active in Nigeria and reached a considerable turnover. (*IGYb*, 1960/61—no dates given)

**Contacts with Nigerian Leaders.** At the beginning of 1960, the Israel Ambassador to Ghana paid two visits to Nigeria. His first was to Lagos, where he held talks with the Federal Prime Minister and members of the Cabinet in a "cordial, friendly atmosphere." (*Ha'aretz*, 28 Jan) The second was to the Eastern Region, where he met PM Okpara and other leaders. It was reported that the Nigerian leaders expressed satisfaction at the results of joint economic projects with Israel, and that new possibilities for cooperation were opened up. (*Jer. Post*, 16 Feb)

**Muslim Element Will Not Affect Policy Toward Israel.** Israel's approach in assisting other nations on a partnership basis was described as "very sound and representing an important precedent in international relations" by Aminu Kano, a Muslim member of the Nigerian Federal Parliament, who visited Israel in Feb on behalf of the NCNC-NEPU Alliance, a partner in the Federal Government coalition. Anticipating full diplomatic relations shortly after the grant of independence, he added that "the fact that the majority of Nigeria's population is Muslim will hardly influence my country's policy." (*Jer. Post*, 17 Feb)



**Israel Consul-General Appointed.** An Israel Consulate-General was opened in Lagos in Mar. (*Davar*, 14 Mar)

**Port Harcourt Development Planned by Israeli.** At the beginning of Apr, the government of the Eastern Region officially adopted a master plan, drawn up by an Israeli town planning expert, for the development of Port Harcourt as a new industrial centre. In a letter to the expert, PM Okpara expressed the hope that this would be the beginning of many more business associations between Israel and the Eastern Region. (*Jer. Post*, 4 Apr)

**Nigerian Finance Minister's Visit.** Israeli Participation in Development Projects. On 9 June the Nigerian Federal Minister of Finance, Chief F.S. Okotie Eboh, who had visited Israel in July 1959, arrived for a six-day visit, as guest of the government. He declared that the friendship between the two countries was bound to grow, and that Nigeria hoped to establish an embassy in Israel after attaining independence. He discussed with Eshkol, the Minister of Finance, and other Israeli leaders, road building, the erection of hotels and public buildings, irrigation and agricultural development plans, etc. Israel was to invest £1 million, and provide construction materials on credit. Israeli construction already in progress was said to involve some \$15 million. (*Davar*; *Ha'aretz*, 13, 14 June)

On his departure, Chief Eboh announced that Nigeria and Israel had provisionally agreed on joint development projects involving millions of pounds. (*HP*, 16 June)

Another visitor to Israel in June as a guest of the government was the Nigerian Attorney-General, Dan-Ibaku. (*Jer. Post*, 15 June)

**NPC Opposition to Ties with Israel.** Following Chief Eboh's announcement, the Northern People's Congress, the government party in the Northern Region [predominantly Muslim], called on the Federal Government to "withdraw its recognition of the Israel Government and immediately break off negotiations with Israel for financial aid." The demand was turned down on 16 June by the Federal PM, Alhaji Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, who told a Press conference in Lagos that his government did not intend to be a party to the quarrel between the Arab world and Israel; it was not opposed to genuine assistance from any country in the world. (*Ha'aretz*, 16, 17 June)

On 22 June, however, the government of the Northern Region officially confirmed the NPC's opposition. It published a statement saying: "Should a report that Mr Okotie Eboh signed a loan agreement with Israel be correct, and should eventually any form of financial assistance be received from Israel, the Northern Regional Government wishes to make it quite clear that it dissociates itself from the whole transaction and does not wish to accept any part of any such loan or export credit," which, it said, "could be interpreted as involvement in the Middle Eastern controversy." (*HP*, 23 June)

**July: Loan Agreement Reached.** Agreement on a £3 million Israeli loan to the Federal Government of Nigeria was reached when Levi Eshkol visited Lagos in the first half of July. Half of the loan was to be in goods. The loan, said Eshkol, "does not include the acquisition of know-how in various fields in Israel, and cooperation in this respect can continue to develop independently." (*Davar*, 18 July)

Reviewing his visit to West Africa, Eshkol said on 30 July that Israel expected to sell IL5 million worth of

goods to Nigeria in 1960. He thought that the Muslims of Northern Nigeria were not essentially hostile to Israel, and mentioned that at the Pan-African Conference in Addis Ababa the Nigerian delegation had resisted Arab pressure for an anti-Israel resolution (see p 186). He had told the Nigerian Finance Minister that "in our stores, we have no strings to sell"; the relationship between Israel and the rising African nations was unconditional and based on the friendship of neighbours. (*Jer. Post*, 1 Aug)

On 6 Aug the PM of Northern Nigeria, Sir Ahmadu Bello, again urged the Federal Government to turn down the Israel loan offer. He argued that since the money would itself have been borrowed, Nigeria would have to pay "interest plus." (*HP*, 7 Aug)

The loan was approved by the Israel Government on 14 Aug. It was stated that it would be for seven years, at an interest of  $\frac{1}{4}$  per cent above the British bank rate. The money was to be spent on goods and services to be supplied by Israel and on construction and housing in Nigeria. (*Davar*, 15 Aug)

**Aug: Nigerian Ministers at Rehovot Conference.** In the second half of Aug, two West Nigerian Ministers, Chiefs A.O. Adeyi and J.A.D. Odebyi, and Dr S.E. Imoke, Finance Minister of Eastern Nigeria, who headed the delegation on behalf of the Federal Government, attended the Rehovot Conference on Science in the Advancement of New States. Chief Odebyi urged that groups of young people from the two countries should exchange visits. Imoke said that "the simplicity of Israel's people, their genuine friendship, and the lack of class distinction are among the strongest impressions of my visit." (*Jer. Post*, 21, 29 Aug)

**Oct: Greeting on Nigeria's Independence.** Moshe Dayan, the Minister of Agriculture, headed the Israel Government delegation at the Nigerian independence celebrations. He was received by the Governor-General Designate, Nnamdi Azikiwe, who told him that the joint Israel-Nigerian Water Company had the night before completed the water pipeline to Nsuka, site of a new university. The project, considered most urgent in Eastern Nigeria, had thus been finished in four months instead of the anticipated nine. (*Ha'aretz*, 3 Oct)

Dayan presented the Federal PM with a model of a mobile clinic for tropical diseases, as "Israel's birthday present to Nigeria." (*Ha'aretz*, 2 Oct)

**Dec: Nigerian Ministers in Israel.** At the end of Dec, Nigerian visitors to Israel included the West Nigerian Ministers of Education and Labour, Dr S.D. Onabamiro and K. Monoh, the East Nigerian Minister of Education, E.G. Okeke, and senior officials, who toured institutions of higher learning. (*Ha'aretz*; *Davar*, 15, 21 Dec)

## SIERRA LEONE

**June: An Israel Consulate was established in Freetown in June.** (*Ha'aretz*, 7 June)

**Joint Construction Company.** At the end of Mar, the Sierra Leone Government and Solel Boneh signed an agreement for the establishment of a joint construction company with a registered capital of £100,000; 60 per cent of the shares were to be held by the government and the remainder by Solel Boneh and the Mekorot Water Corporation. (*Davar*, 30 Mar)

On 7 Aug, Rogers Wright, the Sierra Leone Minister of Housing and Development, and other senior officials



arrived in Israel as guests of the government. The delegation discussed housing projects with Cabinet Ministers and Solel Boneh. On 16 Aug a \$750,000 credit agreement was signed for the building of Parliament House in Freetown by the joint Sierra Leone-Solel Boneh Company, Israel providing credits in the form of building materials. Construction began immediately. (*Davar*, 17-19 Aug)

**Visitors and Students in Israel.** At the beginning of Aug a group of 15 students from Sierra Leone arrived in Israel for a one-year course in agricultural methods. (*Jer. Post*, 9 Aug)

At the Rehovot Science Conference a prominent part was played by the Reverend Dr S.B. Caulker, Vice-Principal of Fura Bay University College in Sierra Leone [he was killed in a plane crash on his way home]. (*Davar*, 31 Aug)

### TANGANYIKA

**Tanganyikan Leaders in Israel.** Relations with African leaders of Tanganyika were first established when Joseph Nyerere, brother of the President of the Tanganyika African National Union, visited Israel [no date]. On his return, experiments in cooperative agricultural settlement were started in Tanganyika. (*IGYb*, 1960/61)

At the end of Jan, Amir Jamal, Minister of Urban Local Government and Works, was the first Tanganyikan Minister to visit Israel, where he held talks and toured

the country. On his return to Dar es Salaam on 2 Feb, he said that if the people of Tanganyika were ready to work hard, Israel would be prepared to help the country in its development by sending experts and technical advisers, principally in agriculture. Referring to Israel's cooperative settlement system, Jamal thought that if Tanganyika could find "the right men and women," his country could emulate Burma in sending study teams to Israel for extended periods. (*Ha'aretz*, 3 Feb)

Labour ties were also established when M.M. Mpanjala, Secretary-Treasurer of the Tanganyika Federation of Labour, attended the Socialist International Executive session in Israel. (*Davar*, 29 Apr)

### TOGO

Hanan Yavor, Israel Ambassador to Liberia, represented Israel at the Togo independence celebrations in Lome at the end of Apr. President Ben-Zvi cabled congratulations to PM Olympio, expressing his certainty that the "bonds of friendship which have already been woven between our two lands will go on to become ever stronger." (*Davar*, 28 Apr)

In Sept, the Israel Ambassador to Ghana, Moshe Bitan, presented his credentials to PM Olympio as Israel's first (non-resident) Ambassador. At the ceremony, the Togo PM spoke of the good relations that existed even before diplomatic ties were established, and noted that a number of Togolese had already gone to Israel to study agricultural methods. (*Ha'aretz*, 12 Sept)

# THE HASHIMITE KINGDOM OF JORDAN

(Al-Mamlakah al-Urduniyah al-Hashimiyah)

## SYNOPSIS : INTERNAL AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS

In Jordan, the internal situation is so closely interwoven with the country's foreign relations that it has seemed advantageous to survey them together.

Until the assassination of Premier Majāli on 29 Aug, the year 1960 saw a continuation of the period of relative political quiet and reconstruction which started after the withdrawal of the British forces in late 1958. Apr 1960 saw the end of the third year since King Hussein's successful counter-coup against the pro-Nasserist forces in 1957.

The most prominent sign of political tranquillity was the almost complete absence of overt political opposition. It would seem that only the Communists and a nationalist group, the Liberation Party, tried to maintain some undercover political activity, and they were suppressed by the government. On the other hand, the political struggle until August was more apparent inside the ruling circles themselves. The struggle for power between PM Hazza' al-Majāli and ex-Premier Samir ar-Rifā'i which went back to 1957, developed further. The two clashed over the general elections, which Majāli planned to conduct in 1960 and which ar-Rifā'i opposed, and the struggle ended only with the death of Majāli.

The actual danger to the regime, however, lay outside the country, in the subversive campaign conducted by the UAR and the Jordanian opposition leaders in Damascus. There were two main elements in this campaign: (1) the UAR plan brought up in the Arab League, to set up a Palestinian Entity and a Palestinian Army, which would have involved a severe infringement of the Kingdom's sovereignty, if not its dismemberment; (2) persistent attempts to assassinate leading personalities. As attempts to organize a popular uprising or a military coup d'état had failed in previous years, the Jordanian opposition in Damascus and its patrons were now believed to be trying to overthrow the regime by removing its heads. There was also an Iraqi campaign for the establishment of a Palestinian Republic, coupled with violent attacks on the Jordanian regime. However, as it was not connected with any Iraqi attempt actually to intervene in Jordanian politics, and as there were no adherents of General Qassim in Jordan as there were of President Abdel-Nasser, it was of relatively minor importance.

In Mar the propaganda warfare between the UAR and Jordan, which had ceased in Aug 1959, was renewed. The UAR called for the Palestinian Entity (p 148 ff) and tried to incite the people against the regime in every possible way, including incitement to murder the King and the Premier. In Mar a plot was uncovered to murder PM Majāli, who in Aug fell victim to another plot. The Jordanian authorities and courts established a connection between these activities and the Jordanian opposition group in Damascus, as well as the Military Intelligence bureau of the UAR Army in Syria. The actual perpetrators of the crimes, how-

ever, were Jordanian residents, from both the East and the West Banks.

The main efforts of King Hussein and the Jordanian Government, both in Jordan and abroad, were devoted to withstanding the UAR offensive.

Inside the Kingdom, the King and the government waged a campaign, both before and after the assassination of PM Majāli, to win the favour of the public, to endow the regime with the qualities of permanence and stability, and to broaden its political base. The preparations for general elections, which were to be held in the autumn, were part of this policy. Other measures were direct appeals to the public and, more important, efforts to strengthen the economic basis of the country and improve its administration. However, progress on the last two points was very limited. Although some major development projects, important in themselves, were completed, and work on others continued, they were only of limited importance in relation to the country's needs, and the Kingdom continued, as before, to finance its budget to a large extent from foreign aid (see below, Economic Survey). A special source of anxiety for the regime was the evergrowing number of unemployed secondary school graduates, a category which is politically highly explosive.

In its foreign relations, the efforts of the regime were also dedicated to the broadening and strengthening of political support in its struggle with the UAR.

In the Arab world, Jordan's position improved as a result of its rapprochement with Iraq and the general shift in the inter-Arab balance of power in favour of the status quo. (Details see pp 115-6.)

As for non-Arab ME countries, Jordan further developed friendly relations with the CENTO countries of Iran and Turkey, as well as with Ethiopia, and established relations with the Republic of Cyprus. With Israel, the state of "normal hostility" continued, while Israel, for the sake of her own essential interests, played a vital role in the preservation of the Kingdom's independence by her declared determination that she could not remain indifferent to a change in the status quo.

On the international scene, Jordan was not only tied to the West through large-scale economic aid and defence considerations, but was also the most outspokenly pro-Western and anti-Communist of all ME states. King Hussein, in fact, made anti-Communism the major plank in his foreign policy. The USSR in return attacked Jordan's "reactionary regime," but did not voice support for UAR or pan-Arab aspirations there. (See p 77.)

The two major events in foreign affairs were Hussein's tour of ME and African countries in Apr-May and his attendance at the UN General Assembly in Oct. On both occasions he not only sought to strengthen his position vis-à-vis Abdel-Nasser, but attacked him publicly. He warned against the Communist danger and hailed Islam as containing the principles upon which human relations should be built.

By the end of 1960, four months after PM Majālī's assassination, the country enjoyed calm. The assassination had proved to be an isolated incident; there were no signs of readiness for a popular uprising or of unrest in the army. Jordan's position in the Arab world had also improved.

While the factors making for basic instability had not been removed, other factors, both internal and external, worked for the continuation of the status quo for the time being. This situation could, however, be upset by the removal of King Hussein, who was regarded by all observers as the linchpin of the regime. (For a detailed evaluation of the internal situation, see pp 331-2.)

### ECONOMIC SURVEY

Jordan's economy, permanently hampered by relatively minute natural resources and having to support large numbers of Palestine refugees, continued in 1960 to suffer the effects of a prolonged drought which was now in its third year. Abundant rainfall at the end of the year indicated brighter prospects for the 1961 season.

The government made special efforts to ease the plight of the Bedouin of Southern Jordan, many of whom were on the verge of starvation, and the distribution of American surplus foodstuffs partially compensated for the losses of other drought-stricken villagers. Increased tourism improved otherwise dormant commercial conditions in the urban centres. In spite of various development projects under way, there was still little hope of solving the serious problem of unemployment, which encompassed nearly a third of the labour force.

Jordan's chronic lack of economic viability was again emphasized in 1960 by her great dependence upon foreign aid. The US continued to carry the burden, providing aid to the tune of approximately \$56.5 million, of which \$40.5 million was a grant to the budget. Britain gave the now traditional sum of £2.5 million. Kuwait entered the field for the first time, with a loan of £1 million, and West Germany signed a technical and economic assistance agreement. UN agencies continued to extend technical and financial aid, UNRWA

alone spending about JD5.5 million in Jordan for refugee relief. A request for a World Bank development loan had not been granted by the end of the year.

Foreign aid was expected to provide JD23 million of the 1960/61 budget revenues of JD34 million. Defence expenditure accounted for 51 per cent of the JD35.2 million expenditure budget, JD16.2 million going to the army and JD2.3 million to internal security. Estimated expenditure on development projects totalled JD6.1 million.

The trade deficit continued to grow, reaching JD39.4 million in 1960, compared with JD37.2 million in 1959. Imports increased from JD40.3 million in 1959 to JD42.8 million, the UK regaining her position as Jordan's principal supplier, while the US and West Germany took second and third place. Domestic exports increased slightly from JD3.1 million in 1959 to JD3.4 million. Phosphates exported totalled 342,000 tons in 1960, mainly to Yugoslavia, India, Czechoslovakia and Poland. The renewal of trade relations with Iraq at the end of the year aroused hopes for increased vegetable and fruit exports, and for transit trade via Aqaba. The tourist industry prospered during the year, bringing in an income of JD4 million.

Several important development projects were pushed forward in 1960. Jordan's first oil refinery, near Zarqa, was completed. With an annual capacity of 330,000 tons, it will make the country independent of nearly all refined oil imports. It receives crude oil from Tapline. There was progress on the first stage of the East Ghor irrigation project and it was expected that 37,000 dunams would be irrigated by mid-1961. The 312-km. desert highway linking Amman with Aqaba was completed, considerably enhancing the importance of the port to the economy. After a small pilot potash plant on the northern shore of the Dead Sea had proved successful, plans were made for setting up a large commercial plant in the near future.

After drilling several dry holes, the Phillips Petroleum Co. gave up its concession in Jordan. By the end of the year no other company was active in oil exploration in Jordan.

## INTERNAL AFFAIRS

### IEWS AND POLICIES

#### KING AND COUNTRY

**The King's Dedication to His Country.** Hussein, 12 Mar: "Personally, my life is absolutely unimportant, except in so far as I can contribute to this country and to this nation. Even if I am lost, this country and this Arab spirit can never be lost. May God make us successful and guide our steps." (*BBC*, 14 Mar)

**The King's Service.** Hussein 16 Mar: "I have reiterated and affirmed on many occasions that my life and my throne derive their strength and existence from the valuable services which I render to my country and my people. Had I felt that my throne and my existence were in conflict with the desire of the people, I would not hesitate for one moment to become a mere soldier,

loyal to the country to which I dedicate my life and my efforts." (*Jer. Times*, 17 Mar)

**Brotherly Relations Between King and People.** Hussein, 26 Sept: "I speak to you, as always, a brother addressing his brothers, heartened by the knowledge that we are closely bound together in our aspirations, aims and objectives." (*Jer. Times*, 27 Sept)

Hussein, 8 July: "I consider that the only proper form of government is that where the person in control removes all barriers between him and his people..."

"I have dedicated myself to be one of you, to mix with you, to know of your needs and to work together with you on the path that leads to the achievement of our aspirations." (*Jer. Times*, 9 July)

## DEMOCRACY IN JORDAN

Hussein in *Life*: "We will pursue our own policies, in the militant democratic tradition..."

"There are in the free world different interpretations of the term democracy. In the Arab world we have learned that to copy one system of government or another completely, and to attempt to apply that to a newer state with a different background and history, is unwise, even dangerous... Some nations in the Arab world have so-called 'democratic parties,' but many of these groups, for reasons of selfishness or subversion, link themselves with elements outside their country. In such cases the party system embodies the reverse of democracy. So Communism entered the Arab world under the guise of nationalism. Almost every party proclaims the same slogans of unity, freedom, development. Few, however, have real programmes. The slogans are merely the means by which an individual or group hopes to gain power. As a consequence, democratic though Jordan's government is, we do not feel we can yet afford the luxury of these parties in our democratic process." (*Life*, 23 May)

## DEVELOPMENT AND PROGRESS

**Speedy Economic Development.** Hussein, 11 July: "We must press forward with all possible speed to execute those projects aimed at developing the city, village, countryside and desert, thus raising the standards of living throughout the country and securing prosperity for all citizens." (*Jer. Times*, 12 July)

Hussein in *Life*: "We are not underdeveloped in those attributes that will eventually make us great—pride, dignity, determination, courage, confidence, and the knowledge that nothing can be achieved without work."

"In a short time we have doubled our national output, and quintupled agricultural output. We are in the process of further development in five major areas: our vast, uncharted mineral resources, our water resources, light industry, internal highway communications, and tourism."

**Educational Progress.** Hussein in *Life*: "Mindful that ignorance is the enemy of the Arabs, we will continue to develop our rapidly expanding school system. Our

immediate goal is the technical training of our youth. Eventually we will achieve for all Arabs an Arab University in the Holy City of Jerusalem. We are aware of the great part which labour plays in the successful development of a truly democratic state."

**Social Progress.** Hussein in *Life*: "We propose to raise the standard of living of all labourers to the maximum possible extent. We will continue to improve our health services, so that no one ever again shall suffer or die from ignorance or neglect. To that end, we are expanding medical and nursing training, and establishing clinics and hospitals."

**Administration to be Reformed.** Hussein in *Life*: "We will continue to improve our system of government. We are still a very young state, but administrative reforms are constantly being effected, and will continue as part of our efforts to achieve a truly efficient, democratic government. We will fight as well the disease of corruption, another old enemy of the Arab world." (*Life*, 23 May)

## THE WEST BANK

**Hashimite Government Represents Palestinians.** PM Majāli, 12 Jan: "The only legitimate representative of the Palestinians in Jordan, who are the vast majority of the Palestinian Arabs, is the government of his Hashimite Majesty." (*BBC*, 14 Jan)

**Readiness for Plebiscite.** Hussein, 16 Mar: "I challenge all those who question our presence in Jordan's West Bank, and all those who allege our presence is merely for territorial gains, to set up a neutral body which would contact ex-Palestinians in Jordan and supervise over a plebiscite among them to determine their future."

"I am fully prepared to accept the plebiscite results whatever these may be." (*Jer. Times*, 17 Mar)

PM Majāli, 19 Jan: "... When the Arabs of Palestine reunite and we share their joy, the joy of realizing these objectives and reunion, His Majesty's Government, which represents both Banks, will be the last to think of standing in the way of a free and true expression of the desire of the entire Palestinian people to determine their fate and future." (*BBC*, 21 Jan)

[For more on the West Bank, see pp 322-3, 333.]

## COURT, GOVERNMENT AND PARTIES

### THE ROYAL COURT

**The Hashimite House in Jordan, 1960.** [King Hussein was born in 1935. His father, Talāl, born in 1909, was deposed in 1952 because of mental illness and sent to a sanatorium in Turkey. Nā'if, brother of Talāl, lives in Beirut. King Hussein had two brothers; the Crown Prince Muhammad, born in 1940, suffered from mental disturbances, while Hasan, born in 1948, went to study in England.]

The Queen-mother, Zayn, was thought to be influential in the affairs of the Kingdom, though latterly less so. Her brother, Sharif Nāsir Ibn Jumayl, was Commander of the Royal Guards' Brigade and active in security affairs.]

**Oct: The King Hon. President of the World Scouts Organization.** In Oct, the King became Hon. President of the World Scouts Organization. (*Difa*, 23 Oct)

**Crown Prince Muhammad.** In Feb-May Muhammad made a tour of the US, the UK and West Germany. He visited army installations and various institutions, and met the West German President. (*Jihad*, 26 Feb-19 May)

He was reported to have suffered a mental breakdown while in the US. (*Ahram*, 25 Mar)

*Time* published an article on the Crown Prince, saying that he was thought of as "a tyrannical egocentric in a major-general's uniform and an everpresent danger to the throne." (*Time*, 15 Feb) The King and the Chief of National Guidance, Wasfi at-Tal, protested against the article in letters to the journal, declaring that the information was based on rumours spread by the enemies of the Hashimite Dynasty. The King stressed his full confidence in his brother. (*Time*, 7 Mar)

In June the Crown Prince was involved in a motor accident in Amman, in which a worker was killed. It



## THE GOVERNMENT

Ministry	20 Sept 1959	Community Bank**	29 Aug 1960	Community Bank**	7 Dec 1960	Community Bank
PM	Hazzā' al-Majālī	Muslim	E	Bahjat at-Talhūnī	Muslim	E
Foreign Affairs	Mūsa Nāsir	Christian	W	Mūsa Nāsir	Christian	W
Interior	Wafī Mirza*	Circassian	E	Fālah al-Madād-hah	Muslim	E
Defence	Wafī Mirza*			Akif al-Fā'iz	Muslim	E
Finance	Hāshim al-Juyūsi	Muslim	W	Hāshim al-Juyūsi	Muslim	W
National Economy	Khulūsi al-Khayrī*	Muslim	W	Rafīq al-Huseini	Muslim	W
Agriculture	Akif al-Fā'iz	Muslim	E	Wafī Mirza*	Circassian	E
Development and Reconstruction	Khulūsi al-Khayrī*			Anwar an-Nashashībī	Muslim	W
Justice	Anwar an-Nashashībī	Muslim	W	Shaykh Muḥammad Ali al-Ja'bari	Muslim	W
Education and Culture	Shaykh Amīn ash-Shanqīti*	Muslim	E	Shaykh Amīn ash-Shanqīti*	Muslim	E
Religious Chief Justice	Shaykh Amīn ash-Shanqīti*			Shaykh Amīn ash-Shanqīti*		
Public Works	Ya'qub al-Mu'mar	Christian	E	Ya'qub al-Mu'mar	Christian	E
Communications	Hāshim al-Juyūsi*			Anwar an-Nashashībī*		
Social Affairs	Akif al-Fā'iz*			Wafī Mirza*		
Health	Dr Jamāl at-Tutunji	Muslim	E	Dr Jamāl at-Tutunji	Muslim	E

\*Also holds other portfolio(s).

\*\*E—East Bank of the Kingdom; W—West Bank of the Kingdom.

was stated that King Hussein had agreed to his brother's request to allocate out of his allowances permanent monthly aid to the victim's family. (*Difa'*; *Jihad*, 19, 20 June) According to a pro-UAR source, Muhammad was responsible for the worker's death. When other workers gathered at the scene, Muhammad was reported to have drawn a gun and wounded several. The King paid compensation. (*Siyasah*, Beirut, 19 June)

In Nov, the King promoted Muhammad to the rank of Lt.-General. (*Manar*, 17 Nov)

**Appointments to the Royal Court.** [The two important posts in the Royal Court are—Minister of the Court (*Wazir al-Bilāt*) and Chief of the Royal Cabinet (*Ra'īs ad-Diwan al-Malaki*). They are advisers of the King and directors of the Royal Diwan and the Court ceremonies. The first post remained unfilled since Hazzā' al-Majālī vacated it in May 1959 to become PM. The second was occupied by Bahjat al-Talhūni until he became PM after the assassination of al-Majālī in Aug 1960.]

**Nov: Hasan al-Kātib—Minister of the Court.** On 19 Nov the King appointed Hasan al-Kātib, Governor of the Jerusalem District, as Minister of the Court. (*Jihad*, 20 Nov) [Hasan al-Kātib, born in Mecca in 1893, studied in the Police School in Beirut. He served as a police officer in Ottoman times and during the British Mandate in Palestine until 1937. He studied law in Jerusalem and in 1937 was appointed a judge. In 1950 he was appointed Governor of Nablus District, and in 1951 Governor of Jerusalem District. In 1956/57 he was dismissed from this post by Nabulsi's government, but reinstated in 1957. Since 1955 he also served as Inspector of Enemy Property in Jordan.]

**Nov: Ahmad at-Tarawnah—Chief of the Royal Cabinet.** On 24 Nov the King appointed Ahmad at-Tarawnah, a representative of al-Karak in the Chamber of Deputies, as the Chief of the Royal Cabinet. (*Jihad*, 26 Nov) [At-Tarawnah was born in Amman in 1910. He studied law in Damascus and in 1948 became a judge in Amman. He is a member of the Tarawnah Bedouin clan, residing in the al-Karak region. Since 1951 he represented al-Karak in the Chamber of Deputies, and during the years 1950–1959 held various portfolios in several governments.]

**27 Nov: New Senior Aide-de-Camp to the King.** On 27 Nov the King appointed Major (*Ra'īs Awāl*) Ghāzi al-Khatīb, Jordan Military Attaché in Beirut, as his senior Aide-de-Camp. Al-Khatīb was also awarded a high-ranking medal for loyalty to the Crown. (On al-Khatīb, see also p 154.) (*Manar*, 28 Nov)

## JAN-DEC 1960: POLITICAL PARTIES

[All political parties have been outlawed since Apr 1957, when an order dispersing them was issued.]

### THE LIBERATION PARTY

(Hizb at-Takrīr or Hizb at-Tahrīr al-Islāmi)

**Background Note and Synopsis.** The Liberation Party was founded in 1952, first as a religious movement, by Shaykh an-Nabhāni of the Tul-Karm region now residing in Lebanon (see also p 347). Its aim is to unify all Islamic nations on the basis of the social and political order of early Islam. It is against all foreign influence and foreign aid. Most of the supporters of this party are concentrated in the Nablus District, especially in the Subdistrict of Tul-Karm.

The leading personality of the party in Jordan is

Shaykh Ahmad ad-Da'ūr of Qalqiliya. In 1954 and 1956 he was elected to the House of Representatives in Tul-Karm Subdistrict as the sole representative of his party. He was the only member to cast a vote of non-confidence when the Nabulsi government was introduced in 1956. In 1957 he voted for the abolition of the Anglo-Jordanian agreement.

The party continued its activities after the parties were outlawed in 1957. Da'ūr was detained in 1958 and sentenced to two years' imprisonment. He was released in 1959 but placed under house arrest in his home town.

During 1960 the party continued its activities—mainly the distribution of leaflets. Arrests were made, and prison and exile sentences issued against some of its members.

**Jan-Oct: Trials of Members.** On 4 Jan a man was sentenced to a year's imprisonment for being a member of the party. (*Jihad*, 5 Jan)

Eighteen persons from Nablus and Azzun village, accused of being members of the Liberation Party, were tried before the Governor of Nablus District on 2 Aug. Fourteen were released on bond and ordered to remain in their villages and to report daily to the authorities for a year. Two were exiled to the East Bank, and two were discharged for lack of evidence. (*Difa'*, 3 Aug)

On 13 Sept another group accused of belonging to the party were sentenced by the State Security Court: two to two years' imprisonment and four to six months. (*ANA*, 13 Sept—*BBC*, 15 Sept)

The same court met at Nablus on 8 Oct to try 20 villagers of Azzun accused of being members of the party. Fat-hi Muhammad Salim, one of its leaders, declared: "I am a member of the Liberation Party and I work for the dismemberment of the existing entities in the Muslim world in order to replace them by principles of my party. I have conducted propaganda for these principles, and the publications which are before the court were in my possession." The other accused pleaded not guilty, denied support of the party, and expressed loyalty to King Hussein. Sixteen of the accused were sentenced to three months' imprisonment. (*Jihad*, 2 Aug, 9 Oct; *Bilad*, 23 Oct)

In Feb several party members who had been sentenced in 1957/58 and had served their prison terms were released. (*Difa'*, 28 Feb)

## THE MUSLIM BROTHERS

(Al-Ikhwān al-Muslimūn)

**Background Note and Synopsis.** The Jordanian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood (*Ikhwān*), which was founded in the late 1920s in Egypt, was consolidated in 1953 on the election of Abd ar-Rahmān Khalīfah as its Controller-General. Since its beginnings, it cooperated closely with the Permanent Bureau of the Islamic Congress (*al-Mu'tamar al-Islāmi*) in Jerusalem, whose SG is Sa'īd Ramadān, son-in-law of the late Supreme Guide of the Muslim Brotherhood, Hasan al-Bana. Following the policy of the Ikhwān in Egypt, they started to support the government when the movement in Egypt was suppressed in 1954, aiding the King in his counter-coup in 1957. However, they remained strongly anti-Western, opposed the aid agreement with the US in 1957, and the arrival of British troops to help the regime in 1958. Khalīfah was accordingly detained in July 1958, but released later in the year. Thereafter and until the end of 1959, their activities were curtailed.

In 1960 they again intensified their activities, as PM Majālī tried to win their support for the government. However, they adopted an attitude of opposition from

time to time, especially on questions relating to their interpretation of Islamic principles.

**Jan: The Ikhwān a Religious Movement Only.** On 4 Jan Khalīfah stated that the Ikhwān were not a political party; the members joined it for religious, and not political reasons. (*Hayat*, 5 Jan)

**Jan: Participation in Islamic Congress.** The Ikhwān represented Jordan at the Islamic Congress conference which convened in the Old City of Jerusalem on 25–30 Jan. [The Congress represents non-governmental bodies.] (*Jihad*, 26–31 Jan)

**June: "Al-Manār" Daily Published.** On 15 July the Ikhwān started the publication of the *al-Manār* daily. [This was also the name of their past publications in Egypt and Syria.] The editors are Kamāl ash-Sharīf, the assistant SG of the Permanent Bureau of the Islamic Congress, and his brother, Mahmūd ash-Sharīf. (*Hawā al-Alam*, 8 Apr; *Manar*, 15 June; *Jihad*, 16 June) [The contents and policy of the paper did not differ materially from those of the Jordanian Press in general—see *Manar*, June–Dec.]

**June: Adult School Opened.** In June, the Ikhwān opened a three-class school for adults in Jerusalem to take part in the government's campaign against illiteracy. The Qur'ān was also to be taught in this school in an attempt to regulate the behaviour of the pupils in accordance with Islam. (*Jihad*, 9 June, 3 July)

**Apr–Oct: Opposition to the Government.** On 4 Apr the Muslim Brotherhood representatives in the House of Representatives voted against the 1960/61 Budget because some items were contrary to Islamic traditions; e.g. the allocation for new song programmes in the broadcasting service. (*Hayat*, 5 Apr)

In July a number of Jordanians, including religious functionaries, demonstrated against the performances of an American Ice Ballet company, because of the use of water which was needed by the population [but perhaps also because of the scanty costumes of the performers]. PM Majālī ordered the detention of the people involved. (*Ruz al-Yusuf*, 27 July)

Abd ar-Rahmān Khalīfah, who was among the detainees, was released on 27 Oct by order of PM Talhūni. (*Difa'*, 28 Oct)

### THE JORDANIAN COMMUNIST PARTY

**Background Note and Synopsis.** The Jordanian Communist party gained popularity and strength during the 1955–1957 period, in the wake of Abdel-Nasser's arms deal with the Eastern Bloc. In 1956 it formed the National Front, composed of Communists and pro-Communists, which succeeded in electing three members to parliament. One was Abd al-Qādir Sālih of Nablus, the most prominent Communist stronghold in the country, while the other two were elected in Jerusalem and Ramallah. Sālih became a Minister in the Nabulsi Cabinet. In 1957, after Hussein's counter-coup, the party was outlawed and went underground, and Sālih was arrested while other leaders fled the country at the end of 1957 and the beginning of 1958, and now live in Communist countries. The most prominent among them are Fu'ād Nāsir, the SG of the Party, Hamzah az-Zīr, Rushdi Sahīn and Dr Hammūdāh.

Since 1959 the government was aided in its efforts to suppress the party by the general reaction against the

Communists caused by their policies in Iraq and by Abdel-Nasser's campaign against them. Nationalist elements in Jordan helped the authorities to discover Communist cells.

**Arrests.** [Three Communist cells were discovered in Nablus and vicinity during the year.] On 20 Jan 43 persons were arrested, including several intellectuals. (*Jihad*, 22 Jan) On 20 Apr three persons were arrested; printing facilities and Communist publications were found in their possession. (*Masa'*, 23 Sept) The third cell was uncovered on 2 Sept in a village near Nablus, and 15 arrests were made. (*Jihad*, 3 Sept)

In Amman a cell was discovered on 11 May, and seven arrests were made. (*Jihad*, 12 May)

In Ajlun, a cell was discovered in July. Among those arrested there were some who had been sentenced *in absentia* in 1958. Forged identity-cards were found in the possession of the prisoners. The authorities announced that the group had aimed at making Ajlun District a centre for Communist activities. (*ANA*, 28 July–BBC, 30 July)

On 13 Aug a fugitive Communist from Nablus was arrested while hiding in Amman. A large quantity of Communist publications was found in his possession. (*Manar*, 14 Aug)

Another fugitive Communist was handed over by the Syrian authorities on 23 Sept to the Jordanian Security Forces in Ajlun District. In 1958 he had been sentenced *in absentia* to 19 years' imprisonment. (*Jihad*, 25 Sept)

**Jan–Sept: Communists Tried.** During Jan–May the State Security Court handed down sentences in several trials of persons arrested before 1960 and accused of belonging to the Communist party. In Jan five persons were sentenced to three to ten years' imprisonment and hard labour in Jarash. In Apr in Zarqa, 16 were found innocent and five sentenced to three to ten years' imprisonment. (*Jihad*, 7 Jan, 15 Mar, 7 Apr)

Three trials were held in Jerusalem (14 Mar, 12 Apr, 30 May), with 42 accused from the West Bank. Seven were found innocent; 35 were found guilty and sentenced to one to 15 years' imprisonment and hard labour. (*Difa'*, 15 Mar; *Jihad*, 13 Apr, 31 May)

In June–July the 43 persons who had been arrested in Nablus in Jan were tried before the State Security Court in the town. The accused included lawyers, doctors, chemists and school teachers. The President tried to persuade them to denounce Communism with a view to mitigating the sentences, but most refused. Twenty-two were given prison sentences of one to 20 years with hard labour, while the rest were acquitted. (*Jihad*, 19 June; *ANA*, 30 July–BBC, 2 Aug; *Mid. Mirror*, 30 July) Of the three arrested on 20 Apr, one was sentenced to 20 years' imprisonment, another to 15, and the third, a woman, to six months. (*Masa'*, 23 Sept)

**Oct: Slander by Allegations of Communism.** On 9 Oct a villager of Nablus District was arrested for slandering 15 fellow-villagers by alleging that they belonged to the Communist party. (*Jihad*, 10 Oct.) On 15 Oct, the Governor of Jerusalem District, Hasan al-Kātib, declared that there was a so-called Patriotic group, whose members made slanderous statements to the authorities about innocent and honest people. It had been decided to eradicate this practice. (*Jihad*, 16 Oct) The Jordanian newspapers denounced such slander-mongering. (*Jihad*; *Falastin*, *Difa'*, 16 Oct)

**Dec: Fu'ād Nāsir in Moscow.** Fu'ād Nāsir, Secretary of the Central Committee of the Jordanian Communist

party, visited Moscow in Dec and held talks with Nuritdin Mukhitdinov, a member of the Soviet Communist Party Central Committee. (*R Moscow* in Arabic, 12 Dec—

*IMB*, 1 Dec) [This visit was probably connected with the conference of Communist parties, which was held in Moscow in Dec.]

## POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS JAN–AUG

### JAN–AUG: THE REGIME'S CAMPAIGN FOR PUBLIC SUPPORT

**Background Note and Synopsis.** The relative stability in Jordan since the end of 1958 was due mainly to the efficiency of the security services in forestalling attempts at undermining the regime, and the slackening of the UAR's attacks on the Monarchy. The somewhat improved economic situation was also a contributory factor. However, there was no increase in the popularity of the King or the government. On the West Bank and in the north of the East Bank, the public attitude towards the regime was, at most, passive.

In the second half of 1959, and especially during the first half of 1960, the different Palestinian Entity (PE) plans were brought up and intensively pushed by UAR and Iraqi propaganda (see p 132 ff). These plans necessarily involved the weakening of Jordan's sovereignty and the creation of unrest on the West Bank.

To counter this threat, King Hussein and the PM started an intensive campaign, particularly on the West Bank, to gain public support for the unity of the Kingdom. This campaign was maintained until the assassination of the PM in Aug and later renewed.

**Jan–Apr: Release of Political Prisoners, Amnesty for Criminals.** In Jan 121 political prisoners were released on the King's orders, most of them from the West Bank and Ajlun District (the northern part of the East Bank). This step was interpreted as an attempt to emphasize the country's stability. (For full list of the released see *Jihad*, 16 Jan; also *Hayat*, 3, 8 Jan.) Also on the King's orders, a law was promulgated pardoning criminal prisoners and 350 prisoners were accordingly released between Feb and Apr. (*al-Jaridah ar-Rasmiyah*, 16 Feb; *Falastin*, 17 Apr)

**Jan: Old City of Jerusalem Proclaimed Jordan's Second Capital.** King Hussein and PM Hazzā al-Majālī announced on 16 Jan that the government and the Parliament would from time to time convene in the Old City of Jerusalem, emphasizing its status as the second capital of the Kingdom. (*Falastin*, 17 Jan) At a session of Parliament held in the Old City of Jerusalem on 19 Jan, the King and the PM stressed the unity of both Banks and attacked the UAR and Iraqi PE plans. (*Jihad*, 20 Jan)

The Jordan Press published many telegrams and messages sent to the King by municipalities and leading personalities—mainly from the West Bank—expressing support for the King and opposition to the proposed PE. (*Jihad*, 14 Jan; *Difa*, 15, 19 Jan) [Throughout 1960, the authorities used the method of publishing such telegrams in their campaign to win popularity.]

**Feb: Granting of Jordanian Citizenship to Refugees.** [In an attempt to gain the sympathy of the Palestinians, even those not living in Jordan, the PM announced at the beginning of Feb that his government would grant Jordanian citizenship to all refugees, even if they had not lived in Jordan for a period of four years, as was sti-

pulated in the Jordanian Citizenship Law. (See also pp 134, 214.)]

**Mar: The King Tours the West Bank.** At the beginning of Mar, after the discussion of the Palestine Problem in the Arab League Council (see pp 134–5), the King set out for the West Bank and addressed civilians and soldiers in Hebron, Nablus, Jenin and Jerusalem and the army camps in these areas. The notables of the West Bank publicly joined in the condemnation of the proposed PE. At one of these meetings in Nablus, the King's address was followed by a speech by Major-General Muhammad as-Sa'di, the senior-ranking Palestinian officer in Jordan; in Jerusalem, on 19 Mar, the Mayors of Hebron, Nablus, Tul-Karm, Birah, Bethlehem, Ramallah followed the King's speech with protestations of opposition to the PE. (*Jordanian Press*, 2–20 Mar)

**The King's Speeches—Plebiscite Proposal.** In his speeches the King reaffirmed that the unity of both Banks after the "Palestine disaster" had been achieved with the full agreement of the people of the two parts of the Kingdom, who were now equally sharing the country's responsibility for the defence of Palestine. Jordan stood in the front-line opposite Israel; Jordan was defending the West Bank "not as others defended the Gaza Strip." The UAR and Iraq who proposed the establishment of a Palestine Army and the creation of the PE, were making no contribution other than verbiage towards a solution of the Palestine Problem. In Jordan, the Palestinians had long since been wearing uniform (see e.g. *Jihad*, 13, 17 Mar; also The PE pp 137–8, Views and Policies p 318). In one speech, the King said: "I invite neutral representatives from Arab League countries to come and to establish contact with anyone in Jordan, so that they can verify the position here; if necessary, let them supervise a plebiscite, which would clarify the true position. I am willing to accept the result of such a plebiscite." (*R. Amman*, 16 Mar–*IMB*, 16 Mar)

**Apr: People's Assemblies.** After the King's campaign, public activity was kept alive by the organization of mass assemblies on the West Bank—in Hebron, Nablus, the refugee camps, etc. Delegations were brought in from the surrounding villages, and the speakers, local notables and army commanders expressed their opposition to the PE. Resolutions were forwarded to the Secretariat of the Arab League. (*Falastin*, 1 Apr; *Jihad*, 7, 11, 16 Apr)

**Apr–May: The King's Visit Abroad.** The King's visit to countries of the ME, Europe and Africa in the months of Apr–May (see pp 335–7) was also intended to help to build up the King's internal prestige. In a speech prior to his departure (4 Apr), the King emphasized that he had been invited by the governments of the various countries he would be visiting, thanks to the friendly relations between them and the people of Jordan. (*R. Amman*, 4 Apr–*IMB*, 4 Apr) The Jordanian Press, which gave wide coverage to the King's tour, published his cables to the PM, telling of the widespread support he met with during his visits and asking



for news of the people of Jordan. (*Jihad*, 7, 10 Apr; *Falastin*, 27, 29 Apr) The authorities organized a lavish reception for the King on his return on 16 May, at which much enthusiasm was displayed. In his speech on that occasion, Hussein said that his chief preoccupation through his visits had been the Palestine Problem. (*Falastin*; *Jihad*, 16-17 May)

**Apr-Aug: Further Tours by the King and Leaders of the Regime.** During Apr, PM Hazzā' al-Majālī, together with Ministers and officials, visited towns and villages on the West Bank and in the Ajlun District. In the main, he dealt with organizational affairs and promised his support on various problems. The Queen Mother, Zayn, toured the towns of the West Bank (but did not hold any public meetings). (*Jihad*, 25 Apr, 1, 15 June; *Falastin*, 24 Apr, 29 May)

At the beginning of June, after relative quiet in May, the UAR renewed its attacks against King Hussein and his government (see p 151). Consequently mass rallies were again organized throughout the Kingdom in June and July denouncing these attacks. (*Jihad*, 26 June, 4 July; *Falastin*, 6, 19 July) At the end of June, the King paid an extended visit to the Ajlun District. In Irbid, he inaugurated a new hospital and ordered the release of political prisoners from the District. Between 5 and 13 July, he toured the towns and villages of the West Bank, granting many of the appeals made to him to release political prisoners. On 15 Aug, the King, accompanied by the PM, the Chief of the Royal Court and the C.-in-C., started on an eight-day tour of the southern part of the East Bank, where he was received with enthusiasm. [This area is populated mostly by Bedouin, who support the King.] His speeches were devoted to the propaganda duel with Abdel-Nasser (see *Jordanian Press*, 24-30 June, 5-14 July, 16-23 Aug).

**Mar-Aug: Release of Political Detainees.** [While carrying on its campaign of propaganda, the government continued its attempts to maintain calm and gain public support by the release of political prisoners.] In May, 40 detainees were released, 20 of them from the Ajlun District, and 63 detainees from the same area were released in July, as the King had promised. Many West Bank prisoners were also released in July-Aug. (*Jordanian Press*, 6, 8, 9 May, 15, 22 July, 8, 23 Aug)

The King was about to renew his tours on 30 Aug, but PM Hazzā' al-Majālī was assassinated on 29 Aug.

**July: Establishment of Complaints Bureau (Diwān al-Mazālīm).** At the end of June, PM Majālī announced the setting-up of a special bureau, attached to the PM's Office, to which the public could address their complaints. It would deal with each complaint received and would bring grave ones before the King. The purpose of the bureau was to safeguard the rights of the citizens where these had been infringed by government offices. If, however, a complaint proved to be unfounded, the complainant would be brought to trial. (*Jihad*, 2 July)

On 3 July, the bureau was formally declared open and the public was invited to submit complaints. (*Jihad*, 2, 4 July)

**Jan-Aug: Effect of Campaign on Public.** [There was little information on the effect of the campaign. Following are some impressions published in the world Press.]

The ME Correspondent of *The Economist*, writing in Feb, estimated the results of King Hussein's visits to the West Bank as "ranging from very good to fair." On

the holding of sessions of Parliament in the Old City of Jerusalem, he added: "The intention was to deepen the roots of the regime in Palestine, and it has succeeded to the extent that many Palestinians now regard the present situation as at least the best temporary settlement, if not the ultimate solution of their status." (*Economist*, 20 Feb)

Another Western journalist, visiting the country in May, found that to "the people of Jordan [mainly Palestinians] waiters, hotel clerks, former Cabinet Ministers and newspapermen... President Abdel-Nasser was the symbol of Arab unity, to many, their single hero... and not once did they mention King Hussein whom the newspapers were daily lauding... When asked about him they talked with respect for his ability, not of love for the Hashimite Monarchy." Palestinians, talking to the writer, did not believe "that the Hashimite Kingdom could endure for long... but they did not want to rush the process, fearing that disorder would bring in the Israelis. The problem will be solved outside, not inside Jordan, concluded one." (*D. Farquharson, Vancouver Sun*, 18 May)

Reporting from Amman after the assassination of al-Majālī, H. A. R. Philby said that the latter had acquired popularity by the release of political prisoners and by deciding on general elections to be held in the autumn 1960. (*Observer*, 4 Sept)

#### JAN-AUG: THE QUESTION OF GENERAL ELECTIONS AND THE MAJALI-RIFA'I DISPUTE

According to the 1955 constitution, the Chamber of Deputies which was elected in 1956 was due to be dispersed in June 1960, while elections were due to be held in Oct.

**Jan-Feb: Amendment to Constitution Empowering King to Prolong Term of Chamber of Deputies.** On 16 Jan a group of Senators including ar-Rifā'i, submitted in the Senate a Bill amending para 68(a) of the Constitution to empower the King to extend the term of the Chamber of Deputies by decree for not less than one year and no more than two years. (*Difa'*, 17 Jan) The Bill was approved by the Chamber of Deputies, the Senate and the King, and was published in the Official Gazette. (*Al-Jaridah ar-Rasmiyah*, 16 Feb)

PM Majālī announced that this amendment did not presuppose a need to prolong the life of the present Chamber, but was designed to provide the King with a permanent constitutional prerogative to use at "any time when circumstances do not permit holding elections at their appointed time." If the present stability and security in the country continued, Majālī added, this would "make the holding of general elections at the end of the present Chamber's term a sound constitutional procedure necessitated by public interest." (*R. Amman*, 24 Jan-BBC, 26 Jan)

**May-Aug: The Majālī-Rifā'i Dispute.** The question of general elections caused a dispute in ruling circles. A group of politicians headed by Samir ar-Rifā'i advocated postponement, fearing that the election would give the UAR an opportunity to undermine the regime, while PM Majālī discounted the risk of disorder. (*Sunday Times*, 5 June)

[An additional reason for these conflicting attitudes may perhaps be found in the composition of Parliament, which was predominantly pro-Rifā'i. Many of the original 40 members, elected in 1956, fled the country after the King's counter coup of Apr 1957 or otherwise ceased to

be members. Rifā'i filled most of the vacancies and the ten additional seats created in 1958 with his supporters.]

It was later reported that the dispute between the two politicians was intensified in the summer, when Rifā'i tried to persuade the King to remove Majāli and improve relations with the UAR. (*Jaridah*, 1 Sept.). [The roots of the dispute, however, go back to 1957, see below.]

**Hazzā' al-Majāli—Biographical Note.** [Hazzā' al-Majāli was born in 1917 in Madba, Karak district. He was the son of a Shaykh of the Majāli clan, the most powerful in the district, which reigned supreme there in Turkish times, refusing to recognize the overlordship of the Ottomans who tried in vain to bring it to heel. The clan gave its allegiance to Amir Abdullah, however, and he and his successors served it well. The clan has provided many soldiers to the Jordanian forces.]

Hazzā' studied law in Damascus. After gaining the confidence of Abdullah he became active in politics in 1948 and was appointed to various ministries. In 1951, however, he joined the opposition and became a founder and leader of the National-Socialist party headed by an-Nabulsi. In 1954 he broke with his party and became an ardent supporter of King Hussein. He advocated a pro-British and pro-Iraqi policy and in 1955 was appointed PM in order to bring Jordan into the Baghdad Pact. However, he failed to overcome popular unrest and was dismissed by the King, who was then under the influence of Abu Nuwār and nationalist elements. In 1957 Majāli helped the King in his counter-coup and in 1958 he worked to bring about the Iraqi-Jordan federation. In July 1958 he was appointed Minister to the Court and in May 1959, after Rifā'i's resignation, he was appointed Premier. During his premiership, after some initial blunders, he tried—and to a limited extent succeeded—to broaden the base of the regime. There were also some efforts to eliminate graft, but Majāli practised favouritism where his own clan was concerned.]

**Samir ar-Rifā'i—Biographical Note.** [Samir ar-Rifā'i was born in Iraq in 1900. His family moved to Palestine, where he became a government official after World War I. After being dismissed (allegedly because of financial fraud), he moved to Transjordan, where he found again employment as an official. In 1925 he married into a wealthy family. He entered politics and in 1944 was appointed PM. During the next 15 years he often held ministerial posts when not acting as Premier, and built up his political power. He appointed, or used his influence to appoint, members of the Rifā'i family to various posts (e.g. Abd al-Mun'am—Ambassador, last post—at the UN; Munir—Director-General of the Ministry of Finance, 1957–1959, pensioned by the Majāli government; Zayd—since 1958 member of the delegation to the UN; Ghāzi—since 1959 Deputy Chief of Protocol in the Foreign Ministry; Ziyā ad-Dīn—in the diplomatic service since 1953, in 1960 appointed Dep. Director-General of the Ministry of Economy). He used his influence to build a corps of supporters in the administration, among the politicians and in the army. Among his more prominent supporters were: Bahjat at-Talhūni (before he became Premier), Shaykh ash-Shanqīti, Falāh al-Madād-hah, Akif al-Fā'iz, Shaykh Ali al-Ja'bari and Bahjat Tabārah.]

In internal politics Rifā'i used severe measures to eliminate opposition; he is known as "the strong man" and

"the man with the iron fist." He is said to be well hated by the majority of the public.]

**Struggle Between Majāli and Rifā'i.** [The political struggle between the two politicians started in 1957 when Rifā'i was serving as Deputy PM in the government of Ibrahim Hāshim but in reality controlled its activities. At the time a dispute developed between the Yaman and Qays Bedouin clans over the right to administrative and army posts. The Majāli clan belongs to the Yaman branch; Rifā'i supported the Qays. In May 1959 Rifā'i resigned as PM following a difference over policy in the case of Sādiq ash-Shar' (see p 327), who was one of his last supporters in the army. It was assumed at the time that he believed that nobody else could rule Jordan and that the King would have to recall him. Majāli's achievements as PM therefore led to a deepening of the enmity between the two politicians.]

**New Electoral Law.** On 11 June a Provisional Electoral Law for the Chamber of Deputies was promulgated. The new Parliament was to be elected according to this law, and was then in turn to be asked to approve the law. The franchise was accorded to male citizens aged 20 years and over, except for members of the Royal Family, the armed forces and the police, convicted criminals and the mentally sick. The number of members of the Chamber of Deputies was increased from 50 to 60, 30 from each of the East and the West Banks: 48 (instead of 41) Muslims, 10 (7) Christians and 2 (2) Circassians.

Election propaganda would be allowed to start on the day the candidates were nominated. Nominations would begin 25 days before election day and continue for five days. Election propaganda was to be unhampered except for the following restrictions: the candidate must not be accompanied by more than five men; his expenditure must not exceed 300 Dinars; he must not attack other candidates, or provoke tribal, clannish or religious fanaticism. (*Al-Jaridah ar-Rasmiyah*, 11 June)

PM Majāli said, that the new law would "guarantee the safety of the elections and ensure a suitable atmosphere free from influence and interference." (*Mid. Mirror*, 29 May)

[The country is divided into electoral constituencies each of which returns a specified number of delegates elected in their constituency according to plurality.]

**Preparations for Elections:** From May to Aug the government prepared for the elections. The period between the announcement of polling day and the elections was shortened from four months to 40 days [which, together with the shortening of the actual campaign to 25 days, drastically reduced the period of possible unrest]. (*Jihad*, 24 May). The government promised that the candidates would be free to conduct their campaigns and that they would be given the opportunity to appear on the radio. (*Jihad*, 15 May; *Falastin*, 10 June) Election committees were set up to prepare the electoral lists; registration of voters started on 19 June. (*Mid. Mirror*, 25 June, *Falastin*, 28 June)

It was generally expected that election day would be announced in Sept (*Hawl al-Alam*, 11 Aug; *Bilad*, 28 Aug), but Premier Majāli was assassinated on 29 Aug, and the idea of elections was abandoned for the time being.

## FEB-APR: MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS

[As the time for municipal elections approached in many towns, it became the practice to try and restrict the

## ELECTION OF PATRIARCH

number of candidates to the number of municipal councillors—thereby obviating the need for polling.]

**Feb: Elections in 13 Towns on the West and East Banks.** On 16 Feb elections were held in: Ramallah, Bethlehem, Bayt-Sahur, Dir-Dabwan (Jerusalem District); Tubas, Ya'bab, Salfit, Anbata (Nablus District); ash-Shunah ash-Shimaliya, Taybah, Nu'aymah, Anjarah (Ajlun District); Wadi as-Sir (Amman District). In Tubas, Salfit, Anbata and Wadi as-Sir the number of candidates was equal to the number of members of the municipal council and all were returned unopposed. (*Jihad* 13, 14, 18 Feb; *Falastin*, 17 Feb) The names of the councillors were published in *al-Jaridah ar-Rasmiyah* on 25 Feb. At the end of Feb and beginning of Mar the Minister of the Interior appointed the mayors from among the councillors and the appointments were confirmed by the government. (*Al-Jaridah ar-Rasmiyah*, 19 Mar)

**19 Apr: Elections in at-Tur. Zarqa, Amman.** Elections should have taken place in these three towns on 19 Apr, but polling actually took place only in at-Tur (Jerusalem District) where six councillors were elected. (*Jihad*, 20 Apr) In Zarqa there were ten candidates, the same number as the members of the council, and they were therefore returned unopposed. (*Jihad*, 11 Apr) Of the 12 municipal councillors in Amman, six are elected by the citizens and six appointed by the government. (*Falastin*, 27 Jan) Twenty-four candidates were nominated for the six former places, and were asked by the government to choose six of their number for the seats. The candidates, having failed to reach an agreement, appealed to the PM, who appointed a committee to select the councillors. Their names were announced on the eve of the polls, which were thereupon cancelled. (*Jihad*, 17, 19 Apr) The government then appointed an additional eight councillors instead of six as hitherto. Dayfallah al-Hamud was reappointed Mayor of the Capital. (*Jihad*, 21 Apr)

### JAN-AUG: DISPUTE OVER ELECTION OF ORTHODOX-ARMENIAN PATRIARCH TO JERUSALEM

**Background Note and Synopsis.** Since 1949 there has been a conflict within the Orthodox Armenian Community over the election of the Patriarch of Jerusalem.

The two rival candidates were Archbishop Diran Nersoyan and Archbishop Yaghishah Derderyan, the acting Patriarch. The latter accused the former of engaging in political activity and maintaining contact with the Soviet Armenian Republic. After several years of strife Nersoyan was chosen Patriarch in 1957. Though Derderyan contested the elections, they were upheld by the court, but Nersoyan was expelled from Jordan on the ground of "pro-Communist tendencies." Derderyan was expelled from Jerusalem.

In 1960 Archbishop Derderyan, who was favoured by the government, was finally chosen.

**Mar-Apr: Preparations for Elections; Protests Against Government Interference.** At the end of Mar, the Jordanian PM permitted Derderyan to return to the Armenian Monastery in Jerusalem, on condition that he did not interfere in matters concerning the Church, did not take part in the elections to the Patriarchate and did not hold any official title. (*Jihad*, 3 Apr) At this time, when preparations were being made for the elections, the Bishop of the Armenian Orthodox Church of Damas-

cus addressed an open letter to King Hussein, to the SG of the Arab League and to Abd al-Hamid as-Sarrāj, Minister of the Interior of the Syrian Region, accusing the Jordan Security Forces of attempting to enforce the election of Derderyan. This was sacrilege and a grave indignity to the Armenian Community, and he demanded that the Jordanian authorities stop their intervention. (*Ayyam, Damascus*, 1 Apr)

Dr Fisher, the Archbishop of Canterbury, was also reported to have protested to the Jordanian Government against intervention in the affairs of the Armenian Patriarchate. A supporter of Derderyan replied to Dr Fisher, stating that he had been misinformed. (*Times*, 10 June)

**June-Aug: Derderyan Elected.** In June, despite the PM's statement on the restrictions placed on Derderyan, the latter was appointed by the Governor of Jerusalem as Acting Armenian Patriarch until the elections. It was reported that the appointment followed a request by members of the St. James brotherhood. [This is the most important brotherhood of the Armenian Community in Jerusalem. It elects the Patriarch of Jerusalem from among its members.] (*Falastin*, 3 June)

On 7 June 23 members of the Brotherhood met and chose five candidates including Derderyan, for the post. (*Falastin*, 8 June) Next day they met again and Derderyan was elected. The vote was 18 in favour of Derderyan, with four abstentions and one vote in favour of another candidate. (*Difa'*, 9 June) On 9 Aug King Hussein handed the new Patriarch the official letter of appointment and conferred a decoration upon him. (*Jihad*, 10 Aug) On 21 Aug the ceremony of inauguration took place, the Governor of Jerusalem representing the King. The Patriarch thanked the King for the appointment and the Jordanian Government for its painstaking efforts. (*Jihad*, 22 Aug)

Supporters of Archbishop Nersoyan claimed that the election was illegal on the ground that the government had interfered. Archbishop Derderyan's supporters, on the other hand, declared that the election was in full conformity with the Patriarchate regulations. (*Times*, 10 June)

### JAN-DEC: GOVERNMENT ACTION TO IMPROVE THE CIVIL SERVICE

[After attempts in preceding years to reform the mushrooming and much-criticized Jordanian civil service had proved ineffectual, Majālī declared on becoming PM that he would introduce a plan for its reorganization. The main points of this plan were: a reclassification of manpower, taking into consideration the qualifications and abilities of the clerks; elimination of favouritism and party influence; facilities for the public to submit complaints against government offices in order to expedite necessary changes. At the end of 1959 some steps were taken to clean up the civil service, but the action taken was in effect mostly aimed against supporters of ar-Rifā'i.]

During 1960, the PM took some action to improve the civil service: he laid down the principles for the appointment and promotion of civil servants within the period of the 1960/61 Budget. The main aim of these regulations was to curb the growth of the civil service and unwarranted promotions. (*Jihad*, 24 Apr; *Difa'*, 18 May) [However, there were signs that these directives were not followed.] Instructions were also issued concerning study groups going abroad. (*Al-Jaridah ar-Rasmiyah*, 2 Apr; *Jihad*, 29 May, 14 Sept) A special bureau was established for complaints against government offices (see p 323).



A UN expert started to investigate the country's civil service. (*Jihad*, 29 Sept, 18 Oct)

### JAN-DEC: PROBLEM OF EMPLOYING SECONDARY SCHOOL GRADUATES

**The Problem.** The majority of the ever-increasing number of secondary school graduates in Jordan turn to the government for employment. By the end of May 1960 there were 5,082 registered as waiting for government employment (*Jihad*, 2 June), and a further 5,000 concluded their studies in June of that year, while the vacancies in the civil service totalled only 500. (*Difa'*, 3 Aug)

[This unemployment constitutes a serious political liability. The government took steps in 1960 to alleviate the problem, but success seemed to be very limited.]

**Mar-Sept: Efforts to Employ Graduates.** In Mar the government and the US Operations Mission each allocated to the Ministry of Public Works 25,000 dinars for the employment of 240 school graduates in various projects. (*Jihad*, 17 Mar; *Difa'*, 9 May)

On 12 June, the PM announced that on the King's orders the government had decided not to retain the services of officials reaching retirement age and to dismiss married women, in order to make room for the employment of young and capable applicants. (*Jihad*, 13 June; *Hawl al-Alam*, 16 June)

The Ministries drew up lists of officials due to retire and handed them over to the PM's Office, and it was expected that a considerable number of clerks would be retired. (*Jihad*, 20 Sept) [No such action was reported by the end of 1960.] In Dec the government officially announced that it would invoke its powers to extend the

service of officials due to retire not more than once in each case (*Difa'*, 9 Dec) [i.e. for a maximum period of two years].

**June-Dec: Efforts of Ministry of Education and Culture to Solve the Problem.** On 1 June the Minister of Education and Culture, Shaykh Muhammad Amin ash-Shanqiti, said that the problem of employing the school graduates was very serious and a satisfactory solution difficult to achieve. He spoke of two possible ways to alleviate the problem: (1) changing the trend of secondary education in Jordan from humanist studies to technical training; (2) sending graduates as teachers to Arab countries where there was a shortage of teachers. (*Jihad*, 2 June) [The Ministry of Education introduced some measures in order to extend the scope of technical training in Jordan.]

In recent years a large number of teachers had gone from Jordan to other Arab countries. In Aug 1960 31 teachers went to Qatar (*Jihad*, 25 Aug); 395 to Saudi Arabia (*Jihad*, 1 Sept); 29 to Libya (*Jihad*, 3 Sept); and 70 to Kuwait, where there were already some 1,200 teachers from Jordan. (*Jihad*, 2 Aug). [August is the month when the Arab governments recruit the teachers needed for the new school year.]

[The Ministry of Education and Culture was the only one which carried out the instructions in respect of employment of married women in 1960.] In Aug the Ministry transferred a large number of women teachers from their own areas of residence to schools in outlying districts. (*Jihad*, 16, 17, 18 Aug) After appealing unsuccessfully against the transfers, a large number of married teachers handed in their resignation in Aug and Sept. The resignations were accepted and the teachers were granted compensation. (*Jihad*, 20, 27 Aug, 7 Sept)

## JAN-DEC 1960: SUBVERSION OF THE REGIME

### BACKGROUND—1949-1960

[Since 1949, subversive activities aimed at overthrowing the regime have played an integral part in the development of the internal political situation in Jordan. It can almost be said that they have played a more important role in political developments in the Hashimite Kingdom during the past few years than any other single factor.]

Subversion was carried out by every known method, from attempts at assassination to an organized subversive campaign by a foreign government, including the setting-up of an underground movement in Jordan, the preparation of an organized uprising, and incitement to mutiny and murder through constant broadcasts.]

**1949: Abdullah at-Tal and the Ba'ath Party.** Abdullah at-Tal, an officer of the Arab Legion, who regarded the King's policy towards the British and towards Israel as treason, attempted in 1949 to organize the first underground movement against King Abdullah. When his activities were discovered, he escaped to Egypt, where he still lives. While Commander of the Old City of Jerusalem in 1949, he assisted two young Palestinians, Abdullah an-Nu'wās and Abdullah ar-Rimāwi, to organize the Arab Renaissance Party (*Hizb al-Ba'ath al-Arabi*—known as Ba'ath—the Jordanian branch of the Damascus party of the same name.) Ar-Rimāwi was to become a leader of the opposition to the Hashimites and later an organizer of the anti-Hashimite underground.

**1951: Hajj Amin al-Husseini and the Assassination of King Abdullah.** King Abdullah was assassinated in Jerusalem in July 1951 by a Palestinian youth. The murderer belonged to a group which was linked to Hajj Amin al-Husseini (ex-Mufti of Jerusalem), leader of the extremist camp of Palestinian Arabs and the sworn enemy of the King since the beginning of the British Mandatory period. This group was assumed to be in league with Abdullah at-Tal. The ex-Mufti, like at-Tal, was then living in Egypt. The assassination was an isolated incident and was not part of any organized movement among the citizens to overthrow the Hashimite Kingdom. Hajj Amin, who had lost standing among the Palestinian Arabs following the military defeat of 1948, was no longer influential in Jordan, and the gangs, including professional murderers, which he had organized in the Arab Revolt in Palestine in 1936-1939, were later to carry on under new masters.

**1953-1956: Organization of Political Opposition in the Arab Legion; Ali Abu Nuwār.** At a time of relative quiet in Jordan, young officers of the Arab Legion started to organize as a political group, led by Lt. Colonel Ali Abu Nuwār. This group aimed at ejecting British officers from the Arab Legion but its main purpose was the overthrow of the government, on the pattern of Syria and Egypt. Abu Nuwār made contact with the Syrian and Egyptian authorities, particularly from 1954-1955, when



Abdel-Nasser in Egypt and Ba'ath members in the Syrian Government and Army started their campaign to unite the Arab world and undermine their opponents. In Jordan itself Abu Nuwār was in contact with ar-Rimāwī. At the same time, he gained the confidence of young King Hussein and was appointed C.-in-C. of the Arab Legion after the expulsion of Glubb, the British Commander, in Mar 1956.

**1955-1957: Egypt, Syria and the Fida'iyyūn.** In 1955 the Egyptian authorities organized the *Fida'iyyūn*. (The term is now used and translated as commandos, marauders, suicide squads; *Al-Fida'iyyūn* in the Middle Ages were the emissaries of the Assassins, who executed their orders.)

Palestinian Arabs, at first in the Gaza Strip and later in Jordan, Lebanon and Syria as well, were recruited by Egyptian Intelligence officers and trained in sabotage and murder to be carried out in Israel (see also p 193). The *Fida'iyyūn* in Jordan were set up as an underground movement, comprising in 1955-1956 some 300-500 men, organized in squads of four to six. Their commanding officer was the Egyptian Military Attaché in Jordan, Colonel Salāh ad-Dīn Mustafa (who was killed in July 1956 by a bomb sent to him by post). He was responsible for the *Fida'iyyūn* to Kamāl ad-Dīn Rif'at (one of the officers of the Junta, now a Cabinet Minister of the UAR) in Cairo. The Syrian Intelligence co-operated in these activities with the Egyptians. To recruit *Fida'iyyūn* the Egyptians used their connections with Hajj Amīn al-Husseini, at-Tal, ar-Rimāwī and other leaders of the opposition. The Egyptians never requested the agreement of the Jordanian authorities for the setting up of this organization in Jordan but in 1955 requested and received King Hussein's permission for the transfer of 500 *Fida'iyyūn* from the Gaza Strip to Jordan.

It soon transpired that the *Fida'iyyūn* were active not only in Israel, but inside Jordan as well. They were used to spread propaganda and rumours, to organize demonstrations and riots. Their activities served as a focus for the opposition in Jordan, and they played an important role in the developments that led to the expulsion of General Glubb in 1956 and the rise to power of the nationalist government of Nabulsi (in which Rimāwī served as Foreign Minister). The Egyptian and Syrian authorities reactivated the *Fida'iyyūn* in Jordan in 1957, after the countermove by King Hussein (see below). This time they engaged in widespread sabotage, in order to undermine public security as a preparation for a national uprising, and arms and reinforcements were moved in from Syria. However, in Dec 1958 their activities were brought to an end, mainly by vigorous countermeasures adopted by ash-Sharīf Nāsir Ibn Jumayl, in charge of internal security. The *Fida'iyyūn* were disbanded, some of them were taken into the security forces and others imprisoned.

**1957-1960: Jordanian Exiles in Syria—Attempt at Revolt in Jordan.** In the spring of 1957 King Hussein carried out a counter-coup. He dismissed PM an-Nabulsi and later foiled (with the aid of Bedouin units) an attempt at mutiny in Zarqa camp, instigated by his C.-in-C. General Abu Nuwār. Abu Nuwār was permitted by the King to leave for Syria, where he was later joined by General Ali Hayyārī, who had taken over as C.-in-C. Prominent among the civilian exiles was Rimāwī. With the aid of Colonel Sarrāj, head of the Syrian Deuxième Bureau (later chairman of the Executive Council of the Syrian Region), these exiles established, together with others, a "Revolutionary Council" (*Majlis*

*ath-Thawrah*) with the purpose of overthrowing King Hussein's regime. They took part in the abortive attempt at a national uprising in 1957, and in 1958 they organized, with UAR help, a military conspiracy to be supported by a campaign of propaganda and sabotage. Colonel Mahmūd ar-Rusān headed the conspiracy, whose aim was to start a revolt in Jordan simultaneously with the revolt in Iraq. However, in July 1958 the Jordanian authorities discovered the plot and detained the conspirators, including ar-Rusān and most of the sabotage agents who had infiltrated from Syria.

In Mar 1959 the Jordanian authorities announced the discovery of another military conspiracy by a group of officers connected with the UAR and led by Major-General Sādiq ash-Shar'. A general purge among the army officers followed; in July 1959 Shar' and others were sentenced to death, and other officers to long prison terms. [However, the King had not confirmed the sentences up to the end of 1960.]

Between autumn 1958 and the beginning of 1960, however, there was a relative let-up in subversive activities, including a drop in UAR broadcast attacks.

**1960: Change in Subversive Policy.** Towards the end of 1959 relations between the UAR and Jordan worsened, as a result of the Palestine Entity plan brought up by the UAR (pp 148-9). In Mar 1960 the UAR renewed the campaign of incitement against King Hussein and his government and, simultaneously, underground subversive activities became rampant again in the Kingdom. However, while the Damascus Revolutionary Council had unsuccessfully attempted to organize a national uprising in 1957 and a military revolt in 1958, they tried this time to undermine the regime by murdering leading personalities, without connecting these attempts with an underground movement or with an overall plan of subversion within Jordan. UAR propaganda called openly for the assassination of leading personalities.

(For a review of subversive activities in Jordan see opening statement of the prosecutor in the Majālī murder trial, *ad-Difa'*, 4 Dec. See also the evidence of Colonel Qāsim an-Nāsir at the same trial—*IMB*, 5 Dec—*BBC*, 6 Dec. Both sources stated, that the agents trained in Syria and despatched to Jordan in 1957 included Communists as well as Ba'athists.)

#### JAN-FEB: TRIAL OF COLONEL MAHMUD AR-RUSAN

On 27 Jan, after detention since July 1958, Colonel Mahmūd ar-Rusān and his associates were brought to trial. The group comprised, in addition to Rusān, 11 officers (two Colonels and nine Majors), all of them residents of the East Bank, and four civilians who were tried *in absentia*. One of the civilians was of the ar-Rusān clan [one of the prominent families of the Ajlun District of the East Bank]. Another prominent civilian was Zakariyah Yūsuf at-Tāhir of Nablus who was found guilty of financing the plot. [For details on the Tāhir family, see below p 329.] (*Jihad*, 16 Feb; *R. Amman*, 4 Dec—*BBC*, 6 Dec)

The case was tried in camera by the State Security First Court. Colonel Rusān and his associates were accused of having conspired to overthrow the government of Jordan in July 1958, simultaneously with the revolt in Iraq. Colonel Rusān and the others admitted their guilt (*Jihad*, 18 Jan; *Hayat*, 28 Jan), and were sentenced on 15 Feb to five to 15 years' imprisonment. Ar-Rusān received a sentence of ten years. (*Jihad*, 16 Feb) On 25 July PM Majālī confirmed the sentence, but de-

cided to release three of the officers. (*Mid. Mirror*, 30 July)

### MAR-MAY: ATTEMPT TO MURDER LEADERS OF THE GOVERNMENT, ORGANIZED BY THE REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL

On 30 Mar, PM Hazzā' al-Majāli presented to the Press two of the men who had been detained on 27 Mar on a charge of plotting to murder him and the King's uncle ash-Sharif Nāsir Ibn Jumayl, Commander of the Royal Guards' Brigade. The assassination had been planned for prayer time during Id al-Fitr, some time between 28 and 31 Mar. The accused described the conspiracy and admitted being connected with Abdullah ar-Rimāwi and Ali Abu Nuwār.

**Mar: Story of the Conspiracy.** The man who was to have carried out the assassination, Nāsiri Muhammad Sa'adallah, of Arabah village in the Nablus District, described how the conspiracy had been planned. On his way from Jordan to Lebanon in search of work he found employment as a waiter in Damascus. There he met ar-Rimāwi, who, together with Ali Abu Nuwār and other Jordanian exiles, tried to persuade him to return to Jordan to assassinate the PM and the Sharif. After nine months of pressure by offers of money and threats to hand him over to the Syrian authorities, Nāsiri agreed to carry out the assassination, but confessed that he did not know how to use arms. He left for Jordan on a passport forged in the name of a Christian Lebanese and reached Amman, where, in accordance with ar-Rimāwi's instructions, he made contact with Muhammad al-Mutlaq, a retired officer working for the Shell Company, who was to supply him with arms and help him plan the assassination. Mutlaq warned Nāsiri that it would be difficult to assassinate the PM, as he was closely guarded; it would be easy to kill the Sharif, however, while he was walking in the street. He promised to give Nāsiri a revolver two days later. In the meantime, Nāsiri met his father and warned him not to disclose his identity should he hear that his son had been put to death. Nāsiri returned to Amman, received the revolver and tried it, but found that it did not work properly. Nevertheless, he went through the streets armed, wandered around the market for a while and finally returned the revolver to al-Mutlaq, claiming that he could not go through with the assassination. He then tried to return to Damascus but was arrested, as his father, worried for his son's life, had in the meantime notified the authorities. (*Falastin*, 30-31 Mar)

The revolver was delivered to al-Mutlaq by a driver working with the ESSO company in Jordan, who had received it from Zakariyah at-Tāhir in Damascus. (*Jer. Times*, 19 Apr) (On the Tāhir family and ESSO company—see also below: Assassination of Hazzā' al-Majāli.)

**UAR Charged with Responsibility.** PM Majāli charged the UAR with responsibility for the attempt at assassination and said that he was aware of the other plans it was fabricating. (*Falastin*, 30, 31 Mar) The Jordanian Government requested the extradition of Rimāwi and Abu-Nuwār (*Jihad*, 31 Mar), [but apparently no official request was made].

Telegrams of congratulation were sent to the King and the PM from various parts of Jordan. (*Difa'*, 1, 2 Apr) A delegation from Ramallah visited the PM and expressed its profound shock at the attempted assassination. Its spokesman was Qāsim ar-Rimāwi, who reviled

his kinsman for his share in the attempt. (*Jihad*, 7 Apr; *Falastin*, 7 Apr)

**Apr: The Trial.** The trial of the accused, which took place in open court, began on 18 Apr in the State Security Second Court. Of the ten accused, five were absent, including Abu-Nuwār, Rimāwi and Zakariyah at-Tāhir (see below).

The three present except for Mutlaq and Nāsiri, were: a native of Jerusalem—the driver who had delivered revolvers to Mutlaq and two residents of the East Bank accused of knowing about the conspiracy. (*Falastin*, 15 Apr, *Hayat*, 10, 20 Apr) The Court handed down its judgment on 4 May. Of the five tried in person, four were sentenced to ten years, and one to seven years' imprisonment with hard labour. Of the five tried in *absentia*, three, Rimāwi, Abu Nuwār and Tāhir were sentenced to 15 years with hard labour, to run concurrently with previous sentences totalling 20 years each against them, and two were acquitted. The judges stated in their judgments that the Syrian Deuxième Bureau had been a party to the plot. (*Falastin*, 5 May)

### JULY-AUG: THE SECOND PLOT OF 1960

**26 July: Arrest of Colonel Nāsir.** On 26 July, the Jordanian authorities announced the discovery of a new plot aiming at the overthrow of the regime. A number of persons were arrested, including Colonel Qāsim Muhammad an-Nāsir, former Deputy Chief of Intelligence of the Jordanian Army. [Colonel Nāsir was among the officers who left Jordan for Syria in 1957, with Major-General Ali Abu Nuwār. In Jordan meanwhile, he was sentenced, in *absentia*, to 15 years' imprisonment.] The Jordanian authorities said that they had been aware of the preparations for the plot from the very beginning. They had watched Colonel Nāsir's movements following his departure from Damascus and his crossing of the Jordanian border on the evening of 24 July up to his arrest in Irbid with other conspirators. (*R. Amman*, 26 July—BBC, 28 July)

The interrogation of Qāsim an-Nāsir and his accomplices revealed that they had received monthly salaries from the UAR authorities. (*Bilad*, 14 Aug) They were in possession of arms and documents containing plans for the overthrow of the regime in Jordan. (*Masa'*, 26 July) Majāli accused the UAR of harbouring members of the Ba'ath Party who carried out subversive activities in Jordan and giving direct aid to such activities. He referred in particular to Nāsiri's and Qāsim an-Nāsir's connections with the UAR. (*R. Amman*, 1 Aug—BBC, 3 Aug)

**8 Aug: Arrest of Abu Gharbiah.** Twelve days later, on 8 Aug, PM al-Majāli announced the arrest in Amman of Bahjat Abu Gharbiah, a leader of the illegal Ba'ath Party of Jordan, whom he described as a friend of Rimāwi and Abu Nuwār. (*ANA*, 8 Aug; *R. Amman*, 9 Aug—BBC, 10 Aug) [Abu Gharbiah was one of the political leaders who escaped to Syria in Apr 1957. In Jordan he was sentenced in *absentia* to two years' imprisonment. No further information concerning his arrest and the purpose of his coming to Jordan was given.]

### AUG-SEPT: ASSASSINATION OF HAZZA' AL-MAJALI

[Starting in Mar 1960, the UAR broadcasting stations specifically incited the people to murder Jordanian leaders (see pp 149-50).]

**29 Aug: The Assassination.** On 29 Aug at 11.30 a.m.,

PM Majālī was killed by a time-bomb placed in the building which houses the PM's office. (On Majālī, see p 324.) Half an hour later a second time-bomb exploded. In addition to the PM, ten people were killed, including the Foreign Under-Secretary, Zahā ad-Dīn al-Hammūd, Shaykh Jamīl Ibn Atīwī al-Majālī, Chief of the Karak Shaykhs, and a child. Forty-two persons were injured, including Shaykh Muhammad Muhyi ad-Dīn as-Sayrafī, Imām of the Great Mosque in Amman. (*R. Amman*, 29 Aug-BBC, 31 Aug)

**Accusations and Jordanian Counter-Measures Against the UAR.** See p 151 ff.

**Political Developments.** See p 330 ff.

**Aug-Nov: Arrests.** On the day of the assassination a military investigation committee was formed under the chairmanship of Major-General Muhammad as-Sa'dī to investigate the explosions. (*Falastin*, 30 Aug) Two minor employees at the Press Bureau who had fled to Syria, were suspected of planting the bombs. (*Jihad*, 31 Aug) During the following days several arrests were made. Among the detainees were Ibrahim Yūsuf at-Tāhir and Muhammad Yūsuf at-Tāhir, brothers of Zakariyah Yūsuf at-Tāhir, a Jordanian political refugee living in Damascus (see above). (*Falastin*, 3 Sept; *Manar*, 15 Sept; *Jihad*, 17 Sept)

**The at-Tāhir Family.** [Background Note: The at-Tāhir family is one of the wealthiest in Jordan. Originating in Nablus, the family lives in Amman. The Tāhir brothers were owners of the Arab Company Ltd., a supply company; the Trans-Desert Transport Co., which transports supplies throughout the Arab countries, and the Petra Taxi Company. They were also the ESSO agents in Jordan and owners of cinemas in Nablus, Amman and Damascus. These companies were ideally suited for the transport of agents and explosives across the border. Employees of the two first-mentioned companies were found guilty of having aided in the conspiracy.] The brothers Ibrahim and Muhammad were released in Dec and denounced their brother Zakariyah in a letter to the Press. (*Jihad*, 5 Dec)

**The Accused.** On 13 Nov the bill of indictment was made public. The accused were: (1) Silāh Muhyi ad-Dīn Sālīh al-Furānī, alias as-Safadi, of Safad, a news-agent, residing in Amman, detained; (2) Hishām Abd al-Fattāh Bakhīt ad-Dabbās, Lieutenant, Royal Engineers, detained; (3) Muhammad Yūsuf Mas'ūd al-Hindāwī, of Amman, detained; (4) Karīm Salīm Shaqrah, refugee residing in Damascus, driver, detained; (5) Zayn ad-Dīn Nimr Ubayd, of Hebron, driver, absconded; (6) Shākir Muhammad Bakhīt ad-Dabbās, of as-Salt, government office messenger, absconded (to Syria); (7) Kamāl Muhammad Khalīl ash-Shammūt, of as-Salt, government office messenger, absconded (to Syria); (8) Zakariyah Yūsuf at-Tāhir, alias abu Nasr, of Nablus, living in Damascus, absconded; (9) Sa'īd Muhammad Rashīd al-Barghūti, of Safad, living in Qatar, absconded; (10) Colonel Burbān al-Ad-ham, of the Syrian Intelligence Office, absconded; (11) Captain Bahjat al-Massūti, of the Syrian intelligence office, absconded; (12-15) Four policemen of the Amman Police Force; (16) Munīb Abd ar-Rahmān Mādi, head of the Press Bureau, detained.

The first eleven were charged with taking part in the conspiracy; the policemen with neglect of duty while guarding the PM's office, and the last was accused of having facilitated the journeys to Syria of as-Safadi and

ad-Dabbās and having allowed the latter to spend the night in the PM's office when the explosives were placed. (*Jihad*, 14 Nov; BBC, 15 Nov)

**UAR Charged with Responsibility.** The trial was opened on 3 Dec at Abdali Barracks near Amman before a special State Security Court composed of a Major-General and two Brigadiers. It was held in open court. The Military General Prosecutor outlined the political background of the plot. He mentioned briefly four plots in Jordan in the past three years (see background, above), for all of which, he said, Abdel-Nasser and his agents in Cairo and Damascus were responsible.

**The Story of the Plot.** The Prosecutor said that in 1959, while in Damascus, as-Safadi met Zakariyah at-Tāhir and agreed to start a rumour campaign in Jordan in return for a monthly payment; back in Amman, he engaged the two employees of the Press Bureau, ad-Dabbās and ash-Shammūt, to aid him. The latter paid frequent visits to Damascus, and in Apr 1960 they informed as-Safadi that at-Tāhir wanted to meet him in Damascus. In May as-Safadi reached Damascus, where he met at-Tāhir and also Colonel Burbān Ad-ham and Captain Bahjat Massūti of the Syrian Deuxième Bureau, and agreed, in return for a payment of 10,000 dinars, to be shared with other plotters, to take part in a conspiracy to blow up the PM's office. At-Tāhir told him that the explosives would be sent to Jordan in vehicles of Trans-Desert Co. [belonging to the at-Tāhir brothers], as these were not searched.

As-Safadi returned to Jordan, and in mid-June received from al-Barghūti a bag containing four bombs and two timing devices, which he had received near Mafrāq from Karīm Shaqrah, a lorry driver of the Trans-Desert Transport Co. The same day the bag was taken away by ash-Shammūt and ad-Dabbās. On 27 Aug the bag was put into a diplomatic pouch, which, after being stored for some hours at as-Safadi's shop, was finally taken by ad-Dabbās to the government building. The following night (28 Aug), Shākir ad-Dabbās went to the government building accompanied by 2nd Lieutenant Hishām ad-Dabbās (a relative of Shākir), al-Hindāwī and al-Ubayd. As-Safadi followed later. Shākir ad-Dabbās and Hishām ad-Dabbās placed a time bomb in the drawer of the PM's desk and another bomb was placed in the basement, while the others kept watch. (*Difā'*, 4 Dec)

According to the evidence of the clerk and drivers of the Petra Taxi Company, ash-Shammūt and Shākir ad-Dabbās fled to Syria in taxi-cabs belonging to the company on the day before and on the day of the explosion respectively. (*R. Amman*, 5 Dec-IMB, 6 Dec)

**The Verdict.** On 7 Dec the court decided to release the four policemen as they could be charged with no more than negligence. (*Falastin*, 8 Dec)

Munīb al-Mādi, the Director of the Press Bureau, who was accused of having facilitated the movements of ad-Dabbās and as-Safadi between Jordan and Syria, pleaded that he had done so in good faith and was acquitted.

Of the other four accused in custody, three pleaded not guilty, as-Safadi, however, made a statement which in general corroborated the Prosecution's charges.

The first 11 accused in the list above were found guilty and sentenced to death. (*Difā'*, 4 Dec; *Falastin*, 9 Dec; *R. Amman*, 29 Dec-IMB, 30 Dec; *Times*, 30 Dec)

**Dec: The Execution.** Those of the 11 condemned to death who were under detention were publicly hanged in Amman on the morning of 31 Dec. They were: as-



Safadi, 2nd Lieutenant ad-Dabbās, at-Hindāwi and Shaqrah. (*ANA, 31 Dec-BBC, 2 Jan 1961*)

#### DEC: RENEWED SABOTAGE

In Dec evidence of renewed sabotage conspiracies planned in Syria was reported in Jordan. Three cases were specifically mentioned, but according to Amman Radio there were more cases under investigation. (*BBC, 22 Dec*)

**Explosion in Mafrāq.** On 13 Dec an employee of the Jordanian Ministry of Public Works and two of his children were killed in Mafrāq when an explosive charge which he was using to test a time pencil blew up. The authorities found in the damaged house another time pencil and a quantity of explosives. The man had made frequent visits to Syria in 1959 and 1960, from the last of which he had returned on the day of the explosion. (*R. Amman, 20 Dec-IMB, 21 Dec-BBC, 22 Dec*) Damascus Radio explained that this man had acted as a double agent—for both the Jordanians and the Syrians—and accused the Jordanian authorities of arranging his death to get rid of a witness. (*R. Damascus, 20 Dec-BBC, 23 Dec*)

**Reported Attempt to Poison Irbid's Water Supplies.** A Syrian soldier who deserted to Jordan on 15 Dec, told the Jordanian authorities that he had been selected for a mission to poison the water supplies of Irbid and to blow up buildings and bridges in this town. On his refusal he was sentenced to nine months' imprisonment, so he decided to escape from Syria. (*R. Amman, 20 Dec-IMB, 21 Dec*) Cairo Radio denied the soldier's story. (*IMB, 21 Dec*)

**Sabotage Attempt in Amman.** In Dec a Jordanian, a native of Hebron, surrendered to a Jordanian border post on the Syrian border. He told the Jordanian authorities that he had fled to Syria in May to escape creditors. In Damascus he was approached by Jordanian political refugees and members of the Syrian Deuxième Bureau. He refused to undertake murder assignments in Jordan—one of the intended victims being Anwar al-Khatīb [the proposed Jordanian Ambassador to Cairo]—but agreed to take three bombs with him and place them at the Royal Palace gate, the Finance Ministry entrance and an Amman bridge. His heart was not in the plot, however, and he surrendered the explosives. (*Falastin, 23 Dec*)

### AUG-DEC: POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS AFTER ASSASSINATION OF AL-MAJALI

#### FIRST REACTIONS

PM al-Majālī was killed at 11.30 local time on 29 Aug. (For details see pp 328-9.)

Curfew was imposed in Amman shortly after the assassination, with military patrols in the streets, but was lifted at 7 p.m. the same evening. (*R. Amman, 29 Aug-IMB, 29 Aug*) The town, like the country in general, remained calm.

In the afternoon the King appointed Bahjat at-Talhūni, Chief of the Royal Cabinet, as PM and in the evening the composition of the new cabinet was announced.

**King Shocked.** On 29 Aug, following the assassination, the King broadcast to the people. He sounded "tired, sorrowful and full of bitterness." (*IMB, 29 Aug, monitors' notes*)

On his return from the funeral of al-Majālī, on 30 Aug, the King held a Press conference. He seemed depressed. One of those present wrote: "It was the first time the King had been seen crying in public. The assassination of his PM has affected the young King probably more than any other event in his turbulent six years on the Jordanian throne. He had difficulty in controlling his emotions." (*Daily Mail, 31 Aug; see also Times; Jaridah, 31 Aug*)

**Hussein "Determined to Carry on the Struggle."** In his brief broadcast to the people on the evening of 29 Aug, Hussein spoke of the "Arabs' readiness to continue on the path of Jihad," and declared, "This country has always defeated tribulation and overcome obstacles." (*BBC, 31 Aug*) In his letter appointing at-Talhūni as PM—see below—he demanded that the government should deal severely with "those who play havoc with peace." (*BBC, 31 Aug*)

The next day, at his Press conference, while still "plainly moved," he announced his determination, "as always, to carry on the struggle to build our country,

preserve our freedom and fight for the deeds we all cherish as a free people in a free world." He also charged the UAR with responsibility for the plot. (*Times, 31 Aug*)

On 31 Aug, Hussein warned the UAR of reprisals. (*Daily Mail, 1 Sept; for details of Jordanian-UAR relations in the wake of the assassination, see p 151 ff.*)

**Aug-Sept: Country Calm.** The country remained calm. Amman was quiet and orderly on the day after the assassination, in an atmosphere of business as usual. Only the heavy guards which toured the streets indicated that something had happened in the town. Foreign correspondents were surprised at the "strange apathy" that prevailed in Amman. "There was nothing to write about." (*Times; Jer. Times, 31 Aug; Jaridah, 1 Sept*)

**Bedouin Rally to Defence of Kingdom; Plan for Eventuality of Hussein's Death.** While the public was generally apathetic, and there were no signs of opposition activity in Jordan after the assassination, there was pronounced activity by the Bedouin of the East Bank. The Majālī tribes vowed to avenge the death of their kinsmen (for details see below). The Bedouin tribes in general were reported to be determined to defend the independence of the Kingdom.

The Bedouin leaders were reported to have reached an agreement with the army on the government of the country in case Hussein should fall victim to assassination, so as to prevent the pro-UAR forces from taking over: Hasan, Hussein's brother (see p 318), would be crowned, and a Regency Council, headed by Hābis al-Majālī, the Chief of Staff, would be set up. (*Jaridah, 3 Sept*)

**Security Precautions.** The success of the assassination was widely attributed to a neglect of security precautions (see, e.g., *Daily Telegraph, 30 Aug; Economist, 3 Sept*). Now, strict security measures were introduced.



Travellers and vehicles crossing the border were carefully searched; so was everyone entering government premises. The King's palace and all his movements were heavily guarded by his Circassian bodyguard and Bedouin soldiers. (*Daily Mail*, 1 Sept; *Times*, 2 Sept; *Sunday Times*; *Observer*, 4 Sept)

### THE TALHUNI CABINET

**Talhūni Biography.** Bahjat at-Talhūni was born in Ma'an in 1913, studied law at the University of Damascus and became a lawyer in Amman in 1936. Until 1953, when he was appointed Minister of the Interior in al-Mulki's government, he held legal posts, first as Attorney General and then as head of the Court of Appeal. In 1954 he was appointed Chief of the Royal Cabinet (*Ra'is ad-Diwan al-Malaki*), a post which he held until he was appointed PM. According to *The Jerusalem Times*, "his loyalty to the Hashimite Crown is exemplary. He has been known for it since childhood." As Chief of the Royal Cabinet, he played an important role "before and during events of Mar and Apr 1957 when the forces of subversion tried to overrun the country and its constitution." (*Jer. Times*, 31 Mar)

**Hussein's Outline of Policy.** The following were the main points on policy made by Hussein in his letter of appointment to Bahjat at-Talhūni: (1) The struggle would be carried on; (2) Those engaged in subversion should be dealt with severely; (3) Construction and development, "which has already covered good ground," should be continued; (4) Support should be given to the Arab issues of Palestine, Algeria, etc.; (5) Policy towards the Arab states should be one of cooperation coupled with firmness against "falseness" and "deception"; (6) Cooperation with friendly countries everywhere should be developed. (*BBC*, 31 Aug)

**Talhūni's Statement of Policy.** In his reply to the King, Talhūni assured him of his loyalty and his adherence to the policies outlined in Hussein's letter. He wrote: "I shall guide this nation towards might and glory." (*BBC*, 31 Aug)

He also stated on the same day that his government's policy would be the same as that of al-Majālī. (*Mid. Mirror*, 3 Sept)

**The Talhūni Cabinet.** The new Cabinet, announced on the evening of 29 Aug, included all members of the al-Majālī Cabinet except Khulūsi al-Khayri (for composition, see table of government, p 319). There were three new members: Falāh al-Madād-hah, a Muslim from the East Bank, Minister of Interior; Muhammad Ali al-Ja'bari, Minister of Justice, and Rafiq al-Husseini, Minister of Economy, both Muslims from the West Bank. (*Orient*, 30 Aug)

[Rafiq al-Husseini is a cousin of the ex-Mufti of Jerusalem, Hajj Amin al-Husseini, a sworn enemy of the Hashimite Dynasty (see e.g. pp 326-7). It was the first time that a member of the al-Husseini family was appointed to a Cabinet post in Jordan.]

**Reasons for Preference of at-Talhūni to ar-Rifā'i.** The question was raised why the King had appointed at-Talhūni as PM rather than ar-Rifā'i, who was regarded as "the man with the iron fist," which was thought to be needed after the assassination. Observers mentioned several reasons:

1. Al-Majālī was a "superb Arab politician." He could inspire the confidence of the Bedouin "while appearing to alleviate the frustrations of the sophisticated Palesti-

nians. He was capable of giving a national flavour to one of history's most awkward improvisations." A return to strong government under Rifā'i would destroy this image. Therefore the King chose "the kindly Talhūni" as a stop-gap. (*D. Braun in Daily Telegraph*, 3 Sept)

2. The King took into consideration the enmity between the Majālī tribe and the Rifā'i family (see above, pp 323-4), and did not want to harm the Majālīs, especially as ar-Rifā'i had tried to remove at-Majālī from his post.

3. Ar-Rifā'i had tried to approach the UAR and persuade the King to improve his relations with that country. (*E. Sa'ab in Jaridah*, 1 Sept)

[However, the new government, like the old, contained supporters of ar-Rifā'i, including an additional one, al-Madād-hah.]

**Aug-Sept: General Reshuffle of District Governors.** On 30 Aug, the morrow of Majālī's assassination, and on 11 Sept, the new Minister of the Interior ordered a complete reshuffle of District and Sub-district Governors. The reshuffle was carried out during Sept in the following districts: Ajlun, Balqa, Amman, Karak, Ma'an, Hebron, Nablus. (*Difā'*, 1, 12 Sept)

**Sept: Postponement of the General Election** On 10 Sept King Hussein decreed the extension of the term of the Chamber of Deputies for another year. (*R. Amman*, 10 Sept-*IMB*, 11 Sept; *Manar*, 11 Sept) (See p 323.)

**Nov: Vote of Confidence to the New Government.** Parliament assembled on 1 Nov and heard the speech from the throne delivered by the King. (*R. Amman*, 1 Nov-*IMB*, 1 Nov-*BBC*, 3 Nov)

On 8 Nov, the Chamber of Deputies unanimously gave a vote of confidence to the Talhūni government. (*R. Amman*, 8 Nov-*IMB*, 9 Nov)

### SEPT: EVALUATION OF POLITICAL SITUATION

Following is a summary of the main points made by foreign observers regarding the political situation in Jordan after the assassination of al-Majālī:

**Deceptive Stability Led to Complacency.** A general observation was that the situation was one of "broken calm," a reference to the relative stability Jordan had enjoyed in the last two years before the assassination.

However, the observers emphasized, the calm had been deceptive and was due only to the efficiency of the security authorities and other, temporary factors (see below), while the internal situation had remained basically unstable. The calm had caused complacency in Jordan and among its allies about the long-term stability of the regime. Since the regime has lasted three years (counting from the King's countercoup in 1957), it was argued, why should it not last thirty? Jordan was believed to be able not only to look after herself but also to challenge Abdel-Nasser in Syria. This complacency was one of the reasons for the laxity of security precautions.

**Causes of Basic Instability.** The causes of the basic instability of the Kingdom had, however, remained unaffected throughout the period. They were: (1) The feeling of the Palestinians, who constitute the majority of the population, that the Hashimite dynasty was alien and imposed on them by the pro-Israeli Western Powers; (2) The wish of the population, except for the Bedouin of the East Bank, to be associated "with the mainstream of Arab nationalism" in its neutralist, anti-

Western, radical form; whereas the Jordanian regime is outspokenly Western-orientated and based on land-owning interests and tribal loyalties; (3) The hope of the refugees that a change in the status quo might ultimately enable them to return to their former homes; (4) The basic poverty of the country, which can keep going only by accepting the humiliating status of a kept nation; (5) The aid given by the UAR to the opposition. To the majority of observers the direct or at least indirect connection of the UAR with the assassination was obvious.

**Assassination an Isolated Act.** While these factors were regarded as a general background to the assassination, the act itself was thought by many observers to have been an isolated episode, as shown by the calm of the country, the absence of any overt opposition activities, and the rallying of the Bedouin to the defence of the Kingdom. On the second day after the assassination an observer wrote from Amman that it had already become clear that the regime would weather the storm. This situation was contrasted with the state of affairs a few years previously when such an assassination would have had "a very different outcome."

**Factors Working for Status Quo.** Several factors were regarded as helping to preserve the status quo for the present in spite of the basic instability: (1) The army was believed to be completely or in the main loyal, following the repeated purges. (2) The Bedouin element—inside the army, in the administration, and in the country in general—provided a sector completely loyal to the Kingdom. (3) The West was aiding Jordan and keeping her going. (4) All observers were agreed that Israel's declared determination not to remain indifferent to a change in the status quo in Jordan imposed restraint on both the UAR and the opposition in Jordan. (5) "A certain disenchantment" of the Palestinians with Abdel-Nasser was noted, largely because of his failures in Iraq and in Jordan itself. Another observation in this connection was that generally the ability of the Arab countries to resist pressure from Abdel-Nasser had increased, a fact from which Jordan benefited. (6) In connection with the foregoing point, the relative improvement of the economic situation in Jordan, compared with the economic deterioration in Syria after the union with Egypt, was believed to influence certain sectors of the public in favour of the status quo—for the time being. (7) King Hussein had proved to be a courageous ruler, as evidenced again by the regime's swift and orderly reaction to the assassination. The King had retained his authority.

**Summing Up.** Weighing up the factors for and against the continuation of the present regime, most commentators refrained from predicting the future. They were generally pessimistic about the long-term outlook while seeing better chances "for the time being." In this connection it was asked what would happen in case King Hussein was removed. One answer was that the Bedouin would rally to the defence of the Kingdom, but generally the answer was one of pessimistic uncertainty. (*H. A. R. Philby in Yorkshire Post, 31 Aug and Observer, 3 Sept; Times, 30 Aug; NYT, 31 Aug; Financial Times, 2 Sept; Economist; Christian Science Monitor, 3 Sept; Eduard Sa'ab in Jaridah, 31 Aug, 1, 3 Sept*)

#### AUG-DEC: THE MAJALI CLAN SEEKS REVENGE

The powerful Majālī tribe (see p 324) lost in the assassination three important members: the PM, their chieftain, Shaykh Jamāl Ibn Atiwi al-Majālī, and Muhammad Ibn Salāmāh al-Majālī.

**30 Aug: Bedouin Descend on Amman; Measures to Prevent Bloodshed.** Immediately after the assassination became known, armed Majālī horsemen descended on Amman with the intention of avenging their kinsmen, their special objective being the Palestinian refugees.

The authorities employed various measures to prevent violence. The intention of the curfew imposed on Amman in the afternoon of 29 Aug was to prevent the tribesmen from entering the town. On the same day the Bedouin units of the army stationed in Amman were withdrawn from the town, as the population was afraid they might attempt to take revenge. It was decided that the funeral procession of al-Majālī would not pass through the streets of the Capital, and it left on 30 Aug immediately for al-Karak, the stronghold of the Majālī tribe and the birthplace of the PM. (*Jaridah, 31 Aug, 1 Sept*)

**30 Aug–3 Sept: Oath of Vengeance.** On 30 Aug members of the Majālī tribe and hundreds of other Bedouin assembled in Karak for the funeral. The Majālī tribesmen swore revenge, according to the Arab tradition of blood feud (*thār*) upon those who had plotted and executed the assassination of their relatives. The leaders of the tribe refused to accept any condolences until the victims were avenged. Several tribesmen, including soldiers and officers, stated their readiness to avenge Majālī with their own hands.

Lieutenant-General Hābis al-Majālī, the Chief of Staff and nephew of the late PM, said that 150,000 other Bedouin stood side by side with the 15,000 strong Majālī tribe. The Bedouin of the southern East Bank were up in arms and eager for blood vengeance.

However, he also told the Bedouin assembled at al-Karak that he would not tolerate private revenge and asked them to leave it to the King to bring the culprits to justice. The security forces were alerted to head off any attempt at revenge. (*NYHT, 2 Sept; Daily Express, 2 Sept; NYT, 3 Sept; Observer, 4 Sept; Bilad, 4 Sept*)

**Sept: Fear of Revenge Spreading.** Fearing the Bedouin's revenge, neighbours of the assassins and citizens with the same family names published a statement in the Press to the effect that they had no connection with the assassins and the assassination.

The citizens of Ma'an and as-Salt disclaimed in the Press any responsibility for the deeds of ash-Shammūt and ad-Dabbās, two of the main figures in the plot, who were natives of these towns. The people of Ma'an added that ash-Shammūt and his family had left Ma'an and settled in Amman ten years before. (*Jihad, 4–5 Sept*)

A high official by the name of as-Safadi announced in the Press that he was no relation of the accused as-Safadi. (*Jihad, 5 Sept*)

**Sept-Dec: Efforts to Prevent Blood Feud.** Bedouin Shaykhs and other notables tried by tribal methods to bring about a peaceable settlement (*Sulhah*) between the Majālī tribe and the families of the accused. By the end of Sept the equivalent of an armistice agreement (*Hudnah*) was reached. (*Jihad, 25 Sept, 1 Oct*) However, efforts to reach a final settlement remained fruitless until the end of the year, even though Parliament held a special meeting for this purpose. (*ANA, 24 Nov–BBC, 26 Nov; R. Beirut, 25 Nov–IMB, 25 Nov*)

In Sept the King appointed Shaykh Sultān Ibn Jamāl al-Majālī Chieftain of the Majālī tribe in place of the late Shaykh Jamāl Ibn Atiwi al-Majālī. (*R. Amman, 7 Sept–IMB, 8 Sept*) He also appointed Faysal al-Majālī

as Senator, [probably in place of the late Premier, who was a member of the Senate]. (*Manar*, 11 Sept)

## SEPT-DEC: CAMPAIGN FOR PUBLIC SUPPORT CONTINUES

[UAR attacks on the Jordanian regime continued intensively after the assassination of al-Majālī (29 Aug), and especially after King Hussein's speech at the UN General Assembly (3 Oct) and the death of the Syrian pilot Adnān Madani in Jordan (4 Oct) (see p 151 ff). To counter the possible repercussions of these attacks inside the Kingdom, the King and the Jordanian Government continued their campaign to win public support.]

**The King's Weekly Audience.** On 19 Sept it was announced that King Hussein would hold audience every Monday at the Royal Palace for various organizations and members of the public. He would listen to requests and complaints and acquaint himself with the lives of the citizens. (*Jihad*, 20 Sept). The first audience was held on Monday, 26 Sept. (*Jer. Times*, 27 Sept)

**Sept-Oct: The King's Appearance at the Head of the Jordanian Delegation to the UN.** [This appearance was also intended to help in the building up of the King's internal prestige.] In a speech prior to his departure (27 Sept), the King paid tribute to the nation's stand after the assassination of al-Majālī. He added that the aim of his going to New York was to further the welfare of the people and represent it at the world forum. (*Jer. Times*, 27 Sept)

The leaders of the Arab refugees and the notables of the Jordanian Circassians and Shishans cabled the UN SG that they regarded King Hussein as their sole spokesman. (*R. Amman*, 29 Sept-IMB, 30 Sept; *Manar*, 4 Oct)

On the King's return on 21 Oct, a great reception and festivities throughout the country were organized. Government offices and the schools were closed, and delegations from all parts of the country arrived at the Royal Palace to welcome the King and praise his speech at the UN. (*Jihad*, 18-24 Oct)

**Proposal for Plebiscite Repeated.** Speaking on his return from the UN, the King repeated his proposal for a plebiscite "to give the Jordanian citizen of the West Bank of the Jordan the opportunity to express his opinion on his fate and future." (*R. Amman*, 21 Oct-IMB, 23 Oct)

**Oct-Nov: Mass Rallies.** Between 23 Oct-9 Nov, mass rallies were held in many towns and refugee camps, especially on the West Bank. Speeches were made by members of Parliament, mayors, refugee leaders and local notables. Resolutions were adopted and telegraphed to King Hussein, expressing complete support for his UN speech (see p 9), and for the union of the two Banks, emphasizing the need to preserve full Arab rights in Palestine, thanking the King for restoring brotherly relations with Iraq, denouncing the UAR propaganda campaign, and appealing to the UAR to put an end to it. (*Jihad*, 24-31 Oct; *R. Amman*, 31 Oct-9 Nov-IMB, 1-10 Nov)

**Dec: Speeches on Life in Jordan.** On 15 Dec the King broadcast a speech to the nation, the first in a series

on matters concerning the life of the people in Jordan. He dealt in general terms with the need for the people to remedy the defects in their society and to co-operate with the authorities to this end. (*R. Amman*, 15 Dec-BBC, 17 Dec; *Difa'*, 16 Dec)

**Dec: New Deal in Hussein's Contacts with the People.** In a message to the PM the King outlined his instructions on the manner of his meetings with the people. He wanted to meet fellow-Jordanians as brothers during his tours of the country and to dispense with formality and ceremony. No money should be spent on decorations. Officials should refrain from making speeches and sending messages [of support for the King], thus saving time and enabling the people to express their own feelings and emotions. The PM conveyed these instructions immediately to the quarters concerned. (*R. Amman*, 25 Dec-BBC, 29 Dec)

## NOV-DEC: PERSONNEL CHANGES

**Nov: Appointments to Royal Court.** See p 320.

**Dec: Cabinet Changes.** On 7 Dec the King accepted the resignation of Anwar an-Nashashibi, Minister of Communications, Development and Reconstruction, and appointed Nusūhi at-Tāhir, Under-Secretary for Agriculture since 1951, Minister of Agriculture, Development and Reconstruction. Wasfi Mirza, who had been Minister of Agriculture and of Social Welfare, retained the latter portfolio and also became Minister of Communications. (*R. Amman*, 7 Dec-IMB, 7 Dec) An-Nashashibi said he had resigned to devote himself to private business. (*Times*, 9 Dec)

**Dec: Director of General Security Replaced.** On 1 Dec, the Director of General Security, General Bahjat at-Tabārah, was replaced by Lieutenant-General Karīm Ohān.

The King appointed Tabārah to the Senate (in place of Ihsān Hāshim, who had been appointed Governor of Jerusalem District), and he was elected Second Deputy to the President of the Senate. (*R. Amman*, 5 Dec-IMB, 6 Dec)

[General Bahjat at-Tabārah was one of the first officers of the Arab Legion (since 1921). He is known as a steady supporter of the Hashimite Dynasty and a supporter of Samīr ar-Rifa'i. From 1948 to 1954 he was District Governor (Ajlun and Nablus). In 1954 he retired on pension but in 1956 was recalled by the King to serve as Director of General Security. In Apr 1957 he was retired by the Nabulsi government but a short time later was called back by the King and nominated Governor of Nablus. In June 1958 he was reappointed Director of General Security.]

[Lieutenant-General Karīm Ohān. (Karamān Ohaniyān) an Armenian born in Aleppo, Syria, emigrated to Palestine after the riots against the Armenians in his home town. In the years 1921-1927 he served in the Palestinian Gendarmerie, and between 1927-1948 in the Transjordan Frontier Force, where he became an officer. In 1948 he entered the Arab Legion, where he remained until Dec 1960. Like most members of the religious minorities, he is neutral in the struggle between the various political factions in the ruling circles.]



## JORDAN: INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

(NOTE: For Synopsis, see above p 316)

### VIEWS AND POLICIES: JORDAN IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

#### JORDAN'S PLACE AMONG THE NATIONS

**Jordanian Experience in Fight for Freedom.** Hussein at the UN General Assembly, 3 Oct: "As the head of a small nation, I felt that it was my duty to the other United Nations to share with them our experience in preserving the freedom for which we, like they, fought so hard to win." (*A/PV, 882, 3 Oct*)

**Contribution to World: the Islamic Tradition.** Hussein at the UN General Assembly, 3 Oct: "Ours is a land of peace, the cradle of religion and civilization itself. It was our country from which the first message of universal peace and good will was proclaimed.

"Also, it was the Prophet of our people who long ago introduced into the world the doctrine that all human beings are equal under God. With such a tradition, we are determined to contribute to the world of the future, as we have to the world of the past..." (*A/PV, 882, 3 Oct*)

#### COMMUNISM, NEUTRALISM AND THE WEST

**Against Communism and Neutralism; for Allegiance to the UN and the Free World.** Hussein, at the UN General Assembly, 3 Oct: "Almost on every vital issue that confronts this body the nations of the world are being offered a choice... It lies between becoming part of the Soviet Empire, subservient ultimately to the dictates of the Supreme Council of the Soviet Union, or standing as a free nation whose sole external allegiance is to the United Nations itself..."

"And may I say at once—and with all the strength and conviction at my command—that Jordan has made its choice... We reject Communism. The Arab people will never bow to Communism..."

"Not until those who honestly believe in God and in his dictates of love, equality and social justice unite to translate those ideals into action will Communism be defeated and peace restored to the world. In the great struggle between Communism and freedom there can be no neutrality. How then can we be neutral in our attitude toward two systems of government, two philosophies; one of which cherishes these concepts, and the other of which denies and stifles them?" (*A/PV, 882, 3 Oct*)

**Communism the Main Danger in the Arab World.** Hussein, 13 June: "The Arab world is at present facing a more dangerous type of infiltration than that in Algeria and Palestine. It is the Communist imperialism that Arabs must now fight, and as strongly as they have fought French imperialism in Algeria and Zionist imperialism in Palestine." (*Jer. Times, 14 June*)

**Jordan Fights Communism.** PM Talhūni, 9 Sept: "Jordan's unrelenting stand is to fight international Communism in any form and to rid the nation and the area of all subversive factions and elements." (*Jer. Times, 10 Sept*)

**Communism the New Imperialism—More Dangerous than the Old.** Hussein, 13 June: "Imperialism, as such,

has almost gone from the Arab world. It remains now only in Algeria and certain protectorates and sheikhdoms on the Arabian coast." (*Jer. Times, 14 June*)

Hussein, at UN General Assembly, 3 Oct: "In taking our stand with the free world, however, we do not forget our long struggle for liberation, nor could we support existing injustices being committed by some members of the free world. But in the setting sun of the old imperialism we are not blinded to the new imperialism of Communism—one far more brutal, far more tyrannical and far more dangerous to the ideals of free people, to the concept of nationalism, than this world has ever known." (*A/PV, 882, 3 Oct*)

**Neutralism Lacks Power Base.** Hussein in *Life*, 23 May: "To be neutral, the third power has to be so powerful as to need no support from either of the conflicting sides. If threatened by either, it must be able to defend itself. Then a constructive, positive neutrality could exist which could perhaps prevent a conflict. But is this the case between international Communism and the free nations?" (*Life, 23 May*)

**Misuses of Neutralism.** Hussein at the UN General Assembly, 3 Oct: "While we reject the doctrine of neutralism for ourselves, we respect the right of any nation to choose its own course of action; but we are wary of what appears in some instances the use of neutralism to exploit the division between Communism and the free world. And we are also wary of the danger in some cases of Communist expansion under the guise of neutralism..." (*A/PV, 882, 3 Oct*)

**Jordan's Adherence to the UN.** Hussein at UN General Assembly, 3 Oct: "It is needless to affirm that the UN presents the only hope of peace and freedom to humanity. This is of major significance to all the small nations of the world." (*A/PV, 882, 3 Oct*)

#### THE ME, THE ARABS, AND THE MUSLIM WORLD

(For Jordanian Views and Policies on inter-Arab relations, see pp 120–2; on Israel and the Palestine Question, pp 174–5.)

**West to Intervene in Arab World Against Communism.** Hussein in an interview with the USNWR correspondent, Apr: "I think they [the Western powers] should attempt to understand the many problems that do exist in the Arab world and, following that, I think they should try to help the free elements in the Arab world check the danger of Communism and/or protect themselves against this threat.

"In addition, they could try to help solve or attain a just solution for some of the big problems we face, such as the Palestine one and the Algerian issue." (*US News and World Report, 18 Apr*)

**Arab Power Needed Through Unity of Purpose.** Hussein in *Life*, 23 May: "The power that should strengthen us should be Arab power, and it is the duty of the upper echelons in the Arab world to organize Arab development through unity of purpose. Then we can engage in strong,



sound, dignified international relations... enlist support to our just cause, pursue in Arab dignity our dealings with other nations, and develop pride in our accomplishments." (*Life*, 23 May)

**Benefits of Arab-Islamic Cooperation.** Hussein at Islamic Congress, 25 Jan: "We believe there to be wide horizons for co-operation between the Arab and Islamic peoples for the sake of safeguarding their spiritual and ideological legacy and adopting a firm stand on common issues... We appreciate the great benefits which we can reap if the Muslim people throw in their lot with us in the battle of right against world Zionism... (and) for our

Algerian brethren... When fraternal co-operation appears... enormous benefit can be reaped by the Arab and Muslim peoples and all humanity in the struggle against atheism and bondage." (*BBC*, 27 Jan)

**But Jordan Seeks no Membership in Alliances.** Hussein, 15 Apr: "Jordan was not invited to become a member [of CENTO]... Jordan does not intend to seek membership in the alliances because all its efforts are directed towards maintaining its independence and the safety of its frontiers through co-operation with the Arab and Islamic countries and the free world." (*Jer. Times*, 16 Apr)

## APR-MAY: KING HUSSEIN'S TOUR ABROAD

### SYNOPSIS

An announcement issued on 1 Apr stated that King Hussein would pay official visits to Iran, Turkey, Morocco and Ethiopia at the invitations of the heads of these states. He would also visit Spain and several other countries. (*Jihad*, 2 Apr)

Between 4 Apr and 16 May the King visited Iran, Turkey, Italy, Morocco, Spain, Guinea, Liberia, Nigeria, the Belgian Congo, Kenya and Ethiopia. He was accompanied by Bahjat at-Talhuni, Chief of the Royal Cabinet, and senior officials and army officers. The visits to Italy and Spain were private. The inclusion of the African states (except Morocco and Ethiopia) was announced only at the beginning of May.

The main purposes of the tour were: to increase the King's prestige at home (see pp 322-3) and to seek support among the Islamic and African states in his struggle against the UAR and Iraq. The main themes in the King's published statements during the tour were: stress on solidarity and cooperation between the Islamic countries (in Iran and Turkey); the necessity for a just solution of the problems of Palestine and Algeria; the danger of Communist penetration of the ME and Africa, and the relations between the Arab states. The last two themes were linked with a denunciation of the policies of the UAR.

### VISITS TO CENTO COUNTRIES:

#### IRAN AND TURKEY

**Iran: Importance of Islam and Danger of Communism Stressed.** The King arrived at Tehran on 4 Apr for a ten-day visit to Iran. He was welcomed by the Shah and the PM. (*Jihad*, 5 Apr)

In an address to the Majlis, he stressed the need for strict adherence to the principles of Islam as by far the best method of combatting tyranny, atheism and distorted beliefs. He called for co-operation between the Muslim states against the danger of Communism. On one occasion during his tour, Hussein offered 1,000 copies of the Qur'an, printed in Jerusalem, as a present to mosques and schools. The copies were delivered in mid-Apr. (*Jihad*, 9-13 Apr; *Hayat*, 13 Apr)

The King received leading Iranian religious functionaries in audience in Tehran on 13 Apr. (*Jer. Times*, 14 Apr)

**Joint Communiqué: Denunciation of Interference in Other Countries' Internal Affairs.** King Hussein and the Shah held talks on 4 and 7 Apr—reportedly on matters concerning the Arab and the Muslim worlds, and espe-

cially on the problems of Palestine and Algeria. (*Jihad*, 5 Apr; *Falastin*, 8 Apr)

Diplomatic circles stated that they discussed Jordanian cooperation with CENTO and that even if Jordan did not adhere formally to this alliance, she would cooperate with it. (*Khwandaniha*, Tehran, 9 Apr)

In the joint communiqué issued on 14 Apr, the Shah and King Hussein expressed their "firm belief in the principles of the UN Charter and their respect for the independence and freedom of nations; in non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries; and in the right of nations to determine their own destiny; and they condemned every type of policy involving threats, pressure, and talking from a position of strength." They also expressed their desire for a complete international understanding and the establishment of a lasting peace, and considered meetings between heads of states necessary for creating a suitable atmosphere for international understanding. They emphasized their resolve to give effect to development programmes, economic expansion, the improvement of public welfare, and the raising of the standard of their peoples. (*R. Tehran*, 14 Apr-BBC, 19 Apr)

**14-15 Apr: Official Visit to Ankara.** On 14 Apr Hussein arrived in Ankara, where he was welcomed by President Celal Bayar and PM Adnan Menderes. (*Jer. Times*, 16 Apr) The reason for the visit was officially given as a conventional exchange of views on matters of mutual interest. The King held talks with President Bayar, but no statement was issued. Later, he said that they had discussed the situation in the ME and Jordan's role in the preservation of freedom. (*Times*, 16 Apr; *Jer. Times*, 16 Apr, 17 May) [Hussein had no meeting with PM Menderes.]

**Islamic Ties Between Turkey, Iran and Jordan.** On 15 Apr, at a Press conference at the Turkish Foreign Office, Hussein stressed the Islamic links between Jordan and Turkey, saying: "While here in Turkey I feel that I am in my own country and among my own people." He was fully aware of the mutual benefits of exchanges of visits between Turkish and Jordanian leaders, whose common traditional beliefs provided the impetus for the defence of their religious heritage and sanctuaries. He hoped that his visit to Iran and Turkey would strengthen the friendly relations between these three Islamic countries. His talks had been "most successful."

Answering correspondents' questions about the situation in the Arab League the King said that the relations between the member states should be based on equality

and accused "certain circles" of weakening the League by attempting to acquire personal gains through it. (*Jer. Times*, 16 Apr)

**Jordan Not to Join CENTO.** Asked whether Jordan intended to join CENTO, Hussein said that Jordan had not been invited to become a member and did not at present contemplate joining. All her efforts were directed towards the maintenance of her independence and the safety of her frontiers through co-operation with all Arab and Muslim countries and the free world. (*Jer. Times*, 16 Apr; *BBC*, 19 Apr)

The official visit lasted one day, after which the King spent another three days on a private visit to Istanbul which he left for Rome and Rabat on 19 Apr. (*Jihad*, 19 Apr; *Times*, 16 Apr)

#### APR: OFFICIAL VISIT TO MOROCCO

Hussein arrived in Rabat on 21 Apr and was welcomed by the King, the Crown Prince and the PM. During his ten-day stay he toured the country and held talks with King Muhammad V. (*Jihad*, 20-30 Apr, 1 May)

**Hussein on Inter-Arab Relations.** At the official receptions and in an interview with the Moroccan newspaper *Al-Alam*, Hussein mentioned the brotherly relations between Morocco and Jordan, and dealt with the problems facing the Arab world. There were three dangers threatening the Arabs' existence, he said: foreign ambitions in Algeria, Zionism in Palestine and the Communist penetration of the ME. Subversive Communist principles were more dangerous than an armed attack.

Speaking on inter-Arab affairs, he accused the UAR leaders of attempting to dominate the Arab world. He called for a conference of Arab leaders to do away with Arab divisions and revise the Arab League Charter in order to ensure equality among all members. (*Jer. Times*; *Jihad*, 24 Apr; *R. Amman*, 26 Apr-BBC, 28 Apr)

*Al-Gumhuriyah* of Cairo replied that the object of the King's visit to Morocco was to undermine Arab solidarity and spread doubts, anxiety and fear in the hearts of believers in unity and Arabism. (*R. Cairo*, 28 Apr-BBC, 30 Apr)

**21-29 Apr: Political Talks.** Hussein and Muhammad exchanged views on Arab unity, the defence of the Arab world against foreign threats, and ways of easing the tension in the ME, especially that between Jordan and the UAR. (*Jihad*, 25, 30 Apr)

The Jordanian Ministers of Education and Agriculture, Shanqīti and Fā'iz, held talks with Moroccan Ministers on cultural and economic relations between the two countries. Shanqīti announced later in Amman that a cultural agreement between the two states would be signed soon. (*Jihad*, 20 Apr, 7 May) [By the end of the year no cultural agreement had been signed.]

The joint Jordanian-Moroccan statement, issued on 30 Apr, said that the two Kings had discussed Jordanian-Moroccan relations, Arab affairs and the international situation; their viewpoints coincided completely. They demanded independence for Algeria and agreed on a common stand in face of the Zionist threat. They proclaimed their adherence to the principles contained in the joint Jordanian-Moroccan statement of 29 Jan and their determination to achieve the objective set out in it (see p 162). (*Jihad*, 16 May; *R. Rabat*, 30 Apr-BBC, 3 May)

#### MAY: VISITS TO AFRICAN STATES

**Conakry: Warm Welcome.** After leaving Morocco on 30 Apr for a seven-day private visit to Spain, the King arrived on 7 May in Guinea, on his way to Ethiopia. (*Jihad*, 16 May)

At Conakry airport he was met by President Sekou Touré and the entire Cabinet. Touré declared that King Hussein was recognized as an outstanding Arab and Muslim leader by Arabs and Muslims all over the world.

The King and the President then drove in an open car through the crowded streets of the capital amid cheering and applause. At a dinner party given in his honour by the President, Hussein had talks with local government officials on developments throughout the country. (*Jer. Times*, 10 May)

Hussein left Conakry the next day after inviting Touré to visit Jordan, being seen off by a large crowd. (*Jer. Times*, 11 May) Later, he said: "My meeting with President Sekou Touré was a welcome affirmation of the ties which we both share, while the reception accorded to me by the people left no room for doubt that Jordan has a new and staunch friend in the newly-awakened people of Africa." (*Jer. Times*, 17 May)

**Hussein's Stopover at Robertville, Liberia.** At a stopover at Robertville airport the King was greeted by the Vice-President of Liberia, and was welcomed by a group of Lebanese citizens resident there. (*Jer. Times*, 11 May)

**Visits to Nigeria, Congo and Kenya.** Between 8 and 12 May, Hussein visited: Lagos, Nigeria, as guest of the British Governor-General; Leopoldville, Congo, as guest of the Belgian Governor-General; and Nairobi, Kenya, as guest of the British Governor-General. In Lagos he was welcomed by Arab residents. (*Jer. Times*, 10-17 May; *Jihad*, 10 May)

**Lagos: Attack on UAR.** In a Press conference in Lagos the King stated that the strained relations between Jordan and the UAR were due to a basic conflict in policies and the arrogant manner in which the UAR leaders sought to impose their policies on the other Arab nations. Abdel-Nasser's aim was to control entirely the Arab world; he was responsible for the penetration of Communism into the ME, where it now constituted a grave danger.

He hoped for the development of friendly relations, based on trust and mutual respect, with all African countries. (*Jer. Times*; *Jihad*, 10 May)

**Nairobi: Radio Message to Arabs and Muslims of East Africa.** In an interview over Kenya Radio on 12 May, Hussein dealt first with the situation in Jordan. During the past three years, he said, stability had prevailed in Jordan as never before, thanks to the bravery of the Jordanian people and their determination to resist any outside pressure.

He then addressed the Arabs and Muslims of East Africa, in Arabic, greeted them in the name of the Jordanian people and explained the mission of Jordan. He warned them against misleading propaganda and false leaders. (*R. Amman*, 13 May-BBC, 16 May)

**Agreement with Ethiopia on Exchange of Diplomatic Representatives.** The King arrived at Addis-Ababa on 12 May for a five-day official visit, and was welcomed by Emperor Haile Selassie. He visited several towns and military bases and held talks with the Emperor. (*Jihad*, 16 May)

## FOREIGN RELATIONS BY COUNTRIES

In a joint communiqué issued on 16 May, the Emperor recalled his close personal friendship with the late King Abdullah. He assured King Hussein of the continued friendship between the Ethiopian and Jordanian peoples, as a symbol of which the two sovereigns exchanged the highest decorations. They discussed world problems and agreed to establish diplomatic relations at embassy level. An invitation by Hussein to the Emperor to pay an official visit to Jordan in the near future was accepted. A commercial agreement would be concluded between the two countries. (*Jer. Times*, 17 May)

[By the end of 1960, there was no exchange of diplomatic representatives and no commercial agreement was concluded. The Emperor did not visit Jordan, as his intended visits to this and other countries were cancelled after the coup in Ethiopia.]

### SUMMING UP

**Jordanian and UAR Comment on African Visit.** Jordanian comments stressed that the UAR had closed the door to Arab co-operation in Africa and opened the continent to the penetration of Zionism and Communism. The UAR leaders had also prevented Islam from spread-

ing in Africa. The King's aim was to restore Afro-Arab solidarity and co-operation; Jordan would protect Africa from Communism and Zionism as it was protecting the Arab world. (*R. Amman*, 9-10 May-BBC, 11-12 May; *R. Amman*, 16 May-IMB, 17 May)

Ahmad Sa'id said on the "Voice of the Arabs" (12, 15 May) that, having failed in their attempts to use Israel to weaken Afro-Asian solidarity, and to separate the Arabs from the African struggle, the colonialists had sent Hussein to Africa for these purposes. He quoted African leaders and Western newspapers to prove the UAR's achievements in preventing Israel's penetration in Africa and strengthening the liberation movements in Africa and Afro-Asian solidarity. (*R. Cairo*, 12, 15 May-BBC, 14, 17 May)

**The King's Return.** The King returned to Jordan on 16 May, and summed up the tour in an address to the people. He had explained Jordan's position to the leaders he met, and was assured of their readiness to aid her to achieve her aims. He stressed the magnificent welcome he had received everywhere and the importance of Islam in most of these countries. (*Jihad*, 17 May)

## FOREIGN RELATIONS BY COUNTRIES

### THE UNITED NATIONS

**Aug-Sept: Spinelli's Visit to Jordan.** See p 152.

**Sept-Oct: Jordan at the UN General Assembly 15th Session.** See p 4 ff.

**Sept-Oct: Jordan's Attitude to Congo Question.** See pp 35, 37-8.

### USA

**Aid.** The US grant in aid to the Jordanian budget for each of the fiscal years 1959/60 and 1960/61 was \$40.5 million, and the USOM grants for development projects totalled \$11 million in 1960/61. To meet drought shortages the US granted Jordan about 90,000 tons of grain—a minor quantity as an outright gift and the remainder in return for local currency to be used for development projects—and a further \$400,000 for the purchase of seeds.

The effects of the drought and US aid in grain and seeds were discussed with the US Secretary of Agriculture, Ezra Benson, during his visit to Jordan in Aug. (*Jihad*, 13 Aug) (For details on the above, see pp 49-50.)

**Mar: Jordan's Attitude to PM Ben-Gurion's Visit to US.** See p 292.

**Apr-May: Jordan's Attitude to Boycott of S/S Cleopatra.** The Jordanian Government supported the UAR in its campaign against the boycott on *Cleopatra*, and decided to participate in the counter-boycott of US ships (see p 39 ff).

**May: Senator Fulbright's Visit to Jordan.** See pp 106-7.

**Oct: Hussein Confers with President Eisenhower.** During Hussein's stay in the US (28 Sept-9 Oct) to attend the UN General Assembly (see p 6 ff), he visited Yale University, where a reception was held in his honour.

(*Jihad*, 2 Oct) On 7 Oct, accompanied by his Premier and his Foreign Minister, he conferred for fifteen minutes with President Eisenhower in Washington. No statement was issued by the President and the King, but the White House summary described the meeting as "a very friendly exchange of views." (*NYT*, 9 Oct)

**Nov: Jordanian Reactions and Comments on US Presidential Elections.** See p 109 ff.

**Dec: Jordan Requested to Increase Imports from US.** In Dec, the US Government officially requested that Jordan's imports of US commodities—which amounted to JD2 million in 1959/60—should be tripled in volume. Similar requests were made to other countries receiving US aid, to remedy the fall in American gold reserves. (*Falastin*, 4 Dec; *Manar*, 8 Dec) US-Jordanian talks on this subject were held in Amman, and the Under-Secretary of the Jordanian Ministry of Finance emphasized his government's willingness to co-operate in so far as Jordan was able. (*Mid. Mirror*, 31 Dec)

### THE UNITED KINGDOM

**Aid.** The UK granted Jordan £2.5 million for the fiscal year 1960/61: £2 million as aid to the budget and £0.5 million for the construction of the desert road from Ma'an to Aqaba. (*Jihad*, 16 May) (See p 49.)

In May, the UK Government supplied Jordan with a quantity of steel water tanks from War Office stocks in Cyprus in response to an urgent request, owing to the serious water shortage in the towns caused by the drought. (*Mid. Mirror*, 29 May)

**Jan: British Commander Visits Jordan.** In Jan Air Marshal MacDonald, C.-in-C. of the British Armed Forces in the ME, visited Jordan. He held talks with the King, the PM and the Commander of the Air Force on questions of British military aid, and discussed the supply of spare parts and light arms for the Jordanian Armed Forces. (*R. Beirut*, 11 Jan-IMB, 11 Jan; *Difa'*, 12 Jan)

**Mar: Jordanian C.-in-C. Visits UK.** General Hābis al-Majāli, the Jordanian C.-in-C., arrived in the UK on 5 Mar for a ten-day official visit, at the invitation of Admiral Mountbatten, the British Chief of the Defence Staff. (*Falastin*, 6 Mar) He met Admiral Mountbatten and toured army and air force establishments, where he visited Jordanian cadets and pilots in training. (*Jihad*, 8-17 Mar; *Hayat*, 10 Mar; *Times*, 12 Mar)

**July: New Airline Through Amman.** On 10 July BOAC opened a service by Britannia planes between London and Bahrain by way of Amman. (*Mid. Mirror*, 16 July)

**Oct: Hussein's Visit to UK.** King Hussein arrived in London on 9 Oct on his way home from the UN, and stayed ten days. (*Jihad*, 10 Oct; *Difa'*, 20 Oct) He held conversations with PM Macmillan (12 Oct) and the Foreign Minister, Lord Home (11 Oct). (*Times*, 13 Oct; *Falastin*, 18 Oct) [No communiqué was published on these meetings.]

On 14 Oct he explained his view of inter-Arab problems at a Press conference. (*Jihad*, 15 Oct; *Difa'*, 17 Oct)

**Oct: New British Ambassador to Jordan.** In Oct the British Ambassador to Jordan, Sir Charles Johnston, was relieved by Mr John Henniker Major. (*R. Amman*, 28, 30 Oct-*IMB*, 30, 31 Oct)

#### FRANCE

**May: Policy Towards France.** [Diplomatic relations with France were severed in Nov 1956 owing to her role in the Suez campaign, and were not re-established up to the end of 1960.]

On 4 May PM Majāli said at a meeting in Amman with 40 visiting French journalists that there were two barriers in the way of progressive co-operation between the Arab countries and France: Algeria and the continued French aid and supply of arms to Israel. (*Jer. Times*, 5 May)

**Feb-Mar: Attitude to French Atomic Tests.** Commenting on the first French atomic test in the Sahara on 13 Feb, Amman Radio attacked France and her President, who "are consumed by an illusion of greatness" although the French Army "over the past 20 years has suffered nothing but shame and defeat" and "France's deteriorating economy, drained by the constant wars of the past 20 years, cannot respond to the call of greatness." An atomic bomb would not help France in Algeria. (*R. Amman*, 13 Feb-*BBC*, 16 Feb)

On 3 Mar the Jordanian Chamber of Deputies denounced the test, and called on the government to boycott France economically and politically. (*Falastin*, 4 Mar) It also protested against the test in a telegram to the UN. (*Falastin*, 6 Mar)

**Jordanian Aid to Algerian Provisional Government.** See p 166.

#### GERMAN FEDERAL REPUBLIC

**Gestures of Goodwill.** On 6 Jan, the Jordanian Ambassador to the GFR presented the Mayor of West Berlin in the name of King Hussein with a decoration granted to its citizens for their heroic stand. (*Falastin*, 7 Jan)

On 6 Jan two West Germans were appointed by the King as Hon. Consuls of Jordan, in Munich and Frankfurt. (*Jihad*, 7 Jan)

Ten West German journalists visited Jordan in Jan as

guests of the Jordanian journalists and National Guidance Office. They toured the country and were received by the King in the presence of the PM and the C.-in-C. Hussein expressed the hope that West Germany would grant economic and technical aid to Jordan. (*Jihad*, 17, 18, 20 Jan; *Difa'*, 24, 25 Jan)

**May-Dec: West German Technical and Economic Aid to Jordan.** A Jordanian delegation, led by the Minister of the Economy, Khulūsi al-Khayri, visited the GFR in Apr-May and negotiated an economic cooperation and aid agreement, which became effective on 12 May. (*Jihad*, 19 Apr, 12 May) The GFR was to supply Jordan with technicians, equipment and technical training, while the latter would pay the expenses of the German experts in Jordan. The GFR would help to promote tourism in Jordan, examine the scheme for a Ma'an-Aqaba railway, send a geologist to carry out a comprehensive survey of Jordan's mineral wealth and subterranean water resources, establish an advisory institute for industries, provide medical and school equipment, and help to finance a survey of the all-Jordan electrification programme. Jordan would be able to obtain a loan from a German bank or institute to purchase West German equipment and machinery for a given project, provided West German study confirmed its usefulness. (*BBC*, 13 May; *Al-Jaridah ar-Rasmiyah*, 17 May)

During May-Dec the West German Government began to fulfil the agreement. In May a representative of a German electric company arrived in Amman for detailed discussions on electrification projects. (*Mid. Mirror*, 22 May)

In June two representatives of a German hotel company discussed with the authorities in Amman the establishment of hotels in Amman, Jerusalem and Aqaba and on the Dead Sea. (*Jer. Times*, 14 June) In the same month, a West German geologist arrived in Amman and began to organize a geological team to survey the country's mineral wealth and subterranean water resources. The Director of USOM in Jordan informed him that the Mission would help to finance the team, and that a US expert would assist it. (*Jer. Times*, 29 June)

The West German Government also helped to establish a vocational centre in Irbid, which was set up in the summer. In Dec it sent the Director of its Technical and Financial Aid Department to Jordan to discuss the establishment of a vocational centre in the West Bank. (*Jihad*, 20 Sept; *Manar*, 20 Oct; *R. Amman*, 8 Dec-*BBC/W*, 15 Dec)

In Oct the two countries signed an agreement by which the GFR would grant Jordan medical equipment after study of her requirements by a German expert. (*R. Amman*, 26 Oct-*BBC/W*, 3 Nov)

#### ITALY

**June-July: Gestures of Goodwill.** Jordan and Italy decided in mid-June to raise their diplomatic missions in each other's country to embassy level. Edmond Rock, Jordanian Minister in Rome, and Guido Navarrini, Italian Minister in Amman, were appointed Ambassadors and submitted their letters of credence at the end of July. (*Mid. Mirror*, 18 June, 23, 30 July)

In July, the Italian Government presented Jordan with 1,000 olive trees, to be planted on the Mount of Olives, Jerusalem. PM Majāli sent a letter of thanks. (*Jihad*, 1 Aug)

In Dec President Gronchi awarded Samir ar-Rifā'i, the President of the Jordanian Senate, a high decoration. (*Manar*, 9 Dec)



**Oct: Italy Requests Jordanian Diplomatic Support.** In Oct Italy asked for Jordanian support at the UN in its dispute with Austria on the problem of the German-speaking element in the Province of Bolzano. (*R. Amman*, 22 Oct-IMB, 23 Oct) The Jordanian delegation was one of the sponsors of the resolution on this question adopted by the Special Political Committee and the General Assembly, which was accepted by both Italy and Austria. (*UN A/4553; A/PV*, 909, 31 Oct)

#### BENELUX

**Oct: Jordanian-Belgian Aviation Agreement.** In Aug Jordan granted SABENA permission to establish a weekly flight between Brussels and Amman, and on 19 Oct a bilateral aviation agreement was concluded in Amman providing equal facilities for Jordanian and Belgian aircraft in the airports of both countries. It was also agreed that the Belgian planes would not land in Israel on their way to and from Jordan, and that the Belgian air companies would not open airlines between Jordan and Lebanon, the UAR, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. (*Jihad*, 10 Oct; *R. Amman*, 19 Oct-IMB, 20 Oct-BBC, 27 Oct)

**Dec: Hussein Represented at Baudouin's Wedding.** Hasan al-Kātib, the Minister of the Court, represented King Hussein at the wedding of King Baudouin on 15 Dec, and delivered presents and congratulations on his behalf. (*R. Amman*, 11, 19 Dec-IMB, 12, 20 Dec) [Jordan was the only Arab country to send representatives to the wedding.]

**Oct: Jordanian-Dutch Aviation Agreement.** On 1 May KLM opened a regular weekly air service between Amman and Amsterdam. On 20 Oct, a bilateral civil aviation agreement was initialled between Jordan and the Netherlands, authorizing the airlines of the two countries to establish regular Amman-Amsterdam services. (*Falastin*, 21 Oct)

**Dec: Diplomatic Representation Raised.** On 12 Dec, the Jordanian and Netherlands missions in each other's country were raised to embassy level. (*Jihad*, 13 Dec)

#### IRAN

**Apr: Hussein's Visit to Iran.** See p 335.

**Apr-May: Special Facilities for Iranian Citizens in Jordan.** In order to strengthen friendly ties with Iran, the Jordanian Government issued orders on 15 Apr and 21 May abolishing entry visas and entry fees for Iranian citizens visiting Jordan and granting them the right to dwell in Jordan permanently. (*Jer. Times*, 16 Apr; *Falastin*, 22 May)

**July-Aug: Jordanian Attitude to Shah's Statement on Recognition of Israel.** See p 216 ff.

**June-July: Jordanian Official Visits to Iran.** In June General Hābis al-Majāli, C.-in-C. of the armed forces, visited Iran for a week (7-14 June) at the invitation of the Iranian Chief of the Imperial Supreme Command's Staff. He visited army camps and studied Iranian Army training methods. (*Jihad*, 9, 15 June)

In the same month General Bahjat Tabārah, Director of General Security, visited Iran for two weeks (8-26 June) at the government's invitation and toured installations of the Iranian General Security Forces. (*Jihad*, 9, 28 June)

At the end of June, Shanqīti, Minister of Education and Culture, accompanied by the Mufti of Jerusalem, arrived in Tehran for a ten-day official visit at the government's invitation. (*Jihad*, 27 June) He visited Iranian educational institutions, paying attention to religious instruction. In his talks with the Iranian Minister of Education, he dealt with opportunities for Jordanian students to study at Iranian universities. (*Jer. Times*, 27 June, 10 July; *Jihad*, 11 July)

**Jordanian Students to Iran.** Meanwhile 18 students were selected in Jordan for study at Iranian universities. Before their departure they met the Under-Secretary of the Ministry of Education and the Iranian Ambassador. (*Jihad*, 29 June)

**Oct: Hussein's Second Visit to Iran.** On his way from London to Amman, after attending the UN General Assembly, King Hussein stopped in Tehran for a short visit. He arrived in the evening of 19 Oct, stayed at the Shah's palace, and left next morning for Amman. (*R. Beirut*, 20 Oct; *R. Amman*, 20 Oct-IMB, 21 Oct)

#### TURKEY

**Feb: General Majāli's Visit to Turkey.** General Hābis al-Majāli, the C.-in-C. of the armed forces, arrived in Turkey on 11 Feb for a three-week official visit. (*Falastin*, 12 Feb)

**Apr: Hussein's Visit to Turkey.** See pp 335-6.

**June: Gürsel Government Recognized.** On 1 June, the fourth day after the coup d'état in Turkey, PM Majāli announced Jordan's recognition of the new Turkish Government. He added that Jordan's relations with Turkey—the fraternal Muslim state—would continue to be friendly and stated that the military coup was an internal matter. (*Jihad*, 2 June)

**Jordanian Students in Turkey.** According to a Jordanian source there were 540 Jordanian students at Turkish universities in the scholastic year 1959/60. (*Jihad*, 13 June) The Turkish Government granted them students assistance and various facilities. (*Jer. Times*, 3 July) King Hussein, while visiting Turkey in mid-Apr (see pp 335-6), met 200 of these students in Istanbul. (*Hayat*, 22 Apr) As a result of this meeting and in order to strengthen the ties between these students it was decided to establish Jordanian student clubs in Ankara, Istanbul and Izmir. (*Jihad*, 2 June) The first club was opened at the end of June in Istanbul by the Jordanian Minister of Education. (*Jer. Times*, 3 July)

**June-Dec: Negotiations for Cultural Agreement.** During a visit to Turkey at the end of June, the Jordanian Minister of Education, Shaykh Amīn ash-Shanqīti, discussed with the Turkish Minister of Education the conclusion of a cultural agreement between the two states. They expressed their wish to conclude the agreement as soon as possible, and Shanqīti promised to work for the conclusion of this agreement immediately on his return to Jordan. (*Jer. Times*, 3 July) Negotiations were opened at the end of Oct. (*Jihad*, 26 Oct). [The agreement had not been concluded by the end of 1960.]

**Oct: Meeting of King Hussein and General Gürsel.** On 19 Oct on his way from New York to Jordan, Hussein had a three hour stop-over at Eseboga airport, where he was met by General Gürsel and Selim Sarper, the Turk-

ish Foreign Minister. Bahjat at-Talhūni, the Jordanian Premier, was also present. (*R Amman*, 19 Oct-BBC, 21 Oct)

**June-Dec: Jordanian Ambassador to Turkey.** In Dec Muhammad ash-Shurayki, Jordanian Envoy to the UAR, was appointed Ambassador in Ankara, replacing Abd al-Majid Haydar, who had retired on 1 June. (*Mid. Mirror*, 18 June, 17 Dec)

### EASTERN BLOC AND YUGOSLAVIA

**No Diplomatic Relations.** There are no diplomatic relations between Jordan and these countries, anti-Communism being a major plank in Jordan's foreign policy. However, commercial relations with some of them developed during 1960. (On Communist attitudes to Jordan, see p 77; on Jordanian attitude to Communism, see p 334.)

**Anti-Communist Measures.** In June Jordanian diplomatic missions were instructed, "for the benefit of the country," not to grant Jordanian entry visas to nationals of Iron Curtain states, without previous reference to the Ministry of the Interior. (*Jihad*, 13 June)

On 25 Dec the Ministry of Interior issued an order to cinema owners not to import any films photographed, acted or produced in Communist countries. (*ANA*, 25 Dec-BBC/W, 29 Dec)

**Phosphate Exports to Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia and Poland.** Jordan exported about 70 per cent of its phosphate output in 1960 to Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia and Poland. Agreements to this end were concluded at the beginning of 1960 between the Jordanian Government and the Economic Attachés of Czechoslovakia and Poland in Beirut. (*Falastin*, 5 Feb; *Hayat*, 6 Apr)

Under an agreement between the Jordanian Government and the Yugoslav company, Yugometal, concluded in Apr 1958, the company supplied the Jordanian phosphate industry with machinery and equipment and sent experts to introduce modern production methods, in exchange for phosphates. This company became the most important customer for Jordanian phosphates. The agreement was renewed in Oct, after negotiations held in Athens. (*Manar*, 26 Oct)

**Dec: Patriarch Alexius of Moscow's Visit to Jordan.** Patriarch Alexius of Moscow spent a week (15-22 Dec) in Jordan during which he visited the Holy Places. He met King Hussein on 17 Dec (*Jihad*, 16-23 Dec)

### AFRICA

**King Hussein's Tour of African Countries.** See pp 336-7.

**Diplomatic Relations to be Established with African States.** In Sept it was reported that Jordan had decided to establish diplomatic relations with African countries which had recently become independent. (*Falastin*, 8 Sept) In Oct it was reported that negotiations were being conducted with a view to the appointment of Ministers in Nigeria and Mali. (*Manar*, 11 Oct)

**Possibility of Exporting Phosphates to Africa.** *Al-Manār* reported in Nov that the possibility of exporting 80 per cent of Jordan's phosphate output to African countries was being examined. (*Manar*, 16 Nov)

**Nov: African Students to Arrive in Jordan.** A group of ten African students was to arrive in Jordan in Nov. They would stay in Jordan for three years and receive instruction in agriculture, anti-malaria warfare and medical care. (*Manar*, 11 Nov) [There was no subsequent report of the arrival of the students, nor did *Al-Manār* specify the countries they were to come from.]

**Dec: Hussein Congratulates Ethiopian Emperor.** King Hussein sent the Emperor a message of congratulation after the suppression of the revolt in Ethiopia in Dec. The message included an invitation to visit the Holy Places. (*R. Amman*, 17 Dec-BBC, 19 Dec)

### LATIN AMERICA

**Aug-Dec: Plans to Strengthen Relations with Latin America.** The Jordanian Press reported during Aug-Oct that Jordan would open embassies in Brazil and Argentina and consulates in other Latin American states, in order to strengthen relations with Latin America in general and with the Jordanian and Palestinian emigrant communities in these countries in particular. (*Jihad*, 2, 9 Aug; *Manar*, 12 Sept; *Difa'*, 23 Oct) [However, up to the end of the year no diplomatic missions were opened.] A visit to Brazil, Argentina and Chile by the Jordanian Foreign Minister, Mūsa Nāsir, which was announced in Oct and Nov and scheduled for the end of the year, did not take place, for unspecified reasons. (*Manar*, 10 Oct; *Difa'*, 23 Oct; *Falastin*, 3 Nov)

**Argentine Embassy in Jordan.** Argentina opened an embassy in Amman in Dec, and her Minister to Jordan presented his letters of credence to King Hussein on 14 Dec. (*R. Amman*, 14 Dec-IMB, 15 Dec)

In Oct-Nov, PM at-Talhūni, Foreign Minister Mūsa Nāsir and Abd al-Mun'in ar-Rifā'i, Jordan's resident representative at the UN, were accorded Argentinian decorations. (*Mid. Mirror*, 5, 26 Nov)

### OTHER COUNTRIES

**Aug: Recognition of Cyprus Republic.** The Jordanian Government recognized the Republic of Cyprus immediately after the proclamation of its independence on 16 Aug, and was represented by a delegation at the independence celebrations. (*Jihad*, 17 Aug)

In Sept it was reported that a Jordanian Ambassador to Cyprus would be appointed soon, in accordance with the Arab League's decision to establish diplomatic missions in Cyprus (*Difa'*, 14 Sept) [but no Ambassador had been nominated by the end of 1960].

**6-10 Sept: Good Will Mission from Nationalist China.** In Sept a military good will mission from Nationalist China, on a tour of Western-orientated states, paid a four-day visit to Jordan. The mission was received at army headquarters, and visited military installations. The army held a parade in its honour in the presence of King Hussein. (*Jer. Times*, 7 Sept; *Falastin*, 7 Sept; *Jihad*, 11 Sept)

**May: Indonesia Closes Legation in Amman.** On 12 May the Indonesian Government informed Jordan of its decision to close its legation in Amman, for reasons of economy from 1 Sept. The legation had been opened in 1956. Jordan had no legation in Indonesia. (*Mid. Mirror*, 15 May)

# THE REPUBLIC OF LEBANON

(Al-Jumhuriyah al-Lubnaniyah)

## INTERNAL AFFAIRS

### SYNOPSIS AND ECONOMIC SURVEY

#### SYNOPSIS

The year 1960 saw an attempt to restore normal political life in Lebanon. Since the end of the 1958 insurrection attempts were made to repair the damage done to inter-community relationships and the political structure based on them. In 1959 "administrative reforms" were introduced with the intention of satisfying the demands of the insurgents for equal shares in the civil service for Muslims and Christians. In 1960 President Shehab considered the conditions ripe for the completion of the task of reconstruction.

The main event of the year was the parliamentary elections. The Chamber of Deputies was not due to complete its term until 1961, but the 1957 elections during the presidency of Sham'un had been, by all accounts, heavily rigged and the Chamber was not representative of the new political power relationships. The former insurgents demanded early elections; the opposition (Sham'un supporters and others who stood to lose) objected; and the June 1960 date was a Shehab compromise.

In the spring, the Karami Cabinet resigned and a caretaker Cabinet headed by Ahmad ad-Da'ūq took over. The election campaign was comparatively peaceful. In the new Chamber, which had been enlarged from 66 to 99 Deputies, in the accepted proportions of six Christians to five Muslims and Druzes, the great majority of political parties, groups and leaders were represented. Most Deputies were independent, though in many cases they were, as usual, supporters of certain personalities, and were elected as belonging to their "groups." These alliances, however, were often unstable. In this respect the new Chamber was not basically different from its predecessors.

A conspicuous feature in the new Chamber was, however, the increased representation of both Christian and Muslim extremists, and of party representatives who, in some cases, had defeated traditional candidates.

The new Cabinet was probably to a large extent the creation of President Shehab. When the Da'ūq caretaker Cabinet submitted its resignation, he forestalled it by resigning himself. Virtually besieged by the entreaties of 91 out of 99 Deputies, he at last consented to remain in his post, to the great enthusiasm of the populace. He was consequently regarded as having obtained a mandate to decide on the composition of the Cabinet at his discretion. Some observers hoped that he would use his power to set up a working Cabinet capable of streamlining the administration and dealing with the country's mounting economic and social problems, which led to serious labour unrest during the year.

However, as one observer remarked, the President preferred to have the troublemakers inside the administration, and consequently a "representative rather than a working Cabinet" was set up. Sa'ib Slām, the ex-rebel leader, replaced Rashid Karami of Tripoli, also an ex-

rebel leader, as Premier. With 18 Ministers the Cabinet was the largest in Lebanese history, including Christian and Muslim moderates as well as extremists. The opposition, consequently much reduced, now included the Sham'un and Eddeh groups (National Liberals and the National Bloc) and ex-PM Karami and his supporters. The latter's opposition was little more than a matter of personal rivalry.

The new Cabinet immediately met with difficulties in Parliament and—which was even more serious—there was dissension inside the Cabinet itself. Here the main opponents were Pierre Jumayil, representing extremism in the Christian sector, and Kamāl Junbalāt, representing extremism in the Muslim-Druze sector. The efficiency of the Cabinet was seriously impaired and there were soon rumours of an imminent Cabinet reshuffle, and even of the impending formation of a military government. With the backing of President Shehab, however, the Cabinet managed to survive into 1961.

Lebanon thus presented a picture of instability: the uneasy relations between the communities, political extremism aggravated by social unrest, and shaky public security. The rallying of all circles to President Shehab was interpreted as indicating how precarious the political balance really was. On the other hand, the great majority of the Chamber, including the majority of the "Arab nationalists," was regarded as being in favour of an independent Lebanon. Also, both Karami and Slām, the Muslim rebel leaders of 1960, having attained the premiership, endorsed and defended the National Charter and categorically rejected all attempts to undermine the inter-community status quo, such as that implicit in the demand for a census of the population.

#### ECONOMIC SURVEY

Nineteen-sixty was a year of relative prosperity for the Lebanese economy, which had made a remarkable recovery following the period of depression and stagnation resulting from the 1958 political upheaval.

The continuation of Lebanon's extremely liberal economic regime enabled the country to earn its living primarily from such sources as the movement of capital, the provision of commercial and monetary services, commissions and tourism. However, the outward signs of prosperity and expansion which characterized the Lebanese economy were not sufficient in themselves to compensate for the serious dangers inherent in the absence of a reasonable productive basis, either agricultural or industrial.

The overall expansion of economic activity during 1960 was reflected in the increase of currency circulation from LL400 million at the beginning of the year to LL431 million by the end of the year. The ratio of gold coverage for the currency grew from 85.5 per cent at the beginning of the year to 92.5 per cent at the end of it.

Lebanon suffered from a certain degree of inflation during 1960, caused partly by an expansion of foreign capital flowing into local banks, and there was a significant increase in local prices. The cost-of-living index (an arbitrary index introduced in 1939) increased by 2.5 per cent during the year, but the food item alone increased by 5 per cent. This increase affected wide sections of the public; wage earners and others with fixed incomes being particularly afflicted.

Because of all these factors, 1960 was a year of social unrest. This became noticeable particularly towards the end of the year, when the movement of unrest increased in scope and intensity and found expression in a growing number of strikes and labour disputes in public enterprises and utilities, in industry and in the government services.

The drought which struck Lebanon for the third consecutive year affected the agricultural crops (principally grains, olives, citrus and apples), thus limiting agricultural export possibilities and necessitating increased imports.

In the industrial sector there was a marked increase in the output of the food processing and cement industries, the latter industry gaining from a 30 per cent growth in construction activity as compared with 1959. The textile industry continued to suffer from what had become a chronic crisis resulting from competing imports and insufficient tariff protection. The authorities attempted to find a temporary solution to this problem and met some of the factory owners' demands half-way, by increasing tariffs on certain imported cotton goods by 15 per cent.

Lebanon's trade deficit grew from LL560.7 million in 1959 to LL636.5 million in 1960. The country's import bill amounted to LL854.4 million and its exports totalled LL217.9 million. While Britain, the US, West Germany and France are Lebanon's principal suppliers, the Arab states constitute the primary markets for Lebanon's exports.

This large commercial deficit, however, was offset by the large capital inflow and by invisible income deriving

from the services sector. The relatively high interest rate on deposits, together with a general feeling of confidence in the stability of the liberal economic regime, enabled Lebanon to attract a relatively large volume of foreign capital during the year under review, particularly Arab capital formerly deposited in Switzerland. Foreign currency bank deposits totalled LL177 million at the beginning of the year and grew to LL377 million by the end of the year. Overall bank deposits increased from LL1,087 million at the start of the year to LL1,438 million at its end.

The volume of commercial activity, transit and tourism also showed a marked increase during the year, while the total of remittances of Lebanese emigrants to their motherland also exceeded that of previous years. The foreign currency income derived from the above sources, as well as from oil transit royalties and from foreign aid, not only covered the entire commercial deficit but left Lebanon with a favourable balance of payments. This was even slightly better than that of 1959.

A series of technical and managerial mishaps brought the Litani irrigation and electrification projects to a complete stand-still in mid-1960. The International Bank (which had made a loan to this enterprise) sent an expert mission to Lebanon in order to investigate the situation and to make recommendations to enable the work to proceed.

In spite of development expenditures of approximately LL50 million, Lebanon did not succeed in advancing towards a solution of its fundamental economic problems in 1960. To do this, in the opinion of various foreign economic experts (e.g. B. Higgins, Père Lebert, *CDL monthly, Nov 1960, Jan 1961*), the country would have to revise the extreme *laissez faire* character of its economic regime, introduce a larger measure of central planning and place increasing emphasis upon the productive branches of the economy. It would also have to make a greater effort to bring about a more equal distribution of the national income among the different sectors of the population.

## VIEWS AND POLICIES: INTERNAL AFFAIRS AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

**NOTES:** (1) Views and policies on internal and foreign affairs are given here together, in deviation from the general practice in this book, as the main emphasis in Lebanese official policy declarations in both fields is on national unity on the basis of devotion to the National Charter and the independence of Lebanon. Because of the wish to preserve national unity, there are comparatively few policy statements on specific issues.

(2) For Lebanese views and policies on inter-Arab relations, see p 122; on the Arab-Israeli dispute, see p 175.

### THE NATIONAL CHARTER, NATIONAL UNITY AND LEBANESE INDEPENDENCE

**The Will to Unity Basis of Lebanese Independence.** Slām Government Statement of Policy, 18 Aug: "If it were not for the national unity and the feeling of every citizen—to whichever party he belongs—that Lebanon is his country, we could not have achieved its independence, established its sovereignty and fortified its position. Out of this unity sprang our National Charter, which lays

down for us an independent policy, purely Arab and internationally free."

**National Unity and Charter—Basis of Internal and Foreign Policy.** (Direct continuation of above): "This unity and this charter are the two main pillars of our work and the basis of our programme, as our primary aim is 'One Lebanon and not Two.'"

"This watchword is the general basis of Lebanese state policy both internal and external." (*Nahar*, 19 Aug)

**National Unity Vital to Independence.** Shebab, 23 May: "Lebanon's history, more than the history of any other nation, proves that national unity is the only guarantee for independence and the borders. Had it not been for this unity, Lebanon would not have been independent today." (*BBC*, 25 May)

Slām, 2 Aug: "Lebanon is an independent democratic republic whose sovereignty springs from its national unity." (*Hayat*, 3 Aug)

**Social Progress to Further National Unity.** Slām, 9 Sept: "I would assure you that Lebanon is one and not two,



and for this reason there should not be some prosperous and some needy, poor and rich, educated and ignorant. The development programme should include all, without discrimination, for this is neither a religious nor a political matter." (*Hayat*, 10 Sept)

**Lebanese and Arabic Lebanon.** [PM Slām was in the habit of calling himself a "true Lebanese and a true Arab"; there was nothing incompatible between the two. For further statements on this question see p 122.]

### INTERNAL AFFAIRS

**21 July: The President.** President Shehab, Message to the people on his resignation: "I accepted the people's will, expressed by the majority of their Deputies, and the very important honour of the Presidency, only because I heeded the voice of duty to undertake a hard task in the darkest days and circumstances through which our country has passed.

"Since the first hour I set myself a limit for this task and then applied myself to it wholeheartedly and soberly, seeking the aid of the Almighty and co-operating faithfully with the Chamber of Deputies and the Lebanese Government." (*BBC*, 22 July)

**President Shehab, 23 May:** "I shall remain the man whom you have always known, who prefers to perform his duties in silence." (*BBC*, 25 May)

**PM Slām, 2 Aug:** "The President is the symbol and source of confidence of the Lebanese nation, of all religions and elements (*Anāsir*)." (*Hayat*, 3 Aug)

**Parliamentary Democracy Vital.** Shehab, 23 May. "The elections are first and foremost the one necessary way for the establishment of a national, civil, general and cooperative way of life in a country like Lebanon, where democracy has a special, delicate role [in the relations] between the different sects and ranks of this nation. Under the protection of this order, equality is enforced by law and none is discriminated against: under its patronage all have the opportunity to serve their country and to rise to high ranks in the government. This system of government enables the unity of the nation to be realized, preserved and maintained.

"It is democracy that has given us this and it is no wonder that this nation was one of the first to practise it in the East." (*Hayat*, 24 May)

**Slām, 2 Aug:** "We now live in a democratic system which suits us best, and if in the past we sometimes complained of the slow pace of this system we cannot do so today... Now, after the last elections, upon which we all agreed, we cannot but gladly admit that the will of the nation is being absolutely represented by parliament." (*Hayat*, 3 Aug)

**Need for Realism about Political Status Quo.** Slām, 2 Aug: "When forming a new government, we in Lebanon must not overlook the reality—some of the limitations of which I hope we will be able to ignore, in either the near or distant future. However, these limitations cannot be overlooked at present, and anyone disregarding them is ignoring reality. Being a practical man, I do not like to neglect existing problems. There are first the religious sects, which are an impediment; there are the parties and the parliamentary groups, which are of course different from parties—the one interfering with the other—; and there is the problem of the [available] candidates and of matching the job to suit them—finally, there is the imperative of securing harmony inside the group [the government] and inducing each to lend his assistance so as to enable the group to work in cooperation, successfully and beneficially." (*Hayat*, 3 Aug)

**Harmony Between Christians and Muslims.** Slām, 9 Sept: "It is our duty, Muslims and Christians alike, to labour faithfully for this dear country. We have done with alienation and estrangement." (*Hayat*, 10 Sept)

**Vital Need for Social Progress and Development.** Slām, 22 Nov: "At this stage, in which science and knowledge are most important, political independence cannot remain firm and fixed if it is not based on complete economic independence. For political independence will remain empty and ineffective if social freedom does not go with it, and for this reason we must work together, nation and government, in the light of statistics and knowledge, according to our social requirements, to advocate social equality, without which no economic independence and no political freedom can prosper...

"Lebanon... cannot grow and prosper after 1960 if it does not possess a social democracy." (*Hayat*, 23 Nov)

**Slām Government Statement of Policy, 18 Aug:** "Our government is taking great care for the development of all parts of the country. In the present period an extensive development movement has begun in this field, for the government that preceded drew up great programmes which required much time and effort, and now this most delicate and important stage begins, the putting of these programmes into practice, the completion of schemes not yet finished and the correction of schemes where necessary." (*Nahar*, 19 Aug)

### INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

**The Primary Aim: To Safeguard Independence.** Slām Government Statement of Policy, 18 Aug: "Lebanon's Foreign Policy is founded on its unity... The most important lines of this policy were laid down at the outset of the independence era in the year 1943. Our primary aim is to protect our independence, existence, sovereignty and constitution, and to defend them in all circumstances against any belligerent body." (*Nahar*, 19 Aug)

**Arab League and UN Charters—Safeguards of Lebanon's Independence.** Slām at UN General Assembly, 4 Oct: "The independence and integrity of Lebanon are also guaranteed by both the Charter of the Arab League and the Charter of the UN," [in addition to the will of its people]. (*A/PV*, 885, 4 Oct)

**Support of Independence Movements; Neutrality; Support of UN.** Foreign Minister Philippe Taqla in the Chamber, 23 Sept: "In relations with Afro-Asian nations Lebanon relies mainly on the general lines of its international policy, part of which is to support every nation in its struggle for freedom and independence. As regards the East-West blocs, our tendency would remain that of neutrality. And when a crisis arises in any country we would refer this to the UN to apply its Charter and principles, so as to strengthen its influence and that of its SG in such cases." (*Hayat*, 24 Sept)

**Unconditional Foreign Aid Welcome.** Slām in the Chamber, 11 Nov: "I declare here that we are ready to accept foreign aid wherever it comes from, so long as it is unconditional." (*Hayat*, 12 Nov)

**Slām, 22 Nov:** "Yes, for after the chaos was over and experienced hands were found, the aid of experts, both local and foreign, was utilized. There is absolutely nothing wrong in our accepting this, for knowledge is the true aim of the nation and we shall take it wherever we shall find it." (*Hayat*, 23 Nov)

[The acceptance of foreign aid from the West was criticized in the Chamber. See also p 361.]

## THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT

Ministry	7 Oct 59-14 May 60	Community	Party	14 May 60-1 Aug 60	Community	2 Aug 1960	Community	Party
PM	Rashid Karami*	Sunni		Ahmad ad-Da'ūq*	Sunni	Sa'ib Slām*	Sunni	
Justice	Philippe Taqla*	Greek Catholic	al-Itihād ad-Dustūrī	Jumrān Nahās*	Greek Catholic	Nasīm Majdalāni	Greek Catholic	S.P.P.
Foreign Affairs & Emigrants	Hussein al-'Awayni	Sunni		Philippe Taqla*	Greek Catholic	Philippe Taqla	Greek Catholic	al-Itihād ad-Dustūrī
Interior	Ali Bizzi*	Shi'i		Edmond Kasbār*	Maronite	Sa'ib Slām*		
Finance	Rashid Karami*			Amin Bayham*	Sunni	Pierre Jumayil	Maronite	Katā'ib
Defence	Rashid Karami*			Ahmad ad-Da'ūq*		Majid Arslān	Druze	
Education	Fu'ād Butrus	Greek Orthodox		Jubrān Nahās*		Kanāl Junbalāt	Druze	S.P.P.
Health	Pierre Jumayil*	Maronite	Katā'ib	Hasan Awad Miqdād	Shi'i	Alyas Khūri	Maronite	
Labour & Social Affairs	Maurice Zuwayn*	Maronite		Amin Bayham*		Joseph Skāf	Greek Catholic	
Information	Ali Bizzi*			George Naqqash*	Maronite	Fu'ād Ghusn	Greek Orth.	
Public Works & Communications	Pierre Jumayil*			George Naqqash*		Uthmān Dana	Sunni	
Agriculture	Fu'ād Najjār	Druze		Fu'ād Najjār*	Druze	Musammad Safi ad-Dīn	Shi'i	
Economy	Philippe Taqla*			Philippe Taqla*		Sulaymān al-Ali	Sunni	
Posts, Telegraphs & Telephones	Maurice Zuwayn*			Fu'ād Najjār*		Sulaymān Faranjīyah	Maronite	
Planning	Fu'ād Butrus			Edmond Kasbār*		Rafiq Shahrīn	Shi'i	
Administrative Reform						Khatchik Babikyan	Armenian Orthodox	Tashnak
Supply						Maurice Jumayil	Maronite	Katā'ib
Municipal & Rural Affairs						Abdullah Mashnūq	Sunni	
Without Portfolio						Hussein Mansūr	Shi'i	
		Sunni 2 Maronite 2 Greek Orth. 1 Greek Cath. 1 Shi'i 1 Druze 1			Sunni 2 Maronite 2 Greek Orth. 1 Greek Cath. 1 Shi'i 1 Druze 1			Sunni 4 Maronite 4 Greek Orth. 2 Greek Cath. 2 Shi'i 3 Druze 2 Arm. Orth. 1
		8			8			18

\* Also holds other portfolios.

## COMMUNITIES AND POLITICAL PARTIES

## THE COMMUNITIES—BACKGROUND NOTE

The formal balance between the communities was formulated in the "National Convention" of 1943, on which independent Lebanon was politically based. Though never put down in writing, it is strictly observed. According to this convention, the President is to be a Maronite, the PM a Sunni, the Speaker of Parliament a Shi'i, etc. For the sake of the equilibrium between the communities no census is conducted, and their percentage of the population is assumed to be fixed as follows:

	%
Maronites	29.0
Sunni Muslims	20.8
Shi'i Muslims	18.2
Greek Orthodox	10.0
Greek Catholics	6.3
Druzes	6.3
Armenians	6.2
Other Christians	2.2
Others	1.0
Total Christians	53.7
Total Muslims and Druzes	45.3

## THE DRUZES

**Feb: Unsuccessful Demand for Increased Parliamentary Representation.** At the beginning of the year, while the revision of the Electoral Law was under discussion in the Chamber of Deputies, the Druzes demanded a seventh place in the Chamber to represent the Druzes of the Hasbaya district. (*Siyasah*, 2 Feb)

On 18 Feb the General Congress of the Druzes (*al-Mu'tamar ad-Drūzi ad-Amm*) proclaimed this demand and called on the Druzes in the Chamber and in the Cabinet to resign if it was not met. (*Hayat*, 19 Feb) The disputed seat in Hasbaya was finally allocated to the Shi'i community. The Druze Minister Fu'ad Najjār left the Cabinet meeting in protest, but did not resign. (*Hayat*, 23 Feb)

**Sept-Dec: Internal Dispute Over Law on Community Affairs.** At the end of the year, there was a dispute within the Druze community over the bill on the establishment of the Community Council (*Majlis Milli*), the elections of the spiritual head (*Shaykh al-Aql*), and the religious courts (*Mahākīm Madhābiyah*). The bill was formulated in 1959 and laid before the Chamber in Sept. [The community was divided in accordance with the traditional division between the "Yazbakiyah" and the "Junbalatiyah" factions. While the Junbalatiyah supported the bill, which they hoped would give them predominance, the Yazbakiyah leaders rejected the idea of a state law to regulate community affairs.]

The Religious Committee (*al-Lajnah ar-Ruhiyah*) [which is under the influence of the Yazbakiyah] was active against the bill. On 11 Oct it called on President Shehab and urged that it be shelved, as its promulgation would split the community. On 23 Oct a large meeting was held by the Yazbakiyah in the house of the Druze Deputy Fadlallah Talhūq in Aley. The meeting declared that the spiritual leaders should be elected by the community and not by the Parliament, and decided to take steps to prevent the passing of the bill. At the close of the meeting, those present took an oath to adhere to the decisions made and to be ready to die in the defence of religion and tradition.

On 26 Oct a delegation called on the Maronite Pa-

triarch to enlist his aid in fighting the bill. In reply, the Patriarch emphasized the importance of freedom of religion for all Lebanese and expressed the hope that the President would see that their views were respected. (*Jaridah*, 18, 19, 20, 26, 28 Oct; *Amal*, 25, 27 Oct)

The Junbalatiyah supported the bill and declared that its opponents were in a minority. The Minister of Education, Kamāl Junbalāt, said that all Druze Deputies supported it. He claimed that the Religious Committee represented only a small minority of the Druzes, while the majority supported the demand for a reform of the community's spiritual and temporal affairs. (*Beirut al-Masa'*, 22 Oct)

PM Sa'ib Slām made efforts to reconcile the opposing leaders. (*Kul-Shay'*, 3 Dec)

[The bill was not discussed in Parliament and the dispute was not resolved in 1960.]

## THE SHI'I MUSLIMS

**Demand for More Shi'i Representation in the Civil Service.** The Shi'i Muslims considered themselves underrepresented in the administration. In Jan there were still reactions to the administrative reform of 1959, which involved many changes in personnel and new appointments and was regarded by the community as unjust. *As-Siyāsah* of 17 Jan carried a proclamation signed by "The Druze Association" (*ar-Rābitah ad-Druziyah*), the Shi'i "Social Struggle Committee" (*Hay'at an-Nidāl al-Ijtima'i*) and the Sunni "Islamic Council" (*al-Majlis al-Islāmi*), which called for the safeguarding of the rights of the Shi'i Muslims. (*Siyasah*, 17 Jan) [Later on the demand died down.]

**Shi'i Protest Against Article in Saudi Arabian Magazine.** In Oct the Shi'i religious leaders protested against an article in the first issue of *Rāyat al-Islam*, a magazine appearing in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, claiming that it contained grave insults to Islam and to the Imam Ja'far as-Sādiq. They demanded that the writer and the paper be punished. (*Hayat*, 12 Oct)

The religious leaders of the community issued a proclamation calling all Shi'i Muslims to boycott the reception to be held on 20 Dec by the Saudi Arabian embassy on the occasion of the anniversary of the King's coronation. (*Hayat*, 6 Nov)

## THE ARMENIANS

**Internal Strife.** The Armenian community is politically divided between followers of the Tashnak (right wing) and Hanshak (leftist) parties. The clashes between them were fierce and often resulted in killings. On one occasion the police had to cordon off the Armenian quarter in Beirut and to exchange fire with gangs. (*Hayat*, 1 Mar; *Mid. Mirror*, 29 May, 9 July; *ANA*, 10 July-BBC, 12 July; *ANA*, 9 Oct-BBC, 11 Oct)

On 13 July a delegation of American Armenians arrived in Beirut from the US to try to reconcile the Armenian parties (*Hayat*, 15 July), but after ten days of meeting it was reported that the delegation had failed. (*Hayat*, 23 July)

## JEHOVAH'S WITNESSES

**Sect Persecuted.** Christian and Muslim religious leaders in Lebanon maintained contact to co-ordinate their efforts against the sect of Jehovah's Witnesses "who work



for the interests of Israel and Zionism." The Christian clergy earlier submitted a complaint to the Ministry of the Interior accusing the sect of working for the interests of Israel. (*MENA*, 19 Nov—BBC, 22 Nov)

### POLITICAL PARTIES

(See also Parliamentary Elections)

**Background Note.** The political parties in Lebanon may be roughly classified as follows:

1. Traditional groupings centred round a personality or a family—these lack most of the characteristics of political parties in the Western world. Such are: the "National Bloc" (*al-Kutlah al-Wataniyah*), centred around the Maronite Eddeh family; the "Constitutional Union" (*al-Ittihad ad-Dusturi*), led by former President Bishārah al-Khūri (Maronite); the "National Liberal Party" (*al-Wataniyūn al-Ahrār*), led by former President Camille Sham'un (Maronite); the "People's Party" (*ash-Sha'ab*) of Ahmad al-As'ad (Shi'i); and the "National Committee" (*al-Hay'ah al-Wataniyah*), led by Rafiq Naja (Sunni).

2. Sectarian organizations: the Christian "Phalanges Libanais" (*Katā'ib*); and the Muslim "*Najjadah*." Both first won parliamentary seats in 1960.

3. Ideological parties: the "Ba'ath" (*Hizb al-Ba'ath al-Arabi al-Ishtiraki*), the Communists; and the "National Social Party" (*al-Hizb al-Qawmi al-Ijtimā'i*)—all of which are also active in other Arab countries. None of these parties succeeded in winning seats in the 1960 elections. A party which might be classified as mainly ideological but has a traditional basis is the "Progressive Socialist Party" (*al-Hizb at-Taqqaddumi al-Ishtiraki*), headed by the prominent Druze leader Kamāl Junbalāt.

Only those parties affected by noteworthy developments in 1960 are discussed below.

### THE NATIONAL SOCIAL PARTY

(*Al-Hizb al-Qawmi al-Ijtimā'i*) (NSP)

**Background Note.** This party, which was founded by Antun Sa'adah in 1932, was formerly known as the National Syrian Party (*al-Hizb al-Qawmi as-Sūri*). It advocates the establishment of a great Syrian nation to include Jordan, Palestine, Syria and Lebanon. The party is highly organized for underground work and played an important role in helping Sham'un against the Muslim extremists during the 1958 insurrection. It claims to have 25,000 members in Lebanon and 3,500 among Lebanese abroad. (*Les Partis Libanais en 1959—Editions L'Orient—al-Jaridah, Beirut*)

**Feb: Abdel-Nasser Accuses NSP of Serving Imperialism.** On 17 Feb President Abdel-Nasser attacked the NSP in a speech in Aleppo, Syria: "We all know how colonialism used to rely on a little group which denied its Arabism and its country, calling itself the Syrian Nationalists." He accused them of receiving money from the colonialists, until the (Syrian) nation, awakening to their deeds, drove them away. He went on to say that they were now plotting in Lebanon and helping the colonialists as they had done in Syria, thinking the Arab nation had forgotten their plots against Arabism and Arab unity. But, he concluded, "if colonialism depends on groups like that we can sleep quietly, because we know them already." (*Gumhuriyah*, 18 Feb)

**NSP Predicts Disintegration of UAR.** On 20 Feb the NSP issued a statement describing Abdel-Nasser's denunciation as "rancorous factitious accusations" and "planned incitements," and the Union between Egypt and

Syria as "fabricated and improvised" and against nature and the logic of history. The statement declared that "the NSP expects the bond of union to part, as happens when ambitions clash and intentions are exposed," and argued that Abdel-Nasser had given a new proof of his continued interference in Lebanon's domestic affairs. In conclusion, the NSP expressed its regret "that President Abdel-Nasser countered its positive work in the interest of Egypt, Syria and Arabism." (*ANA*, 20 Feb—BBC, 23 Feb)

**June-July: Failure in Elections.** In the parliamentary elections all the party's candidates were defeated—Dr Abdullah Sa'adah in Kura, North Lebanon, by a few votes only. Its leader, Abdullah Muhsin, accused the authorities of interfering in the elections against his party. (*Hayat*, 3 July)

**July: Party Leader Replaced.** On 28 July Dr Abdullah Sa'adah was elected leader of the party in place of Abdullah Muhsin. The leader is elected every two years. (*Bina'*, 29 July)

**Party Accused of Sabotage in Syria.** In Oct some Lebanese sources maintained that the party was connected with the sabotage activities which were taking place at the time in Syria. (See pp 504-6). (*Sahafah*, 29 Oct)

### THE PROGRESSIVE SOCIALIST PARTY

(*Al-Hizb at-Taqqaddumi al-Ishtiraki*)

**Background Note.** The party was founded by Kamāl Junbalāt in 1947. Its programme included Socialist planks, but much of its strength comes from Druze followers of the Junbalāt family. In the 1956 elections, during the presidency of Sham'un, Junbalāt lost his seat in the Chamber. In the 1958 disturbances, Junbalāt was one of Sham'un's main antagonists.

The party claims some 10,000 followers throughout the country, centred in Beirut and Mt. Lebanon.

**Jan: Party Leadership Re-elected.** In Jan the party re-elected Junbalāt as the president of the party and Nassīm Majdalāni and Anwar al-Khatīb as his deputies. (*Siyasah*, 2 Feb)

**June-July: Election Success.** The party had some success in the 1960 elections, when it returned six deputies (as against three at the dissolution). Junbalāt was the only Druze among them, four were Christians, and one Shi'i. The party was represented in the Slām Ministry by Junbalāt and Majdalāni; the latter held the post of Deputy PM.

**Policies.** After it joined the government, the party tried to introduce reforms, especially in education, of which Junbalāt was Minister. He wanted his ministry to supervise the independent schools (mostly Christian) and unify the educational programme. He was bitterly opposed by the Christians, especially by Pierre Jumayil (see pp 359-60).

The party advocated the establishment of diplomatic relations with Communist China and its admission to the UN, criticizing Lebanon's policy on this issue. (*Jaridah*, 19 Oct)

### AN-NAJJADAH

**Background Note.** The party was formed in 1946; originally it was only a semi-military organization of Muslim boy scouts over 18, but soon entered politics. In 1949



it was dissolved (together with other organizations) by the government, but was revived by Adnān al-Hakīm and in 1954 became legal again. In 1958 it was militarily active against President Sham'ūn and his supporters.

The party holds extremist Muslim pan-Arab views and opposes the present inter-communal balance. One of its main demands is the holding of a population census. It claims to have some 15,000 supporters, mainly in Beirut and the Biqa'.

**1959-1960: Party Split.** In 1959, there was a split in the party, which continued into 1960, but the majority remained loyal to its leader, al-Hakīm. In 1960 a number of branches in the Biqa' decided to leave the party, on the ground that al-Hakīm's policy was opposed to the free Arab movement. (*Sahafah*, 12 Mar)

**First Seat in Parliament.** In the 1960 parliamentary elections the party won a seat in Parliament for the first time, al-Hakīm being returned (see p 353).

Twice during the year the security forces confiscated issues of the party paper, *Sawt al-Urūbah*, for demanding the fulfilment of the "resolutions agreed upon at the end of 1958" insurrection, promising equal shares for Muslims and Christians in the administration, and reforms in education and local government, and attacking the government. (*Jaridah*, 13 Jan, 19 June)

**July: Dispute With Christians Over Census.** After the parliamentary elections, the party demanded a new census. When Pierre Jumayil branded this demand as criminal, its newspaper attacked on 12 July "the wolves of Lebanon... who live off the fat of the Arabs and yet feel a sickly hatred for them. They poke their noses into Arab affairs, only to act as the eyes and ears of imperialism. They creep on their bellies to the doorsteps of the Western nations, even when the westerners slap their faces, tread them underfoot and smear their foreheads with mud." (Quoted by M.H. Kerr in *ME Affairs*, Vol 11, No 9)

### THE ISLAMIC LIBERATION PARTY

(Hizb at-Tahrir al-Islāmi)

(For background, see on party in Jordan, p 320). [This party, which was founded in Jordan in 1952 by Shaykh Taqi-ad-Dīn an-Nabhāni, is illegal in Lebanon.]

**Oppositionist Activities.** In 1960 the party was fairly active in Lebanon, especially among Palestinian refugees; leaflets were distributed demanding a population census, attacking the PM for approving the National Charter, and calling for the revival of the "Palestinian Entity" and the creation of a Palestinian Army. (*Jaridah*, 24, 26, 27 Aug; *Nahar*, 25, 27 Aug; *Anwar*, 22 Sept)

**Arrest of Leaders.** The Lebanese authorities arrested a number of persons for possessing and distributing the party's leaflets. (*Sahafah*, 12 Mar; *Nida'*, 19 May)

In Aug-Sept some 16 members of the party, including the leader of the Lebanese branch, Ali Fakhr ad-Dīn, were arrested and accused of inciting inter-communal hatred, arousing religious fanaticism, and joining an international organization without a permit. (*Jaridah*, 24, 26, 27, 30 Aug, 2 Sept; *Nahar*, 25, 27 Aug)

In Jan 1961 many more (estimated at over 80) were arrested, including the leader, Shaykh Taqi ad-Dīn an-Nabhāni. (*Jaridah*, 7 Jan 1961; *Nahar*, 13, 15 Jan 1961; *Hayat*, 15 Jan 1961)

During the investigations the Press reported that the leaders of the party were in touch with a foreign power, which some alleged to be Britain and others Israel. (*Siya-sah*, 8 Jan 1961; *Amal*, 10 Jan 1961; *Nahar*, 27 Jan 1961)

### THE POPULAR RESISTANCE

(Al-Muqāwamah ash-Sha'abiyah)

**Background Note.** The Popular Resistance, to which most of the Muslim insurgents belonged during the 1958 disturbances, was still active in 1960, though on a much more limited scale. Its prominent leaders had left it and it was now run by some local leaders of Beirut Muslim quarters.

**Programme.** On 19 Feb its committee held a Press conference, at which its leader, Rashid Shihāb-ad-Dīn, stated its programme.

The main points advocated were: (1) defence of the independence and sovereignty of Lebanon; (2) abolition of the community basis of Lebanese life and the establishment of real social equality; (3) replacement of the reactionary traditional leaders by representatives of the new generation, who are free from sectarianism and feudalism; (4) support for the "National Charter" as a starting point towards national unity, and the rejection of sectarianism as a basis of government; (5) neutralism in foreign policy; (6) education, work and social and health insurance for all; (7) compulsory military service and elementary education; (8) control of educational programmes and supervision of all educational institutions; (9) economic development for the benefit of all. (*Jaridah*, 20 Feb)

### LES PHALANGES LIBANAIS

(Al-Katā'ib al-Lubnaniyah)

The Katā'ib which claim to have some 50,000 members, were established in 1937 by their leader, Pierre Jumayil, as a Christian paramilitary organization, and have branches abroad among the emigrants. In 1958 they played an important role in fighting the Muslim insurgents and since then they have become an important factor in Lebanese politics.

In the 1960 election they won six places in the Chamber, and had two Ministers in Slām's Cabinet.

The party held its third annual conference on 30 Sept-2 Oct. The 114 delegates passed resolutions calling for ties with parties in other Arab countries and the intensification of the party's activities, such as the re-opening of its school, and re-affirming its philosophy. (For full text see *Amal*, 4 Oct.)

### THE COMMUNISTS

**Background Note.** The Lebanese Communist Party is officially illegal, but in fact tolerated. However, control is maintained over its activities and the security authorities act against non-Lebanese Communists in the country and take steps when Communist activities in Lebanon involve other countries. The party publishes papers—though not under its own name—the most important of which are *an-Nidā'* and *al-Akhhbār*. These do not report on developments inside the party, and the little which is published on the subject comes from other sources.

There are also Communist front organizations, the most prominent of which are the Peace Partisans.

**Jan: Involvement in Split of Iraqi Communist Party.** In Jan it was reported that there was a split in the party resulting from the dispute among Communists in Iraq (see p 239 ff). Its papers supported the Iraqi *Ittihad ash-Sha'ab* group and refused to publish messages of denunciation sent to the latter by a group of Lebanese Communists. Members of the group were threatened with expulsion from the party if they repeated this action. (*MENA*, 22 Jan-BBC 28 Jan)

**Attacks on UAR.** The Lebanese Communist papers vehemently attacked the UAR during 1960, especially for holding prisoner in Damascus the leader of the Lebanese Communist party, Farrajallah al-Hillu. The papers carried protests against the UAR on this subject from Communists all over the world (see e.g. *Nida'*, 5 Jan, 2 Feb, 24 Mar, 9 Apr, 22 June, 3 July).

The Communists also claimed that the UAR was interfering in Lebanese parliamentary elections, especially in the third constituency in Beirut, where it was alleged to decide the list of candidates. (*Nida'*, 6, 10, 12 May, 2, 7, 26 June)

They also criticized the visits of the US Sixth Fleet to Beirut. (*Nida'*, 8, 19, Mar, 29, 30 July, 2, 9, 11, 22, 31 Aug, 13 Sept)

**The Party in the General Elections.** In Jan Nicola Shāwi, the Communist leader, said that the Communists had several demands regarding the new electoral law, including the abolition of the sectarian basis of government. (Full text in *Nida'*, 13 Jan)

Two Communists ran for Parliament, though not openly as such: Dr George Hana in Beirut and Dr Ibrahim al-Mu'alim in Nabatiyah. Both were defeated, receiving 2,693 and 2,041 votes respectively. (*Nida'*, 21 May, 4, 21 June)

In Tripoli the Communists supported Rashid Karami's list against the Ba'ath candidate (see p 356).

The Communists took part in the internal struggle among the Armenians, accusing the Tashnak of murdering their rivals. (*Nida'*, 22, 25, May, 14, 15 June)

**Government Activities Against Communists.** On 22 Jan 25 persons, including a teacher and a health inspector, were arrested in a campaign to enforce the prohibition against government officials belonging to political parties. Communist leaflets, books and a hand grenade were discovered in their homes. (*Hayat*, 23 Jan)

On 25 Jan, ANA quoted an "official source" as saying that three Communists had been deported from Lebanon on a charge of suspicious activities in Tripoli. Their nationality was not disclosed. [Lebanese Communists are never deported.] (*ANA*, 25 Jan-BBC, 27 Jan)

On 9 Mar a decree was published prohibiting the entry of 68 periodicals and books published in the USSR or by Communist organizations. (*Nida'*, 25 Mar)

On 23 Apr a Jordanian doctor was arrested in Beirut airport when a search yielded secret coded messages in a toothpaste tube. Following his interrogation two Communist cells were discovered, which had been giving refuge to Communists expelled from Arab countries and providing them with forged Lebanese identity cards. The members of the cells were arrested. (*Jaridah*, 24 Apr; *Hayat*, 1 May; *MENA*, 1 May-BBC, 3 May)

On 18 Aug a Communist cell which was "active in sabotage" was discovered and its members arrested. (*Anwar*, 19 Aug) On the same day ANA reported, quoting "security sources," that the Lebanese security authorities had arrested two Lebanese and two Syrians on a charge of engaging in Communist activities, documentary evidence of which was found on them. (*ANA*, 19 Aug-BBC, 22 Aug)

On 1 Dec a Syrian student alleged to be head of a Communist cell was arrested. (*Jaridah*, 2 Dec)

**Nov: An-Nidā' Sabotage.** On the night of 8 Nov two men and a woman were injured when an explosion occurred in the printing works used by the Beirut Communist paper *an-Nidā'*. The building was partially destroyed. Five persons staying at a near-by hotel, some of them alleged to be Syrians, were arrested on suspicion of involvement. (*Mid. Mirror*, 12 Nov)

**Lebanese Communists at International Communist Conferences.** Lebanese Communist leaders took an active part in several Communist conferences abroad, e.g.: On 4 Feb, Nicola Shāwi delivered a speech at the conference of the Italian Communist Party. (*Nida'*, 5 Feb) In June, Hasan Qraytim delivered a speech at the conference of the Rumanian Communist Party. (*Nida'*, 25 June) and in Nov, he took part in the Conference of Representatives of Communist and Workers' Parties in Moscow. (*Pravda*, 28 Dec)

## NEW GROUPINGS

**Ash-Sha'ab Party.** On 17 Feb, Ahmad al-As'ad, a leading Shi'i landowner in Southern Lebanon, called on the Minister of the Interior and registered an application to found a political party called *ash-Sha'ab* (the People), (*Hayat*, 18 Feb). (For the party's part in the elections, see p 353.)

**New Parliamentary Group.** In Nov an independent parliamentary group of 11 Deputies was formed in the Chamber. Fu'ad Butrus, Vice-President of the Chamber, was appointed secretary of the group. (*MENA*, 2 Dec-BBC, 5 Dec). [This group was composed of independent deputies who supported President Shehab's policies.] (For personal details, see below: Table of Composition of the Chamber.)

## THE PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS

### BACKGROUND NOTE

The Chamber of Deputies, which had been elected under President Sham'un in 1957, was due to end its term only in 1961. At first some 40 Deputies out of 66 supported Sham'un, but this number dwindled after he left the Presidency and moved into the opposition in 1958. In 1960 the opposition to the government included the National Liberals (Sham'un), the National Bloc (Eddeh) and the one National Syrian Deputy. They demanded

that the Chamber complete its term, one of the reasons given being the fear (shared by others) that premature elections might start a new flare-up. On the other hand, the 1958 insurgents, who were now in power, continued to demand the holding of general elections. President Shehab's compromise solution was to hold elections in 1960 (when the atmosphere had settled), which was a gesture towards the ex-insurgents but shortened the life of the Chamber by one year only. (For an analysis

of the 1960 elections see *Nicola A. Ziadeh in The Middle East Journal, Vol. 14, No. 4*, and *Malcolm H. Kerr in Middle Eastern Affairs, Vol. XI, No. 9*

#### JAN-APR: REVISION OF ELECTORAL LAW

Most parliamentary elections in Lebanon have been preceded by an amendment of the Electoral Law. The main changes concerned the division of the country into constituencies and the number of Deputies, which always remains a multiple of 11, so as to preserve the ratio of six Christians to five Muslims and Druzes. The Parliament elected in 1957 consisted of 66 Deputies representing 27 constituencies.

**Jan-Feb: Question of Number of Deputies.** The question of the number of Deputies caused many disputes. The Katā'ib, the National Bloc, the National Liberals and conservative elements such as the Biqa' Province Deputies were in favour of 88.

Muslim and Druze leaders, especially those not represented in the outgoing Chamber and active in the 1958 insurrection, such as Sa'ib Slām and Kamāl Junbalāt, advocated 99 or even more [in order to facilitate the election of those of their supporters who could not secure the funds and connections at the disposal of the traditional leaders for contesting a limited number of seats.] (*Sahafah, 10, 17 Jan*) A Cabinet meeting, presided over by President Shehab, fixed the number of Deputies finally at 99. (*Hayat, 18 Feb*)

**Jan-Feb: Question of Beirut Constituencies.** Another point of dispute was the division of Beirut into constituencies. In 1957 there were two—mixed Christian and Muslim. This enabled the more numerous Christians to decide which Muslim candidates would be elected. The Muslims demanded that Beirut be divided into Christian and Muslim constituencies. The Christians were against any such division, but if it was to be done they had their own proposal for the drawing of the boundaries. (*Hayat, 28, 31 Jan, 3 Feb*)

The dispute was fierce; Christian and Muslim Ministers made it known that they would resign if their demands were not met. (*Hayat, 30 Jan*) The importance of the issue required the intervention of the President. (*Hayat, 17 Feb*)

On 23 Feb a compromise was reached and Beirut was divided into three constituencies: Beirut I, including the eastern quarters, returning eight Christian deputies; Beirut II, including the north-eastern quarters, returning two Muslims and a Maronite Christian; Beirut III, including the western quarters, returning four Muslims and one Christian. (*Hayat, 24 Feb*)

**Jan-Feb: Some Communities Demand Larger Representation.** While the bill was being drafted, some communities demanded increased representation.

A demand by the Druze community for a seventh seat was not met (see p 345); nor was a demand for a seat by the Alawis of Northern Lebanon. (*Siyasah, 2 Feb*) The Protestants also lodged a complaint (*Jaridah, 24 Jan*), and were allocated one seat.

**Mar: The Draft Law.** On 6 Mar the revised draft of the Electoral Law was published. The main changes, according to *al-Hayāt*, were:

1. Parliament will consist of 99 deputies (Article 1);
2. The district (Qadā') will form the constituency, returning at least two deputies (Article 2);
3. No deputy may occupy a public office, a post in a private firm holding a government concession, or a salaried religious post (Article 29);

4. Voting will be secret (Article 50);

5. Voters must be in possession of an electoral card to be distributed by the government (Article 49). [Under the existing law an identity card was sufficient.]

[For the division of seats according to community and constituency, see table above, full text in *Hayat, 6 Mar*. For a description of the voting procedure, see p 353.]

#### FEB-MAR: GOVERNMENT-OPPOSITION CLASH OVER LAW

**Feb: Trial of Strength.** A preliminary trial of strength between the government and the opposition took place before the draft Electoral Law was submitted to the Chamber.

The regular session was due to open on 15 Mar. At the beginning of Feb the National Bloc, the National Liberals and others demanded an extraordinary session "in order to complete the discussion about several bills which were submitted to the Chamber in 1959." (*Hayat, 6, 7, Feb*) The opposition started collecting the necessary 34 signatures for a formal demand to this effect. The government, which did not want to have the session—and consequently the agenda—dictated to it, succeeded in persuading some of the Deputies to withdraw their signatures. (*Hayat, 11 Feb*) Immediately afterwards (13 Feb) however, the Cabinet, presided over by President Shehab, decided to call for an extraordinary session on 19 Feb on its own initiative. (*Hayat, 4 Feb*) [The government was thus victorious and prescribed the agenda.]

On 1 Mar the Karami Government, following a discussion of government policy, won a vote of confidence in the Chamber by 39 votes to three. (*Hayat, 2 Mar*)

**Mar: Electoral Law Before Chamber.** On 5 Mar, the revised draft Electoral Law was submitted to the Chamber, as an "urgent" bill, which meant that the government could enact it as a decree (*Marsūm Jumhūrī*) if 40 days after its submission it was neither approved, rejected or amended. (*Hayat, 6 Apr*) The opposition tried to form a majority to oppose the revision of the Electoral Law, either by annulling the "urgency" of the law or by a vote of no-confidence in the government. Their aim was to postpone the elections until autumn (*Siyasah, 6 Feb; Hayat, 20 Feb, 9 Mar*), on the following grounds: "If the elections are held in the spring, the next elections, in 1964, will take place under the presidency of Shehab, two or three months before the end of his term, while if they are held in autumn the new house will elect the next President. The opposition prefers the President to be elected by a parliament which has almost the full four-year term ahead of it, rather than one which has less than three months to function." (*Hayat, 9 Mar*)

**Apr: Bill Passed.** [All political circles which were out of favour during Sham'un's presidency and took part in the 1958 insurrection demanded early elections.] The leaders of the National Union Front issued a declaration on 10 Mar supporting the holding of early elections. (*Hayat, 11 Mar*)

The government tried to prevent a vote in the Chamber on the revised law for 40 days, presumably so as to be able to enact it as a decree, but refrained from doing so after the 40 days had elapsed without voting on the law. (*Hayat, 1, 6, 9, 20 Apr*)

On 20 Apr the bill was passed in the Chamber by 33 votes to eight, with one abstention, but the clause prescribing electoral cards (see above) was dropped. Pierre Eddeh claimed that the vote was not legal, but was



## LEBANON: INTERNAL AFFAIRS

## DISTRIBUTION OF SEATS

Constituency	Maronites		Sunnis		Shi'is		Greek Orth.		Greek Cath.	
	Voters	Seats	Voters	Seats	Voters	Seats	Voters	Seats	Voters	Seats
Beirut I	13,654	1	8,861	—	2,200	—	16,459	1	5,059	1
Beirut II	3,103	—	18,740	1	10,153	1	1,153	—	1,168	—
Beirut III	2,345	—	48,515	4	4,709	—	7,764	1	1,890	—
<i>Total</i>	19,102	1	76,116	5	17,062	1	25,376	2	8,117	1
<i>Mt. Lebanon</i>										
Ba'abda	40,979	3	1,988	—	12,674	1	6,970	—	3,103	—
Matn	44,256	3	254	—	686	—	12,097	1	6,245	—
Shuf	35,999	3	20,886	2	1,816	—	571	—	8,576	1
Aley	22,061	2	346	—	1,272	—	10,724	1	2,552	—
Kisrawan	50,008	4	—	—	604	—	216	—	925	—
Jubeil	31,618	2	895	—	5,664	1	1,661	—	129	—
<i>Total</i>	224,921	17	24,369	2	22,716	2	32,239	2	21,530	1
<i>South Lebanon</i>										
Sidon Town	6,343	—	17,373	1	19,768	—	290	—	8,341	—
Zahrani				—		1				1
Nabatiye	2,084	—	220	—	36,634	3	56	—	772	—
Tyre (Sor)	1,300	—	2,978	—	37,295	3	452	—	4,133	—
Bint Jbeil	4,643	—	96	—	28,043	2	—	—	1,791	—
Marj-Ayun-Hashaya	4,307	—	8,463	1	22,588	2	9,954	1	3,027	—
Jezzin	20,833	2	—	—	4,118	—	—	—	5,083	1
<i>Total</i>	39,510	2	29,130	2	148,466	11	10,752	1	23,147	2
<i>Biqā'</i>										
Zahle	15,076	1	9,796	1	5,678	1	9,203	1	19,354	1
Rashaya	5,240	—	19,173	1	4,858	—	7,238	1	6,749	—
Ba'albek-Hermil	8,889	1	8,638	1	50,558	4	1,417	—	9,497	1
<i>Total</i>	29,205	2	37,607	3	61,094	5	17,858	2	35,600	2
<i>North Lebanon</i>										
Tripoli (town)	7,547	—	79,273	4	—	—	12,004	1	617	—
Tripoli (district)				2				—		—
Akkar	16,357	1	32,605	2	966	—	19,698	1	1,218	—
Batrun	25,617	2	1,026	—	460	—	5,454	—	808	—
Zgharta	30,976	3	2,591	—	—	—	1,252	—	—	—
Kura	11,285	—	2,889	—	534	—	24,804	2	—	—
Bashherri	20,135	2	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
<i>Total</i>	111,917	8	118,384	8	1,950	—	63,212	4	2,643	—
SUMMARY										
Beirut	19,102	1	76,116	5	17,062	1	25,376	2	8,117	1
Mt. Lebanon	224,921	17	24,369	2	22,716	2	32,239	2	21,530	1
South Lebanon	39,510	2	29,130	2	148,466	11	10,752	1	23,147	2
Biqā'	29,205	2	37,607	3	61,094	5	17,858	2	35,600	2
North Lebanon	111,917	8	118,384	8	1,950	—	63,212	4	2,643	—
<i>Grand Total</i>	424,655	30	285,606	20	251,288	19	149,437	11	91,037	6

NOTE: This table was compiled from official figures published by *al-Hayāt* on 5 Apr. Although according to this source these were figures of voters, they are much closer to the total number of Lebanese nationals, which was estimated ("unreliable or incomplete") at 1,383,000 for 1954 and 1,550,000 for 1958 (*UN Demographic Yearbook 1959*), as against a total of 1,415,441 "voters" for 1960. However, *al-Hayāt* says explicitly that one Deputy will represent 14,300 "voters," which makes approximately the above total.



DISTRIBUTION OF SEATS IN PARLIAMENT

IN LEBANESE PARLIAMENT

<i>Druzes</i>		<i>Armenian Orth.</i>		<i>Armenian Cath.</i>		<i>Protestants</i>		<i>Minorities</i>		<i>Voters</i>	<i>Seats</i>
<i>Voters</i>	<i>Seats</i>	<i>Voters</i>	<i>Seats</i>	<i>Voters</i>	<i>Seats</i>	<i>Voters</i>	<i>Seats</i>	<i>Voters</i>	<i>Seats</i>		
152	—	27,630	3	7,402	1	3,761	1	11,081	—	96,259	8
863	—	3,736	—	952	—	731	—	2,435	1	43,034	3
9,683	—	1,406	—	455	—	990	—	3,635	—	81,392	5
10,698	—	32,772	3	8,809	1	5,482	1	17,151	1	220,685	16
12,828	1	242	—	214	—	190	—	257	—	79,445	5
1,300	—	13,224	1	3,003	—	1,787	—	1,168	—	84,020	5
27,975	2	34	—	46	—	567	—	103	—	96,573	8
29,466	2	364	—	65	—	605	—	380	—	67,835	5
—	—	125	—	359	—	89	—	289	—	52,615	4
—	—	531	—	35	—	7	—	30	—	40,570	3
71,569	5	14,520	1	3,722	—	3,245	—	2,227	—	421,058	30
42	—	278	—	—	—	436	—	1,209	—	54,080	1
—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	34	—	39,820	2
—	—	1,430	—	121	—	516	—	291	—	48,516	3
—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	68	—	34,641	3
6,630	—	—	—	—	—	1,421	—	210	—	56,600	2
220	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	73	—	30,327	4
6,892	—	1,708	—	121	—	2,373	—	1,885	—	263,984	3
318	—	6,695	—	1,424	—	747	—	2,800	—	71,091	18
6,875	1	—	—	—	—	290	—	162	—	50,585	5
—	—	161	—	—	—	—	—	150	—	79,310	3
7,193	1	6,856	—	1,424	—	1,037	—	3,112	—	200,986	7
—	—	1,267	—	—	—	432	—	4,960	—	106,100	15
—	—	—	—	—	—	841	—	2,430	—	74,115	5
—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	176	—	33,541	2
—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	285	—	35,104	4
—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	110	—	39,622	2
—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	121	—	20,256	2
—	—	1,267	—	—	—	1,273	—	8,082	—	308,728	2
10,698	—	32,772	3	8,809	1	5,482	1	17,151	1	220,685	20
71,569	5	14,520	1	3,722	—	3,245	—	2,227	—	421,058	16
6,892	—	1,708	—	121	—	2,373	—	1,885	—	263,984	30
7,193	1	6,856	—	1,424	—	1,037	—	3,112	—	200,986	18
—	—	1,267	—	—	—	1,273	—	8,082	—	308,728	15
96,352	6	57,123	4	14,076	1	13,410	1	32,457	1	1,415,441	20

Another source, *al-Jarīdah* of 26 Apr, gives the following statistics of voters without specifying the source:

<i>Provinces</i>	<i>1957</i>	<i>1960</i>
Beirut	144,792	167,111
Mt. Lebanon	265,107	319,984
North Lebanon	203,160	240,702
South Lebanon	154,218	185,458
Bīqa'	113,654	141,947
<i>Total</i>	880,931	1,055,202

No census has been conducted in Lebanon for over thirty years and figures are fixed according to an accepted division of communities (see above: Communities).

"Minorities" represent all other denominations, mainly Christians and Jews. The "Minorities" representative is always elected in Beirut. In 1960 a Roman Catholic was elected.

overruled. [It would seem that the Deputies no longer saw any reason to oppose the law which the government could now enforce without their consent.] (*Hayat*, 21 Apr)

### MAY: CARETAKER GOVERNMENT FORMED

On 14 May a caretaker government was formed to supervise the elections. It was headed by Ahmad ad-Da'ūq (a former PM) and included eight Ministers: two Sunni Muslims, two Maronites, one Greek Orthodox, one Greek Catholic, one Shi'i Muslim and one Druze. (For list see p 344) Two Ministers, Taqla and Najjār, had been members of Karami's outgoing government, and four held office for the first time. In an official communiqué it was stated that before approaching Ahmad ad-Da'ūq, President Shehab had invited Hussein al-Aw'ayni, Foreign Minister in the Karami Government, to form the Cabinet, but he had declined because of ill health.

The Premier said in his first statement that he would do his best to ensure that the elections were free and fair and that the campaign was carried in a "sportsmanlike" spirit. (*Mid. Mirror*, 15 May)

### MAY-JUNE: SECURITY SITUATION ON EVE OF ELECTIONS

**Background Note and Synopsis.** One of the most important arguments against early elections was the fear that they might lead to disturbances, especially as the people still held vast quantities of arms distributed by the warring factions during the 1958 insurrection. The country remained relatively calm, however, but there were some incidents which at the time aroused fears that they might cause a flare-up. The most serious of these occurred in the Ashrafiyah quarter of Beirut.

**May: The Ashrafiyah Incident.** On 1 May, on a religious occasion, many Maronite Christians were assembled near a convent in the Ashrafiyah quarter. Among those present were Mgr Paul Ma'ūshi, the Maronite Patriarch, Pierre Jumayil, of the Katā'ib, and ex-President Camille Sham'un. When the crowd started to shout political slogans, the police used a tear gas bomb to disperse it. A hand-grenade exploded, killing three and wounding more than 50. The police claimed they had used force because they feared a clash between the Katā'ib and the National Liberals, but they denied throwing the hand-grenade. (*Hayat*, 2 May; *Mid. Mirror*, 8 May)

**Police Blamed.** *Al-Amal*, the Katā'ib newspaper, blamed the police for the incident, and said that Pierre Jumayil would resign from the government unless disciplinary action was taken against those responsible. (*Amal*, 2 May)

On 2 May an explosive device was thrown near the house of Major Ahdab, Commander of the Lebanese Police, and other explosions occurred on the same day and the day after. (*Mid. Mirror*, 8 May)

A Cabinet communiqué, issued after an extraordinary session presided over by President Shehab, stated that the Director-General of the Security Forces would be ordered to take immediate measures against members of the Forces "who seem in the light of preliminary investigations to have been responsible for throwing the bomb."

On 2 May the Ministry of Defence warned newspapers and agencies to avoid exaggeration in reporting incidents, stating: "Any criticisms of the Security Forces might entail prosecution." Mukhtār Itani, a police commis-

sioner, was detained on 3 May for questioning about the incident.

On 4 May a police commissioner was appointed Acting Director of the Police during the absence on leave of Major Ahdab for the duration of the investigations. (*Hayat*, 4, 5, 6, May; *Mid. Mirror*, 8 May)

**Call for Restraint.** Many leading figures expressed their regret over the incident. Pierre Jumayil denounced it, and acts of violence in general (*Hayat*, 4 May), while Sa'īd Slām called for self-restraint. (*Mid. Mirror*, 8 May) The Maronite Patriarch issued a proclamation calling for harmony and demanding the early investigation of those responsible. (*Hayat*, 8 May)

On 4 May, the Cabinet decided to allocate LL75,000 to be paid within two weeks' time to those affected by the bomb. (*R. Beirut*, 5 May-*IMB*, 5 May)

**May: Various Incidents. Armenian Factions Clash.** On 6 May shops in the Ashrafiyah quarter were closed in protest against an attack by two unidentified persons on a Sham'un supporter. On the same day unknown men fired on Sāmi as-Sulh's car in one of Beirut's western quarters. He was not in the car at the time, and no one was injured. (*ANA*, 6 May-BBC, 9 May)

On the night of 28 May an explosive device was thrown near the headquarters of Sham'un's party. In Zgharta, North Lebanon, a man was killed and his political opponents were blamed for the crime.

Serious clashes occurred in the Armenian quarter in Beirut between followers of the Hanshak and Tashnak parties (see p 345). (*Mid. Mirror*, 8, 29 May)

**May-June: Security Precautions.** The government issued various regulations intended to prevent a possible flare-up and assured the people of its intention to hold free elections. The carrying of firearms was banned throughout Lebanon from 16 May till 18 July. (*Mid. Mirror*, 22 May)

On 3 June the Director-General of the internal Security Forces ordered the establishment of a military committee to investigate all disputes or complaints against military personnel accused of taking part in the election campaign. (*Hayat*, 4 June)

On 3 June regulations were issued preventing non-Lebanese from taking part in the elections and forbidding their entry into the districts where voting was taking place on polling day. (*Hayat*, 4 June)

On 6 June the army was made responsible for security in Mt. Lebanon Province. (*Hayat*, 7 June)

On 7 June the government reaffirmed its neutrality and issued various security regulations effective for the duration of the elections. (*Hayat*, 8 June)

On 10 June PM Ahmad ad-Da'ūq broadcast an appeal to the people to conduct the elections quietly and to vote according to their consciences. (*Hayat*, 11 June)

**May: President Shehab on the Elections.** On 23 May President Shehab said in a broadcast to the nation: "I am very anxious to see that the citizens welcome the elections of the new Chamber of Deputies with confidence, assurance and hope. Here in the East elections are invariably preceded by a clamorous period which certain citizens imagine to be symptomatic of instability and disturbances. But they soon realize that they merely have to do with the uproar which usually accompanies electioneering. This is just the nature of things."

"Certain people have wondered why the old Chamber was not allowed to complete its term of office. In the case of a major political event a democratic country

must resort to the people. Therefore Lebanon, which has recently been the scene of a most grave political event, has to resort to the people... Personally, I have never lost confidence in parliamentary democracy... This is the sole and best way for this country, despite occasional obstacles."

He emphasized the importance of national unity: "Had it not been for this unity, Lebanon would not have been independent today." He said he had confidence in the people, which "makes me firmly believe that during this election period you will co-operate with the authorities in crushing all elements of sedition, anxiety and corruption." He added: "The authorities are determined to be firm in striking at anyone who contemplates causing terror or disturbances. There is no room for leniency and appeasement when it comes to the question of maintaining confidence and stability." (*R. Beirut, 23 May-BBC, 25 May*)

### JUNE-JULY: THE ELECTIONS

(For detailed results, see table on following page.)

**The Election Procedure.** The elections started on 12 June and were completed on 2 July.

In order to allow a maximum concentration of the limited Lebanese Security Forces, the elections were held separately in four areas on four successive Sundays, as follows:

Mt. Lebanon Province	12 June
Beirut and South Lebanon Provinces	19 June
North Lebanon Province	26 June
Biqā' Province	2 July

Every Lebanese citizen, male and female, possessing his civil rights and aged 21 has the right to vote. A candidate must be 25 years of age, in the possession of his civil rights for at least ten years and literate. A candidate has to deposit the sum of LL3,000, which is forfeited if he does not secure at least 25 per cent of the votes necessary for election.

Each elector votes for all seats in his constituency and not only for candidates of his own community.

In the 1960 elections the secret ballot was introduced for the first time. The voter went into a booth where he wrote on a piece of paper the names of the candidates he elected, put it in an envelope, which was given to him by the chairman of the election committee, and dropped the closed envelope into the box in the view of the committee. (*Hayat, 6 Mar*)

**12 June: Elections in Mt. Lebanon: Inner Struggle of Maronites and Druzes.** [This province (*muhafazah*), which returns the largest number of deputies (30), is populated mainly by Maronites and Druzes. Here and in Beirut the inner struggle for power among the Maronites is decided. The struggle for power among the Druzes also takes place in this province, as it returns five out of the six Druze deputies.]

The contestants included most of the political parties, blocs and traditional feudal or other leaders. The main contest was between the National Liberals (Sham'un), supported by the National Social Party, on the one hand, and the Katā'ib, supported by Tashnak and co-operating with the Dusturiyūn (Bishārah al-Khūrī), on the other. The Katā'ib, though a new force in the elections, succeeded in electing three of its members and one of the Tashnak. [The struggle between the National Liberals and the Katā'ib was apparently for the supremacy in the Christian sector and was not due to basic differences.]

The alliances mentioned were not rigid, and while in the important al-Matn district there was a fierce struggle between the National Liberals and the Katā'ib, they made common cause for tactical reasons against the Dusturiyūn in Ba'abda.

In Jubeil, home of the Eddeh family, the National Bloc, headed by Raymond Eddeh, won all the seats.

In Aley and ash-Shuf the two rival Druze leaders Majīd Arslān and Kamāl Junbalāt, supported by the two factions of the community (the Yazbakiyah and the Junbalatiyah), tried to defeat each other with the help of other elements. In Aley, Majīd Arslān won, together with independents and Dusturiyūn (Druzes and Christians), while in ash-Shuf Kamāl Junbalāt won with the help of the Dusturiyūn. (For a description of the campaign see *Hayat, 4-12 June*.)

**19 June: Katā'ib Victory in Beirut I.** In Beirut I, which returns eight Christian Deputies, a fierce struggle took place between a list headed by a National Bloc leader, Pierre Eddeh (Raymond Eddeh's brother), and supported though not actively, by Sham'un's National Liberals, and another headed by Pierre Jumayil, the Katā'ib leader, which also included Tashnak leaders and independents.

The Katā'ib and Tashnak lists won all the seats. Observers mentioned two factors as having helped: their party organization and the Muslim vote. (*Ziadeh, ibid*) [The Muslims in Beirut I constitute about nine per cent of the population.] Pierre Eddeh claimed that the Security Forces had worked against him. (*Sahafah, 21 June*)

**Najjādah Victory in Beirut II.** In Beirut II, a list including Adnān al-Hakīm, the Najjādah leader, and two others defeated traditional Muslim leaders like Taqī ad-Dīn as-Sulh and Rashīd Baydūn. This result was ascribed to the success of the Katā'ib in Mt. Lebanon the week before, which aroused Muslim apprehensions, as well as to the fact that only 3,500 out of 14,000 Christian electors in the constituency voted, and many of them were leftist Hanashak Armenians, who voted for Hakim. (*Hayat, 21 June; Ziadeh, ibid*)

**Slām Victory in Beirut III; UAR Interference Alleged.** In Beirut III there was a contest between Muslim leaders. Efforts were made to reconcile personal and ideological differences, in which it was reported that the UAR embassy played a major part. (*Nida', 2 June; Ziadeh, ibid*) Sa'ib Slām was returned while his partner Abdullah al-Yāfi was defeated. The premiership was generally assumed to be at stake in this contest, and al-Yāfi accused Slām of betraying him and "stabbing him in the back." He wrote: "You have your ministries and we have our honour." (*Siyasah, 20, 24 June*) (For a description of the campaign in Beirut see *Hayat, 12-21 June*.)

**19 June: South Lebanon: Victories for Traditional Leaders and Katā'ib.** [This province, which is populated mainly by Shi'i Muslims, retains its traditional character and loyalties even more than other parts of the country.] The campaign in this province was mainly between traditional leaders, who grouped themselves around personalities such as Ahmad al-As'ad, a big landlord who formed the ash-Sha'ab Party, or Adil Usayrān, an influential figure in his district. The sole genuine party representative elected was a Katā'ib candidate in Jezzīn district, where there are many Christians. (For a description of the campaign, see *Hayat, 12-21 June*.)

**26 June: North Lebanon: Victories for Traditional Leaders; Parties Growing Power.** [This province, populat-

LEBANON: INTERNAL AFFAIRS

CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES, JULY 1960

(NOTE: for full names of parties, see table below; for meaning of symbols in col. 5, see notes below.)

Constituency	Name	Community	Party <sup>3</sup>		Profession	Age
BEIRUT—Beirut I	Pierre Jumayil	Maronite	Katā'ib	=	Pharmacist	55
	Khatchik Babikyan	Armenian Orth.	Tashnak	×	Lawyer	38
	Fu'ad Butrus	Greek Orthodox	Ind. Group <sup>1</sup>	=	Lawyer	43
	Mosis Dirkalusyan	Armenian Orth.	Tashnak	×	Merchant	64
	Surin Hanamiryan	Armenian Orth.		=	Lawyer & Merchant	36
Beirut II	Anton as-Sahnāwi	Greek Catholic		=	Merchant	57
	Charl Sa'ad	Protestant	Ind. Group <sup>1</sup>	=	Schoolmaster	58
	Joseph Shādir	Armenian Catho.	Katā'ib	×	Lawyer	53
	Muhsin Salīm	Shi'i		=	Lawyer	43
	Adnān al-Hakīm	Sunni	Najjādah	=	Merchant	44
Beirut III	Farīd Jubrān	Latin Catholic	Prog. Soc.	=	Accountant	48
	Nassīm Majdalāni	Greek Orthodox	Prog. Soc.	×	Lawyer	48
	Sa'ib Slām	Sunni		+	Businessman	55
	Rafiq Naja	Sunni	Ind. Group <sup>1</sup>	=	Financier	48
	Abdullah al-Mashnūq	Sunni		=	Journalist	56
MT. LEBANON—Ba'abda	Uthmān ad-Dana	Sunni		=	Judge	32
	Alyās al-Khūrī	Maronite	Dusturiyūn	+	Physician	60
	Mahmūd Umar	Shi'i	al-Ahrār	×	Lawyer	39
	Abduh Sa'ab	Maronite	Katā'ib	=	Bank Executive	45
	Bashir al-A'wār	Druze	Ind. Group <sup>1</sup>	×	Lawyer	48
Matn	Edouard Hanīn	Maronite	Kutlah	×	Lawyer	46
	Camille Sham'un	Maronite	al-Ahrār	+	Lawyer	58
	Albert Mukhaybar	Greek Orthodox	al-Ahrār	×	Physician	51
	Jamīl Lahūd	Maronite	Ind. Group <sup>1</sup>	=	Ex-Army General	57
	Maurice Jumayil	Maronite	Katā'ib	=	Lawyer	53
Shuf	Sarkis Shamilyan	Armenian Orth.	Tashnak	=	Lawyer	40
	Kamāl Junbalāt	Druze	Prog. Soc.	+	Traditional Leader	41
	Bahij Taqi ad-Din	Druze	Dusturiyūn	+	Lawyer	50
	Abd al Aziz Shehab	Maronite		=	Ex-Senior Official & Lawyer	47
	Emile Bustāni	Maronite	Ind. Group <sup>1</sup>	×	Businessman	53
Aley	Isām al-Hajar	Sunni		=	Lawyer	31
	Sālim Abd an-Nūr	Greek Catholic	Prog. Soc.	×	Merchant	52
	Aziz Awn	Maronite	Prog. Soc.	=	Physician	57
	Qablān Qablān	Sunni	al-Ahrār	=	Ex-official	50
	Majid Arslān	Druze		×	Traditional Leader	50
Jubeil	Fadlallah Talhūq	Druze	Ind. Group <sup>1</sup>	=	Ex-executive	42
	Munir Abu Fādīl	Greek Orthodox		×	Businessman	52
	Emile Makarzal	Maronite	Ind. Group <sup>1</sup>	=	Businessman	44
	Khalil al-Khūrī	Maronite	Dusturiyūn	=	Lawyer	40
	Raymond Eddeh	Maronite	Kutlah	×	Lawyer	46
Kisrawan	Ahmad Usbar	Shi'i	Kutlah	=	Ex-official	40
	Ghabrial Jarmanus	Maronite	Kutlah	=	Lawyer	37
	Nahad Buwayz	Maronite	Kutlah	×	Lawyer	50
	Fu'ad al-Būn	Maronite	Dusturiyūn	=	—	42
	Louis Abu Sharaf	Maronite	Katā'ib	=	Teacher & Journalist	48
SOUTH LEBANON—Sidon	Fu'ad Nafā'	Maronite	Dusturiyūn	=	Lawyer	38
	Ma'arūf Sa'ad	Sunni		×	Ex-Police Inspector	46
	Adil Usayrān	Shi'i		×	Politician	54
	Yūsuf Sālim	Greek Catholic		+	Engineer, Businessman	54
	Yūsuf az-Sayn	Shi'i		×	Traditional Leader	85
Tyre (Sur)	Rafiq Shahin	Shi'i		=	Businessman	35
	Samih Usayrān	Shi'i		=	Lawyer	37
	Muhammad Safi ad-Din	Shi'i		+	Lawyer	45
	Ja'far Sharf ad-Din	Shi'i	Sha'ab	=	Schoolmaster	40
	Sulaymān Arab	Shi'i		=	Businessman	45



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Name	Constituency	Community	Party <sup>2</sup>		Profession	Age
Bint-Jbeil	Ahmad al-As'ad	Shi'i	Sha'ab	=	Traditional Leader	52
	Sa'id Fawāz	Shi'i		=	Ex-official	42
Marj-Ayun	Ali Bizzi	Shi'i	Ind. Group <sup>1</sup>	×	—	52
	Ibrahīm al-Abdullah	Shi'i	Ind. Group <sup>1</sup>	=	Ex-official	36
	As'ad Bayūd	Greek Orthodox		=	—	44
	Khalid Shehab	Sunni	Ind. Group <sup>1</sup>	+	Traditional Leader	75
Jezzin	Nikola Sālim	Greek Catholic		×	Engineer	54
	Jean Aziz	Maronite		×	Lawyer	43
	Basil Abūd	Maronite	Katā'ib	×	Physician	43
BīQA'—Zahle	Joseph as-Skāf	Greek Catholic		×	—	40
	Mikhail ad-Dibs	Greek Orthodox		=	—	41
	Hussein Mansūr	Shi'i		=	Businessman	44
	George Harāwi	Maronite		×	—	44
	Kazīm as-Sulh	Sunni		=	Ex-Ambassador	51
Rashaya	Shibli al-Aryān	Druze		+	Traditional Leader	43
	Nāzim al-Qādiri	Sunni		×	Lawyer	46
	Michel as-Skāf	Greek Orthodox		=	Agricultural Engineer	38
	Sabri Hamādah	Shi'i	Dusturiyūn	×	Traditional Leader	54
BA'ALBEK—Hermil	Shafiq al-Murtada	Shi'i	Prog. Soc.	×	Lawyer	51
	Mustafa ar-Rifā'i	Sunni		=	Physician	74
	Murshid Habashi	Maronite		=	—	42
	Na'if al-Masri	Shi'i		=	—	45
	Fadlallah Dandash	Shi'i		=	Traditional Tribal Leader	42
	Habīb al-Mutrān	Greek Catholic	Dusturiyūn	+	—	53
NORTH LEBANON—Tripoli	Rashid Karami	Sunni		×	Lawyer	39
	Fu'ād Albert	Greek Orthodox		×	—	—
	Muhammad Hamzah	Sunni		=	Businessman	42
	Amin al-Hāfiz	Sunni		=	Economist & Journalist	33
	Hāshim al-Husseini	Sunni		×	Physician	45
Tripoli (Dist.)	Muhammad Fitfit	Sunni		=	—	—
	Muhammad ilm ad-Dīn	Sunni		=	—	—
Zgharta	Rene Mu'awwad	Maronite		×	Lawyer	36
	Sulaymān Faranjiyah	Maronite		=	—	60
Bsherri	Yūsuf Karam	Maronite		+	—	45
	Sa'id Tūq	Maronite		+	—	—
Akkar	Habīb Fayrūz	Maronite		=	—	—
	Sulaymān al-Ali	Sunni		+	Traditional Leader	51
Kura	Ali Abd al-Karīm	Sunni		=	—	39
	Rushdi Fakhr	Maronite		=	—	45
	Ya'qūb as-Sarrāf	Greek Orthodox		+	Physician	50
	Fu'ād Ghusn	Greek Orthodox		+	Ex-official	50
	Philippe Būlus	Greek Orthodox		+	Judge	56
Batrun	Camille Aql	Maronite	Kutlah	+	—	—
	Jean Khūri Harb	Maronite	al-Ahrār	×	—	54

= For the first time in the Chamber

× Was a member of the outgoing Chamber

† Was a member of the Chamber in the past, but not of the outgoing Chamber

<sup>1</sup> The Independent Group was formed in the Chamber at the end of Nov 1960

<sup>2</sup> In addition to the two Deputies of the Sha'ab party, another six Deputies are considered as belonging to the Group of Ahmad al-Aslad

<sup>3</sup> Including only known members and not supporters or sympathizers

SOURCES: personal details which appeared in *al-Jarīdah* on 27 June, 4 July, 5 July; the details about the Independent Group are from *al-Hayāt* of 5 Dec

LEBANON: INTERNAL AFFAIRS

PARTIES AND GROUPS IN THE CHAMBER

Party	Seats
Hizb al-Ittihad ad-Dusturi (Constitutional Union) (Dusturiyūn)	7
Al-Kutlah al-Wataniyah (National Bloc) (Kutlah)	6
Al-Katā'ib al-Lubnaniyah (Lebanese Phalanges) (Katā'ib)	6
Al-Hizb at-Taquaddumi al-Ishtirāki (The Progressive Socialist Party) (Prog. Soc.)	6
Al-Wataniyūn al-Ahrār (National Liberals) (Ahrār)	5
Tashnak	3
Ash-Sha'ab (The People)	2 <sup>2</sup>
An-Najjādah	1
Independent Group	11 <sup>1</sup>

NOTE: The remainder of the Deputies do not belong to any party or group.

ed mainly by Sunni Muslims and Maronites, can be divided into the town of Tripoli—where, though traditional leaders are still strong, ideological parties, especially the Ba'ath and the Communists, are influential—and the countryside, where traditional influences are stronger.]

In Tripoli Rashid Karami, the former PM, with his supporters, was successful, though his opponent, Abd al-Majid ar-Rāfi'i of the Ba'ath, lacked only a few votes for success. The Communist papers supported Rashid Karami and strongly criticized the Ba'ath candidate. (*See Nida' 21, 22, 23, 26, June*)

In the countryside, traditional leaders won in the Muslim constituencies. In Akkar, Sulaymān al-ʿAlī, a traditional regional leader, was successful. Bashīr al-Uthmān and his supporters withdrew from the campaign and boycotted the elections, alleging that the security authorities were working against them and for their rivals.

In the Christian constituencies the votes were divided between traditional leaders and political parties, though the former won. The National Bloc and the National Liberals secured a seat each. Sa'ādah, the leader of the National Social Party, who stood for election in Kura and faced strong opposition, was defeated by a few votes. (For a description of the elections see *Hayat, 19-27 June*.)

**2 July: Elections in the Biqa'.** [This province is populated mainly by Shi'i Muslims and various Christian communities. It is controlled to a large extent by traditional regional and feudal leaders.]

On the whole the traditional leaders won in this province, but Sabri Hamādah, the Shi'i leader who is also Speaker of the Chamber and has dominated the Ba'albek-Hermil district for a long time, suffered a setback, securing only three out of the seven seats. The other candi-

dates elected were previously not prominent in politics. In Ba'albek there were scattered incidents of shooting during the elections.

In Zahle and Rashaya districts the Skāf brothers (Christians) and other traditional leaders were successful. (For elections in the Biqa' district see *Hayat, 28 June-3 July*.)

**Summing Up: Successes for Extremists and Party Candidates, but No Basic Change.** The new Chamber of Deputies, which included most of the country's rival leaders, had two main characteristics: the large number of extremists elected on both the Christian and the Muslim sides, and the increased number of deputies affiliated to parties. (*Jaridah, 21 June*)

[This outcome was seen as the result of the polarization of political affiliations following the 1958 insurrection and also of the weakening of the traditional system in Lebanon and the search of the youth and intelligentsia for modern forms of political life. However, the Chamber was not basically different from its predecessors insofar as most of the political parties are still not parties in the modern Western sense of the word.]

**Support for Lebanon Independence.** As to the opinions represented in the new Chamber on the question of Lebanese independence versus Arab Union, an observer concluded after talks with Deputies who were "believers in Arab nationalism" that only "a very small number" were willing to support "a union with the UAR at all costs," while the majority either would like to see "unity" but "only when the last Christian in Lebanon would be prepared to accept it," or saw no contradiction at all between the concepts of Lebanese and Arab nationalism. (*Ziadeh, ibid*) (For fuller evaluation of the election results see *Kerr, ibid; Ziadeh, ibid*.)

## JULY-DEC: POST-ELECTION POLITICS

### ELECTIONS TO PRESIDENCY OF CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES

**July: First Election.** On 18 July, at the first meeting of the Chamber, Sabri Hamādah was elected President of the Chamber, receiving 66 votes as against 31 for Adil Usayrān, his opponent. Both candidates belonged to the Shi'i community, for which this post is reserved, and both had served in this capacity before, Hamādah for eleven terms. Usayrān was supported by the National

Bloc (Eddeh), the National Liberals (Sham'ūn) and some of the Biqa' Deputies, while Hamādah had the support of all the others, including the Katā'ib. [In 1958 Hamādah was one of the insurgents and Usayrān was President of the Chamber.] Fu'ād Butrus was elected Vice-President with 68 votes against 25 for Munir Abu Fādil, Hamādah's term was to expire in Oct 1960, for according to constitutional practice the Chamber elects a new President at the beginning of the ordinary parlia-

mentary session. (*Hayat*, 19 July; *Nahar*, 19 July; *ANA*, 18 July—*BBC*, 20 July)

**Oct: Second Election.** On 18 Oct, the beginning of the regular session, the Chamber re-elected Sabri Hamādah for a term of one year, with 58 votes against 22 for Adil Usayrān. Fu'ād Butrus was unanimously re-elected Vice-President. (*Hayat*, 19 Oct; *Mid. Mirror*, 22 Oct)

## 20 JULY: PRESIDENT SHEHAB'S RESIGNATION AND ITS WITHDRAWAL

**The Resignation.** When the caretaker government met on 20 July at 11 a.m. in the Presidential Palace to submit its resignation in order to clear the way for the formation of a new government, President Shehab forestalled the PM by announcing his own resignation. The decision, which came as a complete surprise, was read by the President from a draft written out in his own hand to ensure secrecy.

The Ministers tried for 90 minutes to dissuade him but he remained firm. Sabri Hamādah, who was called to the Palace, "heard the news with tears in his eyes," but he too failed to dissuade the President. (Sources see below.)

**President Appoints Officers to Military Posts.** At the same meeting, before resigning, Shehab appointed Major-General Adil Shehab, C.-in-C. of the army (a relative), as Minister of National Defence, while retaining his military command, and Colonel Yūsuf Shmayyit, Chief of Staff of the army, as Under-Secretary of the Ministry of the Interior, to take charge of internal security in addition to his military post. (Sources see below.)

**Shehab Reviews Achievements.** At noon, in a message to the nation, Shehab described the circumstances which had brought him to the Presidency "at the darkest moment and the most delicate period in the history of our country." He said that "from the first moment I defined privately the scope and extent of this task." He reviewed the achievements of his term: "The foreign troops here [the US forces, which were in Lebanon when he became President] evacuated our territory... Love again linked the hearts of the Lebanese; tension and suspicion disappeared from Lebanon's relations with her sister Arab countries. New life appeared in the body of the Lebanese economy, which revived and prospered. Later we worked out essential (basic) legislation designed to put the state services on a sound basis... The last point was to secure a wide parliamentary representation by having a sufficient number of representatives from all Lebanese factions. As soon as we realized that the general atmosphere was favourable for this step we took it and the people elected the new Chamber... Now, after all the elements of normal government have become available, I believe that I have done my duty for which the people put their confidence in me, and that I have completed my task. Therefore I have decided, with a satisfied conscience, to resign the Presidency, so that the representatives of the people can elect right from the beginning of the life of their new chamber a new President of the Republic."

He ended the message with thanks to the people and a call to preserve unity, the National Convention, the constitution and constitutional government. (Sources see below.)

**Deputies Plead for Withdrawal of Resignation.** At 5 p.m. the Deputies assembled and dispatched a mission to plead

with Shehab to withdraw his resignation. They were not admitted to the Palace. Furthermore, all telephone lines there had been disconnected by the President's orders.

All the Deputies assembled thereupon and signed a petition appealing to the President's patriotism and asking him to withdraw his resignation. The number of signatories came to 91, out of 99 Deputies. In the end, after the Army Commander had interceded with the President at the request of the Deputies, Shehab consented to receive them.

They told the President that internal security, national unity and the world's confidence in Lebanon would be gravely endangered if he persisted. Kamāl Junbalāt was reported to have warned him that the election of a successor by Parliament would throw open the whole sectarian question, adding: "We only accepted the status quo because of you."

In the end, after his wife had added her pleas, Shehab withdrew his resignation. (Sources see below.)

**Demonstration of Shehab's Popularity.** When Shehab withdrew his resignation, Deputies carried him on their shoulders, the church bells were rung, crowds cheered outside the Palace and Deputies, soldiers and others fired shots in the air, with the result that the electric wires were cut. Candles had to be lit, and it was said that Sabri Hamādah used the opportunity to burn the letter of resignation.

The Ministry of Information issued the following announcement on the night of 20 July: "In view of the decisive rejection by all blocs in the Chamber of Deputies of the resignation of the President of the Republic, and huge remonstrations by all sectors of the populace in Beirut, Tripoli and most other towns on the coast and in the mountains, President Shehab has considered that he cannot but comply with the desire of the people and their representations and withdraw his resignation." (*Hayat*, *Orient*, 21 July; *Mid. Mirror*, 23 July; *Times*, 21, 22 July; *M.H. Kerr in MEA*, Vol. XI, No. 9; *BBC*, 22 July)

**President's Position Strengthened.** President Shehab's surprise resignation at the time of negotiations for the formation of the new government was regarded by *al-Hayāt* as prompted by two motives: (1) His feeling that his task had been completed with the restoration of parliamentary life; (2) his fear that parliamentary life would not be conducted in the future in keeping with his "character and views." During the preliminary discussions on the formation of the new Cabinet, he had found that he might be compelled to accept governmental arrangements opposed to his concepts and conscience. The pressure of the Deputies was a strong factor in inducing him to withdraw his resignation, but more important was the fact that he remained on his terms, and not on theirs. As a result, he could regard himself as having been empowered by parliament to govern according to his own judgment, and not according to the interests of the competing groups in the Chamber. He thus had a free hand in the formation of the next government. (*Hayat*, 21 July)

**President Regarded as Being Backed by Army.** Another observer said that Shehab's appointment of army commanders to ministerial posts simultaneously with his resignation proved that he was backed by the army in his political plans. (*Orient*, 21 July)

**Incident Regarded as Indicative of Instability.** An observer on the spot, M.H. Kerr, concluded that the in-

cident had shown that Lebanon was being kept from a return to anarchy only by "tenuous circumstances." Parliament was incapable of performing its constitutional functions and the Deputies displayed solidarity only because they were afraid to face the deep divisions among themselves. This situation also boded ill for future governments, which, like past ones would be based on "the principle of sectarian, regional, partisan and personal appeasement" rather than on competence for the job, so that the country would continue to stagnate. (*Kerr, MEA, Vol. XI, No. 9*)

**Did Shehab Waste an Opportunity?** Writing after the formation of the new government (see below) the above observer said that although Parliament had "abjectly surrendered its power" to Shehab, he had "so far" ignored this opportunity to form an efficient Cabinet. (*Kerr, ibid*)

#### JULY-AUG: SLAM GOVERNMENT FORMED

**July-Aug: The New Government.** On 28 July, the President asked Sa'ib Slām to form the government.

On 2 Aug, after four days' negotiations aimed at reconciling the conflicting views of various parliamentary blocs, Slām formed an 18-man cabinet, the largest in Lebanon's history. It comprised four Maronites, four Sunnis, three Shi'is, two Greek Orthodox, two Greek Catholics, two Druzes and one Armenian Orthodox. Four parties were represented: the Katā'ib by Pierre Jumayil and his cousin Maurice Jumayil; the Constitutional Party by Philippe Taqla and Dr Khūri; the Progressive Socialists by Kamāl Junbalāt and Nassīm Majdalāni, and the Tashnak by Khatchik Babikyan (Papikyan). There was only one Minister not in the Chamber—Philippe Taqla. Eight Ministers took Cabinet office for the first time: Mashnūq, Faranjiyah, Maurice Jumayil, Dana, Mansūr, Shahīn, Majdalāni and Babikyan.

There were no representatives of the Tripoli deputies led by former PM Rashīd Karami, the National Bloc (Raymond Eddeh), or the Liberal Nationalists (Sham'ūn). Raymond Eddeh declined a Cabinet post. (*Mid. Mirror, 6 Aug*)

**Slām's Policy Statement.** On 2 Aug, at a Press conference, Sa'ib Slām declared that the foreign policy of his government was "Lebanese, Arab and liberal." Lebanon desired "fraternity and détente with all Arab brothers" everywhere, and was determined to "work seriously and immediately to strengthen brotherly relations in various spheres." Lebanon's policy in her relations with all nations was friendship based on mutual interests. The government's programme was inspired by national unity and by the national convention in both the external and internal fields. "Our motto is one Lebanon, not two." Lebanon's independence was firm and established. The government would concentrate on enhancing agreement and fraternity among the Lebanese people, retaining peace and tranquillity, promoting justice and equality, and assuring prosperity, stability, construction and development. "We cannot accept any alternative to our democratic system," he emphasized. The PM said that Parliament should be granted "all its rights," and he was looking forward to cooperating with the Chamber. On 4 Aug Slām said that he was anxious to carry out "radical reforms" in the judiciary as quickly as possible. (*Mid. Mirror, 6 Aug*) (See also Views and Policies, pp 342-3.)

**"Compromise" Hailed.** [Comment on the new government was divided. In Lebanon, many papers belonging

to or representing the views of the many factions and personalities in the new Cabinet, confined themselves to generalities.]

*The Times* hailed the Cabinet as a return to the politics of compromise, which were essential to the country. Slām's government included every important sect and the leaders of the 1958 battle except Sham'ūn were now in office. Although perhaps unwieldy, the Cabinet at least "provides an opportunity to argue instead of to fight." (*Times, 4 Aug*)

**Cabinet Unwieldy—President Criticized.** Kamāl Mrawah, editor of *al-Hayāt*, wrote that it was difficult to find Ministers or Deputies satisfied with the "strange bazaar": 18 Ministers against 99 Deputies in a country as small as Lebanon. "On seeing this mosaic one can't help thinking that the shock of the President's resignation has been in vain. It is regrettable that he permitted such anarchy, unless there is a wisdom in it which we have not yet perceived..." Also, some Ministers were given portfolios which they did not want and about which they had no knowledge. (*Hayat, 3 Aug*)

**Concern for Power of Parliament.** The writer exhorted the new Cabinet to co-operate with the Chamber. For the past two years the government had been to a large extent free from parliamentary control. If matters did not change, the last blow would be dealt to parliamentary rule. (*Hayat, 3 Aug*) [See also Slām's assurances to Parliament, above. Apparently there was some apprehension that the Chamber might permanently lose the power it had forfeited during the period of reconstruction after the 1958 disturbances, when the President and the Cabinet ruled mostly without recourse to the discredited and non-representative Parliament. See also rumours about intentions to include officers in the government or to establish martial law, below.]

**Pros and Cons.** Another Lebanese commentator wrote that the struggle among the rival factions in the Cabinet was liable to paralyze its work. Moreover, it was responsible to a Parliament also made up of tiny factions and independents, so that there seemed no possibility of arriving at a constructive working schedule. On the other hand, the large number of Ministers would enable each to concentrate on the work of one portfolio only, and public opinion was ready to give the new government a chance. In this situation very much depended on whether PM Slām would succeed in fusing the various factions in the Cabinet into a working proposition. (*Jaridah, 3 Aug*. For other comment, see *Nahar, Beirut al-Masa', 29 July; Amal, 3 Aug*.)

#### AUG: FIRST CABINET CRISIS

**Crisis Over Alleged Slām Statement.** On 4 Aug the Egyptian daily *al-Gumhuriyah* said Slām had declared in a telephone interview that his government was "an extension of the revolt in Lebanon," and had told the editor: "Tell the people of the UAR that the Lebanese offer them their hearts in all their battles."

This report caused criticism, and even though Slām declared that the report "did not entirely correspond with what he had actually stated," the Katā'ib party, represented by two Ministers, described his denial as "insufficient" and urged him to publish an official statement clarifying his position; otherwise the party would "reconsider its participation in the government and its position towards it."



On 7 Aug, Slām said in answer to a Press question that the proper forum for discussing the statements attributed to him by *al-Gumhuriyah* was the Cabinet.

**Slām: "Nobody More Lebanese Than I Am"—Crisis Overcome.** At a Cabinet meeting on 8 Aug, Sa'ib Slām was asked by Maurice Jumayil, the Minister of Finance, whether there was any truth in *al-Gumhuriyah's* allegations. He replied: "... Before I answer, I would like to repeat two things. First, I cannot accept the suggestion that there is anyone in Lebanon who is more Lebanese than I am. Secondly, I have never had and will never have, two identities. I am Lebanese inside and outside Lebanon." Maurice Jumayil said he considered Slām's statement "comprehensive and satisfactory." In an official statement issued after the Cabinet meeting on 8 Aug, the PM explained that *al-Gumhuriyah* had misquoted him, and added: "I reiterate that my government is a government of national unity, and my first motto is that Lebanon is one and not two. In my Cabinet, Manifesto in the Chamber of Deputies, which is the official forum in which to declare my doctrine and my views, I shall include a declaration to this effect." (*Mid. Mirror*, 13 Aug; *R. Beirut*, 8 Aug—BBC, 10 Aug)

#### AUG: GOVERNMENT STATEMENT OF POLICY

At the Cabinet meeting of 8 Aug it was decided that a committee of six Ministers would work out a draft of the Cabinet Manifesto on the basis of which the government would seek a vote of confidence from the Chamber. (*Mid. Mirror*, 13 Aug)

**Vote of Confidence.** On 18 Aug the PM presented to the Chamber the statement of policy, and received a vote of confidence by 78 votes to nine with one abstention, 11 Deputies being absent. The National Bloc (Raymond Eddeh), the National Liberals (ex-President Sham'un), and the Deputy for Zahle, Kazim as-Sulh, voted against the government. (*Mid. Mirror*, 20 Aug)

**Statement of Policy.** The statement of policy claimed to be based on two pillars, national unity and the National Charter, "which will remain an unwritten law for our nation, ensuring its existence, triumph and prosperity."

The government's main aim was to maintain Lebanon's independence, status, sovereignty and constitution, and to defend them at all times, in all circumstances, against all who might threaten them. The government aimed at preserving sincere, friendly and fraternal relations with the Arab countries. It would seek to strengthen Arab relations, uphold the Arab League, and co-operate with the Arab brothers on all major issues, particularly those affecting liberation and independence, with the Palestinian question in the foreground.

In the international field, the government wanted Lebanon's relations with all nations to be based on mutual friendship and respect, without equivocation and free from strings or restrictions incompatible with complete sovereignty. It would be inspired at all times by the principles, rights and safeguards embodied in the UN Charter.

"Our objective, therefore, is that Lebanon should remain an Arab, independent country of firm status—a democratic, republican Lebanon, whose sovereignty springs from its national unity—a progressive, advancing Lebanon, striving to improve its relations with all nations."

The government pledged itself to carry out a comprehensive plan for economic and social development, to consider the reorganization of the judicial system, and to revise the tax system.

It was planning to form a currency and credit board, complete the road network, build government offices, prepare a comprehensive study for the execution of major water projects, and construct artificial lakes in the valleys to store winter water.

It promised to institute social insurance by stages, combat the high cost of living, and reduce the prices of medicines. It would try to improve free elementary education, expand secondary and vocational education, reduce the prices of textbooks and support the Lebanese University (sic) by opening institutes of applied engineering and sociology.

The statement concluded by expressing the government's determination to co-operate closely with the Chamber of Deputies, to uphold the parliamentary system, and to conduct Lebanese policy in general in such a way as to ensure security and peace. (*Mid. Mirror*, 20 Aug; *Nahar*, 19 Aug)

**Opposition's Criticism.** Raymond Eddeh, leader of the National Bloc, criticized the statement and wanted to be assured that the government's aim of strengthening the Arab League meant that it would not agree to a revision of the League's Charter. (On this question, see pp 123–4.)

Edouard Hanin of the National Bloc asked why a Ministry of Emigrants had not been created to handle emigrants' affairs. He criticized the size of the Cabinet and the powers given to Ministers, describing the government as a "representative Cabinet and not a ruling one."

Ex-Premier Rashid Karami criticized the composition of the Cabinet, declaring that the four Ministers of State were not Ministers in any real sense, as according to the law there were no portfolios for them, and they could not sign decrees. He added that the budget would not permit the implementation of any of the projects outlined, and asked whether the government intended to increase taxation.

In reply PM Slām said that there was complete agreement among Ministers. He would welcome constructive, though not subversive, criticism to strengthen the work of the government. (*Mid. Mirror*, 20 Aug)

**Slām Rejects Demand for Census.** Adnān al-Hakim raised the demand for a general census. Slām replied that reference to a census had been deliberately omitted from the statement: "There are people who want to exploit this demand in order to further their own aims. A certain group [the Muslims] claims to be the majority. We do not want to live in dispute." (*Mid. Mirror*, 20 Aug)

#### OCT: CABINET RIFT DURING SLAM'S ABSENCE

[The difficulties in the government became more acute during Slām's absence. He went abroad as head of the Lebanese delegation to the UN General Assembly, while Nassim Majdalani served as acting PM. Especially concerned in the tense situation were Kamāl Junbalāt and his supporters on the one hand and the Katā'ib leaders, Pierre and Maurice Jumayil, on the other.]

**Junbalāt–Jumayil Education Dispute.** At the Cabinet meeting of 12 Oct, when Kamāl Junbalāt, the Minister of Education, asked for allocations for certain education institutes, Maurice Jumayil demanded that the whole question of educational policy should be discussed in the Cabinet. (On this question, see also p 346.) An angry dispute ensued, during which Kamāl Junbalāt claimed that the issue was within the competence of his Ministry

alone, while Jumayil insisted that it should be dealt with by the whole government. Shouts were exchanged and both threatened to resign. After the intervention of the other Ministers, it was decided to form a Cabinet committee to study the question. The committee consisted of Kamāl Junbalāt, Maurice Jumayil and Abdullah al-Mashnūq. (*Hayat*, 13 Oct)

On 25 Oct Kamāl Junbalāt issued a declaration accusing the "Katā'ib Ministers and Deputies" of preventing the allocation of necessary funds to hire the thousands of teachers which his Ministry needed, and manoeuvring to postpone their appointment. [Pierre Jumayil was Minister of Finance.] *Al-Amal* replied on 26 Oct with an attack on Junbalāt and accused him of trying to appoint his supporters as teachers even though they had not passed the necessary examinations. (*Amal*, 26 Oct)

**Crisis over Pierre Jumayil's Alleged Statement on Syrian Situation.** [In the midst of the above dispute, another one broke out involving the same adversaries.] At the Cabinet meeting of 17 Oct, Uthmān ad-Dana [Sunni from Beirut, Independent] referred to Pierre Jumayil's alleged statement that "a free plebiscite in Syria today would not be in President Abdel-Nasser's favour," which, he said, impaired internal unity and was injurious to relations with the Arab countries. When a Minister made such a statement, the Cabinet should take steps in the matter, he declared, adding: "I entered the government on the basis of a clear Arab policy and when this policy is disregarded, I am ready to leave." Maurice Jumayil said he thought his brother had made no such statement. When a Cabinet delegation called on Pierre Jumayil (who was convalescing), he said that he had been misquoted.

Kamāl Junbalāt was not satisfied, and demanded that the government issue a proclamation denying the statement and affirming Lebanon's friendship with the UAR.

On 19 Oct, the Cabinet affirmed "the good relations existing between Lebanon and the UAR, and the nation's respect for President Gamal Abdel-Nasser and the present regime of the UAR." It asked the acting PM, Majdalāni, to convey these sentiments to the UAR Government and to express "Lebanon's regret for a recent statement allegedly made by a Minister in Beirut." (*Hayat*, 18, 19, 20 Oct; *Mid. Mirror*, 22 Oct)

**Slām's Return.** The rifts in the Cabinet necessitated Slām's early return. On 26 Oct, the day of his arrival, he denied all rumours of intentions to resign or to reshuffle the Cabinet. (*Hayat*, 27 Oct)

**Temporary Reconciliation After Intervention by Shehab.** President Shehab attended a Cabinet meeting on 26 Oct, and reprimanded both Junbalāt and Jumayil. He said that the dispute did no good to the country and strengthened the rumours of imminent Cabinet changes.

Junbalāt argued that as a Minister he co-operated with his Cabinet colleagues, but as head of a political party he was bound to his party's decisions. Jumayil said that what *al-Amal* wrote was one thing and what his Ministry did was another. Shehab insisted that they were responsible for their actions, and after the meeting both Ministers left reconciled. Abdullah al-Mashnūq observed, however, that the reconciliation was temporary. (*Hayat*, 27 Oct)

## OCT-DEC: CABINET AND PARLIAMENT

**Opposition Attack.** Shortly after Slām's return from the UN, the opposition Deputies launched an attack upon

him. *Al-Hayāt* reported that they had agreed that Rashid Karami should deal with foreign policy, Raymond Eddeh with the deteriorating internal security (pp 361-2), and Dr Mukhaybar with "scandals." (*Hayat*, 28 Oct)

On 28 Oct Rashid Karami, chairman of the Parliamentary Foreign Affairs Committee, invited the PM and the Foreign Minister to attend its meeting on 2 Nov for a discussion of the policy of the Lebanese delegation to the UN. (*Hayat*, 29 Oct)

On 2 Nov the committee heard the Foreign Minister and decided to request the attendance of the head of the delegation to the UN (i.e. Sa'ib Slām) on 3 Nov. (*Hayat*, 3 Nov) The committee met on 3 Nov, but the PM declined to attend. Later in the day, it published a statement regretting Slām's attitude as a deviation from parliamentary procedure and prejudicial to the dignity of the Chamber. The committee would raise the question in the Chamber for debate the same evening. (*Mid. Mirror*, 5 Nov)

**Nov: Slām Bows to Chamber's Recommendations.** On 3 Nov the Chamber assembled for a general debate on the government's domestic and foreign policies. The session opened, however, with the reading of a message from the Foreign Affairs Committee, calling upon the Deputies to postpone discussion of foreign policy until the PM agreed to appear before the committee.

Sa'ib Slām began an address on foreign policy, but opposition deputies insisted that he should not speak until the committee's message had been debated. He made several attempts to resume, but was constantly interrupted by Deputies, who shouted and banged on the tables. At length he asked for a vote of confidence, as he was not allowed to continue his speech. Violent arguments ensued, and the President of the Chamber adjourned the session for 24 hours. (*Mid. Mirror*, 5 Nov)

On 4 Nov the crisis was settled, when the Chamber unanimously recommended that the PM appear before the committee and he agreed. According to reports, it was President Shehab who advised Slām to appear.

The PM said in the Chamber that he had no desire to see Lebanon's foreign policy "fraught with doubt." He paid tribute to the fact that the atmosphere in the Chamber was "different from yesterday's" and said that its recommendation was "an honourable one, which nobody could resist." In the circumstances, the vote of confidence which he had sought the day before was no longer necessary. (*Hayat*; *Mid. Mirror*, 5 Nov)

**Nov: Rumours of Cabinet Reshuffle.** Despite Slām's statement (on his return to Beirut, see above) that no changes in the government were anticipated, the general view was that changes were imminent. *Al-Hayāt* reported that the planners of the change (i.e. Slām and Shehab) seemed to have three aims: (1) to reduce the number of Ministers; (2) to provide increased representation for the provinces (about half of the Ministers were from Beirut); (3) to nominate army officers to the Ministries of the Interior and Defence. This last aim, the paper reported, was the basis of the rumours about a military government to replace Slām's Cabinet. President Shehab was reported to oppose the idea of officers mixing in politics, while Slām argued that such a step was necessary to maintain law and order. (*Hayat*, 10 Nov)

**Nov: Shehab Supports Cabinet.** *Al-Hayāt* reported on 20 Nov that "the high authority" (*marāji' ulya*—e.g. President Shehab) was working for the continuation of the Slām government, without, however, becoming a

party to the parliamentary disputes. The paper said that as a result of Shehab's attitude many Deputies who opposed the government had decided to make a temporary truce with it. (*Hayat*, 20 Nov)

**Sensitive Question of Foreign Policy.** On 8 Nov Slām appeared before the Chamber's Foreign Affairs Committee.

Asked whether he had discussed with President Eisenhower the question of US aid to Lebanon, Slām denied that he had asked for aid but said that wheat supplies might be offered.

On the vote against the admission of People's China, he said that this was in conformity with Lebanon's attitude since 1951, and reaffirmed Lebanon's neutrality.

Raymond Eddeh raised the question of political asylum. Although Lebanon must not be used as a springboard for hostilities against other Arab states, and particularly not against the UAR, the government should not take any action contrary to normal international practice in relation to refugees, he said. [This issue concerned subversive activities against the UAR by political refugees and others in Lebanon. See pp 504-6] Slām replied that no "severe" action would be taken beyond the scope of the existing laws.

Karami asked whether Slām had offered to mediate between Abdel-Nasser and Hussein, as reported (see also p 13), and accepted Slām's denial. (*Mid. Mirror*, 12 Nov)

On 11 Nov these and related questions were raised in the Chamber. PM Slām answered in similar vein, adding that the country's general policy of neutrality was "purely Lebanese and purely Arab." He reiterated that he had not sought US aid, but Lebanon was prepared to accept any foreign aid entirely free of political strings. (*Hayat*, 12, 13 Nov; *Mid. Mirror*, 19 Nov)

**Internal Affairs Raised in Parliament.** Following are questions of internal affairs raised in two general debates in the Chamber, on 25 Oct and 11 Nov. They may be regarded as representative of matters brought up by Deputies during the last quarter of 1960, many of which concerned regional interests.

On 25 Oct Dr Mukhaybar (National Liberal) blamed the government for the strikes (see pp 362-3), and Nahād Buways demanded a raise in wages. Ex-premier Rashīd Karami brought up the "demands of Tripoli" (his home town) and criticized the security situation there. Other Deputies criticized the government because of the general security situation (see below); asked why the government ignored water and electricity supply needs in the Batrun district; demanded an increase in the number of permits for tobacco raising in Nabatiye district and the lowering of electricity tariffs in Kura district; and recorded their opposition to the transfer of the provincial administration (*Saray*) from Ba'albek. Dr Mukhaybar also said that the government policy led to the smuggling of cigarettes into the country. (*Hayat*, 26 Oct)

On 11 Nov two Deputies criticized the lack of harmony in the Cabinet and the discrimination against their districts Batrun and Jubeil. The demand not to transfer the *Saray* from Ba'albek was repeated, and the government was asked to "do justice" to ash-Shuf district. There were also demands for more judges and an increase in their salaries. The government was criticized for not yet having dealt with the law on wages. (See pp 363-4) (*Hayat*, 12 Nov)

**Dec: Uproar in Parliament.** On 8 Dec there was a heated debate in the Chamber of Deputies, and its President

adjourned the proceedings for some 20 minutes to "allow the atmosphere to calm down."

The trouble began when Dr Mukhaybar accused the government of conniving in the smuggling of foreign cigarettes into the country. Government supporters banged their desks violently and the speaker asked Dr Mukhaybar to withdraw his statement. The general noise increased, and "insults were freely exchanged." (*Hayat*, 9 Dec; *Mid. Mirror*, 10 Dec)

It was reported that Deputy Muhain Salīm (Shi'i from Beirut, Independent) called for the establishment of a special court to try Ministers violating Lebanese laws and regulations, who enjoyed immunity from prosecution. (*MENA*, 13 Dec-BBC, 15 Dec)

**Dec: Rumours of Cabinet Changes.** Sa'ib Slām accused a politician (unnamed) of supplying the Press with false reports that the Cabinet was about to resign. He stressed that Press reports of the resignation or reshuffle of the Cabinet were unfounded, and declared that it would remain in office. (*ANA*, 13 Dec-BBC, 15 Dec)

### THE INTERNAL SECURITY SITUATION

**Background Note and Synopsis.** Internal security, always a serious problem in Lebanon, had remained acutely unstable after the 1958 insurrection. In 1960 the improvement was slight; bomb throwing, shooting and assaults continued throughout the year. Some of these incidents, which were reportedly connected with foreign interests, are dealt with in the chapter dealing with inter-Arab relations and the internal situation in Syria, (pp 504-6). The government tried to master the situation and was especially active against the activities of illegal groups.

**Nov: Slām Claims Improvement.** PM Sa'ī Slām said in the Chamber: "I know that the security situation is not as we would like it to be, but it is wrong to say that it has become worse. The truth is that it has become better than before. While in 1959 there were 161 murders, in 1960, up to Nov, there were only 99." (*Hayat*, 12 Nov)

**Incidents.** (For incidents during the elections; including incidents among Armenians, see p 352). At the end of Jan and the beginning of Feb the papers reported the discovery of a plot to murder the Maronite Patriarch and the arrest of a Palestinian refugee in this connection. Official sources denied the whole story. (*Hayat*, 29 Jan, 2 Feb; *Jaridah*, 27 Jan, 2 Feb)

On 12 Aug an officer and an NCO were killed and three others were wounded in a clash between the security forces and the Duwayhi family in Zgharta, when they followed an escaping convict belonging to the family. The convict and some of his relatives were arrested. (*Hayat*, 13 Aug)

On 25 Aug three unknown persons placed a time bomb in the *al-Hayāt* building. The bomb exploded during the night, and the damage was slight. The saboteurs were not caught. (*Hayat*, 26 Aug)

On 29 Aug Gāzi Hamādah, nephew of Sabri Hamādah, the President of the Chamber of Deputies, was killed in Beirut in a clash between members of the Hamādah and Zu'aytar families. (*Hayat*, 30 Aug) [This incident was a continuation of a long-standing feud between these two great land-owning families of the Ba'albek-Hermil district.]

On 6 Sept an unknown man placed a bomb which exploded at the entrance of the Arabic Culture Club in Tripoli. (*Hayat*, 7 Sept)



On 9 Sept an active member of the Popular Resistance, Mustafa al-Haris, was killed in a Beirut café. The motive was said to be animosity between insurgent leaders, which developed in 1958 and continued ever since. (*Hayat*, 10 Sept)

On 10 Sept an explosion occurred at the UAR consulate in Beirut (see p 154.)

On 11 Oct a time-bomb exploded in front of the *al-Hawādith* (pro-UAR) weekly building in Beirut, but caused little damage. (*Hayat*, 22 Oct)

On the same night an explosion occurred in the backyard of the *as-Sayād* (pro-UAR) weekly building in Beirut. (*Hayat*, 13 Oct)

On the night of 8 Nov two men and a woman were injured when an explosion occurred in the printing works used by the Communist paper *an-Nida'* in Beirut. The building was partly destroyed. Five people, some

of them alleged to be Syrian, who were staying at a nearby hotel, were arrested on suspicion. (*Mid. Mirror*, 12 Nov)

On 18 Dec a bomb was thrown at the printing works of *Beirut al-Masā'* (pro-UAR, belonging to al-Mashnūq, a member of the Cabinet). (*Hayat*, 20 Dec)

On the night of 20 Dec an explosion occurred in a Beirut building where a Syrian ex-officer was staying and opposite the house of Riyād Tah, owner of *al-Kifāh* (pro-UAR). (*Amal*, 20 Dec)

On 23 Dec Philippe Bustāni [a member of a well-known Maronite family], who had been a candidate for Parliament, was murdered in Deir al-Qamar (Shuf district). Several suspects were arrested. The Progressive Socialist Party (Junbalāt) issued a declaration describing the act as a political murder and demanding the discovery of the instigators. (*Hayat*, 25, 28 Dec)

## LABOUR UNREST

### SOCIAL CONDITIONS AND LABOUR CLAIMS

**Factors of Social Instability.** The year 1960 saw an unprecedented wave of strikes in Lebanon. On the conditions making for social unrest, an FAO report on Lebanon stated:

"Despite the existence of a very strong and relatively large middle class, there are extremes of wealth and poverty which are not conducive to social stability. Government fiscal and other policies, instead of leading to the rectification of this ill, tend rather to aggravate it. The income of the unskilled labourer is considerably below the average national income per capita. Further, under the prevailing economic philosophy of freedom, such matters as labour welfare, social security, problems of unemployment and underemployment do not elicit sufficient concern and hence may constitute a nucleus of potential conflict and instability." (*FAO Mediterranean Development Project / Lebanon / Country Report / Rome 1959*, pp 1-8)

An economic expert, Father Jenissel, writing of the extremely low standard of living of wage earners, estimated that 80 per cent of the population enjoy about 20 per cent of the national income. (*Commerce du Levant*, 23 Mar) (For social-political background see also *Commerce du Levant* 15 Oct; *Orient*, 19 Nov.)

**The Rising Cost of Living.** Following are Lebanese statistics on the cost-of-living index, 1954-1960 (1939=100):

Year	Food	General
1954	493	411
1955	566	417
1959	640	509
1960	670	526

**Sources:** Republique Libanaise, Ministère de l'Economie Nationale, Service de Statistique Générale, *Bulletin Statistique Trimestriel*, Volume X, No. 4, 1959; *Le Commerce du Levant*, Mensuelle No. 10, 15 June 1961.

[The composition of the index was fixed in 1939—arbitrarily, according to expert observers—and has not been changed since.]

**Labour Income Below Subsistence Level.** Gabriel Khūri, Chairman of the Executive Council of the United Trade

Unions, wrote, summing up the 1960 strike wave: "The obvious reason for the strikes is the need to raise living resources, as the purchasing power of the regular wage-earner has reached the point where he cannot secure the necessities of life." He said that the Karami government had promised in Feb to deal with the workers' demands and the unions had agreed to wait three months, but three and four months had passed without results, while the prices had been going up all the time. He accused the employers of ignoring the poverty of the workers. Khūri thanked the Slām government for its efforts to solve the crisis, however [see below for its decision to raise wages], and said that had it not been for these efforts the country would have suffered much more. (*Nahar*, yearly supplement, Jan 1961)

### LABOUR DISPUTES

**Strikes.** The following strikes for better wages and working conditions took place in 1960:

Mobil Oil employees went on strike on 22 Jan but returned to work the next day after receiving assurances from the company. On 24 Feb an agreement was reached for a four per cent raise in wages. (*Jaridah*, 23, 24 Jan, 25 Feb)

On 24 Feb some 1,500 workers of the Office de l'Electricité et Transports en Commun (OETC) went on strike, demanding 14 months' wages a year, a raise in wages, a seven-hour working day, and higher insurance against work accidents. The strike continued for 17 days till 11 Mar. The strikers received a lump sum of IL300,000 and payment for the period of the strike. Hours were reduced to seven a day for some categories of workers. (*Hayat*, 25 Feb, 12 Mar)

The employees of the State Tobacco Monopoly (*La Règle des Tabacs*) went on strike for higher pay from 13 to 18 May. A committee representing the government, the company and the workers was formed to deal with the demands. (*Hayat*, 14, 19 May)

About 950 workers of the Mideast Aircraft Service Company (MASCO) struck from 19 to 25 May for the right to form a union. The strike ended after they were granted this right and 120 workers dismissed during the strike were taken back. (*Hayat*, 20, 26 May)

On 23 May the employees of the cafés, restaurants and hotels at the Beirut international airport went on strike demanding higher wages and 24 hours' rest after a 12-hour day, instead of 12 hours' work and 12 hours'



## LABOUR UNREST

rest. On 16 June an agreement was reached on a 10½-hour working day and a 15 per cent wage increase. (*Hayat*, 24 May, 17 June)

The employees of the Esso Company went on strike on 8 July and returned to work on 13 July after mediation by the Ministry of Social Affairs. (*Hayat*, 9, 14 July; *Sahafah*, 11 July)

On 8 Sept telephone workers paid on a daily basis, numbering about 800 (by their own account), went on strike, but returned to work after being warned that they would be dismissed. The government accepted the strikers' demands for better pay and working conditions. It refused to accept their claim for permanency in employment, since there were no vacancies in the establishment, but proposed to refer the matter to a special committee for study. (*Mid. Mirror*, 24 Sept)

A strike broke out in the Lebanese Petroleum Company (LEPCO) on 21 Sept and ended on 30 Sept after the government assured the workers that in a few weeks wages and salaries would be raised in the country as a whole. (*Hayat*, 22, 23 Sept)

On 21 Sept some 1,400–1,500 employees of 24 banks went on strike for higher salaries. They returned to work on 26 Sept after a raise was granted. Pierre Eddeh represented the employers in the negotiations. (*Hayat*, 22, 27 Sept)

About 900 Beirut dock workers went on strike on 18 Oct and returned to work on 28 Oct. Representatives of the strikers and the United Unions conferred with PM Slām, who assured them of his sympathy and that of the President, but asked for a few days to study their demands. (*Hayat*, 18, 28 Oct) The government asked the company concerned to continue certain social benefits until the end of the year, when it expected that a permanent system would be framed. (*R. Beirut*, 31 Oct–*BBC*, 2 Nov)

On 12 Nov, 870 employees of the Lebanese Cement Company went on strike. On 27 Nov gendarmerie forces took over the company's installations in Shaka. The strike ended on 1 Dec, after an intervention of the PM and the company's acceptance of the demands for higher wages, the establishment of a mutual loan fund and other social benefits. (*Hayat*, 13, 30 Nov, 2 Dec; *Orient*, 28 Nov)

About 400 workers of the Government Survey Department went on strike on 16 Nov for higher wages. They returned to work on 19 Nov after the government had promised to consider their demands. (*Hayat*, 17, 20 Nov)

The employees of the Beirut water department went on strike on 18 Nov, but returned to work after their demands had been partially met. (*Hayat*, 18, 19 Nov)

**Oct-Dec: Other Labour Difficulties.** [There were two incidents which were not directly comparable to the above wave of strikes but which nevertheless contributed to the general tension in labour affairs.]

The textile manufacturers claimed that they were unable to compete with imported products and would have to dismiss workers unless the government imposed protective customs duties.

Accordingly the Arida plant dismissed 250 workers on 30 Oct, whereupon the other 1,000 employees started a solidarity strike. Following the intervention of President Shehab they terminated the strike and the dismissed workers were reinstated.

On the following day the Cabinet decided to raise the customs duty on textiles by 15 per cent, whereupon the merchants held a token strike of 24 hours in protest.

On 4 Nov it was decided to appoint a commission to propose a solution within six months. (*Hayat*, 30 Oct, 5 Nov)

The other incident occurred on 22 Dec, when the majority of the public transport drivers went on strike in protest against a government project to double the number of taxis in Lebanon. The strike was organized by the Public Vehicle Drivers' and Owners' Syndicate. (*Mid. Mirror*, 24 Dec)

**Oct: Threat of General Strike.** Most of the strikes were actively supported by the United Unions (*an-Niqabāt al-Muttahidah*), which is the largest of the four trade union federations in Lebanon, and is not affiliated to any international organization.

On 27 and 28 Oct the United Unions declared a general strike for one hour each day. The federation had intended to hold a general strike, but relented as a goodwill gesture towards PM Slām, who had returned from the US on 26 Oct. (*R. Beirut*, 27 Oct–*IMB*, 27 Oct)

## GOVERNMENT EFFORTS

**Cabinet Committee Appointed.** On 28 Sept the Lebanese Cabinet discussed labour problems, including strike, threats over wages and unrest over rising living costs. A Cabinet committee was formed to study the situation together with union and employers' representatives, and to examine the law on wages. (*ANA*, 28 Sept–*BBC*, 1 Oct)

**President's Attitude.** A Beirut Radio commentator discussed the President's efforts to solve the workers' problems peacefully and to see that the gains of one group did not become a public burden. The commentator argued that a raise in the cost of living as a result of increased wages would benefit no one, and said that the government favoured the adoption of a social insurance scheme. (On the President's intervention in strikes see above: Labour strike.) (*R. Beirut*, 29 Sept–*BBC*, 1 Oct)

**Oct: Slām's Promises to Labour.** After Slām's return from New York, he met representatives of the unions in his office on 31 Oct. He commended the workers for trying to avoid obstructing the government or public works and said that even before they submitted their demands the government had been aware of their legitimate rights. The PM announced the following measures: allocation of LL13,500,000 in next year's budget for the improvement of civil service conditions; steps to improve the conditions of the workers through their trade unions by early next year; the setting up of a committee, representing the Ministries concerned, workers and employers, to deal with labour problems, and the granting of family allowances. He said he had always felt sympathy for the workers and had advocated "Social Democracy," though he admitted that the government had been remiss in applying it. After trade union representatives had thanked the PM, Slām said he hoped the workers would bear no grudge against the Ministers who had handled these matters before his return, since Ministers, government and President were all anxious to serve the public interest. (*R. Beirut*, 31 Oct–*BBC*, 2 Nov; *Hayat*, 1 Nov)

**1961: Labour Dissatisfied with Cabinet Committee's Recommendation.** On 9 Dec the Cabinet committee recommended the following changes, to come into force on 1 Jan 1961: the minimum wage was to be raised from

## LEBANON: INTERNAL AFFAIRS

LL94 to LL125 (per month); a 15 per cent increase in salaries and all wages above the minimum was to be granted on the basis of the rise in the cost-of-living index since 1955.

PM Slām said that the Cabinet had adopted the re-

commendations. However, they did not satisfy the workers. (*Hayat*, 10 Dec; *Orient*, 5, 8 Jan 1961) [The recommendations, involving the revision of the Wages Law, had also to be approved by Parliament and the President.]

## LEBANESE EMIGRANTS

**Background Note and Synopsis.** Lebanese emigrants constitute an important factor in Lebanese life, especially in the field of economics, as they extend much aid to their families in Lebanon. The majority are Christians.

Annual emigration from Lebanon, which in the first decade of the century averaged about 15,000, has dwindled to 2,000-4,500 (in 1955, for example, some 4,555 Lebanese left, mainly for South America), while returning emigrants are officially estimated at about 1,000 per year. (These figures are quoted from *The Middle East*, Sir Reader Bullard, Ed., RIIA, 1958.)

In their adopted countries the emigrants remain conscious of their Lebanese origin and identity, and many even retain Lebanese nationality.

The importance accorded in Lebanon to the emigrants is exemplified by the official title of the Lebanese Foreign Ministry: Ministry for Foreign Affairs and Emigrants.

Lebanon was intensely active during the year in strengthening the ties between the Lebanese abroad and their country and safeguarding their interests, especially in Africa. The main event during the year was the first General Conference of Emigrants held in Beirut in Sept.

### Lebanese Emigrants by Countries, 1960:

The Americas	Argentina	150,263
	Bolivia, Colombia,	
	Ecuador, Venezuela	42,308
	Brazil	304,819
	Canada	15,567
	Chile, Paraguay	10,019
	Cuba	2,013
	Mexico	20,022
	Uruguay	15,082
	USA	400,311
	Other countries	20,053
TOTAL in the Americas		980,457
Europe	Canary Islands	315
	Various countries	2,023
TOTAL in Europe		2,338
Oceania	Australia	12,251
	New Zealand	1,600
TOTAL in Oceania		13,851
Asia	Philippines	38
Africa	Gambia	650
	Cameroun	150
	Ghana	2,200
	Guinea	3,008
	Dahomey	95
	Egypt	33,008
	Equatorial Africa	300
	Ethiopia	580
	Ivory Coast	1,854

Kenya	59
Liberia	2,697
Mali	1,200
Niger	150
Nigeria	6,150
North Africa	350
Portuguese Guinea	1,050
Senegal	10,070
Sierra Leone	2,900
South Africa	60,020
Sudan	1,600
Tanganyika	115
Togo	165

TOTAL in Africa 128,371

GRAND TOTAL 1,125,055

NOTE: 1. This table has been compiled from official statistics published in *Jaridah*, *Sahāfah*, *Siyāsah*, 19 Feb. Estimates differ greatly. For another estimate see *Revue du Liban*, 25 July 1959.

2. The totals have been added up from the figures in the table. The above sources, however, give the total as 1,071,037.

### Lebanese Emigrants' Press.

Country	No. of Papers	Language
Brazil	8	Arabic
USA	7	"
Argentina	6	"
Mexico	4	"
Uruguay	1	"
Cuba	1	Spanish

SOURCE: *Jaridah*, 3 Apr.

## LEBANESE GOVERNMENT ACTIVITIES

**May: Establishment of Diplomatic Centres.** On 7 May a decree was issued establishing regional diplomatic centres headed by the respective Ambassadors to deal with the affairs of Lebanese abroad, especially in economic and cultural matters. Following is the regional division, with the embassies responsible: (1) North America: Washington; (2) Latin America: Brazil; (3) North Africa: Tunis; (4) Egypt, Sudan and Ethiopia: Cairo; (5) The rest of Africa: Accra; (6) Western Europe: Paris.

The decree provides for the establishment of advisory boards on emigrant affairs in all Lebanese diplomatic missions. Each board numbers three to nine Lebanese resident abroad, expert in economic or cultural affairs, to be appointed by the Minister of Foreign Affairs on the recommendation of the head of the mission. At the central missions higher advisory boards are to be established on the same lines. (*Jaridah*, 8 May)

**Establishment of Lebanese Cultural Centres.** On 3 Aug a decree was issued ordering the establishment of cultural centres at the Lebanese diplomatic missions in all countries where Lebanese emigrants have settled, to strengthen cultural ties with these countries and with the emigrants.

The head of each mission will appoint, on the recommendation of the Cultural Attaché, an advisory board consisting of emigrants and local personalities. (*Jaridah*, 4 Aug)

In Aug the Ministry of Foreign Affairs decided to allocate 150 scholarships to sons of emigrants and of non-Lebanese notables in Africa for study in Lebanon. (*Nahar*, 24 Aug)

**Support for Emigrants' Interests.** In several instances during 1960 the Lebanese Government intervened on behalf of Lebanese emigrants abroad.

One issue was the demand of the Maronites in Cyprus for a seat in the Cypriot Parliament. Lebanon tried to enlist the support of Turkey [on behalf of the Turkish community in Cyprus]. A Foreign Ministry official, Khalil Taqi ad-Din, was sent to Turkey, where he met the President, the PM and Foreign Minister, and on his return reported to President Shehab. (*Sawt al-Arab*, 19 Mar-IMB, 20 Mar; *R. Beirut*, 24 Mar-IMB, 24 Mar)

Lebanon also sought the support of the Arab League, and at the 33rd session of the League Council (see p 128) a resolution was adopted urging the member states to support the demand. (*Hayat*, 11 Apr) [No provision was made for a Maronite deputy in the Cypriot Parliament.]

Lebanon also intervened on behalf of Lebanese living in Africa. (See p 369.)

#### SEPT: GENERAL CONFERENCE OF EMIGRANTS IN BEIRUT

The first government-sponsored conference of Lebanese emigrants was opened in Beirut on 15 Sept.

**Preparations.** On 1 Mar a decree was issued establishing a permanent committee in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, headed by the Minister, to organize a General Conference of Emigrants and draft a proposal for the establishment of a permanent organization of Lebanese abroad responsible to the Conference. (*Jaridah*, 2 Mar)

Four committees, dealing with economic affairs, cultural matters, tourism and propaganda, were set up to prepare reports for the conference. (*Jaridah*, 30 Mar; *Mid. Mirror*, 17 Sept)

On 20 June President Shehab addressed a message to Lebanese throughout the world welcoming their decision to hold their conference in Lebanon. Lebanon had resolved to "assure emigrants opportunities [in Lebanon], to provide guarantees for capital investment in complete freedom and to guarantee conditions of political and economic stability which would enable individuals and groups to undertake commercial, industrial and financial activity in an atmosphere of security." The message also advocated the establishment of an Emigrants' League. (*Mid. Mirror*, 25 June)

It was announced that the government had asked airlines to reduce fares by 25 per cent for Lebanese emigrants wishing to attend the conference. (*Mid. Mirror*, 25 June)

**The Conference: Economic Aspects Stressed.** The con-

ference, which lasted from 15-18 Sept, was attended by some 1,500 emigrants from different parts of the world.

In an opening address President Shehab welcomed the emigrants "home," and asked them to assist their "brothers in Beirut" in strengthening Lebanon's prosperity by providing them with the fruits of the experience they had gained abroad. The aim of the conference was, he said, "to lay the foundations for... fruitful co-operation during which Lebanese throughout the world will combine to achieve all that is right. The process of building up Lebanon's economic, cultural and social development will prove beneficial both here and abroad, and strengthen the bonds of friendship and love between Lebanon and your host countries. This is a mission which you are qualified to fulfil."

The Foreign Minister, Philippe Taqla, said that one of the objectives of the conference was to cement Lebanese relations with the countries in which the emigrants live. He added: "Let our individual efforts become fused in collective determination devoted to Lebanon's higher interests, on the local, Arab and international levels." (*Mid. Mirror*, 17 Sept)

**Slām: Conference to Stimulate Lebanese-Arab Consciousness.** At the concluding session on 18 Sept, PM Sa'ib Slām emphasized that equality and fraternity had been established in Lebanon under President Shehab, and there was no longer any discrimination between sects. He urged the emigrants to adopt his motto "Lebanon is one, not two." He spoke, he said, as a true Lebanese and a true Arab: there was no incompatibility between the two terms, and he hoped that the conference would act as a stimulant to Lebanese-Arab feeling. (*Mid. Mirror*, 24 Sept)

**Resolutions.** The conference endorsed without discussion the recommendations submitted by its committees for economic affairs, culture, publicity and tourism.

The main economic decision was to form a financial organization with a minimum capital of LL10 million, for the purpose of expanding trade relations between Lebanon and the adopted homeland of the emigrants and developing agricultural and industrial projects in Lebanon and abroad. It was announced that by 17 Sept LL2,500,000 had already been subscribed and that Pierre Eddeh had been elected president of the organization.

The other economic resolutions were concerned with encouraging barter trade, transport facilities and the exchange of economic information between Lebanon and the host countries.

The propaganda committee recommended the establishment of a Lebanese news agency to circulate material of interest to Lebanese nationals both at home and overseas. The agency, which would have fully equipped headquarters in Beirut, would publish a daily news bulletin, a monthly magazine in five languages—Arabic, English, French, Spanish and Portuguese—and a yearbook providing information on various aspects of life in Lebanon and the activities of Lebanese abroad. The committee also recommended to strengthen the ties with the Lebanese broadcasting service and with foreign radio and Press.

The tourism committee recommended that the Lebanese Government provide various facilities to encourage emigrants to visit the country, and asked for the establishment of a permanent tourist organization responsible to the emigrants' organization, which would conduct propaganda for tourism in Lebanon.

The cultural committee recommended that cultural centres be attached to Lebanese missions abroad, urged

that study of Arabic be encouraged and asked for more translations from and into Arabic, as well as scholarships and exhibitions.

Full support was given to the plan to create a Lebanese World Union to improve and expand relations between Lebanese at home and abroad. The Union—also called the League of Lebanese in the World—will have branches in most main cities overseas. Its central board will be in Beirut, but it may arrange meetings in any world capital in accordance with the wishes of branches. A conference of emigrants is to be held every three years in Beirut. (*Hayat*, 18 Sept, 16 Oct; *Mid. Mirror*, 17, 24 Sept)

**Lebanese Comment:** The Lebanese Press unanimously welcomed the conference and called for the strengthening of the ties between the homeland and the emigrants (see e.g.: *Hayat*, 15 Sept; *Jaridah*, *Beirut al-Masa'*, *Kifah*, 14 Sept). [There were, however, some differences between Muslim pro-UAR and Christian papers.] *Beirut*

*al-Masa'* (pro-UAR) called the emigrants "our brothers in Lebanonism and our brothers in Arabdom" [echoing PM Slām's appeal, above]. The paper opposed dual citizenship, which could only harm the emigrants' interests in their adopted countries, while they were not entitled to the benefits of Lebanese citizenship. The emigrant should either return or, if he prefers to remain abroad, he should spread the message of Lebanon and Arabdom and work for the strengthening of ties between his adopted country and Lebanon. [The retention of Lebanese citizenship by the emigrants, most of whom are Christians, constitutes a reinforcement of the Christian sector in Lebanon.]

The Christian paper *al-Jaridah*, emphasizing the importance of the emigrants' contribution to the Lebanese economy, called on each of them to aid his home village or area. [Because of the preponderance of Christian emigrants such a scheme would mostly benefit the Christian sector.] (Sources as above.)

## INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

### SYNOPSIS

(NOTE: References are given only to events not recorded in the text below.)

Lebanese foreign, as well as internal policy, was primarily designed to keep intact the precarious internal balance between the communities and political groupings. Consequently, in all official policy pronouncements, whether by President Shehab or by Premiers Karami and Slām—the Muslim rebel leaders of 1958—it was stressed that Lebanese foreign policy was based on the pillars of the National Charter and national unity, that its primary aim was to safeguard Lebanese independence, and that its guiding line was neutrality (see p 343).

The policy of neutrality constituted an attempt to steer a middle course between the pro-UAR Muslim extremists favouring Arab unity and a UAR-type policy of Positive Neutrality on the one hand, and the pro-Western Christians, resolved to keep the country independent in face of any attempt at Arab union on the other.

In practice this meant in inter-Arab relations a verbal approach best typified by PM Slām's slogan that he was a true Arab and a true Lebanese and that there was nothing incompatible between the two. Lebanon's aim was to avoid any involvement in inter-Arab conflict, except for some mediation at the League Council, and to safeguard the status quo. Alleged attempts at mediation between the UAR and Jordan, for instance, were met with criticism at home (see p 361).

In her international relations Lebanon no longer adopted the outspoken pro-Western attitude of ex-President Sham'ūn, but at the same time safeguarded her good relations with the West—although the government had to tread carefully in this respect. On the other hand, her identification with Positive Neutrality went no further than verbal support for dependent peoples. In the UN, for example, Lebanon deviated from the UAR voting line on such central questions as the admission of Communist China to the UN (voting against), the Congo problem, the USSR proposal on Colonialism, etc. (see p 14 ff).

Relations with the US were a cause of special sensitivity among the Muslim opposition (see e.g. p 361). Government spokesmen reiterated that Lebanon did not accept the Eisenhower Doctrine, or that the US itself had abandoned it. On the other hand the government was clearly interested in "unconditional aid." US new government and other aid in 1960 amounted to \$10.5 million (see p 50).

Relations with France remained normal, Lebanon being one of the three Arab countries in the ME which had not cut off relations with France in the wake of the Suez campaign. A Christian Minister emphasized that Lebanon would not obey Arab League recommendations to boycott France. (However, in the end the League did not agree on such a step.)

Relations with Soviet Russia continued to improve. USSR writers ceased to describe Lebanon as a Western outpost and emphasized favourable aspects of Lebanon's foreign policy and Soviet-Lebanese relations. However, when the US Sixth Fleet visited Beirut, Russia voiced sharp disapproval, evoking a protest from Lebanon. In her relations with Lebanon, Russia utilized special points of association, such as the affinity between the Russian Orthodox and the Greek Orthodox churches, or the visit of a high Soviet Armenian functionary to Lebanon. Lebanon showed special interest in the development of commercial relations.

Particular attention was laid to relations with the newly independent African states, especially to the safeguarding of the interests of Lebanese emigrants in these countries. (For synopsis on this topic see p 369).

Relations with other countries were mainly of a routine nature.

There were many outspoken Lebanese statements on Israel, especially in connection with the Jordan waters (pp 175, 207-8) and Israel's relations with African countries (p 183). However, border relations were normal.



## FOREIGN RELATIONS BY COUNTRIES

(NOTE: For views and policies see pp 342-3; for Lebanon's relations with African countries see below, p 369; Lebanon in inter-Arab relations, p 115 ff; relations with the UAR, pp 156-7; with Israel, pp 195-6; with Communist Countries pp 77-9; Lebanon in the UN, p 4 ff; Lebanon and the Congo question, p 35; foreign aid, p 50; foreign trade, pp 57-8.)

## THE UNITED STATES

**Opposition Sensitivity.** [In 1957 Lebanon accepted the Eisenhower doctrine. However, after the 1958 insurrection when President Shāmūn called for American forces, Lebanon embarked on an official policy of neutrality in world affairs.]

The opposition was very sensitive to any signs of closer Lebanese-US relations. Both Rashīd Karamī and Sa'ib Slām were criticized after their meetings with President Eisenhower (the former in Sept 1959, the latter in Sept 1960), and had to explain in detail what was said. (For Karamī's difficulties in the Chamber on this issue, see *Hayat*, 13, 30 Jan, 19 Feb, 4 Mar; regarding Slām, see below.)

There was an anti-American incident when the US Sixth Fleet visited Beirut.

**Eisenhower Doctrine Rejected.** On 12 Jan the Lebanese Foreign Minister told the Foreign Affairs Committee that Lebanon did not accept the Eisenhower Doctrine, which would make her a dependent country. The aid received from the US in 1959 had been unconditional. (*BBC in Arabic*, 13 Jan-IMB, 13 Jan)

On 3 Mar PM Karamī told the Committee that the US Government had abandoned the Eisenhower Doctrine. (*Hayat*, 4 Mar)

**US Aid.** [US aid to Lebanon was also a sensitive point for the opposition, whereas the government's declared policy was to accept unconditional aid from anywhere. (See p 343. For US aid see p 50.)]

On 14 Dec an American embassy spokesman confirmed recent reports of a "cut-back" in Point 4 aid to Lebanon, which had now become possible.

"The American Government," he added, "shares the gratification which all Lebanese must feel at the fact that this reduction has become possible, thus releasing technicians for other and less fortunate territories." (*Mid. Mirror*, 17 Dec)

**Sept: Slām Meets Eisenhower.** On 22 Sept PM Sa'ib Slām met President Eisenhower. The discussion dealt with the Palestine problem, Lebanese-US relations and general Arab problems. (*NYT*, 24 Sept; *R. Beirut*, 23 Sept-IMB, 25 Sept) (On Slām's difficulties over this meeting at home, see pp 360-1.)

**Oct: Sixth Fleet in Beirut.** On 10 Oct the Sixth Fleet visited Beirut. Its commander, Admiral Anderson, said at a Press conference that he had explicit orders not to intervene in the internal affairs of any country. He said that the aim of the visit was to improve the friendly ties with the Lebanese nation and had no connection with the internal situation in the country. (*Hayat*, 12 Oct)

Commenting on the visit, the Lebanese Minister of Guidance and Information, Fu'ād Ghusn, said that Lebanon was ready to welcome any fleet as long as its visit was based on friendship and cordiality. (*MENA*, 12 Oct-BBC, 14 Oct)

In Beirut "unknown persons" threw stones at marines of the Sixth Fleet. Commenting on Admiral Anderson's statement that he did not take the incident seriously, *al-Anwār* said that he was wrong; it was the spontaneous reaction of citizens who could not bear to see the marines of the country which had created Israel. (*MENA*, 12 Oct-BBC, 14 Oct)

(On USSR reactions see p 78.)

**Oct: US Gift of Atomic Energy Equipment.** On 29 Oct the Lebanese Government received, for use in the university's laboratories, a gift of atomic energy equipment from the US, including radio-isotopes, a radiation analyzer and a teletherapy unit, under the US "Atoms for Peace" programme. (*Mid. Mirror*, 5 Nov)

## FRANCE

**Relations Normal.** On 5 Apr Pierre Jumayil, the Minister of Public Works, said that Lebanon refused to obey any Arab League recommendation for a diplomatic, economic, and cultural boycott of France. (*ANA*, 5 Apr-BBC, 7 Apr)

[Lebanon, Libya and Sudan were the only Arab countries in the ME which had diplomatic relations with France in 1960.]

On 25 Apr, 35 French journalists came for a week's visit. (*Hayat*, 26 Apr)

In Aug a hundred deputies of the French National Assembly formed a Franco-Lebanese friendship society with the aim of reviving the traditional ties between the two countries. (*Monde*, 9 Aug) M. Roger Pimoteau, Deputy from Paris, was elected President.

On 8 Sept it was announced that France and Lebanon had settled their dispute over the tax position of two French companies in Beirut (Compagnie du Port des Quais et des Entrepôts de Beyrouth and Société-Radio-Orient), and the case was withdrawn from the International Court of Justice. (*Mid. Mirror*, 10 Sept)

On 19 Oct a delegation of four French Senate Members, including the chairman of its cultural committee, arrived to discuss matters connected with the cultural agreement between the two countries. (*Anwar*, 21 Oct)

**Lebanese Aircraft Intercepted.** On 22 Dec it was announced in Paris that a privately chartered Lebanese aircraft had been intercepted by French Air Force planes, and forced to land at Oran. It was said to have been on a flight from Stockholm to Casablanca, with a cargo of five tons of arms.

Swedish Government officials later disclosed that a Lebanese plane had left Stockholm for Argentina on 21 Dec with "a legal load" of bazookas.

In Beirut, on 23 Dec, a Minister said that Lebanon would "retaliate by similar methods" should the French refuse to release the detained aircraft.

On 25 Dec the plane and its crew returned to Lebanon without the cargo of arms. On 29 Dec Lebanon formally protested to the International Aviation Organization. In the Chamber of Deputies the Premier said he wished that the cargo had been destined for Algeria. He emphasized that it was on its way to Argentina. (*Mid. Mirror*, 24, 31 Dec)

## OTHER NATO COUNTRIES

**German Federal Republic.** On 24 Mar a West German delegation arrived in Lebanon for economic talks. On 25

Mar it discussed economic cooperation with President Shehab and Pierre Jumayil, the Minister of Public Works. Earlier, it visited PM Karami and the Minister of General Planning.

Members of the delegation said that West Germany was ready to give Lebanon technical and economic aid, and it was agreed to prepare reports and surveys of suitable Lebanese economic projects. (*R. Beirut*, 25 Mar–*BBC*, 28 Mar; *Hayat*, 25, 28 Mar, 1 Apr)

On 29 Apr a West German Army Colonel, accompanied by a civilian advisor, called on the Commander of the Lebanese Army, Adil Shehab. (*Bina'*, 30 Apr)

On 26 Oct a delegation of West German experts arrived in Beirut to study water and building projects. (*R. Beirut*, 26 Oct–*BBC*, 28 Oct)

**Greece.** On 8 June a commercial agreement, ratified by the Chamber two months earlier, was signed between Greece and Lebanon. (*R. Amman*, 9 June–*IMB*, 10 June)

**Italy.** On 11 June an air traffic agreement between Lebanon and Italy was signed in Beirut. (*R. Damascus*, 12 June–*IMB*, 12 June)

**Netherlands.** On 3 Nov, the diplomatic relations between Lebanon and the Netherlands were raised to ambassadorial level. (*R. Amman*, 4 Nov–*IMB*, 4 Nov)

#### OTHER COUNTRIES

**Afghanistan.** On 7 Nov the King of Afghanistan arrived in Beirut from Belgrade for a two-day private visit. He was received at the airport by President Shehab and other leaders. (*ANA*, 7 Nov–*BBC*, 9 Nov)

**Argentina.** On 3 May the Speaker of the Argentine House of Representatives arrived from Damascus for a two-day visit. He was officially greeted at the Lebanese-Syrian border. (*Mid. Mirror*, 8 May)

On 17 May a delegation led by Alfred Naqqash, a former President, left for Argentina to represent Lebanon at the celebration commemorating the 150th anniversary of Independence in Buenos Aires on 25 May. (*Mid. Mirror*, 22 May)

On 21 May an official Argentine commercial delegation arrived in Beirut to discuss the development of economic ties. (*Jaridah*, 22 May)

**Brazil.** On 25 Apr a delegation from the Brazilian Coffee Institute arrived in Beirut for negotiations on the establishment of a centre for the sale of Brazilian coffee in the ME. (*Mid. Mirror*, 1 May)

**Burma.** On 5 Feb the Lebanese authorities detained two Burmese military aircraft on their way from London to Rangoon for landing at Beirut without the Defence Ministry's permission. (*MENA*, 6 Feb–*BBC*, 8 Feb)

**Chile.** On 17 Oct the Speaker of the Chilean Senate arrived for a week's visit. (*Jaridah*, 18 Oct)

**The People's Republic of China.** [Lebanon does not recognize the People's Republic of China. In the UN she voted against discussion of China's admission, and this was resented in opposition circles at home.]

At the end of Mar China closed her trade office in

Beirut, and the staff left for home. No reason was given for this step. (*ANA*, 1 Apr–*BBC*, 3 Apr)

On 23 Aug a troupe of Chinese artistes came to Beirut for a series of performances at the invitation of the Lebanese Ministry of Education. (*Jaridah*, 24 Aug)

As'ad al-Muqaddam, Editor-in-Chief of the Lebanese newspaper *as-Siyasah*, arrived in Peking on 25 Sept for a visit at the invitation of the Chinese Journalists' Union. (*MENA*, 26 Sept–*BBC*, 28 Sept)

**Colombia.** On 30 Jan it was announced that Lebanon's diplomatic relations with Colombia were to be raised to the ambassadorial level. (*R. Beirut*, 30 Jan–*IMB*, 31 Jan)

**India.** On 23 Apr an Indian delegation, sent by the Indian board for encouraging silk exports, arrived in Beirut from Baghdad. (*Hayat*, 23 Apr)

On 24 May Mr Nehru, the Indian PM, arrived in Beirut on a two-day visit in the course of a tour of ME countries. After a conference with President Shehab and PM Da'ūq, the latter said that the talks had dealt with the collapse of the Summit Conference and the international situation in general. He denied Press reports that the government would seize the opportunity to seek Mr Nehru's collaboration for mediation with France to solve the Algerian problem. Mr Nehru left for Damascus on 26 May. (*Mid. Mirror*, 29 May)

On 19 Oct an Indian commercial delegation arrived in Beirut for a one-week visit to discuss the strengthening of commercial ties. (*Hayat*, 20 Oct)

**Iran.** (For relations with Iran concerning Israel see p 216 ff.) On 13 Jan, as a result of the rupture of talks on an air traffic agreement, the Iranian authorities prevented the departure of a Lebanese plane and the Lebanese retaliated by holding an Iranian plane. After an exchange of protests a temporary agreement was signed on 17 Mar and air traffic resumed. (*Hayat*, 14 Jan, 16, 18 Mar; *Orient*, 12 Feb)

On 31 July ten students left Lebanon for Tehran University on Iranian Government scholarships. Most of them were to study engineering and medicine. (*Hayat*, 3 Aug)

On 2 Aug Ali Bizzi, a Shi'i Deputy and former Minister of the Interior, returned to Lebanon after a nine-day visit to Iran at the invitation of the Iranian Government. (*Hayat*, 3 Aug)

**Japan.** On 8–9 Feb a delegation of Japanese cotton importers met local industrialists and businessmen in Beirut and discussed commercial possibilities. (*Siyasah*, 9 Feb)

On 13 Sept representatives of the Japanese Ministry of Communications touring the ME discussed in Beirut the possibility of co-operation in the fields of broadcasting and telecommunications. (*Mid. Mirror*, 17 Sept)

**Philippines.** In May the Philippines Minister of Commerce had talks with Lebanese authorities during a three-day visit. (*Anwar*, 21 May)

**Venezuela.** On 23 Mar a decree was published on the establishment of a Lebanese legation in Caracas, Venezuela. (*Jaridah*, 24 Mar)

## LEBANON AND AFRICA

## SYNOPSIS

Lebanon's paramount interest in Africa in 1960 was to safeguard the position of the Lebanese emigrants who had become the principal commercial group in several African countries. (For the number of emigrants see p 364.) As the African countries became independent, anxiety was expressed lest the rights of the emigrants—who were also a source of foreign income for Lebanon—be curtailed. Difficulties did arise in Senegal and Guinea. This was the main motive for the extension of Lebanese diplomatic representation in Africa in 1960.

Preliminary measures were taken by the government and Lebanese emigrants to expand commercial relations. Commercial and air agreements were concluded with several West African countries.

After the UAR, Lebanon was the most vociferous in demanding Arab initiative to obstruct Israel's activities in Africa. (See Arab anti-Israeli Activities in Africa, p 182 ff.)

## AFRICA IN GENERAL

**Interests of Lebanese Emigrants.** In Mar *al-Jaridah* demanded that the Lebanese Government strengthen its ties with African countries, expressing the anxiety that African governments might restrict the activities of the emigrants. (*Jaridah*, 18 Mar) In Apr the Lebanese Government, after hearing a report from two Ministers who had visited Senegal, decided to strengthen its ties with African countries, in order to strengthen the position of Lebanese there. (*Hayat*, 14 Apr) A delegation of such emigrants visited President Shehab in Aug and emphasized the need for closer relations, Shehab replied that the Lebanese Foreign Ministry had already been instructed to award scholarships to Africans and that new diplomatic missions were about to be established in Africa. (*Anwar*, 14 Aug) The Conference of Lebanese Emigrants, held in Beirut in Sept, resolved to create a financial institution, with a minimum capital of LL10 million, whose activities would include African projects (see pp 365–6). (*Hayat*, 2 Oct)

In Dec *al-Hayāt* reported that the Lebanese Government had received cables and letters from emigrants in Africa, complaining of "obstacles lately put in their way" and requesting government protection. President Shehab had decided to send special missions in 1961, which would try to persuade the authorities in African countries to withdraw several regulations which threatened to limit, or even bring to a standstill, the activities of the emigrants. (*Hayat*, 25 Dec)

**Extension of Lebanese Representation in Africa.** In Apr the Lebanese Government ordered the establishment of a legation in Conakry, Guinea, and consulates in Abidjan, Ivory Coast, and Freetown, Sierra Leone. (*Hayat*, 15 Apr) In June the government decided to establish embassies in Ghana and Senegal. The embassy in Dakar would serve as a centre for dealing with the affairs of Lebanese emigrants in Africa. (*Hayat*, 30 June)

In May it was reported that the Lebanese Foreign Ministry had decided to transfer staff from its diplomatic missions in Europe to Africa. (*Hayat*, 14 May) However, in Oct another newspaper reported that most of the officials were shirking orders to serve in Africa, preferring to serve in Europe or America, or remain in Beirut. (*Beirut al-Masā',* 27 Oct)

In Nov it was again reported that Lebanon intended

to extend her representation in Africa, so as to safeguard the interests of her emigrants. (*Anwar*, 1 Nov)

**Scholarships for Africans.** In Oct the Lebanese Ministry of Education announced the award of 25 scholarships to students from Ghana. It was discussing with the Foreign Ministry the award of scholarships to Nigeria and other African countries. (*Siyasah*, 19 Oct)

In Nov the Lebanese Government decided to award about 100 scholarships to African students. (*Hayat*, 8 Nov)

## CAMEROUN, ETHIOPIA

**Cameroun.** Lebanon recognized Cameroun in Jan. (*Hayat*, 28 Jan)

A Cameroun parliamentary delegation, making a tour of Arab countries, visited Lebanon in Dec. Its leader said that its purpose was to strengthen relations with the Arab countries. There were 6,000 Lebanese in Cameroun, he said. [The 1960 official Lebanese estimate was 150.] He showed President Shehab a copy of a Cameroun law which awarded rights and facilities to Lebanese emigrants. (*Hayat*, 3 Dec) [The mission also visited Iraq and Saudi Arabia.]

**Ethiopia: Projected Visit by Emperor.** A semi-official source in Beirut reported that the Emperor would visit Lebanon in the spring of 1961, after visiting the Holy Places in Jerusalem. (*Hayat*, 22 Nov)

The Lebanese Press and radio reported the Ethiopian revolt factually, generally abstaining from comment. *Al-Hayāt*, however, remarked that the revolt was unavoidable, because the Emperor's rule was extremely backward. (*Hayat*, 18 Dec)

## GHANA

**Mar: Lebanese Mission Raised to Embassy.** On 16 Mar the Lebanese Foreign Ministry announced that the Lebanese legation in Ghana would be raised to the rank of embassy, in order to intensify efforts against Israeli penetration and as an act to counter the raising of diplomatic relations between Ghana and Israel to ambassadorial level. (*Hayat*, 17 Mar)

**Apr: Ghanaian Parliamentary Mission in Lebanon.** A parliamentary mission from Ghana visited Lebanon in Apr. (*Hayat*, 14 Apr)

**May: Draft Commercial Agreement Prepared.** The Lebanese Ministry of Commerce prepared a draft commercial agreement between Lebanon and Ghana. (*Jaridah*, 12 May) [There were no subsequent reports about this agreement in 1960.]

**Aug: Ghana to be Represented in Lebanon.** In May it was reported that Ghana would be represented in Lebanon by a Minister. (*Jaridah*, 12 May) When the Ghanaian Transport Minister arrived in Lebanon in Aug he said he had been charged with opening Ghana's diplomatic mission in Lebanon. (*Hayat*, 23 Aug) [Up to the end of 1960, Ghana did not open a diplomatic mission in Lebanon.]

**Aug: Air Agreement Signed.** A Ghanaian delegation, headed by the Transport Minister, arrived in Lebanon on 20 Aug to discuss an air agreement. The agreement was signed on 29 Aug. (*Hayat*, 21, 23, 30 Aug)

## GUINEA

**May: Lebanese Emigrants in Plot Against Regime.** Several Lebanese emigrants were detained in Guinea in May, following the uncovering of a plot against the regime. At a conference of the Guinea Democratic Party, Sekou Touré announced that there were several Lebanese emigrants among the plotters. The Lebanese Foreign Ministry instructed the Lebanese Minister in Liberia to go to Conakry and question President Sekou Touré about the condition of the detained Lebanese. It was reported that one of them had died of beating.

Several Lebanese emigrants protested to the Lebanese Government against the absence of diplomatic representation in Guinea, maintaining that detained nationals of other countries had received a better treatment because the representatives of their countries were on guard. In the meantime, the Guinea Government forbade all Lebanese nationals to leave the country until the conclusion of the investigation. (*Hayat*, 11, 12 May; *Jaridah*, 12 May)

**June-Sept: Lebanese Diplomatic Representation in Guinea.** In June the Lebanese Government appointed its Minister to Liberia to be Minister to Guinea as well. In Sept it was announced that a Lebanese legation had been opened in Conakry and that it had begun looking after the interests of all Lebanese emigrants. (*Amal*, 3 June; *Jaridah*, 15 Sept) [There was no Guinean mission in Lebanon.]

**July: Economic Agreement Signed.** On 29 July an economic agreement between Lebanon and Guinea was signed in Conakry. A Foreign Ministry spokesman said Lebanon hoped the agreement would open a new era in the relations between the two countries. (*Hayat*, 30 July)

## LIBERIA

**Lebanese Emigrants "Dominate" Liberia's Economy.** The Liberian Minister in Lebanon, Henri al-Jamil, stated in Feb that there were 2,000 Lebanese in Liberia. [According to 1960 Lebanese official statistics there were 2,697. See p 364.] The Lebanese dominated the Liberian economy, because they controlled 65 per cent of the country's commerce, although they were a small minority in the population of 2.5 million. They were among the richest people in Liberia; in a single year they had sent LL8 million to relatives in Lebanon. They had considerable properties in Lebanon, as well as in Liberia. (*Hayat*, 21 Feb) [During 1960, the Lebanese Press noted several times that Lebanese emigrants controlled 65 per cent of Liberia's economy. See *Hayat*, 26 July, 19 Aug.]

**Feb: Proposals for Establishment of Arab-African Company.** Alfred Naqqāsh [former Lebanese President], on his return from Liberia where he represented President Shehab at President Tubman's inauguration, submitted a report to the Lebanese Government proposing to establish several undertakings to strengthen the cooperation between the two countries. (*Sahafah*, 25 Feb)

In Apr it was reported that Jamil, the Liberian Minister in Lebanon, had proposed to President Shehab that a Lebanese-African company should be established with a capital of LL100 million. It would be financed by the Lebanese Government and businessmen and by oil-producing Arab states. The company would establish development projects in Liberia and West Africa, and fight the increasing Israeli activity in Liberia.

Later, Jamil met with the Lebanese PM and other

leaders and officials to explain his project. (*Hayat*, 5 Apr; *Nahar*, 21 July; *Anwar*, 13 Oct)

In Oct Jamil met with President Tubman and reported to him that the Conference of Lebanese Emigrants in Beirut in Sept had decided on the establishment of a Lebanese financial institution which would organize an Arab-African development company. (*Anwar*, 25 Oct)

**Feb: Decision to Open Lebanon-Liberia Airline.** The Lebanese Government decided in Feb to open an airline between Lebanon and Liberia. (*Sahafah*, 25 Feb)

In Oct the preparation of a draft air agreement between Lebanon and Liberia was discussed in Beirut. (*Anwar*, 13 Oct)

**Aug: Liberia's Highest Decoration for Shehab.** In Aug President Shehab was awarded Liberia's highest decoration. (*Hayat*, 19 Aug) [Abdel-Nasser was similarly decorated in July.]

## LEBANON AND MALI FEDERATION; SENEGAL

**Apr: Airline Inaugurated.** A Lebanese mission, headed by Ali Bizzi, Minister of the Interior and Information, and Pierre Jumayil, Minister of Public Works, visited Dakar on 7-12 Apr to inaugurate the new Lebanese Beirut-Tripoli-Dakar airline. (*Hayat*, 2, 7, 13, 26 Apr)

**Apr: Mission Deals with Affairs of Lebanese Emigrants.** Jumayil held talks with the Senegalese authorities and obtained promises on the safeguarding of the interests of the "15,000" Lebanese emigrants residing in Senegal. [According to 1960 Lebanese official statistics they numbered 10,600. See p 364.]

The mission also tried to settle quarrels among the emigrants, some of whom participated in local political affairs, while others opposed such activities as likely to jeopardize their interests. (*Hayat*, 2, 7, 13, 26 Apr; *Amal*, 26 Apr)

**Apr: Reported Difficulties in Senegal.** In Apr a Lebanese source reported that the Senegalese authorities "had taken measures to cancel the licences granted to Lebanese enterprises." Reporting this, *as-Sayād* mentioned that the Senegalese Press had recently accused the Lebanese of aspiring to dominate Senegal, following a statement made by Jumayil during his visit concerning Lebanon's readiness to send teachers to Senegal "to fight illiteracy in that country." (*Sayad*, 14 Apr)

**June: Senegalese Arab Affairs Official's Visit.** Hajj Malik Si, the official in charge of Arab and Muslim affairs in the Senegalese Ministry of the Interior and Controller of the Arabic Press in Senegal, visited Beirut on his return from the pilgrimage to Mecca. At an interview with *al-Hayāt* he stated that there were special schools for the teaching of Arabic in Senegal, with 800 pupils in each under the control of the Muslim Cultural Association. [He did not say how many such schools existed.] He said the authorities had prepared a programme for the study of Arabic, together with French and English. (*Hayat*, 19 June)

**June: Lebanon Recognizes Mali Federation.** When the Federation of Mali (former French Sudan and Senegal) became independent on 20 June, Lebanon announced the recognition of the new state. (*Hayat*, 24 June) The Lebanese emigrants had sent messages to the Presidents of Lebanon and the UAR, requesting the speedy establishment of diplomatic and economic relations with the Mali Federation. (*Hayat*, 22 June)



**June: Senegalese PM Engaged to Lebanese Girl.** On 15 June the Senegalese PM, Mamadou Dia, became engaged to a Lebanese girl. He said he hoped his engagement would contribute to the strengthening of the relations between the two countries. (*Hayat*, 30 June)

**June: Importance of Relations with Federation of Mali.** In a leading article, in June, *al-Hayāt* wrote that if there was a country in the world that should maintain amicable relations with the Federation of Mali it was Lebanon. Senegal was the first African country to which Lebanese emigrants had gone and the Lebanese emigrants' colony in the Federation was the largest in Africa, consisting of 30,000 people. [According to 1960 Lebanese official statistics, they numbered 11,670, but this was still the largest concentration in Africa. See p 364.] The emigrants had done much for the development of the country. Senegal was the most important source of African income to Lebanon, where tens of thousands of families were living on money and gifts sent by their relatives from the Federation. The Lebanese Government should therefore establish in Mali an embassy of a high standard and send there a special mission to examine all possibilities for cooperation. (*Hayat*, 24 June)

**Aug: Lebanese Emigrants Propose Strengthening of Ties.** The Lebanese Consul General in Dakar conferred with the representatives of the Lebanese emigrants preparatory to the emigrants' conference in Lebanon in Sept.

The Association for Mutual Aid of the Arab Lebanese submitted to the Consul General proposals for strengthening Lebanon's ties with the emigrants and the countries where they resided. The proposals included the sending of cultural and economic missions, the grant of scholarships in Lebanon to emigrants and Africans, the despatch of teachers of Arabic, the establishment of an Arabic Cultural Institute, the establishment of an Arab printing house and the publication of Arabic periodicals. (*Hayat*, 16 Aug)

**Sept: Lebanon Recognizes Republic of Mali.** The Mali Federation broke up in Aug. Lebanon announced its recognition of the new Republic of Mali on 28 Sept (*Hayat*, 30 Sept), maintaining her existing relations with Dakar.

**Oct: Senegal to Open Consulate.** The Republic of Senegal decided to open a consulate in Beirut [while opening embassies in the UAR, Morocco and Tunisia]. (*Hayat*, 28 Oct)

#### SIERRA LEONE

**Aug: Establishment of Lebanese Consulate General.** Lebanon announced in Aug the establishment of a consulate general in Freetown. An embassy would be established when Sierra Leone became independent in Apr 1961. These steps would be taken in view of the large number of Lebanese emigrants in the country. (*Hayat*, 10 Aug)

At a ceremony in Freetown, the PM of Sierra Leone, Sir Milton Margai, was awarded Lebanon's highest decoration. (*Hayat*, 10 Aug)

**Sept: Sierra Leone Islamic Congress Asks for Aid.** Jibril Sisi, SG of the Islamic Congress in Sierra Leone, visited Lebanon in Sept to ask for aid for the establishment of Arabic schools. He said that Sierra Leone needed aid from Arab countries and mentioned that there were 5,000 Lebanese emigrants there. [According to 1960 official Lebanese statistics, they numbered 2,900; see p 364.]

Sisi reported that Israel had offered material aid to Sierra Leone and the despatch of Arabic lecturers from Israel, but its proposal had been rejected. Several Sierra Leoneans were in favour of accepting Israel's proposals, arguing that the Arab countries were not capable of carrying them out. (For Israel's relations with Sierra Leone, see pp 314-5.)

Sisi said he would visit other Arab capitals as well. (*Hayat*, 3 Sept)

# THE SAUDI ARABIAN KINGDOM

(Al-Mamlakah as-Saudiyah al-Arabiyah)

## INTERNAL AFFAIRS

### BACKGROUND AND SYNOPSIS

Political power in Saudi Arabia is concentrated in the hands of the royal family. The history of the country's internal affairs in 1960 is essentially the history of a struggle for power, which went on within the royal family throughout the year, though without violence and with few outward manifestations beyond the obvious changes in office and a controversy over the issue of constitutional reform. The main protagonists were the two eldest surviving sons of Abd al-Aziz Ibn Abd ar-Rahmān "Ibn Saud," the founder of the Kingdom: Saud Ibn Abd al-Aziz (b. 1901), the reigning King, and his brother, Amir Faisal Ibn Abd al-Aziz (b. 1907), the heir-apparent.

As Prime Minister, the Amir Faisal had been the *de facto* ruler since Mar 1958. At that time a family council had compelled King Saud to forgo most of his powers, following a severe crisis due to the King's mismanagement of finance and foreign affairs (when Saud was accused of having tried to procure the assassination of President Abdel-Nasser). Saud's efforts since then to regain his lost positions were aided by Faisal's policy of retrenchment, which alienated powerful tribal interests, as well as commercial circles who were accustomed to the spendthrift ways of the former regime. Moreover, Faisal, though not averse to administrative reform and a measure of civic freedom, was opposed to a constitutional monarchy. This was becoming the *dernier cri* in political circles—mainly, of course, in the towns and oil centres—and among those members of the royal house who were afraid that autocratic rule might speedily lead to social and political upheaval, unless abandoned in time.

Throughout 1960 the King built up his position by cashing in on all these fears and hopes. He let it be known that he favoured a constitution for the Kingdom, based on a measure of popular representation. He assiduously cultivated the tribes, and kept the religious interest on his side by stressing his adherence to tradition in word and deed. He progressively obstructed Faisal in the execution of his functions. Faisal was also hampered by a serious chronic disease.

At last, in Dec 1960, the King's delay in giving his assent to the new budget drawn up in Faisal's name provoked the Amir into a gesture which the King interpreted as a formal letter of resignation. Saud thereupon declared the government dissolved and proceeded to form a new one under his own premiership, in spite of the protests of Faisal and his supporters. However, Saud tried to avoid a complete breach by offering Faisal the post of Vice-premier—which he rejected,—and by implicitly recognizing him anew as heir to the throne.

The surging hopes of the constitutionalists were damped, before the year was out, by clear indications on the King's part that he did not intend to take practical steps in this direction in the foreseeable future.

Apart from this central theme, the following events are noteworthy:

At the beginning of the year Faisal, as Prime Minister, announced the abolition of Press censorship.

Preparations were pushed ahead for the establishment of an Islamic University at Medina.

Some measures of Labour Legislation were announced, and steps were taken to oust foreigners from the local labour market.

NOTE: "*Views and Policies*" have not been brought in a separate paragraph because of the comparative scarcity of relevant utterances: they appear in the general text in the appropriate place.

### ECONOMIC SURVEY

The consolidation of Saudi Arabia's public finances, internal and external, began under the administration of Amir Faisal in 1958 and continued in 1959 and 1960. The latter year was inaugurated with a series of royal decrees providing for thorough financial reorganization.

The most important move was a *de facto* devaluation of the Saudi Arabian riyal to 4.5 riyals to the US dollar (0.197482 grammes of fine gold per riyal), instead of the previous official rate of 3.75 riyals to the dollar. The new rate corresponded with the real value of the riyal on the free market.

Other decrees provided for the introduction of a new paper currency fully backed by gold or transferable foreign currency to replace the "pilgrim receipts" and Saudi Arabian gold guineas, which were gradually withdrawn from circulation during the year. The new paper riyal was divided into 20 piastres instead of 22.

The improvement in the financial situation during 1959 and the introduction of the new exchange rate enabled the government to abolish as from the beginning of 1960 the import restrictions and exchange controls in force since Mar 1958.

The budget for 1379/1380 AH (corresponding roughly to 1960) continued to reflect the tight control on finances introduced in the summer of 1958. Revenue and Expenditure balanced at 1,405 million riyals (\$375 million) compared with 1,410 million riyals in the previous year. Oil revenues supplied 84 per cent of the estimated income. Following the devaluation of the riyal the value of the budget income grew to 1,637 million riyals, most of the resulting surplus being allocated to repayment of government debts. In the expenditures the royal court and bodyguard accounted for 268 million riyals (252 million in 1959), security for 197 million and development for 215 million.

The financial consolidation enabled the government to increase its share in the capital of the International Monetary Fund from \$10 million to \$55 million and its subscription to the funds of the International Bank from \$10 million to \$73.3 million.

Though it had a beneficial effect upon the national economy as a whole, Faisal's monetary policy adversely affected domestic commercial activity, which showed signs

of stagnation, and private capital continued to flow abroad in large amounts.

Saudi Arabian crude oil production reached a record of 61 million metric tons in 1960—a 13.9 per cent increase over 1959. Throughput at Ras Tanura refinery rose to ten million tons, compared with less than nine million tons in 1958 and 1959. Aramco continued with development and exploration, concentrating on the Rub' al-Khali desert area. New producing wells and facilities were completed in the Hadriya oilfield. The Khursaniyah oil field, discovered in 1956, started commercial production at the beginning of 1960. Tapline throughput to Sidon fell to the lowest figure on record, owing mainly to competition with depressed tanker rates; average daily throughput was 240,000 barrels, compared with the pipeline capacity of 469,000 barrels. Oil royalties in 1960 were \$335 million compared with \$315 million in 1959.

The Japanese Arabian Oil company continued the development of its commercial oil field, Khafji, off-shore from the neutral zone of Kuwait. Saudi Arabia and Kuwait will share in the royalties. Commercial exports were due to begin in 1961.

A royal decree at the beginning of June authorized

Amir Sa'ad, a son of King Saud, to set up the first locally-owned refinery in the country. The plant was to be owned by the Saudi Arabian Refining Company (SARCO). It was to be built in the Jedda area at an estimated cost of \$20 million and have a capacity of 20,000 barrels a day (a million tons a year). Fifty-one per cent of the 40 million riyal capital was subscribed by a group including members of the royal family, and the remaining shares were offered for public subscription by Saudi Arabian citizens only. The company will enjoy the exclusive right to distribute oil products in the western part of the country for 40 years.

A mission from the International Bank of Reconstruction and Development arrived in May 1960 and drew up a report outlining suggestions for economic development, emphasizing agricultural projects, particularly in the province of Asir, and road and port development.

Although there are no reliable foreign trade statistics for Saudi Arabia, it would appear that the imports were no higher in 1960 than in 1959. This was attributed to the depressed domestic commercial market. The main suppliers in 1960, in order of importance, were the US, the UK, West Germany, Japan and Italy.

### THE GOVERNMENT

Ministry	26 Mar 1959	2 July 1960	21 Dec 1960
Prime Minister	Amir Faisal Ibn Abd al-Aziz*	Amir Faisal Ibn Abd al-Aziz*	King Saud Ibn Abd al-Aziz
Foreign Affairs	Amir Faisal Ibn Abd al-Aziz*	Amir Faisal Ibn Abd al-Aziz*	Shaykh Ibrahim as Suwayl
Economics and Finance	Amir Faisal Ibn Abd al-Aziz*	Amir Faisal Ibn Abd al-Aziz*	Amir Talāl Ibn Abd al-Aziz
Defence and Civil Aviation	Amir Fahd Ibn Saud	Amir Musā'id Ibn Abd ar-Rahmān	Amir Muhammad Ibn Saud
Interior	Amir Faisal Ibn Abd al-Aziz*	Amir Faisal Ibn Abd al-Aziz*	Amir Abd al-Muhsin Ibn Abd al-Aziz
Communication	Amir Sultān Ibn Abd al-Aziz	Amir Sultān Ibn Abd al-Aziz	Amir Badr Ibn Abd al-Aziz
Education	Amir Fahd Ibn Abd al-Aziz	Amir Fahd Ibn Abd al-Aziz	Shaykh Abd al-Aziz Ibn Hasan
Health	Dr Rshād Far'ūn	Dr Rshād Far'ūn	Dr Hasan Nasif
Agriculture	Khalid as-Sadiri	Khalid as-Sadiri	Abdullah ad-Dabbāgh
Oil and Mineral Resources			Abdullah al-Hammūd at-Tariqi
Trade and Supply	Amir Faisal Ibn Abd al-Aziz*	Ahmad Salāh Jamjūm	Ahmad Shata
King's Counsellor (Mustashār al-Malik)	Amir Mash'al Ibn Abd al-Aziz	Amir Mash'al Ibn Abd al-Aziz	

\* Also holds other post(s).

NOTE: Ministers of State are not included in this list; as a rule they do not attend Cabinet meetings.

### THE KING CAMPAIGNS FOR SUPPORT

**The King Tours the Country.** Throughout 1960, the King was constantly paying visits to various parts of the country, sometimes for several weeks at a time. These were always accompanied by publicity in the local newspapers, and royal receptions in the encampments of the Bedouin tribes, as well as in the villages and towns, where he distributed money to the needy. Saud travelled with his own tents, setting up camp alongside a Bedouin tribe and then moving on to another one.

During most of Jan and the early part of Feb, the King travelled through the district of the Mutir and Sabi tribes, in the East of the Kingdom. (*Bilad*, 24 Jan, 3 Feb; *Umm al-Qura*, 12 Feb)

In the second half of Feb, he encamped in Al-Kharj (south of Riyadh), taking part in receptions and ceremonies, and paid out thousands of riyals to cover the debts of poor citizens who had been thrown into prison

for non-payment. He also visited the camp of the Ammāj tribe and the suburbs of Riyadh. (*Bilad* 16, 19, 22, 28 Feb)

In Mar Saud journeyed to Hijaz, Jedda and Mecca, again paying the debts of imprisoned debtors and visited Bedouin tribes, on his return journey to Riyadh. (*Bilad*, 22 Mar, 5 Apr)

In Apr he toured towns, villages and tribes on the east coast; conspicuous in welcoming him was Abd al-Muhsin Ibn Jalawi, Amir of the Eastern District. (*Umm al-Qura*, 22, 29 Apr, 6 May)

From the end of May and until 18 June, the King stayed in Mecca for the pilgrimage. Amirs, dignitaries, religious leaders, senior officials and heads of tribes came to pay him homage, and he received leaders of pilgrimages from all over the world. (*Bilad*, 27 May, 19 June)

In July, the King spent a weekend in Al-Kharj with

tribal and religious leaders and other notables. (*Umm al-Qura*, 29 July)

In Aug he was the guest of the 21st Regiment of the King's Guard, stationed along the Al-Kharj-ar-Riyadh road. (*Umm al-Qura*, 12 Aug)

In Sept, he again visited the east coast. In Kharj he once more settled the debts of the poor and distributed food and clothing to needy families affected by the drought in the northern part of the district. (*Bilad*, 16 Sept; *Umm al-Qura*, 28 Sept) Lavish receptions were given in his honour in the towns south of Al-Kharj. (*Umm al-Qura* 21 Oct; *Bilad*, 26 Oct)

In Nov King Saud visited Medina, "where the enthusiasm of the population knew no bounds," and received tribal and religious leaders, dignitaries and senior officials from all over Hijaz. (*Bilad* 20, 22 Nov) Afterwards, he visited the Bedouin tribes and the small towns of Najd, northwest of Riyadh. During this trip he was the guest of Amir Fahd Ibn Faisal on his estates. (*Bilad*, 25, 27 Nov, 4, 14 Dec; *Umm al-Qura*, 2, 14 Dec)

[For impressions of these visits, see the local Press.]

**The King as a Religious Functionary.** As was his custom, the King received religious leaders (Ulamā'), led sometimes by the Chief Mufti, every Thursday in his palace in Riyadh. Wide publicity was given to these meetings in the Press. (See *Umm al-Qura* throughout the year; *Bilad*—Friday feature "Royal Interviews" or "His Majesty the Great King.")

He also continued another custom of his, "leading the pilgrims," taking part in the ceremonial washing of the Ka'bah and performing the other precepts of the Hajj.

As head of the host state and Guardian of the Holy Places, Saud received leaders of the overseas Hajj pilgrims. (*Bilad* 3, 9, 12, 15, 17, 24, 30 June) From time to time, he gave donations from his own purse for the erection or renovation of mosques in various parts of the Kingdom and also abroad. (*Bilad*, 7 Apr, 1 July, 14 Sept; *Umm al-Qura* 2, 12, 19, 26 Aug, 9 Sept)

[On the King's orders for the establishment of an Islamic University and on the relationship between religion and the state, see pp 378-9.]

Wide coverage was given in the local Press to all information connected with the King as a religious functionary. He was referred to as "Guardian of Religion and Prime Defender of its Lofty Precepts" (*Umm al-Qura*, 12 Feb), "Keeper of the House of the Lord" (*Umm al-Qura*, 19 Aug), or "The Arab-Muslim King." (*Umm al-Qura*, 12 Nov)

**Closer Link Between Bedouin and King.** [In addition to the King's visits to the Bedouin tribes, almost every issue of *al-Bilad* and *Umm al-Qura* carried notices of interviews and discussions between the King and tribal leaders and notables.]

**Wide Publicity for Saud's Acts of Charity.** The Saudi Arabian Press continued to describe Saud's acts of justice and charity. The King spent hundreds of thousands of riyals during the year, mostly to meet the obligations of imprisoned debtors. In several instances, the King paid out of his own pocket for medical treatment and hospitalization; he even defrayed the costs of medical treatment abroad, sometimes sending the patient in his private plane. (See "The Humanity of the King," regular feature in *Umm al-Qura*; the column in *Bilad*, "His Majesty the Great King," subtitled "King and Kingly Gesture,"—*Bilad* 4, 5, 20 Feb, 7, 9, 10, 11, 13, 14 Mar, 20 June, 29 July, 2, 8, Aug, 23, 30 Oct, 9, 11, 13 Nov; and the *Letters*

to the Editor column in *Bilad*, 3, 29 July, 30 Oct, 11 Nov.)

He also donated various sums for public undertakings such as the supply of water to villages (*Umm al-Qura*, 19 Feb; *Bilad*, 21 Mar), road laying (*Bilad*, 20 Mar; *Umm al-Qura*, 8 Apr, 15 July), the erection and renovation of mosques (see above: The King as Religious Functionary), and upkeep of cemeteries. (*Bilad*, 10 Mar)

The King's charitable donations abroad were also widely reported in the Saudi Arabian Press, e.g. £10,000 for an orphanage for Palestinian children in Beirut (*Umm al-Qura*, 12 Aug) and the allotment of 50,000 riyals as an annual donation to the Islamic Institute of Aden. (*Umm al-Qura*, 14 Oct)

**Public Appearances on Popular Occasions.** In addition to his tours, the King also appeared on popular occasions, such as football matches (*Umm al-Qura*, 15 Apr, 7 Oct; *Bilad*, 13 Oct), the races (*Umm al-Qura*, 27 May) and school inspection tours. (*Umm al-Qura*, 4 Mar; *Bilad*, 7 Mar)

**Events at Court.** On 12 Nov, the seventh anniversary of King Saud's accession to the throne, poems and articles were published in praise of the King. Saud published a Declaration to the People and, through a *Bilad* reporter, repeated it in simpler terms. The King's message touched on the country's achievements in economic life, health and social conditions and reiterated Saudi Arabia's foreign policy. (*Bilad*; *Umm al-Qura*, 12 Nov)

### THE ROYAL HOUSEHOLD'S BUDGET

In the budget of the Kingdom for the fiscal year 1379/1380 AH [corresponding to 1960], covering 1,405,000,000 riyals, (12.6 riyal = £1 sterling), 247,861,380 riyals were allotted to a "Special Fund for Expenses and Use of the Ruling Royal Family." In addition, 5,685,000 riyals were allotted for the upkeep of "The Royal Office" (administrative expenses) and 13,590,000 riyals for the maintenance of "The Royal Guard." These sums were slightly higher than the corresponding figures for 1378/1379 AH. (*Umm al-Qura*, Mecca, 1 Jan)

The above figures cover the state's expenditure for all branches of the royal family, including brothers, uncles, cousins, all of whom enjoy budget allocations on a scale corresponding to closeness of relationship to the King. An Amir of the first class, i.e. brother or son of the King, not serving in any official capacity, receives an allowance of ten million riyals per annum if married, and two million if a bachelor. (*Scotsman*, 15 June)

### CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM—FIRST INTIMATIONS AND BASIC STANDS

**Jan-Apr: First Intimations of King Saud's Intention to Initiate Reforms:** At the beginning of Jan, it was reported that King Saud "intended to institute, some time in 1960, elections to the first Legislative Council of his state." (*Ruz al-Yusuf*, 4 Jan) In Mar a rumour circulated that "responsible quarters in Saudi Arabia are considering the gradual introduction of parliamentary government—i.e., a Senate comprising notables of the state and religious leaders, all members of which would be appointed by royal order." (*Musawwar*, Cairo, 18 Mar) According to *The Economist*, the demand for constitutional reform was voiced in the local Press after Faisal lifted Press censorship on 23 Jan. (*Economist* 30 Apr)

It was reported that emissaries who had been sent to Holland, Western Germany and Sweden on economic



missions were showing interest in democratic procedures there. The people with whom they talked felt that they came as representatives of Saud rather than of Faisal. Saud's emissaries spent a particularly long sojourn in Sweden, where they collected information on three aspects: (a) the workings of constitutional monarchy, (b) trade unions and (c) a free Press. (*NYHT*, 26 Apr)

**May-July: Nawwāf Backs Proposed Reforms.** The Amir Nawwāf Ibn Abd al-Aziz, during a visit to Cairo in May, declared that "there is a tendency to establish, for the first time in Saudi Arabia, a constitutional assembly, to prepare the state's first Constitution and also to establish a Supreme Court and a Supreme Planning Board. The problem was now how to put this experiment into operation." (*Gumhuriyah*, 25 May)

During the first half of July, while visiting Beirut, Amir Nawwāf spoke of the objects of the proposed reforms, at the same time attacking their opponents:

"We are working for the realization of reforms which the country needs, but those who are motivated by personal gain wish to foil our efforts and represent us as striving for personal interests... His Majesty King Saud once proclaimed that the rule of the Kingdom would rest on love and not on force. The King is right. We are endeavouring to implement his statement by the most positive means." In reply to a question, the Amir stated: "The intention is to find the means by which the executive powers of the King will be suited to the needs and development of the nation." (*Hayat*, 10 July)

**Proposed Reforms: Provincial and Central Assemblies; Supreme Advisory Council.** King Saud was said to be planning the creation of provincial assemblies, half elected and half appointed. Representatives of these would constitute the Central Assembly, which would advise the Council of Ministers and approve the budget. (*Time*, 30 May) It was also reported that the King intended to create a Supreme Advisory Council of six-two from each province: Hijaz, Najd and al-Hasa. (*Hayat*, 12 June)

A draft speech prepared by Saud, but not delivered owing to Amir Faisal's opposition to the opening of the summer session of the Cabinet on 12 June, had reportedly included the following points:

"The passing of a law providing for provincial administrations and assemblies with sufficient powers to manage local affairs must be dealt with speedily. The necessary steps must be taken to enable the Saudi Arabian people to play their part in the administration, so that they may be able to re-examine existing customs and practices which no longer meet the nation's needs and have them amended for its benefit." (*Anwar*, Beirut, 22 July)

**King Saud's Attitude to the Reforms.** Observers believed that King Saud was using support for the proposed reforms as a means of strengthening his own position at Faisal's expense. (*Hayat*, 26 May, 12 June) Others felt that Saud, while not apparently in favour of instituting complete democratic control, accepted the views of the more advanced Amirs that the monarchy would be safer against subversive activity by more advanced circles if constitutional reforms were effected. A correspondent in *The Economist* stressed both motives: King Saud, he wrote "has chosen to join sides with the forces of revolution he feels he cannot beat." "In the struggle for power," he added, "the King has struck a masterly blow by marshalling the forces of change on his side." (*NYHT*, 26 Apr; *Hawl al-Alam*, Amman, 26 May; *Economist*, 30 Apr)

[At the same time, Saud was careful not to give grounds for interpreting his support for reform as a slight to religious law.]

In a conversation with a local reporter on 4 Aug, the King declared: "We have resolved, with God's help—may he grant us strength—to act in accordance with our constitution which is the Qur'ān, the Law of our Prophet... We have no constitution other than this... Our constitution is the Qur'ān; the tradition of our worship and the pattern of our behaviour is as written in the Book of the Lord and in the Law of His Prophet and His Holy Caliphs and those who follow in their footsteps. The principles of our social pattern are the principles ordained by Islam..." (*Bilad*, 5 Aug)

In Aug or the beginning of Sept the Amirs submitted to the King a draft constitution (*Nizām Asāsi lil Hukm*) prepared by lawyers in Cairo, but Saud rejected it as too radical. (*Hayat*, 9 Sept)

**Faisal and the Reforms.** At a Press conference with editors of Saudi Arabian newspapers on 23 Jan in Riyadh, Amir Faisal said: "We all know that our country is different, in its situation and its conditions, from all other countries in the world. We have, praise be to God, no political parties, or sources of friction to menace our unique position; we are brothers who love each other with brotherly love. But that does not mean that we have no need of reform, for we are still at the beginning of the road." He announced the abolition of Press censorship; henceforth editors would be subject to the General Publications Ordinance only. (*Bilad*, 26 Jan)

It was reported that Faisal and his followers were opposed to constitutional reform for the next ten years at least, as he believed the nation was not yet ready for it. *The Economist* saw in Faisal's attitude to this question a political liability. "Manoeuvred into the company of a few old reactionaries and bigoted religious leaders (he) cannot cry aloud for long against more popular sentiments." (*Economist*, 30 Apr; *Hayat*, 7 June, 4 Sept)

**The Amirs and the Reforms.** (For Amir Nawwāf's backing of the King and the reforms—see above.) A group of Amirs led by Fahd Ibn Abd al Aziz sided with Faisal. Amir Talāl Ibn Abd al-Aziz headed a group "which wavers from side to side in a desperate effort to save something from what it feels sure will be the ruins." (*Economist*, 30 Apr) (For Talāl's later support of the reform, see below.)

## MAY-SEPT: CONTROVERSY OVER TEMPORARY SUBSTITUTE FOR FAISAL

**May: Conflict Between Saud and Faisal.** Faisal arrived in Jedda on 5 May to sail for Europe for an operation, but returned to Riyadh, a few days later. (*Umm al-Qura*, 6, 13 May) He then went back to Jedda, but remained there and did not leave for Europe. (*Ahram*, 21 May) It was reported that he had requested Saud to empower him to appoint two Amirs of his choice to replace him during his absence, but that the King had refused. According to the Lebanese Press, Faisal had proposed that the powers and duties of Prime Minister should devolve on the Amir Fahd Ibn Abd al-Aziz, Minister of Education, regarded as his chief supporter, and Amir Musā'id Ibn Abd ar-Rahmān, Saud's and Faisal's uncle, who was regarded as neutral. Saud had denied Faisal's right to appoint replacements with executive powers. He claimed that he had conferred these powers on Faisal personally, and in his absence they should revert to their source

—i.e. the King. (*Hayat*, 22, 24, 27 May; *Anwar*, Beirut, 5 June)

**May: Failure of Mediation.** Throughout the month, Ahmad ash-Shukairy, Saudi Arabian representative at the UN, and others tried to mediate between the King and Faisal. It was proposed that Saud appoint Amir Fahd Ibn Abd al-Aziz as acting Prime Minister, jointly with Saud's son Amir Muhammad, with the latter as Director of the Royal Office in addition, but this proposal was rejected. (*Hayat*, 27 May)

**Majority of Abd al-Aziz's Sons Support Faisal.** During the second half of May, 12 of Abd al-Aziz's other sons met in Riyadh at Fahd's house. After heated argument, nine of them signed a memorandum to the King warning him against mistakes in financial and political matters that would arise if the present situation, with its lack of clarity as to the executive powers, were to continue, and if he continued to be guided, or misguided, by his alien advisers. The memorandum also demanded the appointment of Musaid Ibn Abd ar-Rahman and Fahd Ibn Abd al-Aziz as substitutes for the Prime Minister. The Amirs Nawwaf, Talal and Bandar supported the King and declined to sign the memorandum. (*Hayat*, 31 May; *Anwar*, Beirut, 5 June)

Faisal reportedly denounced and disclaimed the memorandum. (*Hayat*, 7 June)

**June-Sept: No Solution; Faisal Remains.** Towards the middle of June, the King appointed Amir Khalid Ibn Abd al-Aziz as "permanent acting Prime Minister." (*Hayat*, 15 June) However, Khalid did not have an opportunity of taking up his duties, as the King and Faisal agreed to shelve the whole matter until mid-Sept. (*Hayat*, 27 July) Towards the middle of Sept it was reported that Faisal had decided not to leave Saudi Arabia, in spite of his urgent need of medical treatment, until the problem of replacement was satisfactorily settled. Thus the whole question remained in abeyance. (*Hayat*, 9 Sept)

#### DEC: FAISAL REMOVED FROM POWER

**The Crisis.** The struggle for power between Saud and Faisal culminated, in Dec, with Faisal's resignation.

On 18 Dec, Faisal submitted to the King, for his approval as usual, the draft Royal Order concerning the budget for 1380/1381 AH. [The Saudi Arabian fiscal year commences on the 1st of Rajab of the Hijrah year; in 1960, this fell on 20 Dec.] The King refused to sign the Order, maintaining that details of the budget were not given. Faisal explained that the detailed budget was still at the printers, but the excuse was not accepted.

The same evening, Faisal sent a note of protest to the King, in which he declared that the conflict was one of principle and not a personal quarrel.

"As I am unable to continue, I shall cease to use the powers vested in me as from tonight and I wish you every success," he declared.

Faisal and his supporters did not regard this note as a letter of resignation, as the word was not mentioned. The King, however, interpreted the words "cease to use the powers vested in me" as a resignation, and accordingly issued three Orders on 21 Dec, by which he accepted Faisal's "resignation" and, consequently, that of his entire government, took over the chairmanship of the Council of Ministers, and appointed a new government. (*Hayat*, 1 Jan 1961) (For a list of the new Ministers see table, p 373.)

**The New Government.** Three of Abd al-Aziz's sons, in addition to the King, were included in the new government, as well as one of his sons, all of them under 30. Outstanding among the Amirs who now joined the government were Talal Ibn Abd al-Aziz and Muhammad Ibn Saud, Ministers of Finance and Defence respectively. Talal is known as leader of the section in Saudi Arabia which is in favour of changing from theocratic to constitutional rule. Muhammad is regarded as the most promising of Saud's sons and the most likely successor to the throne. His appointment was interpreted by some commentators as designed to placate Faisal, one of whose daughters is Amir Muhammad's wife.

The six Ministers who were not Amirs were comparatively young, each an expert in his field, who had previously served as senior officials or diplomats.

Shaykh Abd al-Aziz Ibn Hasan, of Najd (Education), of the Muhammad Abd al-Wahab family, founder of the Wahabiyah, had been Deputy Minister of Education in Faisal's Cabinet.

Ibrahim as-Suwail, of Najd (Foreign Affairs), 57, graduate of Cairo University, was previously Ambassador to Baghdad.

Abdullah al-Hammud at-Tariqi (Oil and Mineral Resources) is a well-known Arab oil expert. He was Director of the Oil and Mineral Resources Department, which now became a separate Ministry. He is known as a liberal Arab nationalist.

Abdullah ad-Dabbagh of Hijaz (Agriculture), served as Deputy Minister of Agriculture in Faisal's Cabinet.

Ahmad Shata, of Hijaz (Commerce), served as a member of the King's Advisory Council, and more recently as Deputy Minister of Commerce. He was believed to be held in esteem by economic circles in Hijaz.

Dr Hasan Nasif of Hijaz (Health), a physician, served as Deputy Minister of Health in Faisal's Cabinet. (*Hayat*, 23 Dec; *Keyhan*, Tehran, 23 Dec; *NYHT*, 27 Dec; *Hawadith*, Beirut, 30 Dec)

**Relations Between Saud and Faisal After the Change-over.** Amir Fahd Ibn Abd al-Aziz, who was Faisal's Minister of Education and his chief supporter, declared that the Amirs refused to admit the validity of Faisal's resignation and that they would not accept anybody else in his place. They regarded the Cabinet changes as having injured the interests of the monarchy. (*Hayat*, 22 Dec) It was also reported that Faisal, Fahd and others of the same group had decided to continue their opposition by publishing a statement in the Lebanese Press. The King forestalled them, however, and by sending intermediaries to appease them he succeeded in persuading them to confine the dispute within the family circle. (*Hayat*, 1 Jan, 1961)

Saud offered to appoint Faisal as Deputy Prime Minister and reconfirm his status as Crown Prince [which had not been formally affected by his resignation as Prime Minister]. (*Hayat*, 1 Jan 1961) Rumours had, however, been spread that the King intended to withdraw this title and transfer it to his son, Muhammad. (*Glasgow Herald*, 23 Dec; *Daily Express*, 23 Dec) It was reported that Faisal was not ready to become Deputy Prime Minister as long as his responsibilities in the government were not clarified. (*Hayat*, 1 Jan 1961)

#### DEC: THE QUESTION OF CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM AFTER THE CHANGEOVER

Before leaving for Riyadh, on 21 Dec, to assume his position in the new government, the Amir Talal declared: "There is still in the country a group that opposes the

establishment of a popularly elected assembly... This group does not appreciate the danger inherent in its position and does not grasp the inexorable developments which will undoubtedly impose themselves. The need to establish an assembly that will represent the nation—even if it is only a partial representation—has become an established fact." [It is not clear to what developments the Amir was referring, unless it was to the new government itself.] "Those who have experienced one-man rule," the Amir continued, "have become disillusioned and have come to the conclusion that the only way out is to include others in the process of government through a National Assembly, as the democratic form of government is the way of progress and prosperity, particularly in a country such as ours... We shall have to adopt a set of basic principles for the government of the country [a constitution] (*nizām asāsi-amm lil-hukm fi al-bilād*) which will define its powers and responsibilities before we set up the elected assembly. This is a primary necessity for fashioning the image of the state in this period. I have no doubt that those who oppose the establishment of a National Assembly are in fact opposing the tide of development, the tide of history itself. Time is not on their side." (*Hayat*, 23 Dec)

During the night of 21 Dec, the editors of *al-Hayāt* contacted the Amir Talāl at Riyadh, and he told them that he hoped that "the future will prove that the new government will serve the Kingdom in all its efforts and will implement the necessary reforms." He added: "The passage of time will convince you that the constitution of this government was a great event in the life of the Kingdom, and that it will help to advance the country in every field." (*Hayat*, 22 Dec)

**Press Opinions in Favour of Reform.** With the establishment of the new government the Saudi Arabian Press began to publish demands for reform, couched in the form of hints. The following is an example: "The step that we have to take has to be a swift one, a very swift one indeed, so as to catch up with the caravan of true civilization." (From an article by Shakīb al-Umawi, *Bilad*, 30 Dec.)

**Dec: "The Draft Constitution."** The Lebanese newspaper *al-Jaridah* published a "draft constitution" of 200 paragraphs, which, it was reported, had been drawn up with the aid of Egyptian jurists, working under the inspiration of Talāl and other young Amirs of his group. (*Jaridah*, 30 Dec)

A number of newspapers in the Arab countries and the West also reported that on 24 Dec Radio Mecca announced that the King had presented this document to his government and had proposed that elections should be held for a Constituent Assembly. This assembly, which would hold office for one year, would discuss and approve the draft constitution. (*Jihad*, Jordan, 26 Dec; *Monde*, 28 Dec; *Economist*, 14 Jan 1961)

The following are the draft constitution's leading provisions:

1. A National Assembly, consisting of not less than 90 members and not more than 120, shall be established.
2. Two-thirds of the members shall be elected by the people; the remainder shall be appointed by a council of ten tribal heads and Amirs especially appointed for the purpose by the King.
3. Members of the National Assembly shall have the right to introduce bills; financial bills must be proposed by at least twenty members. The King may return a bill to the Assembly within a month of its having been passed, together with his amendments; the Assembly shall then consider the bill again, and send it up to the King in the new version for approval. The final decision shall rest with the King, who is to act "according to the public welfare."
4. The King shall have the right to dissolve the Assembly; but he must provide for new elections within four months.

(*Revue du Liban*, 31 Dec 1960, 7 Jan 1961; *Monde*, 28 Dec; *Nahar*, Beirut, 27 Dec)

**Optimism Abroad.** At first, many foreign newspapers, feeling confidence in the members of the new government, believed that it would implement these constitutional reforms. (*Times*, 22 Dec; *Economist*, 31 Dec; *Observer*, Article by H.A.R. Philby, 25 Dec; *Glasgow Herald*, 23 Dec; *Monde*, 31 Dec; *Kayhan*, Tehran, 23 Dec; *Hayat*, 22 Dec 1960, 1 Jan 1961; *Revue du Liban*, 31 Dec)

**Prospects of Reform Grow Dim.** However, the Saudi Arabian Director of Broadcasting and Publications denied that the King had ever submitted the draft constitution to the government. (*Hayat*, 23 Dec; *Jaridah*, 30 Dec) This denial, and the fact that, in his speech from the throne at the first session of the new government, the King did not even hint at any intention to introduce constitutional reforms (*Umm al-Qura*, 30 Dec), were regarded as indications that he had retreated from his previous support for the reformist programme. Observers now believed that Saud had only used the support of the reformers in his struggle against Faisal. They did not expect, however, that Talāl and the other reformers, both inside and outside the royal household, would simply accept the new position. It was therefore expected that the following three principal groups would be in competition in Saudi Arabia's internal politics:

1. The King;
2. The Amir Faisal, his royal supporters, and the reactionary circles, particularly the religious groups, which look to him for leadership;
3. The Amirs led by Talāl Ibn Abd al-Azīz, who advocate a programme of constitutional reform, supported by the young intelligentsia—graduates of foreign universities—and Hijaz's growing commercial and professional middle class. (*Jaridah*, 30 Dec; *Monde*, 31 Dec; *Economist*, 14 Jan 1961)

## LABOUR; ALIENS; STATE AND RELIGION

### LABOUR

**NOTE:** This section does not deal with Aramco employees whose conditions of work are far above the Saudi Arabian average. No special developments in regard to these employees were reported during the year.

**The Labour Authority.** [Since 1955 a "Labour Authority" has functioned at Riyadh, as a part of the administration. Its director is Shaykh Turqi al-Atishān. The Authority acts as a kind of Ministry of Labour, and in the absence of trade unions or other labour organizations is also supposed to look after the interests of



the wage-earners. It has branches at Jedda and Mecca which also serve as labour exchanges.]

**Labour Policy and Legislation.** In an interview with a local journalist, Atishān outlined the general policy of the Labour Authority. He said that his most important problem was vocational training. The government had approved the opening of a training institute in the eastern region with accommodation for 800 students in 14 classes, studying carpentry, metal-working, the electrical and building trades, etc. He estimated that it would cost about 15 million riyals to establish. In the more distant future additional institutes would be set up at Riyadh and at one of the towns in the Hijaz.

Another issue, Atishān continued, was employment for local labourers. He admitted that it was difficult to demand that every employer should observe the regulation that at least 75 per cent of the employees on their payroll should be of Saudi Arabian origin, since local labour lacked the necessary skill. He added that the Labour Regulations did not empower the government to punish employers who violated their provisions. The Authority, Atishān said, intended to establish additional labour exchanges in Medina, Ta'if and elsewhere.

Another important task of the Authority was to safeguard the rights of wage-earners and settle labour disputes. When a labour dispute was brought to its attention, it appointed one of its officials to act as arbitrator. In these cases, Atishān added, "we always are on the side of the weak."

The Authority had drawn up minimum scales of compensation for death or disablement as the result of work accidents, varying according to the worker's professional grading: apprentices, skilled and unskilled. Compensation was paid in a lump sum. (*Bilad*, 28 June)

**Unemployment.** [No unemployment figures were available.] *Al-Bilad* reported in July that "a great number of Saudi Arabian citizens" came to the paper's offices daily and asked for employment. Azīz Diya, editor of the *Akāz* weekly, also wrote that every day a number of unemployed came to his office to ask for work. "I see on their faces the signs of hunger and suffering and hear from them long tales of woe," he declared. (*Akāz*, No 9, July)

A group of unemployed workers wrote to *al-Bilad* that the only thing the labour exchange at Jedda could do for them was to supply them with letters to prospective employers, but on reaching the places of work they would find the gates locked. (*Bilad*, 14 July)

Hasan Abd al-Hay Qazāz, editor of *al-Bilad*, regarded foreign labour as the cause of unemployment. "The evil root of this problem," he wrote, "lies in the continued granting of residence permits to everyone who comes to us, whether during the pilgrimage season or afterwards." (*Bilad*, 1 Dec) [See Aliens, below.] Azīz Diya, writing in *Akāz*, proposed that the government should make jobs available in existing enterprises. It should pay a special subsidy to employers on condition that they provided vocational training for workers employed under this scheme, so that they would gradually replace skilled foreign workers. (*Akāz*, No 9, July)

**Labour Relations.** A Saudi Arabian businessman, Ahmad Abu Ruways, told a local journalist that "the existing relations between employers and employees are very bad." The employers were more to blame than the workers, he said; they deprived the workers of their rights notwithstanding the existence of the Labour Authority and its regulations. The reason was that "we do not have a working class consciousness and we have

not yet discovered a way of producing it, either by establishing separate trade unions or by founding a united general trade union organization." He admitted that Aramco was fostering labour consciousness, but he was dissatisfied with its methods. He believed that labour relations should be based on the laws of Islam, "since Islam provides for social justice... and I would like to live in the same type of Islamic society as Umar Ibn al-Khattāb established." [The second Caliph; his caliphate is regarded by tradition as the period in which all the political institutions of the Muslim state had their origin.] (*Bilad*, 13 Sept)

A Jedda worker, in a letter to *al-Bilad*, complained that he and his companions had been cheated by their employers on dismissal, because they were not acquainted with the regulations issued by the Labour Authority. (*Bilad*, 14 Sept)

## ALIENS

**Foreign Competition on the Labour Market.** At the end of Jan, the General Directorate of Alms and Revenue [i.e. Commissioners of Income Tax] announced compulsory registration of all employees of commercial companies, workshops and merchant houses. The purpose of this measure was to find out how many foreigners were entitled to have their work and resident permits renewed. (*Umm al-Qura*, 29 Jan)

During the year the local Press carried an increasing number of complaints from unemployed Saudi Arabian workers that foreigners were occupying jobs that should have gone to them. (*Bilad*, 3, 4, 5, 14, Feb; 15 June, 14 July)

As a result, the authorities cancelled the driving licences of many foreign drivers [there are no figures], as their growing number began to threaten the livelihood of the local drivers. (*Bilad*, 3 Feb) [The authorities also attempted to cancel the work permits of Yemenite labourers, but the King annulled this measure; see pp 167-8.]

**Restrictions on Foreign Capital.** In Sept, the authorities began to supervise more thoroughly the implementation of an order [issued in 1958], prohibiting the existence of foreign commercial and industrial enterprises without the participation of local investors. As a result, a considerable number of foreign Arab businessmen, mainly Lebanese and Egyptians, left Riyadh. (*Anwar*, Beirut, 14 Sept; *Kul Shay'*, Beirut, 24 Sept; *Financial Times*, 18 Oct)

**Alien Control.** In Dec, the Mecca police published an order that all hosts must report to the police within 24 hours the arrival of all foreign guests. They also had to report their departure within three days, or within six days if they left without prior notification. (*Bilad*, 26 Dec)

## STATE AND RELIGION

**Background Note.** The Sunni Islam is the state religion and the foundation of the Kingdom's social and political order. There are only religious courts, which base their judgments on the Qur'an and the Sacred Law. Violations of religious laws, such as the drinking of alcohol and eating (in public) during the Fast of Ramadan, are regarded as violations of State Laws and the guilty are liable to punishments as severe as public decapitation. Participation in group prayers is compulsory in all government offices and institutions. Friday and all the other religious holy days of the Sunnis are official holidays. Public education is essentially religious education.



**The King Stresses His Religious Functions.** See p 374.

**The State Serves Islam.** [The following examples will show the extent to which state institutions and the civil service impose the observance of religious laws.]

At the beginning of July, the "Society for Charity" in Hijaz [which possesses police powers] published a warning against the activities of "witch doctors and spiritualists" (*Dajjalīn, Mash'udhīn*), who in return for money "established contact" between their clients and the spirits of the deceased. The population was called upon to report to the Society every such case, so that these offenders could be punished with the full rigour of the law. The warning emphasized that the activities of these "spiritualists" were contrary to the country's religious laws, and that "this is the only country where this superstitious cult cannot raise its head, for, thank God, the laws of this Kingdom are founded on the Book of Allah, and are the instruments of his rule." (*Bilad*, 1 July)

At the end of June, the Ministry of Finance and National Economy announced that, in accordance with paragraph 95 of the Customs Act, it was prohibited to import pictures of a man or of a human figure, or any goods the form or packaging of which either resembled or depicted a cross. It was also prohibited to import goods carrying pictures of members of the royal family and watches bearing inscriptions from the Qur'ān. (*Bilad*, 30 June)

The Directorate of General Security, or sometimes the Ministry of the Interior, confirmed the conversion of Christians to Islam by the religious courts (*Shar'i*), and reported these cases in *Umm al-Qura* (see e.g., 19, 26 Aug).

**Shi'i Complaints.** In Oct an article in the first issue of

the *Rāyāt al-Islam* magazine, published in Riyadh, containing insulting references to Imam Ja'far, and his Shi'i adherents. (*Ha'aretz*, 12 Oct) [Ja'far, the sixth of the twelve Imams of the Shi'ah, the supreme rulers of the world of Islam according to Shi'ah tradition.] The representatives of over a million Saudi Arabian Shi'is who constitute the majority of the population in the al-Hasa region, were aroused to protest. A delegation to the King denounced the article, and reportedly demanded the repeal of "all those Saudi Arabian laws that discriminate between Shi'is and Sunnis... and the regulations that prevent Shi'is from obtaining certain posts and types of work..." The King promised the delegation that he would study their demands and submit their complaints to the Cabinet. The delegation remained in Riyadh for two weeks, but had to return empty-handed to al-Hasa. (*Hayat*, 17 Nov) (On protest of Lebanese Shi'is on the same issue, see p 345.)

**The Islamic University.** A decision to build an Islamic University at Medina was taken by King Saud after this had been demanded by the Saudi Arabian Press, and after he had exchanged notes on this subject with the Mufti of the Kingdom, Muhammad Ibn Ibrahim. The King also agreed to donate some of his palaces in that town for the purpose. At first, he had considered establishing the university at Riyadh. (*Bilad*, 5 Sept)

During Sept and Oct plans were announced for its opening. (*Bilad*, 19 Sept; *Umm al-Qura*, 7 Oct)

An official spokesman announced that it was to become "a centre of training for the whole Islamic world." (*Bilad*, 25 Sept) The King defined the university's task as to educate "propagandists for Islam all over the world." He said that teachers and students would be recruited at home and abroad. (*Bilad*, 12 Nov)

## INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

### SYNOPSIS

1960 was an uneventful year in Saudi Arabian foreign relations. Both the Amir Faisal and King Saud, each when officiating as Prime Minister, asserted the country's wish for "absolute neutrality, inter-Arab and Muslim cooperation and adherence to the principles of Bandung and the United Nations." Saudi Arabia defended her known claims against Great Britain, the US and France in the diplomatic sphere, but abstained, in general, from exacerbating the position by steps of practical consequence. (See also Foreign Trade, pp 57-8.)

Saudi Arabia's quarrel with Great Britain over the Buraimi oasis was not settled.

The main features of Saudi Arabia's relations with the US were repeated efforts to administer pinpricks to Aramco and define as narrowly as possible the scope of the American Air Force's lease of the base at Dhahran.

Relations with the USSR were restricted to the exchange of polite messages on national holidays and similar occasions.

Nearer home, the Emperor of Ethiopia and the President of Pakistan paid state visits—the former in Jan and the latter in Nov.

Saudi Arabia followed a policy of passive neutrality with regard to the movement for Arab unity; she was

definitely in favour of the maintenance of the status quo, but at the same time was careful not to offend the UAR. This policy was exemplified by her attitude to the UAR-Jordan conflict. King Hussein visited Saudi Arabia, where he was cordially welcomed, but King Saud abstained from paying the expected return visit. The joint communiqué issued at the end of Hussein's visit ostensibly supported the Jordanian opposition to the UAR-sponsored Palestinian Entity scheme (see p 168), but Jordanian expectations of Saudi Arabian support on this question in the Arab League were disappointed (p 134).

Relations with individual Arab countries were generally friendly. A potential source of friction with Yemen—the question of Yemeni labourers in Saudi Arabia—was eliminated, for the time being, by the personal intervention of the King. Sudan was the only Arab country with which relations clearly deteriorated, as a consequence of a diplomatic incident in Khartoum in Nov (p 168).

There were no special developments in relation to Israel. At the UN, Shukairy, the Saudi Arabian representative, continued to expound his well-known views on the subject (see pp 177-8, 212).

**General Policy.** On 12 Nov, in his proclamation to his people on the sixth anniversary of his accession to the

throne, King Saud emphasized the loyalty of his country to the Charter of the Arab League and its support for the liberation of Palestine, Algeria, Oman and Buraimi. He declared: "Our foreign relations are conducted on the basis of mutual respect and absolute neutrality, in co-operation with the Arab and Islamic countries and the Afro-Asian bloc, and by stressing the principles of Bandung and of the UN Charter." (*Umm al-Qura*, 12 Nov) (See also Ahmad Shukairy's speech at the UN, p 9; his pronouncements should not, however, be taken as fully representative of Saudi Arabian policy.)

### SAUDI ARABIA-GREAT BRITAIN DISPUTE OVER BURAIMI AND KHOR AL-ODAID

**Background Note:** The principals in this dispute are Saudi Arabia and Great Britain, while minor participants on the side of the latter are the Sultanate of Muscat and Oman and the Sheikhdom of Abu Dhabi. The main reason for this prolonged dispute, which has disturbed Saudi-British relations since 1949, has been the belief that oil deposits exist in this area.

The Buraimi Oasis extends over an area of approximately 35,000 sq. km. in the south-east of the Arabian Peninsula, and consists of eight villages with a population of 25,000 (see map).

Six of the villages are claimed by the Sheikhdom of Abu Dhabi, which is under British protection. The remaining two are under the jurisdiction of the Sultan of Oman and Muscat, who has an agreement with Britain, under which the latter is responsible for foreign relations and the defence of his territory.

The Saudi Arabian demand for sovereignty over this region, which was first raised in 1949, is based on the claim that the inhabitants of the Oasis owed allegiance to the Saudi rulers of Najd in the 18th and 19th centuries. The political allegiance of the area in question was not determined by the 1927 Jeddah Agreement between Britain and Saudi Arabia, which fixed, though not finally, the frontiers of the latter.

Sporadic arbitration and negotiations over the years did not lead to a settlement of the dispute. There have also been attempts to solve it by force. A Saudi Arabian force entrenched itself in the disputed area in 1952 and was expelled in 1955 by an Omani force under British command. On 6 Nov, 1956, after the Suez Campaign, Saudi Arabia broke off diplomatic relations with Britain and since early 1957 has made their renewal conditional on the settlement of the Buraimi dispute. The Pakistani embassy at Jeddah represents British interests in Saudi Arabia.

In Nov 1958, the Saudi Arabian Government claimed the territory of Khor al-Odaid (see map), which it said, had been illegally occupied by an Abu Dhabi military force under British command. The British Government recognizes Abu Dhabi's sovereignty over the area.

In Nov 1959 the PM, Amir Faisal, declared that Saudi Arabia has further territorial claims in the south and south-east of the Arabian Peninsula.

However, in Dec 1959, Faisal implied that it was not necessary to resolve the dispute in all its details for the renewal of diplomatic relations, which, he said, "depend on the British Government's willingness to arrive at a satisfactory basis with us for the opening of negotiations" on the disputed area (*italics inserted by editor*). (*Bilad*, 15 Dec 1959)

**Feb-Mar: Military Situation at Buraimi.** At the beginning of Feb it was reported that the British forces in the Persian Gulf had been reinforced by the despatch of

heavy weapons and bombers "which had been stationed in airfields near the Buraimi Oasis." (*Sha'ab*, Jordan, 23 Feb) On 20 Mar British forces participated in manoeuvres near Buraimi, and a British officer was wounded when his tank hit a mine. (*BBC*, in Arabic, 20 Mar-IMB, 21 Mar)

**Mar-July: Talks under UN Auspices.** [At the end of 1958 King Saud appealed to the UN SG to use his influence to solve the questions in dispute between Britain and Saudi Arabia. In the summer of 1959 the SG invited both sides to unofficial talks, at which it was agreed to ask Mr Hammarskjöld to take steps to settle the dispute. Additional meetings were held in New York between Sept and Dec 1959 through the good offices of the SG. It was agreed to continue with these in Mar 1960.]

On 4 Mar Hammarskjöld met Harold Beeley, the British Deputy Representative to the UN, and Abd ar-Rahmān Azzām, Political Counsellor to King Saud, for a further exchange of views. (*Times*, 5 Mar)

Hammarskjöld, Beeley and Azzām held about 30 subsequent meetings in New York (*Hayat*, 10 July), at the end of which both sides requested the SG to appoint a representative to investigate the dispute between them. (*Ahram*, 15 July)

**Aug-Oct: Hammarskjöld's Representative Active.** In Aug, Herbert de Ribbing, the Swedish Ambassador to Spain, accepted Mr Hammarskjöld's invitation to conduct a fact-finding mission as his personal representative in regard to the Buraimi dispute. This was not a UN appointment. (*Hayat*, 24 Aug, 9 Sept)

In Sept de Ribbing held discussions with the British Foreign Office (*Times*, 10 Sept), which were followed by discussions with King Saud and Azzām, at Riyadh. (*Bilad*, 18-19 Sept) He also visited the disputed areas and Muscat, where he held talks with the Sultan, Saud Ibn Taymūr. On 18 Oct de Ribbing arrived in London, where he held discussions with the Foreign Office, and then left for New York. (*Falastin*, 24 Sept; *Bilad*, 6 Oct; *Ahram*, 7 Oct; *Times*, 10 Oct; *Guardian*, 20 Oct)

**Nov-Dec: Further Talks Under Aegis of UN.** On 24 Nov Abd ar-Rahman Azzam left for New York to renew contact with the British representatives, through the good offices of Hammarskjöld. (*Hayat*, 25 Nov) These contacts continued throughout Dec, while the Saudi Arabian Government, in the words of its Foreign Minister, Ibrahim Suwayl, "was waiting for results." (*Bilad*, 19 Dec)

**Jan-Dec: Divergent Views Within Saudi Arabian Royal Family.** On 23 Jan Amir Faisal, discussing the Buraimi dispute, declared: "It is inconceivable for us to conduct a policy of renunciation when the honour and rights of our country are involved. But we welcome any solution... that is not in conflict with the principles which I have just mentioned." (*Bilad*, Jeddah, 26 Jan)

The Amir Nawwāf, a brother of the King and one of his advisers, on the other hand, showed a militant attitude in a statement in May. He said: "We have already tried everything—both negotiations and arbitration—in order to achieve a solution of the Buraimi question. Now we have only one possibility left: to organize a popular resistance organization to drive out the British from the Arab territory they have unjustly conquered." (*Gumhuriyah*, Cairo, 25 May)

On 12 Nov, in his proclamation to the nation, on the seventh anniversary of his accession to the throne, the King declared: "We have tried everything possible to

settle by peaceful means the dispute that has been created by British aggression against that part of our country, Buraimi, which is so dear to us. However, in the event that the SG of the UN fails in his present efforts, we will not hesitate to take all the steps that we deem fit to recover this Arab part of our country." (*Umm al-Qura*, 12 Nov)

At the end of Dec the King repeated this declaration in the policy statement which he submitted to his government. (*Umm al-Qura*, 30 Dec)

### UNITED STATES

**Aramco.** It was reported in Apr that King Saud, in his desire to reduce the influence of Aramco on his country's oil economy, had suggested, through an intermediary, to a number of West German companies that he was ready to grant them concessions to drill for oil and establish a petro-chemical plant. (*Hayat*, 26 Apr)

[In 1959 Saudi Arabia, in co-operation with Kuwait, granted a Japanese company a concession to drill for oil under the sea-bed off the shore of the neutral zone between the two countries.] (See also the activities of Abdullah at-Tariqi, Director of Saudi Arabia's Oil and Mines Department, pp 60-1.)

**Interpretation of Dahrhan Base Agreement.** On 19 July the spokesman of the Saudi Arabian Ministry of Foreign Affairs published the following statement, in reply to "distortions of fact" in connection with the Dahrhan Airport Agreement between Saudi Arabia and the US by foreign newspapers and radio stations: "(a) The Dahrhan Airport does not serve as a military base for any foreign country. (b) The Dahrhan Airport Agreement does not include any renunciation of sovereignty in favour of the American Government. (c) The Agreement only makes available technical facilities to American aircraft. (d) The Agreement cannot in any way be considered as a defence and security alliance between the two countries, and it does not give the United States the right to use the Dahrhan Airport for any kind of military operations. (e) The facilities provided under the above agreement consist of regular arrangements designed to serve purely peaceful purposes, and His Majesty's Government has prohibited the use of the Dahrhan Airport, or of any part of its territory, or of its airspace, for military operations against any other state, or for any other operations in violation of the laws of the [third] country. (f) The above interpretation of the Agreement by the Saudi Arabian Government is identically shared by the American Government, and the latter government has unequivocally confirmed this reading of it." (*Bilad*, 20 July)

**Declaration of Boycott on American Shipping** following the *Cleopatra* incident. See p 42.

### OTHER COUNTRIES

**Ethiopia.** Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia arrived in Riyadh on a state visit on 9 Jan, and left on 12 Jan.

In a joint communiqué it was stated that the Emperor and King Saud had "had cordial talks which have demonstrated their identical views on the need to support peace in accordance with the UN Charter and the Bandung Conference resolutions. They have also discussed economic exchange between the two countries for the good of both Kingdoms. Details of this cooperation will be discussed in the near future through the exchange of economic missions." (*BBC*, 14 Jan)

Two Eritrean politicians visited Saudi Arabia in Feb. They were Ibrahim Sultan and Idris Muhammad Adam,

both former members of the Eritrean parliament and of the ar-Rābitah al-Islamiyah party. (*Bilad*, 23 Feb)

**France.** [In Nov 1956 Saudi Arabia broke off diplomatic relations with France after the Suez crisis, but commercial relations were not interrupted. The Italian embassy at Jedda looks after French interests. Saudi Arabian leaders have said that they are ready to renew diplomatic relations with France on condition the latter grants full independence to Algeria. See also Saudi Arabia-Algeria.]

Saudi Arabian newspapers called for a general boycott of France because of her Algerian policy. (*Bilad*, 15 Apr, 21 Apr, 20 May)

In June the Saudi Arabian Ministry of Commerce announced the repeal of the boycott which had been in force against a French motor company. (*Bilad*, 28 June)

**Japan.** On 25 Aug the Soama Trading Co., Jedda, of which King Saud is the co-owner, offered a credit of \$100 million for 25 years at 8 per cent interest to the Metropolitan Bank, Tokyo, for investments in Japan. (*Commerce du Levant*, 31 Aug)

**Pakistan.** On 1 Nov President Ayub Khan of Pakistan arrived on an official visit. He conducted political discussions with the King, the Amir Faisal and their leading advisers, and toured the Kingdom's main centres. He left on his way to the UAR on 5 Nov. (*Bilad*, 2 Nov; *Umm al-Qura*, 4, 11 Nov)

The joint communiqué which was issued on 5 Nov at Riyadh emphasized the identity of views on the world situation between Saud and Ayub, declared their agreement on the necessity for close co-operation between all Islamic countries, and called for the strengthening of the economic ties between the two countries. President Ayub had proposed that Saudi Arabia should invest in Pakistan's five-year plan, and the King had promised sympathetic consideration of the proposal, the communiqué stated. (*Umm al-Qura*, 11 Nov)

On his return to Pakistan, Ayub Khan said that his visits to Saudi Arabia and the UAR had given him the opportunity to dispel his hosts' doubts about the policies of Pakistan's former rulers by promising support in solving the problems of the Arab countries. He had also explained Pakistan's problems and the kind of assistance he expected from the countries of the Middle East. (*R. Karachi*, 16 Nov-BBC, Part III, 18 Nov)

**USSR and Communist Bloc.** [Saudi Arabia does not maintain diplomatic relations with the USSR or any other Communist country, including Yugoslavia.]

It does exchange greetings with the USSR on national holidays or special occasions, however. (*Bilad*, 26 June, 9 Nov, 2 Dec; *Umm al-Qura* 18 Nov)

[Saudi Arabia imports goods from Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland. Since the beginning of the year two Polish cargo-boats had been plying regularly between Jedda and Polish ports (see Foreign Trade pp 57-8). Saudi Arabia suspected Soviet intervention in its affairs by smuggling guns into the country from the Yemen (see Saudi Arabia-Yemen, pp 167-8).]

On 13 Oct Ahmad Shukairy, the Saudi Arabian representative at the UN, met PM Khrushchev in New York. According to a Saudi Arabian statement, "Mr Shukairy seized the occasion to explain to Mr Khrushchev Arab problems, particularly Palestine, Algeria, Oman and the extremities of the Arabian Peninsula." (*NYT*, 16 Oct)



# SOUTHERN ARABIA AND THE PERSIAN GULF

## ADEN COLONY AND PROTECTORATES

### SYNOPSIS

The territory of Aden consists of Aden Colony and the Western and Eastern Protectorates, which comprise altogether 25 states or Amirates. A number of Amirates in the Western Protectorate have formed the Federation of the Amirates of the South.

Both in Aden Colony and in the Western Protectorates Britain's efforts to suppress opposition while furthering a policy of self-rule under her protection continued during the year.

In Aden Colony the trade unions posed the main problem: a continued wave of strikes did serious harm to the economy, and the Trade Union Congress (TUC) constituted the only organized body of pro-Nasser Arab nationalists. In Aug the government enacted an anti-strike bill and other ordinances designed to curtail TUC activities and closed the TUC paper. The TUC's opposition proved fruitless: after three days it had to call off a general strike against the government's action. During the remainder of the year there were no strikes and little political or other TUC activity, but the TUC still opposed the new measures.

At the same time the government persevered in its policy of gradually introducing self-government. The governor welcomed the establishment of political parties, and his invitation was taken up by members of the Aden Association (AA) who cooperated with the government in the Executive and Legislative Councils. Before its organized activities had come to a standstill during the preceding years of political unrest, the AA had advocated gradual progress towards independence within the Commonwealth, and it opposed Arab Nationalist schemes for the union of Southern Arabia. Now, however, the AA accommodated its programme more to nationalist opinion, advocating a union between Aden Colony and the Protectorates, with the "ultimate aim" of complete independence and envisaging an eventual union with Yemen. For all practical purposes, however, this programme fitted in with the policy of the government, which wanted to merge the Amirates into the Federation and unite the Federation with the Colony. There were also attempts to form opposition parties, and especially to unite into a cohesive party the various nationalist groups which advocated immediate independence and a South Arabian union; the TUC was active in this respect. By the end of the year, however, only the AA, renamed the National Union Party, could register some progress in organization. The government measures against the TUs probably had something to do with the failure of the opposition; moreover, the most prominent opposition leader, Muhammad Ali al-Jifri, who had been deported in 1958 following anti-government activities, was still in exile in Cairo.

Other political issues were the related questions of citizenship and immigration, and the question of "Adenization."

While the new definition of an Adeni subject and an

amendment to the Immigration Ordinance apparently meant some progress in the direction desired by the Arab nationalists, British policy in these fields was still denounced by the opposition and the UAR as designed to destroy the Arab character of Aden.

There was apparently very slight progress in the Adenization of the civil service, a practical prerequisite for independence. Moreover, according to a critical appraisal of the prospects by a pro-government commentator, it was unlikely that at the present rate of progress the official goal of Adenization by 1967 could be achieved.

In the Western Protectorate, the Federation of Amirates, established in 1959, was joined by three more states, bringing the number of federated states to ten out of the 20 in the Protectorate. Trouble in the territory continued, however. In the Sheikdom of Upper Awlaqi the Abu Bakr tribe, and in the Yafi mountain area Muhammad Ibn Aydarus and his followers, persisted in their revolts. Both were hailed by Cairo as Arab nationalist warriors fighting imperialism. There was a report that the insurgents received arms from the outside. According to the very incomplete sources available on this topic—there are no British published reports—it would seem that RAF aircraft and local ground forces carried out major offensives (though "major" only in the terms of these local conflicts) in the Awlaqi territory in May and the Yafi territory in Nov. The local troops under British command, such as the Aden Levies and Guards, were apparently joined by tribal forces of rulers cooperating with the British. There were some indications that the action in Awlaqi met with a measure of success, while in Yafi the insurgents themselves admitted toward the end of the year that they were in grave danger.

In the Eastern Protectorate, the rulers of Qu'aiti and Kathiri—who were not always on the best of terms—joined hands to bring about an agreement with the oil companies to drill for oil, though without success for the time being. There were some indications that efforts were afoot to bring about a federation of these two states.


### FOREIGN INTERFERENCE

Foreign interference in Aden mainly takes the form of Arab activities and propaganda against the British presence in the territory.

The Arabs in general claim that Aden is part of the Arab homeland, the "Arab South," which must be liberated from foreign occupation. Yemen, however, claims it as an integral part of its own territory, the "Southern Yemen," and has tried to assert the claim by military action. Hostilities, mainly in the form of border incursions and assistance to Adeni tribes hostile to the British, last took place during 1953–1958.

In 1959 border incidents became less frequent, and in Nov the Governor of Aden concluded in Ta'izz two informal agreements with the Yemen, one covering civil





aviation and the other establishing local frontier commissions to settle border incidents. The first commission met in Feb 1960. In June 1960 the Governor of Aden visited Yemen but did not meet the Imam (p 399). The border remained relatively quiet throughout the year, except for border crossings—both ways—by refugees, sometimes reportedly whole tribes.

Yemen continued to claim Aden, and San'a Radio expressed support for all kinds of opposition activities. She found herself in a somewhat ambiguous position, however, as the Arab nationalists in Aden, though striving for a union with her, wanted a "democratic Yemen" (p 388). A considerable percentage of the Yemenis in Aden, too, were opposed to the present Yemeni regime and it was in deference to the Imam's wishes that the Aden authorities asked a Yemeni opposition leader to leave the territory (p 396). If Yemen extended material aid to the insurgents in Awlaqi and Yafi there were no reports to this effect available. (See also: Yemen, International Relations p 397.)

Of the other Arab countries, the UAR was the most active in regard to the territory. Aden opposition leaders had found refuge in Cairo, from where, with the aid of Cairo's Voice of the Arabs station, they tried to incite the Adenis to rebel against the British. (See many references below.) Cairo paid special attention to the British military establishment in Aden, claiming *inter alia* that the GHQ of the British ME Command had been transferred from Cyprus to Aden. [The ME Command remained in Cyprus: Aden houses the Arabian Peninsula Command and various bases, see p 99.] The Voice of the Arabs followed up a warning by Moscow Radio that parts of Aden and Saudi Arabia were becoming a target to Russian guided missiles because American and British atomic bases had been established there—by calling upon the people of Aden to force out the British in order to save themselves from nuclear destruction by Russian rockets. (*Aden Chr.*, 16 June; *BBC*, 12, 14 July)

The Aden question was not discussed by the Arab League Council owing to Yemeni objections (see p 128).

## ADEN COLONY

### THE GOVERNMENT

The Colony is administered by a Governor, assisted by an Executive Council. He is also C.-in-C.

In Jan 1959 a new constitution for Aden Colony came into force, under which 12 out of the 23 members of the Legislative Council (inaugurated in 1947) were to be elected. Elections took place on 4 Jan 1959, nine Arabs, two Somalis and one Indian being returned. They were members of the Aden Association (see below—Parties) and other moderates cooperating with the British authorities. The Arab nationalists, led by the Trade Union Congress, boycotted the elections.

In 1959, besides, the "Members-in-Charge" scheme was introduced, five Adenis being put in charge of administrative functions in the Executive Council. In Jan 1961 it was announced that they would soon assume ministerial status. (*ME, Europa 1961; Aden and the Yemen, HMSO, 1960*)

**The Legislative Council.** The Council comprises the Speaker and five *ex officio* members, all British; six nominated and 12 elected members.

#### *Nominated members, Jan 1961:*

Ali Sālim Ali; R.P. Errington; Abd al-Qawi Makkawi; F.P. Sharpe; Sayyid Umar Abd al-Aziz Shihāb; Sayyid Ali Abdullah as-Safi.

#### *Elected members:*

Abdullah Ibrahim Sa'idi; H. I. Khodabux; Hussein Ali Bayūmi; A.M. Luqmān; A.S.S. Basendwah; V.K. Joshi; S.M. Hasson; A.M. Alwān; J.A. Salole; M.E. Abdu; M.A. Maktari; M.S. Husseini.

**The Executive Council,** presided over by the Governor, comprises five *ex-officio* members (British) and five members in charge.

#### *Members in Charge, Jan 1961:*

A.I. Sa'idi (Education); H.A. Bayūmi, (Labour and Welfare, Antiquities); A.S.S. Basendwah (Medical); Ali Sālim Ali (Posts, Telephones and Electricity); V.K. Joshi (Public Works, Water).

**Apr: Municipal Elections.** On 3 Apr by-elections to Aden Municipality took place in several wards. The average poll was about 37 per cent. The TUC boycotted the elections, but there was an increased vote of Yemenis in comparison with 1959, and a good turnout of Indians and Somalis. (*Aden Chr.*, 17 Mar; 7 Apr) According to the Voice of the Arabs, the "Arabs of Aden" boycotted the elections. (*BBC*, 14 Apr)

[The candidates elected belonged to the Aden Association and like-minded moderate circles. (For names see *Aden Chr.*, 7 Apr)]

Following the elections, H. Khodabux Khan was elected Chairman of the newly convened Municipal Council. (*Aden Chr.*, 14 Apr)

**June: New Muslim Religious Leader.** In June, the Aydarus family elected Abu Bakr al-Aydarus to succeed Zayn Ibn Hassan al-Aydarus, the deceased Mansab (religious leader) of the Muslims in Aden. (*Aden Chr.*, 16 June)

**June-Oct: New Governor's Policy Statement.** In June the British Colonial Office announced the appointment of Sir Charles Hepburn Johnson (formerly Ambassador to Jordan) as Governor of Aden and C.-in-C. in succession to Sir William Luce. (*BBC*, 22 June) He was sworn in on 24 Oct. In his inaugural address, the new Governor said that: (1) He would give his closest attention to an active programme for the Adenization of the Civil Service; (2) The recent legislation for the settlement of industrial disputes was an important step towards economic stability; (3) "The development of the Federation [of the Protectorates] inevitably brings it and the [Aden] colony closer together and it is my earnest hope that this will result in a permanent relationship of great advantage to both sides." (*Aden Chr.*, 27 Oct)

### TRADE UNIONS AND THE GOVERNMENT

**Background Note.** The Aden trade union movement started to develop in the early fifties and by 1956 25 unions had been formed. Labour conditions had been extremely bad for a long time, and while there was some improvement after the Second World War, it did not keep pace with the growing pressure for a better stan-

dard of living. Labour unrest came to a head in 1956, when about 30 strikes broke out, involving some 6,000 workers. In the same year the Aden Trade Union Congress (TUC) was founded; its SG is Abdullah Asnag, an Arab nationalist advocating independence and union with Yemen. When political parties ceased to function during the subsequent period of political unrest and violence, the TUC became the sole organized body representing nationalist aspirations. In 1959 it was the main force in a nationalist grouping, the People's Union, which boycotted the elections to the Legislative Council. In 1960, Asnag was apparently again the spearhead of an attempt to organize the various nationalist groupings into a political party (p 388). In Nov the TUC boycotted the Aden municipal elections. The TUC is supported by the UAR. There is a large Yemeni element among the workers.

**Wave of Strikes, Political Objectives of TU.** In his opening speech in the Aden Legislative Council on 25 Jan, the Governor criticized "the deplorable behaviour" of the Aden trade unions in 1959, which "induced" and supported "no less than eighty-four strikes." He added that the government was looking for a "suitable solution to put an end to such a miserable situation." (*Aden Chr.*, 31 Jan)

According to another official source, nearly 150,000 days' work were lost in these strikes; in the first four months of 1960, 24 strikes cost 120,000 days. (See below: BP strike.) (*Aden Chr.*, 4 Aug)

A Lebanese writer commented that the TU struggle was not so much social as political; it was part of the Arab awakening. Aden was a part of the Arab homeland; it must be liberated and united with the Arab countries. (*Hayat*, 18 Aug) (On TUC political activities see: Formation of Political Parties, pp 387-8.)

**Feb-Apr: Strike of British Petroleum Refinery Workers.** In Feb 1,700 workers in BP installations went on strike for higher salaries and against discrimination and ill-treatment. (*BBC*, 4, 6 Feb) The strike came to an end after 70 days on 11 Apr. An agreement between the TUC and the Company was concluded through the mediation of the Regional Representative of the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU).

The agreement laid the basis for detailed negotiations for an increase in wages, water and electricity allowances, an improved annual leave scale, compensation for work on public holidays, an end-of-service benefit scheme, extension of medical facilities to cover parents, and facilities to acquire ownership of houses supplied by the Company. (*Aden Chr.*, 14 Apr; *Fatat al-Jasirah*, 17 Apr)

The International Federation of Arab Trade Unions (IFATU) (managed and financed by the UAR) pledged full support for the strike, called "in protest against discrimination between foreign and local workers." (*MENA*, 3 May-BBC, 5 May) The South Arabian League (see p 386) announced in Cairo that it had donated EAS 60,000 for relief of the British Petroleum workers. (*Aden Chr.*, 7 Apr)

**May: TUC-UAR Cooperation.** In May, Abdullah Asnag, the SG of the TUC, stated that the TUC had been asked to sponsor a scheme for Adenis to study at UAR universities, all expenses to be covered by the UAR. (*Aden Chr.*, 26 May)

In May the TUC declared its readiness to join in the UAR-sponsored Arab boycott of American ships in retaliation to the picketing of the UAR s/s *Cleopatra* in New York Port (see p 42).

**May: TUC Reorganization Proposed.** In May Ali as-Sayyid, the Egyptian Assistant SG of the IFATU, visited Aden to advise the TUC on a reorganization scheme. Eight TU confederations were to be set up to deal with "major tasks individual and collective" (apparently including negotiations in trade disputes), which had hitherto devolved upon the TUC, freeing it to deal with general policy "in addition to [its] natural role in the national cause." The IFATU would help to set up the new organization. (*Aden Chr.*, 12, 26 May)

**Aug: Legislation Enacted to Curtail Right to Strike.** In Jan, the Governor announced that he would engage a labour relations expert to advise on the establishment of "effective negotiating machinery." (*Aden Chr.*, 28 Jan) At the beginning of Aug, following the adviser's report, it was stated that a bill curtailing strike rights would be submitted to the Legislative Council on 15 Aug. (*Aden Chr.*, 4 Aug)

On 4 Aug the TUC called for an hour's strike every day for 15 days in protest. (According to another report the strike started on 8 Aug and was to end on 12 Aug.) The strike was widely observed and at the government's application the Supreme Court issued an injunction against the SG of the TUC and the President of the Government Employees' Union to refrain from inciting government employees to break their contracts of service. The TUC agreed to abide by the injunction. (*R. Cairo*, 4, 5 Aug-BBC 6, 8, 13 Aug; *Aden Chr.*, 11 Aug) A number of government employees were dismissed. (*Aden Chr.*, 25 Aug)

According to the Voice of the Arabs on 11 Aug, the TUC representatives said the proposed legislation was meant to weaken the labour movement in preparation for the main purpose of the British: namely to introduce self-government and link Aden with the Commonwealth. The TUC was preparing to frustrate this plot. (*BBC*, 13 Aug)

The TUC planned an extraordinary conference of TU representatives from the Arab countries for 10-20 Aug. (*ANA*, 7 Aug-BBC, 9 Aug)

A TUC leader, Muhammad Sa'id Miswat, was dispatched to Brussels and London to meet labour leaders. (*Fatat al-Jasirah*, 13 Aug)

On 15 Aug, the Legislative Council approved the Industrial Relations Bill (Conciliation and Arbitration), to come into force on a date to be fixed by the Governor-in-Council, setting up "an independent and impartial Industrial Court" to give a binding verdict on any labour dispute, either by arbitration or injunction. (*Aden Chr.*, 4, 17 Aug)

**Aug: General Strike Called Off After Three Days.** On 15 Aug the TUC called a general strike which was apparently widely observed. On 17 Aug, after an abortive conference with the Governor, the TUC leaders called off the strike at a "mammoth labour rally." Al-Asnag, the TUC SG, said that if the strike continued, the government would deport "our northern brethren," i.e. the Yemeni workers. The government had issued a warning that foreign workers would be expelled if they participated in any form of troublemaking. Al-Asnag accused the Sultan of Lahej and the Sharif of Beihan of having offered to supply labourers to break the strike. He said that the government had also passed ordinances to ban the collection of donations and suppress demonstrations and Press freedom, and that it would enact the anti-strike bill. The TUC, however, would fight the government and not allow it to destroy the TU movement.



## ADEN COLONY

There was opposition among the workers to the ending of the strike.

The government also revoked the licence of the TUC paper *al-Amal*. (*Aden Chr.*, 18, 25 Aug)

**ICFTU Support for TUC.** In Aug two representatives of the ICFTU, Alfred Braunthal, head of its Economic and Social Development Department, and Muhammad an-Nūri Būdali, of the Tunisian trade union, who were invited by the TUC to advise on the bill, declared in Aden, after having met the Governor, that the new legislation violated recognized labour law principles. They said: "The strike is a fundamental right of workers while the new legislation introduces compulsory arbitration, bans strikes and introduces penalties. Under such conditions a free trade union cannot exist." (*Aden Chr.*, 25 Aug)

In Oct it was reported that the ICFTU had sent the TUC £1,000 to assist the families of workers dismissed by the government for striking. It also submitted a complaint on the new legislation to the International Labour Organization. (*Aden Chr.*, 20 Oct)

**Aug: Arab and Communist Bloc Support for TUC.** Cairo Radio reported that the TUC had received cables of support from China, Czechoslovakia, Rumania, and elsewhere. (*BBC EE*, 2 Sept) The World Federation of Trade Unions [pro-Communist] cabled the TUC expressing "full solidarity with their struggle for union rights and democratic liberties." (*R. Prague*, 18 Aug—*BBC EE*, 20 Aug)

The General Federation of Arab Workers in Cairo declared its support for the workers of Aden.

In Latakia, Syria, dockers downed tools on 15 Aug for ten minutes, and ships sounded sirens, in support of the Adeni workers. (*Sawt al-Arab*, 16 Aug—*BBC*, 18 Aug)

Ali Shukur, President of the Iraqi General Federation of Labour, cabled the Shtura conference of the Arab League Council to condemn "the imperialist persecution of the Adeni people and workers." (*R. Baghdad*, 24 Aug—*BBC*, 26 Aug)

The General Federation of Tunisian Workers condemned the new labour legislation. (*R. Tunis*, 24 Sept—*BBC*, 26 Sept)

Yemen also expressed support for the unions. (*R. San'a* 14, 17 Aug—*BBC*, 16, 19 Aug)

**Aug: Trend Towards Leftist Extremism in TUC.** At the end of Aug it was reported that the new bill had produced a rift among the TUC leaders which might drive the extremists towards the left. The TUC had cabled the WFTU and the Chinese TUF, among others, appealing for immediate material and moral aid against British rule. (*ANA*, 31 Aug—*BBC*, 2 Sept)

**Aug-Sept: New Bill Enters into Force.** In Aug the Governor announced that the bill was entering into force, and Professor H. Richardson was appointed President of the Industrial Court. At a Press conference on 29 Sept, Richardson stated that a right balance between freedom and discipline was essential for progress, and declared that the TUC was pursuing political objectives with which he was not concerned. Aden was in an early stage in the evolution of industrial relations, and "it should be safeguarded against irresponsible elements." (*Fatat al-Jasirah; Recorder*, 2 Oct)

In Sept the Labour Commissioner referred the first labour dispute which did not involve a strike to the Industrial Court for settlement. (*Aden Chr.*, 29 Sept)

**Aug-Dec: TU Movement in "State of Inertia."** In Oct and Dec the editor of the *Aden Chronicle* reported that following the enactment of the anti-strike law and the suppression of the TUC organ, *al-Amal*, the TU movement had lapsed into a "state of inertia, . . . hopelessness and inactivity." The TUC did not recognize the jurisdiction of the Industrial Court and continued to seek international labour assistance against the strike law. Labour disputes had remained dormant, however, since its enactment.

In Oct the acting SG of the TUC, Muhammad Salim Ali, said at a Press conference that the Union would "exhaust every peaceable means" to reach an amicable settlement of disputes. (*Aden Chr.*, 27 Oct, 29 Dec)

**Dec: Ordinance Requiring Submission of TU Accounts to Government.** On 22 Dec amendments to the Trade Unions and Trade Disputes Ordinance were published, requiring the submission of TU accounts to the Registrar of TUs and providing for close supervision of TU funds and activities. (*Aden Chr.*, 29 Dec)

## POLITICAL PARTIES

**Background Note:** In the fifties there were three political parties active in Aden.

The Aden Association (AA)—an offspring of the Muslim Association, the first political body in the Colony—drew its support largely from businessmen cooperating with the British. It had a programme of self-government inside the Commonwealth and stood for "Aden for the Adenis," mindful of Aden's economic advantages over the Protectorates and Yemen, with which the nationalists wanted to unite.

The South Arabian League and the National United Front were both anti-British and advocated immediate independence.

The South Arabian League advocated union between the Colony and the Protectorates, but some members broke away when it later also started to advocate union with Yemen. Its leader, Muhammad Ali al-Jifri, was regarded by the British authorities as the focus of nationalists' activities during the 1956–1958 unrest in Aden and the insurrection in the Amirates (especially Lahej, the seat of the Jifri family). He and one of his brothers were arrested and deported in Apr 1958. Since then, the League has operated mainly from Cairo, where Jifri took up residence.

The National United Front's aim was the establishment of a South Arabian independent state comprising the Aden Colony and Protectorates, Yemen, and Muscat and Oman. It comprised nationalists, the left wing of the South Arabian League and "Free Yemenis" aiming at the overthrow of the regime in Yemen. (On the Free Yemenis, see also p 396.) The Front had a following among the trade unions, Abdullah al-Asnag, the SG of the TUC, belonging to it. It was backed by Egypt.

Party activities, always confined to small circles, came to a standstill during the period of unrest.

**Jan: Governor Welcomes Formation of "Responsible Parties."** In Jan, in his address to the opening session of the Aden Legislative Council, the Governor, Sir William Luce, welcomed the forming of political parties "Opposition," he declared, "will not prevent Her Majesty's Government from continuing by gradual and orderly steps along the road to a more fully responsible self-government." An effective party system, which was still lacking, he continued, was "fundamental to the kind of parliamentary democracy which it is hoped to establish



in Aden and it is difficult to see how the next stage in constitutional evolution can be approached until responsible parties, led by men of experience in the affairs of government, have first been created."

The *Aden Chronicle* [pro-Government] commented that Aden had little leadership. A "negative set of elements" were predominant: vested interests, self-aggrandizement, demagoguery, and "callous play with the cupidity of the masses." The paper advocated that the members-in-charge (Adeni members of the Executive Council with administrative functions) should form a political party. They were "in a better position to learn the public mind and . . . to help mould it in the shape to come." The paper mentioned in this connection "men like Basendwah, Joahi, Sālim, Sa'īdi and Bayūmi" [members of the Executive, the Legislative Council or both]. (*Aden Chr.*, 28 June)

The Voice of the Arabs attacked the Governor's statement as one more "imperialistic design" to deceive the people. (*BBC*, 11 Feb)

**Apr-June: Attempts to Revive Aden Association.** In Apr Abd ar-Rahmān Jarjūrah, secretary of the AA, stated that work was "in full swing to convert the AA into a political party, with clear principles, after the shock it had suffered." Other parties were welcome, he added. The *Aden Chronicle* (whose editor, Muhammad Luqmān, was a former secretary of the AA) supported the establishment of the party. (*Aden Chr.*, 2 Apr)

In June it was reported that the party programme was to be prepared by Hussein Ali Bayūmi [Member of the Legislative Council in Charge of Public Works and Social Affairs, later elected President of the party, see below], Abd ar-Rahmān Jarjūrah, Jawād Shamah, Sālih Ka'aki and Muhammad Maysari. The party intended to open branches in Baraykah and Shaykh Uthman. (*Fatat al-Jazirah*, 3 June)

**Nationalist Opposition to AA.** In June an Aden paper reported:

"British activity is seen in various parts of Aden to open branches of the Association. The public reaction to the move seemed to be very cold. The consensus of opinion seems to be that the Association is far from nationalist in its convictions . . . Reference is made to the fact that the President of the Association is a member of the Governor's Executive Council, besides the SG and many members are considered pro-government individuals." (*Recorder, Aden*, 26 June)

AA circles were reportedly considering the dispatch of a delegation to London to confer on full independence for Aden within the Commonwealth. This move was held up, however, because of disagreement between advocates of "home rule" and those of "independence within the Commonwealth." The paper denounced these aims and denied the right of the AA to represent the Arab people of Aden. (*Ayyam, Aden*, 13 July) Another nationalist paper wrote that the separatist elements aimed by the revival of the AA to exploit the rifts amongst the nationalists. (*Talīhah, Yemen*, 2 July)

**Trade Union Opposition to AA.** In July Luqmān reported that the reactivation of the AA had aroused the TUC's opposition. While the AA was still studying "the possibilities before drafting a tentative plan of approach," its President [Hussein Ali Bayūmi] and Secretary discussed the formation of the proposed party at a workers' meeting. The Secretary of the BP workers' union denounced the formation of the party on two principal counts: (a) It was a separatist movement, serving the impe-

rialists and aiming to split the people into Adenis and Yemenis; (b) Since it would enrol only Adeni and Federal citizens, it would undermine the solidarity of the unions [which have a large membership of Yemenis]. (*Aden Chr.*, 14 July)

**AA Programme Versus TUC Programme.** In answer to this attack, Luqmān further reported, the Association issued the following general statement of aims: "(1) Aden and South Arabia are identical; (2) Adenis, Federal nationals and those who identify themselves with full allegiance to Aden qualify for citizenship; (3) Once unity [apparently of Aden Colony and the Protectorate] is achieved, the next phase would be to endeavour to merge with Yemen in order to form one state." The AA also affirmed its faith in the importance of the unions and denied any intention to undermine them.

Subsequently the TUC published its own programme: complete independence for Aden and the Protectorates, immediate merger with Yemen and affiliation to the UAR to bring about the ideal of Arab union. In Luqmān's view, these aims were "premature."

At a debate between TUC and AA members on a semi-public occasion, it was finally agreed, according to Luqmān, that "the ultimate aim as far as Aden was concerned was complete independence." Luqmān saw in this approach the possible programme of a third political grouping. (*Aden Chr.*, 14 July)

**UAR Opposition to AA.** The Voice of the Arabs denounced Luqmān for wanting to set up "a separatist party in the service of his masters the imperialists." The party's aim to include Aden in the Federation of Amirates was a British policy to bully the Arabs in the South while the British ME Command was being transferred to Aden, it declared.

The formation of political parties as a result of the Governor's speech was against Arab unity. (*BBC*, 16, 21 June)

**July-Nov: AA Becomes National Union Party.** In Aug Hussein Ali Bayūmi, President of the AA, published a draft constitution to transform the AA into a political party called "The National Union Party" (*al-Ittihā al-Watani*). The aims of the party would remain complete union with Aden Protectorate and a possible union in the future with other principalities of the Arab South, including Yemen. (*ANA*, 31 Aug-BBC, 2 Sept)

In Nov it was reported that the party had commenced its activities. (*Fatat al-Jazirah*, 12 Nov)

**June: Women's Club Closed Down.** On 15 June Cairo reported that the British authorities had closed down the Aden Women's Club "to prevent the spreading of national vigilance among the Arab women." (*Voice of the Arabs*, 15 June-BBC, 17 June)

**Aug: Formation of Arab Islamic Association Planned.** In Aug informal discussions on the forming of an Arab Islamic Association were reported. The sponsors were said to include merchants, landlords and professional men. Among those mentioned for presidency of the party was the Sharif of Beihan, Minister of Interior of the Federation of Arab Amirates. The programme, as published, did not refer to the major political questions; a point of interest was that it advocated full citizen rights for Arabs living in Aden for five years if "they also own property, business, employ workers and have families." The programme also advocated full citizen rights for

Adeni non-Arab Muslims. (*Fatat al-Jazirah*, 2 Aug; *Aden Chr.*, 18 Aug)

Hasan Ghabari, a Municipal Councillor and member of the AA, opposed the setting up of the new party, claiming that it was under "the influence of those who should be excluded from political activities." (*Aden Chr.*, 29 Sept)

**Sept: Revival of Arab National Congress Planned.** [The Arab National Congress was founded in 1955 as a coalition between the South Arabian League and the National United Front.] In Sept it was reported that its political committee was drafting a political manifesto. (*Recorder, Aden*, 18 Sept)

In an interview Abdullah al-Asnag, the SG of the TUC, a former member of the National United Front and now a member of this committee, declared that Aden and the Protectorate "cannot be separated from the rest of Yemen" and that "the fight for freedom from British rule included the fight for democratic rule in Imam's Yemen." This would be achieved "by seeking liberation from the British yoke and keeping in mind the fact that Aden is part of Yemen. When the British will leave, the new government to be formed will be the government of Yemen, democratic Yemen." (*Recorder, Aden* 2 Oct)

The Voice of the Arabs reported on 11 Sept a meeting of the Committee of Liaison and Study for National Grouping (*Lajnat al-Ittisāl wa ad-Dirāsah li-Tajammu al-Qawmi*) to consider the merger of the various nationalist groups into a nationalist party. [This item probably refers to the committee mentioned above.] (*IMB*, 12 Sept, *BBC*, 13 Sept; see also *Aden Chr.*, 22 Sept)

**Nov: Istiqlāl (Independence) Party Planned.** It was reported in mid-Nov that the Istiqlāl (Independence) Party was preparing its "new constitution." (*Fatat al-Jazirah*, 15 Nov)

**Dec: Communists Infiltrating Political Parties.** In Dec it was reported that the "recent resurgence" of nationalism and the emergence of political parties had prompted a Communist band of active workers, over 100 strong, to conduct a drive to infiltrate into the new parties. More finance was expected to come from abroad by way of Yemen. (*Recorder*, 18 Dec)

**The South Arabian League.** [Activities in the name of the South Arabian League (SAL) were conducted mainly in Cairo by its exiled President, Muhammad Ali al-Jifri. See Background Note above.]

In May, the *Aden Chronicle* quoted the TUC organ, *al-Amal*, to the effect that the SAL leader in Cairo, al-Jifri, and the ex-Sultan of Lahej, Ali Abd al-Karim, had embezzled funds and contributions donated to the Algerian cause and were squandering them in Cairo on amusement. (*Aden Chr.*, 12 May)

Similar accusations were made by San'a Radio. (*BBC*, 24, 27 May; *Aden Chr.*, 16 June)

In June a delegation of the SAL from Cairo, led by al-Jifri, visited Saudi Arabia. Al-Jifri stated that it would discuss with Saudi officials the developments in the "Arab South" and would meet in Jedda with leaders who would come especially from the South [i.e. Aden] to lay down a comprehensive plan for the continuation of the struggle against imperialism. (*BBC*, 1 June)

In Aden a pro-government paper commented that the motive was to prove that the revolt in Aden was still active, as the SAL had collected more than 200,000

Riyals in Hijaz and Kuwait for this purpose. (*Fatat al-Jazirah*, 14 June)

In Sept it was reported that Rashid Ali al-Hariri, head of the SAL in Aden, had arrived in Cairo for consultation with SAL leaders there. (*BBC*, 30 Sept) (See also pp 157-8.)

**A Secret Organization:** In May it was reported that leaflets had been distributed in Aden, signed by Munāzamat as-Sā'iqaḥ (Commando Organization), containing a nationalist programme and threats against collaborators with imperialism. (*Fatat al-Jazirah*, 31 May)

**Dec: Little Progress in Party Organization.** [It would seem that by the end of the year little progress had been made in party organization, except for the AA, though it too seemed to be in the very first stages of consolidation.]

## SELF-GOVERNMENT AND OTHER POLITICAL ISSUES

(See also below: Political Parties, Trade Unions.)

**Towards Self-Government and Union with the Federation.** [In Jan, the Governor stressed in the Legislative Council the government's determination to proceed towards a "more fully responsible self-government" (p 386). In Oct, the new Governor spoke of a possible close and permanent relationship between the Colony and the Federation (see p 384). The AA and other Aden circles cooperating with the British took up the call for self-government and gradual unification with the Federation.]

In May a pro-government paper reported that members of the Legislative Council were studying questions of independence. (*Fatat al-Jazirah*, 10 May) In May the same paper asked what the Adenis would do if they were suddenly confronted by "home rule towards unification with the Protectorates and independence." (*Fatat al-Jazirah*, 26 May)

In July, the *Aden Chronicle* wrote that responsible leaders in Aden and the Protectorates were contemplating a gradual process of unification, political, economic and cultural. However, the political status of Aden Colony must first be advanced to a stage comparable with that of the Federation (see p 390). (*Aden Chr.*, 7 July)

[Throughout July, *Fatat al-Jazirah* and the *Aden Chronicle* paid much attention to the design of a flag for independent Aden; many suggestions were printed.] The Voice of the Arabs commented that the flag issue was an imperialist design to throw dust in the eyes of the people. (*BBC*, 9 Aug)

M. H. Khalifah, a founder-member and sponsor of the AA, called on the British to grant "the Aden people's unanimous demand for self-government, to be followed immediately by complete independence." He said that the "present general discontent among the people" was mainly political, and advocated a fully elected Legislative Assembly as a first step. (*Aden Chr.*, 25 Aug)

**Citizenship and Immigration.** On 28 Dec, 1959, the Aden Government Council approved the definition of an Adeni subject as anyone born in Aden or the Aden Protectorates, or who had lived in Aden for ten years and knew Arabic.

Al-Jifri, the exiled leader of the South Arabian League, commenting in Cairo on this definition, said that it was an improvement over the government's original definition, as knowledge of Arabic had been added

## ADEN COLONY

and those born in the Protectorates were recognized. However, Britain's basic intention—to make Aden into "another Singapore," a mixture of nationalities and groups of immigrants in which the Arabs would be no more than one such group—had not changed, he declared. (*R. Cairo*, 11 Jan—BBC, 13 Jan)

The Voice of the Arabs denounced the "imperialist scheme" to isolate Aden from the Arabs by preventing Yemenis from living in Aden, while awarding citizenship to citizens of the British Commonwealth. (BBC, 16 Jan)

In Jan the Governor of Aden announced a forthcoming amendment of the Immigration Ordinance "that will henceforth prevent any immigrant from acquiring permanent exempted status by reason of long residence."

The editor of the *Aden Chronicle* expressed the hope that this amendment would satisfy the workers, who felt insecure because of the ease with which they could be replaced by foreigners. (*Aden Chr.*, 28 Jan)

The Voice of the Arabs, on the other hand, commented that the proposed legislation, the text of which had not been published, did not change the British policy to "destroy the Arabism of the Aden people" through immigration. (BBC, 8 Feb)

Replying to the argument that foreigners were brought in because of a shortage of qualified personnel, Ahmad Sa'īd asked over the Voice of the Arabs why the authorities were preventing Adenis from studying in the UAR. (BBC, 20 Jan)

In Apr *Fatāt al-Jazīrah* stated that in spite of the Immigration Ordinance it was still easy for British subjects to come to Aden, make money and return home. (*Fatāt al-Jazīrah*, 26 Apr)

In Mar an Adeni was appointed Chief of the Immigration Department—the only Adeni department head. (*Aden Chr.*, 24 Mar) In Oct it was reported that some members of the Legislative Council were planning to amend the Immigration Ordinance; one objective was to place the Immigration Department under the supervision of a member-in-charge. (*Aden Chr.*, 20 Oct)

**Status of Yemenis.** In Aug it was reported that the Yemenis in Aden were concerned over "the recent development of political activity and ideological differences." Informal discussions among the leading Yemenis in Aden resulted in a suggestion to draft a memorandum of complaints and grievances. They objected that:

- (a) The definition of Adeni citizenship was a crippling obstacle to Yemenis, obtaining positions in the civil service and private firms;
- (b) Yemenis could not obtain exemption certificates, not being Commonwealth citizens;
- (c) Only children born in Aden were eligible for schooling;
- (d) Political rights were denied to Yemenis because

they were not British subjects (BBC, 26 July; *Aden Chr.*, 11 Aug)

**Adenization of the Civil Service.** In Jan, Luqmān, editor of the *Aden Chronicle*, commented on Press discussion of Adenization. "Adenization is a farce and will remain so for a long time to come," he wrote. Quoting from the Adenization Report's [prepared in 1959 by governmental committee] recommendations for long-term contracts for foreign civil servants and non-discrimination in promotion [i.e. no favoured treatment for Adenis], Luqmān concluded: "The Adeni is actually non-Adeni." The upper echelons of the Civil Service were largely non-Adeni and would remain so for many years; the number of Adeni professional men was negligible; trade, the TUs and the social system were run by foreigners. The Adenis were predominantly Arabs and "proud of Arab nationalism." A civil servant must be, above all, Aden-born, Arab, an Arabic speaker, and "all for Aden and its aspirations"; all higher posts in the Civil Service must be filled by Adenis at the earliest possible date, though technical and administrative assistance would be needed for some time. Luqmān appealed to the Adenis to work for these achievements as a part of the movement towards self-government and federation with the Protectorates. (*Aden Chr.*, 28 Jan)

In another article, Luqmān said that, though the Adenization Report envisaged the Adenization of the Civil Service by 1967 and provided for annual scholarships for Adenis, there were only about 50 Adeni students in the UK. This was totally insufficient, especially as the students were not legally bound to return to Aden. Present arrangements made it completely unlikely that Adenization could be achieved in 1967. (*Aden Chr.*, 17 Nov)

In Nov M.A. Luqmān launched a drive against regulations by which a student sent abroad at Aden's expense could withdraw from his obligations to serve in Aden on payment of EAS (East African Shilling) 1,599, as against more than EAS 60,000 spent on his education abroad. (*Aden Chr.*, 10 Nov)

**Military Training Advocated in Preparation for Independence.** It was reported that the members of the Legislative Council were unanimous in demanding the "opening up of opportunities for military service for their fellow nationals." "Senior Arab army officers" were reported to advocate military training for Adenis and their enrolment in the Aden Protectorate Levies. The *Aden Chronicle* commented that military training was essential, as Aden "is likely some day to shoulder her own defence responsibility." (*Aden Chr.*, 23 June)

*Fatāt al-Jazīrah* called for the formation of a cadre of military officers, the sending of cadets to British military schools, compulsory military service and the opening of a military college for South Arabia, which "we have decided to proclaim as the Republic of Aden." (*Fatāt al-Jazīrah*, 9, 31 July)

## THE ADEN PROTECTORATES

### THE STATES OF THE PROTECTORATES

The Western Protectorate consists of 20 and the Eastern Protectorate of five self-governing states. The rulers are styled Sultan or Amir in the larger states and Shaykh in the smaller. British officials serve in advisory capacity.

Following is a list of the states, their capitals (in brackets) and their rulers at the end of 1960 (see also

map). The states that joined the Federation (see p 390) up to Feb 1960 are marked (F).

### The Western Protectorate:

1. (F) Lahej: the Abdali Sultanate (Lahej or Al-Hauta) Sultan Fadl Ibn Ali Ibn Ahmad Ibn Ali Muhsin al-Abdali (Lahaj is the senior state in the Western Protectorate)



## THE ADEN PROTECTORATES

2. Amiri: Amir Sha'afal Ibn Ali
3. (F) Fadhli: (Zinjibar) Sultan Abdullah Ibn Uthmān
4. (F) Lower Yafi: (Ja'ar) Sultan Mahmūd Ibn Aydarus al-Afifi
5. Haushabi: (Museumir) Sultan Faisal Ibn Sarūr
6. Upper Yafi: Sultan Muhammad Ibn Sālih  
(The following four Sheikhdoms form independent subsections of Upper Yafi)
7. Mausatta: Ahmad Ibn Abubakr Ibn Ali Askar an-Naqib and Sālih Hussein Muhsin Askar an-Naqib
8. Dhubi: Shaykh Abd ar-Rahmān Ibn Sālih (a minor); Regent: Sālih Sālim
9. Maflahi: Shaykh Qāsim Abd ar-Rahmān
10. Hadhrami: Shaykh Abdullah Ibn Muhammad Ibn Hussein Ibn Ghālib al-Hadhrami
11. Shaib: (Awabil) Shaykh Yahya Ibn Muhammad
12. (F) The Sultanate of Dhala (Dhala), includes Quteibi: Shaykh Sā'if Hasan Ali al-Akhrami al-Qutaybi
13. Alawi: Shaykh Sālih Ibn Sayl al-Alawi
14. (F) Aqrabi: (Bir Ahmad) Shaykh Muhammad Ibn Fadl al-Aqrabi (joined the Federation in Feb 1960)
15. (F) Awdhali: (Lodar) Shaykh Sālih Ibn Hussein Ibn Ja'abil al-Awdali
16. (F) Upper Awlaqi: (Nisab) Sultan Awadh Ibn Sālih Ibn Abdullah
17. Upper Awlaqi Sheikhdom: (Said) Shaykh Abdullah Ibn Muhsin Ibn Farid
18. (F) Lower Awlaqi: (Anwar) Sultan Nāsir Ibn Aydarus Ibn Ali Ibn Abdullah al-Awlaqi (a minor); Regent: Amir Abubakr Ibn Ahmad al-Awlaqi (joined the Federation in Feb 1960)
19. (F) Beihan: (Beihan) Amir Sālih Ibn Hussein Ibn Ahmad al-Hābili al-Hāshimi and Sharif Hussein Ibn Ahmad al-Hābili al-Hāshimi (father of the Ruler)
20. (F) Dathina: (Mudia) ruled by a Council (joined the Federation in Feb 1960)

### The Eastern Protectorate:

1. Qu'aiti: Sultan Awādh Ibn Sālih al-Qu'ayti
2. Kathiri: Sultan Hussein Ibn Ali al-Kathiri
3. Mahri Sultanate of Qishn and Socotra: Sultan Isa Ibn Ali Ibn Afrūr
4. Balhaf: Sultan Nāsir Ibn Abdullah al-Wāhidi
5. Bir Ali: Sultan Alawi Ibn Muhsin al-Wāhidi  
(ME, Europa 1961; Aden and the Yemen, HMSO 1960)

**Background Note on Local Security Forces.** According to Cairo sources, local Aden security forces played the major part in the land fighting against the insurgents in Upper Awlaqi and Yafi—see below. These forces consist of:

*The Aden Protectorate Levies*, over 3,000 strong, organized in four infantry battalions. They are recruited mainly from the Western Protectorate and have British and Arab officers. They rank as military forces and are under the control of the Commander, British Forces, Arabian Peninsula.

*Western Protectorate Government Guards*, over 2,000 strong, charged with internal security, under the direct control of the Governor. They are to constitute the nucleus of a Federal National Guard and have been [formally?] handed over to the Federation.

*Western Protectorate Tribal Guards*, under the direct

control of the rulers but subsidized by the government. Lahej also maintains a small standing army.

*Eastern Protectorate: The Hadhrami Bedouin Legion*, over 1,000 strong, under the direct control of the Governor.

*Local Forces of the States*, under the control of the rulers, altogether some 1,200 strong. (Based on *Aden and the Yemen*, HMSO 1960)

### WESTERN PROTECTORATE—THE FEDERATION OF THE AMIRATES OF THE SOUTH

**Background Note.** The Western Protectorate comprises 20 states with a population estimated in 1959 at 335,000. The plan for a federation, which had been first brought up by the British authorities in 1954 and 1956, received a new impetus during the Yemeni intervention in Aden and the Lahej uprising in 1958. Five rulers friendly to the British and opposed to the Imam's claims were the founder-members: The Sultan of Awdhali, Sharif Hussein of Beihan, the Nā'ib of Fadhli, the Amir of Dhala and the Upper Awlaqi Shaykh; they were joined later by the Sultan of Lower Yafi. On 11 Feb 1959 the Federation of the Amirates of the South was formally inaugurated, when the six rulers signed a federal constitution and a treaty of friendship and protection with the UK, by which they bound themselves not to enter into foreign relations without British approval. Britain promised financial and military aid which would assist the Federation eventually to become an independent state.

Lahej (or Abdali), whose ruler, Sultan Ali Abd al-Karim al-Abdali, was deposed in 1958 for cooperation with Yemen against British interests and succeeded by Fadl Ibn Ali, joined the Federation in 1959.

The main features of the federal constitution are: an executive Council of six Ministers, each of whom in rotation serves as chairman for a month, and a Legislative Federal Council consisting of six nominated members from each of the federating states.

*The Council* (end of 1960, according to ME, Europa 1961):

President and Minister of Finance: Muhammad Farid Ibn Muhsin

Minister of Defence and Adviser on Foreign Affairs: Sultan Fadl Ibn Ali Ibn Ahmad Ibn al-Muhsin al-Abdali

Minister of Agriculture: Sultan Ahmad Ibn Abdullah al-Fadl

Minister of Education: Amir Sha'afal Ibn Ali

Minister of the Interior: Sharif Hussein Ibn Ahmad al-Hābili

Minister of Health: Shaykh Ali At'if-Kaladi

In Feb Lower Awlaqi, Aqrabi and Dathina Joined the Federation, which now comprised 10 of the 20 states of the Western Protectorate. (BBC, 12 Feb) Cairo and San'a denounced this step as one more imperialistic plot. (BBC, 17, 26 Feb)

During May-July, the Ministers of the Interior and of Finance of the Federation visited London. (Fatat al-Jazirah, 19 May, 29 July)

**Cairo Denounces the Federation.** Throughout the year the Voice of the Arabs denounced the Federation and accused its rulers of being "imperialist agents," "toys in the hand of Britain," "traitors," and "hirelings." (BBC-IMB)

**Proposed Union of the Protectorates and Aden Colony.** See p 388.



In Aug the Voice of the Arabs reported that members of the AA had met the Sharif of Beihan, Minister of the Interior of the Federation, to discuss the proposed union between Aden Colony and the Protectorates. (BBC, 18 Aug)

#### UPRISING IN YAFI

**Background Note.** In 1956-1957 relations between the Aden Government and Lower Yafi had already begun to deteriorate. The opposition was headed by Muhammad Ibn Aydarus al-Afifi, son and deputy of Sultan Mahmūd. By the end of 1957 the British demanded that the Sultan nominate another successor to the throne, but he refused. At this junction Muhammad left for Al-Qara, his mountain refuge, taking with him most of the state officials, the 170 strong Yafi tribal guards, and a good part of the Treasury. The authorities reorganized the Lower Yafi administration, and when Muhammad's attempts to oppose this were not successful he shifted his attention in 1958 to Aden Colony, where he, among others, organized terrorist activities.

In June 1958 the RAF demolished his base in Al-Qara and thereafter his activity declined. He received limited support from Yemen.

**Feb: Sultan Succeeded by Younger Son.** The death of Sultan Aydarus Ibn Muhsin al-Afifi of Lower Yafi was reported at the beginning of Feb. (BBC, 9 Feb)

The *Aden Chronicle* reported that the chiefs of the Lower Yafi tribes elected Muhammad Ibn Aydarus to succeed him. The majority of the ruling Afifi family, however, as well as the Kalad tribes led by Shaykh Ali Atif, elected his younger brother, Mahmūd, aged 12, who was proclaimed Sultan on 25 Feb in the presence of the members of the Federal Supreme Council. Few members of the Yafi mountain tribes attended the celebration, as they had been intercepted by the followers of Muhammad Ibn Aydarus. (*Aden Chr.*, 3 Mar) The Voice of the Arabs supported Muhammad as the legitimate Sultan. (BBC, 9 Apr)

In July Sultan Mahmūd arrived in London, reportedly "for consultations" and/or for schooling (*Akhir Sa'ah*, Cairo, 20 July)

**Apr: Arms Despatch to Yafi Denied.** On 7 Apr, the *Aden Chronicle* reported that during the preceding week a BBC broadcast "alleged" that a large haul of arms had been despatched from Egypt, by the ex-Sultan of Lahej, Ali Abd al-Karim, and his associate and adviser, Muhammad Ali al-Jifri, for delivery to the Aden Protectorate via Saudi Arabia. They were intended, it was claimed, to bolster up the anti-British uprising in Lower Yafi.

All along the border there was a huge build-up of troops and a constant patrol of Shackleton aircraft to intercept any attempt to smuggle arms into the Protectorates through Beihan.

Later on, according to the paper, it was found that the whole affair was based on false information, and no interceptions were made. (*Aden Chr.*, 7 Apr)

The Cairo Voice of the Arabs, commenting on the BBC broadcast, said that such reports were a pretext to justify a British military build-up. Suggesting that the arms came from "the heart of the Arab homeland" it asserted the right of the Arabs in the South to arm themselves to defend their liberty. (BBC, 5 Apr)

**Jan-Nov: Cairo Reports on Hostilities.** Throughout the year, the Voice of the Arabs reported from time to time on hostilities in Upper and Lower Yafi.

In Jan the station reported on fighting in Upper Yafi between the "nationalists and the pro-imperialist agents," as a result of British attempts to complete from the north the encirclement of the nationalist strongholds in Lower Yafi, which were already surrounded on three sides. The British were aided by the Sultan of Upper Yafi, Muhammad Ibn Sālih; the nationalist warriors had surrounded his forts and bombarded them with mortars, using this weapon for the first time. Supplies and ammunition dropped for the Sultan by aircraft had been captured by the warriors, the station said. (BBC, 12 Jan, 3 Feb)

[During the spring and summer months there were relatively few reports on Yafi.]

At the beginning of Nov it was reported that followers of Muhammad Ibn Aydarus had attacked a group of dignitaries, including Shaykh Haydarah Ibn Mansūr of Lower Yafi, Shaykh Ali Atif, the Federal Health Minister, and the Nā'ib Ja'bl Ibn Hussein. A tribal guard was killed and two injured, while three of the attackers were killed and two injured. (*Patat al-Jazirah*, 5 Nov)

**Nov: Reported Offensive Against Rebels.** In Nov-Dec the Voice of the Arabs reported on concentrated efforts to crush the insurgents, led by Muhammad Aydarus, who, however, continued offensive operations in Upper and Lower Yafi.

The RAF bombed Al-Qara and caused damage. In a special statement on the bombardment, read over the Voice of the Arabs, Muhammad said that the RAF had also wrecked 15 forts "in Suq." The aerial attacks were apparently preceded by ultimatums signed by the ruler of Awdhali (see below). (BBC, 23 Dec)

An official spokesman of the Federation of the Amirates confirmed that early in Nov a "Rocket bombardment of the dissidents' hideouts" was carried out in Lower Yafi. He mentioned that the dissidents had attacked a party of officials (see above). (*Aden Chr.*, 1 Dec)

A coalition of local rulers had been formed to fight the rebels, the Voice of the Arabs reported. The ruler of Awdhali, Shaykh Sālih Ibn Hussein al-Awdhali [C.M.G., C.B.E.], had persuaded Shaykh at-Taqi [apparently in the Yafi area] to cooperate with Britain; a third ruler collaborating was "Sultan Haydarat al-Mansūr, whom the British have appointed as the ruler of the coastal Yafi Sultanate." These rulers and the British had joined forces against Muhammad Aydarus.

A "cable sent by the leaders of the people of the South" appealed for help. It said that "the forces of occupation" were carrying out "a war of annihilation against unarmed innocent citizens in Upper and Lower Yafi... The situation in Yafi is grave and demands positive and quick action." (BBC, 14 Nov, also 25, 26, 30 Nov, 3, 10, 21, 23 Dec)

#### UPRISING IN UPPER AWLAQI

**Background.** The uprising reported in Upper Awlaqi concerns the Sheikdom only, not the Sultanate of the same name. The reports gave no specific reason for the uprising except that it was part of the "holy war against imperialism." However, it is clear that there was strife inside the ruling clan: the uprising was led by the Deputy Shaykh, Muhammad Ibn Abu Bakr Ibn Farid, while the Shaykh, Abdullah Ibn Muhsin Ibn Farid, was one of the founder members of the Federation in 1959.

According to a talk over the Voice of the Arabs, the uprising started in Apr 1959, when British forces cordoned off the homes of the Ibn Bakr tribesmen, who succeeded, however, in escaping to the mountains. Shaykh

Abdullah Ibn Muhsin was cooperating with the British. (*BBC, 14 Apr*)

The talks on Awlaqi over the Voice of the Arabs, which are cited below, were mostly given by Muhammad Ali and Abdullah al-Jifri of the South Arabian League.

**Cairo Reports on Uprising.** In Dec. 1949 the Voice of the Arabs reported that the "*mujahidin*" (warriors) had attacked a British camp and wounded three British soldiers. In Rummah they had wounded Anderson, the resident Political Officer. The British had carried out a series of aerial attacks and used napalm. (*BBC, 5 Dec 1959*)

In Jan-Mar 1960 the Voice of the Arabs reported on operations against the rebels. British forces were carrying out encircling movements from the neighbouring Amirates; at the same time they were supported by "agents" inside Upper Awlaqi. The British had collected "nearly 4,000 warriors, including British imperialists, traitors and mercenaries," to destroy the revolution led by the Abu Bakr Ibn Farid family in Upper Awlaqi. The commentator accused Britain of having carried out a "continuous air bombardment." Muhammad al-Jifri appealed to the Aden Levies and other local government forces to disobey orders to attack their kin and to join the "struggle against imperialism." (*BBC, 26 Jan, 6 Feb, 12 Mar*)

In Apr Abdullah al-Jifri, reporting armed clashes and more military moves against the insurgents, implied that no British soldiers had been actively engaged in the fighting. Only local government troops and guards, as well as tribes incited by the British and their agents, were doing the fighting. (*BBC, 23 Apr*)

[However, according to following reports British officers took part in the operations.]

On 19 May the Voice of the Arabs reported on a series of armed clashes from 3 to 21 Apr, resulting in 42 fatal casualties and many wounded suffered by the British and the "mercenaries." Among the dead were three British officers. (*BBC, 21 May*)

**May: British Offensive.** At the end of May the Voice of the Arabs reported that "the occupation authorities" had opened an offensive, deploying over 10,000 men, against the warriors of Upper Awlaqi, led by Muhammad Ibn Abu Bakr, following the attacks of the rebels in Mar-Apr. The attacking forces were using tanks and other heavy weapons. Aircraft were carrying out continuous raids and reconnaissance patrols along the coast to watch boats [carrying arms to the insurgents]; an aircraft carrier served as the base for these operations. Many of the houses in Wadi Yashbum in Upper Awlaqi, including those of the Shaykhs, had been destroyed. (*BBC, 28 May*)

**May: Abu Bakr Tribe Reported to Have Fled; Leader in Cairo.** In May it was reported in Aden that the entire tribe of Abu Bakr Ibn Farid had left Upper Awlaqi and trekked to Beida in Yemen. They had previously proposed a truce to Shaykh Abdullah Ibn Muhsin Ibn Farid. It was expected that peace would now reign in the Sheikdom, as Yemen was no longer supplying arms to the insurgents. (*Aden Chr., 26 May*) [There were no other reports that the whole tribe had fled.]

The leader of the insurgents, Muhammad Ibn Abu Bakr Ibn Farid, appealed "from the platform of the Voice of the Arabs" on 14 May to the tribes of the "Arab South" to join hands against the British, and proclaimed "a revolt in Awlaqi." (*BBC, 17 May*) [It was

not quite clear, however, whether he was actually in Cairo.]

On 19 May he denied reports that his tribe had asked for talks with the government in order to end the revolt. (*BBC, 21 May*)

**June-Dec: Relative Quiet.** [During this period there were only sporadic reports of actual hostilities in Awlaqi, especially as compared with the period preceding the British action in May. The Voice of the Arabs continued up to the end of the year to claim—though it did so mostly in general terms—that the fighting was continuing.] Following are some incidents reported:

In July, according to the Voice of the Arabs, a relative of Shaykh Muhammad Abu Bakr, leader of the "Awlaqi revolution," was killed by a stray bullet. In Nisab, capital of Upper Awlaqi, warriors attacked a British army unit, killing a captain and wounding a soldier. (*Voice of the Arabs, 10 July-BBC, 12, 26 July*)

In Oct, the same station reported that five British soldiers had been killed and many wounded in Awlaqi. (*BBC, 14 Oct*)

### EASTERN PROTECTORATE

**Political Developments in Kathiri.** In Apr the first political party in Kathiri called "Ash-Shanaker" after the name of Arab tribes in the Sultanate, was permitted to operate. Its programme was to bring about closer ties between, and eventually freedom of the States of the Eastern Protectorate and, later, all Aden states. (*Musawwar, Cairo, 8 Apr*)

An Aden source reported that it was intended to elect a Legislative Council in the Kathiri Sultanate, to take the place of the current State Council. (*Fatat al-Jazirah, 1, 2 Dec*)

**Political Developments in Qu'aiti.** It was reported that it was intended to hold municipal elections in Mukallah, the capital of the Qu'aiti Sultanate, after the first census there. It was expected that all the people of the South residing in the town would have the right to vote. (*Voice of the Arabs, 18 July-BBC, 20 July*)

**Proposals for Union of Qu'aiti and Kathiri.** The Voice of the Arabs reported from Hadhramaut that the authorities in Kathiri and Qu'aiti were receiving hundreds of petitions for the union of the two Sultanates. At the same time Cairo warned against such a union if it was inspired by the British. (*Voice of the Arabs, 1, 15 Aug-BBC, 3, 17 Aug*)

**Sept 1959-Oct 1960: Qu'aiti-Kathiri Agreement to Share Oil Income.** In Sept 1959 representatives of the Qu'aiti and Kathiri Sultanates, meeting at Aden, reached an agreement on the sharing of income from oil, which it was hoped would be discovered. They were unable, however, to reach a compromise on their territorial claims. [In 1938 the Governor of Aden granted to Petroleum Concessions Ltd., a subsidiary of the Iraq Petroleum Company, an exploration licence for the whole Aden Protectorate. Surveys found that the upper reaches of Wadi Hadhramaut in the Eastern Protectorate were promising, but the region is the subject of a border dispute. Parts are claimed by Saudi Arabia and Britain claims it on behalf of the protected rulers, while the rulers disagree on its ownership among themselves, and unattached local tribes also have claims.]

According to the agreement, two-thirds of any payments by the oil company would go to the Qu'aitis and one to the Kathiris. The concession area was to be administered by The Petroleum Affairs and Disputed

Area Authority, on which the two Sultanates would have equal representation.

*The Economist* commented that "the makeshift arrangements for the control of the area contribute nothing towards the permanent settlement that is so desperately needed for all Southern Arabia. If oil is eventually discovered, the local rulers will be even less willing to compromise than they have been in the past." (*Economist*, 13 Feb)

**Failure to Reach Agreement with Oil Company.** In July it was reported that Petroleum Concessions Ltd. had failed to reach agreement with the Shaykhs of Qu'aiti and

Kathiri and had withdrawn from Aden Protectorate in Apr. (*PPS*, July 1960, p 270)

The two American partners in Petroleum Concessions, Jersey Standard and Socony, both of them shareholders of ARAMCO, had dissociated themselves from the company early in 1960 (*PT*, 25 Mar, p 204) [Apparently they were afraid that Petroleum Concessions might find oil in an area over which the King of Saudi Arabia might be in a position, because of an ill-defined border, to claim sovereign rights.]

The Shaykhs of Qu'aiti and Kathiri invited bids for a concession. (*PPS*, June, p 270; *Recorder*, Aden, 2 Oct) [None was made by the end of the year.]

## THE MUTAWAKILITE KINGDOM OF YEMEN

(Al-Mamlakah al-Mutawakkiliyah al-Yamaniyah)

### INTERNAL AFFAIRS

#### SYNOPSIS

The year 1960 witnessed a continuation of the unrest and violence traditional in Yemen.

While the Imam Ahmad's health remained poor, he continued to function as an absolute ruler and concentrated decision-making in his hands still more than in the past, even on minor administrative matters. This was said to be a consequence of his ever-growing suspicion of everybody. As a result, it was said, administrative efficiency was deteriorating.

In Feb a plot against the Imam by supporters of Crown Prince al-Badr was reported. There were also reports of a teachers' strike—perhaps the first in Yemen—and of a refusal to pay taxes in towns of Northern Yemen.

In Apr the Khawlān, part of the Baqil tribe which rose against the Imam in 1959, rebelled. The Imam employed the army to crush the rebels, but in July it was reported that they were still holding out in the mountains. Some fled to Aden.

During June–July and again in Nov–Dec, a wave of terrorism swept the country. Bombs were planted in one of the Imam's palaces, government buildings, and houses of the Imam's supporters. According to Yemeni and Aden sources the Imam held Yemeni emigres in Aden and Cairo responsible. (See below, International Relations.)

In Dec attempts on the life of the Imam and the Crown Prince, by members of the family, were reported; four princes were said to have been imprisoned.

Among the Imam's efforts to safeguard his position were the traditional levying of hostages from the tribal chiefs, the execution of persons implicated in opposition and terrorism, attempts to rally the royal family and the Hashimite clan, to which it belongs, and the transfer of the capital from Ta'izz to Hodeida, which was apparently less affected by the terror than San'a or Ta'izz.

#### THE IMAM, THE GOVERNMENT AND THE ADMINISTRATION

**The Government** (Jan 1961)

King of Yemen: Imam an-Nāsir li-Oin Allah Ahmad Ibn Yahya Hamid ad-Din [The Imam functions as an absolute ruler; the Council's function is purely advisory.]

#### *The Council of Ministers:*

Minister of Foreign Affairs and Minister of Defence: Sayf al-Islam al-Badr (the Crown Prince)

Minister of the Interior: Ahmad Ibn Ahmad as-Siyāghī

Minister of Finance: Abdullah Uthmān

Minister of Education: Hussein al-Waysi

Minister of Health: Muhammad Ali Uthmān

Minister of Economy: Abd al-Qādir Ibn Abdullah

Minister of Communications: Qādi Abdullah al-Hajari

Minister of Works: Yahya Abd al-Qādir

Minister of Justice: Ahmad Ibn Ahmad al-Jarafi

Minister of Agriculture: Muhammad Ibn Hussein al-Amri

Ministers of State: Hasan Ibn Ali Ibn Ibrahim; Abd ar-Rahmān Abu Tālib; Muhammad Abdullah ash-Shāmi; Al-Qādi Muhammad Abdullah al-Amri. (*The ME, Europa*, 1961)

**Apr–May: Reported Deterioration of Imam's Authority.** The *Aden Chronicle* reported that the authority of the Imam was diminishing: "His suspicions intensify as he grows older, weaker and the country slips away from the old strong hands of control." The Crown Prince, Sayf al-Islam al-Badr, had not proved himself a strong heir.

Administration was gradually deteriorating. Key officials had ceased to discharge any duties without the Imam's assent. Every decree and order must bear his seal or initial to make it valid. But the Imam himself was on his sick bed. A "national outburst" was thought not unlikely. (*Aden Chr.*, 14 Apr, 19 May)

**Imam's Health Failing.** All through the year there were reports on the failing health of the 70-year-old Imam. In the spring he spent most of his time in as-Sukhna, taking baths to ease his rheumatic pains.

In May he underwent a surgical operation, and San'a Radio quoted messages congratulating him on his recovery. (*Aden Chr.*, 19 May; *BBC*, 21 May) At the end of the year it was reported that he suffered periods of inactivity through near-paralysis due to acute arthritis.

The Imam's illness was regarded as contributing to the



precariousness of his control. (*Aden Chr.*, 14 Apr; *Mid. Mirror*, 31 Dec)

**Changes in Government and Administration.** Imam Ahmad's representative in Hodeida province, Muhammad Ahmad Pasha, died on 18 Jan. (*BBC*, 21 Jan)

[For changes in representation in Cairo in Feb, see p 157.]

Muhammad Ali Uthmān was appointed Minister of Health.

Qādi Abdullah Ibn Sālih al-Fadli was appointed Governor (Hākim) of Ibb. (*Saba*, 4 Aug) [In Dec it was reported that Qādi Ahmad as-Siyāghī was appointed to this post, see below.]

In an air crash near Moscow several leading Yemenis were killed. Among them were: al-Qādi al-Amri, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs; al-Qādi Muhammad Ahmad al-Hajari, 74, Minister of Finance; and Dr Abd ar-Ra'ūf Rifā'i, of the Ministry of National Economy. (*Aden Chr.*, 25 Aug)

The Imam's uncle and former head of the Court, Hamūd al-Washali, was appointed as his representative in Ta'izz instead of al-Qādi Ahmad as-Siyāghī. (*Falastin, Jordan*, 13 Oct) (See also below.)

Hussein Ibn Ali al-Waysi, Minister of Education, was appointed the Imam's deputy in Hajja district. (*Fatat al-Jazirah*, 22 Dec)

**June-Nov: Authority to Enforce the Shari'ah.** On 29 June Imam Ahmad issued a decree setting up in San'a an Authority "to order what is reasonable and forbid what is wrong" (Arabic: *hay'at al-amr bil ma'aruf wa an-nahi an al-munkar*), consisting of Qādi Ahmad Abd ar-Rahmān ash-Shāmi, chairman, Qādi Abdullah Ahmad al-Hajari, and Yahya Ibn Hamūd an-Nahari. Its function was to enforce the Shari'ah [the Islamic law] and deal severely with wrongdoers. The committee had a long meeting with the Imam on 29 June. (*R. San'a*, 29 June - *BBC*, 1 July) Prince al-Badr, it was reported, regarded the Authority as highly important and planned opening branches in Ta'izz, Hodeidah and other Yemeni towns. (*Saba*, 21 July)

**Enquiry into "Wealth" of Foreign Ministry Officials.** In July it was reported in Aden that the Imam had appointed an enquiry commission to investigate the affairs of certain highly placed Foreign Ministry officials who had suddenly shown signs of wealth. Some of them were summoned before the Imam who asked them how they had been able to own modern houses and expensive cars. Rumours in Ta'izz connected the establishment of the commission with an article published in the last week of June in *Saba*, the only non-government newspaper in Yemen, which alleged that there was in Ta'izz "a group of persons having a strange relationship with a foreign power."

In this connection the report mentioned that members of the American Point Four programme were showing "singular activity" after the Imam had cancelled the US-Yemeni agreement for the construction of the Ta'izz-San'a road.

The commission began its interrogation in July. (*Mid. Mirror*, 16 July)

**Dec: Hashimites Against Qahtanites: Removal of as-Siyāghī.** In Oct Qādi Ahmad as-Siyāghī, the Imam's chief deputy in Ta'izz, was removed from his post, and replaced by the Imam's uncle, Hamūd al-Washali. Reports from San'a indicated that as-Siyāghī was under house

arrest, but it later appeared that he had been transferred and was reoccupying his old post as Governor of Ibb province.

Reports from Ta'izz, however, stated that Qādi al-Aryāni, holder of one of the highest judicial posts had been instructed by the Imam to "watch" as-Siyāghī's public activities. (*Falastin, Jordan*, 13 Oct; *Mid. Mirror*, 10 Dec) According to a later report, as-Siyāghī's property had been confiscated. (*Ayyam, Aden*, 22 Dec)

(In 1959 as-Siyāghī sought asylum in the Amirate of Beihan in the Aden Protectorate, following a dispute with the Imam after the latter's return from Rome. He was later pardoned.) (*Mid. Mirror*, 30 July)

On 25 Nov the Imam ordered that all the property of Abdullah Ibn Ahmad al-Wazīr, the late Imam designate, which had been confiscated after his execution for heading the 1948 coup d'état, should be returned to al-Wazīr's family. Earlier the Imam had granted an amnesty to imprisoned members of the family. (*Mid. Mirror*, 10, 19 Dec)

The significance of these moves was seen in the fact that al-Wazīr's family were Hashimites—of whom the Imam is the head in Yemen—while as-Siyāghī was a prominent leader of the Qahtanites, who were generally opposed to the Hashimite regime and were gradually building up their strength. The Imam was believed to be trying to consolidate Hashimite strength against any possible move by the Qahtanites. (*Mid. Mirror*, 10 Dec; *Ayyam, Aden*, 22 Dec)

[According to Arab tradition, the Arabs derive from two different stocks: the Qahtanites or the Arab al-Muta'arribah are the descendants of Qahtan, the Joktan of Genesis, a descendant of Shem, while the Arab al-Musta'ribah come from Ishmael, son of Abraham. To the latter belongs the Quraysh tribe, of which Muhammad's clan, Hāshim, forms a part. The genealogy of the Imam goes back to Muhammad, i.e. he is a Hashimite. In Arabia the division between these two kinds of Arabs has been maintained to the present day, and some observers hold that there is even a marked difference in physical features. The Qahtanites live mostly in the south.]

**Capital Transferred from Ta'izz to Hodeida.** In July the Imam was reported to be considering the transfer of the capital from Ta'izz to Hodeida, where he would be safe with his "loyal Zaraniq [tribe] soldiers."

The Imam was said to be disenchanted with Ta'izz, his second capital, which a certain section of the army had occupied when he stayed in Rome for medical treatment in 1959. His old capital, San'a, was reported to be in "his bad books." [Imam Ahmad discarded San'a in 1949 when he gained power after the coup d'état in which his father was killed.] (*Mid. Mirror*, 23 July)

In Dec it was reported that the Imam had moved to Hodeida, which had become the capital. (*Ayyam, Aden*, 21 Dec)

[The transfer of the capital was perhaps also connected with the wave of terrorist activities in the summer and in Nov-Dec, which swept Ta'izz among other places, while Hodeida seemed to have remained relatively unaffected, as far as can be ascertained from the incomplete reports published. See below: Internal Security and Terror.]

## TRIBAL UNREST

**Jan: Shaykhs of Hāshid Tribe Executed.** A statement reportedly issued by the Imamate of the Yemen said that two chiefs of the Hāshid tribe, one of the strongest



and most influential in Yemen, Shaykh Hussein Ibn Nāsir al-Ahmar and his son Shaykh Hamid al-Ahmar, who had been captured by loyal tribes while trying to provoke other tribes to rise against the Imam, had been beheaded in Hajja castle. It was added that after this incident many tribal chiefs came to Ta'izz and vowed allegiance to the Imam. (*R. Ankara*, 28 Jan-BBC, 30 Jan)

Earlier, on 18 Jan, the Imam gave a reception for the chieftains of the Hāshid and Baqil tribes, who declared their loyalty to him. (BBC, 20 Jan)

(The Hāshid and Baqil tribes rose in 1959, and elected a new Imam. The uprising was said to have been caused by the Imam's demand for the refunding of the money Crown Prince al-Badr had paid them to assure their loyalty while the Imam was abroad. Some of the chiefs of the Baqil tribe sought asylum in Aden.) (*Hayat*, 22 Aug 1959; *Difa'*, 8 Oct; *Sha'ab*, 19 Dec; *Masa'*, 20 Dec 1959, *Jordan*)

**Apr-July: Khawlān Tribe Insurrection.** In Apr it was reported from Aden that at least 500 members of the Khawlān, which is part of the Baqil tribe, had crossed the border to Beihan [Sultanate in the Western Aden Protectorate] during the night of 15 Apr to ask the help of the British and of the Federation Government in opposing the Imam. It was understood that they had not yet received any aid. The situation in Yemen was described as still vague, after the Imam's troops had failed to subdue the Baqil. (BBC, 22 Apr; *Fatat al-Jazirah*, 22 Apr)

At the same time it was reported that the Imam had asked the chiefs of the Khawlān to meet him at as-Sukhna, assuring them of immunity. They refused, however, saying, "We do not trust your word," and quoting the example of Bani al-Ahmar (see above) and the destruction of the house and property of Shaykh Sinān Abu Luhūm. (See: Yemeni Opposition in Aden and the UAR.) (*Aden Chr.*, 21 Apr)

It was further reported that the Khawlān chiefs had refused to hand over some of their sons as hostages to the Imam's troops, at Ahmad's demand. [It is the custom of the Imam to levy hostages, usually boys, to ensure the loyalty of the tribes.] A collision was avoided, as the troops retreated without taking the boys. (*Fatat al-Jazirah*, 1 May) A month later it was reported that three Yemeni Army columns had advanced on the Khawlān to crush the rebellion and secure the hostages. (*Fatat al-Jazirah*, 3 June)

**June: More Tribes Join the Insurrection.** In June it was reported that the insurrection had spread following the refusal of the Bani Hashish and Bani Murād tribes to help the Imam's army against the Khawlān. The al-Jawf tribes, near the Saudi border, had invaded the town of Hazm and seized the arsenal. (*Fatat al-Jazirah*, 17 June)

**June-July: Khawlān Tribes Hold Out in the Mountains; Efforts at Settlement.** Yemeni sources in Aden said that the rising of the Khawlān tribes had been completely crushed and that Yemeni forces had occupied the whole area, while the tribes had fled in the direction of Ma'rib. The rising had finally turned into a tribal battle between the pro-Imam Rādi' and the Khawlān tribes; but it had actually been crushed by the army. The Khawlān had previously agreed to surrender on condition that the Rādi' tribes were not allowed to enter their territory, but this condition had been rejected.

Attempts were now being made by tribal leaders to bring about a truce between the Khawlān and the Imam,

who had charged al-Qādi Muhammad ash-Shāmi, a 70-year-old Yemeni politician experienced in settling tribal rifts, with the restoration of peace and order in Khawlān territory. (*ANA*, 16 June-BBC, 17 June)

In a broadcast over San'a Radio, the Imam denied the existence of any rebellion or disorder against the authorities in Yemen. (*Fatat al-Jazirah*, 23 June)

In July it was reported that the Khawlān chiefs were still in the mountains, and had not submitted. (*Ayyam*, 13 July)

**June: Abdel-Nasser's Reported Refusal to Help Imam.** In June rumours were afloat that the Yemeni Crown Prince had asked for troops from Cairo to help suppress the Khawlān insurrection. Abdel-Nasser had replied that he was not prepared to fight Arab brethren, and counselled caution and a diplomatic approach. (*Aden Chr.*, 16 June)

## OPPOSITION, TERRORISM AND PLOT AGAINST THE IMAM

**Feb: Failure of Plot Against Imam?** In Feb al-Hayāt reported from Jedda that a plot against the Imam had been discovered during the first half of the month. A number of police officers, aided by followers of the Crown Prince, al-Badr, had been implicated. The Imam had arrested some of them, but many had escaped to Aden and Saudi Arabia; in the latter an order had been issued to detain everyone crossing the border. (*Hayat*, 16 Feb)

**Mar: Teachers' Strike.** It was reported in Mar that teachers in the towns of Maidi and Haradh had gone on strike for higher pay. The Imam ordered the schools closed. The report added that this was the first strike of any kind in Yemen. (*Aden Chr.*, 17 Mar)

**Mar-Apr: Civil Disobedience.** In Apr it was reported that on "Id Day" [probably Id al-Fitr, 28-31 Mar] Shaykh Abdullah al-Barādūni, "a blind poet," speaking to a huge gathering in the mosque at Dhamar, Upper Yemen, attacked the despotic rule of the Imam. "We are just slaves of the mighty ruler," he was quoted as saying, "For forty years we have awaited relief." He warned the "despots" that "the day of reckoning is coming." He attacked the taxation system and said "the coffers have been depleted for the personal expenditure of the Law Giver," who deposited the money in foreign banks. The Imam was not interested in foreign aid, as this might bring progress, while the Imam "wants us to work for Heaven."

The Shaykh was arrested on leaving the mosque.

When, a week later, the tax collectors arrived in the towns of Dhamar, Khoban and Anis, Upper Yemen, the report continued, the people refused to pay. The Imam ordered soldiers to be billeted in the houses, but the inhabitants remained adamant. (*Aden Chr.*, 14 Apr)

**May: An Execution.** In Mar a preacher, Abd al-Qādir al-Ahdal, aged 72, who had attacked the government, was detained and later (in May?) executed by order of the Imam. (*Fatat al-Jazirah*, 27 Mar, 6 May)

**June-July: Wave of Terrorism.** In June Adeni sources reported a wave of terrorism in Ta'izz and San'a and other towns. According to "reliable sources," hand grenades were thrown at the Imam's ar-Rawdah palace, near San'a; the Imam, however, was in Hodeida at the time. In the towns explosions occurred in houses and on property belonging to supporters of the Imam. A bridge on a recently built road between Ta'izz and San'a was said to have been blown up.

It was believed that the incidents were a prelude to a terrorist movement led by "Rightist Yemeni youth elements dissatisfied with the status quo." (*ANA*, 17 June–*BBC*, 20 June; *Aden Chr.*, 23 June; *Fatat al-Jazirah*, 30 July)

As a result, the Governor of Ta'izz ordered a night curfew. (*Aden Chr.*, 14 July)

Later it was reported that a night curfew had been imposed in the main towns of central and southern Yemen following new bomb incidents in Ibb and Ta'izz in the second half of July, in which several people were killed.

Government buildings and houses of leading officials were said to be under heavy guard.

The house of Qādi Ahmad as-Siyāghi in Ibb was reportedly blown up by terrorists, "usually reliable sources" stated. (*Mid. Mirror*, 30 July)

**Nov–Dec: Another Wave of Terror—Call for Revolution.** [Judging from the sources available, it would seem that there was an interlude of relative quiet between the terrorist wave in June–July and a renewed outburst in Nov–Dec; this could not be ascertained, however.]

In Nov it was reported that bombs had been thrown at the Foreign Ministry building in Ta'izz and the government house in Dhi Suffal, where guards clashed with the suspects. A similar incident happened in Ibb, where the Governor, Sayyid Muhammad Hassan al-Mutawakkil, a son-in-law of the Imam, escaped injury. (*Fatat al-Jazirah*, 6 Nov; *Aden Chr.*, 10 Nov)

The Imam's ar-Rawdah palace was reportedly attacked again when three time-bombs exploded there in Nov. The palace was severely damaged and people buried under the wreckage. More bombs exploded in Gihana, Khawlān. (*Fatat al-Jazirah*, 1 Dec)

Clandestine leaflets were reportedly distributed in Hodeida and other Yemeni towns calling the people and the army to join forces under the leadership of someone whose name would be disclosed later and who would lead Yemen to liberty.

The government was said to be trying unsuccessfully to stem this movement. Though the Imam had ordered the taking of the Shaykh's sons as hostages, he had failed to stop the sabotage or the distribution of leaflets. (*Ayyam*, 1 Dec; *Fatat al-Jazirah*, 11 Dec)

A quantity of explosives was found in the possession of a Hodeida citizen, who confessed that he intended to use them on the Imam's palace. (*Akhbar*, Cairo, 7 Dec)

*Al-Kifāh* (Aden) reported the arrest of eight officers on charges of alleged conspiracy against the Yemeni Crown Prince. The paper also alleged that Shaykh Sālih Mushin, an official of high prestige, had been executed at Hajja prison last week. No reasons were given. (*BBC*, 4 Jan 1961)

**Responsibility for Terror.** Alleged British complicity, see p 399; alleged responsibility of Ahmad Nu'mān, the Free Yemen leader, see below.

**Dec: Reported Attempts on Imam's Life by Members of his Family.** In Dec. Sayf al-Islam al-Badr, the Crown Prince, reportedly discovered two time-bombs in the cars generally used by the Imam and himself. There was said to be strong evidence implicating members of the court and the royal family, including Prince al-Hasan Ibn Ali. Al-Hasan and his nephews were detained in a palace in Hodeida. (*Ayyam*, Aden, 21 Dec)

Subsequently it was reported that several Yemeni prin-

ces had attempted to overthrow the Imam's rule, and that he had imprisoned four of his nephews: al-Hasan Ibn al-Hasan, al-Hasan Ibn Ali, Abdullah Ibn al-Qāsim and Yahya Ibn al-Hussein. The arrest of the Imam's private secretary, Sālih Muhsin, was also reported in connection with the plot. (*Hayat*, 25 Dec)

The Imam invited all the Princes to a conference in his palace on matters concerning the royal family. Eighteen Princes, including al-Badr, were present. (*Jihad*, Jordan, 26 Dec)

## YEMENI OPPOSITION IN ADEN AND THE UAR

**Shaykh Ahmad Muhammad Nu'mān in Aden.** [Shaykh Nu'mān played a leading part in the 1948 revolution, when Imam Yahya was assassinated and Abdullah al-Wazir set up a government, lasting for 24 days, in which Nu'mān served as Minister of Agriculture. Saif al-Islam Ahmad, Imam Yahya's eldest son and successor, succeeded in driving out the insurgents. Nu'mān fled to Saudi Arabia, where he was imprisoned for seven years. In 1955 he found asylum in Cairo, where he headed the "Free Yemen" movement which supported the al-Wazir coup. He is 51 years old.]

In Jan Yemeni sources were quoted to the effect that the Imam held Shaykh Nu'mān responsible for the terrorism in Yemen, while they themselves were convinced that it was purely internal. (*Manar*, Jordan, 2 Jan)

In the spring of 1960 Shaykh Nu'mān arrived in Aden. According to the *Aden Chronicle*, the convictions of this "past revolutionary" had undergone a deep change, and he was now against violence and revolution. "His new principle was learning," he had reportedly told his Yemeni supporters. The paper attributed to the Shaykh's arrival a quietening influence on the political climate in Aden, which was reflected in the Yemeni vote in the municipal by-elections in Apr. (*Aden Chr.*, 7 Apr, 7 July)

In June the Aden authorities expelled the Shaykh and he left on 27 June for Cairo.

Reports from Ta'izz suggested that he had been expelled because the Imam Ahmad associated him with the recent disturbances in Yemen and considered his presence in Aden a threat to Aden-Yemeni relations. An Adeni source said it was merely hearsay that Ahmad demanded the expulsion of the Shaykh before the Governor of Aden could visit Yemen. [The visit took place on 27 June.]

At a Press interview with ANA the Shaykh declared that he had not engaged in any political activity during his stay in Aden.

Before leaving, the Shaykh said he had cabled the Imam and President Abdel-Nasser that he had been asked to leave Aden "in the interests of good relations with Yemen." He warned the Imam against "conspiracy against Yemen and the Yemeni people."

In a farewell message, Shaykh Nu'mān urged the "Free Yemenis" to set aside their tribal disputes and unite for the long struggle to save themselves.

Three thousand Yemenis gathered in Aden to see him off. (*BBC*, 25, 27, 29 June; *Mid. Mirror*, 2 July; *Aden Chr.*, 7 July)

**Aug–Oct: Yemeni Political Refugees in Aden.** ANA reported that an eight-man Yemeni delegation arrived in Aden from Ta'izz on 6 Aug, carrying a pardon from the Imam, to conduct negotiations for the return of all Yemeni refugees. The delegation met three of their leaders, Naqib Sufyān Abu Luhūm, Ahmad Zaydi and Ali Ruwayshān, in the presence of Sharif Hussein, ruler of

Beihan and Minister of the Interior of the Federation. It was understood that no results were obtained because the refugee leaders suspected the Imam's intentions. (BBC, 9 Aug)

In answer to San'a Radio, the *Aden Chronicle* wrote that it was common knowledge in Aden that Yemeni tribal chieftains had recently taken refuge in the colony; one of these was Shaykh Sinān Abu Luhūm who was often to be seen in the streets. (*Fatat al-Jazirah*, 16 Oct; *Aden Chr.*, 20 Oct)

In Dec it was reported that the Yemeni authorities held Yemeni exiles in Aden, and especially Shaykh Abu

Luhūm, responsible for terrorist activities in Yemen. (*Mid. Mirror*, 31 Dec)

**Aug: Aden Trade Union Leader Demands Democracy in Yemen.** See p 388. [There is a considerable Yemeni element in the Aden TU's.]

**Dec: Alleged British Complicity in Terrorism in Yemen and Arms Smuggling from Aden.** See p 399.

**Yemeni Opposition to Activities of South Arabian League Leaders and Ex-Sultan of Lahej in Cairo.** See pp 157-8.

## INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

### SYNOPSIS

Political relations between Yemen and the UAR, with which it had been aligned since Mar 1958 in a loose federation called the United Arab States, seemed rather strained. Cairo harboured Yemeni political refugees whom the Imam held responsible for terrorism in Yemen. It did not identify itself with the Imam's claim to Aden as the "Southern Yemen," but supported Adeni exiles who demanded an Aden-Yemeni merger in the framework of a general Arab union and opposed the Imam's rule. Talks on UAR economic aid apparently bore no fruit. Yemenis continued to be sent to Egypt for study (see pp 157-8).

Relations with Saudi Arabia were slightly disturbed by the cancellation of the work permits of Yemenis working in Saudi Arabia; King Saud, however, personally intervened to restore the previous conditions. The Ta'if Treaty was abrogated and it was announced that talks were being held for the conclusion of a new treaty (pp 167-8).

There was a Yemeni attempt to improve relations with Iraq (perhaps in connection with the unfavourable development of her relations with the UAR) (see p 168).

Yemen received large-scale development and other aid during the year from both East and West. Her relations with the Communist bloc continued to be much closer, however, though they were not so one-sided as they had been before her relations with Britain improved and she signed an aid agreement with the US in 1959.

The Yemeni Army was still Russian equipped and trained. The Russians continued to build Hodeida port, and the Chinese the Hodeida-San'a road and a number of factories. Three hundred Russians and 500 Chinese were reported to be employed in these two projects. There was also other aid and efforts were made to expand trade with the Communist countries. Diplomatic and other delegations were exchanged. Over 300 Yemeni students were said to be studying in the Communist countries and special groups were sent there to train for the operation of the new projects.

On the other hand, it was reported in July that the Imam had cancelled the agreement with the US in 1959 on the construction of the San'a-Ta'izz road. He was said to be dissatisfied with the American approach to the project; in Apr he had declared in no uncertain terms that he expected large-scale aid and prompt execution of the projects. In Nov, however, the Americans were reported to be building the road and negotiations on a US loan were said to be in progress. The US also shipped wheat to the country to alleviate drought shortages.

Relations with Britain continued to centre on Aden, which the Imam claimed as the "Southern Yemen." This claim had led to hostilities on the border and Yemeni backing of anti-British elements in Aden in 1958. At the end of 1958 the border situation started to improve, and continued to do so in 1959-1960, though the claims to the "Southern Yemen" continued to be voiced. The Imam's position on the question of Aden had become difficult, because the Yemenis and others in Aden who opposed British rule and were in favour of union with Yemen, were also opposed to the Imam. He now seemed primarily concerned with the expulsion from Aden of elements which he suspected of sharing responsibility for anti-government terrorism in Yemen. In fact, it seemed that a Yemeni-British understanding on action against joint enemies was becoming a possibility. However, suspicion continued, and at the end of the year there were reports of a new strain in the relations between the two countries, in connection with anti-Imam activities in Aden. (See below and also pp 382-4, 396.)

Yemen's voting in the UN General Assembly generally followed the line of the UAR. This meant that in the great majority of cases she voted with the Communist bloc (p 14 ff).

### COMMUNIST COUNTRIES IN GENERAL

**Background Note.** In Oct 1955 the Soviet-Yemeni Treaty of 1928 was renewed, and in the summer of 1956 the Crown Prince went on a tour of Communist countries, which led to the signing of various trade agreements and the establishment of diplomatic relations (conducted through representatives in Cairo) with the Soviet Union and China. In Jan 1958 the Crown Prince toured Roumania, Poland, Yugoslavia, the Soviet Union, China, Egypt and Syria.

Since 1956 the Soviet bloc has sold Yemen considerable quantities of arms—reported to include a number of fairly old-fashioned aircraft, field and anti-aircraft guns, T34 tanks and other armour. Military instructors and advisers have also been provided by the Soviet bloc and by Egypt.

In Jan 1958 a Soviet mission visited the country and a Soviet legation was opened in Ta'izz. An agreement on economic cooperation was signed later in the year and Russian engineers started work on the construction of the Hodeida harbour.

A Treaty of Friendship and Commerce was signed during the Crown Prince's visit to Peking and the Chinese granted Yemen a loan of 70 million Swiss francs (about £5,700,000) for public works and factory building. Later in 1958 a Chinese legation was established



in Ta'izz and Chinese technicians and labourers arrived to begun work on a new from Hodeida to San'a.

According to a number of reports, the Imam later became alarmed by the danger of Communist penetration. (*The Yemen, COI, London, R. 4820, Dec 1960*)

**Students in Communist Countries.** Yemeni students on free scholarships in Communist countries, mostly in China, were reported to number 300. Seventy more were on the way. (*Scotsman, 25 Nov*)

**Various Projects.** According to an East German source, the EG Government would build a short and medium wave radio station in San'a. (*BBC, 6 Jan*)

The Czechoslovak and Yugoslav Envoys to Yemen presented their credentials to the Imam and later inspected the Hodeida projects. (*R. San'a, 19 Apr-BBC, 21 Apr*)

### THE USSR

**New Soviet Ambassador.** On 27 Jan, Ambassador Vladimir Yakovlevich Yerofeyev presented his credentials to the Imam. Later he declared that "his warm reception on presenting his credentials had been a proof that the relations between the USSR and Yemen are based on peaceful cooperation and respect of sovereignty." He added that the Imam's views on the benefits of peaceful coexistence were similar to those of Soviet leaders, and praised the Imam and the Crown Prince. (*R. San'a, 27 Jan-BBC, 29 Jan; Fatat al-Jazirah, 13 Feb*)

**Construction of Hodeida Port.** In Apr the New China News Agency (NCNA) reported that 300 Soviet experts and 1,500 Yemeni workers were employed in the construction of Hodeida port. (*BBC, 28 Apr*)

A Soviet ship was the first to arrive at the new port, casting anchor on 30 Apr. (*Hayat, 1 May*)

On 31 July Moscow Radio reported on progress in the "second stage" of the construction of the port; the second and third quays were being built, the channel deepened, and the port supplied with equipment for the petrol base and mechanical workshops. The training of Yemeni specialists and skilled workers was difficult because most of the employees were illiterate and the Soviet experts did not know Arabic. Nevertheless they had been able to train many skilled workers; in the carpentry shops, e.g., only Yemenis were employed. (*R. Moscow, 31 July-BBC, 4 Aug*)

In Nov speedy progress was reported in the construction of the harbour, the warehouses and other installations, "a chain of communication" between the harbour and Hodeida town, a power house and a hotel. The harbour had already been equipped with tugs and launches and a shipyard for maintenance and repairs was reported to be on the way. (*Aden Chr., 10 Nov*) [The report did not state whether all construction was being supervised by the Russians.]

In Dec it was reported that the Russians had discovered that the sea was carrying sand into the harbour and that the port was threatened by silt. (*Fatat al-Jazirah, 2 Dec*)

**Aid and Trade, Study Groups, Visits.** On 8 Jan 12 Yemeni students left San'a for the USSR on a two-year scholarship. (*Nasr, Yemen, 14 Jan*)

In July a Russian ship unloaded in Hodeida harbour an air-conditioned 50-passenger motor launch, as a gift from PM Khrushchev to the Imam. (*Aden Chr., 28 July*)

On 4 Aug Qādi Muhammad al-Amri stated in Cairo,

on his way to Peking at the head of a Yemeni economic mission, that he would deliver in Moscow a message from the Imam to PM Khrushchev, expressing Yemen's desire to strengthen her relations with the Soviet Union, especially in the economic field. (*MENA, 4 Aug-BBC, 6 Aug*)

The USSR continued to buy the bulk of Yemen's coffee. (*Aden Chr., 25 Aug*)

Several Yemenis were sent to the Soviet Union to study port administration. (*Aden Chr., 4 Aug*) Later, *Izvestia* reported that a number of Yemeni "specialists" had been received at the Soviet Ministry of Merchant Marine. They had been studying at the Odessa commercial port. (*Tass, 26 Oct-BBC, 29 Oct*)

In Nov it was reported that the USSR contemplated competing with Aden for Yemeni trade. It was understood that, in addition to exporting directly to Hodeida, Russia also offered lower quotations for certain consumer goods than those obtainable in Aden. (*Aden Chr., 10 Nov*)

In Nov it was reported that the Russians had established a meteorological service in Yemen, which would set up observatories on the airfields of Hodeida, Ta'izz and San'a. (*Fatat al-Jazirah, 29 Nov*)

On 19 Nov a 20-man Yemeni medical mission left to study in the Soviet Union. (*R. San'a, 19 Nov-BBC/W, 24 Nov*)

On 1 Dec Russian survey experts, who were preparing a town plan for Hodeida, left Yemen for Moscow to complete the plan there. (*Yagzah, Aden, 1, 2 Dec*)

### COMMUNIST CHINA

**Construction of Hodeida-San'a Road.** In Mar it was reported that the Hodeida-San'a road, under construction with Chinese assistance, was being asphalted. (*Aden Chr., 17 Mar*) The Minister of Public Works, Yahya Abd al-Qādir, said that the Chinese experts were cooperating very well with the Yemeni staff and workers. The highway would connect the new Hodeida harbour with other parts of the country and promote Yemen's home and foreign trade. (*NCNA, 11 Apr-BBC, 13 Apr*) Five hundred Chinese technicians and ten thousand Yemeni labourers were working on the road. (*Tali'ah, Yemen, 18 June*)

In Nov it was reported that 800 Yemenis had started a "week of voluntary labour" on the road, under the guidance of the Chinese experts. (*Al-Qalam al-Adani, 16 Nov*)

**Other Aid and Trade, Study Groups, Visits.** Thirty Yemenis had accepted a Chinese invitation to study in Peking; the Chinese would cover travelling and living expenses. (*Fatat al-Jazirah, 17 May*)

The first shipment of the equipment for a San'a Spinning and Yarn Factory, to produce cotton textiles, was due to arrive in Hodeida at the beginning of Aug. It was expected to be completed in six months, during which 75 Yemenis, who had gone to Peking in May for training in the industry, would have returned. (*Tali'ah, 18 June; ANA, 11 July-BBC, 13 July*)

On 4 Aug Qādi Muhammad al-Amri, Deputy Foreign Minister and head of a Yemeni economic delegation to Peking, stated in Cairo that he was carrying letters from the Imam to the Soviet Premier and Chou En Lai. (*MENA, 4 Aug-BBC, 6 Aug*) The delegation left Cairo for Peking on 17 Aug. (*MENA, 17 Aug-BBC, 19 Aug*)

A Yemeni economic mission led by Adnān at-Tarsūsi, Yemen Minister to Lebanon, was to leave for Peking during Sept. Tarsūsi left for Yemen in mid-Sept to con-



sult the Imam. The projects to be discussed included a Ta'izz-Hodeida road and a silver mint. (*R. Amman, 17 Sept; MENA, 18 Sept-BBC, 20 Sept*)

In Sept a delegation of Muslims from the Chinese People's Republic arrived in Ta'izz. Two of its members were in San'a, where they were expected to meet Crown Prince al-Badr. (*R. San'a, 13 Sept-BBC, 15 Sept*)

In Oct it was reported that China was shortly to send army instructors to Yemen. (*Fatat al-Jazirah, 16 Oct; Aden Chr., 20 Oct*)

Eight engineers from China had been studying the possibility of constructing a port at Maidi, and had forwarded their report to the Yemeni Government. (*Fatat al-Jazirah, 7 Nov*)

## THE UNITED KINGDOM

Relations with Britain continued to centre on Aden. (See: Aden, Foreign Interference, pp 382-4, and Yemeni Opposition Abroad, p. 396.)

**Jan: Border Incidents.** On 23 Jan Yemeni forces based at Qataba launched a surprise attack on the government guard post at Sanah, north of Dhala, Western Aden Protectorate. An NCO of the guard was killed, but the Yemenis were repulsed and reportedly suffered several casualties.

On 26 Jan Yemeni forces reportedly violated the frontier again, this time in the Mukeiras area. Soldiers of the Awdhali Sultanate and the Protectorate security forces beat off the attack.

These incidents came after several months of quiet on the border. (*Aden Chr., 29 Jan*)

**Diplomatic Contacts.** On 1 Feb the British adviser in the Western Aden Protectorate, accompanied by the Protectorate Minister of Internal Security, visited Bayda in Yemen and discussed border problems with Yemeni officials. (*ANA, 3 Feb-BBC, 5 Feb*)

[This meeting took place under an unofficial agreement between the Aden Government and Yemen in Nov 1959 for local frontier commissions to settle border problems.]

On 27 June, Sir William Luce, the Governor of Aden, started an unofficial visit to Yemen. In Ta'izz he discussed with the Crown Prince, al-Badr, according to the reports, measures to secure the peace along the border and civil aviation arrangements. He also visited Hodeida as guest of the government, but was not received by the Imam. (*Fatat al-Jazirah, 7, 23 July; R. San'a, 29 June-BBC, 1 July*)

The new British Chargé d'Affaires, Ronald Bailey, presented his credentials on 1 Aug. (*Saba, 4 Aug*)

**July-Dec: Cooperation Against Subversive Elements?** [In July the Aden authorities expelled a Yemeni opposition leader, Ahmad Nu'mān, the leader of the "Free Yemeni" movement, reportedly in deference to the wishes of the Imam. See p 396.]

In Dec the Yemeni Police raided the Ta'izz residence of Alawi al-Jifri, brother of Muhammad Ali al-Jifri, President of the South Arabian League, who was exiled in 1958 by the Aden authorities (see also pp 388, 157-8).

Observers in Aden interpreted this as an attempt to show the British authorities in Aden that Ta'izz was not encouraging South Arabians in exile to carry out anti-Aden activities, so that the Yemeni Government would be in a position to ask the British to expel certain rebel Yemenis, particularly Shaykh Sinān Abu Luhūm, who

were suspected to be behind the recent wave of bomb explosions in Yemen. (*The Recorder, Aden, 25 Dec*)

**Nov: British Statement: Anglo-Yemeni Relations Calm.** On 16 Nov, Edward Heath, the British Lord Privy Seal, stated in a written answer to a parliamentary question on Anglo-Yemeni relations: "No formal negotiations have been necessary during the last six months." He added that the British Chargé d'Affaires in Ta'izz was in constant touch with the Yemeni authorities and mentioned the Aden Governor's visit to Yemen in June (see above). "There have only been minor incidents on the frontier, arising from inter-tribal disputes," he said. "Local frontier meetings have been able to discuss problems there and have settled most of them." (*Hansard, 11-17 Nov*)

**Dec: Yemeni Protest on British Bombing in Aden Protectorate.** At the end of Nov a spokesman for the Imam said that the Imam had forwarded a strongly worded protest to the British Chargé d'Affaires in Ta'izz against bombing raids by British aircraft in the "Yemeni Arab South" in retaliation for the ambushing and killing of 10 British soldiers. A spokesman of the Federation of the Amirates of the South confirmed a bombing raid in Lower Yafi, but denied that British soldiers had been killed (see also p 391). (*Aden Chr., 1 Dec*)

**Dec: Yemen Blames British and Yemeni Exiles in Aden for Terrorism.** On 30 Dec it was reported in Cairo that Yemen had severed diplomatic relations with Britain and expelled its Chargé d'Affaires, Ronald Bailey, for being implicated in the current terrorist activities in Yemen.

The Yemeni office in Cairo later stated that the Imam had handed the British Chargé d'Affaires a strong protest over recent bomb incidents. Anglo-Yemeni relations had seriously deteriorated, and unless the British authorities acted to eliminate anti-Yemen activities in Aden, relations between the Imam and Britain would be broken off, a spokesman of the office said.

Yemeni sources in Cairo said that 20 of the Imam's officials had recently been arrested and charged with complicity in British-inspired bomb plots. They added that the Imam's protest, made three days ago, had alleged that explosives for bombings in Ta'izz, San'a and Hodeida had been smuggled in by anti-Imam groups from Aden.

In London a Foreign Office spokesman denied that diplomatic relations had been severed, and that Bailey had been expelled or been handed a protest and added: "What is true is that over the past few months there have been a number of discussions between Mr Bailey and the Yemeni Government on the possible connection between the bomb explosions and the activities of Yemeni exiles now in the Aden Protectorate. On this matter Mr Bailey has gone to Aden to consult with Sir Charles Johnston." (*Mid. Mirror; Hayat, 31 Dec*)

## THE USA

**Background Note.** In 1959, a US Legation with a resident Chargé d'Affaires was established in Yemen and an agreement concluded for economic aid. There were grants of American wheat and an agreement to build a road from Mocha to San'a via Ta'izz at the expense of the US Government. (*The Yemen, COL, London, R. 4870, Dec 1960*) This development came at a time when the Imam had reportedly become wary of Soviet influence in his country.

**American Aid.** In Mar it was reported that the US had given Yemen a large quantity of wheat to alleviate scar-

city caused by drought and had paid cost of transport to the interior. (The report added that Yemeni officials were making large profits on the transactions involved.)

The US had granted the Imam \$200,000 and was building 350 houses for officials.

American equipment was arriving at Mocha, and Yemenis expelled from Saudi Arabia (because they were crowding the labour market) were being recruited for American projects, the most important of which was the San'a-Ta'izz-Mocha road. (*Aden Chr.*, 10 Mar)

In May it was reported that the US Government had "sold" Yemen a \$1.5 million textile plant. (*Aden Chr.*, 5 May)

**Apr: US Ambassador to Yemen: Imam Demands Speedy Execution of Projects.** On 28 Apr Frederick Reinhardt, US Ambassador to the UAR, presented his credentials to the Imam. The Imam said: "We are willing to co-operate and are interested in strengthening relations between our countries... We are thinking of carrying out big projects which will develop our country. We are hopeful of progress and were happy when President Eisenhower sent his special envoy, Mr. Richards... but unfortunately... our hopes and aspirations were pushed backward. However, we did not give up trying... Finally, we lost hope because obstacles were placed in our way. Some of these obstacles were technical and others (indistinct words)..."

"However... we will not forget the past and revive our hopes... We say quite frankly that we want to translate our words into actions. As for courtesies and beguiling promises, these do not mean anything. As others say, this is the age of speed. The Yemen is still far behind its Arab sisters."

The Imam then expressed his concern over the *Glo-patra* incident (p 39 ff) which might even spark a "comprehensive world war." He concluded by saying that his words "emanate from friendship." His object was "to maintain world peace." (*R. San'a*, 28 Apr-BBC, 30 Apr)

**Reports on the Imam's Dissatisfaction.** In July it was "authoritatively learnt" in Aden that Imam Ahmad had

informed the American Point Four programme of his decision to cancel the US-Yemeni agreement on the construction of the San'a-Ta'izz road, although no official statement had been made.

Informed Yemeni sources stated that the Imam had noted the "procrastination" of the Point Four programme and the alleged attempt by the US company concerned to start the road from a point at Sharaiqa, a Yemeni village near the Western Aden Protectorate border, instead of from San'a, as provided in the agreement.

The Imam's resentment was enhanced by the alleged insistence of the Americans on importing their construction equipment via Aden rather than the port of Hodeida, the sources said. Official quarters at Ta'izz maintained that the American insistence on Sharaiqa had a political motive. It was also claimed that the American action would neutralize the prospective advantage of Hodeida port.

The reports from Ta'izz also indirectly alleged that American officials had been bribing Yemeni Foreign Ministry officials in connection with the project. (See above, Enquiry into "Wealth" of Foreign Ministry Officials.) (*ANA*, 11 July-BBC, 13 July; *Mid. Mirror*, 16 July)

Another report added that the Russians had undertaken to build the road without payment, to train 500 Yemeni technicians and to employ local labour. (*Aden Chr.*, 14 July)

According to a British opinion, the development of close ties between Yemen and the West was being hindered by "American administrative shilly-shallying," and Britain was being partially blamed for US "tardiness." (*Manchester Daily Telegraph*, 12 July)

In Nov it was reported that road building equipment for the Mocha-Ta'izz-San'a road had been "regularly" arriving in Mocha port, which was soon to be dredged to accommodate large vessels. The Americans were building a modern little town for the accommodation of their staff, which they intended to present to the Yemeni Government before leaving. (*Aden Chr.*, 10 Nov)

Another source, reporting that the Americans were building the road, also said that negotiations were reported to have been in progress since Oct for an American loan. (*Scotsman*, 25 Nov)

## MUSCAT AND OMAN AND THE PERSIAN GULF

### MUSCAT AND OMAN

#### BACKGROUND NOTE AND SYNOPSIS

The Sultanate of Muscat and Oman (*Saltanat Masqat Wa Umān*) is an independent state comprising the Sultanate of Muscat and the Imamate of Oman (see map, p 383).

The population is estimated at 550,000, mostly Sunni Muslims.

In 1891 the Sultan of Oman signed an agreement with the British not to cede or otherwise give for occupation any of his territories except to Britain. Successive treaties of friendship and commerce were signed in 1939 and 1951, the last to run for 15 years, starting in Jan 1952.

The British Consul General, who is the only foreign diplomatic representative in the Sultanate, enjoys limited jurisdiction over British nationals. These are British officers and nationals in the service of the Sultan, who relies on Britain to help him resist aggression. Britain acts on behalf of the Sultan (as well as of Abu Dhabi) in the dispute with Saudi Arabia over the Buraimi territories (see p 380).

In 1921, following the resistance of the Oman tribes to the Sultan's control, the Treaty of Sib was concluded, containing the following provisions, which was later interpreted by the Imam as conceding virtual autonomy:

"The government of the Sultan shall not grant asylum to any criminal fleeing the justice of the people of Oman. It shall return him to them if they request it to do so. It shall not interfere in their internal affairs."

However, the treaty is interpreted by the Sultan and the British to mean that the Sultan's sovereignty over the whole Sultanate remained unimpaired.

Relations between the Sultan, Sa'īd Ibn Taymūr, and the Imam of Oman began to deteriorate seriously in 1954, when Ghālib Ibn Ali became Imam.

With the aid of Saudi Arabia, which had also previously been active among the tribes, Ghālib Ibn Ali now claimed complete independence. He maintained that the oil concessions granted by the Sultan were not valid in areas under his control, and applied for membership of the Arab League. In Dec 1955 the Sultan's forces invaded Oman and confined the Imam to his village, but the latter's brother, Tālib Ibn Ali, fled to Saudi Arabia and later to Cairo, where an "Oman Imamate" office was set up. With Egyptian and Saudi Arabian aid, Tālib trained an Omani "Liberation Army" in Dammam, Saudi Arabia, and in 1957 re-established himself in the mountain area of Oman, north-west of Nizwa, where he was joined by his brother and Shaykh Sulayman Ibn Himyār, the Amir of Jabal al-Akhḍar. (*The Green Mountain*)

The Sultan requested British military assistance, which was promptly provided. The RAF bombed Omani forts, and fighting continued until early 1959, when the Imam's last refuge, Jabal al-Akhḍar, was taken, Ghālib fled to Damascus, and later took up residence again at Dammam.

While Britain denied that any hostilities have occurred in Oman since 1959, the Omani offices and other Arab sources continued to issue detailed reports of continued rebellion all through 1959-1960 and into 1961. However, British sources admitted that British forces continued to operate in the territory.

The Arab League countries extended political support to the Omanis; Iraq, Saudi Arabia and the UAR supplying material aid as well. The Oman dispute was one of the major causes most frequently mentioned by Arab leaders, Press and radio in the struggle for independence and against imperialism. A step forward in the Arabs' efforts to internationalize the question was their success in having it included in the agenda of the 15th UN General Assembly. The question was to come up for debate in 1961.

Omani representatives visited Soviet Russia, People's China and other Communist countries. Communist Press and radio supported their "struggle against imperialism."

In the summer of 1960 and Jan-Feb 1961, Omani and British representatives met for preliminary talks on a settlement of the dispute, to which Saudi Arabia and the UAR were reported to have agreed. No basis for negotiations was found, however, as the Omani demands amounted to immediate and complete independence, while Britain was apparently not prepared to cede her treaty rights. The Omanis rejected a British proposal that they should negotiate directly with the Sultan of Muscat and Oman, whom they regarded as a British tool.

In the winter of 1960/61, there was a reshuffle in the Omani leadership. Three members of the al-Hārithi family, who held the major representative posts abroad and had visited the Communist countries, were dismissed by the Imam or resigned. At the same time members of the Imam's family, as well as Amir al-Himyār, became more prominent in foreign affairs.

## THE OMAN CONFLICT

**Cairo and Damascus Reports on Rebellion.** In hostilities at the beginning of the year, nine of the British forces were said to have been killed. (*Bilad, Jedda, 2 Feb; Jihad, Jordan, 28 Feb*)

In Feb and May Damascus Radio reported the arrival in Oman of strong British reinforcements. (*BBC, 9 Feb, 3 May*) British forces were reported to have searched ships and boats for arms meant for the insurgents. (*BBC, 5 Apr*) Damascus and Cairo reported heavy British casualties in Oman. (*BBC, 27 Feb, 15, 26 Mar, 19 Apr, 28 May, 13, 17 July, 23 Nov*)

In June the Voice of the Arabs stated that British authorities had announced that an "RAF pioneer aircraft" had been shot down over the Dahirah region in Oman. A campaign in the area to search for nationalists had been fruitless. (*Voice of the Arabs, 19 June-BBC, 21 June*) [No such report could be found in the British Press available.]

The Omani Imamate office alleged that Omanis had been arrested and tortured by the British, that a British vehicle was missing near Muscat and that a British patrol had clashed with the Imam's tribesmen near Ja'alan. It reported a mine explosion in Ubayda, an explosion at the British Consulate in Muscat, and other armed encounters. (See e.g., *BBC, 2, 22 Mar, 9 Apr, 11 July, 18 Aug, 10, 16, 24, 30 Sept*)

**Britain Denies Fighting.** The UK delegation to the UN denied that British troops and rebels had clashed in Oman. "After the collapse of the abortive rebellion in Jan 1959, the rebel leaders fled to Saudi Arabia," the UK statement said. "There has been no fighting in the Sultanate of Muscat and Oman since that date." (*Mid. Mirror, 19 Nov*)

British troops, however, continued to operate in the Sultanate. (*The ME, Europa, 1961, p 267*)

An "informed British source" in Bahrain denied reports of "large-scale" military operations in the Sultanate of Muscat and Oman. He said that the local Arab population had become hostile to the rebel cause. (*Mid. Mirror, 5 Nov*) The same source stated that British military personnel in Muscat numbered less than 70, including 25 regular officers in the Oman Scouts, 15 NCOs training the Sultan's army, ten technical experts of the air force, and clerks. (*Fatat al-Jazirah, 6 Nov*)

**Iraqi Support for the Imam.** On 21 Apr Ghālib Ibn Ali, the Imam of Oman, arrived in Baghdad following an official invitation from General Qassim. In an interview, he expressed his gratitude for Iraq's aid to the Omani people's struggle. (*R. Baghdad, 24 Apr-BBC, 26 Apr; Fatat al-Jazirah, Aden, 25 Apr*) PM Qassim described the Imam's visit as "an overt challenge to imperialism." He said that Iraq was sending extensive aid to Oman, including regular arms consignments, and urging the Arab countries to increase their aid and send volunteers if necessary. (*At-Taḡaddum, 25 Apr; R. Baghdad, 25 Apr-BBC, 27 Apr; see also BBC, 2 May*) In a joint communiqué issued on 2 May, Iraq promised "to take positive steps to help the Omani strugglers by every means: material, moral, political and international, to acquaint world public opinion with the truth about the aggression... and to persuade other countries to join in efforts to end the aggression both individually and through the UN." (*R. Baghdad, 2 May-BBC, 14 May*) (For Iraqi declarations of support see also *BBC, 21, 25 June, 17 Aug.*)



**UAR Support.** In July *al-Ahrām* reported that the UAR armed forces had granted the Omani fighters LE 54,000 worth of arms. (*Ahrām*, 8 July)

On 19 July the Voice of the Arabs reported that the UK Government had requested the UAR Chargé d'Affaires in London for an official explanation of information that the UAR had sent large quantities of arms and ammunition to the Arab nationalists in Oman. The UAR diplomat, on instructions from Cairo, had replied that "those who sell arms to Israel have no right to ask for such an explanation from the UAR."

[No such report has been found in the British Press available.] (*Ahrām*, 16 July; *BBC*, 22 July)

**Arab League Support.** See pp 128, 131.

**Apr: Omani Leader Denounces Western Powers.** On 7 Apr Amir Sālih Ibn Isa al-Hārithi, Deputy Imam, declared in Damascus: "Imperialism, whether US, British or French, is aiming to enslave the peoples... The US is not advocating peace but war." He added that the Omani people "were now stronger than five years ago" and that "the struggle against the imperialists has spread far and wide, from the Buraimi Oasis in the West to the coastal area in the East." (*BBC*, 18 Apr; *Ayyam*, 10 Apr)

**Jan-Oct: Omani Diplomatic Activity, Visits to Communist Countries.** In Jan Sālih Ibn Isa al-Hārithi, Deputy Imam, went to Austria to mobilize support for his country. (*Akhbar al-Yawm*, Cairo, 2 Jan)

In Jan Ibrahim al-Hārithi, Director of the Oman Office in Damascus, returned at the head of an Omani delegation from a three-month tour of Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Greece, Hungary, Yugoslavia, the USSR, Indonesia and Pakistan. (*Ayyam*, Damascus, 22 Jan)

In Apr Muhammad al-Hārithi, Director of the Oman Office in Cairo, took part in the AAPS Conference in Conakry. (*Sahafah*, Beirut, 18 Apr)

In Sept Sālih Ibn Isa al-Hārithi, Deputy Imam, visited Moscow. On 23 Sept he was received by Nuritdin Mukhitdinov, Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the USSR Supreme Soviet. He was accompanied by Amir Sulaymān Ibn Hamid al-Hārithi, who was staying in the Soviet Union at the invitation of the Soviet Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee. (*R. Moscow*, 23 Sept-BBC SU, 27 Sept)

The Deputy Imam arrived on a visit to Czechoslovakia on 28 Sept. (*CTK*, 28 Sept-BBC, 30 Sept)

Muhammad al-Hārithi, head of the Omani office in Cairo, visited Communist China [no date given in the reports]. (*Amal*; *Siyasah*, Lebanon, 4 June 1961)

**"Oman Day"; Communist Countries' Support.** The Arab countries declared 18 July as "Oman Day." (*Zaman*, Baghdad; *Hayat*; *Ahrām*, 17 July; *BBC*, 18 July)

"Sawt Oman" (The Voice of Oman—a programme of the Voice of the Arabs) appealed to the Arabs, the peoples of Africa and Asia, and others, to celebrate Oman Day by extending "urgent actual aid" to the Omani fighters. (*Voice of the Arabs*, 13 July-BBC, 15 July)

On the occasion of Oman Day, Communist China sent the Imam a message of support. Another message was sent by the President of the China Islamic Association in Peking. (*NCNA*, 17, 18 July-BBC FE, 19, 20 July)

The Omani case was supported in articles appearing in *Izvestia*, 18 July and *Trud*, 19 July, and in an Arabic broadcast over Moscow Radio on 18 July. (*BBC SU*, 20 July)

**Oman Question On UN General Assembly Agenda.** A move by ten Arab states to have the UN Assembly debate the deteriorating situation in Oman and "continued British military intervention" there was taken up by the 21-nation General Committee and placed on the agenda. (*UN Review*, No. 11, 1 Dec) [Up to the end of the year the issue had not come up for discussion.]

In Sept it was reported that the Imam had appointed his brother, Tālib Ibn Ali, Himyār Ibn Sulaymān Ibn Himyār, son of the Amir, and two political experts, to the Omani delegation to the UN. (*Voice of the Arabs*, 22 Sept-BBC, 445, 24 Sept)

Earlier it was reported that the delegation would include Shaykh Muhammad Ibn Abdullah al-Salimi and Shaykh Abdullah Ibn Ali al-Mahmūdī [the experts]. (*Cairo*, 11 Sept-BBC 435, 13 Sept)

#### JULY 1960-FEB 1961: BRITISH-OMANI TALKS

**July 1960-Jan 1961: Talks in Beirut.** At the beginning of Jan 1961, a three-man Omani delegation, led by Shaykh Sulaymān Ibn Himyār, the Amir of the Jabal al-Akhdar, and including Shaykh Tālib Ibn Ali, the Imam's brother, and Shaykh Himyār Ibn Sulaymān, arrived in Beirut to conduct negotiations with British representatives. Shaykh Sulaymān said he had been instructed by the Imam (who was still residing in Dammam, Saudi Arabia) to wait in Beirut for instructions. He said the Imam and the Omanis were fighting for the restoration of the status quo. The Imam was calling for peace and an end to bloodshed, and welcomed any step to guarantee the rights, independence and freedom of the Omanis by peaceful means. (*Hayat*, 5 Jan 1961)

The British representative was said to be the Deputy Political Resident in the Persian Gulf. (*Hayat*, 28 Feb 1961)

Preliminary talks were reported to have been held in Kuwait. (*Hayat*, 18 Jan 1961) At a later date Tālib stated that a meeting had been held in Lebanon on 18 July 1960. (*Eg. Gaz.*, 26 Feb 1961)

**Omanis Demand Withdrawal of Forces and Independence.** On 18 Jan *al-Hayāt* reported, after an interview with the delegation, that no direct negotiations had yet been conducted in Beirut. The delegation had met the British representatives and handed them a note containing the main demands "as defined by the Omani office in Cairo," which amounted to an immediate withdrawal from Oman of the British-commanded Muscat forces. When this had been agreed upon, the talks could proceed to the restoration of the deposed Imam, a cease-fire and the establishment of "unconditional" friendly relations with Britain. On 17 Jan, *al-Hayāt* further reported, the British replied that there could be no negotiations on the Omani demand for evacuation before a general clarification of all questions involved. To agree to the demand would amount to the ceding of the rights accorded to Britain in the treaty with Muscat and Oman. The Omani delegation replied that the negotiations could only be held on the basis of the Omani note and that the Imam had never recognized the validity of the treaty. (*Hayat*, 18 June 1961)

**British Propose Negotiations with Sultan.** On 1 Feb 1961 Tālib Ibn Ali stated in Baghdad that the Imam had also rejected a British proposal (apparently made in Beirut in mid-Jan) that he enter into negotiations with Sultan Sa'īd Ibn Taymūr, the British participating as observers, who would guarantee any agreement reached. The Omanis, added the Shaykh, regarded the Sultan as a power-



less man guided by the British. Britain was responsible for everything that takes place in Oman, he declared. (BBC, 3 Feb 1961)

**Feb: Negotiations Broken Off.** The Omani delegation thereupon left for Cairo to report to the Imam, who was staying there. *Al-Hayat* reported from a reliable source that consultations would also be held with the governments of Saudi Arabia and the UAR, which had agreed to negotiations. (*Hayat*, 22 Jan 1961)

On 25 Feb, Tālib stated in Damascus that the negotiations had broken down; a further meeting with the British held on 24 Feb in Shtura, Lebanon, had proved abortive. The Omanis would now intensify their rebellion with foreign aid, and the Imam would not resume negotiations until Britain gave sufficient assurances for their success. The Omanis adhered to their original demands, which the British had failed to meet: the withdrawal of the "occupation forces," return to the status quo, complete independence for the Omani people, and "reparations" for war damage. (*Reuter; Eg. Gaz.*, 26 Feb)

**Nov 1960-Jan 1961: Reshuffle in Omani Leadership.** At the end of the year—according to one statement, in Nov—the Imam Ghālib Ibn Ali dismissed his three major representatives abroad, all of them of the al-Hārithi family: Muhammad and Ibrahim al-Hārithi, directors of the Oman offices in Cairo and Damascus respectively,

and Sālih Ibn Isa al-Hārithi, the Imam's representative. [At the same time members of the Imam's family became more prominent in foreign affairs.] Tālib Ibn Ali, the Imam's brother, headed the Omani delegation to the meeting of the Arab League Council in Baghdad and participated in the negotiations with the British in Lebanon in Feb. In Jan Faisal Ibn Ali became director of the Damascus office. Also a member of both delegations was Sulaymān Ibn Himyār. [This reshuffle coincided with the negotiations with Britain.] Sheikh Sulayman's son, Himyār, and Tālib Ibn Ali were also appointed to the Omani delegation to the UN.

At the beginning of Jan it was reported that Muhammad al-Hārithi was against the negotiations with Britain, and that he and his staff would resign in protest. Faisal Ibn Ali denied on 15 Jan that the al-Hārithis had resigned as a result of their opposition to the negotiations, and said they had already been dismissed on 25 Nov. Sulaymān Ibn Himyār stated on 4 Jan that the Imam had decided to establish a consultative council of Omani representatives abroad; he had relieved the al-Hārithis of their posts for this reason so as to benefit from their experience. They had felt injured, however, and had published statements in Cairo harmful to the Omani cause. The struggle in Oman was continuing, Sulaymān added. (*Times*, 3 Jan 1961; *Amal; Siyasaḥ, Lebanon*, 4 Jan 1961; *Hayat*, 15 Jan 1961; BBC, 17 Jan, 3 Feb 1961)

## PERSIAN GULF PRINCIPALITIES

### BAHRAIN

**Background Note:** The Sheikhdom of Bahrain consists of the Bahrain Archipelago in the Persian Gulf. The capital, Manama, is located on Bahrain, the principal island, itself. The total population in 1959 was 14,213.

Bahrain is a formally independent state under British protection according to treaties signed in 1861, 1880 and 1882.

**The Government:** Ruler: Shaykh Salmān Ibn Hamad Al Khalifah

Secretary to the Bahrain Government: G.W.R. Smith  
British Political Agent: E.P. Wiltshire

**Council of Administration.** President: Shaykh Abdullah Ibn Isa Al Khalifah

**Members:** Shaykh Isa Ibn Salmān Al Khalifah

Shaykh Ali Ibn Muhammad Al Khalifah

Shaykh Khalifah Ibn Muhammad Al Khalifah (Director of Police and Public Security)

Shaykh Du'ayj Ibn Hamad Al Khalifah (Judge in Bahrain Senior Court)

Shaykh Khālid Ibn Muhammad Al Khalifah (Judge in Bahrain Junior Court)

Ahmad al-Umrān (Director of Education)

Salim al-Arayidh (Registrar, Bahrain Courts)

G.W.R. Smith (Secretary to the Government); Yūsuf ash-Shirāwī (Assistant to the Secretary)

Secretary: Yūsuf ash-Shirāwī. (*The ME, Europa*, 1961)

**Oil:** The preliminary estimate of crude oil output in 1960 was 2,250,000 tons, as against a final figure of 2,253,000 tons for 1959. (*PPS, Aug 1960, Jan 1961*) [The refinery in Bahrain refines about eight million tons of crude oil per annum. Close to 80 per cent of the Bahrain budget is financed from oil revenue.]

**Internal Affairs—Opposition.** The National Liberation Front, a radical leftist organization, was reported to have intensified its activities, especially among labour. In a leaflet the Front demanded the release of three leftist leaders detained in 1956 after anti-British demonstrations and exiled in 1957 (see below). (*Europa Press*, 4 Feb, 16 Mar)

On 18 May the brothers Ali Abdullah and Hasan Abdullah Madan were sentenced to five and three years' imprisonment respectively for membership of the illegal National Liberation Front and the possession of pamphlets. (*Times*, 20 May)

**Britain and Bahrain Political Prisoners in St. Helena.** In June *The Times* reported that the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council had rejected an appeal by Abd ar-Rahmān al-Bākīr, a Bahrain Arab in custody in St. Helena, against the rejection by the Supreme Court of St. Helena of his application for *habeas corpus*.

Al-Bākīr and four of his political associates were arrested in Bahrain on 6 Nov 1956 after serious rioting. On 26 Dec 1956 they were tried by a special court set up by the Ruler the day before and charged with attempting to assassinate the Ruler and his British adviser, depose the Ruler and overthrow the government, and with organizing a general strike and demonstrations. They were found guilty, and three of them, al-Bākīr, Abd al-Azīz Shamlān and Abd al-Ali Alaywat, were sentenced to 14 years imprisonment. On 28 Dec they were sent to St. Helena on board a British warship. The legal basis for this deportation was prepared five days before the trial, when on 18 Dec 1956 the Colonial Prisoners Removal Act of 1869 was extended to Bahrain, following a request by the Ruler of Bahrain the day before.

The Judicial Committee, which rejected al-Bākīr's ap-

peal, was concerned with the legal arguments arising out of the extension of the 1869 Act to Bahrain, which is not a colony but under British protection. It decided that the detention had been legally carried out.

*The Times* commented editorially that in the Arab countries it was the political, rather than the legal aspects of the case, that had aroused interest. "Inevitably the picture has been given of an alliance between the ruler of Bahrain and the British Government to contrive special machinery for removing trouble makers quickly from the scene. There is certainly something hugger-mugger about the business that cannot be reconciled with the principle of justice being seen to be done." *The Times* added that an overhaul of juridical methods in Bahrain and other territories was badly needed, and suggested that "a gesture of clemency to the St. Helena prisoners would be widely welcomed."

On 7 July the issue came up in the House of Commons, when Labour members asked Mr Macleod, Secretary of State for the Colonies, whether he was really satisfied with the situation, though the Privy Council was unable to interfere, and whether it was not time that the men who had been unjustly imprisoned were released and compensated.

On 19 and 20 Dec the issue was debated in the House of Commons. Earlier in the year Mr Heath, speaking for the government, had said that the Ruler of Bahrain had reviewed this matter at the request of the Foreign Secretary and asked that the prisoners be returned to his custody in Bahrain; arrangements for this were now being considered.

Labour opposition speakers (Messrs Fletcher, Healey, Paget, Stonehouse and Wyatt) demanded that they be not returned. Paget quoted a communication from the Ruler of Bahrain to the Queen five days before the trial, in which he had asked for "arrangements with the Governor of St. Helena for the reception of prisoners who will be sent to that island in accordance with the sentence decided." Paget said that the prisoners were apparently members of a revolutionary group whose object appeared to have been to ensure that members of some advisory committee on public sanitation should be elected instead of being nominated by the Ruler. It seemed a rather limited revolutionary aim, he added.

The Labour MPs argued that the court proceedings and the deportations were not lawful, that even if they were legal the British Government did not have to make itself the assistants and executioners in this sort of justice, that the government must not return the prisoners to the Ruler, as they were now under British jurisdiction and on return to Bahrain might have "their sentences doubled or their heads cut off," and that justice and humanity demanded that they be released. The government was preparing to return the prisoners to Bahrain, it was argued, in order to evade *habeas corpus* proceedings.

Heath quoted the opinion of the Privy Council that the judicial proceedings had been valid, and said that the government would not go back on its agreement on the issue with the Ruler. He added that the government had very strongly urged on the Ruler the need for clemency, but he had been unable to accede, and had asked for their return to Bahrain as "that was the only alternative if they did not stay in St. Helena or if they were not released." He concluded that the arrangements for the return of the prisoners would take some considerable time, and in the meantime the issue would be discussed with the Ruler again in the light of the debate. He could not give any undertaking, however, what the

Ruler's decision would be. Several Conservative MPs backed the government. (*Times*, 3 June, 20, 21 Dec; *Hansard*, 1, 7 June; *NYHT*, 26 Dec; *Mid. Mirror*, 24 Dec)

**Iranian Immigration.** [Iranian claims on Bahrain are based on the Persian occupation of the islands from 1602 to 1782, when they were expelled by an Arab tribe. These claims have been repeated from time to time; in 1959, for instance, the Shah asserted that Bahrain was Iranian.]

The Voice of the Arabs quoted the magazine *Huna al-Bahrain* protesting against illegal immigration into Bahrain and the Gulf Amirates. The article welcomed the immigration of skilled persons, and said that there were no objection to the immigration of "a particular race." Legitimate immigration, however, must not affect the "Arabism of the country."

Illegal immigrants arrested during the first two weeks of July numbered 57—all Iranians—it was announced in Bahrain on 22 July. All were convicted, and their deportation ordered by the courts. (*Mid. Mirror*, 23 July)

In Aug the Bahrain Government announced that illegal immigrants had totalled 208 in the past two months. (*R. Cairo*, 21 Aug-BBC, 23 Aug)

## KUWAIT

**Background Note and Synopsis.** The Sheikhdom of Kuwait (see map p 383) was protected by the UK, in accordance with a treaty signed in 1899. Its foreign relations were mainly conducted through the British Government. It is ruled by the Sabāh family, the current ruler being Abdullah as-Sālim as-Sabāh.

Kuwait continued to be the largest single producer of oil in the ME. The preliminary figure for crude oil output in 1960 was 84,000,000 tons, and the Ruler's oil revenues were estimated at \$440 millions. While the Ruler spends an appreciable part of this income on the development of his tiny country, he also invests huge sums in the British money market. This adds much weight to British oil interests in the Sheikhdom.

Kuwait's population was estimated at 210,000, of which a large number were Jordanians of Palestinian origin, Iraqis, Egyptians and other Arabs, as well as Persians. The Egyptians are predominant in education and justice. The large number of foreign Arabs with a relatively high standard of education have made Kuwait a lively centre of Arab nationalism.

On 25 Feb, 1960, the UK ceded to Kuwait full jurisdiction over foreign citizens as a step towards independence.

Kuwait maintained cordial relations with the Arab countries during the year, without taking sides in inter-Arab disputes (she was not a member of the Arab League). For the first time she granted a loan to an Arab government, Jordan.

(For a survey of oil, economic and social developments in Kuwait in 1960, see: *Economic Developments in Kuwait 1960*, US Department of Commerce, June 1961.)

**The Government.** In 1956 the Shaykh appointed a Supreme Council, consisting of members of his family, which he consults on matters of economic and political importance.

**Ruler of Kuwait:** Shaykh Abdullah as-Sālim as-Sabāh  
**British Political Agent:** J.C.B. Richmond

**The Supreme Council—Jan 1961**

Shaykh Abdullah al-Mubārak as-Sabāh—Deputy Ruler and President of Police and Public Security Department

Shaykh Sabāh as-Sālim as-Sabāh—President of Health Department

Shaykh Jābir al-Ahmad as-Sabāh—President of Finance Department

Shaykh Jābir al-ʿAlī as-Sabāh—President of Electricity Department

Shaykh Saʿad al-Abdullah as-Sālim as-Sabāh—Deputy President of Police and Public Security Department

Shaykh Salīm al-ʿAlī as-Sabāh—President of Public Works Department

Shaykh Khālid al-Abdullah as-Sabāh—President of Port and Customs Departments

Shaykh Mubārak al-Abdullah as-Sabāh—President of Posts, Telegraphs and Telephones Department

Shaykh Mubārak al-Hamīd as-Sabāh—President of Awqāf Department

Shaykh Sabāh al-Ahmad as-Sabāh—President for Social Affairs and Printing and Publishing Departments

Shaykh Abdullah al-Jābir as-Sabāh—President of Justice and Public Instruction Departments

(*The ME, Europa, 1961*)

**Dec 1959: Kuwaiti Nationality Act.** Under Kuwait's first Nationality Act, issued on 14 Dec, any person resident in the country since 1920 would be entitled to receive Kuwaiti citizenship; any resident of at least eight years' duration and any Arab who had rendered beneficial services to Kuwait might apply for citizenship. (*MENA, 14 Dec 1959-BBC, 16 Dec 1959*)

**The UK: Full Jurisdiction Ceded to Kuwait—Advance Towards Independence.** On 15 Feb an agreement was signed between the British Government and the Ruler of Kuwait whereby Kuwait would exercise, as of 25 Feb, full judicial power over any person within its territory. [Kuwait had previously exercised judicial power over its own Arab citizens and citizens of other Arab and Muslim countries, while the foreigners came under the jurisdiction of a British court.]

The agreement, which was regarded as an important advance towards the attainment of full independence, was received with satisfaction in Kuwait and widely celebrated. (*Hayat, 17 Feb; The World Today, 4 Apr*) (Subsequently, Kuwait engaged Egyptian lawyers to administer justice, see below.)

It was reported that in Mar Britain delivered to Kuwait a number of Centurion [heavy] tanks. The Kuwaiti crews had been trained in the UK. (*Hayat, 30 Mar; Zaman, Baghdad, 15 May*)

**Membership of Kuwait in International Bodies.** In Feb it was reported that Kuwait had joined the Universal Postal Union, and in May that she had become a member of the World Health Organization and of the Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative Organization. (*Zaman, Baghdad, 22 Apr, 29 May; Iraq Times, 20 May*)

On 16 Nov Kuwait was accepted as a full member of UNESCO. (*Hayat, 17 Nov*)

**Iraq: Transit Agreements.** Early in June an agreement was concluded with Iraq permitting the transit of sheep from Turkey to Kuwait. The Iraqi Government also agreed to facilitate the transit of Kuwaiti tourists to Lebanon. (*Zaman, Baghdad, 16 June*)

In an interview with an Iraqi correspondent, the Deputy Ruler, Amir Abdullah al-Mubārak as-Sabāh, declared that "Kuwait wishes its relations with Iraq to prosper."

He praised General Qassim's leadership and added: "The relations between Kuwait and Iraq are fraternal..., based on complete understanding and good neighbourliness." Iraqis in Kuwait, "numbering more than 30,000, are occupying professional, industrial and governmental posts... and we do not differentiate between them and the Kuwaitis." Al-Mubārak also said that the road linking the two countries was being asphalted and would facilitate trade and traffic; Kuwait hoped to be able to import all her requirements from Iraq. (*Bilad, 2 Dec, quoted R. Baghdad, 2 Dec-BBC, 4 Dec*)

**Jordan: Official Visits, Kuwaiti Loan.** On 19 Jan an official Jordanian mission arrived in Kuwait to thank the authorities for their liberal policy towards Jordanian citizens (mainly Palestinians) working in the country, and invited the Deputy Ruler to visit Amman. (*Hayat, 20 Jan*) On 25 Jan the head of the delegation said that the 29,000 Jordanians in Kuwait enjoyed good conditions and that he had discussed methods of regularizing travel between the two countries. (*ANA, 25 Jan-BBC, 27 Jan*)

Jordanian papers, however, wrote that thousands of Jordanians in Kuwait were unemployed, as they were not accepted in government employ. Jordanians were continuing to emigrate to Kuwait. In April the numbers were 50 per day; according to another estimate the total for Apr was 3,500. (*Difa', 29 Apr; Jihad, Jordan, 2 May*)

On 17 Feb the Deputy Ruler of Kuwait arrived in Amman on a three-day official visit. (*Falastin, 17-20 Feb*)

In July the Jordanian PM stated that Kuwait had lent Jordan £1 million at an annual interest of 4 per cent, to be repaid in nine annual instalments beginning 1 Aug 1962. (*Falastin, 25 July*)

**Morocco: King Mohammed V's Visit to Kuwait in Jan.** See pp 161-2.

**Saudi Arabia: Shaykh Sabāh's Visit.** On 13 Oct, the Ruler of Kuwait, Shaykh Abdullah as-Sabāh, arrived in Riyadh on a three-day official visit as the guest of King Saud. A joint communiqué, published on 15 Oct, stated that the two rulers, after discussing questions of common interests in an atmosphere of cordiality and fraternity, had reached identity of views and reaffirmed the traditional good relations between their neighbouring countries. King Saud had accepted an invitation to visit Kuwait. (*Hayat, 14-16 Oct*)

**The UAR: Various Contacts.** Eight Kuwaitis were among the officers concluding a two-year course at the Cairo Military College in Jan. (*Gumhuriyah, 8 Jan*)

On 11 Feb Amir Sabāh as-Sālim as-Sabāh, President of the Health Department, arrived in Cairo, and was received for a three-hour talk by President Abdel-Nasser. (*Ahram, 12 Feb*)

On 17 Mar six Kuwaiti officials studying the UAR judicial system in Cairo were received by the Executive Minister of Justice, Ahmad Husni, for a two-hour talk. (*MENA, 17 Mar-BBC, 19 Mar*)

In June the Minister of Education of the UAR—Egyptian Region—confirmed the renewal of an agreement with Kuwait under which 431 Egyptian teachers were lent to Kuwait for the new school year. (*Akhbar, Cairo, 13 June*)

On 29 Sept 20 lawyers, including six judges, arrived in Kuwait from the UAR for a year's service under contract. (*Ahram, 30 Sept*)



## QATAR

On 13 Dec the President of the Finance Department, Shaykh Jābir al-Ahmad as-Sabāh, arrived in Cairo on a one-week official visit, and held extensive discussions with the UAR Minister of Economy. A joint communiqué issued on 20 Dec stated that the two Ministers had discussed various common economic problems, and had investigated economic cooperation and the possibilities of expanding trade. (*Gumhuriyah*, 14, 16 Dec; *Hayat*, 16, 21 Dec)

**Establishment of University Planned.** At the beginning of the year it was reported that a plan for the establishment of a university in Kuwait was being prepared by three professors, one from Cambridge, one from the American University of Beirut and one from Asyut University, Egypt. Later it was reported that the report prepared by the three scholars envisaged the opening of the first department in 1963. (*Zaman*, Baghdad, 20 Feb, 21 May)

A Voice of the Arabs commentator, congratulating the Kuwaiti Government on its decision to establish a "university for the Gulf Area," suggested that it should put the concept of Arab nationalism in the forefront of its curriculum, and that oil should be the leading subject of practical studies, so as to enable the Arabs to dispense with foreign experts when they had liberated their land. (*Voice of the Arabs*, 13 Feb-BBC, 16 Feb; also BBC, 19 July)

## QATAR

**Background Note and Synopsis.** The Sheikhdom of Qatar, on the Persian Gulf (see map, p 383), with a population estimated at 40,000, is protected by Britain in accordance with a treaty concluded in 1916. Oil has been produced in the Sheikhdom since 1941.

In Oct the Ruler of Qatar abdicated in favour of his son Shaykh Ahmad Al Thāni, after growing criticism of his personal conduct. It was reported, however, that the strong man in the Sheikhdom was the Heir Apparent, Khalifah Ibn Hamad, known for his sympathy for the Abdel-Nasser version of Arab nationalism. According to an unconfirmed report Khalifah had curtailed the powers of the British advisers in the Sheikhdom.

**Jan: "Supreme Council" of the Ruling Family.** In Jan it was reported that the Deputy Ruler, Shaykh Ahmad Ibn Ali Al Thāni, and other members of the Thāni family, had decided to set up a Supreme Council headed by the ruler and comprising ten members of the family. (*Ahram*, 25 Apr)

**May: Leaflets Against Shaykh Ali Al Thāni.** In May it was reported that the Lebanese authorities were investigating the source of leaflets distributed in Lebanon, Qatar and "14 other Arab countries" against Shaykh Ali Al Thāni, Ruler of Qatar. The leaflets accused the Shaykh of having neglected his duty, travelling abroad for pleasure while his people were suffering from poverty and disease, denying the riches of his country to his people, and squandering millions of dollars on pleasure and women. (*Kul-Shay'*, Lebanon, 28 May)

For a description of Shaykh Ali's spending habits see *Time* (7 Nov). According to this source he used his income of \$12.5 million, out of Qatar's oil revenue of \$50 million, for such purposes as building "pink green and gold palaces at Doha, his capital; spending the summers at his villa in Switzerland (where his retinue, housed in hotels, caused \$20,000 worth of damage to furnishing in one season) and the winter at his \$1,000,000

villa in Lebanon; and presenting King Saud with 16 cars, one with gold fittings. As his income was insufficient to cover such expenses, he accumulated a \$14 million debt with Doha banks.

During Feb-May [and perhaps also later] Shaykh Ali spent his time in Lebanon and Syria. (BBC, 20 Feb, 16, 17 May)

**May: Attempt on Life of Ali Al Thāni.** It was reported on 30 May that a cousin of the Ruler of Qatar, Shaykh Nāsir Ibn Hamad Al Thāni, had fired at Shaykh Ali's car, unoccupied at the time, at the Lebanese summer resort of Alayh, because Shaykh Ali had refused to give him a sum of money he demanded. Shaykh Nāsir was detained by the Lebanese Police and, following Shaykh Ali's intervention, released and expelled from Lebanon. (*R. Baghdad*, 31 May-BBC, 1 June; *Hayat*, 31 May; *Ahram*, 1, 2 June)

**Oct: Shaykh Ali Abdicates, Succeeded by Son, Khalifah Ibn Hamad Reported Actual Ruler.** On 24 Oct Shaykh Ali abdicated and was succeeded by his son, Shaykh Ahmad Al Thāni. (*Ahram*, 25 Oct) It was reported that all the decisions in the new regime would be made by Khalifah Ibn Hamad, cousin of the new Ruler, and the new Heir Apparent, who was "known for his loyalty to Arab Nationalism." On the other hand, the new Ruler was inclined to the West, like his father. (*Akhbar*, Cairo, 26 Oct) Khalifa was said to be determined that more of the state's revenues would be channelled into public welfare projects. (*Times* 7 Nov)

The British were said to have taken a hand in Shaykh Ali's abdication. The Advisory (Supreme?) Council decided to pay his debts out of state revenues. (*Time*, 7 Nov)

It was reported on 28 Oct that Shaykh Khalifah Ibn Hamad "has taken over the functions of head of the administration." (*Nahar*, Lebanon, 28 Oct)

**Nov: Arab Support for the New Ruler.** On 2 Nov a UAR delegation went to Qatar to congratulate the new Ruler and the Heir Apparent. The delegation, headed by Anwar as-Saadat, Chairman of the National Assembly, included Hussein Dhu al-Fiqr Sabri, Deputy Foreign Minister, and Mahmūd Riyād and Tal'at Sidki, Counsellors to the President. Anwar as-Saadat announced that Abdel-Nasser had presented the new Ruler with two fighter planes. (*Akhbar*, Egypt, 2 Nov; *Kul Shay'*, Lebanon, 26 Nov)

A Saudi Arabian delegation headed by Amir Abdullah, son of King Saud, arrived in Doha to congratulate the new Ruler. (*Ahram*, 6 Nov)

A Lebanese delegation, consisting of two Cabinet Ministers, Sulaymān Faranjiyah and Joseph Skaf, presented Shaykh Ahmad with a Lebanese decoration. At the end of Nov a second Lebanese delegation, headed by PM Sa'ib Slām, arrived for a four-hour stay in Doha. (*Kifah*, 21 Nov; *Jaridah*, Lebanon, 30 Nov)

**Dec: Activities of British Advisers Curtailed?** In Dec a Lebanese pro-UAR paper reported from "reliable sources" that Shaykh Khalifah, the new Deputy Ruler, had relieved the British Adviser of his post, and had himself assumed the powers of the Adviser as well as the direct supervision of the Finance Department, in addition to the general supervision of all government functions. The first action of the Deputy Ruler had been to issue instructions to British experts and heads of the Water Department limiting their powers. When the British Di-



rector of the Water Department was reluctant to carry out these instructions, Shaykh Khalifah relieved him of his post and ordered him to leave Qatar within 24 hours. In this policy, it was reported, Shaykh Khalifah enjoyed the support of the Ruler and the people of Qatar (*Kifah*, 19 Dec) [No comment from British sources was available.]

### TRUCIAL STATES

**Background Note.** The Trucial Coast States, or Trucial Oman States, are: Abu Dhabi, Ajman, Dubai, Fajairah, Ras al-Khaimah, Sharjah and Umm al-Quwain. Dubai is the state with the largest population and the seat of the British Political Agent. The total population is estimated at 80,000, and that of Dubai at 40,000. All the states are British protected. Their relations with one another and with the outside world are handled by the British. Dubai is the administrative capital.

Order is maintained by the British-controlled Trucial Oman Scouts. Dubai and Abu Dhabi have Police of their own.

No oil has yet been produced in the states, but production from offshore wells was expected to begin in 1962.

**The Government.** Rulers: Sharjah: Saqr Ibn Sultan  
Ras al-Khaimah: Saqr Ibn Muhammad  
Umm al-Quwain: Ahmad Ibn Rashid  
Ajman: Rashid Ibn Humayd  
Dubai: Rashid Ibn Sa'id  
Abu Dhabi: Shakhbūt Ibn Sultan  
Fujairah: Muhammad Ibn Hamad ash-Sharji  
British Political Agent: D.F. Hawley  
British Political Officer, Abu Dhabi: E. F. Henderson.  
(*The ME, Europa*, 1961)

**British Aid.** According to the *Aden Chronicle*, the British Foreign Office, in a written reply to a question in the House of Commons, stated that Britain was planning to spend "this year" under the Trucial States Development Scheme, which is in its fifth year, £37,000 on education, more than twice the previous year's expenditure, and over £25,000 for public health, nearly three times the sum spent in 1959. It was stated that the British Government had built schools in Sharjah and Abu Dhabi, and ran a trade school in Sharjah and an agricultural school in Ras al-Khaimah. Teacher training courses had been arranged in Bahrain for candidates from the Trucial States, expenses being paid by Britain. The capacity of the hospital in Dubai, under a British doctor, had been increased. Nine dispensaries had been built in six of the states and another was to be

built in a seventh. Anti-malarial work was being undertaken. (*Hansard*, 24-30 June)

**Iranian Influence Alleged in Trucial States.** [UAR and pro-UAR Arab sources charged that the British were conducting in the Trucial States an immigration policy designed to "Iranize" the territory.] In Mar the Oman Office in Damascus claimed that the British intended to bring thousands of non-Arabs into the Imamate and the Trucial States. (*R. Damascus*, 23 Mar-BBC, 25 Mar)

A Lebanese [pro-UAR] paper claimed that the British were propagating a legend that the tribes in Oman [Trucial States] were of Iranian origin. The increasing number of Iranians who were being granted citizenship in the states were designed to serve as the future weapon of imperialism, the paper alleged. Iranian publications and technicians were being sent to Oman, and Iran extended annual invitations to the rulers to visit Iran. (*Sayyad, Lebanon*, 28 July)

In Aug Ahmad Sa'id of the Voice of the Arabs claimed the existence of an "imperialist policy which encourages foreign immigration into the Arab Gulf [Persian Gulf] area so as to destroy its Arab character and sever it from the Arab homeland." In Dubai, whose "Arab owners" numbered about 20,000, the foreigners, mostly Iranians, who had been granted citizenship by the British, numbered "no less than 70,000," he said. An Iranian school in Dubai was designed to spread Iranian culture and destroy that of the Arabs. All the main government posts in this state were held by Britons or Iranians, Ahmad Sa'id continued. This policy was co-ordinated by Britain and Iran and endorsed by the Shaykh of Dubai, who had agreed in Mar to the distribution in Dubai of an Iranian leaflet claiming the state to be part of Iran, and who frequently visited Iran.

An Arab popular movement had been started recently, the commentator added, to demand, among other things a drastic restriction of non-Arab immigration and the encouragement of Arab immigration from the "neighbouring Arab states, Palestine and the UAR." (BBC 25 Aug)

**The UAR.** In May *al-Ahrām* reported that the Egyptian and Syrian teachers in Dubai had established a "House of the UAR," where questions of education and general matters of public interest were discussed. These teachers were employed in four schools. (*Ahrām*, 9 May) There were four Egyptian teachers in Sharjah. (*Masa', Egypt*, 13 July)

In Sept, the Ruler of Sharjah visited Cairo. (BBC, 17 Sept)

# THE REPUBLIC OF SUDAN

(Jumhuriyat As-Sudan)

## INTERNAL AFFAIRS

### SYNOPSIS AND ECONOMIC SURVEY

#### SYNOPSIS

Nineteen fifty-nine was the first year in power of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (*al-Majlis al-A'la lil-Quwwat al-Musallahah*), which had taken over through a bloodless coup d'état on 17 Nov 1958. It was characterized by pronounced political unrest, mainly among army officers (especially the younger ones), who carried out one coup and attempted two others. After the last attempt, in Nov 1959, five young officers were executed and others imprisoned or dismissed.

In contrast, 1960 was a year of at least outward political calm in the armed forces, while growing unrest became evident among civilians, especially in the last quarter of the year. Apparently, the improved economic conditions did not strengthen the position of the government.

The military rulers of the country made it clear that they intended to stay in power indefinitely, but they made almost no progress in the institutionalization of the regime. The only attempt in this direction was the decree on the reorganization of local government, which, however, had yet to be implemented.

It also became clear that the power of the political opposition was not yet broken, and that there was popular resentment against the regime.

Communists, Communist sympathizers and other leftists were active throughout the year. They included workers and members of the "middle class intelligentsia": students, teachers, officials and others. The workers, the most powerful group in this sector, were permitted to reorganize the unions which had been suspended after the revolution. The amended Union Act placed heavy restrictions on the activities of the unions but it remained to be seen to what extent the government would succeed in preventing their becoming political factors.

Popular dissatisfaction found a clear expression in Oct, in the disturbances and demonstrations following the decision of the government to transfer the Nubians from Wadi Halfa (which will form part of the Aswan High Dam reservoir) to Khashm al-Girba against their wishes. The demonstrations were started by the Nubians, but others, especially students, joined in and the protests spread to various parts of the country.

It was this growing unrest which emboldened some of the politicians of the old regime to petition the military rulers to restore civilian government. For this purpose, there was an attempt to form a combined opposition comprising al-Mahdi and al-Mirghani, the heads of the Ansār and Khatmiyah religious sects, and the leaders of the dissolved political parties. In the end, the Khatmiyah, members of which belong to the ruling military group, withdrew. The others, including the former premiers and rivals, Abdullah Khalil of the Ummah party and al-Azhari of the National Union Party, signed the petition. The government, however, reacted firmly and reaffirmed its resolve to stay in power.

The government also tried to bolster its position, apart

from direct action against the opposition, by tightening control over the Press, making gestures to win the favour of the public, and building up a leader-image of General Abbud.

Special efforts were devoted to the "Sudanization" of the South; Christian missionary activity was curtailed and missionaries evicted; Islamic missionary activity was intensified and attempts made to "Arabize" the tribes speedily. Promises were also given to develop the economy of the South, and wages in the region were ordered to be equalized with those in the North. Sudanization and Arabization were also carried out, though to a lesser extent, in the North.

By the end of the year, though the military seemed for the time being firmly in power, the political situation remained basically unstable.

#### ECONOMIC SURVEY

The Sudanese economy showed a marked improvement in 1960 as compared with its very depressed state during the 1956-1958 period. The economic revival was mainly due to the continuation of a more realistic cotton export policy, initiated in 1959. Net foreign assets stood at £\$61.9 million at the end of 1960, as compared with £\$23.9 million at the end of 1958. Cotton exports were satisfactory, and the year ended with a net trade surplus of about £\$3 million. Money circulation and prices remained fairly stable, and increasing attention was being paid to integrated economic development.

The Managil Extension irrigation project entered its final phase, and in June 1960 Sudan received a World Bank loan of \$15.5 million to cover the foreign exchange costs of the remaining work. Tenders were issued for the construction of the Khashm al-Girba dam—a long-planned project, now intended also to benefit the inhabitants of Wadi Halfa, who had to leave their homes because of the Aswan High Dam project (see also below)—and for the construction of the Roseires Dam, for which Sudan is requesting World Bank assistance. Western Germany reportedly offered to participate in this latter project. Industrial development, almost completely neglected in the past, was pushed forward in 1960. West German firms secured contracts for a paper mill to be built at Kosti and for Sudan's first sugar refinery, to be built in the Guneid area. A British consortium was awarded a contract to build the country's first modern textile mill at a cost of about £\$6 million. (In 1959 the US Development Loan fund authorized a loan of \$10 million for this purpose.) The government approved the offers of both Shell-BP and ENI-AGIP (Italy) to build two oil refineries, although originally only one was contemplated. Exploration for oil continued, but no commercial discoveries were reported.

The 1960/61 budget (expenditure £\$47.8 million and revenue—£\$56.2 million) reached record proportions. The estimated surplus of £\$8.3 million would be transferred to the Development Budget, which totals £\$24.4 million for the 1960/61 financial year.

## VIEWS AND POLICIES: INTERNAL AFFAIRS

## THE POLITICAL REGIME

**The Military to Stay in Power.** Tal'at Farid in the name of Abbud, 7 Dec: "We have taken over the government of the country to implement the will of the people. We are therefore not ready to quit before the Revolution Government attains its goal, and completes the schemes which it has laid down for development on behalf of the citizens." (*Sudan Daily*, 9 Dec)

**Organic Sudanese Democracy.** Bashir Nasr, 22 Apr: "Democracy is the best type of government suiting our country's situation. I mean the democracy growing from the core of our being, not the imported democracy brought to us from abroad." (*Sarahah*, 23 Apr)

**Political Unrest Will Not be Tolerated.** Bahari, Minister of Interior, after the disturbances in Oct: "I wish to emphasize that the government will not neglect to maintain the country's security and will not allow a group of people to disturb the country's peace and stability or excite disturbances and disorder among citizens." (*Sudan Daily*, 28 Oct)

**The Goal: Independence, Social and Economic Improvement, National Unity.** Bashir Nasr said on behalf of Abbud on 24 June: "The main objective of the Revolution is to preserve the independence of the country and protect it, whatever may be the cost."

"In practice, however, independence has no significance unless the people live in prosperity and are free from want. Poverty, disease and ignorance are the bitter enemies of freedom and independence, and cause the people to become easy prey and to be misled into following the wrong paths. That is why, since we assumed power, our main task has been to realize the wellbeing and welfare of the people." (*Sudan Daily*, 27 June)

Abbud speaking to southern chiefs on 1 Dec, said that the regime had worked from the start towards the attainment of national unity and the abolition of all estrangement. The government regarded the Sudan as one unit and all the citizens in it as equals. (*Sudan Daily*, 2 Dec)

## ECONOMY AND DEVELOPMENT

**Integrated Development.** Bashir Nasr on behalf of Abbud, 24 June: "Industrialization should not interfere with agricultural expansion, and productive schemes should not be developed at the expense of curtailing social services

in the sphere of education and health... Reforms should be coordinated to cover all aspects of the life in this country."

"All the various parts of the Sudan are now given a fair share of attention and care." (*Sudan Daily*, 27 June)

**Development of the South.** Tal'at Farid on the government resolution to equalize wages in the South and the North: "One of the Revolution Government's foremost principles is to secure justice and equality for all citizens from all classes and standards. Then it is only natural that the government gives its particular consideration to the so called undeveloped areas by the foreign rule and the successive governments, and acts to raise the standard of its people and secure for them justice, equality, prosperity and happiness... The Revolution Government... has at heart the developing of... Sudan in general and the South in particular..." (*Sudan Daily*, 5 Oct)

**Dependence on Cotton to be Minimized.** General Abbud at a Press conference with American pressmen, 16 Mar: "We are pursuing agricultural researches for the diversifications of crops. Experiments in castor oil seeds, coffee beans, groundnuts and mechanical cultivation proved a success. Secondly we started the industrialization of our agricultural products, i.e. textile and sugar processing. These measures are intended to relieve dependence on cotton as the only cash crop in the country." (*Sudan Monthly*, Apr)

## EDUCATION, RELIGION

**Education.** Bashir Nasr on behalf of Abbud, 24 June: "The Revolution Government will do its utmost for the spreading of education in the Sudan. But knowledge in itself will not alone create a happy society. It must be supported by morals and ideals." (*Sudan Daily*, 27 June)

Abbud: "In the educational field we are drawing for post-graduate courses in an unprecedented manner in this country." (*Sudan*, Apr)

**Religion.** Al-Bahāri: "The Revolution Government's policy is to give its protection to religious creeds without any intervention, and to enable all citizens to practise freely their religion according to their beliefs." (*Sudan Daily*, 19 Aug)

(On Religion, see also below, on the Southern Sudan Question.)

## THE GOVERNMENT'S POLITICAL ACTIVITIES

## THE GOVERNMENT OF SUDAN

Theoretically the government of Sudan is vested in two bodies: the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces and the Cabinet. All the members of the Supreme Council are now Cabinet Ministers. Parliament has been suspended and the legislative power is exercised by the government.

There were no changes in 1960 in the composition of the government, as detailed below.

## EFFORTS TO WIN POPULAR SUPPORT

The military regime, conscious all the time of the need to enlist popular support, emphasized several aspects of the relations between government and people.

**Official Tours by Ministers.** There were many official tours by leaders of the regime. During one week, for example, Abbud visited Roseires Dam, Tal'at Farid visited Athara and Port Sudan, Maqbūl al-Amin went to Managil, Hasan Bashir Nasr flew to Western Sudan, and Santino Deng Teng visited the South. (*Ahram*, 3 May) *As-Sarāhah* emphasized this fact, enumerating Abbud's various trips in two editorials, and said that this was an evidence of his concern with the problems of the people. The politicians had not made half as many trips, the paper said. (*Sarahah*, 13, 18 June)

**Delegations to Ministers.** Ministers also encouraged delegations to visit them. Special occasion and events (such

## THE SUDANESE GOVERNMENT 1960

Ministry	Name of Minister	Remarks
Prime Minister and Minister of Defence Interior and Local Government Information and Labour	Ibrāhīm Abbud Ahmad Majdhūb al-Bahāri Muhammad Tal'at Farid	Lt.-Gen. (Arabic—Fariq) Maj.-Gen. (Arabic—Liwā') Maj.-Gen. (brother of Ahmad Rida Farid)
State, Communications Agriculture and Irrigation Public Works and Mineral Resources Commerce, Industry and Supply Min. of State for Cabinet Affairs and Deputy Commander of the Army	Maqbūl al-Amin al-Hajj Ahmad Rida Farid Muhammad Ahmad Irwah	Brigadier (Arabic—Amir-Alay) Maj.-Gen. (Brother of Tal'at Farid) Brigadier
Foreign Affairs Education and Justice Finance and Economy Health Animal Resources	Hasan Bashir Nasr Ahmad Khayr Ziyādah Uthmān Arbāb Abd al-Majid Ahmad Dr Muhammad Ahmad Ali Santino Deng Teng	Maj.-Gen. Lawyer, former politician Lawyer, former politician Former senior government official Doctor of Medicine Only Min. from South Sudan

as the anniversary of the revolution, Abbud's homecomings from abroad, visits by foreign statesmen, etc.) were regularly followed by delegations expressing support for the regime. These visits were utilized to exhort the people to cooperate with government policies, both general and specific (e.g. the encouragement of nomads to settle). (*Sudan Daily*, 7 Nov)

#### EFFORTS TO CREATE LEADER-IMAGE OF PRESIDENT ABBUD

Throughout the year efforts were made to create an image of Abbud as a great leader. Most issues of most papers carried his pictures, describing him as "Abbud the Great," or "The Leader of the Revolution." A typical passage is the following about his tour to Yugoslavia. "He was admirable, with his gentle smile. He was never late and never complained. He was always eloquent and clear in the many speeches he delivered." (*Sudan Daily*, 1 Aug) When Ministers delivered a speech, they frequently did so "on behalf of HE President Abbud." Festivals in his honour were held in Khartoum Bakhri on 16 Apr and in Umdurman on 24 June. The latter, which lasted a whole day, included speeches, a parade, and the unveiling of the President's statue in the municipal square: "...The President could not resist his usual desire to mix with the people... He drove slowly round the square in an open car to spend what must have been one of the happiest moments of his life, waving and shaking hands with the still cheering people who love him and have faith in him and his government... The entire afternoon was spent in opening social institutions or laying the foundation stones for others not yet built. The historical occasion of honouring the President in Umdurman was well commemorated." (*Sudan Daily*, 27 June)

A passage in Abbud's speech on this occasion (read by Hasan Bashir Nasr) read: "A good citizen is the backbone of the ideal life in any society, and I am delighted to praise the spirit of sacrifice and self denial of the citizen who did me the honour of creating my statue in bronze which has today been unveiled in Municipal Square in Umdurman. It is a symbol of industrial progress and of work of precision and efficiency." (*Sudan Daily*, 27 June)

[The President's travels in the country, his state visits to Yugoslavia, UAR and Ethiopia, and the visits of Emperor Haile Selassie and President Abdel-Nasser were also utilized to increase his prestige at home.]

#### THE GOVERNMENT AND LABOUR: NEW LEGISLATION ON TRADE UNIONS AND LABOUR DISPUTES

**Background, 1946-1960:** The constitutional changes relating to trade unions and labour disputes, which were introduced in the spring of 1960, are of political importance, as they affected the organizational rights of a section of the population which has proved to be a lively and active political factor.

The organization of TUs in the Sudan began in the summer of 1946, against a background of low wages, the rising cost of living and the increased political and social consciousness of the workers. In 1947, in the midst of strikes and political unrest, the unions were recognized by the government, and in 1948 laws to this effect were promulgated. In 1949 the unions formed overall organizations which became, in 1950, the Sudan Workers' Trade Union Federation (SWTUF). This body exercised great authority over the unions and played an important role in the Sudanese nationalist movement. At the beginning of 1956, the Railway Workers' Union, the largest (over 25,000), broke away and set up a separate organization. On the eve of the revolt of Nov 1958 there were about 150 TUs, the majority of whose members were employed by the government and a small number by private industry.

There was a marked Communist influence among the leaders of the unions; they established contact with the WFTU (which includes the Communist trade unions), though they were not members.

After the Military Revolt on 17 Nov 1958, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces issued an order putting an end to the activities of the TUs, but without disbanding them. (*Ayyam*, 11 Feb) This step, simultaneous with the prohibition of party politics, did not put an end to political activity on the part of the workers. Feeling ran high among them in 1959, expressing itself, among other ways, in demonstrations and increased Communist activity. Among the steps taken by the government to appease the workers was the amending of the Trade Unions Act and the Labour Disputes Act of 1948, so as to permit them to reorganize.

**Feb 1960:** Preparing the Ground for the Publication of the Acts. On 13 Feb the Minister of Labour and Information, Major-General Muhammad Tal'at Farid, left for Atbara, which has the largest concentration of transport



and industrial workers, to meet the workers' leaders, who had belonged to the disbanded TUs, and take part in factory meetings. He tried to acquaint himself with the workers' point of view and at the same time, to explain advantages of the new laws which were about to be published. (*Sarahah, 14 Feb*) At the beginning of Feb, the Press devoted much space to describing and explaining the new laws.

**Feb-Mar: Amendments to the Trade Unions Act 1960.** The following are the main amendments to the TU Act of 1948 (*Qanūn Niqabāt al-Ummāl*) promulgated on 9 Feb (together with comments and explanations in the Press).

1. The law applied only to manual labourers, and did not permit clerks, even those working side by side with labourers, to join or set up a union (explanation given by a representative of the Ministry of Labour to workers' representatives at Atbara.) (*Ra'y al-Amm, 6 Mar*)
2. Each TU would be a separate entity; it must not unite with any other organization. (A similar regulation had at first existed under the law of 1948, but this had later been cancelled and unions were permitted to unite upon a decision by a two-thirds majority.)
3. In each union, membership would be open only to those employed in the same place of work, or by the same employer. (Thus the Transport Ministry's employees had to set up independent unions for line-men, post-office workers, etc., while those who were not grouped under one employer—e.g. taxi drivers—could not unite at all.) (*Ra'y al-Amm, 6 Mar*)
4. The law of 1948 required a minimum of 10 to form a TU; the amended law raised the minimum to 50, all employed in the same place of work, or working for one employer.
5. Under the law of 1948, if the Register of Unions refused to register a union, any member could appeal to the Courts; under the new law, only those who had signed the application for registration could appeal.
6. In the past, the books could be supervised in any manner which conformed with the requirements of the law, as the union thought fit; under the new law, supervision would be by the government.
7. The law of 1948 forbade participation in any political organization, while the amendment forbade co-operation with any organization which did not come under the jurisdiction of the TU Act.
8. A TU was not permitted to interfere in a labour dispute of any other union.

The main points of the law were published in *al-Ayyām* on 16 Feb (full text in *Ra'y al-Amm, 16 Feb*).

**Feb: Labour Disputes Act 1960 (*Qanūn Niza'āt al-Amal*).** The new Labour Disputes Act, replacing that of 1948, was published simultaneously with the amendments to the TU Act. Under the previous law, strikes were permissible, except in the case of government officials or those whose work was important for the health and safety of the public. Arbitration was voluntary and decisions were not binding, though the findings were made public to influence public opinion.

Under the new law, when a labour dispute arose, both sides must enter into direct negotiations. If these failed, either side might request the intervention of the Commissioner of Labour, in which case the workers were forbidden to strike. If neither side requested such intervention, workers had the right to strike. Should the Com-

missioner of Labour fail in his attempts to mediate, the dispute would be brought before a conciliation committee (composition not specified); if that, too, failed, the dispute would be taken to an arbitration committee (a) if both sides agree to such arbitration; (b) if the Minister of Labour ordered such a step. The arbitration committee's decision would be final and binding. The Prime Minister was empowered to forbid any strike which would affect the general welfare. (*Ayyam, 16 Feb*, full text *Ra'y al-Amm, 16 Feb*)

**Feb-Mar: Enforcing the Law.** On 22 Feb, an order was issued disbanding the existing TUs and cancelling their registration, thus clearing the way for the setting-up of new ones in accordance with the new law. (*Ra'y al-Amm, 23 Feb*)

The Minister of Labour opened an office in Atbara headed by Colonel Mahjūb Tah, who was responsible for enforcing the law. At a meeting with railway workers, he explained that they were free to discuss the composition of the TU bodies, but not the new law itself. Criticism was permitted only at a personal interview with the Minister of Labour. (*Ayyam, 23 Feb*)

The Minister of Labour also threatened the closing down of any newspaper criticizing the new law. (*Zaman, 25 Feb*)

At a meeting in Atbara on 5 Mar between Colonel Mahjūb Tah and the workers' representatives, he stated that the former TUs had political and revolutionary aims which were anti-colonialist in nature. They had achieved their purpose; they should now devote themselves to activities for the benefit of the public and strive for construction, not destruction. (*Ra'y al-Amm, 6 Mar*)

**Mar: Controversy Over Setting Up of Railway Workers' Union.** The Railway Workers' Union, the largest and most influential of unions, remained a strong factor even after the enforcement of the new law. The majority of its members were concentrated in Atbara, where the railway workshops are situated. On the publication of the law, three groups emerged among the railway workers, led by: (a) Mūsa Ahmad Mati, (b) Al-Hajj Abd ar-Rahmān, and (c) Ali Muhammad al-Bashīr respectively. Commentators classified group (a) as rightist and the other two as leftist. (*Sudan al-Jadid, 20 Mar*)

The antagonism between the groups grew, and Mati's group applied for registration as a separate union. The newspapers published a great deal of detail on the conflict, but without clarifying the underlying differences, and called for a settlement of the dispute. (*Sarahah, 9, 21 Mar; Sudan al-Jadid, 9, 15 Mar; Ra'y al-Amm, 8 Mar*) Atbara workers held meetings in Khartoum and Port Sudan, at which they called for unity. (*Sarahah, 17 Mar; Zaman, 19 Mar*) On 16 and 21 Mar, while the conflict was at its height, people were caught distributing Communist leaflets against the regime and were arrested. (*Sarahah, 17, 22 Mar*) The announcement did not clarify whether there was any connection between the distribution of the leaflets and the dispute.

The Minister of Labour stated at a Press conference that the controversy was not concerned with the basic provisions of the law, but with the administrative problems involved; he warned that through this conflict they might lose the great opportunity offered to them by the new law. (*Sarahah, 21 Mar*)

On 11 Apr, after several attempts at intervention by a conciliation committee, a huge workers' meeting was held in Atbara, with the participation of the Minister of Labour and Information, Tal'at Farid, and all three

groups agreed to set up one union. (*Sarahah*, 12 Apr) The newspapers welcomed the settlement (editorials in *Sarahah*, 12 Apr, *Ra'y al-Amm*, 14 Apr).

**Apr-Dec: Registration and Elections.** Up to 12 Apr six TUs—all of government employees—renewed their activities and registered with the Registrar of Unions covering railways, mechanical transport, stores, military industry, the post office and the cement factory. (*Sudan al-Jadid*, 13 Apr)

The first two TUs were approved by the Registrar of TUs on 18 Sept. (*Morning News*, 19 Sept. For registration of TUs and settlements of funds and property affairs, see *Sarahah*, 2 May; *Ayyam*, 6 Aug; *Sudan Daily*, 18 Aug, 6 Sept)

The Railway Workers' Union received its certificate on 15 Oct, but the offices and funds were handed over only on 11 Nov, after the signature of an understanding to meet all the debts of the dissolved union. (*Morning News*, 5, 12 Nov) Later in the year, preparations were started for elections in the unions. In Dec a first supervisory commission was set up in Khartoum, consisting of a first-grade magistrate as chairman and two other members, representing the Municipal Council and the Military Governor. Similar commissions were to be formed in other centres where TU election were to be held. (*Morning News*, 9 Dec) The railway workers refused to conduct elections if they were supervised by a committee imposed by the government. Deadlock ensued, but it was later stated that another attempt to hold the elections might take place at Atbara in Jan 1961. (*Daily Telegraph*, 29 Dec)

**The Government's Policy.** General Tal'at Farid, Minister of Information and Labour, made the following statement in connection with the first approval for the formation of a number of Hus: "When HE President Abbud ordered the revision of the Labour Laws so as to suit the conditions in the country, he aimed at promulgating a law which would be compatible with the Revolution's principles, a law which secures justice to both employee and employer and safeguards the rights of each without injuring the country's interest. The President stated at that time that the workers were considered among the country's soldiers or rather in the lead, and that he would take interest in them so long as they remained well behaved and abiding by the country's and workers' laws." (*Sudan Daily*, 17 Sept)

## THE GOVERNMENT AND THE PRESS

**Synopsis.** During 1960, the Press became a central issue in Sudan's political life. The government tightened control of the Press (though there was no official censorship): it closed down newspapers, often threatened the Press in general, and considered nationalizing it. At the same time it established governmental papers and encouraged the publication of privately-owned pro-government ones. By the end of the year, however, the Press was not entirely subdued.

**The Sudanese Press.** The main newspapers in Sudan at the beginning of 1960 were *al-Ayyām* (independent), *an-Nil* (the "Ansār" sect organ) *as-Sudan al-Jadid* (formerly pro-NUP), *as-Sarāhah* (formerly leftist but now pro-government), *ar-Ra'y al-Amm* (independent), *az-Zamān* (pro-Egyptian), *Sawt as-Sudan* (the Khatmiyah sect organ), *Morning News* (belongs to *al-Ayyām* proprietors), *The Daily News Bulletin* (independent, issued by The Sudanese Press Agency).

**Dec 1959-Jan 1960: Publication of Non-Government Papers Serving Government Policy.** At the end of Dec 1959 and at the beginning of Jan 1960 two new papers were published, a labour journal and an Islamic one.

The first number of *ar-Risālah* (which was planned as a weekly, but became a monthly) was dated 29 Dec. Its declared aim was to spread Islamic ideas in order to fight Communist theories. The first issue included, e.g. an article dealing with the Communist movement, headed "Know thy Enemy." The paper praised the government and called for close cooperation between the people and the authorities. At the same time it demanded the amendment of certain laws in order to foster the spirit of Islam, e.g. that working hours should be fixed so as to enable officials to attend the daily prayers. (*Risalah*, 29 Dec 1959)

On 1 Jan the weekly *al-Amīl as-Sudānī* (The Sudanese Workers) appeared for the first time, with the declared aim of dealing with workers' affairs. It too was full of praises for the government and the country's leaders. (*Al-Amīl as-Sudani*, 1, 7 Jan)

**23 Feb: An-Nil Daily Closed.** On 23 Feb the Minister of Interior closed the oldest Sudanese paper, *an-Nil*, publishing by Ansār sect-Ummah Party circles. The paper was accused of publishing articles not conforming to the government's policy, e.g. it demanded a constitution. (*Nil*, 8 Feb) The immediate cause of the closure was an article praising the Burmese army for handing back the government to the civilian. (*Anba as-Sudan*, 24 Feb)

*As-Sudan al-Jadid* and *as-Zamān* called for the lifting of the ban on *an-Nil* and criticized governmental control of the Press and censorship in general. (*Sudan al-Jadid*; *Zman*, 25 Feb) The pro-governmental daily *as-Sarāhah* claimed that *an-Nil* had deserved its fate, as it was the only newspaper that continued to represent political circles. (*Sarahah*, 24 Feb)

**Jan-Aug: Publication of Government Papers: Sudan; The Sudan Daily; Ath-Thawrah.** Until 11 Jan 1960 the government had published a weekly bulletin in English and Arabic. It was replaced by a monthly called *Sudan*, in English and Arabic, whose first issue came out in Feb.

In June *The Sudan Daily* appeared for the first time, with eight pages on good-quality paper. [It prints a considerable amount of news, mingled with copious praise of the government. As it is in English, and so of limited influence, its publication did not arouse any public reaction. *The Morning News*, the only other English daily in the Sudan, consists of our pages on low-quality paper.]

On 15 Aug *ath-Thawrah* (The Revolution) started to appear daily, published by the Ministry of Information. It is printed in Arabic on large pages of good-quality paper, much better and larger than those of any other newspaper in Sudan. Its publication aroused concern among the other newspapers.

The *al-Ayyām* daily criticized the government for competing with the independent Press on unfair terms, both economically and as regards sources of information. (*Morning News*, 6 Aug) *As-Sarāhah*, on the other hand, welcomed the new paper, but proposed the formation of a semi-independent committee to guard the rights of the independent Press. (*Sarahah*, 6 Aug) General Tal'at Farid said that the new paper was not intended to injure the local Press: "It would not please us to see the clean and constructive newspapers vanish never to return... On the other hand nobody will feel sorry if they see malicious and destructive newspapers vanishing from the scene." (*Sudan Daily*, 16 Aug)

**Aug: Az-Zamān Daily Closed.** On the 2 Aug, the Minister of Interior closed *az-Zamān* and withdrew its permit for not observing government directives to the Press though no specific reasons were given. The paper had been founded in Feb 1958 and showed pro-Egyptian tendencies. This time there were no appeals by the Press for the cancellation of the decision, and *as-Sarāhah* called on the newspapers to begin to settle their relations with the government. (*Sarahah*, 3 Aug)

**Nov: Sudanese Press Agency Closed.** On 9 Nov the Minister of Interior closed the Sudanese Press Agency for violating Press laws. The Agency published a Daily Bulletin and a weekly supplement, both in English. (*Mid. Mirror*, 12 Nov)

**Aug: Higher Penalties for Press Law Violations.** On 30 Aug the Minister of the Interior issued an amendment to the Press Law fixing higher penalties: up to one month's imprisonment, or a fine not exceeding £550, or both. Previously, violators had not been liable to imprisonment, while fines originally did not exceed £55 and were later raised to £525.

The amendment also provided that henceforth a journalist would be punishable for knowingly publishing an article where the writer's signature was not genuine or if he refused to reveal the source of an unsigned news item or article. (*Ra'y al-Amm*, 31 Aug)

**14 Sept: Warning to Press not to Criticize the Government.** On 14 Sept the Minister of Interior issued a warning to the Press "not to direct criticisms to the existing laws of the country or allow their publication in their papers or correspondence. It should be clearly understood by them all, that this Ministry will not allow or deal leniently with any one who deviates from the state's policy or contravenes its directions." (*Sudan Daily*, 14 Sept)

**Aug-Sept: Plan to Nationalize the Press.** The first issue of the government paper *ath-Thawrah* on 16 Aug (see below) included a statement by Tal'at Farid. He commented on the nationalization of schools and newspapers in Ceylon and said that in Sudan similar steps had been taken in the field of education. As the Press was also an institution of public education, the steps taken by the Ceylonese government were commendable. "We are not surprised at her nationalization of these vital institutions which happens every day in various countries." (*Sudan Daily*, 17 Aug) On 22 Aug Farid returned to the subject and invited the expression of opinions "so that a clear conclusion can be reached on this issue." (*Sudan Daily*, 23 Aug) The same day he held in his office a symposium of government officials, university teachers, newspapermen and others, to debate the subject of Press nationalization. The main points of view, for and against, appeared as articles in *ath-Thawrah*, accompanied by violent attacks on the Press, describing the journalists as failures and declaring that the present situation of the Press recalled the saying, "He who pays the piper calls the tune." (*Thawrah*, 23, 24, 25, 26 Aug) An editorial in *as-Sarāhah* welcomed the debate but deplored the attacks on the Press. (*Sarahah*, 28 Aug)

**Nationalization Plan Dropped; Press Celebrates Victory.** [Public reactions seemed to have prevented the execution of the plan.] On 6 Sept the government publicly ordered that all discussion of Press nationalization should stop, as the authorities thought the idea had received all the attention it deserved. (*Ayyam*, 7 Sept) On 8 Sept *Ra'y*

*al-Amm*, in an editorial, thanked all those who with their pens had helped to achieve the victory of freedom of thought, which depends on the freedom of the Press. (*Ra'y al-Amm*, 3 Sept)

*The Times* commented editorially: "The threatened newspapers have hit back vigorously, as might be expected, but though they have won a respite it would be optimistic to assume that they were safe." The paper doubted whether the government really needed nationalization, as it exercised strict control in many ways. (*Times*, 22 Sept) In a letter to *The Times*, the Director of the Sudanese Ministry of Information denied any intention to nationalize the Press, and the existence of "internal censorship" in the Sudan. "Newspapers only come into conflict with the authorities if they persist in the sort of abuse which may not be tolerated in Britain." (*Times*, 4 Oct)

## REORGANIZATION OF PROVINCIAL ADMINISTRATION

**Synopsis.** In summer 1959, after governing for less than a year, the military government began to pay attention to the establishment of a constitutional framework for its rule. One of the reasons was the growing dissatisfaction in the country with the complete absence of any popular representation. A committee was set up to propose constitutional and administrative changes, and the people were led to expect much from it. But the law which was eventually promulgated in Nov 1960 was concerned only with provincial administration, and did not provide for popular representation.

**Aug-Nov 1959: Commission Appointed.** On 17 Nov 1959, the first anniversary of the Revolution, President Abbud announced that in Aug he had appointed a commission "with unlimited terms of reference... with the purpose of making recommendations on the best way for the citizens to take part in the government of the country and play an effective role in the development of their own affairs." It was hoped that this "would ultimately pave the way for a constitutional framework suited to the Sudanese way of life." (*Sudan Daily*, 1 Dec)

The commission was headed by Chief Justice Abu Ranāt and included representatives of various ministries. It met for the first time on 4 Aug 1959 and asked the government for terms of reference. These included the following main point: "To carry out an extensive survey of the present administrative machinery (local and central) and to submit its recommendations as to the best system for an efficient unified administration in the Sudan." (*The Sudan Daily*, 1 Dec)

**Jan-July 1960: The Commission's Proceedings.** The commission held more than forty meetings in Khartoum and studied the views of various ministries and departments, as well as the systems of government in other countries. It also toured the provinces. (*Sudan Daily*, 1 Dec)

The main emphasis was laid by the Chief Justice and the newspapers on the aim of letting the citizens have a share in the government. [There was as yet no indication that the reorganization would be limited to local administration only.] (*Nil*, 10 Jan; *Ayyam*, 14 Mar; *Sudan al-Jadid*, 2 Apr)

On 8 July the commission's conclusions were submitted to President Abbud. (*Zaman*, 8 July) The government formed a committee to study them and report to President Abbud. (*Ayyam*, 9 Sept)

**Nov: Promulgation of Act Announced.** On 17 Nov, in his speech on the occasion of the second Anniversary of



the Revolution, Abbud announced that the Provincial Administration Act 1960 had been promulgated the day before on the recommendation of the committee. "This will have a far reaching effect in shaping the system of government and its development. It ensures the actual and effective supervision by local councils of the progress of government machinery in their area." (*Sudan Daily*, 18 Nov)

**Nov: Commission's Report.** The new act was made public on 26 Nov by Chief Justice Abu-Ranāt, who told a Press conference that a committee would soon be formed to apply the new act. (*Morning News*, 28 Nov) The first part of the report was concerned with observations on the present system of administration and the premises on which the reorganization of the administration should be based.

The main criticism of the existing system was that it incorporated "side by side two systems under two different ministries, the one being a centralized administrative system represented by the governor and the district commissioner; the other a local system functioning on the basis of councils." This resulted in duplication of work, extra expense, etc. The system of centralization was introduced by the foreign rulers to ensure maximum security; later, when the exclusive maintenance of this system became impossible, they also initiated a nucleus of local government.

Any system of local government should aim at "the spread of democracy from the base to the top," ensure the participation of citizens, train them to run their own affairs, empower local representative bodies to handle local problems, and confine the responsibilities of the central government to "general supervision, direction and technical advice." (*Sudan Daily*, 1 Dec)

The commission recommended the establishment of district and provincial councils "representing the different interests of the area" and also the central government. All members should be appointed; election being "only one of the various means for attaining a fully representative body." Election in the past had produced some members who degraded the standard of the councils and also led to party groupings. (*Sudan Daily*, 2 Dec) The report then continued to elaborate on the proposed organization. (For full text see *Sudan Daily*, 1-16 Dec.)

**The Provincial Administration Act—1960.** The Act concerns administration at the level of the province only (not districts). The Provincial Administration will be composed of (1) a Government Representative, (2) the

Province Council, (3) the Province Authority. The Council and Authority are established by special warrants of the Council of Ministers, which may thereafter cancel or amend them. Members are either appointed, or both appointed and elected by the local authorities in the province as specified in the warrant. The members of the Authority are ex officio members of the councils.

The Authority is composed of representatives of the Ministries in the province. The competence of the Council is mainly legislative and supervisory, and that of the Authority executive. (For full text see *Sudan Daily*, 28, 29 Nov.)

**Opposition's Reaction.** *The New York Times* summarized the opposition's reactions as follows: "The complaint of the opposition is that the plan proposes less democratic rule for the provinces than they had enjoyed in the last twenty years of British rule. The Mahdi said that the government was proposing "a backward step." "Our people are capable of electing their council members," he declared. "They are used to it, and local elections worked from 1937 to 1958." (*NYT*, 11 Dec)

### SUDANIZATION CAMPAIGN

The "Sudanization" campaign (*Sawdanah*) was mainly directed to the South (see pp 418-9), but it was also perceptible in the country as a whole. Sudanization generally meant Arabization and Islamization.

**Translation of Laws.** In Feb an Egyptian expert started the translation of the Sudanese laws from English into Arabic. He said that it was not only a question of translation, but also of introducing terms and concepts common to the Arab countries. (*Zaman*, 17 Feb) In Sept he completed the translation of the criminal laws and the penal code. (*Sudan Daily*, 21 Sept)

**Sudanization of Personnel.** In Jan it was decided that fifty foreign engineers would be dismissed on the return of a group of Sudanese engineers from abroad. (*Ayyam*, 13 Jan; *Sudan al-Jadid*, 24 Jan) It was also announced that when the terms of office of the foreign judges expired they would not be renewed, and that Arabic would replace English in the courts. (*Ruz al-Yusuf*, 21 Nov)

**Islamic Mission Work.** Islamic missionaries, mostly active in the South, also worked in the Nuba hills in Kordofan Province, where they received the Governor's active support. (*Sudan Daily*, 8 Nov)

## THE GOVERNMENT AND THE OPPOSITION

### COMMUNIST ACTIVITIES; ARREST AND TRIAL OF SUBVERSIVE ELEMENTS

[After the attempted coup d'état of Nov 1959 (five of whose participants were executed), many political suspects, especially Communists and Communist sympathizers, were detained. Some were still in prison in 1960, and further arrests of Communists were made throughout the year. A few others who expressed anti-government sentiments were also detained. On the other hand, the wish of the authorities to win the favour of the public induced them to show leniency. Besides the courts showed their independence and frequently acquitted those accused of expressing anti-government sentiments.]

**Arrest of Communists.** All through the year arrests were made, mostly of people accused of possessing and distributing Communist leaflets. In Atbara, the labour centre, arrests were particularly numerous, including workers, officials, teachers and students. Six members of the dissolved Anti-imperialist Front (the Communist front organization) were arrested there in July. Sometimes groups were detained, e.g. six students of a veterinary school were arrested in June for being in possession of Communist leaflets and founding a society to aid the families of political prisoners. In June 15 persons, including teachers and officials, were detained in the town of Shendi, in the Northern Province, after Communist leaflets had



been distributed. (*Zaman*, 4 Jan; *Sudan al-Jadid*, 5 Jan; *Sarahah*, 17 Mar, 23, 28 Apr; *Sudan al-Jadid*, 20 June; *Zaman*, 15 June; *Sarahah*, 20 June, 3 July; *Ayyam*, 26 Aug) During the last months of the year, which was a period of unrest, comparatively hard sentences were passed, e.g. two persons found guilty of "alleged Communist activity" received four years' imprisonment and three received two years (which were reduced to two years and one respectively). (*Morning News*, 11 Nov) [For release of Communists, see below.]

**Goodwill Gestures of Government, Release of Communists.** At the end of 1959 workers presented a petition to the government calling for the release of nine former trade union leaders who had been detained. On 15 Feb 1960 they were found guilty, as it was decided that the petition contained opposition to the government, but in view of personal factors they were only fined. (*Sudan al-Jadid*, 16 Feb) On 18 July the High Court repealed their conviction and acquitted them. (*Zaman*, 19 July)

An example of a goodwill gesture by the government was the decision to pay pensions to the families of the executed or imprisoned officers. (*Sarahah*, 24 Feb) The release of prisoners was also used to secure goodwill. This was done on special occasions such as the Id al-Fitr (holiday) (*Ra'y al-Amm*, 24 Mar), and also after the wave of demonstrations and petitions at the end of the year, when 62 Communist internees were released. (*Morning News*, 15 Dec) In May Dr Izz ad-Din Ali Amir, the former head of the dissolved Anti-imperialist Front [who had been detained after the revolution and released in Sept 1959] was permitted to go abroad for health reasons. (*Morning News*, 19 May)

**Independence of Courts Demonstrated.** On 14 Apr a former active member of the NUP was arrested and charged with having tried to dissuade people from participating in a festival in honour of Abbud and the military regime. (*Zaman*, 31 May) The Court not only acquitted him but reprimanded the police for the way it had acted in the matter. (*Zaman*, 1 June; *Sarahah*, 3 June)

**Prisoners Unruly.** The political prisoners embarked on hunger strikes, which became known to the public through the Press. Such a strike in Sept ended only after the Minister of Interior himself had talked to the prisoners in the hospital to which they had been transferred. [Information on this topic is fragmentary.] (*Sarahah*, 3 June; *Zaman*, 14 June; *Sudan Daily*, 20 Sept)

#### MAY-SEPT: STIRRINGS OF POLITICAL OPPOSITION

During the first months of the year the only matter in which politicians and dissolved parties were openly concerned were the settlement of the latter's property and debts. (*Zaman*, 13 Apr; *MENA*, 4 Apr-BBC, 6 Apr; *Sarahah*, 22 May; *MENA*, 25 May-BBC, 27 May) In May, a declaration by Sadiq al-Mahdi, leader of the Ansar sect, made it clear that he was suspected of opposition activity. In June-July the former premiers, Abdullah Khalil and Isma'il al-Azhari, broke the silence which they had maintained since the coup d'état.

**May: Declaration by Imām Sadiq al-Mahdi.** On 17 May a declaration was issued by the Imām Sadiq al-Mahdi to all his followers (the Ansar), [with the obvious purpose of clarifying his attitude to the govern-

ment after rumours about his activities]. It included three points:

1. Various meetings between the Imām and some citizens had dealt with maintaining religious studies and were meant for the benefit of the whole nation. [No particulars of these meetings were published.]
2. There was no basis for the rumours claiming that there were candidates for the Presidency of the Republic [denying a rumour that he himself was a candidate for the presidency?].
3. The Imām, like his late father, (who died in 1959), supported the present regime. (*Ayyam*, 18 May; *Zaman*, 18 May)

**July: Khalil Quoted as Opposing Arab Nationalism and Abdel-Nasser.** On 10 July a Sudanese paper reported an interview with Abdullah Khalil by an ANA reporter, broadcast by the BBC. Khalil had said that efforts were being made to permit a form of democratic rule in Sudan suitable to the country's conditions. In the past, Sudan had adopted the English pattern of democracy and failed, because of the basic difference between the two countries. He was not an Arab but a Nubian, and did not believe in Arab Nationalism, as it represented the rule of the strong over the weak. He attacked Abdel-Nasser, comparing his way of building the Aswan dam to the way the Pyramids were erected. (*Zaman*, 11 July)

*Sarahah*, the pro-government daily, asked who had permitted him to make statements and urged the government to prevent him from sowing intrigue and distrust. (*Sarahah*, 11 July) Abdullah Khalil replied in a letter to the paper that the BBC had distorted his words. Actually, he said: (1) He had praised the Revolutionary Government for its efforts to find a type of democracy which would suit the country's position and nature of the people; (2) He was not absolutely against Arab nationalism but personally felt closer to Islamic and African unity; (3) He did not disapprove of Abdel-Nasser; all he had said was that he was one of the great rulers of Egypt remembered by history for their gigantic buildings, but while they had achieved what they did at the expense of the people's sufferings, Abdel-Nasser was doing so with his people's approval. (*Sarahah*, 12 July)

**July: Al-Azhari: Sudanese are Democratic.** In July, following Khalil's statement, another former Premier, Isma'il al-Azhari, repudiated the idea that democracy had failed in Sudan. He claimed that the Sudanese were democratic in character and respected the principle of elections. (*Zaman*, 12 July)

**July: Government Warning to Politicians and Press.** On 13 July Abdullah Khalil and Isma'il Azhari were summoned to the Minister of Interior, who warned them not to indulge in political controversy or to communicate with the Press and news agencies in regard to the governmental system and activities. He also warned the Press not to mention politicians and their opinions. In conclusion, the Minister declared that the government was determined to go ahead with what it thought would best serve the interests of the citizens and the country, and would deal severely with anyone attempting to oppose it. (*Sudan Daily*, 14 July)

**July: Affair Regarded as Decisive Showdown with Politicians.** *Sarahah* wrote that the Minister of the Interior's declaration was "of great importance. It utterly destroys repeated rumours that ex-politicians enjoy power that prevents the Revolutionary Government... taking ac-

tion that will bring them to their senses and keep them in their place... Were it not for this clear and determined attitude of the Revolutionary Government, the respect for it would have weakened and the status seekers would have had an opportunity to creep back and to replace order with anarchy... Compared with punishment meted out by similar governments when they came to power, our government was too generous. Politicians were not detained, their properties were not confiscated, and the mention of their corruption by the masses was prohibited." (*Sarahah*, 14 July; *Sudan Daily*, 15 July)

#### THE WADI HALFA ISSUE—DEMONSTRATION AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT

**The Re-settlement Problem.** The area of Wadi Halfa was to be flooded as a part of the Aswan High Dam project of the UAR. The Sudanese government agreed to this as part of the Sudanese-UAR Nile Water Agreement of 8 Nov 1959. The agreement provided for the payment of LE15 million (over a period of four years, starting in Jan 1960) for the re-settlement of the area's inhabitants. The latter, numbering some 52,000 (*Economist*, 29 Nov), are Nubians; they have a strong sense of ethnic unity and speak their own language.

**Mar-Aug: Choice of Re-settlement Area.** From the beginning the Sudanese government was reported to have been anxious for the Nubians to choose the Khashm al-Girba (al-Qirbah) area on the Atbara river for re-settlement. It was already planned to irrigate a million acres in this area, 125 thousand of which the Nubians could usefully occupy. However, President Abbud promised the Nubians that they could settle where they liked, and the government offered four other areas, all on the Nile: north of Khartoum; in the Gazira; near Sennar; and in Dongola province. In the spring a Nubian delegation was touring the Sudan in search of a suitable area.

Da'ud Abd al-Latif, Governor of Kassala province and a native of Wadi Halfa, was appointed chairman of a special committee to deal with the problems arising in the Sudan as a result of the High Dam. He was said to have "done his best to persuade his hard-headed kinsmen that moving from the banks of the Nile is advantageous as well as necessary." (*Economist*, 21 May, see also *NYHT*, 18 Mar; *Ra'y al-Amm*, 28 Mar)

However, the Nubians were reported to be opposed to the transfer from the Nile banks; they feared that they would lose everything and gain nothing. (*NYHT*, 18 Mar; *Sarahah*, 6 July) At the beginning of Aug the Abd al-Latif committee reported that the Wadi Halfa delegation had opted for the region south of Khartoum; a few had agreed to other sites but not one had voted for Khashm al-Girba. (*Sarahah*, 8 Aug; *Morning News*, 24 Oct)

**Oct: Government Decides on Khashm al-Girba.** In spite of the committee's report, the government decided on Khashm al-Girba as the re-settlement area, and its decision was announced in Wadi Halfa on 22 Oct. A ministerial delegation toured Wadi Halfa to explain the reasons for the choice and convince the people of its advantages. Tal'at Farid, the Minister of Information and Labour, called on the Nubians to sacrifice sentimental and material considerations for the common cause and the public interest, while other Ministers promised facilities in many fields. (*Sudan Daily*, 24 Oct)

**Oct: Widespread Demonstrations.** Demonstrations started in the Wadi Halfa area following the above announce-

ment. According to an official statement, "at 2 p.m. (23 Oct) some agitators attempted to make trouble but they were dispersed by the police without using force." (*Morning News*, 24 Oct)

[The following account is based on rather fragmentary information, as the Sudanese Press did not publish detailed descriptions, and the foreign Press did not cover the events extensively.]

On 26 Oct a demonstration took place in Khartoum. According to the official statement, "a number of university students and some of the people of Wadi Halfa" demonstrated, shouting slogans. They were met by police and ordered to disperse; they refused, "the police had to use tear gas," and the demonstrators dispersed, but no one was injured. "The police was able to separate demonstrating women from the men before using tear gas against the men." (*Morning News*, 27 Oct) It was noted that for the first time many women (from Wadi Halfa) took part in a demonstration. (*Rus al-Yusuf*, 21 Nov) The demonstrators included prominent people such as Muhammad Tawfiq, Commissioner of Labour, and the wife of the official in charge of the resettlement. (*Morning News*, 11 Nov)

Besides Wadi Halfans, students formed the main part of the demonstrators, shouting slogans against the Sudanese-Egyptian Nile Waters Agreement and the 17 Nov Revolution. (*Morning News*, 4 Nov)

Students of secondary schools failed to attend classes. [Cases of absence attained probably serious proportions.] The Minister of Education issued a statement saying that disciplinary action had been taken against the students and that they had immediately returned to school. Schools would be always kept open for those wishing to continue study. The authorities would not hesitate to punish any breach of discipline. (*Sudan Daily*, 2 Nov)

Other demonstrations were staged in Atbara, the industrial and trade union centre. Trade Union leaders were among the demonstrators, who had to be dispersed by tear gas. (*Morning News*, 29 Oct, 11 Nov)

From news about arrests and trials it can be gathered that demonstrations also took place in Port Sudan and Kosti. (*Morning News*, 2 Nov)

**Oct-Nov: The Government's Reaction.** As soon as trouble broke out, Wadi Halfa was placed under martial law and its communications with the rest of Sudan were cut. (*Economist*, 19 Nov) Twenty people were reported injured in clashes with the police. Many demonstrators were arrested: about 50 in Khartoum and 28 in Atbara. (*Daily Telegraph*, 5 Nov; *Morning News*, 27, 29 Oct, 11 Nov)

The Khartoum Branch of Cairo University was closed by the University authorities following meetings and demonstrations by the students. (*Morning News*, 29 Oct) The Vice-Chancellor of Khartoum University decided to dissolve the students union and close down their club. When the students protested, the police were called to disperse them. Three leaders of the students union were dismissed from the university. (*Morning News*, 4, 8, 13 Nov) Several secondary schools, such as Wadi Siedna and Atbara secondary schools, were closed down, and 24 students were dismissed from the Egyptian secondary school in Khartoum.

The trials of the arrested demonstrators in the different parts of Sudan were held in camera. The sentences passed were comparatively light [possibly because the country was calm again and the government did not wish to aggravate the situation]. The Khartoum demonstrators were fined and released, while in Atbara some were sentenced to fifteen days in jail and others received sus-

pending prison sentences. (*Morning News*, 4, 11 Nov) Several university students were sentenced to be flogged. The Press reacted demanding the abolition of flogging and the suspension of the sentence. (*Morning News*, 11 Nov)

**Nov: Further Demonstrations.** [It is difficult to conclude to what extent Abdel-Nasser's visit to Sudan (15-25 Nov) caused further demonstrations, as reported by Jordanian and Lebanese sources (see p 159).]

The *Morning News* reported on 10 Dec the trial "last week" of railway workers and Trade Union leaders for leading a demonstration in Atbara and shouting anti-government slogans. (*Morning News*, 10 Dec)

#### NOV-DEC: POLITICIANS PETITION AGAINST MILITARY RULE

In the wake of the growing political unrest, culminating in the Wadi Halfa demonstrations, the politicians opposed to the government formed an ad-hoc coalition and presented a petition calling for the army to be sent back to barracks and the government to be handed over, wholly or partially, to civilians.

**Nov: Preparations for Petition.** The politicians' preparations were not kept secret. On 8 Nov, Wilton Wynn of AP, reporting from Cairo, quoted sources in the Sudan as saying that "the three strongest political parties in the country plan to serve Abbud a virtual ultimatum around 25 Nov to pull the army back into the barracks and to permit parliamentary life to resume." He added that the politicians intended to wait till that date to avoid a crisis during the visit to Sudan of Abdel-Nasser starting on 15 Nov. The coalition was being formed of the Ummah Party [Sadiq al-Mahdi, Abdullah Khalil], the People's Democratic Party [Ali al-Mirghani, Ali Abd ar-Rahman] and the National Unionist Party [al-Azhari], the three major parties in the former regime. (*AP*, 8 Nov) [This coalition, comprising as it did the major mutually opposed religious sects (Ummah Party = Ansar; PDP = Khatmiyah) was soon to show signs of internal dissension.] The Khatmiyah sect hesitated [it enjoyed comparatively close relations with the Military Government, some of whose members belonged to the sect]. Khartoum was full of rumours about the Khatmiyah's position. (*Ruz al-Yusuf*, 21 Nov)

**29 Nov: Presentation of Petition.** On 29 Nov over 20 Sudanese political leaders, headed by al-Mahdi, al-Azhari and Khalil, appealed to President Abbud to end the state of emergency, restore members of the army to their normal duties, and pave the way for the restoration of popular freedom. They declared that government is not a function of the army, and called for country-wide elections, followed by the formulation of a permanent constitution by a new parliament. (*Reuters*, 30 Nov; *Mid. Mirror*, 3 Dec) As a first step, the government should be handed over to a national committee. (*NYT*, 11 Dec)

Ali al-Mirghani, the Khatmiyah leader, and his PDP followers did not join the other politicians, mainly belonging to the Ummah Party and the NUP, who were believed to be aiming at some sort of compromise with

the military in the future. *The New York Times* wrote: "The Mahdi and other opposition leaders agree that the Sudan should not be returned to the former republican leaders and the parliamentary government. He said: 'But we should work some kind of civilian rule and popular government' and added: 'General Abbud always told me that was his intention.'" (*NYT*, 11 Dec)

**Nov-Dec: The Government's Reaction:** Within 24 hours of the receipt of the memorandum, the Minister of Interior warned the Press not to mention or comment on it. (*Mid. Mirror*, 3 Dec)

General Farid, the Minister of Information, was quoted as saying that "the army would ignore the manifesto." Asked whether the Supreme Council would take measures against the signatories, he replied: "We have our special method for dealing with such a situation." (*Reuters*, 1 Dec quoting *Akhbar*, Cairo)

An immediate step (taken on 5 Dec) against al-Azhari and Khalil was the termination of the £S100 monthly pensions they had been receiving as former Premiers. (*Sudan Daily*, 6 Dec)

**Nov-Dec: Memoranda and Delegations in Support of Military Regime.** On 30 Nov a memorandum was sent to the government, signed by Sudanese personalities "including lawyers, engineers, teachers and workers," denouncing the politicians as agents of imperialism and blaming them for the recent riots. The memorandum called for the former politicians to be barred by law from political activity. (*R. Cairo*, 30 Nov-BBC, 2 Dec)

Another memorandum, signed by forty former Ministers and Members of Parliament, listed the achievements of the Military Regime and claimed that the "imperialist activities against Sudan" had been caused by Abbud's visits to Yugoslavia and the UAR, which aroused the imperialist circles. As a proof, attention was drawn to the fact that Wynn, the American journalist, had been the first to mention that the petition was to be submitted (see above), and also to the hostile articles in the Western Press. The leaders of the Revolution were asked to ignore the petition, as its objectives and evil purposes were clear. (*MENA*, 4 Dec-BBC, 6 Dec) During Dec the Press and radio reported a wave of delegations to Abbud or his Ministers pledging their support for the regime. (*Sudan Daily*, 7, 8, 9, 11, 13, 15, 16 Dec; BBC, 8, 12 Dec)

**Dec: Government Determined to Stay in Power.** The Minister of Information made public the following statement by President Abbud: "We have taken over the government of the country to implement the will of the people. We are therefore not ready to quit before the Revolutionary Government attains its goals, and completes the schemes which it has laid down for development on behalf of the citizens. The government has to further the aims of consolidating national unity and ensuring a highly respected place for the Sudan in the international community." The Minister added: "The Revolution will remain and will eliminate everyone who stands in, or attempts to obstruct its way, as long as this is the will of the people." (*Sudan Daily*, 9 Dec; *R. Umdurman*, 8 Dec-BBC, 10 Dec)



## THE SOUTHERN SUDAN QUESTION

## BACKGROUND NOTE AND SYNOPSIS

Southern Sudan includes the three tropical provinces: Bahr El Ghazal, Equatoria, and Upper Nile, the inhabitants of which are given as 2,784,440 out of a total population of 10,262,674. The southern tribes are stated to number 3,056,000. There are ethnic, linguistic and religious differences between the northern and southern Sudanese. The Southerners are "Hamitic" Africans, few of whom speak Arabic, while the North is predominantly "Semitic" and Arab. Of the 2,428,703 Animists and 206,295 Christians (162,745 of whom are Catholics) the great majority are Southerners. (All figures according to *The Middle East 1961*, Europa Publications, London.)

The South is governed by the Arabs of the North, and in the past separatist tendencies have developed in the area. The feeling among the Northerners is that these tendencies were kindled by "imperialists," i.e. Britain. On the eve of Sudan's independence, a rebellion broke out among the southern military units, which was suppressed with great difficulty. Most of the rebels were not caught, and remained a source of unrest.

Before the revolution, the Southerners were represented in parliament by a few politicians, on the whole lacking popular backing, most of whom disappeared from the scene after the military coup d'état. Some, with separatist tendencies, were imprisoned. The only Southerner in the Cabinet was Santino Deng Teng, who held the Ministry of Animal Resources. The Revolutionary Government embarked on the Sudanization (*Sawdanah*) of the South. (The governments of independent Sudan before the revolution also concerned themselves with this question, but little action was taken.) Sudanization proceeded in 1960 along the following lines: strengthening of public security; changing of animist habits; dissemination of the Arabic language; restrictions on the work of the Christian missionaries, and the spreading of Islam.

## PACIFYING THE SOUTH

**Jan-Feb: Remnants of 1955 Rebellion.** According to a review of the situation in *as-Sarāhah* on 22 Feb, the effects of the 1955 rebellion were still apparent. The South was now calm, the paper claimed, but a few rebels and deserters were still at large. The authorities, however, had succeeded in arousing the tribes against them; whereas the tribes had previously harboured them, they now drove them away or killed them. Some of the rebels had found refuge in Uganda, but now a few had begun to give themselves up; those who were judged by military courts received light prison sentences because of the progressive nature of the regime. [The comparatively light sentences were apparently intended to help in restoring peace in the South.] The frontier zone, the paper said, was now being purged of the remaining rebels by the Uganda police and the Sudanese Army. (*Sarahah*, 22 Feb)

**Mar-Aug: Other Signs of Unrest.** On 14 Mar the Khartoum police arrested a Southerner who threatened the Northerners with a new rebellion in the South as soon as the leaders in prison were freed. (*Sudan al-Jadid*, 5 Mar) In May it was stated that the Uganda authorities had caught and extradited to Sudan one of the rebel leaders, and that two rebels had been sentenced to death. (*Ra'y al-Amm*, 11 May) In Aug it was announced that "a Sultan" (unidentified) had been sentenced by a court in Juba, Southern Sudan, to 17 years imprisonment for assisting a rebel gang to disrupt communications between

Malakal and two centres in the Upper Nile province, as well as other anti-state activities. (*MENA*, 21 Aug-BBC, 23 Aug)

**Dec: The Government and the Tribal Chiefs.** In Dec, eighteen Sultans and Chiefs from the South visited the North on a tour arranged by the government. Addressing President Abbud in the name of the group, Sultan Cheer Riham of Gogrial, praised the military regime for its action in the South and mentioned especially the improved security, the lack of which had hitherto been "the chronic political disease" of the region. He concluded: "We now rule our subjects on your behalf under serene civil circumstances in the discharge of our duties." (*Sudan Daily*, 2 Dec)

**Oct: Development of the South:** In Oct, the government decided to equalize wages in the South gradually with those in the North, starting on 1 Oct. [The announcement did not make it clear how this order was to be enforced.]

Tal'at Farid commenting on this decision, spoke of development projects; the building of rail connections between the North and the South was already under way, and the government had taken various decisions to improve existing economic schemes in the South. (*Sudan Daily*, 5 Oct)

## SUDANIZATION AND THE SPREADING OF ISLAM

**Abbud's Visit to the South: Campaign Against Nudity.** In Jan Abbud visited the South accompanied by some of the Ministers. Many ceremonies and festivals were held in his honour, and he distributed presents among the chieftains. (*Zaman*, 16 Jan; *Nil*, 15 Jan) At the same time a campaign, spearheaded by Tal'at Farid and *as-Sarāhah*, was launched to make the inhabitants wear clothes. During his visit to the South Abbud distributed a thousand garments to the people. (*Sarahah*, 6, 16, 19, 20, 21, 25 Jan) The Muslim missionaries joined the campaign, and together with the recent converts tried to persuade people to wear clothes. According to the Grand Qadi, the results were "remarkable." (*Morning News*, 1 Nov)

**Disseminating the Arabic Language.** [Most of the Southerners do not know Arabic and speak a variety of African languages and dialects, while the educated few usually speak English. The spreading of Islam helps the spreading of Arabic.]

The Sudanese Government sent Arabic teachers and experts to the South to spread Arabic. It intended to train Arabic teachers from among the Southerners themselves. (*Sudan al-Jadid*, 25 Apr)

At a tribal gathering in Equatoria the Governor spoke in Arabic and said that he would not speak to them in English any more. The people must understand that the British had left the country and today there was an independent Sudan whose language was Arabic. He added that the time had come for the missionaries to teach the New Testament in Arabic, like the Christians in Egypt, Lebanon and other Arab states. (*Sudan al-Jadid*, 2 May)

Addressing the Sultans and southern leaders who had come to Khartoum to attend the anniversary celebrations of the revolution, Abbud urged them to promote the Arabic language in the South as a means of fostering



culture and understanding with the citizens in the North. Abbud said that although there were various dialects in the North, the citizens there spoke Arabic. The Sultans and leaders welcomed this appeal and promised to comply. (*MENA*, 3 Dec-BBC, 7 Dec)

**The Spreading of Islam.** Efforts to spread Islam in the South were intensified in 1960. The Press published news items about the conversion of Southerners to Islam. (*Sarahah*, 17 May) It was claimed that during the first four months of the year some 4,000 were converted (*Zaman*, 27 May), including most of the tribal leaders. (*Morning News*, 31 Oct)

Events connected with Islamic activity in the South received wide Press publicity, as, for example, the inauguration of a mosque and Islamic school in Juba (*Ra'y al-Amm*, 14 Apr), and the laying of the corner-stone of a mosque in Equatoria. (*Sarahah*, 20 Apr)

**Government Activities.** The government played a large part directly in Islamic activity. The Religious Affairs Departments sent religious instructors (*Ayyam*, 30 Apr) and allocated £\$100,000 for the building of Islamic schools in the South. (*Morning News*, 24 Sept)

In Oct the Ministry of Information and Labour sent a cultural and religious mission to Torit (Equatoria Province), which was given a public reception. The Military Governor, who welcomed the mission, praised Abbud for raising the banner of Islam. There were other speeches and questions and answers on Islamic subjects. The Torit Islamic Affairs Group (*Jamā'at ash-Shu'ūn al-Islamiya*) was also active during the visit. (*R. Umdurman*, 26 Oct-BBC, 28 Oct)

**Islamic Missionary Activity.** Conversion is mainly the concern of *Jam'iyat at-Tabshir*, a missionary society which has been working in the area since 1950 and raises its funds with the help and encouragement of the authorities. (*Ra'y al-Amm*, 21 June)

In an editorial, *Ra'y al-Amm* analyzed the problem and ways of spreading Islam. The missionaries had to deal with three main groups:

(1) A minority who had served in the army and mixed with people from other regions; these spoke Arabic; (2) those who spoke broken Arabic; (3) the majority, who knew no Arabic at all.

The third group was the most difficult, and before the Muslim missionaries could start their work, they had to learn the different local dialects.

The Muslim missionary worked along the following lines: (1) He taught in a simple, basic way the existence of God; (2) He told the people about the Prophet; (3) He taught the *Sūrat al-Fātihah* (the opening chapter of the Qur'ān) and the prayers; (4) After the pupil had learnt by heart at least ten *Sūrah*s, the study of reading and writing was started.

The necessary institutions were built by the missionaries in this order (1) a *Khalwah* (prayer place) or *Madrasah* (school) for teaching the potential converts; (2) a mosque; (3) buildings for the teachers; (4) workshops for teaching the inhabitants a profession. (*Ra'y al-Amm*, 21 June)

#### CURB ON ACTIVITIES OF CHRISTIAN MISSIONARIES

**Expulsion of Missionaries.** The expulsion of missionaries started before 1960, but it was intensified during the year. Twenty missionaries were reported to have been expelled "during the past three years" (*Universe*, Lon-

don, 8 Mar), and expulsions continued until the end of the year. Among reasons given by the authorities were: opposition to the transfer of the day of rest from Sunday to Friday (*Zaman*, 20 Feb; *Ra'y al-Amm*, 10 May); disrespect for the Qur'ān (*Sarahah*, 9, 10 Feb); involvement in a car accident (*Universe*, 8 Mar); attempts to convert Muslims inside a mosque (*Ra'y al-Amm*, 7 Oct.) See also *Vatican Radio*, 14 Nov-BBC, 16 Nov; *Daily Telegraph*, 17 Feb, 29 Dec.

**Entry of New Missionaries Prohibited.** In May it was reported that the government had refused applications by American missionaries to enter Sudan because of the government's policy "to Sudanize all foreign missions now in the country and not to allow any new missionaries to work in it, either at present or in the future." (*Sarahah*, 25 May)

**1959-1960: Limiting the Scope of Missionary Work.** The declared policy of the Sudan is to limit missionary work to purely religious functions. All missionary schools have been brought under government control. (*Economist*, 19 Nov) In 1959, 79 such schools were taken over by the government. (*Anba as-Sudan*, 28 Jan) According to a British Catholic weekly the missionaries were ordered to close down their bookshops and all other "business" enterprises, and prevented from tending the sick. (*Universe*, 29 July) Another source also reported that several medical missions had been told that they must not treat patients, although there were often no other doctors or nurses near. (*Economist*, 19 Nov)

It was also reported that local chiefs in the South had been ordered to choose between Islam and Christianity. They would receive favour or disfavour accordingly.

Christian parents in the South were reportedly told to apply in writing for written permission before they could have their children baptized as Christians. (*Universe*, 29 July)

**1960: Fixing Friday as Day of Rest.** Sunday was the day of rest in the South, but in Feb a governmental decree fixed Friday as the official rest day. This act caused unrest among the southern Christians and in Feb three missionaries were expelled from Sudan because they had called on the people to oppose it. (*Zaman*, 20 Feb)

The Governor of Equatoria said that the act did not violate "the freedom of Christian religious principles," and that Christian officials would be permitted to leave their offices in order to attend religious ceremonies. In Sudan the day of rest was Friday, he said, and there was no justification for imposing Sunday on the majority while Christians constituted only ten per cent of the population of the South according to figures given by the missionaries. It had taken 60 years to Christianize these ten per cent with the aid of foreign rulers, and 500 years would therefore be required to Christianize the whole of the South. The government did not ask the Christians to stop praying on Sundays, but in the North Christians also worked on Sundays and rested on Fridays like the majority of the population. Even Christ had advised: "Render unto Caesar that which is Caesar's and unto God that which is God's." (*Sarahah*, 28 Mar)

A British Catholic paper expressed understanding of Sudanese policy in this respect. It was not "unnatural... even if very awkward." The Sudanese Government sought unity in this matter and naturally chose Friday. (*Catholic Times*, London, 26 Feb)

Leaflets opposing the measure appeared in a few southern secondary schools. (*Ra'y al-Amm*, 10 May) A student strike broke out; it was ended only with difficulty, and students were flogged on returning to school. (*Ayyam*, 9 May)

In Dec it was reported that a Sudanese priest and four students had been sentenced to 12 years and 10 years respectively for protesting against the measure and calling for a boycott of Sunday work. (*Universe*, 16 Dec; *Daily Telegraph*, 29 Dec)

**Sudanization of the Church; Contacts with the Vatican.** At the beginning of Mar, a special representative of the Vatican met the Sudanese authorities in Khartoum. He was reported to have agreed that the priests should not interfere in politics and promised to train Sudanese priests as soon as possible. (*Ra'y al-Amm*, 3 Mar) *As-Sarāhah*, welcoming the visitor, said that the government was only exercising its rights in taking over education and unifying the day of rest, but at the same time it did not permit any infringement of religious freedom. The aim should be, as the representative agreed, to Sudanize church posts and the paper called for an early execution of the plan. (*Sarāhah*, 3 Mar) It was reported that 19 Sudanese were currently studying at the Vati-

can and it had been promised that more would join them. (*Ra'y al-Amm*, 20 Mar)

**Views on Sudanese Policy.** *The Universe* and *The Daily Telegraph* attributed to the Sudanese Government the intention to "stamp out Christianity." (*Universe*, 18, 26 Feb, 26 July, 16 Dec; *Daily Telegraph*, 17 Feb)

*The Catholic Times*, linking the problem with the situation in Africa in general, said that the expectations of some missionaries and native clergy that the fulfilment of African national ambitions would make things easier for the church had been proved unfounded. (*Catholic Times*, 26 Feb)

*The Economist* regarded this drive as part of the government's programme for integrating or Arabizing the Negro and Nilotite tribes. (*Economist*, 19 Nov)

A Sudanese source claimed that the missionaries were the colonialist's accomplices and that they had been working under the protection of imperialism as a bulwark against the penetration of Islam. (*Ra'y al-Amm*, 7 May, 9 Nov)

Ali Baldu, Governor of Equatoria, said the missionaries were helping southern politicians who used to wield influence in parliament before the Revolution. (*ANA*, 14 Dec-BBC 16 Dec)

## INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

### SYNOPSIS

(NOTE: References are given only to events not described in this chapter.)

The Abbud government's official foreign policy was positive neutralism, but its interpretation of this policy was different from that of its neighbour, the UAR: it sought to avoid involvements which could lead to tension. In the government's communications to the people, however, it was possible to discern a tendency to stress Sudan's activity in foreign affairs after the Revolution, which, it was claimed, had gained her an honoured place among the nations.

The policy of positive neutralism found expression in the strengthening of relations with Yugoslavia, the UAR and Ethiopia; in support for the admission of Communist China to the UN (diplomatic relations had been established after the Sudanese Revolution); in the strengthening of relations with the USSR, including the acceptance by Abbud of an invitation to visit Russia (see p 79); in the repeated insistence on aid from the USA being unconditional; in the voting in the UN, which was mostly identical with that of the UAR (see p 14 ff). The government made it clear that it expected its neutralist policy to result in unconditional and extensive aid from East, West and the neutral powers.

Sudan's relations with Yugoslavia, which had perhaps become closer than with any other non-African country, deserve special mention. In 1960, Abbud paid a state visit to Yugoslavia in return for President Tito's visit to Sudan in 1959.

In the sphere of relations with Sudan's neighbours, the policy was identification with both the Arab world and Africa. However, there was a rather more pronounced identification with Africa, both with African nationalism and with the coloured peoples as against the white. For example, Abbud, speaking at an Arab League forum in Cairo, mentioned African nationalism but not Arab nationalism. On the other hand, Sudan expressed support

for Arab unity (as distinct from union) and for the Arab causes from Oman to Palestine and Algeria. Compare Views and Policies on Africa, below, with those on inter-Arab relations, pp 122-3). Sudan took part in the routine activities of the Arab League, without, however, demonstrating any initiative or becoming embroiled in inter-Arab rivalries (see p 115 ff). She also took part in the Afro-Asian and African political and economic congresses (except for the All-African Peoples' Conference in Accra, and the Abidjan and Brazzaville conferences), but again, no special Sudanese initiative was reported (see p 22 ff.)

Cordial relations developed further between Sudan and neighbouring Ethiopia, and state visits were exchanged between Abbud and the Ethiopian Emperor. During the rebellion in Ethiopia, Abbud expressed his support of Haile Selassie.

Friendly relations also developed with Sudan's northern neighbour, the UAR, which were again expressed by an exchange of state visits (see pp 155-6). Sudan's relations with Saudi Arabia seemed to have been untowardly affected by a diplomatic incident towards the end of the year.

The Sudanese Government's policy of avoiding involvement in conflict was expressed in its failure to follow the UAR's lead in the latter's conflict with Iran (see pp 155, 218), and in the Congo question. The latter was crucial for Sudan as for the African countries in general in regard to orientation in world affairs (as proved e.g., by Ghana's change of policy and the formation of the Casablanca bloc). Sudan remained neutral and reportedly withstood UAR and USSR pressure to permit the transfer of military equipment to the Gizenga government in Congo. Throughout the crisis the government supported the United Nations, as it did on other questions, and diverged from the UAR line of voting at the UN (see pp 34-5, 37-8).

## VIEWS AND POLICIES: SUDAN IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

(For Sudanese views and policies on inter-Arab relations, see pp 122-3.)

### SUDAN'S PLACE AMONG THE NATIONS

**Sudan's Central Position in Africa.** President Abbud in Belgrade, 10 July: "The geographical situation of the Sudan as a link between the North and South of Africa and the ecological affinities which attach its people to almost all the ethnological groups, North, South, East and West, have associated it with the national aspirations of non-independent African countries and made it support and enhance African nationalism." (*Sudan Daily*, 11 July)

**Sudan—African and Islamic.** Ziyadah Arbāb, Minister of Education, 6 July: "The Sudan will stand by the side of her African and Islamic neighbouring states. She will offer her cultural and educational assistance within her capacity." (*Sudan Daily*, 7 July)

**Sudan's Respected Position in the World.** General Tal'at Farid, 4 Sept: "The Sudan is now the target of many delegations from all friendly countries... It will receive even more delegations, ... and every Sudanese should be proud of this; as these delegations come to our country because of our respected position in the international field and to become acquainted with our internal system of government. It is indeed a good situation, which emphasizes world confidence in us, and make all nations who believe our words, our friends." (*Sudan Daily*, 5 Sept)

### POLICIES ON WORLD AFFAIRS

**The Policy: Positive Neutralism.** Abbud, 28 July: "No sooner had the Revolution Government assumed power than it set to work, and in less than two weeks declared its foreign policy, positive neutrality, support of world peace, combating of imperialism and the support of national movements in all parts of the world. This went side by side with our respect for the independence of other countries and our refusal to interfere in their internal policies" [continued below.]

**Positive Neutralism in Action.** Abbud, 28 July: "The Revolution Government interpreted its words by deeds, when it announced its recognition of the Peoples' Republic of China, accepted unconditional American aid and welcomed political and economic delegations from all nations of the world, having only at heart the country's interests. Our diplomatic missions abroad, acting in accordance with our clear foreign policy, emphasized our aims and purposes in the international sphere; thus winning the world's confidence and respect, which enabled us, on many occasions, to take the lead in world affairs. The effect of this sound policy on internal affairs was great—our relations with world nations have been developed and we have concluded economic, trade and cultural agreements with many of them, for we have taken into consideration only our country's interests.

"In support of this policy... we have encouraged the exchange of visits on the highest level. We received at

the beginning of the Revolution two leaders of positive neutrality, President Tito, a sincere friend of the Sudan, and H.I.M. Emperor Haile Selassie...

"We agreed to accept two kind invitations extended to the Sudan: the first from President Tito and the second from President Gamal Abdel-Nasser." (*Sudan Daily*, 29 July)

**Unconditional Aid Welcome from All.** Abbud, 5 Feb: "We welcome all aid from other nations, provided it is unconditional and does not infringe upon our independence and sovereignty and does not interfere with our internal or external policies." (*Sudan*, 2 Mar)

### SUDAN AND AFRICA

**Support for National Uprisings.** Abbud at Arab League luncheon, 22 July: "I wish to emphasize that the people and the government of the Sudan will support national uprisings in the African continent, the inhabitants of which are our relatives and neighbours, whose independence we consider as completion of our own, and its colonization a direct menace to our freedom." (*Sudan Daily*, 24 July)

**Confidence in African Nationalism.** Abbud at Arab League luncheon, Cairo 22 July: "Our confidence in African nationalism makes us sure that those countries will safeguard their independence." (*Sudan Daily*, 24 July)

**African Union—a Question for the Future.** Abbud, 5 Feb: "Unions between nations depend on many factors, mainly the wishes of the nations themselves. A union, or several unions, may exist in Africa in the future if its people so wishes and other factors prevailed. However, this question could be left till a suitable time, upon which it was rather difficult to speculate at present." (*Sudan*, 2 Mar)

**On Racial Discrimination.** General Tal'at Farid, 15 Sept: "We, [the Africans?] before other coloured folks all over the world are affected by such discrimination [as practised by the government of South Africa.] When we abhor it, we abhor an act unrecognized by the simplest rules of humanity.

"The last war was waged by the whites alone, but its fuel in all its fields were the coloured people who sacrificed their blood to end it. The least reward they should have is their natural right in equality and freedom in their countries and in the whole world which they saved from an inevitable fate of destruction." (*Sudan Daily*, 16 Sept)

**Africa to Hold the Balance Between the Powers.** Abbud, 5 Nov: "Africa must hold the balance between the power blocs and will have far reaching effect on international policy, not because of her geographical position, but by virtue of her natural resources, numerical strength and revolutionary development. This all depends on the extent of African co-operation and unity of purpose, for the realization of which we must both work unceasingly." (*Sudan Daily*, 6 Nov)

## FOREIGN RELATIONS BY COUNTRIES

(For Sudanese relations with the USSR and the GDR see p 79; with the Arab countries, p 155 ff; Sudan and the Palestine Question, p 175 ff; Sudan in the UN, p 4 ff; foreign aid, pp 51-2; foreign trade, pp 57-8.)

## NATO COUNTRIES

**United States.** US economic aid to Sudan for the fiscal year 1960/61 was fixed at about \$12 million (see pp 51-2), compared with \$30.5 million in 1959. In Dec the Finance Minister, Abd al-Majid Ahmad, said that the Sudan insisted on US aid being unconditional. "We shall accept from this aid whatever suits us and whatever conforms to our policy." (*MENA*, 15 Dec-BBC, 17 Dec)

**United Kingdom.** Colonel Sulaymān Ibrahim was appointed the first Sudanese Military Attaché in London, to be accredited also to Germany and Yugoslavia. (*Times*, 8 Jan) In Aug the Sudanese Government decided to send four police officers to Britain on training courses. (*MENA*, 21 Aug-BBC, 23 Aug)

**German Federal Republic.** In Feb a German economic delegation, including Ministers and Members of Parliament, visited Khartoum. In a joint declaration following the official talks, it emphasized its desire to aid in the development of the Sudan. The financing of major irrigation and agricultural projects was discussed, and the delegation promised technical assistance "in agriculture, culture and industrial fields." (*Sudan al-Jadid*, 3, 6 Feb; *Sudan*, Mar)

In Dec an agreement providing for a German loan of \$23 million was signed in Khartoum. (*CDL*, 4 Jan 1961).

Sudanese Army personnel were studying the manufacture of munitions in Germany. (*Ayyam*, 14 July)

Two police inspectors went to Germany on scholarships offered by the German Government. (*R. Umdurman*, 29 Nov-BBC, 8 Dec)

**France.** French nuclear tests in the Sahara led to official protests and criticism in the Press. (*Sudan al-Jadid*, 15 Feb; *Ra'y al-Amm*, 1 Mar; *Sudan al-Jadid*, 3 Apr; *Ayyam*, 2 Sept)

On 23 Feb a group of French tourists were refused entry visas at the Sudanese embassy in Paris on government orders. (*Sarahah*, 24 Feb)

**Italy.** In Sept, Major-General Ahmad Rida Farid, Minister of Mineral Resources, accompanied by the Italian Ambassador to the Sudan, visited Italy and discussed development projects with the Italian Government. (*Sudan Daily*, 13 Sept; *Ayyam*, 14 Sept) In Nov Sudan accorded the ENI company of Italy preliminary approval for building a refinery in Sudan. (*Financial Times*, 1 Nov)

**The Netherlands.** On 27 Feb Prince Bernhard arrived in Khartoum for a two-day visit, and discussed with the government economic aid from his country. (*Sarahah*, 28 Feb)

**Turkey.** On 11-20 May Major-General Hasan Bashir Nasr and Brigadier Tahir Abd ar-Rahman visited Turkey as guests of the Turkish Government. They devoted most of their time to the Turkish Army. (*Sarahah*, 10, 25 May)

## YUGOSLAVIA

**1959 Development.** After the military coup d'état the relations between the two countries became closer. In Feb 1959 Marshal Tito visited Sudan, and later in the month Yugoslav experts arrived in Khartoum to discuss the implementation of the trade agreement agreed on in principle by the two Presidents.

Sudanese military and cultural delegations visited Yugoslavia in May and June respectively; the latter signed a cultural agreement.

An agreement was signed for Yugoslavia to finance a hides factory and a paper carton factory in Sudan, and for the establishment of a Sudanese-Yugoslav navigation company.

In Dec 1959 a Yugoslav military mission visited Sudan, and an agreement was signed for Sudanese to train in the Yugoslav Navy. (*Sudan News*, *Sudanese Embassy London*, 29 June)

**Jan-Apr 1960.** In Jan it was reported that Sudanese pilots were training in Yugoslavia. (They were still in Yugoslavia in July, when they were visited there by President Abbud, see below.) (*Nil*, 29 Jan)

On 7 Feb 1960, the Yugoslav Minister of Education visited Khartoum and signed an agreement for cultural exchanges between Yugoslavia and Sudan. (*Zaman*, 8 Feb; *Sudan al-Jadid*, 8 Feb)

In Apr, a delegation of Sudanese journalists visited Yugoslavia. On 13 Apr, an agreement was signed for the formation of a Sudanese-Yugoslav shipping company under joint management. (*Sudan News*, as above, 29 June)

**9-19 July: Abbud's Visit to Yugoslavia.** On 9 July President Abbud arrived in Yugoslavia for a state visit, returning Marshal Tito's in Feb 1959, accompanied by ministers, senior army officers and officials. During a ten days' stay he toured the country, visited military bases, and held talks with Marshal Tito in Belgrade and Brioni Island. (*Sudan Daily*, 9, 10, 11, 12, 14, 15 July)

A joint communiqué issued on 20 July resembled that issued in Feb 1959. Its main points were: "In the present situation the non-aligned countries, those that are not directly involved in the cold war, as well as all peaceful forces, should exert utmost efforts to oppose actively the policy of force, pressure, interference, propaganda and rivalry." The two Presidents expressed support for the UN and "the principles adopted in Bandung and Accra," and called for "general and controlled" disarmament. They emphasized the inevitability of the final elimination of colonialism and condemned racial discrimination, called for extensive unconditional economic and technical assistance to the new states, and supported the Algerian claim for self-determination. The Palestine conflict should be solved by peaceful means on the basis of the UN Charter and UN resolutions. The communiqué reviewed the cooperation between the two countries and expressed their determination to strengthen the ties between them. (*Sudan News*, as above, 28 July)

## AFRICAN COUNTRIES

**Ethiopia.** The Emperor Haile Selassie paid a state visit to Sudan on 2-6 Jan. Among the subjects he discussed with President Abbud was the diversion of the Nile waters. Abbud paid a return state visit to Ethiopia from 29 Oct to 5 Nov.



## SUDAN: INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

In the joint communiqués issued at the end of the visits "the two African leaders" expressed their agreement on the following points: they resolved to join their efforts to expel imperialism and exploitation in all forms from Africa; stressed that through coordinated action the African states could contribute to the maintenance of peace and order in the world and particularly in Africa, and "accorded their recognition" to the principles of equality and freedom for all men, non-interference in the internal affairs of others and the resolutions adopted at the Bandung, Accra and Addis Ababa conferences. In the Jan communiqué it was stated that a commercial and cultural agreement would be signed between the two countries. In Nov, "full support" was expressed for the UN in Congo and the Congolese called to work for national unity. [The term "positive neutralism" was not mentioned.] (*Ethiopian Herald*, 6-9 Jan, 30 Oct-7 Nov; *Sudan Daily*, 6 Nov)

After the outbreak of the rebellion in Ethiopia in Dec, Haile Selassie passed through Khartoum airport on his way home. Abbud welcomed him at the airport and promised to "give every possible aid and help" to Ethiopia. The crowd shouted "Long live Haile Selassie." (*R. Umdurman*, 16 Dec-BBC, 19 Dec) When the revolt was suppressed, Abbud sent the Emperor a message of congratulation. (*R. Umdurman*, 19 Dec-BBC, 21 Dec)

Problems of frontier crossing by tribes, smuggling and extradition of criminals were dealt with by direct contact between Sudanese and Ethiopian district governors and army authorities. (*Sarahah*, 10 Jan; *Ayyam*, 21 June)

A Sudanese delegation, headed by the Minister of Agriculture and Irrigation, visited Ethiopia in May to discuss problems relating to the Nile waters. (*Sarahah*, 9 May)

**Somalia.** Following his visit to the UAR, Sharmark, the PM of Somalia, visited Sudan at the invitation of the Sudanese Government. In his talks with Abbud, he requested him to mediate between Somalia and Ethiopia,

if such mediation were needed. Abbud agreed. He offered 20 scholarships for Somali students. (*R. Mogadishu*, 6 Dec-BBC, 8 Dec)

**Chad.** A clash took place on the Sudan-Chad border on 21 Mar between the Chad Police and a nomadic Sudanese tribe, when the tribesmen were watering their herds at a frontier well. One Chad policeman and two Sudanese tribesmen were killed. (*Ayyam*, 22 Mar)

**Congo.** See pp 34-5, 37-8.

## OTHER COUNTRIES

**People's Republic of China.** Sudan maintains diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China and supports its admission to the UN (see p 11). China offered the Sudan five scholarships, and two students—the first from Sudan to go to China—left in Aug to study textile engineering there. (*Ra'y al-Amm*, 1 Sept)

**Finland.** The government of Sudan agreed to exchange non-residential representation with Finland on the ambassadorial level. (*Morning News*, 8 Dec)

**Japan.** In Feb a Japanese commercial delegation touring the ME consisting of cotton importers and leaders in textiles visited Sudan. (*Ayyam*, 9 Feb; *Nil*, 9 Feb)

**Switzerland.** Sudan agreed to the establishment of a Swiss diplomatic mission in Sudan, provided this did not oblige her to set up a mission in Switzerland. (*Anba as-Sudan*, 23 Mar)

**UN.** On 19 Jan Dag Hammarskjöld, the UNSG, accompanied by Dr Bunche, visited Sudan. He met Sudanese Ministers and discussed development projects with them. (*Sarahah*, 19, 20 Jan; *Zaman*, 21 Jan)

# THE REPUBLIC OF TURKEY

(Türkiye Cumhuriyeti)

NOTE: Turkey's foreign relations are not included in this survey. For partial information, see: Views and Policies, below; Turkey in the UN, p 4 ff; attitude to the Arab refugees problem, p 213; foreign aid and foreign trade, pp 52, 57-8; relations with the Eastern bloc, pp 65-6; Iraq, p 261; Israel, p 308; Jordan, p 339;

Sudan, p 422; the UAR, pp 531-2. See also: The Western Military Position in the ME, p 94 ff; US Views and Policies, p 102 ff. The ME and the Summit Conference, pp 3-4; The Arab Boycott, p 187; The Arab League Council, p 131; Cyprus, p 223 ff; see also index.

## BACKGROUND AND SYNOPSIS

The coup d'état in Turkey carried out by the army on 27 May 1960 marked the gravest crisis the Turkish Republic, founded by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk in 1923, had yet undergone. The immediate reasons for the coup were the suppression of democratic freedoms and the involvement of the army in policies by the government of the Democratic Party, headed by President Celal Bayar and PM Adnan Menderes.

The Constitution of the Republic granted the right of political association. The government was responsible to the Grand National Assembly (*Büyük Millet Meclisi*) (throughout referred to as the Assembly). The Assembly elected the President, who chose the Prime Minister, who in turn formed the government.

Although this constitutional structure was maintained, and the Assembly was not without influence even in Atatürk's time, the country was ruled until 1950 by one party, the Republican People's Party, RPP (*Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi*). The RPP was formed by Atatürk in 1924, and since his death in 1938 it was led by İsmet İnönü, who was also President of the Republic from then until 1950.

After the Second World War, İnönü responded to the demands of the intelligentsia, including members of his own party, for the democratization of political life, and he permitted the formation of additional parties.

On 7 Jan 1946 a group of politicians including ex-PM Celal Bayar, Fuat Köprülü, Adnan Menderes and Refik Koraltan, who had broken away or been expelled from the RPP, founded the *Demokrat Partisi* (Democratic Party—DP). The new party promised to introduce democratic government, to repeal restrictions on the freedom of the individual and of the Press, and to grant the right to strike.

In the 1946 elections, which were not impartially conducted, the DP won 60 seats out of 465. The RPP, however, persevered in its policy of liberalizing political life. A new liberal electoral law formed the basis for the first fair elections in the country's history, held in 1950. The DP won 55 per cent of the popular vote, giving it 408 seats in the Assembly as against 79 for the RPP and ending its 27 consecutive years in power. Celal Bayar was elected President and Adnan Menderes was appointed Prime Minister.

However, the DP not only failed to keep its promise to liberalize the regime, but actually regressed from the position reached during the latter years of RPP rule. In 1953 all property belonging to the RPP was confiscated. A Press law enacted in 1954 enabled the severest political censorship to be applied; later, newspapers were closed down and journalists tried and sentenced. (The Press was among the main factors in the DP's rise to power, but turned against it when it went back on its promises.) In 1956 Menderes had laws passed that virtually prohibited political meetings and demonstrations. Permits for political meetings were granted, in general, only to the party in power; the broadcasting services became an instrument of the party, which brought political pressure to bear on government officials and judges, and on the universities.

The DP also went back on one of Atatürk's central principles: secularism. The government not only permitted much more Islamic activity, but encouraged it by building mosques in the villages and other measures. This policy, while arousing the resentment of the majority of the élite—the intelligentsia and the officer corps—gained for the DP the sympathy of the rural population, where traditional Islam had remained strong. Politics thus became mingled with religion.

The DP's economic policy also benefited the peasants; the prices of farm products were raised, and some rural development, especially the building of roads providing access to markets, was undertaken. The urban population, on the other hand, suffered from the consequences of accumulating economic ills: haphazard industrial development, leading to an adverse balance of payments; inefficiency of the state enterprises; budget deficits; an ever-increasing public debt—and inflation as the inescapable consequence. The material conditions of army personnel—especially of retired officers—, which had never been especially good, deteriorated, while inflation mounted.

Thus, the DP gradually lost its support in the towns—and especially among the élite—where the political power potential was concentrated—, while enjoying the sympathy of the villagers, the majority of the electors.

Menderes' policy aroused opposition even within his own party, and in 1955 nineteen Assembly Deputies, who

had resigned or been expelled from the DP, founded the Freedom Party (*Hürriyet Partisi*). (This party, as well as other small parties formed as a result of breakaways from the DP, has failed to gain a real foothold in the country's political life.)

In view of the general deterioration of its political position, and realizing that time was against it, the DP advanced the general elections, due in 1958, to Oct 1957. In spite of the increasingly obstructive tactics employed against them, the opposition parties gained a total of 4.7 million votes, as against the 4.4 million polled by the DP, but owing to the constituency system the DP retained a clear majority in the Assembly, with 424 seats against the 178 of the RPP and eight of the smaller parties.

The election results only strengthened the DP's determination to hold down the opposition, and it increased the severity of its measures against party activity and the Press. The economic situation continued to deteriorate. In 1958 the receipt of aid and credits from the US and the OEEC countries for the stabilization of the economy obliged the government to adopt a stabilization programme (including measures such as the actual, though unacknowledged, devaluation of the currency, the imposition of credit restrictions), which aroused resentment in industrial and trade circles.

In the campaign for the interim elections, scheduled for the summer of 1959, the leaders of the opposition—in particular İnönü—were received with enthusiasm by the people, who thus showed their discontent with the regime. This manifestation of public feeling led the government to postpone the elections.

On the other hand, DP circles now considered the possibility of advancing the date of the general elections from 1961 to spring 1960. They believed that they would gain from the increased prestige of the DP following the solution of the Cyprus problem, but in the main they relied on an attempt to bring about an artificial improvement in the economic situation of the urban population, by utilizing the remainder of the foreign currency reserves to supply the markets with consumer goods, encourage trade and reduce the cost of living. Though this was done in autumn 1959, dissatisfaction with the regime continued, and at the beginning of 1960 the DP gave up its plan to advance the election date.

The events that brought about the coup of 27 May may be said to have started with a political tour by İnönü, the RPP leader, to western Anatolia at the beginning of Apr. The government tried to stop him with the help of the army, which led to serious resentment in its ranks and the resignation of officers. The officer corps, though together with the intelligentsia it had continued throughout the republican period to constitute the Turkish élite, had not interfered in politics since the formation of the republic, serving as a symbol of national unity.

However, the issue that directly led to the coup was the establishment by the Assembly on 18 Apr of a Parliamentary Committee of Inquiry to investigate the activities of the opposition, which was in fact designed to suppress the RPP. The Committee's far-reaching powers enabled it to outlaw party activity, which it promptly did. On 27 Apr the Assembly further widened its competence, investing it with judicial powers. At the same sitting İnönü and other RPP Deputies were excluded from the Assembly for a number of sittings.

The next day large-scale student demonstrations against these measures started in Istanbul, soon spreading to the other university cities, and to towns in almost all parts of the country. The intelligentsia, especially the

university staffs and lawyers, joined the students. The government reacted by declaring martial law, closing the universities, shutting down newspapers, and carrying out wholesale arrests. It also conducted a campaign to rally public opinion. Menderes stressed again and again that the opposition was confined to the students and the intelligentsia in the cities, while the great mass of the people stood behind him.

While the political situation thus rapidly deteriorated, it became clear that the government could not count on the support of the army. When units were called out to disperse demonstrations, they refrained from using force, and the demonstrators apparently regarded them as allies. At the beginning of May, General Gürsel, Commander of the Land Forces, resigned. In a letter to the PM, he warned him of the consequences of his policies, demanding the abolition of the Committee of Inquiry, the release of the detainees, the reform of the government and the separation of religion from politics. Army opposition came to a head on 21 May when several hundred cadets of the Ankara War College, together with some of their officers, marched through the streets in protest against the government's measures. The officer corps was now becoming apprehensive of the possibility of a rift in its ranks if it continued to enforce martial law, in addition to its concern over Turkey's political future and its fear that the army might be involved in a civil war.

Early on 27 May, in an almost bloodless coup d'état, the army seized power with the declared aim of restoring democracy. The coup was headed by a group of officers calling themselves the National Union Committee and headed by General Gürsel, who was proclaimed Head of State and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces.

The Grand National Assembly was dissolved, the Administration placed under the orders of the local military commanders, and the civil police disarmed. The President, the PM, members of the Cabinet, army commanders and many DP Deputies were detained. All party activities were banned.

On the day of the coup General Gürsel appointed a committee of university professors to draft a new constitution, stating that he assumed that general elections could be held within three months.

On 28 May a government was set up, headed by Gürsel, comprising officers and a majority of professors, jurists and civil servants, but no party members.

The appointment of university professors to the Constitution Committee and the Cabinet was interpreted as a confirmation of the NUC's declared intention to establish democratic freedoms and procedures, to which the intellectuals were known to be faithful.

The public in the towns and the Press were reported to have enthusiastically welcomed the coup; the rural population apparently remained apathetic.

Immediately after the coup the NUC took measures to normalize life in the country. Martial law was relaxed, the universities reopened, and the detainees of the DP regime (officers, students and journalists) were released. The provincial administration was partly returned to civilian hands; the police was rearméd and returned to duty; new appointments were made in the army high command to fill the posts vacated by appointments to civilian offices and by detentions.

On 12 June the NUC issued a Provisional Constitution by which it assumed the legislative power and complete control over the government. The courts remained independent. An investigation committee and a special court were established for the trial of the DP leaders.

The law was signed by the members of the NUC, thus for the first time officially publishing their number and names. The NUC now comprised 38 members, five with the rank of General and the others ranging from Captain to Colonel.

The NUC was now faced with several tasks: to establish its authority, to make good its promise to re-establish civil government, and meanwhile to devise policies for the conduct of current affairs and to supervise their execution.

Differences on these issues developed inside the NUC in the very first days after the coup, and came to a head with the ousting of 14 "radical" officers on 13 Nov. The main issue was, apparently, the demand of the "radical" group, led by Colonel Türkeş, that the NUC should remain in control until far-reaching social and educational reforms had been introduced, while the majority advocated a return to democratic civil government.

There was also evidence that the Türkeş group was hostile to the RPP and its leader, İnönü, and was considering the establishment of an alternative political party. In addition to its political radicalism, there were also indications of a radical attitude to social questions, though no evidence was available of clearly formulated plans in this field.

The available sources do not clarify the exact extent of the differences on particular issues, for several reasons: The proceedings of the NUC were kept secret and, as General Gürsel said in his statement on the ousting of the fourteen, "insincere statements," apparently had to be made to preserve the appearance of unity. Moreover, even after the purge the NUC did not retract policies attributed to the "radicals," such as the trial of the leaders of the DP regime, the purge of the university staffs and the appointment of officers to administrative key positions; and it continued with others, such as the introduction of a national health service (though this does not show that there were no initial differences on these issues). Lastly, the Türkeş group, always in a minority, had already, apparently, lost influence in Sept, so that its views may have been reflected only to a limited extent in the actual policies of the NUC. However, there was no doubt on the basic division on the question of the future of the political regime.

The fourteen officers were dispatched as political advisors to Turkish diplomatic missions abroad.

It was reported that the public received the ousting of the group with satisfaction, both because it wanted a speedy return to civil government and the establishment of democratic liberties, and because it was essentially conservative. In this connection it should be mentioned that in the anti-government movement prior to the coup social problems apparently played no part at all; it was concerned solely with the government's violation of democratic procedures.

The following were the main developments in the NUC's conduct of political affairs:

As already mentioned, party activities were banned on the day of the coup, and on 4 July the NUC decided to abolish all party branches in the villages, on the ground that they had caused deep rifts in village life. Rumours of links between the NUC and political parties were denied. In Oct, General Gürsel announced his readiness to stand for the presidency as a non-party candidate, hoping "to balance the country's political equilibrium."

In Sept the DP was liquidated by court action. In Oct the trials of 528 leaders and collaborators of the DP regime, including several senior army officers opened in Yassi Ada; 403 were present at the reading of the in-

dictment. The main charge was the violation of the Constitution; but the first trials of Celal Bayar, Adnan Menderes and other leaders of the DP regime were concerned with charges of personal misconduct; observers assumed that the intention was to humiliate them in the eyes of the population.

The NUC carried out a major reshuffle in the government at the end of Aug when ten Ministers were relieved of their duties, following disagreement on policy, especially in the economic field. It was also reported that several Ministers had proved incompetent. Two weeks passed before replacements were found. The new Ministers, like the old, were university professors, civil servants and jurists. The policy to be followed by the new government was contained in a detailed directive from the NUC published on 10 Sept; complete control of the NUC over the government was thus reaffirmed.

The police was purged during June-Aug and the army during Aug-Oct. In addition to officers arrested on the day of the coup, 235 Generals, Admirals and Air-Marshals, as well as over 4,000 field officers, were now retired on pension. The NUC explained that the armed forces were in need of rejuvenation, but all observers, though agreeing that this was one reason, also saw in these wholesale retirements two political objectives: to rid the forces of politically unreliable officers, and to free other officers for administrative posts.

The universities also underwent a purge at the end of Oct, when 146 members of the teaching staffs were dismissed by an NUC law. This step caused general surprise, as the NUC had closely cooperated with the universities, but it was explained that the measure was needed to facilitate the progress of the universities, which did not come up to accepted academic standards. The purge was said to have originated with the Türkeş group, but the measure was not withdrawn even after it was ousted, though General Gürsel had, in response to petitions from the universities, promised to reconsider it.

The Press enjoyed a considerable measure of freedom under the new regime, though the NUC found it necessary to close down three papers for short terms. In Nov a new Press law was enacted, correcting the anti-Press legislation of the former regime.

The policies and the conduct of state affairs were aimed primarily at increased efficiency and the correction of the abuses of the former regime, rather than at social reform or basic structural innovations.

In the economy a deflationary policy was followed, and greater emphasis placed on coordinated planning. It was stated that the state would play the major role in the economy in the future but private enterprise was welcomed as a partner.

Regarding social affairs, such as health services and housing, the need to base policies on "social principles" or "social justice" was emphasized. Housing, it was stated, should cease to be a matter of exploitation, and homes should be built for the masses.

Labour was promised that the problem of unemployment would be tackled, social rights extended and the right to strike "be very carefully studied."

Both General Gürsel and Colonel Türkeş spoke in favour of land reform, but no plans were prepared and the only step taken was the arrest of 244 Ağa—semi-feudal landowners—in eastern Anatolia and, in 55 cases, the confiscation of their land and their resettlement in other areas. The remaining Ağa were released in Nov. This policy of breaking the power of the Ağa was described as a most important social reform; but it was certainly of political importance as well, and it was not



# SYNOPSIS: THE COUP D'ETAT

accompanied by the use of the expropriated lands for agrarian reform. The NUC also made it clear that a tax on large agriculture income would be introduced. These measures aroused the anxiety of landowners, and a government statement was issued in Dec to reassure them that "there was no such thing as land reform yet."

In regard to Islam, the NUC followed Atatürk's principle of secularism, stressing the separation of religion and politics. In his speeches General Gürsel stressed the imperative need for national unity as against religious sectarianism, and progress and hard work as against religious passivity. He emphasized that Islam was progressive but had been subjected to false and reactionary interpretation. The NUC revived Atatürk's policies by conducting a campaign against the *çarşaf*, a traditional women's garment, calling for prayers in Turkish instead of Arabic, and arranging for an official translation of the Qur'ân. It also took measures to reform the curriculum of the schools for religious functionaries.

Opposition activities against the NUC started soon after the coup and continued throughout the year. They were apparently conducted by DP members and religious functionaries, coming from all walks of life, and took the form of speeches, small-scale demonstrations, the distribution of leaflets and the dissemination of rumours. In addition to this outright opposition, the NUC soon found itself faced with widespread public dissatisfaction, for several reasons. The rural population was afraid to lose the privileges it had enjoyed under the DP regime and opposed the NUC on its policy on Islam. In the towns, industry and trade suffered from the NUC's deflationary policy and a decline in consumers demand which followed the political upheavals, and unemployment assumed growingly serious proportions. The statements of the NUC "radicals," as well as the various purges, aroused anxiety that the NUC might perpetuate military government, and created an atmosphere of instability. The trial of the DP leaders, especially the charges of

## THE GOVERNMENT

Ministry	11 Dec 1959	28 May 1960	Reshuffle During 28 Aug-10 Sept 1960	Changes on 21 Oct and 24 Dec 1960
Prime Minister	Adnan Menderes	Cemal Gürsel*	Cemal Gürsel	—
Deputy Prime Minister	Medeni Berk*	—	—	Fahri Özdilek* (from 21 Oct)
Defence	Etem Menderes	Cemal Gürsel* (acting); Fahri Özdilek (from 4 June)	Fahri Özdilek	Hüseyin Ataman (from 21 Oct)
Foreign Affairs	Fatin Rüştü Zorlu	Selim Sarper	Selim Sarper	—
Interior	Namik Gedik	Ihsan Kiziloğlu	Ihsan Kiziloğlu	—
Justice	Eşat Budakoğlu; Celal Yardımcı (from 3 Apr 1960)	Abdullah Gözübüyük	Amil Artuş	—
Finance	Hasan Polatkan	Ekrem Alican	Ekrem Alican	Kemal Kurdaş (from 24 Dec)
Education	Atif Benderlioğlu	Fehmi Yavuz	Bedrettin Tuncel	—
Public Works	Tewfik İleri	Daniş Koper	Mukbil Gökdoğan	—
Economy and Trade	Hayrettin Erkmen*	Cihat İren	Mehmet Baydur	—
Health and Social Welfare	Lütfi Kırdar	Nusret Karasu	Ragıp Üner	—
Customs and Monopolies	Hâdi Hüsmen	Fethi Aşkin	Fethi Aşkin	—
Agriculture	Nedim Ökmen	Feridun Üstün	Osman Tosun	—
Communications	Şemi Ergin	Sitki Ulay	Sitki Ulay	—
Labour	Halûk Şaman*	Cahit Talas	Mehmet Reşit Beşerler	—
Industry	Sebati Ataman	Muhtar Uluer	Şahap Kocatopçuoğlu	—
Reconstruction and Settlement	Hayrettin Erkmen* (acting)	Orhan Kubat	Fehmi Yavuz	—
Press Broadcasting and Tourism <sup>1</sup>	Halûk Şaman*	Zühtü Tarhan	—	—
Coordination <sup>2</sup>	Abdullah Aker	—	—	—
Minister of State	Muzaffer Kurbanoglu	Şefik İnan	Hayri Mumcuoğlu	—
Minister of State	Halûk Şaman*	Amil Artuş	Nasir Zeytinoğlu	—
Minister of State	Medeni Berk*	—	—	Fahri Özdilek* (from 21 Oct)
Minister of State	Izzet Akçal	—	—	—

\* Also holds other portfolio(s)

<sup>1</sup> The Ministry was turned into Department, in Sept, by the New Regime.

<sup>2</sup> The Ministry was abolished in May by the New Regime.

personal misconduct, which were designed to discredit them in the eyes of the public, aroused widespread sympathy for them instead, mainly perhaps because the public thought that the proceedings against leaders whose authority it had accepted for ten years were undignified.

To counteract these tendencies, the NUC conducted an intensive campaign all over the country to enlighten the public on its aims. The ousting of the *Türkez* group from the NUC and the preparations for the convening of the Constituent Assembly may have alleviated public anxiety over the political future. At the same time, stern measures were employed against outright opposition, and there were many arrests. In Aug a law was issued establishing "revolutionary courts," empowered to impose the death sentence, to try persons accused of opposition to the NUC, but up to the end of the year no such court was apparently set up. In Dec a number of convicted murderers were executed in public, and it was commented that this was "a measure intended to strike terror into the populace."

Following the ousting of the *Türkez* group in Nov, the NUC went ahead with the preparations for the Constituent Assembly, which was convened in Jan 1961. The law establishing the Assembly provided for two chambers with equal powers—the NUC and the House of Representatives—appointed by administrative and public bodies as well as by parties; the NUC thus retained control over the shaping of the country's future political structure. However, the constitution was to be subject to a popular referendum, and the government was to be handed over to a new Grand National Assembly, to be elected not later than 29 Oct 1961. The Constituent Assembly was also invested with legislative powers over various current affairs, including the budget and the declaration of martial law.

Thus, while the NUC was beset with many difficulties, it could register progress on the major issue for which it had carried out the coup and on account of which the coup was welcomed by the public: the restoration of democratic government.

## MAR–MAY: THE POLITICAL SITUATION ON THE EVE OF THE MILITARY COUP

### APR: OUTBREAK OF THE CRISIS RESENTMENT IN THE ARMY

**Government Employs Army Against the Opposition.** On 3 Apr, İsmet İnönü, the leader of the RPP left for Kayseri to take part in his party's convention. Even before his departure from Ankara, he was informed by the Military Governor there that the convention had been banned. Just outside Kayseri, İnönü's train was stopped by an army unit. This was the first time the government had found it necessary to use the military against its political rivals. After protracted discussions, in which the Deputy Governor demanded that İnönü return to Ankara, the train was allowed to proceed and the leader of the Opposition was received with enthusiasm in Kayseri by a crowd some 100,000 strong. On İnönü's return to Ankara the following day, this time by car, he was detained by an army unit—according to Turkish Press reports—for about eight hours. According to foreign Press reports, the commander of the unit permitted İnönü to pass and the soldiers cheered and saluted him.

In reply to a question in the Assembly regarding this incident and on the use of the army for party purposes, the Deputy Prime Minister, Medeni Berk, declared that no instructions had been issued by the government in connection with the incident and that the Military Governor of Kayseri had acted on his own initiative. (*Ulus*, 3, 4, 5 Apr; *Times*, 6 Apr; *Monde*, 9 Apr)

**Officers Resign in Protest.** The officer in charge of the unit that had detained İnönü resigned from the army on 5 Apr on the grounds that he had received orders from his superiors which were incompatible with the oath of loyalty he had sworn as an officer, as the Constitution, he claimed, granted freedom of movement to every citizen. (*Ulus*, 6 Apr; *Times*, 7 Apr) During the days that followed, other army officers followed his example. The deputy-commander of the regiment which had taken part in detaining İnönü's train handed in his resignation on 7 Apr. A staff officer with the rank of Colonel also resigned. In their letters of resignation, both emphasized that the use of the military for political purposes was a breach of the Constitution. (*Ulus*, 8 Apr; *Vatan*; *Monde*,

9 Apr) All three officers were detained on 13 Apr. (*Times*, 14 Apr; *Monde*, 15 Apr)

### APR–MAY: THE STRUGGLE IN THE ASSEMBLY— "THE COMMITTEE OF INQUIRY INTO THE ACTIVITIES OF THE OPPOSITION"

**Apr: Committee Established.** [The reaction of the public in Kayseri and the army officers increased the nervousness of the government.] The semi-official *Zafer* accused the RPP of organizing an underground movement using Communist methods. (*Zafer*, 6 Apr) The parliamentary group of the DP, in a proclamation on 9 Apr, accused the RPP of instigating an army revolt and establishing subversive groups throughout the country. Accordingly, it unanimously decided that a Parliamentary Committee of Inquiry should be set up to establish the facts about the activities of the Opposition. (*Milliyet*; *Monde*, 9 Apr)

On 15 Apr, the Democrats submitted a motion to the Assembly on the subject. The motion stated that the RPP, helped by a section of the Press, had used illegitimate means in its political struggle, had created armed bands made up of criminals, and was trying to involve the army in politics and bring about a situation where the armed forces would refuse to obey legally constituted authority. The bill called on the Assembly to grant the Committee far-reaching powers, such as the right to outlaw political activity.

In the debate on 18 Apr in the Assembly on this subject, İnönü said that such a committee was unconstitutional and that he would not recognize its terms of reference. He stated that his party would not take part in any revolutionary movement, but doubted whether the government would succeed in averting the results of its present actions. In protest, members of the Opposition left before the vote.

The establishment of the Committee and its terms of reference were confirmed on 18 Apr in the presence of 271 Democrat Deputies, out of a total of 419; of these 216 voted in favour, while the remainder abstained. Fifteen Democrat Deputies, chosen by the DP parliamentary party prior to the session, were appointed members of the Committee, with Hamdi Sancar as Chairman. As

an initial step, the Committee, which had been given three months to do its work, decided to forbid all party activity for this period and also to forbid the Press to publish details of, and comment on, its activities and the discussion in the Assembly. (*Milliyet*, 19 Apr; *Monde*, 20 Apr)

The RPP parliamentary party reacted by deciding to propose legislation for the establishment of an investigation commission "in connection with the unlawful actions of the Democratic Party and its members." (*Milliyet*, 14 Apr) However, it did not put forward the proposal but, instead, tabled a motion on 16 Apr proposing that the PM should be interrogated by a special Court of Justice on his intention to set up a dictatorship and on his unlawful expenditures from state funds. It accused him of abrogating the constitutional rights of the citizens, quoting the Kayseri incident as an example. (*Ulus*, 17 Apr; *Monde*, 19 Apr)

**Powers of Committee Enlarged, RPP Leaders Expelled From Assembly Sessions.** On 27 Apr, the Assembly carried a motion tabled by four Democrat Deputies investing the Committee of Inquiry with the powers normally exercised by the Attorney-General and by military and civilian judges, to close down newspapers and confiscate documents and property. Refusal to comply with the Committee's order would be a punishable offence, carrying from one to three years' imprisonment.

A statement by the Presidium of the Assembly declared that, during the discussion, İnönü had used language inciting the public to mutiny against the government and to oppose the law and had insulted the people, the army and the Assembly. It was therefore decided to exclude him from 12 sittings of the Assembly. Three Republican Deputies who had caused a disturbance were to be excluded from three sittings and nine others were to be excluded from six sittings. They refused to leave the Assembly and were forcibly ejected.

The Committee of Inquiry forbade publication of the details of these proceedings. Specialists in constitutional law believed that the granting of such authority to the Committee was a violation of the Constitution. (*Cumhuriyet*; *Ulus*, 28 Apr; *Economist*, 7 May)

#### APR-MAY: STUDENTS JOIN STRUGGLE— MARTIAL LAW IMPOSED

**28 Apr: Students' Demonstrations in Istanbul.** On 28 Apr students and professors of Istanbul University demonstrated in protest against the Assembly's decision to broaden the powers of the Committee of Inquiry and İnönü's temporary expulsion from the Assembly, shouting "Long live İnönü!", "Freedom!", and "Menderes Resign!" Police blocked the entrances to the university. The Rector, Dr Sıdık Sami Onar, who was slightly wounded in the ensuing fracas, urged the students to disperse, but they refused and began marching in the direction of the Vali's (Governor's) office. The police used tear gas to disperse the demonstrators—estimated at 10,000. Troops, including tanks, were called in, but did not interfere. The demonstrators threw stones at the police, but cheered the soldiers. According to official statements one student was killed, 16 were injured and 15 policemen injured. Unofficially, five to eight students were reported killed and 28–40 injured.

**28 Apr: Martial Law Declared.** The same day (28 Apr) the government proclaimed martial law in Ankara, Istanbul and Izmir for a period of three months. The censorship forbade publication of details of the incidents.

Public meetings were prohibited and all places of entertainment closed. Night curfew was imposed; the Universities of Istanbul and Ankara were closed for one month. (On 30 Apr the authorities also closed the University of Izmir). The PM cancelled his projected journey to Tehran to attend the CENTO Council meeting. The following day, 29 Apr, the Assembly confirmed the enforcement of martial law. (*Zafer*; *Times*, 29 Apr; *Monde*, 30 Apr; *Economist*, 7 May)

**29 Apr–5 May: Mass Student Demonstrations in Ankara, Istanbul and Izmir.** The Istanbul student demonstration on 28 Apr touched off a series of demonstrations in the towns of Turkey, which continued daily till 5 May with the exception of the 1st of the month.

On 29 Apr, the demonstrations spread to Ankara. Police attempts to disperse a students' memorial meeting in commemoration of their colleagues who had fallen in Istanbul resulted in 11 students and seven policemen being injured, according to *Zafer*, but five students and two policemen killed, and 30 students injured, according to *The New York Times*. The student demonstrators were estimated at 4,000. An official communiqué of the Ministry of Internal Affairs accused six RPP members of the Assembly of inciting the students to mutiny. (*Zafer*, *NYT*, 1 May).

On the same day (29 Apr), a demonstration of about a thousand students was held in Izmir, at the foot of the Atatürk Memorial; in dispersing it, several students were wounded. (*NYT*, 1 May; *Monde*, 2 May)

On 30 Apr demonstrations were renewed in Istanbul; an estimated 4,000 students defied martial law and were dispersed by the army and the police. Two thousand were detained while attempting a sit-down strike on the university campus, and a thousand in the streets. Special detention camps were set up in army camps outside the town. (*NYT*; *Monde*, 2 May).

On 2 May, 2,000 students demonstrated in Istanbul, and marched past the building where the NATO Ministerial Council was in session, but were dispersed without force by army units which included tanks. Several of those detained admitted that the demonstration had been planned to coincide with the Council session. (*NYT*, 5 May)

Two thousand students demonstrated again in Istanbul on 3 May. (*NYT*, 5 May)

In Izmir, about 5,000 demonstrated shouting slogans against the Menderes government.

In Ankara, on 5 May, PM Menderes found himself in the middle of a mass rally of some 3,000 people. He was jeered and jostled by students, and the crowd shouted demands for freedom. (*NYT*, 7 May; *R. Ankara*, 5 May; *BBC*, 7 May; *Kim*, 30 May)

**May: Student Demonstrations in Provincial Towns.** Student demonstrations also spread to provincial towns, but because of censorship blackout only isolated details became known. E.g., it was reported that 33 lawyers in Bursa (a town in north-west Anatolia) had volunteered to defend 16 students detained for demonstrating in the town. (*Yeni Sabah*, 4 May; *NYT*, 5 May) In Erzurum, eastern Turkey, 300 students tried to demonstrate but were forced by troops to withdraw. (*Ha'aretz*, 9 May—date of incident not specified)

From 6 to 14 May there was a respite in the demonstrations.

**Aims of the Student Demonstrations.** Observers emphasized that throughout the demonstrations the students demanded "Freedom" alone; no social motives or ques-

tions of foreign policy seemed to be involved. (*Ha'aretz*, 22 May)

#### APR-MAY: THE INTELLIGENTSIA JOIN THE MOVEMENT

On 30 Apr about a hundred members of the Izmir Bar Association organized a silent march from their club to Atatürk's Memorial. Telegrams were sent to the President and to the Prime Minister, demanding a return to constitutional government. (*Milliyet*, 1 May)

On 1 May, the authorities of Istanbul University threatened collective resignation failing release of the detained students and proper burial services for the dead. (*Monde*, 2 May)

On 2 May in Istanbul, during the student demonstration in front of the NATO Council building, members of the Bar Association, wearing their robes, also held a demonstration. Arrests were made; according to one source, about a hundred lawyers were detained. (*NYT*, 5 May)

(See also above on lawyers' offer to defend detained students in Bursa.)

#### ARMY'S LOYALTY THE CENTRAL PROBLEM

**May: The Army Does Not Use Force Against the Demonstrators.** [The troops helped the police to disperse the demonstrations, but were apparently careful not to harm the demonstrators, who seemed to regard them as allies.]

During the great students' demonstration in Istanbul on 28 Apr the demonstrators threw stones at the police, but cheered the soldiers. On 1 May the Military Commander of Istanbul issued a communiqué stating that, beginning 2 May, the army would "open fire" if there were any further demonstrations. (*NYT*, 3 May) But when, on 2 and 3 May, demonstrations occurred in the city, "the demonstrators dispersed peacefully at the request of army officers" (see above). (*NYT*, 5 May)

[The Military Commander of Istanbul, General Fahri Özdilek, was later to reveal himself as one of the originators of the coup d'état.]

**6 May: Resignation of General Gürsel.** On 6 May, General Cemal Gürsel, Commander of the Land Forces, issued a farewell message to his troops, including this appeal: "At this moment, when a political storm is blowing over the country, know how to protect yourselves from this nefarious atmosphere; keep out of politics at any cost..."

Official sources denied that General Gürsel had resigned, stating that he was due to retire the following June and had gone on leave until then. (*NYT*; *Times*, 7 May)

In June, after the coup d'état, a letter sent by General Gürsel to the Minister of Defence in the Menderes government, Etem Menderes, on the eve of his resignation on 3 May, was made public. In his letter, the General had proposed the following steps to remedy the political situation: the resignation of President Bayar; the dismissal of "corrupt" Ministers; the setting-up of a Cabinet comprising "honest and hard-working" personalities; the abolition of the Assembly's Committee of Inquiry; the release of the detained students and newspapermen; an end to the exploitation of religion for party purposes. He had termed the use of the army against the demonstrating students as "an unwise act" which had undermined confidence throughout the army and confirmed the gravest misgiving concerning the involvement of the army in politics. (*Ulus*, 14 June)

**Government, Opposition and Army.** Menderes' Foreign Minister, Fatin Zorlu, said at a Press conference on 6 May: "The Turkish officer is fully aware that the army should not interfere in politics." İnönü, the leader of the Opposition, said at a Press conference on the same day that his party had no connection whatsoever with the army. He added: "I have no political contacts with my old comrades" [İnönü had served as a General in the Turkish Army] adding: "But I know that an oppressive regime can never be sure of the army." (*Times*, 7 May; *Monde*, 8, 9 May)

Foreign observers in Turkey reported that the PM's use of the army for political purposes had angered even his own followers, but that he believed that the very appearance of the army would avert the need to use arms and loss of life. It was explained that in the course of several years he had appointed a number of officers whom he trusted to the General Staff, and therefore felt he could rely on the loyalty of the army. (*Ha'aretz*, 21 May)

#### MAY: THE OPPOSITION THREATENS MUTINY

On 4 May, RPP members in the Assembly introduced a motion for an investigation into the PM's actions. In the course of the debate, a Republican spokesman asserted that any unconstitutional or illegal step taken by the government would be opposed by force. This aroused strong protests from Democrat members, and after being refused the right to reply, the Republican members of the Opposition left the session. (*Milliyet*, 5 May). At a Press conference on 6 May İnönü said that RPP had hitherto resisted the government's dictatorial actions by legal means which, however, were becoming less and less effective. (*Times*, 7 May)

In an interview with a *Times* reporter on 9 May, İnönü acclaimed the students who had been killed in the demonstrations as fighters for the freedom of Turkey, "they have saved the regime and our honour and with their blood they have taught the people where their duty lies." (*Times*, 10 May)

#### MAY: FOREIGN POWERS AND THE INTERNAL SITUATION

[The strong ties between Turkey and member-countries of NATO, the Menderes government's great dependence on US aid and the West's concern for Turkey's stability raised the question of the nature of the relationship between the Western countries and the various factors involved in Turkey's internal struggle.]

After the students' march on the building where the NATO Council was meeting in Istanbul on 2 May, PM Menderes accused the Opposition of attempting to show the government as powerless in the eyes of the NATO countries. In this, he said, the Opposition was prompted solely by its ambition to win power, taking no account of Turkey's national interests. (*BBC*, 2 May)

On 4 May the American embassy in Ankara denied that Ambassador "Fletcher Warren had met with Menderes or had intervened in the unrest." (*NYT*, 6 May)

At separate Press conferences held on 6 May in Istanbul by Zorlu, the Foreign Minister, and İnönü, the Leader of the Opposition, Zorlu claimed that the opposition's incitement against the regime was actually aimed against the Atlantic Pact; İnönü categorically denied this. (*Times*, 7 May; *Monde*, 8, 9 May)

#### APR-MAY: GOVERNMENT COUNTERMEASURES

[The government adopted several measures to maintain its power in addition to the use of police and the army



against demonstrators, the imposition of martial law and the banning of public meetings: it closed newspapers to prevent the Opposition reaching the masses; and exploited its complete control of the radio to influence public opinion. Menderes broadcast a number of speeches in order to deter his opponents and gain public support, and made two tours of Turkish towns, where the authorities organized demonstrations of sympathy in his favour. (It was while he was on his second tour, in Eskişehir, that the revolt broke out.) On the eve of the revolt, an attempt was also made to assure the support of the army by a promise of improved conditions of service. Nevertheless, the government did not curtail the personal freedom of the leaders of the Opposition, who were active both within and without the Assembly (though the authorities prevented the publication of any adverse criticism voiced in the Assembly).]

**30 Apr–27 May: Closing Down of Newspapers.** In spite of the severe censorship, the Turkish Press utilized every possible device to demonstrate its support for the resistance to the government; in retribution, the newspapers were closed down by the military authorities.

On 30 Apr *Cumhuriyet* was closed down for ten days for publishing on that day a cartoon of a "provocative character." On 4 May *Yeni Sabah* was closed down for ten days for publishing, that day, a photograph showing university professors demonstrating in South Korea, under the heading: "Professors' Demonstrations."

On 8 May, *Milliyet*, Istanbul, was closed down for 15 days for "publishing information contrary to martial law regulations." It had published the wavelengths of the BBC and the Voice of America (to which many Turks listened in order to keep abreast of events in their own country from sources independent of government censorship). On the same date, the semi-official *Zafer* was closed down for a week for reporting demonstrations. [Possibly, the real motive for the closing down of *Zafer* was an attempt to show "impartiality" towards newspapers of both sides.]

On 18 May, *Akşam* was closed down for 20 days for contravening martial law regulations. (*Zafer*, 1 May; *Milliyet*, 5 May; *Hürriyet*, 9 May; *Vatan*, 19 May)

**Apr–May: Menderes' Speeches.** In an attempt to rally public opinion, the Premier broadcast a series of speeches just after the outbreak of the student demonstrations and during his tour of western Anatolia (15–19 May). He reported on "the conspiracies against the peace, security and prestige of the country," and tried to calm the public and dissuade it from believing rumours. The situation in the country was generally quiet and stable, he said, and democracy was unscathed. The Assembly's Committee of Inquiry, which, it was claimed, was the cause of the riots, was not without precedent in the annals of parliamentary life; it was legal—and indeed justified—in view of the situation. The real cause of the riots was the Opposition's ambition to seize power. For years, it had followed a policy of incitement and had established an underground movement among the academic youth. The RPP's cry for democracy was hypocritical and deceitful—it had ruled dictatorially up to 1960. University professors who were now shouting for freedom had not uttered a sound before 1950. Their real aim was to become Ministers. All these circles constituted an insignificant minority; the populace as a whole, carrying on its daily work, supported Menderes and his government, which they had elected legally by a majority vote. The government wanted to hold free elections as soon as

possible, but order had to be restored first. (*BBC*, 2, 4, 17, 19, 20 May)

**May: Organizing Sympathy Demonstrations.** [In an attempt to buttress the PM's prestige, the authorities tried to organize demonstrations in his favour. On previous occasions similar demonstrations had been organized by the Minister of the Interior, Namık Gedik.] In Ankara a clash seems to have taken place on 5 May between Menderes' organized supporters and his opponents, when he found himself in the midst of a crowd of demonstrators. (*R. Ankara*, 5 May–*BBC*, 7 May; *NYT*, 7 May; *Kim*, 30 May) (See also below: Demonstrations in Izmir—15 May.)

#### 14 MAY–26 MAY: LAST DAYS OF THE DP REGIME

**14 May: Renewal of Demonstrations.** The comparative lull since the last demonstration against Menderes in Ankara on 5 May came to an end on 14 May, when a mass demonstration was held in Ankara on the tenth anniversary of the DP's rise to power. About 5,000 people, mostly students, marched on the broadcasting station and tried to break in. Leaflets quoting İnönü's declaration of 6 May were distributed. Many civilians tried to shield the students from the police, who dispersed the demonstrators with tear gas. (*NYT*, 16 May)

**15 May: Demonstrations in Izmir—Menderes Refuses to Resign.** On 15 May the PM started a four-day tour to Western Anatolia with a visit to Izmir. Thousands cheered him—the numbers being officially estimated at 300,000. Other sources reported that government supporters rounded up the population and transported many villagers to the towns. Counter-demonstrators, organized by the RPP, cried "Menderes Resign" and "Freedom." Clashes occurred between Menderes' supporters and his opponents.

Speaking at Izmir, Menderes declared that he had no intention of resigning. He claimed that "a few students" had demanded his resignation whereas "millions" wanted him to carry on. Only free and fair elections—not demonstrations—would decide whether the people were with him or against him. He promised general elections in the coming spring "once the present difficulties were removed," in order to put an end to the atmosphere of unrest. (*Cumhuriyet*, 16 May; *Monde*; *NYT*, 17 May)

**16 May: İnönü Against Elections Under Present Conditions.** In a speech on 16 May, publication of which was forbidden by the martial law authorities, İnönü replied to Menderes, claiming that the 1957 elections had been rigged. He also said that martial law conditions were not suitable for general elections. (*Times*, 18 May)

**17 May: Demonstrations in Izmir.** Five hundred demonstrators were dispersed by the police in Izmir (*NYT*; *Monde*, 19 May)

**19–20 May: Mass Demonstrations in Ankara.** The authorities forbade the holding of the traditional Youth Festival Day celebrations on 19 May (marking Atatürk's disembarkation at Samsun on 19 May 1919, to initiate the War of Independence), but allowed groups of up to ten people to visit Atatürk's Mausoleum in Ankara. One to two thousand students gathered in the area. A young girl recited a patriotic poem and the students responded with shouts of "Freedom!" Military patrols did not interfere, but police dispersed the demonstrators,

arresting 17, including three girls. (*NYT*; *Monde*, 21 May)

On 20 May, demonstrations against the government started again in Ankara, with the arrival of the Indian PM, Jawaharlal Nehru. Menderes' supporters clashed with his opponents; police dispersed the crowds with tear gas and about 50 people were detained. (*Monde* 22-23 May; *NYT*, 22 May)

**21 May: Cadets' Demonstration in Ankara.** On 21 May, the army for the first time publicly vented its dissatisfaction with the regime. Several hundred cadets of the Ankara War College, together with some of their officers, marched, in uniform, through the streets. They refused to obey the Ankara Military Commander's order to disperse, and broke through a cavalry cordon which tried to bar their way. The cadets dispersed in orderly fashion, after singing the National Anthem, only on being requested to do so by Brig.-General Sıtkı Ulay, Commander of the College [who became a Cabinet Minister after the Revolt.]

The cadets were cheered by thousands of onlookers, but did not mingle with them. The crowd was dispersed by the security forces, with the help of tear-gas. It was reported that the cadets' demonstration was organized as a protest against the arrest of army officers (*NYT*, 23 May; *Monde*, 24 May)

**22 May: Tightening of Martial Law.** Following the cadets' demonstration, the authorities tightened martial law regulations in Ankara. Curfew hours were lengthened, public meetings of more than five people were banned, censorship was imposed on letters and telegrams and the military authorities were empowered to conduct searches and confiscations among the civilian population. The universities and the colleges were ordered closed (the former had been closed at the end of Apr) for as long as martial law should remain in force. (*Times*, 23 May)

**24-25 May: The Government and the Army.** After the cadets' demonstration, military schools were instructed to close the term on 28 May instead of 16 June. (*Cumhuriyet* 25 May). It was announced that the government would improve army officers' conditions of service, increase their pay and go into the question of providing cheap and comfortable quarters. (*Zafer*, 25 May)

**22-25 May: In the Assembly.** The Assembly reconvened on 22 May, after a ten-days' recess. RPP members, who

had boycotted the sessions since the end of Apr, participated and presented a motion for a parliamentary investigation into the government's attitude during the Ankara and Istanbul incidents. The Opposition deputies then left the session. (*Monde*, 25 May)

On 25 May the Opposition tabled a motion in the Assembly demanding that a bill be presented immediately to amend the elections law. An attempt by the President of the Assembly, Refik Koraltan, to silence the opposition was followed by a violent fracas between the deputies of the two parties, which lasted for 15 minutes until a recess was ordered. About 12 deputies were injured. When the Assembly reconvened, it was unanimously decided to place electoral reform on the agenda for the following session. The DP then passed a resolution to adjourn the Assembly until 20 June, against the votes of the Opposition and the protest of its spokesman, who accused the government of closing the only place in the country where the voice of the people could still be heard. (*Milliyet*, 26 May; *NYT*, 30 May)

**End of May: Opposition's Activity.** The RPP continued its activities openly outside the Assembly. A reporter who visited the party's headquarters in Ankara (on 23, or 24 May) said that it was "working without interference," and İnönü was conducting the political struggle which, he believed, would decide Turkey's destiny. "One-time diplomats, famous barristers, professors on forced leave, journalists, lawyers and ex-senior army officers..." had joined forces with İnönü and were seen working at RPP headquarters. (*Havd Cana'an*, *Ha'aretz*, 25 May)

**25 May: Menderes' Last Tour as Prime Minister.** Menderes returned from his tour of western Anatolia on 19 May "convinced that the masses, both townsfolk and peasants, did not support the intelligentsia and the students." (*Ha'aretz* reporter, 20 May)

On 24 May, it was announced that, owing to the internal situation, the PM had postponed his official visit to Athens, which was to have started on 26 May. On 25 May he left Ankara for a further speaking tour, this time to central Anatolia. His first stop was at Eskishehir, where he stayed on 26 May. Speaking in the town, he declared that the parliamentary committee of inquiry had completed its work and there were no longer any grounds for "all the subversive propaganda relating to that committee." (*Times*, 26, 27 May)

On 26 May, while in Eskishehir, Menderes was notified of the military revolt.

## 27 MAY: THE COUP D'ETAT

### THE GOVERNMENT AND THE ARMY ON THE EVE OF THE REVOLT

Menderes' statement that the Assembly's Committee of Inquiry had concluded its work (in a month, instead of the allotted three months) was interpreted as a tactical retreat. Some explained it as the result of pressure by a moderate group of about 150 DP members, headed by Sıtkı Yırcalı, an ex-Cabinet Minister. However, as this group had not previously been outspoken in its opposition to the PM, it seems more reasonable to ascribe Menderes' step to the attitude of the army. The army's tradition of non-interference in politics, adhered to throughout the era of the republic, had been violated by the declaration of Martial Law, which it had been

called upon to enforce. The cadets' demonstration in Ankara on 21 May, was the clearest indication of its rebellious mood, and served as a warning to the government. Apparently the PM himself was prepared to compromise and form a new caretaker government without the most unpopular Ministers, those of the Interior and Defence, but the President, Celal Bayar, favoured a resolute stand.

The cadets' demonstration raised apprehensions of a rift in the ranks of the army, if the officers were to continue enforcing martial law. But the main concern of the officers—who had reached the conclusion that the only way out of the impasse was the seizure of power—was that the country was facing a civil war in which

## THE MILITARY COUP

the army would have to play the part of the DP's janissaries instead of being a symbol of national unity. (*Time*, 27 May; *Monde*, 28, 29, 30 May)

### 27 MAY: THE ARMY TAKES OVER

On 27 May, between midnight and 4 a.m., the army seized power. The public first learned of the coup d'état over Ankara Radio in the early hours of 27 May.

**Announcement of the Revolt.** "This is the Turkish radio broadcasting station. The Turkish armed forces invite Turkish citizens to stand by their radios. Attention, attention, honourable fellow countrymen, come to your radios! The voice of your armed forces, which you trust, will address you in a moment. Stand by."

"Honourable fellow countrymen! Owing to the crisis into which our democracy has fallen, in view of the recent sad incidents, and in order to avert fratricide, the Turkish armed forces have taken over the administration of the country. Our armed forces have taken this initiative for the purpose of extricating the parties from the irreconcilable situation into which they have fallen, holding just and free elections as soon as possible under the supervision and arbitration of an above-party and impartial administration, and for handing over the administration to whichever party wins the elections."

"The initiative is not directed against any person or class. Our administration will not resort to any aggressive act against individuals, nor will it allow others to do so. All fellow-countrymen, irrespective of the parties to which they may belong, will be treated in accordance with the laws and the principles of law..."

"We address ourselves to our allies, friends, neighbours and the entire world: Our aim is to remain completely loyal to the United Nation's Charter and to the principles of human rights... We are loyal to all our alliances and undertakings. We believe in NATO and CENTO and are loyal to them." (*R. Ankara*, 27 May—*BBC*, 28 May)

**The Coup.** According to one source, the coup was initiated by the instructors and cadets of the war colleges in Ankara and Istanbul. The details were planned by cells of four men, only one of whom was in contact with any other cell. All senior officers who were approached by this group expressed their support. (*World Today*, Sept)

The operation was reportedly planned by Major-General Cemal Madanoğlu, who had, on the instructions of Menderes' government, drawn up plans for the defence of the capital in the event of a mutiny and passed them on to the conspirators. (*Monde*, 1 June)

The revolt took the government by surprise, as the Director of Military Intelligence, Admiral Sargut, was one of the conspirators and had seen to it that the government was given optimistic reports on the security situation. (*Monde*, 29, 30 May)

All three arms of the Turkish forces took part. "Armoured brigades and infantry troops moved from depots in Thrace and Anatolia and into key cities. Fighter-planes flew sorties over Istanbul and Ankara. A destroyer was anchored in the Bosphorus off Istanbul, underscoring the navy's participation in the revolt." (*NYT*, 29 May)

**Taking Over the Reins.** During 27 May, announcements and orders streamed from Turkish broadcasting stations, indicating the extent of the planning of the coup.

The first proclamation in the name of the Committee of National Unity (NUC) was broadcast at 8.40 GMT and General Gürsel's announcement that he had taken

over administration of the country and command of the armed forces came at 10.52 GMT.

A series of broadcasts announced the names of the military commanders appointed by order of the NUC to take over local government, among them:

General Canif Iskilipilgil, who took over the military and civil administration of Izmir

Brig-General Refik Tulga—Military Governor and Mayor of Istanbul

Brig-General Irfan Baştuğ—Governor of Ankara

Brig-General Muammer Ülgen—General Security Director of Ankara and Commander of the Ankara Police.

All administrative officials in the country—governors, district and sub-district officers,—were put under the orders of the local military commanders. All gendarmerie units were put under the command of the army of the respective regions. Maj-General Nezihi Fırat was appointed commander of the gendarmerie.

The civil police, who defended the Menderes government and enforced its policy before the revolt, was disarmed on the day of the coup.

In the afternoon, General Gürsel announced the appointment of a group of university professors to prepare a new constitution and the banning of all party activities until it should come into force.

On the evening of 27 May, the NUC announced that the Assembly had been dissolved.

In the course of the day the President, the PM, members of the government, army commanders and many DP members of the Assembly were detained.

The same evening, Ankara Radio announced: "The Turkish armed forces, thanks to the assistance of the honourable Turkish people, are in command of the situation throughout the country without having shed blood."

In all, the army lost one officer, who was killed in a clash with the police in Ankara. (*Vatan*, 28 May; *BBC*, 28, 30 May; *Times*, 28 May)

According to *The Times* of 31 May, several policemen were killed when the cadets seized the broadcasting station in Ankara.

In an interview some days later, General Gürsel claimed that he could have accomplished a successful coup d'état at an earlier date, but had preferred careful planning in order to avoid bloodshed. The main reason for the army's remaining in power in other countries where there had been military revolts, he said, was the fear of those responsible that they might be called to account for the bloodshed involved.

Soldiers in Turkey had no cause to fear handing over power to the civil authorities. (*Vatan*, 4 June)

**General Gürsel and the NUC.** On 27 May, at 10.52 GMT, the following communiqué was broadcast over Ankara Radio in the name of General Gürsel:

"I have taken over the entire administration of the state and the command of the entire Turkish armed forces; I expect assistance and support from my colleagues and compatriots."

The titles of the General were given as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces and Chairman of the Committee of National Unity. (*BBC*; *Times*, 28 May)

General Gürsel, who was 65 years old, fought in the Dardanelles and Palestine campaigns in the First World War and took part in Atatürk's struggle. He held various commands in the army and served as Commander of the Land Forces until the beginning of May, when he resigned, objecting to the army's involvement in politics by the Menderes government (see above). He lived



in Izmir up to 27 May, when he was flown to Ankara. (*Times*, 28 May)

The Committee of National Unity (*Milli Birlik Komitesi*), the existence of which became known on the morning of 27 May, was the name chosen by the group of army officers who planned and directed the coup d'état.

Colonel Alpaslan Türkeş, a member of the NUC, declared on 3 June that about five years before a group of officers, then captains and majors, had started preparations for the overthrow of the corrupt and inefficient system. They believed that Turkey's social problems must be solved at all costs so that she should not fall a prey to Communism. This group did not sympathize with any of the existing parties. (*Monde*, 4 June)

On 31 May, General Gürsel declared that, heading as he did both the government and the Council, he served as a link between them.

On 2 June, a NUC spokesman, Colonel Alatlı, declared that the NUC had taken over all the powers of the Assembly (see below: The Provisional Constitution).

[The names of the NUC members, except that of General Gürsel, were not announced on the day of the revolt.]

(Further on the NUC, see below: Developments Inside the NUC.)

**27-28 May: General Gürsel on Causes and Aims of Coup.** In his first broadcast, on 27 May, General Gürsel said:

"You are aware of the incidents which have been taking place in Turkey for the past month and which were rapidly dragging the nation towards dreadful crises. I am of the opinion that every fellow countryman with common sense appreciates the fact that this course was leading the country to bloody fratricide.

"While the international situation was deteriorating daily, the drifting of our nation into moral and material disorder as a result of private political ambition was grieving all honest fellow countrymen... I have pondered agonisingly over this situation for months, and indicated the way out to these gentlemen. [The General refers here, it seems, to the letter he had sent Menderes before his resignation, see above.] But because of the bad effect that their political ambitions had had on their awareness, they took no heed, and they chose to handle the situation by force...

"Motivated by such thoughts and considerations I resolved to put an end to this tragic course and I have taken over the administration of the state. I hasten to tell all fellow countrymen that I am in no way desirous of becoming a dictator. My sole desire is to establish a clean and honest democratic order in the country as fast as possible, and to turn the administration of the state over to the will of the nation." (*BBC*, 30 May)

On 28 May, General Gürsel made his first public appearance at a Press conference, where he outlined his intentions. He asserted that the revolt had been carried out without prior consultation with İsmet İnönü, the RPP leader, "who would have opposed the revolt had he been consulted." However, İnönü had met General Gürsel afterwards and wished him success. Gürsel assumed that general elections, under the existing constituency system, could be held within three months, with all parties, including the Socialists, taking part. The Communist party, however, did not exist in Turkey, and it would not be legalized. After handing over the government to an elected legislative the General would retire from the army and from public life. The Turkish Press would now enjoy full freedom of expression.

The General said that under the new constitution, for the preparation of which he had appointed a special committee (details see p 453), a bicameral legislature would be established, as well as a court to deal with constitutional matters. The constitution would clearly lay down the secular nature of the state. General Gürsel reiterated his declaration of 27 May that party activities were prohibited until the enactment of the new constitution. (*Ulus*, 29 May; *Monde*, 31 May)

**Public Reaction to the Coup.** According to *The New York Times*, "the Turks reacted with evident relief to the end of Menderes' ten-year rule, increasingly dictatorial in recent months."

"[On 28 May] as many as 20,000 persons gathered in the capital's principal square to cheer them [the cadets] as they rode to and fro in army jeeps and tanks. At the mausoleum for Kemal Atatürk... about 5,000 Ankara University students demonstrated in favour of the junta by cheering and singing patriotic songs... From central Anatolia, where Premier Menderes commanded a heavy vote in the popular rural areas, there were no reports of overt opposition to the junta." (*NYT*, 29, 30 May)

Istanbul Radio broadcast on 27 May: "Istanbul is in a festive mood. Despite the curfew, our fellow-countrymen are joyful. All houses and premises have been decorated with flags..." (*BBC*, 28 May)

Press reaction to the coup was enthusiastic. The Press praised the army, "which saved the country from a dangerous crisis." It was emphasized that the Turkish revolt was not to be compared with those in Egypt and Iraq; the army had no intention to establish a dictatorship and only wanted to ensure the right conditions for handing over the reins of government to a constitutionally elected body. (*Milliyet*; *Dünya*; *Vatan*; *Akşam*; *Ulus*; *Cumhuriyet*, 28, 29 May)

#### DETENTION OF DP LEADERS AND ARMY OFFICERS

On 27 May, Ankara Radio stated, in one of its first communiqués: "All members of the Cabinet are requested to take refuge with the Turkish armed forces. Their personal security is guaranteed by the law." Those arrested on the day of the revolt itself included President Celal Bayar; Refik Koraltan, President of the Assembly; Premier Menderes (who was detained together with the Finance Minister on the way from Eskişehir to Kütahya); all the Ministers (except Muzaffer Kurbanoğlu, who was abroad) many DP members of the Assembly (including all the members of the Parliamentary Committee of Inquiry into the activities of the opposition); the Chief of Police; the Governor and the Mayor of Istanbul. Also detained were five senior army officers who had co-operated with the Menderes government in repressing the opposition, including General Rüşü Erdelhan, the former Chief of Staff, who had attempted, too late, to warn the PM of the impending revolt. (*Ulus*; *Times*; *BBC*, 28 May)

**Inconsistencies in Treatment of Leaders of the Menderes Regime.** The army was not consistent in its treatment of the detainees, a NUC spokesman said on 27 May, that the Ministers were being detained "for their own safety" and General Gürsel declared on 28 May that his government would not prosecute the detainees (who, he said, numbered 200), but would leave the decision to the government to be formed after the elections. Many DP members of the Assembly who had been detained on the day of the revolt and freed a short while later were



nevertheless re-detained on 30 May. On 31 May Sıtkı Yırcalı, a DP member of the Assembly who the previous day had declared his intention to lead a purified DP in the General Elections, was detained. [For sources see below.]

**May-June: Accusations Against Old Regime Leaders.** On 1 June, an NUC spokesman said that 403 of the 406 DP Members of the Assembly, including several women, as well as senior officials, had been detained. He refused to give the exact number of detainees. On 31 May, General Gürsel announced the appointment of a committee of seven civilian and military judges to investigate the activities of the leaders of the old regime. He said it would investigate charges that the regime had distributed arms to its followers and established special units for the physical liquidation of its opponents. He added that munitions stores had been discovered in Ankara and Istanbul.

The NUC spokesman added on 1 June that the detainees would be prosecuted for violating the Constitution, the main offence being the vote on 27 Apr for the motion to increase the powers of the Assembly's Committee of Inquiry. In some cases, he said, the sentence might be death. Three members who had resigned from the party and had not voted for the motion were not detained. Ex-President Bayar would also be brought to trial for violating the Constitution. The spokesman denied that the DP members had attempted, after the revolt, to raise public support to save Menderes and his Ministers, but claimed that they had tried to subvert the people.

On 4 June, General Gürsel accused the ex-President and members of the government of having planned the murder of 1,500 Ankara cadets in retaliation for their demonstration on 21 May (see above).

On 9 June, the former President, PM and President of the Assembly were removed to the island of Yassi (Yassi Ada) in the sea of Marmora, where most members of the Assembly had been flown earlier. On 13 June, the number of detainees on the island amounted to 403.

On 29 May, the ex-Minister of the Interior, Namık Gedik, committed suicide in prison. He was the most unpopular Minister in the Menderes government and, more than any of his colleagues, symbolized for the public the previous regime. Ex-President Bayar unsuccessfully attempted to commit suicide on his detention. (*BBC*, 28 May; *Ulus*, 28, 29 May; *Times*, 28, 30, 31 May; *NYT*, 29 May, 1, 2 June; *Monde*, 1, 3 June; *Cumhuriyet*, 11 June; *Vatan*, 14 June)

## 28 MAY: GOVERNMENT OF GENERAL GÜRSEL

On 28 May, General Gürsel announced that he had formed a government: "The following decision has been taken by the NUC: I have assumed the Presidency and Premiership, the acting Ministry of National Defence, and the Chief Command of the Turkish armed forces... I have formed a government, in accordance with my duties as Premier assigned to me by the NUC. The point observed by us in forming this Cabinet has been to draw its members from among persons who have earned themselves countrywide and world-wide fame and at the same time belong to no political party."

The government comprised four army officers, three jurists, three university professors, six civil servants and three independent experts. (For details see p 441.)

On 30 May, following its first meeting, the Cabinet published a policy statement.

"The following decisions were taken at this meeting:

rapidly to take all necessary measures, within the framework of democratic regulations, to procure material and moral comfort for our honourable citizens; to subject all, irrespective of whether they belong to a party or not, to just treatment, and to recognize their equal rights; for the time being definitely not to allow any party activities in order to avoid any fraternal arguments and struggles which might cause regrettable incidents: to abrogate the main laws and decisions restricting rights and freedoms...; the Ministry of Justice to make the necessary preparations in this connection in a short time; to take necessary measures rapidly to improve the economic and financial situation and to ease the citizens' living conditions; to regard all political, military, economic and financial obligations formerly undertaken towards foreign states by the state as valid, and accordingly to take the necessary action; to establish friendly relations primarily with allied and friendly countries and with neighbouring countries and all nations of the world..." (*BBC*, 31 May, 1 June)

## JUNE: CHANGES IN THE HIGH COMMAND

On 3 June, the following appointments in the High Command were announced: General Ragıp Gümüşpala, Commander of the Third Army in Erzurum, was appointed Chief of the General Staff in place of General Rüşdü Erdelhun, who was arrested on the day of the coup (see p 434). Lt-General Seyfi Turagay, Quartermaster-General, was appointed Deputy Chief of the General Staff. The former Deputy Chief of the General Staff, General Cevdet Sunay, was appointed C.-in-C. of the Land Forces. General Gürsel held this post before he resigned in May. The acting C.-in-C. of the Land Forces Lt-General Muzaffer Alankus was appointed Commander of the First Army, in place of General Fahri Özdilek, who was appointed Minister of Defence (see p 441). Lt-General Celal Alkoç was appointed Commander of the Third Army in place of Gümüşpala. (*Vatan*, 4 June; *Cumhuriyet*, 5 June; *Times*, 6 June)

[On arrests of senior army officers who had cooperated with the Menderes government, see above.]

## MAY-JUNE: LIFE RETURNS TO NORMAL

Immediately after the coup and during June, the NUC took various steps to normalize the life of the country.

The state of emergency imposed by the Menderes government remained in force, but was alleviated. The night curfew in the cities was abolished, and public meetings could again be held, with special permits. The universities opened on 7 June. The six newspapers which the Menderes government had closed were allowed to reappear. Officers, journalists and students imprisoned by the former government were released. (For sources, see below.)

**Civil Provincial Governors Reinstated.** On 8 June the provincial administration, which had been taken over by the army on the day of the coup, was restored to the civilian authorities. Out of 67 provincial Governors, 21 were reappointed. The other 46 were accused of various crimes, and detained in Yassi Ada, but all except seven were replaced by civilians. In Ankara, Istanbul, Izmir, Ağrı, Bitlis, Içel and Van the post of Governor remained in the hands of army officers, but all except General Tulga (Istanbul) were pensioned off in Aug.

On 2 Sept the NUC announced the merging of the functions of Governor and Mayor in Ankara, Istanbul and Izmir. [In Ankara there had been no Mayor since 1959; the Mayor of Istanbul resigned shortly before the

merging of functions was announced.] (*Turkish Press*, 28-31 May, 1-30 June; *BBC*, 10 June; *Ulus*, 3 Sept.

See also below under separate headings: The Universities, The Press.)

## DEVELOPMENTS INSIDE THE NUC

### JUNE: THE NUC MEMBERS

Following is the list of the 38 officers who signed the Provisional Constitution—published on 12 June—according to which they constituted the NUC. (The military ranks were added by the editor; see also below: Struggle over Membership.)

Gen. Cemal Gürsel	Col. Osman Köksal
Chairman	Maj. Münir Köseoğlu
Col. Ekrem Acuner	Col. Fikret Kuytak
Maj. Fazıl Akkoyunlu	Col. Sami Küçük
Lt.-Col. Refet Aksoyoğlu	Maj.-Gen. Cemal Madanoğlu
Col. Mucip Ataklı	Lt.-Col. Sezai Okan
Brig. İrfan Baştuğ	Capt. Muzaffer Özdağ
Capt. Rifat Baykal	Gen. Fahri Özdilek
Capt. Emanullah Çelebi	Maj. Mehmet Özgüneş
Capt. Ahmet Er	Maj. Selahattin Özgür
Maj. Orhan Erkanlı	Maj. Şükran Özkaya
Maj. Vehbi Ersü	Cap. İrfan Solmaz
Capt. Numan Esin	Maj. Şefik Soyuyüce
Maj. Suphi Gürsoytrak	Maj. Dündar Taşer
Lt.-Col. Orhan Kabibay	Col. Haydar Tunçkanat
Maj. Kadri Kaplan	Col. Alpaslan Türkeş
Lt.-Col. Mustafa Kaplan	Brig. Sıtkı Ulay
Lt.-Col. Suphi Karaman	Maj. Ahmet Yıldız
Maj. Muzaffer Karan	Col. Muzaffer Yurdakuler
Capt. Kamil Karavelioğlu	

(*R. Ankara*, 12 June-*BBC*, 14 June; *Monde*; *Ulus*, 14 June)

### JUNE-NOV: MODERATE AND EXTREME FACTIONS IN THE NUC

Reports of political differences inside the NUC started to appear in the first days after the coup.

On 8 June, *Le Monde* reported the appearance of two factions in the NUC: a moderate one, headed by General Gürsel, in favour of transferring power to civilian government as soon as possible, and an extremist one [headed by Colonel Türkeş—see below], in favour of army rule for an interim period, during which a new Kemalist revolution would take place. The moderate faction consisted mainly of senior army officers who had joined the junta almost at the last moment, such as General Gürsel himself, while the junior officers belonged to the extremist faction. (*Monde*, 8 June)

**Struggle over Membership in the NUC.** [The differences of opinion between the factions also seem to have been reflected in the struggle over the inclusion of certain officers in the NUC. At first, the number of NUC members was given as 20; on 7 June, General Gürsel denied that this number had been increased to 50 and claimed that it had remained 20. On 12 June, however, the names of 38 members were published. The spokesman for the NUC declared that the 20 announced on 30 May were those members who were in Ankara at the time. It also appeared that at least one of the original 20, Colonel Ertuğrul Alatlı, who was the first spokesman of the NUC, was not included among the 38.] The spokesman for the NUC explained that several of the principal members had in the meantime returned to their units and their previous commitments. Again, ac-

cording to *Le Monde*, several of the original members of the NUC had withdrawn in opposition to the enlargement of this body. (For sources, see below).

**Struggle Over Policy.** It was reported that the Provisional Constitution (see below), under which the NUC became the legislature, was a compromise between the extremists and the moderates. The former demanded that the NUC assume both legislative and executive authority, but under the pressure of the moderates the executive powers were vested in the government [over which, however, the NUC was given complete control]. On the other hand, as a concession to the extremists, no date was set for the elections, political activity was still prohibited, and a court was set up to try the leaders of the old regime.

The extremists were also victorious in a conflict over the publication of the names of the Committee members. The moderates were against this, believing that anonymity would ease their return to their previous duties without any complications. The extremists demanded publication of the names so that those who had carried out the revolution would be known, and political parties, particularly the RPP, would not be able to make political capital. (For sources, see below).

**Influence of Extremists over Policy-Making.** *Le Monde* classified the NUC members as "Reformists" versus "Revolutionists." The former wanted political life to be restored after it had been purged of its blemishes, while the latter aspired to a more radical political and social regime. Their hatred of the RPP was the main factor in their desire to set up a military regime, to resign from the army and establish a new political party. Although they were a minority in the Committee—which had been broadened by the inclusion of high-ranking traditional and conservative officers—the extremists succeeded in imposing their will in several spheres: the prohibition of political activity, postponement of elections, the purging of the administration, the trial of leaders of the old regime, the appointment of officers to key positions in the administration, the freezing of prices for agricultural produce, which was a hard blow for the landowners, and the opening of discussions on agrarian reform, which would crush the large landowners (see below). (*Monde*, 3, 8, 14 June; 3, 4, 5 Aug; *Ulus*, 14 June)

**June-Oct: Gürsel Denies Differences in the NUC.** On 21 June, General Gürsel denied the existence of differences in the NUC. He said that the exchange of views only served to bring the members closer together. (*Yeni Sabah*, 22 June) He issued another denial on 1 Oct. (*Cumhuriyet*, 2 Oct)

**Sept: Signs of Moderates Gaining Upper Hand; Resignation of Türkeş.** The NUC's first real crisis came to a head in Sept, when the moderate members won a narrow majority over the radicals, with the result that Colonel Türkeş, leader of the radical wing, resigned.

The leader of the moderate wing was thought to be

Lt-General Cemal Madanoğlu, and it was believed that General Gürsel tended to support them. (*Times*, 11 Sept; *NYHT*, 9 Nov)

Türkeş resigned his position as Under-Secretary of the Prime Minister's Office on 22 Sept, and was replaced by Hilmi İncesulu, who had served as Under-Secretary of the Ministry of the Interior.

Colonel Türkeş told the Press that his resignation was part of the normalization process, whereby posts held by army officers in the early days of the revolution were being handed back to the civil administration. He declared that he had accepted the position temporarily, at the NUC's request; he would remain a member of the Committee, which was more important than being an Under-Secretary or a Minister. The Minister of Communications, Brigadier Ulay, explained that Türkeş had resigned in order to prepare plans for the establishment of the Constituent Assembly and to carry out other tasks for the NUC. (*Vatan*, 23 Sept; *Times*, 24 Sept; *NYT*, 25 Sept; *Cumhuriyet*, 26 Sept)

**Sept: NUC's Directive to Government Termed Moderate.** The NUC's directive to the government covering internal and external policy, issued on 10 Sept, was regarded by observers as moderate, compared with more radical statements by "some younger members." (*Times*, 12 Sept)

(For the directive see Views and Policies and compare with the attitude of the radicals, below.)

**Oct: General Gürsel Announces His Candidacy for the Presidency.** On 17 Oct, General Gürsel announced at a Press conference that he was ready to stand as candidate for the Presidency in the elections to be held in 1961—"if the people make clear they want me to lead them." He added: "I have received many requests that I should continue to serve in public life." He said he would run as an independent; "as a non-party man, I hope to be a factor in balancing the country's political equilibrium."

General Gürsel also disclosed that the new Constitution which was being drafted would provide for the election of the President by direct, popular vote. Under the old Constitution the President was elected by the deputies of the National Assembly. (*Cumhuriyet*; *Times*, 18 Oct; *NYT*, 19 Oct)

[This announcement came at a time when relations inside the NUC were sharply deteriorating; the reports available do not state whether there was any connection between these developments.]

#### SOCIAL AND POLITICAL ATTITUDE OF THE RADICALS

**Against Social Inequality.** At the beginning of Aug, a *Le Monde* correspondent said that the junior officers in the NUC who—in contrast to the senior officers—came from the lower classes, showed bitterness at the lack of social equality. One of them had told him that "political democracy could not be maintained without social democracy." Another officer had said: "The revolution must achieve its objectives before elections can take place." (*Monde*, 5 Aug)

**"Tendency Towards Socialism."** At the beginning of Nov Major Orhan Erkanlı [of the radicals] told a *New York Herald Tribune* reporter: "We are not influenced by sectional interests, so we can do things that political parties would not do for fear of losing votes."

Erkanlı spoke of a tendency towards socialism, which, he said, would be imbedded in the policy of any future

regime. The NUC had decided upon this, he said, not on any philosophical grounds, but simply out of recognition that private enterprise was too small and too slow to fulfil the demands of Turkey's economic revival. (*NYHT*, 9 Nov)

**On "Kemalism" and the Need for Progress.** Captain Numan Esin, described as "one of the intellectual radicals of the ruling group," said on 6 Oct that, although the May revolution was a return to the "Kemalism" of Atatürk, Kemalism had never been defined as a definite doctrine. It was thus often wrongly interpreted as fascism or socialism.

Atatürk, he said, was not "an empty man of action," but a progressive intellectual. It was not sufficient merely to preserve his reforms; westernization meant progressing beyond them to achieve a system of social justice. (*Times*, 7 Oct)

**New Political Party Advocated.** Captain Esin said that he thought a new political party should be created in Turkey to capture supporters of the liquidated DP, and that it might be dangerous to the revolution if this were not done. (*Times*, 7 Oct)

**Colonel Türkeş Against Communism and Class Distinction.** In a speech on the anniversary of the death of Atatürk, on 10 Nov, Colonel Türkeş, said that Atatürk's principles had defined the Turkish nation as national, revolutionary, secular, republican, and etatist; these, he said, were the principles which had inspired the 27th May revolution. He went on to stress that the Turks were nationalists who regarded Communism as their enemy; in the words of Atatürk, Communism should be crushed wherever it was spotted. The Turkish nation was also revolutionary, and would never allow despotism and the Caliphate to return to Turkey.

He said that the law on the establishment of revolutionary courts was designed to maintain peace and tranquillity in the country, though so far there had been no need for them.

It was the duty of the intellectuals to mix with the masses, go into the country and enlighten the peasant, he declared. Atatürk had wanted to create a nation free from class distinction and privileges. (*R. Ankara*, 10 Nov-BBC, 12 Nov)

**Leftism of the Radicals.** In Nov, after the ousting of the radicals from the NUC, *The Economist* wrote: "[Colonel Türkeş's group] has been labelled 'fascist' both inside and outside Turkey... Colonel Türkeş was a pan-Turanian... in 1944, but there is no certainty that he is still one now, and even if he were, that would not be conclusive. From the combined declarations, made individually since 27 May by members of the fallen group of fourteen, it would seem that their views are essentially more left than right, and at all events much more left than the views of General Gürsel and others... Land reform, the right to strike, popular education, houses for the people, a national health service and social insurance schemes have been the sort of thing that the fourteen have most spoken of. It is true that some of them have made extremely nationalistic attacks on foreign schools and American oil companies, but not more than was done in the time of Kemal Atatürk, who was never accused of being a fascist." (*Economist*, 19 Nov)

#### NOV: RADICALS OUSTED FROM NUC

On 13 Nov General Gürsel announced the dispersal of the NUC and the formation of a new Committee headed



by himself and consisting of 23 of the original 38 members. Fourteen officers, known as the radicals, the most prominent of whom was Colonel Türkeş, were ousted and appointed to diplomatic posts abroad. (One member, Maj.-General Baştuğ, had died in Sept.)

**Preparation of the Coup.** Following the coup, various reports appeared on how it was prepared.

*The Times* reported from reliable sources that the coup had been planned a week beforehand. The commanders of the three Turkish Armies were in the know, and in Istanbul the secret was known down to the level of divisional commander.

According to unconfirmed reports, General Gürsel had a long interview in Ankara with the former leader of the RPP, İsmet İnönü, before the decision was taken. As it was an open secret that the "radical" group was strongly hostile to İnönü and his party, it was assumed that it was privy to the coup and may have had a hand in it. (*Times*, 14 Nov)

*Le Monde* said that the coup was preceded by the removal of members of the Türkeş group, such as the command of the Istanbul police, from key positions.

On 12 Nov, on the eve of the coup, Colonel Küçük reportedly left Ankara, ostensibly for private purposes, for Istanbul, where he met the local commanders and discussed measures for the prevention of a counter-operation by the Türkeş group. After Küçük returned, the operation was started; the 14 officers were informed of General Gürsel's decision and detained. (*Monde*, 15 Nov)

**13 Nov: NUC Dissolved; New Committee Formed.** On 13 Nov General Gürsel broadcast the following announcement: "Dear compatriots: As the work of the NUC has entered a stage which might endanger the high interests of the country, I have—at the request of the Turkish armed forces and NUC members—dissolved the Committee as of today, 13 Nov 1960.

"The following are the members of the new NUC which will exercise legislative powers on behalf of the Turkish nation: Cemal Gürsel—chairman; Ekrem Acuner, Refet Aksoyoglu, Mucip Ataklı, Emanullah Çelebi, Vehbi Ertu, Suphi Gürsoytrak, Kadri Kaplan, Suphi Karaman, Kamil Karavelioglu, Osman Köksal, Fikret Kuymak, Sami Küçük, Cemal Madanoğlu, Sezai Okan, Fahri Özdilek, Mehmet Özgüneş, Selahattin Özgür, Şükran Özkaya, Haydar Tunçkanat, Sıtkı Ulay, Ahmet Yıldız, Muzaffer Yurdakuler,—members." [For a list of the ousted officers—see below.)

"Together with the Constituent Assembly, to be set up as soon as possible, the new NUC will regularize conditions in the country according to democratic principles. The members who have been relieved of their duties have been retired on pension. No official or person other than the Head of State is authorized to make a statement on this subject. I hereby inform the citizens of this fact." (*R. Ankara*, 13 Nov—BBC, 15 Nov)

**Gürsel on the Struggle Within the Committee.** At a Press conference on 13 Nov, General Gürsel declared that the dismissed officers had wanted to set up a military dictatorship and attempted to persuade younger army officers to dispense with the general elections and perpetuate military power. He added:

"For many months past serious efforts were made to establish unity in work and unity in proper ideas. Unfortunately, all these efforts were of no serious help. In view of the responsibility we undertook before the nation and the world, we were compelled to act very patiently

to put things right without giving cause for any split. At times we were even compelled to make insincere statements to save appearances.

"But during the last 15 or 20 days, the situation and its nature were such that not only was no sound work being produced by the Committee, but also doubts, distress, and even anxiety, were growing among our fellow countrymen. Divergent statements and talk expressing extremist opinions led everyone to wonder anxiously: What is happening to us? Where are we heading? Because of certain statements which might paralyze economic life, an atmosphere of anxiety and distrust was created. All the sons of the country, and also all intellectuals who are as patriotic as we are, began to see the imminent danger in this development, and were troubled." (For source, see below.)

**Gürsel Takes Personal Responsibility for Decision.** General Gürsel continued: "I have taken a decision which will provide the Committee with a harmonious character, and which will allow harmonious work to be carried out. This decision has not been directed against any individual." (For source, see below.)

**The Aim: To Safeguard Democracy.** General Gürsel continued: "I repeat that the fate of the Turkish nation is bound to a development within a democratic order, and to the atmosphere of honesty which such an order will bring. We have neither the right nor the authority to obstruct such a development; nor do we have the right or authority to debate such noble ideas. Thus, within the framework of these thoughts and views, we had to illuminate our path and to make the decisions which would illuminate our path. This we have done." (*R. Ankara*, 13 Nov—BBC, 15 Nov)

**Foreign Comment on Causes of Coup.** Foreign commentators thought that three immediate issues had led to the ousting of the 14 officers: (1) The purge of the university staffs [which had not been rectified, however, by the end of the year] (see pp 446–7). (2) Arguments about the powers of the Constituent Assembly (see pp 453–4). The Türkeş group wanted it to have merely consultative powers, the real power resting with the NUC, while the majority, led by Gürsel, wanted it to have full legislative authority. (3) A new plan, said to have been originated by the Türkeş group, for a general directorate of ideological and cultural unity; this project was attacked by the intellectuals as fascist. (*Times*, 14 Nov; *Economist*, 19 Nov)

**Generals Versus Colonels.** *Le Monde* saw the immediate reason in the struggle between Colonel Türkeş and Colonel Küçük. Both had the same radical ideas for reform, but while Türkeş advocated a full army government Küçük was for a gradual hand-over to civilian authorities. Gürsel and the Generals, though they tried to mediate, supported Küçük's opinion, while the younger NUC members supported Türkeş. (*Monde*, 15 Nov) [Among the 23 members of the new NUC there were four Generals, seven Colonels, three Lt.-Colonels, seven Majors and two Captains. The 14 dismissed included one Colonel, two Lt.-Colonels, six Majors and five Captains.]

**Public Support for the Purge; Conservatism Dominant.** Foreign observers said that the purge was supported by many circles in Turkey: the intellectuals, including the students, who marched in silence through Ankara in its support, the Press, the army, business circles, the Greek and Armenian minorities, and most of the young people.



The great mass of the peasantry was as usual enigmatic and inarticulate.

Remarking that the views of the *Türkeş* group were essentially leftist though they had been labelled fascist, *The Economist* commented: "The clash between General Gürsel and Colonel *Türkeş* was not only between the old and the young, between the Generals and the Colonels, but between conservative and radical... The fact that the bulk of the nation supports General Gürsel against Colonel *Türkeş* seems to mean, if it means anything, that the Turkish nation—even its intellectuals, more astonishing even, its youth—is fundamentally conservative. It is a country where there has never been even the mildest form of socialism, where all parties since the republic was founded can, by Western standards, be said to belong to the extreme right... The Westernized Turkish intellectuals—who spend most of their time talking about constituent assemblies, political institutions, second chambers and electoral laws—tend to ignore the harsh facts of Turkey's economic and social conditions." (*Times*, 14, 15 Nov; *Cumhuriyet*, 15 Nov; *Economist*, 19 Nov)

**Foreign Posts for Deposed Officers.** On 17 Nov it was officially announced that the 14 deposed officers had been appointed as political advisers in Turkish missions as follows: Alpaslan *Türkeş*—New Delhi; Orhan Kabibay—Ottawa; Münir Köseoglu—Stockholm; Orhan Erkanlı—Mexico City; Mustafa Kaplan—Lisbon; Muzaffer Karan—Oslo; Şefik Soyuyüce—Copenhagen; Fazıl Akkoyunlu—Kabul; Rifat Baykal—Tel Aviv; Dündar Taşer—Rabat; Numan Esin—Madrid; Muzaffer Özdağ—Tokyo; Ahmet Er—Tripoli (Libya); İrfan Solmaz—The Hague.

They were instructed to take up their posts by the end of Nov and remain abroad until the general election. They were permitted to take their families with them, and were pensioned off as army officers, receiving an extra gratuity. (*Cumhuriyet*; *Ulus*, 18 Nov)

It was reported that the martial law commander of Istanbul had issued strict written instructions to the Press to avoid all comment on the movements of the dismissed officers and to refrain from publishing photographs of them. (*Times*, 16 Nov) [No details on their departure were available.]

## IEWS AND POLICIES

On 10 Sept the NUC published two documents containing detailed statements on internal and security affairs and the general principles of foreign policy. One was the NUC's Directive to the government, the other was entitled "Basic Views of the NUC on Matters Concerning the Country." Both covered the same fields, the latter being more detailed on some issues. Below is a summary of the two documents read together. More detailed policies on foreign relations were formulated in a government statement issued on 11 July; this is also summarized below. (For source, see end of summary.)

### INTERNAL AFFAIRS

**General Aim of NUC.** "The aim of the National Union movement is to deal with Turkey and the Turkish people as a whole, to establish an honest rule based on Atatürk's reforms, to solve short-term problems of our day, to determine the main principles of long-term problems and to try to apply them as much as possible in the available time, and, together with the preparations made, to turn over the government to the new government which will come to power, at the latest, in the autumn of 1961."

**Structure of the State.** The state will be reorganized "in accordance with a system embracing democratic rights and rational methods and principles" and in the manner best suited to the "structure" of Turkey. A constitution and an electoral law to this effect must be prepared and all anti-democratic laws abolished.

**The Administration.** The administration must be reorganized "in the shortest possible time in accordance with the principles of justice, morality and productivity." Effective controls must be established and civil servants responsible for failures must be punished.

**National Defence.** A political directive must be drawn up and a strategic concept formulated accordingly. In this framework "the minimum forces required must be determined" and the forces swiftly reorganized "in accordance with the requirements of modern warfare."

Social requirements of the forces (salaries, housing, etc.) will be satisfactorily met.

**National Education.** "The aim of national education is to meet the country's needs in accordance with contemporary developments, and to train the student for life."

Primary efforts will be made in elementary and adult education. The assistance of graduates, the general educated public, and reserve officers not needed in the army who will work in education as part of their military service, will be utilized. The state will provide the maximum support.

The level of the universities must be raised "to that of contemporary institutions" and assistance provided to enable students to continue their studies.

Vocational education must be expanded and improved.

Private and foreign schools must be controlled.

Teachers must be assured a status appropriate to their position in society.

**Agriculture.** "There must be land-planning and agricultural reform on the basis of private ownership." (Thus in "Basic Views"; the "Directive" does not mention "agricultural reforms," but says that in the framework of individual ownership "the necessary measures will be taken to provide for the most fruitful utilization of land available.")

In both documents special emphasis is laid on the preservation of forests and afforestation; the need for the preservation and improvement of soil and livestock is also mentioned. Industry "that will support agriculture and render it valuable" should be developed and markets reorganized with the "object of obtaining the real value of agricultural produce." "Importance must be given to purchases based on the principle of support."

**Resettlement and Housing.** "Studies will be conducted for the realization of a resettlement policy suited to agricultural and social principles."

Housing must cease to be a commercial question, and modest but sound houses must be built. Priority will be given to "collective constructions" to meet the requirements of the great masses of citizens, but also to "essential individual efforts" in this field.

**Health Service.** Medical services, including preventive me-

dicine, must be planned on countrywide and comprehensive basis, in conformity with the principles of social justice.

**Labour.** The grave problem of unemployment must be tackled by coordinated investment and industrial and other development. The social rights of the workers must be re-examined with a view to extending them. The right to strike "must be studied very carefully."

**Religion.** Religious questions must be dealt with on the basis of freedom of conscience. Exploitation of religion for political purposes will be prevented. On this basis, religious questions and institutions must be supervised "by men of religion, of intellect and independence," who must be accorded their proper place and value in society. Existing institutions must be developed for the purpose of training qualified men of religion. (See also: Islam, pp 447-8.)

**Finance and Taxation.** The aim is to preserve financial stability. "Luxury and waste" will be swiftly eliminated. Budgetary expenditure on investment must be met from sources that will not dislocate the national economy.

A balanced credit policy and a stable currency must be arrived at. Inflation and deflation must be avoided. Short-term credit must be subject to a dynamic policy in accordance with current requirements. The capital market must be adjusted by means of long-term credits. Expenditure in the current budget must be cut to the minimum.

The burden of taxation must be justly distributed in accordance with the citizens' capacity to pay. Income, building and land taxes must be newly regulated, and the introduction of an agriculture product [income?] tax and a luxury consumption tax be planned. Income tax must be linked with inheritance and death duties. The re-establishment of tax exemptions must be "carefully studied."

**Economic Development: State and Private Enterprise.** The state must play an "extensive and active role" in the economy. "Economic and industrial institutions and installations directly linked with large public services must be managed under state control." State enterprises must be reorganized to increase their efficiency and their debts transferred to the Treasury. A planning organization must be established to supervise state investment in the framework of integrated economic planning.

No "illegitimate gains" or profits from monopolies and exploitation must be allowed, and equal economic opportunities must be provided for all.

Without interference with its "free activities," private enterprise must be encouraged to participate in the drive for national recovery with the same aims as public investment.

Industry must be carefully protected, with attention to quality and productivity.

The greatest possible benefit must be derived from foreign aid and investment.

Development must be free from political influence and serve social as well as economic needs. Special attention must be paid to underdeveloped regions, but meanwhile priority must be given to areas and projects producing essential commodities and export goods. "Construction efforts will also be concentrated in positive areas which provide opportunities for social and cultural development."

In the development of transport, economic and social

requirements must be reconciled with those of defence. Public transport must be controlled for safety and comfort.

Short- and long-term planning must be coordinated.

Tourism must be developed on a countrywide basis with the participation of foreign capital.

**Rural Development.** Villages must be encouraged to build hygienic and civilized dwellings, and technical aid for this purpose will be extended to them.

"Village development centres" with the necessary personnel, equipment and materials will be established to aid in "hygienic, social, cultural and economic" development.

The educational needs of the villages must be speedily met.

"For providing the peasants with land, and the villages with pasture land, drinking water, and essential roads, all necessary principles will be drawn up, and their implementation will start in the near future."

**The Press.** Laws must be drafted for the creation of a free Press.

**Internal Policy and Security.** "Laws and institutions relating to internal policy" must be impartial and isolated from party influences, so as to secure the citizens' "security and peace of mind."

The needs of internal security personnel must be speedily met. (NUC "Directive" and "Basic Views"; BBC, 14 Sept)

## FOREIGN POLICY

**Principles of Foreign Policy and National Unity (NUC "Directive" and "Basic Views").** Foreign policy must be conducted on the basis of national interest and the preservation of international peace, security, tranquillity and freedom.

Existing agreements must be observed, friendly relations with the neighbouring countries maintained and struggles for national freedom supported.

"Faithful to the idea that the Turkish people's integrity and unity springs from elements of national independence, freedom and belief which observe no racial, religious or sectarian discrimination, a rigorous struggle will be waged against all activities aimed at dividing or damaging this integrity and unity." (BBC, 14 Sept)

(The following points on foreign policy are taken from a BBC precis of the Government Programme read at an "open meeting" of the NUC on 11 July. They are summarized in their original order.)

**Support for UN, NATO and CENTO; Special Friendship with US.** "Turkey supports... the UN and the NATO and CENTO alliances. NATO is a defensive organization established in conformity with the UN Charter by the Western countries, which are determined to live in freedom and independence and defend the true principles of humanity and civilization. One of the main principles of our foreign policy is to maintain and improve our relations with these countries."

Everything possible will be done to improve the friendship with the US.

"Turkey is attached to CENTO," which is "a defensive organization, also set up in conformity with the UN Charter, with a view of achieving peace and progress in the ME."

**Greece and Cyprus.** Relations with "friendly and allied Greece" had improved since the solution of the Cyprus

problem, and hope was expressed for further improvement. The Zurich and London Agreements (see pp 223-4) "will make possible the preservation of the rights and interests of our community [as heard] in Cyprus and assure the future of our Cypriot co-racialists. We believe that our co-racialists in Cyprus will carry out their duties with honour and dignity and with the peace of mind inspired by the close interest and affection which they will always receive from the nation and the government."

**Yugoslavia.** "We hope to improve our relations with Yugoslavia—which is an important element in the Balkan region, which is of great importance to Turkey."

**The Council of Europe.** It will be "an honourable and pleasant duty" for Turkey to take an active part in the future work of the Council of Europe, of which she is a member.

**Improvement of Relations with ME Countries, Especially Arab States.** "Turkey... feels especially its closeness to, and interest in, the countries of the Near and Middle East. Among these, we strongly desire the continued progress of the Arab countries along the path of prosperity and in independence and freedom... We have a mutual understanding with the UAR and Iraq for the further strengthening of the traditional ties of friendship with these two neighbours."

**Improvement of Relations with USSR.** "We sincerely desire to improve our relations with... the USSR, within the framework of good-neighbourly relations based on mutual respect. However, the materialization of this desire would be facilitated by the fruitful conclusion of the efforts for the establishment of stability and peace in the world and for the removal of tension."

**Support for Peaceful Attainment of Independence.** Attainment of independence by all nations in peace and tranquillity is one of Turkey's goals. "Accordingly, it would only make us glad to see the countries which have not yet achieved their aims do so by means of mutual agreements made in peace."

**Friendly Relations with Countries of Africa, Far East, Latin America and the Commonwealth.** "The development of the African countries—with some of which we have established closer political relations—in tranquillity and prosperity is our most sincere hope..."

"We sincerely desire that our relations with the countries of the Far East gain steadily in every field... We consider it essential... to... improve our relations with the countries of Latin America, whose influence in international politics is steadily increasing..."

"We are also resolved to show similar interest in the other nations within the British Commonwealth of Nations which are very close to us from the standpoint of political views and aims, although situated very far off geographically." (*BBC, 13 July*)

## CURRENT AFFAIRS UNDER THE NUC ADMINISTRATION

### THE GOVERNMENT

**May: The First Gürsel Government.** The first government formed by General Gürsel on 28 May, the day after the coup, was composed as follows (see also table of Governments on page 466):

#### *Army Officers:*

General Cemal Gürsel, Head of State, Prime Minister, Acting Minister of Defence

General Fahri Özdilek, appointed Minister of Defence on 4 June (Military Governor of Istanbul under Menderes)

Major-General Muharrem İhsan Kızıoğlu — Interior (Commander of 61st Army Division)

Brig-General Sıtkı Ulay—Communications (Born 1907, Commandant of Ankara War College)

#### *Jurists:*

Amil Artuç—Minister of State (member of Court of Appeal)

Abdullah Gözübüyük—Justice (Rapporteur of Court of Appeal)

Zühtü Tarhan—Press, Radio and Tourism (former judge, now in business)

#### *Professors (all of Ankara University):*

Professor Fehmi Yavuz—Education (Born 1912. Since 1958 Dean of Faculty of Political Science)

Professor Nusret Karasu—Health and Social Welfare (Born 1902. Lecturer on chest ailments)

Professor Cahit Talas—Labour (Born 1917. Member of Faculty of Political Science)

#### *Civil Servants:*

Selim Sarper—Foreign Affairs (Born 1899. SG of the Foreign Ministry. Formerly Ambassador to Moscow and Rome and permanent Representative at UN and NATO Council)

Şefik İnan—Minister of State (Born 1912. Director-General of Statistics)

Daniş Koper—Public Works (Born 1908. Under-Secretary of Public Works Ministry)

Fethi Aşkın—Customs and Monopolies (Born 1916. Director-General of Customs)

Feridun Üstün—Agriculture (Born 1916. Director of New York Branch of Turkish Land Produce Office)

Muhtar Uluer—Industry (Born 1908. Director-General of Mining in Ministry of Industry)

#### *Independent Experts:*

Orhan Kubat—Reconstruction and Settlement (Born 1904. Chairman of Agricultural Bank)

Ekrem Alican—Finance (Born 1916. Inspector of Finance. DP member of Assembly in 1950; expelled from DP in 1955 and joined Freedom Party; in 1958 again became politically independent)

Cihat İren—Economy and Trade (Born 1916. In 1955 appointed SG of Turkish Union of Chambers of Commerce and Industry, resigning on 6 Mar 1960 because he refused to join DP)

In the first announcement of the composition of the government, Admiral Fahri Korutürk was named as Foreign Minister, but two hours later the announcement was repeated with Selim Sarper holding the post. No explanation was given for the change.

Observers saw in the composition of the government proof of the close contact between the army and the intellectuals, who were faithful to Atatürk's principles of Westernization and Western-type democracy. (*BBC, 31 May, 1 June; Times, 30 May*)

According to the Provisional Constitution of 12 June, the NUC had complete control over the government; it could "always control the Ministers and dismiss them."



Registered party members could not be appointed as Ministers. (For details see pp 452-3.)

**Aug: Civilian Ministers Dismissed.** On 25 Aug the NUC relieved the following ten civilian Ministers of their duties. (Names given in the order of the list above): Abdullah Gözübüyük; Zühtü Tarhan; Nusret Karasu; Cahit Talas; Şefik İnan; Daniş Koper; Feridun Üstün; Muhtar Uluer; Orhan Kubat; Cihat İren.

No official explanations were given. (*R. Ankara*, 25 Aug-BBC, 27 Aug; *NYT*, 27 Aug)

An Ankara Radio commentator said that the revolutionary government was composed of learned and enlightened members of their professions and had exerted praiseworthy efforts. These superior qualities, however, did not always create situations reconcilable with the views and principles of the legislative organ [i.e. the NUC]. This situation resulted in the dismissals. The ten Ministers were relieved because the NUC did not identify itself with the way they tackled their work within the government programme. (*R. Ankara*, 26 Aug-BBC, 29 Aug)

*The Times* quoted semi-official circles as saying that the first Gürsel Cabinet had been a hasty stop-gap and considered open to alteration. Many Ministers—particularly those in charge of economic affairs, who had now been dismissed—whose qualifications had seemed sound enough on paper, had proved incompetent administrators.

Two days later *The Times* wrote: "The general supposition in informed circles is that the ten Ministers have been made scapegoats for the unsatisfactory state of economic stagnation and political uncertainty which is now hanging over Turkey." (*Times*, 27, 29 Aug)

*The New York Times* also regarded economic issues, as well as the question of the freedom of the Press, as the causes of the dismissal. (*NYT*, 27 Aug)

*The Times* concluded that the situation, both political and economic, was much less satisfactory after three months of military rule than many people had hoped. (*Times*, 27 Aug)

**Aug-Sept: The New Appointments.** No new appointments were announced at the time of the dismissals. *The Times* correspondent commented that the NUC "apparently had no replacements up its sleeve," as the Provisional Constitution precluded members of political parties from taking up government office. The NUC approached a number of prominent personalities, but succeeded in finding replacements only after two weeks.

The new Ministers were:

**Professors:** Ragıp Üner (of the Faculty of Medicine, Ankara University)—Health and Social Welfare; Osman Tosun (of the Faculty of Agriculture, Ankara University)—Agriculture; Bedrettin Tuncel (Dean of the Faculty of Languages, History and Geography at Ankara University, who previously held a key post in the Ministry of Education)—Education; Mukbil Gökdoğan (of the Technical University in Istanbul)—Public Works.

**Civil Servants:** Mehmet Baydur (Director of the Economic Department of the Foreign Ministry)—Trade; Mehmet Reşit Beşerler—Labour; Şahap Kocatopçuoğlu (Director-General of the State Glass Industry)—Industry.

**Jurists:** Hayri Mumcuoğlu (member of the Court of Appeal)—Minister of State; Nasır Zeytinoğlu (independent lawyer)—Minister of State. (*Ulus*, 26 Aug; *Times*, 29 Aug; *R. Ankara*, 3 Sept-BBC, 6 Sept; *Cumhuriyet*, 11 Sept)

No new Minister of Press, Radio and Tourism was

appointed. [The Ministry apparently became an independent department headed by Lt.-Colonel Ahmet Yıldız, member of the NUC.]

*The Times* commented: "With one or two exceptions, the newly appointed members... are relatively obscure men who are expected to do little more than fill the role of technical advisers to the NUC, with whom ultimate power will rest. Many observers believe that the abrupt dismissal of the ten Ministers... was due to friction with the NUC. Some of the previous Cabinet are said to have been powerful personalities and inclined to act more independently than the committee wished. If these reports are correct, the revised administration should function more smoothly." (*Times*, 9 Sept)

**Sept: NUC Directive to the New Government.** On 10 Sept the NUC issued a directive to the government accompanied by another document, entitled Basic Views (see Views and policies, above). The government's programme was to be faithful to the principles laid down in the directive, to take into consideration the basic views of the NUC, and to be implemented "in accordance with factors governing time, place and feasibility." (*BBC*, 14 Sept)

**Oct: Özdilek—Deputy PM.** On 21 Oct General Gürsel appointed General Özdilek, the Minister of Defence, as Minister of State and Deputy PM. General Hüseyin Ataman became Minister of Defence. Ataman was the Commandant of the Ankara War College until Aug, when he asked to be pensioned, in accordance with the army rejuvenation programme. (*Cumhuriyet*, 22 Oct)

**Dec: Ekrem Alican Resigns.** On 24 Dec Ekrem Alican, the Minister of Finance, resigned from the Cabinet. He was replaced by Kemal Kurdaş, Finance Ministry official during the former regime, who had resigned because of differences of opinion and then worked for the International Monetary Fund in Washington.

Alican stated that he was resigning in order to gain freedom of action in the country's political life. It was reported that he planned to found a political party which would attract the former Democrat vote. (*R. Ankara*, 24 Dec-BBC, 29 Dec; *Cumhuriyet*, 27 Dec; *Times*, 28 Dec)

## THE POLICE

**May: Police Disarmed.** The police, who had enforced the policy of the Menderes government before the May revolution, were disarmed on the day of the coup d'état and replaced by troops and military police.

On the day of the coup an army officer, Brigadier Muammer Ülgen, was appointed Director-General of Security. He announced that the Security Organization "will carry out its duties under the direction and with the assistance of the military administration." (*BBC*, 28, 30 May; *Times*, 30 May)

**June: Police Returned To Duty, Public Support for Police Organized.** On 5 June the police was rearmed and returned to its duties. (*Bayram Gazetesi*, 6 June)

In a communiqué published in Ankara on the same day, it was announced that the removal of members of the police who had carried out "unlawful orders issued by the overthrown government" had been completed. "It is not fair nor just," the communiqué continued, "to embark on mass accusations against the police, which offered no resistance whatever to the action of the NUC, but on the contrary, helped to obtain a bloodless re-



sult." The citizens were urged to give full support to the security organization. (*R. Ankara, 5 June-BBC, 7 June*)

On 23 June public rallies were held in Ankara, Istanbul and Izmir, with speakers from the police force and the academic institutions, to counteract "public disappointment with the police organization" following the "disgraceful acts of a few malicious members." The policemen were dressed in new uniforms, as the old ones had become objects of hatred during the final period of the Menderes regime. (*R. Ankara, 22, 23 June-BBC, 24, 25 June; Times, 30 June*)

The *Times* correspondent noted the present "modesty and affability" of the police attitude to the public. (*Times, 30 June*)

**Police Purged.** The purge of the police which started with the coup continued until mid-Aug. Fifty eight policemen were arrested on charges of sadistic torture of detainees, 400 were pensioned off, and 600 (of whom 80 per cent were heads of local police stations) were transferred to other jobs within the police organization. The Director-General of Security said on 23 Aug that those pensioned off had obeyed the unlawful orders of the former administration and were liable to do the same under a future administration. Public security had dangerously deteriorated during the previous regime, he said, and the police were now studying ways to rectify this situation. (*R. Ankara, 20 June-BBC, 22 June; R. Ankara, 23 Aug-BBC, 25 Aug; Monde, 24 Aug*)

### THE ARMY

**First Purge in the High Command** during and immediately after the coup, see p 435.

**Senior Officers Retired.** On 3 Aug it was announced that 235 Generals, Air-Marshals and Admirals were being retired from the army and the gendarmerie. They included five Generals, 13 Lt.-Generals, 54 Major-Generals, and 108 Brigadier-Generals; an Admiral, two Junior-Admirals, three Vice-Admirals and nine Rear-Admirals; four Air-Marshals, seven Air Vice-Marshals, and 14 Air-Commodores; and five Brigadier-Generals of the gendarmerie. Of the seven Generals in the NUC, six were retired. General Gürsel was the only exception; he wanted to retire, but the NUC decided that he should keep his rank for the time being. Other important retirements were: the Chief of the General Staff, General Ragıp Gümüşpala; the C.-in-C. of the Navy, Admiral Fahri Korutürk; and the C.-in-C. of the Air Force, General Cevdet Sunay, previously C.-in-C. of the Land Forces, was appointed Chief of the General Staff. (*Cumhuriyet, 4 Aug; Times; NYT, 5 Aug*)

The retiring Generals were immediately replaced by "young Generals." On 3 Aug 132 new appointments of young officers of the rank of Colonel or below, were announced by the Ministry of Defence. (*Times; NYHT, 5 Aug*)

**Retirement of Field Officers.** On 6 Aug it was announced that approximately 30 per cent of the field officers would be pensioned off in Aug and Sept. This would affect 70 per cent of the Colonels and 10-15 per cent of the Majors. (*R. Ankara, 6 Aug-BBC, 9 Aug; NYT, 8 Aug*) By Oct about 5,000 officers of these ranks were reportedly retired. (*Times, 29 Oct*) However, according to official sources the total number of retired officers was only 4,195 (see below).

On the same day the Ministry of Defence published

a new provisional law (No. 42) granting a fair deal to officers pensioned off. It raised the pension rate, which had been extremely low, and eased the requirements for pensions. Specially favourable terms were promised to officers of the rank of Major and above who applied for retirement by 20 Aug 1960. (*R. Ankara, 6 Aug-BBC, 9 Aug*) The government also promised housing on easy terms for the retiring officers. (*R. Ankara, 11 Aug-BBC, 13 Aug*)

**Military and Political Motives for Retirements.** Generals Gürsel and Özdilek explained that the reason for these measures was the need for the rejuvenation of the Armed Forces. "More youth was needed in the army because of new war techniques," stated General Özdilek. (*Cumhuriyet, 4 Aug; R. Ankara, 4 Aug-BBC, 6 Aug; Times, 5 Aug*)

A *Times* correspondent wrote that the retirements "have been expected for some time. It was realized that the structure of the Turkish forces had become top-heavy... and that room must be made for younger men. Even so, the wholesale nature of the changes took observers somewhat aback. It is considered reasonable to assume that the new military rulers have their own pressing reasons for wanting to remove from positions of authority some leading officers whose allegiance to the revolution was in doubt... Conversely it is clear that the new men were among those behind the May revolution." (*Times, 5 Aug*)

**Aug-Nov: Retired Officers to be Appointed to Administrative Posts.** The Defence Minister, Özdilek, announced on 11 Aug that the retired officers would be employed in the administration. "We are determined to strengthen the state administration and other public service, which were in the hands of partisan, incompetent, lazy and dishonest people, with retired generals and officers who are honest and honourable... Some of the retired generals have already been appointed to new posts, and more will be appointed as the need arises." (*R. Ankara, 11 Aug-BBC, 13 Aug*)

Two months later the NUC announced that 662 of the 4,195 officers retired on pension who requested civilian employment had been found such employment; "256 are already working for the Education Ministry, and the others will be appointed by early Nov." (*R. Ankara, 25 Oct-BBC, 3 Nov*)

### JUNE-JULY: CAMPAIGN AGAINST ADULATION OF LEADERS AND OFFICIALS

[Towards the end of June the government launched a campaign to put an end to the adulation and flattery of state leaders and officials which was customary under the RPP and DP regimes—and was, in fact, a historical heritage.]

On 29 June General Gürsel sent a circular to all Ministries, banning greetings and farewell ceremonies for the Head of State, the Premier and the Ministers, as well as the kissing of hands, applause, ovations and other forms of pretentious flattery. Demonstrations of respect and affection for government leaders should be dignified, the circular said. Official banquets, cocktail parties and other "unnecessary expense" were also banned, with a view to a general simplification of official ways and procedures.

General Gürsel also urged young Turks not to waste their blood by sending him flags steeped in blood [to prove their loyalty].

Ten days later the Premier's Office called on citizens

to concentrate on ordinary business, not to waste time by sending delegations from the provinces, and to drop the custom of sacrificing animals when welcoming government leaders. (*R. Ankara, 29 June-BBC, 1 July; R. Ankara, 9 July-BBC, 13 July; Hürriyet, 30 June; Times, 1 July; Cumhuriyet, 9 July*)

The NUC spokesman told the Press on 29 June that adulation was a social disease, which the administration would try to cure. Artificial and hypocritical ovations undermined morality. Soldiers did not like applause, which had no place in the army's tradition. Once the hypocrites failed to benefit from their hypocrisy, they would give it up. (*R. Ankara, 29 June-BBC, 1 July*)

### THE POLITICAL PARTIES

**May: Party Activities Banned Till the Elections.** On the day of the coup d'état the NUC issued the following announcement: "To ensure law and order and the security of the country, all forms of political party publications, activities and processions, and all types of gatherings are prohibited until further notice."

An order was issued in the name of General Gürsel: "Until the proclamation and coming into force of the new Constitution I ban all activities by all political parties. Activities to the contrary will be punished very severely." (*BBC, 28, 30 May*) [The parties were not disbanded however.]

Several days later General Gürsel promised that all parties, including the DP, would be permitted to take part in the general election under the new Constitution. Asked whether this included the DP leaders, he said: "If it is proved, as the results of the investigations, that among them are those who according to the Constitution and other laws are eligible to be elected, these like any other Turkish citizen will be able to participate in the elections." (*Ulus, 29 May; BBC, 2 June*)

**May-Dec: NUC to Remain Above Party Politics.** Following the coup d'état, General Gürsel and NUC spokesmen repeatedly denied any link with political parties or any intention to establish a party. A NUC announcement on 28 May, stated that the armed forces' action had been intended to save "the parties from the irreconcilable situation in which they landed themselves." "Just and free elections" would be held as soon as possible "under the supervision and arbitration of an above-party, impartial administration." (*BBC, 31 May*) A week later the NUC spokesman stated: "The NUC supports no political party whatever; i.e. it does not associate itself with the activities of any party. We support the people." (*BBC, 7 June*) (See also on the RPP, immediately below.)

Rumours that members of the NUC were creating a new party were denied at the end of the year by the Minister of the Interior, General Kızıloğlu, who reaffirmed its policy of remaining above party politics. (*Cumhuriyet; Times, 2 Dec*)

**The Republican People's Party.** Following the coup rumours spread that İsmet İnönü had been privy to it. This was denied by General Gürsel on the morrow of the coup (28 May). İnönü met Gürsel the same day (see p 434).

After the meeting on 28 May İnönü issued a statement urging his party to refrain from revenge, ill-will and rancour and to wait for free and honest elections, trusting in the traditions of the Turkish Army. (*Times, 30 May; BBC, 31 May*) [The sources available do not clarify whether the RPP obeyed these instructions. The

following statement issued by Gürsel on 14 June may, however, be relevant:]

"Some people, by assuming the national reform action to be... carried out by their own party, are spreading propaganda to this effect... and are attempting to intimidate members of the other party. The national reform is not a movement in favour of any person or any class. Our main objective is to achieve democracy... and to secure justice and freedom and economic development for [the people]. The essential thing is that our citizens, in their private affairs and in all fields of work, must have brotherly sentiments and live in peace." (*BBC, 16 June*) General Gürsel made a statement to the same effect on 27 June. (*Hürriyet, 28 June*)

In Nov, it was reported that General Gürsel had met İnönü before the decision was taken to oust the 14 "radicals" from the NUC. The "radicals" were strongly hostile to the RPP and İnönü personally (see above: Developments Inside the NUC).

**July: Party Branches Abolished.** On 4 July the NUC issued a law abolishing branches of political parties in the villages and the sub-districts (*nahiye*). When party life would be resumed, the parties would be permitted to retain branches only in the districts (*kaza*) and the provinces (*vilayet*) [district and provincial capitals?] (*Cumhuriyet, 24 June, 7 July*)

General Gürsel declared that this law had been found necessary because the branches had caused rifts in village life by creating two hostile camps, with separate mosques and cafes, even refraining from "intermarriage." The new law, however, was not meant to exclude the parties from village life, and they would be allowed to expound their views when they resumed their activities. In time, when they had attained the level of European parties, the restrictions would be abolished. (*Cumhuriyet, 11 July*)

**Sept-Oct: Democratic Party Liquidated.** On 29 Sept an Ankara court decided to liquidate the DP on a legal technicality which prescribed that every political party must hold an annual convention, which the DP had not done for five years; its property was to be turned over to the state. The leaders of the DP had the right to appeal within 15 days.

This claim for the liquidation of the DP had been submitted to the court on 14 Mar by a member of the party, but under the pressure of the former regime the trial had been delayed. (*Cumhuriyet, 30 Sept; Times 10 Oct*)

The decision of the court became final on 16 Oct, as no appeal was submitted. (*R. Ankara, 17 Oct-BBC, 20 Oct*)

### THE ECONOMY

[When the NUC came to power, it found itself faced with an extremely serious economic situation, following ten years of largely inflationary policies. To improve matters, the new government employed policies based in the main on the economic stabilization programme introduced in Aug 1958, the difference being that the necessary measures were now applied much more strictly. The main features of this policy were the abandonment of deficit financing and greater emphasis on planning. While progress was made in these respects and various development projects went ahead, the position deteriorated in other fields. The deflationary policy led to an aggravation of unemployment, while the political upheavals resulted in a retrenchment of consumer demand, with

all that this entailed for trade and industry. These developments constituted, of course, a political liability for the new regime.

Following is a survey of economic developments after the coup d'état. (It is based in part on extracts from the report for 1960 of the British Chamber of Commerce of Turkey, *MEED Aug-Sept 1961*.)

The NUC's policies: (Compare Views and Policies on Economic Affairs, pp 439-40.)

(a) An overhaul of fiscal policies was carried out, resulting in new rates of taxation from 1961 and the taxation of the larger agricultural incomes for the first time in Turkey's history.

In an effort to balance the 1960 budget, expenditure was cut by LT518 million from LT7,621 million. The economies mainly affected investments.

(b) The operations and organization of the debt-ridden state enterprises, which had been a serious burden on the economy for many years past, were being thoroughly reviewed by a team of Turkish and foreign experts in an effort to place them on a sound economic footing.

Of a total of 1,363 state and municipal development projects on hand at the time of the revolution, work was suspended or abandoned on 574 projects, on which over LT5,400 million had still to be spent. Work was expected to be restarted on some of the more viable projects, while such grandiose schemes as a bridge across the Bosphorus were definitely abandoned.

Efforts were expected to denationalize some industrial plants; three were already earmarked for transfer to private enterprise. State enterprise and Treasury debts in respect of advances from the Central Bank (totalling LT5,300 million) were consolidated and further advances halted.

At the same time the government went ahead with the development of steel and coal-mining projects. With the aid of a \$129.6 million US Development Loan Fund credit (agreed in Jan 1961) plans were completed for the construction of a second iron and steel works, at Ereğli, on the Black Sea coast; the operating company was set up and site preparations were started. Meanwhile, the Karabük iron and steel plant and the coal mines on the Black Sea were being expanded.

Progress was also made in the construction of two new refineries.

(c) A law for the establishment of a State Planning Organization was promulgated in Oct, to assist the government in determining economic and social policies. The British Chamber of Commerce report assumed that, in the long run, the Organization could ensure that there was no return to the wide-scale but haphazard and uneconomic development of the 1950-1958 era. At the same time a temporary planning committee was set up to deal with short-term problems. The basis for a detailed five-year development plan was drawn up. No new industrial or other development project could proceed without government approval.

(d) Credit restrictions for industrial and export undertakings—which, like the economy in general, were suffering from a shortage of funds—were eased. At the same time, bank interest rates were raised, with special, lower rates for industrial and export credits. Credit remained very limited, as the banks were almost fully extended.

(e) Unreasonably high minimum prices for such important crops as cereals, sugar beet and tobacco were no longer guaranteed by the government; steps were taken for the cultivation of low-grade tobacco to replace sugar

beet. Long-term plans for integrated agricultural development were being prepared.

(f) On 16 Sept the National Protection Law was suspended; under its terms trading and manufacturing profit margins had been controlled and other restrictions placed on trade and industry. Prices, however, did not rise because of overstocking and low demand.

(g) Efforts were made to develop the export of manufactured goods, especially cotton textiles. A special low-interest credit fund was established to assist manufacturers who entered the export field. The government gave active consideration to the possibility of a duty drawback scheme for materials used in producing exports. A government export Promotion Centre was set up.

(h) Development of tourism was given close attention and the assistance of foreign experts obtained but an immediate, large-scale increase in revenue from this source could not be expected.

(i) Social policies were still in the process of being reviewed; an extension of the workers' insurance scheme was promised and a pilot "national health" scheme was due to be introduced in 1962; a ten-year plan for the provision of adequate primary school education facilities was the subject of a law already on the Statute Book. A bill aiming to double the rate of house-building had been drafted; labour legislation had been the subject of much consideration and, with reservations, the right to strike had been promised. (Social legislation was promulgated in Jan 1961.)

(j) Negotiations on Turkey's admission as an associate member of the Common Market were continued.

(k) The global import quota scheme was maintained, but on the basis of quotas fixed every six months instead of at irregular intervals. The free import list was enlarged. Foreign exchange payments for imports and in respect of consolidated commercial and intergovernmental debts were made without delay. Credit-term imports were prohibited. Foreign trade regulations were modified to ease the burden of formalities.

(l) Further substantial foreign aid was obtained from international organizations, the US and West Germany (see table p 52). The US also released LT1,000 million from counterpart funds derived from the sale of US surplus agriculture produce.

(m) The Turkish Pound was formally devalued to the rate of LT9.—to \$1 (LT25.20 to £1 sterling) from 22 Aug; this regularized the system of premiums which had been in force since Aug 1958.

On the debit side, the slowing down of economic activity as a consequence of deflationary policy and the fall in demand resulting from the political upheavals has already been mentioned. The public kept most of its money in cash; bank deposits rose over the year by seven per cent, but there was evidence that money was being hoarded. New investment fell below the 1959 level, and so, apparently, did industrial output, while stocks accumulated. Credit scarcity added to the companies' problems. Unemployment inevitably increased as firms closed down and development was curtailed.

The below-average crops of 1960 aggravated the internal economic situation in addition to their adverse influence on the foreign trade situation; cereals had to be imported while export of agricultural commodities fell below the 1959 level.

The measures contemplated by the new government to eliminate the long-standing foreign trade gap and rectify the adverse balance of payments could be expected to show results only in the long run. Meanwhile, foreign aid remained of the utmost importance.]



## PUBLIC FUND-RAISING TO IMPROVE THE FINANCIAL SITUATION

**Voluntary Contributions.** Following the coup d'état the treasury was found to be empty and the state enterprises deep in debt. Brigadier Sıtkı Ulay, the Minister of Communications, revealed the financial mis-management of the Menderes government in a series of broadcasts in June. At the same time the Press dealt intensively with the seriousness of the economic situation. This was followed by a fund-raising campaign among the public. Officers and men of the armed forces, as well as civilians, donated their wedding rings and other valuables to the treasury. Committees were formed to receive the contributions.

Religious leaders of the minorities—the Chief Rabbi and other rabbis, and the Greek Orthodox and Armenian clergy—contributed.

The gold and jewelry donated by the beginning of July was valued at LT12,050,000 (about \$1.34 million); the gold given weighed 514,721 kg. The government requested the donors to refrain from buying new wedding rings in order to prevent a rise in the price of gold. (*Turkish Press*, 1–30 June; *R. Ankara*, 9 June–BBC, 11 June; *Times*, 16 June; *R. Ankara*, 9 July–BBC W, 14 July)

**Domestic Loans.** On 16 June General Gürsel issued an announcement praising members of the armed forces and civilians for their part in the campaign. "There can be no doubt that this gesture is a token of great national solidarity," he said. "However, we have decided to obtain the funds needed by the Treasury through domestic loans by issuing 'freedom loan' bonds rather than accepting donations." (*R. Ankara*, 16 June–BBC, 18 June)

On 11 July a law authorizing the Ministry of Finance to raise LT500 million (about \$55.5 million) by a public issue of Freedom Bonds, was published. On 15 July the government placed on sale LT250 million, of which LT51,572,000 were raised within the first five days. (*R. Ankara*, 11 July–BBC W, 14 July; *R. Ankara*, 20 July–BBC, 22 July)

## THE UNIVERSITIES

**The University Reform Law—Purge of University Staffs.** On 27 Oct the NUC issued a law dismissing 146 members of the university academic staffs. It affected 28 full professors, 57 professors, 43 lecturers, 7 chief assistant professors and 11 assistant professors in five major institutions: the universities of Ankara and Istanbul, Istanbul Technical University, the Aegean University in Izmir, and the Atatürk University in Erzurum. Those dismissed would not be employed again in a university, but might be given other unspecified functions. They were to receive their full salaries for Nov; if they did not find other employment within six months thereafter, they would be subject to normal retirement conditions. (*Times*, 29 Oct)

Professor Tunaya and Professor Giritli, former members of the Constitution Committee (from which they had been expelled on 31 Aug—see p 453), were among those dismissed.

No official explanation was given for the law, but it was reported that it "was directed against professors, including doctors and lawyers, who had private practices and were not devoting full time to university studies." (*NYT*, 29 Oct)

On the following day another law was issued granting administrative autonomy to the universities. It abolished the titles of professor ordinarius, professor and lecturer, and prohibited university teachers from working more

than ten hours a week outside the universities. (*Times*, 29 Oct) [No further details on the law were available.]

**Universities Oppose the Dismissals.** The dismissals, which affected some of Turkey's best-known scholars, caused general astonishment, especially as the professors had been among the warmest supporters of the military coup and one of the first acts of the army leaders had been to bring them into the government and set up a panel of professors to prepare the new constitution.

Most of those dismissed were taken by surprise, and several, when told the news, thought at first that it must be a joke.

Part of the Press and the university circles reacted sharply. Professor Sami Onar, Rector of Istanbul University (who had been a central figure in the anti-Menderes student demonstrations, and was serving as Chairman of the Constitution Committee), Professor Fikret Narter, Rector of Istanbul Technical University, and Professor Kemal Yetkin, Rector of Ankara University, resigned (on 28 Oct) in protest. They said they regarded the action as an abridgement of academic freedom, adding that the NUC should have consulted the universities first. Dr Şensoy, who was appointed acting Rector in place of Professor Onar, said that the dismissals "will depreciate academic freedom and lessen the university's function to a great extent."

On 28 Oct about a thousand students met in Istanbul University to protest against the move. (*Times*; *NYT*, 29 Oct; *Times*, 1 Nov)

**NUC Explanations.** On 28 Oct a NUC spokesman explained to correspondents in Ankara that the Committee had ordered the universities two months ago to prepare a reform programme, and had been obliged to act because they had failed to comply. Some of the professors were incompetent, some were lazy, and others were working in jobs outside the universities, he declared. (*Times*; *NYT*, 29 Oct)

On 29 Oct the NUC issued a statement saying that a law on staffing and reorganization had long been favoured in principle by university circles. As this demand was one of the cornerstones of the revolution, the NUC had now given the universities complete autonomy and enabled their staffs and students to work in material and moral comfort. At the same time, some members of the teaching staff had been relieved of their chairs. Rumours that a subsequent list was being prepared were totally untrue, and contrary to the spirit of the new law. (*R. Ankara*, 29 Oct–BBC, 1 Nov) (See also Views and Policies on education.)

On the same day members of the NUC explained that the laws had enhanced the autonomy of the universities and ensured greater participation by the younger members of the staff in their administration. It had also widened the powers of the deans and rectors and given them control of university affairs. The aim was to ensure the development of the universities in an atmosphere of complete academic and administrative autonomy and freedom. (*R. Ankara*, 30 Oct–BBC, 1 Nov)

**Efforts to Revise the NUC Decision.** On 31 Oct and 1 Nov representatives of the universities and the students met NUC members and General Gürsel in an effort to obtain a withdrawal of the dismissals.

On 31 Oct, a committee elected by the senates met the NUC, which announced after the meeting that it had "agreed to review the problems which the laws have created within the spirit of university autonomy."



On the same day General Gürsel received the acting Rector of Ankara University and, it was reported, told him, "If there has been a mistake we shall correct it."

On 1 Nov he received a delegation of Ankara University students, after some of them had staged a silent protest march. He promised that some of the dismissed professors would be reinstated, and the students expressed their satisfaction at this undertaking. (*R. Ankara*, 31 Oct-BBC, 2 Nov; *Times*, 1, 2 Nov)

These moves apparently had a calming effect on the university staffs and students. On 4 Nov the rectors who had resigned in protest were re-elected, and three days later, on 7 Nov, the academic year, which should have started on 1 Nov, was opened. (*Monde*, 2, 6, 7 Nov; *Times*, 5 Nov; *R. Ankara*, 7 Nov-BBC, 9 Nov)

**Reported Disagreement in NUC; Dismissals not Revised.** It was reported that the NUC was divided on the issue; General Gürsel was willing to rescind the dismissals, but the radical members were unwilling to alter the decision. (*Times*, 4 Nov) When on 13 Nov the radical elements were ousted from the NUC, the university issue was generally mentioned as one of those on which it had been divided (see p 438).

However, efforts by the rectors and senates to obtain a revision of the law remained fruitless, even after the purge of the NUC. The personal files of the dismissed professors vanished after the purge of the NUC officers who had prepared the dismissals, according to the Turkish Press, and it was therefore impossible to re-examine the problem. Up to the end of 1960 no professor had been reinstated, though it was hoped that the issue would be submitted by the university representatives to the Constituent Assembly for reconsideration. (*Hürriyet*, 19 Nov, 2 Dec; *Cumhuriyet*, 25 Nov; *Vatan*, 6 Dec)

## RELIGION

**NOTE:** See also Views and Policies on Religion.

**July: Attacks on Secular Character of State.** Ali Fuat Başgil, Professor of constitutional law, Istanbul University, published several articles against the secular character of the state in *Yeni Sabah* in July. [See also p 451.] (*Yeni Sabah*, 31 July; *Cumhuriyet*, 1 Aug)

[Probably as a result of these articles, the new regime began at the end of July to explain its attitude to religion.]

**NUC Favours Separation of Religion from Politics; No Antagonism to Religion.** On 25 July the NUC issued the following statement:

"It is the greatest aim of the NUC to keep our sacred religion, which is the treasure of freedom of conscience, pure and unblemished, without making it a tool of reactionary and political movements. The religious beliefs and practices of our compatriots can be interfered with neither by law nor by force. With this aim, we would like to state categorically that statements, comments and propaganda emanating from certain organizations and individuals about the chanting of the Qur'an and the Ezan [the call for prayer] in Turkish, which might cause people to hold wrong views, cannot represent the opinions of the NUC." (*Yeni Sabah*, 26 July; *R. Ankara*, 25 July-BBC, 27 July) [On the problem of using the Turkish language in prayers see below.]

Eight days later (2 Aug), Amil Artuğ, Minister of State denied rumours that the NUC's attitude was anti-religious, and that it intended to turn mosques into army barracks, to have the call to prayer chanted in Tur-

kish, to ban prayers, and to prohibit the reading of the Qur'an and the relaying of religious services over the radio. He said that the persons spreading such propaganda were trying to poison the minds of the people because their interests had been harmed by the reforms. Artuğ recalled the misuse of religion for political ends in the days of the former regime, adding that in the future the Qur'an would be broadcast only on Fridays and religious services on the appropriate days. (*R. Ankara*, 2 Aug-BBC, 4 Aug; *Cumhuriyet*, 3 Aug)

**Dec: NUC Policy on Religious Affairs.** On 17 Dec Hayri Mumcuoğlu, Minister of State, issued a statement on the activities of the Religious Affairs Directorate in the PM's Office. He said that the government was determined to hand over religious institutions and the discussion of religious matters to men of religion and to endeavour to avoid the abuse of the citizens' faith for political purposes. He added that freedom of faith and conscience, which would also be guaranteed by the new Constitution, were held in greater respect than ever.

The Directorate of Religion would be reorganized to increase its efficiency, he continued; preparations were in hand to improve the training of clergy; a new translation of the Qur'an into Turkish was in progress; the Qur'an course [in the schools?] would be improved and steps would be taken to see that the people were better enlightened by the preachers at Friday services.

The Minister said that mosques were not only places of worship but also outstanding examples of Turkish architecture, and steps would be taken to restore them.

He concluded that there was no place for superstition in Islam; a study of its causes was now being undertaken, on the completion of which methods of combating superstition would be considered. (*R. Ankara*, 17 Dec-BBC, 20 Dec)

**Religion and National Unity.** During July-Oct General Gürsel expressed in his speeches the need for national unity as against division into religious sects.

At Iskanderun on 29 July he stated that the shaken economy of the country could be rapidly improved, provided that national unity was maintained and the nation tackled its problems with diligence. The promotion of various religious beliefs capable of disintegrating the nation constituted a great danger; no one had the right to do this, he said. The evil of sects which had come down through history must be destroyed, he said, and there must be no internecine enmity. (*R. Ankara*, 29 July-BBC, 2 Aug)

In another speech Gürsel said: "Islam is a sacred institution, whose intention is not to set countrymen against one another, but to bring them close together as brethren. It is not reactionary but edifying, and it leads to perfection. Those who have tried to interpret the mission of Islam in a different way are very unfortunate." (*Cumhuriyet*, 12 Aug; *R. Ankara*, 11 Aug-BBC, 13 Aug) (See also Gürsel's speech in Gaziantep, southern Anatolia, *R. Ankara*, 24 Oct-BBC, 26 Oct.)

**Religion in Relation to Work and Progress.** In his speeches in Oct-Nov Gürsel also discussed the problem of religion in relation to work and progress. At Malatya, southern Anatolia, he called for efforts to improve the economic situation and said: "Islam orders us to work and advance towards perfection." (*R. Ankara*, 24 Oct-BBC, 26 Oct)

In Erzurum, on 25 Oct, General Gürsel called on the people to work and to overcome Turkey's backwardness.

He said: "Those who blame religion for our backwardness are wrong. No, the cause of our backwardness is not our religion but those who have misrepresented our religion to us. Islam is the most sacred, most constructive, most dynamic and powerful religion in the world. It demands of those who believe in this faith always to achieve progress and better wisdom. But for centuries Islam has been explained to us negatively and incorrectly. This is why we are now lagging behind the world nations. While nations have reached into space we have become even unable to walk on earth. Such darkness is unbecoming the Turkish people, who once conquered continents and before whose sword the world trembled. We will march forward. You will march forward and achieve the greatest advances." (*R. Ankara, 25 Oct-BBC, 27 Oct*)

Speaking in Zonguldak, northern Anatolia, on 7 Nov, General Gürsel urged his listeners to work hard, saying that God was not to be found by sitting in the mosque and that one of the teachings of Islam was the importance of hard work. (*R. Ankara, 7 Nov-BBC, 9 Nov*)

**Oct-Dec: Question of Turkish in Religious Ceremonies.** [Controversy over the use of Turkish in religious ceremonies has raged since the founding of the republic. The Qur'an was never officially translated into Turkish, and the unofficial translations were never used in religious ceremonies. The orthodox Muslim view is that the Qur'an, having been handed down to the Prophet in Arabic, cannot legitimately be translated. Kemal Atatürk only changed the call to prayer (*ezan*) from Arabic into Turkish, but the Menderes government restored it to Arabic.]

On 5 Oct, during his visit to the Supreme Islamic Institute in Istanbul, General Gürsel said he thought that the Qur'an should be translated into Turkish and that the call to prayer should be read in Turkish. Turks ought to be able to understand the sacred book of their religion, he said, but very few could do so, as few understood Arabic. The same applied to the call to prayer and to prayers in the mosque. "A Turk can never really be master of his religion," he declared, "if he cannot express it in his own language." (*Cumhuriyet, 6 Oct; Times, 7 Oct*)

On 4 Dec, Hayri Mumcuoğlu, the Minister of State, announced that professors and religious functionaries had begun to translate the Qur'an into Turkish. The work would be completed within six to seven months. On 17 Dec he said that the translation was in progress and added that the volume would include detailed interpretations. (*Cumhuriyet, 5 Dec; R. Ankara, 17 Dec-BBC, 20 Dec*)

**Changes in the Supreme Islamic Institute.** [The Supreme Islamic Institute (*Yüksek İslam Enstitüsü*) in Istanbul was opened in Nov 1959 to train teachers of religion for the secondary and teachers' training schools, as well as the schools for Imams and preachers. The students are selected from the graduates of the schools for Imams and preachers, which were opened in the academic year 1951/52 to train enlightened Imams and preachers for the mosques all over the country. In 1959 there were 19 such schools, with 4,233 students and 169 teachers.]

In Oct it was reported that the Ministry of Education had begun to introduce changes in the curriculum of the Institute. Lessons in economics, astronomy, civil law and sociology would be introduced. It was also decided to erect a new building for the institute. (*Cumhuriyet, 10 Oct*)

**Aug-Oct: Campaign Against the Çarşaf.** [The wearing

of the *çarşaf*—a traditional wrap-round garment, including a veil, worn by women—was prohibited by Kemal Atatürk. Despite all efforts, however, women continued to wear it.]

At the end of Aug the new regime opened a campaign against the *çarşaf*. The Governor of Istanbul, General Refik Tulga, stated at a Press conference on 26 Aug, that although 37 years had passed since the founding of the republic, some of the Turkish women were still wearing it, while women in Pakistan, Indonesia and India had now gone unveiled for hundreds of years. "I think," he continued, "that the wearing of the *çarşaf* is a habit inherited from the Christian Church and has no connection with Islam; in Italy I saw nuns wearing the same sort of *çarşaf*. The only association of the *çarşaf* is with reaction." Tulga said that in the campaign against the *çarşaf* men in general and heads of families in particular had an important role to play and he expressed his appreciation of Press support for the campaign. Tulga declared: "We are determined to carry through the struggle on this issue; before resorting to drastic measures, however, we shall try to convince by explanation and persuasion."

During the first days following the coup, the Governor added, the *çarşaf* had vanished from the streets of Istanbul, but it had appeared again when the leniency of the government became apparent. He said that a company had donated 120 sewing-machines and with the aid of women's organizations coats would now be sewn for women wearing the *çarşaf*. (*Cumhuriyet, 27 Aug*)

The Mufti of Istanbul, Bekir Hakkı Yener, stated on 27 Aug: "The word *çarşaf* is not even Turkish; it is of Persian origin. The *çarşaf* has not come down from Muhammad; it is a leftover from the times of Sultan Abdul Hamid. We shall explain the relation between religion and the *çarşaf* in sermons in the mosques." (*Cumhuriyet, 28 Aug*)

In Aug a women's organization was founded in Antalya, southern Anatolia, to combat the *çarşaf*. Members of the organization were to visit the villages and explain the issue. (*Cumhuriyet, 29 Aug*)

In Sept it was reported that representatives of reform and student organizations, headed by the Governor of Istanbul, Refik Tulga, spoke at a village meeting against the wearing of the "uncivilized" *çarşaf*. They urged the village women to wear coats instead, and a number of coats were given to the mukhtar for distribution. (*R. Ankara, 10, 11 Sept-BBC, 14 Sept*)

In Oct it was reported that in the village of Soğukpinarı, in the vicinity of Bursa, north-western Anatolia, 129 women had exchanged the *çarşaf* for coats (*Cumhuriyet, 8 Oct*)

## THE RURAL POPULATION

NOTE: See also Views and Policies, Rural Developments.

**Rural Population's Suspicion of New Regime.** *The Times* described the mood of the Turkish villages during the first few weeks of the revolution as follows:

"In many Turkish villages, there is an audible bewilderment. Menderes, built up by Democrat propaganda, especially since his miraculous survival in the Gatwick air crash, was for many of them a sort of god, or a prophet... For the more reactionary peasants the new regime means one thing only—the advent to power of the Dinsizler (the irreligious men), by which they mean the RPP, founders of the secular state, abolishers of the Caliphate—and they have other things to grumble about.

"One of the last acts of the Menderes government...

was to announce a steep increase in the price paid to the peasant for his corn. The new government... has already declared that the price will not be raised... It is also possible that now for the first time the richer peasants will have to pay taxes." (*Times*, 15 June)

Teachers who visited a number of villages at the end of July, reported that the influence of the old regime was still marked; a number of peasants whom they had tried to approach had avoided them. (*Cumhuriyet*, 2 Aug)

In Sept an observer remarked: "The trouble at the moment is that many of Menderes' peasant devotees refuse to believe that he is a bad man and that the NUC are good men. The Democrats' encouragement of more reactionary manifestations of religious feeling had won them many votes." (*World Today*, 9 Sept 1960) (See also below on hostile reactions to the NUC's propaganda efforts.)

**July-Dec: NUC Propaganda Campaign in Villages.** [The NUC made considerable efforts to win over the peasants. Students and teachers went out to the villages to talk to them, and leaders, including General Gürsel himself, visited the provincial capitals to explain the aims of the new regime and describe the faults of the old one. Special attention was devoted to eastern Anatolia, where traditional forces were strong. The NUC took strong measures against the landowners.]

**General Gürsel's Campaign.** In the middle of July, General Gürsel spent three days in the eastern provinces on a special enlightenment campaign. His two main themes were the need for unity and hard work.

Speaking in Erzinjan, he said that the Democratic government had accustomed the Turkish people to laziness. "Turks must give up sitting in the village coffee-house and expecting everything to come from God."

Turkey was a long way behind other countries, he continued. "People are going to the moon, to the stars. We are walking on the ground. We cannot accept such backwardness in this century. We must work and work hard."

Speaking in his home town, Erzurum, General Gürsel tackled two delicate questions. He said there would be complete religious freedom for all sects and creeds under the new regime. "Şafi or Hanefi Sunni or Kızılbaş, we are all Turks," he declared. (Eastern Turkey is inhabited by many dissident Muslim sects.)

General Gürsel also said that a foreign Ambassador had asked him questions about the Kurdish problem, and he had replied: "There is no such thing in Turkey as Kurds and Kurdishness. We are a single nation in heart and spirit." (*Cumhuriyet*, 19 July; *Times*, 20 July)

Speaking in Eskişehir (central Anatolia) on 11 Aug, Gürsel accused the Democrat Party of vote-snatching by molycoddling the Kurdish shaykhs. (*Cumhuriyet*, 12 Aug)

**Aug-Nov: Turkish Cultural Society Founded.** On 17 Aug the Turkish Cultural Society (*Türk Kültür Derneği*) was formed, with the object of spreading learning throughout the land. (*Cumhuriyet*, 18 Aug)

On 30 Aug the Ministry of Education decided to put at its disposal the "People's Houses" (built by the RPP in towns and villages when it was in power and expropriated by the DP in 1951). (*Ulus*, 31 Aug)

On 8 Nov, at the opening of a branch of the Society in Ankara, it was announced that it had so far formed 115 branches. Colonel Türkeş in his inaugural address,

said: "The Turkish Cultural Society will take the Turkish intellectual to the Turkish village. The intellectual and the people will thus be united in friendship." (*R. Ankara*, 9 Nov-BBC, 11 Nov.)

**Aug: Gürsel Government Not to Press Farmers for Immediate Payment of Debts.** In a speech in Izmir on 19 Aug, General Gürsel denied rumours that the property tax [*vergi*-levied only during the Second World War] would be reimposed, or that the authorities would commandeered half the farmers' crops. He said that Turkey's new leaders were preoccupied with the problem of improving the position of the farmers. He charged the previous government, which had overreached itself in granting credits to the farmers, with being responsible for their heavy indebtedness to the Agricultural Bank which amounted to almost LT1,500 million. The NUC would not exert pressure on those who were unable to pay their debts immediately, but would facilitate repayment at low rates over a long period. On the other hand, those who did have the means were asked to pay their debts in order to help the Agricultural Bank to recover. (*Cumhuriyet*, 19 Aug)

**Aug: Gürsel on Agrarian Reform.** On 18 Aug *Ticaret*, Izmir, carried a declaration by General Gürsel on agrarian reform, which said: "We are about to introduce agrarian reform and solve the main problems of land and people in the eastern provinces. We have no intention to deprive anyone of his rightful property, duly registered as such in the Land Registry Office; we will not requisition land without compensation... But in the east... much of the land... was taken by force and was never registered. There are people who usurped lands on which there are 20-30 villages, without any registration, and exploit those who live on these lands. We will distribute such lands among the peasants. We shall make the eastern peasants, enslaved by the shaykhs and their like, into landowners." [This statement foreshadowed the NUC's campaign against the Ağa in eastern Anatolia—see below.] (*Cumhuriyet*, 19 Aug)

**Sept 1960-Jan 1961: Taxation of Income from Agriculture.** [During the DP regime, income from agriculture was not taxed, which helped the regime to build up popularity among the rural population. On the other hand this policy increased the burden of taxation on the urban population and was regarded as one of the causes of inflation.]

In Sept Gürsel announced: "For the purpose of ensuring equality and justice in taxation, it has now become a necessity to impose taxes on profits acquired by agricultural activities... The imposition of taxes on small and even medium-sized 'agricultural works' [incomes] is not being contemplated. Only large landowners and those who acquire large profits from agriculture will basically be subjected to this tax... Only ten per cent, or even less, of establishments will be effected by this tax. This subject is still being carefully studied. As no results have yet been obtained, it is impossible to estimate the amount of revenue that would accrue from this taxation." (*R. Ankara*, 17 Sept-BBC, 20 Sept; *Ulus*, 18 Sept)

[On 5 Jan 1961, in the framework of new fiscal laws, a tax on agriculture incomes on the above lines was introduced.]

**Sept: Propaganda in the Villages.** Students and teachers touring villages as part of the information campaign were



met with hostility, sometimes with stones. With the approach of the trial of the former leaders of the old regime, the mood of the peasants assumed even greater importance, and it was decided that members of the NUC should conduct an intensive campaign in the provinces. (*Monde*, 21 Sept)

On 21 Sept Ankara Radio announced the names of 28 members of the NUC who were touring the country to describe the work done since the May 27th revolution and study its psychological and sociological effects on the public. (*BBC*, 23 Sept)

**Sept: NUC Members' Statements.** On completing tours of Izmir and Manisa, NUC members made the following points: none of the civil servants would be eliminated; workers' problems would be tackled and agricultural produce disposed of; the taxation system would be adjusted in accordance with "just principles"; the peasants' assistance would be sought in building village schools; land reform would be tackled as a whole; the removal of villages in unproductive forest areas to fertile plains was being studied; and serious efforts were being made to eliminate "hidden unemployment."

NUC members who visited Thrace said that the people there were fully aware of the social and economic damage done by the ousted government, had confidence in the NUC and were convinced that "any pressure directed against the reforms by any force" would never succeed. They were "very much enlightened" on the religious question, and "wish to have among them genuine men of religion." NUC members who had visited other areas said they had fully explained to the people the significance of the "May 27th reform" and stressed the importance of education and the fight against illiteracy. (*R. Ankara*, 28 Sept-BBC, 30 Sept)

**Oct-Nov: General Gürsel's Tours.** On 24 Oct General Gürsel, accompanied by Muzaffer Özdağ, of the NUC, and the Minister of Trade, Mehmet Baydur, set off on a tour of the provinces of Erzurum, Gaziantep, Diyarbakir and Malatya. In his speeches, General Gürsel said that the objects of the revolution were the abolition of tyranny and the prevention of fraternal conflict. He promised democratic rule and called for hard work, stressing that the prosperity of the nation depended on its progress in science and technology. He spoke of Islam as the most instructive, the most dynamic religion in the world; but those who had preached it had distorted it and brought backwardness upon the Turkish people. (*BBC*, 26, 27 Oct)

In Nov Gürsel visited the countryside near the Black Sea. Here again, he urged his listeners to hard work. He discussed local problems and promised help in meeting local needs. (*R. Ankara*, 7 Nov-BBC, 9 Nov; *Ulus*, 8 Nov)

**Dec: Opening of Radio Station for Eastern Turkey.** On 15 Dec a new radio station was inaugurated in Erzurum, eastern Anatolia. A message from General Gürsel was read out, in which he said:

"Dear fellow-countrymen of the eastern provinces! We have established a radio station in Erzurum in order to save you from listening to foreign radios... In the majority of cases foreign radios carry sedition, corruption and even poison. The Erzurum Radio will protect you against these vices. It will discuss our own problems in our own pure language." (*R. Ankara*, 15 Dec-BBC, 17 Dec)

## OCT-NOV: NUC ACTION AGAINST THE AĞA

**Power to Exile Ağa to Other Areas.** On 20 Oct, the NUC passed a Bill to counteract the influence of the Ağa [semi-feudal landowners] and religious leaders in Turkish villages. Under this law, the Ağa could be banished, by administrative order, from their domiciles and barred from holding any government office or army post. (*Monde*, 22 Oct)

**The Status of Ağa.** A correspondent of *Hürriyet* who visited eastern Anatolia, the Ağa's stronghold, in Nov, reported that these "reactionaries" had been members of the Assembly, mayors and heads of local party branches, who maintained their control over the peasants with the aid of mounted private troops. They engaged in smuggling to Iran and Iraq, aided by their connections in those countries. The previous regime had turned a blind eye to these activities, in order to win the votes of the peasants, over whom these people ruled. (*Hürriyet*, 19, 20 Nov)

**Arrest and Exile of Ağa.** Shortly after the coup, 244 Ağa were imprisoned in Sivas. On 21 Nov, 189 of them were released. The Minister of the Interior, who went to Sivas, addressed the released prisoners and warned them not to become the tools of party factions or religious exploiters. (*Ulus*, 22 Nov)

The Minister of the Interior announced on 6 Dec that the Compulsory Resettlement Law passed by the NUC would apply only to the 55 prisoners in Sivas who had not been released. (*R. Ankara*, 6 Dec-BBC, 8 Dec; *Ulus*, 7 Dec)

The proceeds of the sale of the exiles' property would be utilized to cover the cost of their resettlement elsewhere and the payment of their taxes, the remainder being handed over to its owners. The property would be sold by a special committee of three. (*Ulus*, 4 Dec)

*The Times* reported that most of the 55 landowners were to be resettled in such places as Izmir, in the west, Antalya on the south coast, and the old Ottoman capital of Bursa in north-west Anatolia.

Most of the 55 were of Kurdish origin, and had previously held despotic sway in the eastern provinces, particularly Van and Hakkari, some of them owning fifty or more villages as their personal property, as well as immense flocks of sheep and herds of cattle. In these areas the writ of the central government hardly ran at all, and the population were little more than serfs of the feudal landowner.

One of the principal charges against the Menderes government was that it gave full scope to these landowners in exchange for their electoral support. In these still backward regions, where there was still almost complete illiteracy and much religious fanaticism, whole communities voted for the ruling party at a mere word from the local landowner.

No previous government since the time of Kemal Atatürk had taken measures to break the power of the landowners of eastern Turkey or carve up their estates. (*Times*, 12 Dec)

*Ulus* commented that the resettlement was "one of the most important social reforms we have carried out since the time of Mahmud II" (quoted in *BBC*, 8 Dec).

**Adverse Reaction Among Landowners; Government Statement: "No Land Reform Yet."** *The Times* further reported that these measures had caused perturbation among landowners large and small, particularly those who favoured the fallen Menderes government, through-



out the country, and some of them, according to reports had refused to plough and sow their land for next year's crop.

The *Times* reported that General Kızıloğlu, Minister of the Interior, "had been obliged" to issue a statement (on 6 Dec) saying that the Compulsory Resettlement Law was aimed only at "those who are guilty" and that "land reform is not intended to meet out justice." The statement added: "There is anyway no such thing as land reform yet." (*Times*, 12 Dec)

### THE PRESS

(On the Press under the DP regime, see pp 424, 431)

**May-June: Freedom of the Press.** On the day of the coup the NUC announced that all newspapers banned under the DP regime might resume publication on 28 May. On the following days newspapermen imprisoned under the Menderes regime were released.

At a Press conference on 24 June, General Gürsel pledged respect for the freedom of the Press. He encouraged the newspapers to advise and even to criticize his government, and said that the Menderes regime had fallen largely because it had refused to allow Press criticism. (*Times*, 28 May; 6 June)

**June: Problem of Distributing Paper and Advertisements.** [In the last years of the DP regime, newspapers refusing to toe the government line were discriminated against in official advertisements and in the allocation of newsprint. In 1959 the government established a Central Advertising Agency which channelled all official and private advertisements, and papers showing signs of independence were discriminated against in private advertisements as well.]

On 14 June the six national newspapers (*Cumhuriyet*, *Dünya*, *Hürriyet*, *Milliyet*, *Vatan* and *Yeni Sabah*—all independent, appearing in Istanbul) issued an announcement suggesting that the government abolish the supervision over newsprint imports and the allocation of private advertisements. It also suggested that the government issue an official advertising bulletin instead of publishing official notices in the Press [probably to assure that official advertising should not be used again for discriminatory purposes.] (*Cumhuriyet*, 14 June)

General Gürsel, admitted to newspaper owners and editors on 23 June that the government could save about LT 20 million a year by publishing an official advertising bulletin; but said that such a step would lead to the closure of all except five or six newspapers [probably meaning the six national papers mentioned]. The government would therefore continue to publish official notices, in the Press, but in consultation with its representatives. (*Cumhuriyet*, 24 June)

**Warning to Press to Exercise Self-censorship.** [During July and Aug, as it became clear that the former DP leaders would be brought to trial, several newspapers demanded the trial of other persons who had cooperated with the former DP regime in its misdeeds.] The government asked the Press to desist from such appeals. On 8 July General Gürsel called on the Press for self-censorship, as there were complaints of libel.

A month later the Minister of Justice warned the Press that the Press Law enacted by the former regime was still in force and would be resorted to if needed. (*Ulus*, 9 July; *Vatan*, 16 Aug)

**Suspension of Newspapers.** By the end of 1960 the new regime had suspended three newspapers for short terms.

In mid-July the Istanbul daily *Havadis* (a former DP paper) published an article suggesting that if the leaders of the Menderes regime were to be punished for crimes against the state, the RPP should also be held guilty of similar offences during its 27 years in power (1923-1950). Further articles in the paper implied that there were Communists among the university staffs and students. This raised a storm of protest—the first article was taken as an attack on Atatürk—both in the RPP and in the universities. On 28 July students held a protest march and demonstrated outside the *Havadis* offices. A counter-demonstration by supporters of the newspaper followed.

On 29 July army officers entered the paper's offices, imposed a ban on its reports of the counterdemonstration, and warned the editors not to provoke young people. On the same day about 3,000 students collected at Istanbul University and prepared to march again on the *Havadis* offices but were dissuaded by army officers.

A spokesman for the students told *The Times* correspondent that the students favoured democracy and the free expression of opinion, but would not tolerate attacks on Atatürk's reforms and would not permit anybody to call them Communists. Later in the day the paper was closed down for ten days.

On the following day (30 July) there was a youth demonstration in Ankara in favour of a university professor who had been accused of writing articles against the secular character of the state (see p 447). It was reported that the demonstrators also demanded the re-opening of *Havadis*. About 86 youths were arrested but 79 were soon released. (*Times*, 30 July, 1 Aug; *Yeni Sabah*, 31 July; *Cumhuriyet*, 1 Aug)

On 13 Dec two newspapers were suspended for three days for having disobeyed instructions not to publish news on opposition leaflets distributed in Ankara. [On the leaflets see p 459.] They were: *Öncü* (believed to have been associated with the *Türkez* group in the NUC) and *Yeni Gün* (formerly belonging to the Freedom (*Hürriyet*) Party). (*Cumhuriyet*; *Times*, 14 Dec; *R. Ankara*, 15 Dec-BBC, 17 Dec)

**July: Code of Press Ethics.** On 24 July newspaper owners and editors signed a code of professional ethics, which had been drawn up by Turkish journalists with the assistance of the International Press Institute in Zurich, representatives of which had visited Turkey for the purpose.

The code was based on similar codes in some Western countries. A Press Court of Honour was set up, somewhat on the lines of the British Press Council. (*Cumhuriyet*, 25 July; *Times*, 26 July)

**Nov: "Press Forum."** In Nov, the NUC set up a "Press Forum" in Ankara to draw up rules and regulations governing the Press. (Its composition was not made entirely clear by the report available, which said that it consisted of members of the Press, with professors, undergraduates and youth organization representatives as observers, but quoted the main speaker at the first meeting of the Forum on 11 Nov, who said that representatives of legislative and executive organs would exchange views on the issue at the meeting.)

Colonel Ahmet Yıldız, NUC member and Director-General of Press, Radio and Tourism, speaking at the first meeting, outlined the main principles for adjusting the status of the Press: (1) All individual or collective attempts to exploit or monopolize the Press must be prevented. (2) In meeting the needs of the Press, objective measures must be employed. (3) All activities, such as dis-

tribution of official notices and commercial advertisements, which might be used for financial pressure on the Press, must be conducted by an impartial organization. (4) The relationship between Press employers and employees should be adjusted, and guaranteed by law. (*R. Ankara, 11 Nov—BBC, 14 Nov*)

**Nov: Press Laws Amended.** [In 1954 the DP regime enacted a law imposing heavy penalties, including prison terms, on journalists attacking, slandering, belittling, etc. persons in official positions, while denying the accused the right to prove their allegations. In 1955 and 1956 heavy penalties were inflicted on journalists. Following the coup the Press demanded the amendment of the law to give the journalists the right to prove their allegations and reduce penalties.]

Towards the end of Nov two Press laws, amending those of the DP regime, were enacted by the NUC. On 30 Nov Ahmet Yıldız explained that the Press could

only do its work in freedom, though like every other freedom it must be regulated. "This can best be done through the Press itself," he said. Freedom of the Press had been trampled underfoot by the DP laws, which were now replaced by democratic legislation.

The first law, he said, confined responsibility for any offence, as far as possible, to individuals. The responsibility of editors had been regulated in the best possible manner. The publication, printing, and distribution of newspapers had been made easier. The age-limit for correspondents had been reduced from 21 to 18 years. Prison sentences for newsmen would be confined to very exceptional cases.

The second law conceded the recognition of the right to prove allegations made, though this did not mean that permission had been given for slander and the disclosure of private affairs. The responsibility for articles or reports whose contents could not be proved to be true had been broadened. (*R. Ankara, 30 Nov—BBC, 2 Dec*)

## JUNE-DEC: CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENTS AFTER MAY REVOLUTION

### JUNE: THE PROVISIONAL CONSTITUTION

At the beginning of June, the NUC decided to issue a Provisional Constitution to serve as the legal basis for the new regime.

The Provisional Constitution was prepared by the NUC in cooperation with four jurists, Amil Artuğ, Minister of State, and three members of the Constitution Committee: Hüseyin Nail Kubali, Hifzi Veldet Velidedeoğlu and Muammer Aksoy. It was ratified by General Gürsel and published by the NUC on 12 June. (*Milliyet, 10 June; Cumhuriyet, 13 June*)

It was officially designated: "Provisional Law on the Abolition and Amendment of Certain Articles of the Constitutional Law of 1924 No. 491," and consisted of 27 articles in four sections: General Provisions, the NUC, the Head of State, the Council of Ministers. It was signed by General Gürsel, Chairman, and the 37 members of the NUC (as detailed on p 436).

**Army Take-Over "Sacred Legal Duty."** The preamble to the Constitution stated that the Assembly had been "reduced to the position of a party group and lost its legality as a result of violation of the Constitution by the leaders of the party in power... The Turkish Army, to which the duty of protecting the Turkish country and the Turkish Republic... is given in... the law on the army's internal service, acted on behalf of the Turkish nation against the former administration... In order to fulfil this sacred legal duty and re-establish the state of legality, [it] dissolved the Assembly, which had lost the quality of representing the nation, and provisionally entrusted power to the NUC."

**Full Legislative and Executive Powers Vested in NUC.** Art. 3 provides: "The NUC exercises the power of legislation directly by itself, and the power of execution through the Council of Ministers appointed by the Head of State and approved by the Committee."

The NUC exercises "the right of sovereignty on behalf of the Turkish nation" until it will hand it over to the Grand National Assembly re-established by democratic methods, which shall be done as soon as possible (Art. 1). The NUC will then cease to exist (Art. 8)

and the Assembly may then abrogate the provisional laws enacted by the NUC (Art. 25).

The Chairman of the NUC is at the same time Head of the State, PM and C.-in-C. of the armed forces. If he is prevented from exercising his duties or if the presidency becomes vacant, his functions are taken over by the oldest member of the NUC until it elects a new Chairman (Art. 17). Provisional laws adopted by the NUC will be issued by the Head of State within seven days. He may return a law to the NUC, but if the NUC reapproves it by a four-fifths majority he will issue it within five days (Art. 18).

The NUC "can always control the Ministers and dismiss them"; the Head of State appoints the new Ministers (Art. 4).

"Ministers will be appointed either from among the members of the NUC or from among citizens who were not registered members of any political party on 27th May 1960" (Art. 21).

"Ministers will be individually and jointly responsible for the general policy pursued by the Council of Ministers" (Art. 19).

**Independent Judiciary; Special Court for Trial of Former Leaders.** The law provided that "the power of trial is exercised on behalf of the nation by neutral and independent courts within the limits of the law."

A Supreme Investigation Committee and a Supreme Judicial Council were established to investigate and try the leaders of the old regime. (For details, see p 454.)

**NUC Membership and Procedure.** The NUC consists of the signatories to the Constitution (Art. 9). A member may withdraw, but cannot be dismissed unless convicted of betrayal of his oath or "crimes of disgrace." Proceedings against a member are valid only with the approval of four-fifths of the NUC (Art. 10, 11, 12). The debates will be secret and decisions will not be published unless the NUC decides otherwise (Art. 15). Each member is entitled to one vote; in case of a tie, the Chairman's vote will be decisive (Art. 16).

**NUC Oath: to Work for Democracy and Hand Over Power to New Assembly.** The following oath was to be

taken by NUC members: "I have devoted myself to the Turkish nation without expecting any return, without being bound by anything other than the principles of morality, justice, laws, human rights and my convictions of conscience. I will not pursue any aim contrary to the sanctity of the fatherland and the sovereignty of the nation; I will not depart from loyalty to organizing the democratic community according to the new Constitution and to the aim of handing over power to the new Assembly. I swear this on my honour and all things held sacred." (*R. Ankara, 12 June-BBC, 14 June*)

The NUC members took the oath on 24 June in the Assembly building in Ankara. (*Ulus, 25 June*)

**NUC Sub-Committees.** On 28 June the NUC appointed four sub-committees to deal with matters concerning the various Ministries:

1. Security—Defence, Interior, Foreign Affairs, and Communications.
2. Economy—Finance, Industry, Trade, Agriculture, and Customs and Monopolies.
3. Social Affairs—Education, Social Welfare, Health, and Press, Broadcasting and Tourism.
4. Public Works—Public Works and Reconstruction and Settlement. (*Ulus, 29 June*)

#### JUNE-OCT: THE CONSTITUTION COMMITTEE

A Constitution Committee, to work out a new Constitution, was appointed on 28 May by General Gürsel; it consisted of seven professors from Istanbul University:

1. Professor Sıddık Sami Onar, Rector of the University (Chairman).
2. İsmet Giritli, Asst. Professor of Administrative Law.
3. Hüseyin Nail Kubalı, Professor of Constitutional Law.
4. Ragıp Sarıca, Professor of Administrative Law.
5. Naci Sensoy, Dean of Faculty and Professor of Criminal Law.
6. Tarık Zafer Tunaya, Professor of Constitutional Law.
7. Hıfzı Veldet Velidedeoğlu, Professor of Civil Law. (*Ulus, 29 May; Monde 31 May*)

On 2 June three professors from Ankara University were appointed: İlhan Arsel and Muammer Aksoy of the Law School and Bahri Savaş of the Political Science School. (*R. Ankara, 3 June-BBC, 4 June*)

**Aug-Sept: Difference Within the Committee; Dismissals.** On 31 Aug the NUC dismissed two members of the Committee, Professor Giritli and Tunaya, and replaced them with Asst. Professors Vekor Versan and Lütfi Duran. (*Hürriyet, 1 Sept*)

At a Press Conference in Istanbul on 1 Sept Professors Giritli and Tunaya complained against the undemocratic behaviour of Professor Onar, the Committee's chairman, and contended that the authorities ought to explain the reasons for their dismissal.

Professor Omar stated that he could give no explanations, as the Committee had been appointed by the NUC. (*Ulus, 2 Sept*) *Vatan* reported that he had disagreed with several members on the position of political parties and the Senate in the Constitution. (*Vatan, 1 Sept*)

**Oct: Draft Constitution Finished But Not Published.** On 18 Oct the Committee submitted the draft Constitution to the NUC. It was expected to be published after the NUC had examined it. (*Cumhuriyet, 19 Oct; Monde, 20 Oct*) [The Constitution was not published, as it was decided to refer it to a Constituent Assembly for consideration and ratification.]

#### NOV-DEC: THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY (Kurucu Meclis)

**Nov: Delay in Preparations for Establishment of Constituent Assembly.** In mid-Sept General Gürsel announced that two months before the NUC had started preparations for the establishment of a Constituent Assembly; within a few days the public would be informed of the results. (*Cumhuriyet, 18 Sept*) Nothing was published, however, during Sept and Oct. Only on 3 Nov was it announced that a group of university professors headed by Professor Turhan Feyzioğlu, Rector of the ME Technical University, had started to draft a Constitution for the Assembly. (*R. Ankara, 3 Nov-BBC, 5 Nov*) [On differences inside the NUC regarding the status of the Assembly, see p 438; whether the delay was due to these differences could not be established from the sources available.]

On 21 Nov the group submitted to General Gürsel the draft bills which he passed to the government for consideration. A NUC committee then examined the draft and the suggestions added by the government, and, after consulting with political parties and public institutions, submitted the amended draft to the NUC, which approved it on 11 Dec. (*Cumhuriyet, 22 Nov, 12 Dec; Ulus, 30 Nov*)

The draft bills were published on 14 Dec and became law on 16 Dec. They were officially called: The Constituent Assembly Organization Law, The House of Representatives Law (*Temsilciler Meclisi Kanunu*) and the Individual Rights Law (*Özlük Hakları Kanunu*).

**Two Houses: NUC and House of Representatives.** The laws provide for two Houses. The Constituent Assembly was to consist "of the NUC, which has been entrusted by the Turkish nation... with setting up a legitimate government, and of the House of Representatives...", which will represent the Turkish nation in the broadest sense of the word in the efforts to form a democratic, legal state in a manner compatible with existing conditions" (Art. 1).

**Powers of the Assembly.** "The Constituent Assembly is authorized to exercise legislative power and the power of controlling the executive organ in accordance with the principles laid down in this law, until the new electoral law and the new Constitution... are completed in as short a time as possible and the government is turned over to the Turkish Grand National Assembly, which will be elected on 29 Oct 1961 at the latest. The Constitution which will be accepted by the Constituent Assembly assumes its final form only when approved by popular vote" (Art. 2).

In addition to its main duty, preparing the Constitution, the "Assembly is empowered to make, amend or abolish laws," to debate and approve the budget and financial bills, "to take decisions in connection with war and peace" and the use of force, and to ratify agreements and treaties and "the decision of the Council of Ministers to proclaim martial law" (Art 18).

**Composition of the House.** Art. 3 provides that the Assembly members should represent the Turkish nation alone and not any political or other body "which happens to elect them," and may not receive directions from any quarter. They would be responsible only to their conscience and their oaths.

The House of Representatives would consist of 272 members "elected according to the House of Representatives Law by the following provinces or organizations":  
(a) 10 representatives elected by the Head of State;



(b) 18 elected by the NUC; (c) 16 members of the Council of Ministers [all Ministers except those who were also members of the NUC]; (d) 74 representatives of political parties: 49 of the Republican People's Party and 25 of the Republican Peasant's National Party; (e) 75 representatives of the provinces; (f) representatives of organizations and societies: judicial bars—6, Press—12, Veteran Soldiers' Union—2, trade unions—6, youth organizations—1, shopkeepers' associations—6, chambers of commerce and industry—10, teachers' organizations—6, agricultural organizations—6, university representatives—12, judicial organs—12 (Art. 4).

The law also fixed members' salaries and living allowances.

Bills might be proposed by the Council of Ministers or by at least one member each of the NUC and the House (Art 19).

**NUC and House to Have Equal Power in Assembly.** In case of disagreement on a bill between the two houses, the disputed points would be debated by a committee comprising seven members each of the NUC and the House under the chairmanship of the senior represent-

ative of the Court of Appeal in the Assembly. Divergent views expressed in the Committee would be explained in a joint meeting of the Assembly and texts put to a vote without debate. "Members of the NUC and of the House use their votes separately, and acceptance or rejection is decided on the average of the voting percentages" (Art. 20).

Laws would be submitted to the Head of State immediately for publication. If he returned the bill it would go through the procedure set out in Art. 20. If again approved by the Assembly (a two-thirds quorum being prescribed for this purpose), the law would be published without delay" (Art. 21). *Cumhuriyet*, 12 Dec; *R. Ankara*, 14 Dec—*BBC*, 17 Dec; *Ulus*, 17 Dec)

**Dec 1960–Jan 1961: Constituent Assembly Convened.** During the second half of Dec the various provinces and organizations elected their representatives to the House of Representatives. (See Turkish Press, 20–31 Dec.) On 25 Dec General Gürsel appointed ten representatives, including three each from the Greek, Jewish and Armenian communities. (*Cumhuriyet*, 26 Dec) [The Constituent Assembly was convened on 6 Jan 1961.]

## JUNE–DEC: TRIAL OF LEADERS OF OLD REGIME

### JUNE–SEPT: ENACTMENT OF SPECIAL LAWS AND PROCEDURE OF TRIAL

During June–Sept preparations were made by the NUC to bring to trial the leaders of the DP regime (numbering 496—see pp 434–5), who had been detained in Yassi Ada. (*Cumhuriyet*, 17 Sept)

Three of them, Muzaffer Kurbanoğlu, ex-Minister of Communications, and two members of the Assembly, who had been abroad on the day of the coup, were requested to return, but refused. (*Tercüman*, 25 Aug)

**Establishment of Supreme Investigation Committee and Supreme Judicial Council.** Article 6 of The Provisional Constitution of 12 June issued by the NUC (see p 452), established the Supreme Judicial Council and the Supreme Investigation Committee. It said: "A Supreme Judicial Council [SJ Council] is set up to try the fallen President, Premier, Ministers and Deputies of the former administration, and those who participated in their offences. The SJ Council is set up from among the judges belonging to the judicial, administrative and military courts, on the proposal of the Council of Ministers, and consists of a president, eight regular members and six reserve members to be elected by the NUC. A Supreme Investigation Committee [SI Committee] is set up to investigate the responsibility of the accused and to decide whether their cases will be referred to the SJ Council. The SI Committee consists of a President and 30 members to be elected by the NUC on the proposal of the Council of Ministers. The organization and working procedure of this council is defined by special law. The chief prosecutor and five assistant chief prosecutors of the SJ Council are elected by the NUC, on the proposal of the Council of Ministers, from among the President and members of the SI Committee. The verdicts of the SJ Council are final. However, the carrying out of death sentences is subject to approval of the verdict by the NUC. Members of the NUC cannot serve on the SJ Council and SI Committee, or as prosecutors... Powers of investigation and trial in respect of persons whose

cases come under the jurisdiction of the Supreme Council, under the constitutional law of 1924, are exercised by the SJ Council and SI Committee." (*R. Ankara*, 12 June—*BBC*, 14 June)

**Powers and Procedure of SJ Committee.** On 18 June a law, consisting of three sections, specifying the procedure to be followed by the SI Committee and the SJ Council, was issued by the NUC. The first section dealt with the procedures of the SI Committee and contained provisions to prevent the loss of evidence during the investigation. The Committee was empowered to examine files and documents; to hold moneys, jewellery, and other valuables belonging to persons under investigation, to secure the restoration to Turkey of property held abroad; to sequester property; to prevent relatives and dependents leaving the country, and to order them to take up forced residence. During the inquiry the defendants would not be allowed bail and their counsel might not confer with one another or examine documents used in evidence.

The second section dealt with the decisions of the SI Committee, which would be taken at the conclusion of the investigations by unanimous or majority vote, 16 of the 30 members constituting a quorum. There could be no appeal against its decisions, but if the Committee ruled that there would be no indictment the NUC might request it within 15 days to reconsider. The Committee's further decision would then be final.

**Procedures of SJ Council.** The third section laid down the provisions for the trial phase. The SJ Council would hold trials in public; all proceedings would take place in the presence of the defendants concerned; each defendant would be entitled to three defence counsel, and would have the right to object to the appointment of the President of the SJ Council or its members. (*Cumhuriyet*, 19 June; *Keesings*, 1959/60, p 17505)

**Appointments to SI Committee and Resignations.** On 29 and 30 June the NUC appointed the thirty members



of the SI Committee. Celalettin Kurelmen, a senior judge of the Court of Appeal, was appointed President, and the members included civil and military judges, prosecutors and financial experts. The Committee began its work immediately. (*Cumhuriyet*, 1 July)

On 17 July Kurelmen resigned for health reasons. Three days later three other members (two civil judges and one military judge) resigned—no reasons were published—and on 21 July the NUC appointed replacements. The new President was Hayrettin Şakir Perk, another senior judge of the Court of Appeal, who had hitherto acted as Vice-President of the Committee. *The Times* commented that the resignations were possibly connected with the changes in the penal code (see below). (*Cumhuriyet*, 18, 21 July; *Times*, 22 July) [On the members of the SJ Council—see below.]

**Amendment of Penal Code.** On 11 July the NUC issued amendments to the penal code permitting the death penalty to be passed on persons over 65, who were previously exempted from capital punishment. This measure was made retroactive in cases of high treason, which was defined in eight examples, three of which carried the death penalty: (a) an act which "places part or whole of the territory of the state under the sovereignty of a foreign power" or infringes the territorial integrity or independence of Turkey; (b) violation of whole or part of the Constitution; (c) encouraging revolt, or provoking civil war by arming the people.

The Foreign Press commented that the measure was clearly aimed at the former leaders, especially the former President, Celal Bayar, and the former President of the Assembly, Refik Koraltan, who were over 65.

Another amendment issued by the NUC on 11 July provided that persons violating the Constitution or found guilty of an attempt to obstruct the work of the Assembly by force might be sentenced to from five to 15 years' imprisonment and loss of civil rights for life, instead of the death penalty. It was believed that the purpose of this amendment was to relieve the court of the obligation to sentence to death all the DP Deputies who had voted for laws now considered unconstitutional.

On 12 July the Turkish Press published a disquisition by a committee of 16 Istanbul University professors, headed by the Rector, Dr Siddik Sami Onar, which sought to establish a legal basis for the amendment permitting the death penalty to be passed on persons over 65. They claimed that a parallel was to be found in changes made in French penal law by General de Gaulle's government after the Second World War at the time of the trial of Marshal Pétain and collaborators. (*Cumhuriyet*, 12, 13 July; *Times*, 13, 14 July)

**Celal Bayar Charged.** On 12 July, the day after the issue of the amendments, the NUC announced its decision to bring Celal Bayar to trial on charges of altering and revoking the Constitution, provoking the Turkish people to civil war, and attempting to place parts of Turkey under the sovereignty of a foreign power. (The Menderes government was accused of attempting to cede parts of eastern Turkey to the USSR in exchange for economic aid.) (*Cumhuriyet*, 13 July)

**Trial to be held in Yassi Ada.** On 19 July the NUC decided to hold the trial of the DP leaders in Yassi Ada, near Istanbul. Those concerned were instructed to ensure that the Press, lawyers and audience should be able to follow the proceedings, and local and foreign journalists to report them. (*R. Ankara*, 19 July—BBC, 21 July)

## OCT-DEC: THE TRIALS

**Composition of Court and Prosecution.** On 3 Oct the NUC announced the names of the members of the Court and the Prosecution. The Court (the Supreme Judicial Council) consisted of the President, eight regular members, and six reserve judges. The President was Salim Başol, President of the first department of the Court of Criminal Appeal. Of the eight regular judges, five were civilian and three military. Of the six reserve judges, four were civilian and two military. Military judges were required because high army officers were among the accused.

Twelve prosecutors were nominated; one chief prosecutor, Altay Egesel, previously Prosecutor for the Republic, and eleven assistant prosecutors—seven civilian and four military. They were all members of the SI Committee, in accordance with the Provisional Constitution. (*Times*, 4 Oct)

**The Defendants.** The defendants were: President Celal Bayar; PM Adnan Menderes; all the members of the last Menderes Cabinet, except Namık Gedik, who had committed suicide, and Muzaffer Kurbanoglu, who had remained in Switzerland (for names and posts see p 427); the President of the Assembly, Rafik Koraltan; all the DP members of the Assembly; several provisional Governors (of Ankara, Istanbul, Izmir, Kayseri and others); several army officers, including General Rüstü Erdelhun, Chief of the General Staff; General Salih Coşkun, Deputy Minister of Defence; Major-General Arif Onat, Chief of the Department of Justice, Defence Ministry; General Namık Argüç, Istanbul Martial Law Commander; several police officers, including Kemal Gökten, Director-General of the General Security; several mayors, including Kemal Aygün, mayor of Istanbul; and a number of private citizens.

**Opening Session—The Indictment.** The trial of the former leaders (528, of whom 403 were present) opened on 14 Oct. Several of the defence counsel asked for an adjournment, arguing that they had not had time to study the charges or sufficient personal contact with their clients to prepare the defence. This plea was refused by the President of the Court on the ground that only the findings of the SI Committee were being read at this session, and counsel would have time to study the charges.

In general the indictment accused the leaders of violating the Constitution by stifling Press freedom and other civil liberties and trying to set up a dictatorship by a single party. Other main accusations were: confiscation of RPP property; lowering the status of Kirshehir from provincial capital to district capital [in the 1954 elections Kirshehir province returned the only candidates of the Republican National Party, an opposition group, and the DP government consequently redefined its boundaries so that the town of Kirshehir ceased to be a provincial capital]; illegal interference with the judiciary; unlawful amendment of the election law; the enactment of laws to ban public meetings and rallies and their unilateral enforcement against the opposition; establishment of the Parliamentary Inquiry Committee (see pp 428–9) and granting it unlawful powers; banning of the publication of speeches made in Assembly debates.

The Prosecution demanded the death penalty for 38 of the accused: the former President, PM, Ministers, President and Vice-President of the Assembly, the four deputies who had suggested the establishment of the Parliamentary Inquiry Committee, and the 15 members

of this Committee. (*Cumhuriyet*; *Times*; *NYT*, 15 Oct; *Monde*, 16, 17 Oct)

[Following the opening session the Court began to deal separately with the various charges against individuals and groups.]

**Oct: The "Dog Case" Against Bayar.** The first charge dealt with was against the former President, Celal Bayar and the former Minister of Agriculture, Nedim Ökmen, who were accused of forcing the Ankara Zoo to buy a dog, presented to Bayar by the King of Afghanistan, for LT20,000. Bayar claimed that he had donated the money for the construction of a fountain in a village near Izmir. The Prosecutor told the court that this was another instance of Bayar's "habit of making donations out of the people's pockets." The verdict was postponed on 24 Oct until the end of the trial. (*Cumhuriyet*; *Times*, 15 Oct; *NYT*, 16 Oct; *Times*, 25 Oct)

**Oct: Adverse Public Reaction.** *The Times* wrote on the effect of the case on Turkish public opinion: "Although it was almost certainly expected by the authorities that the trials would discredit still further the fallen regime, in Istanbul there have in the past few days been a surprising number of openly expressed currents of sympathy for the country's former rulers."

"Much comment has been caused by the authorities' decision to open the trials with the charge against Celal Bayar... Many people suggest that it is undignified to begin so important a series of trials with such a case... Officials, on the other hand, justify the 'dog case' on the ground that it indicates the degraded mentality of the deposed rulers." (*Times*, 19 Oct)

*The New York Times* correspondent in Istanbul reported that the opening of the trials had had a "sobering impact" on the city. "The trial has restored to the public eye and mind many personalities that for ten years were a vivid part of everyday living. But they are returning in circumstances of shocking contrast to their former situations."

"The sight of former Premier Adnan Menderes in an emaciated state while making a plea that the court end his solitary confinement has shocked many Turks, including some who rejoiced in his overthrow by the military of 27 May."

The people were concerned with the fate of the accused and especially Menderes. Many Turks with a religious turn of mind shared "an unassailable belief in Mr Menderes' mystical power of survival," since he escaped death in an air crash in 1959 near London while many fellow passengers were killed. (*NYT*, 18 Oct)

There was very little comment in the Turkish Press. Most reports were purely descriptive. (*Times*, 19 Oct)

[The Turkish Press maintained this policy during the whole course of the trial.]

**Oct-Dec: Case of the 1955 Anti-Greek Riots.** On 19 Oct the hearing began of the next charge, against Bayar, Menderes, Professor Fuat Köprülü, Fatin Rüştü Zorlu (former Foreign Minister), the late Namık Gedik (former Minister of the Interior), three former officials of the Turkish Consulate in Salonika, the former Governors of Istanbul and Izmir, the former commander of the Istanbul Police, and a Turkish student who had studied in Salonika in 1955. They were accused of having conspired to arrange for a bomb to be sent from Turkey and exploded in the birthplace of Kemal Atatürk, in Salonika, with the purpose of provoking a violent outburst of anti-Greek feeling in Istanbul and Izmir at a moment when

relations between Turkey and Greece were strained by the Cyprus dispute. The student with the help of the Turkish consulate staff in Salonika, was said to have planted the bomb, which exploded on the morning of 6 Sept 1955 in the house of Atatürk. The Greeks had been blamed for planting the bomb and anti-Greek demonstrations had broken out in Istanbul and Izmir on the night of 6/7 Sept 1955. The demonstrations had soon turned against other minorities as well: Greek, Armenian and Jewish shops and storehouses had been demolished and churches burnt. The accused were also charged with not having intervened immediately to stop the demonstrations.

All the accused denied any responsibility for the riots. Professor Köprülü, however, stated that he was convinced that the violent demonstrations had been inspired by Zorlu and organized by Menderes, in whose hands "all power resided," and that the demonstrations had degenerated into riots.

A consular servant and the student, who had been tried by a Greek court for planting the bomb, claimed that they had been "framed" by Greek justice.

The Governor of Istanbul stated that he had immediately ordered the army to intervene, but effective action had been delayed for three to four hours because all the principal army commanders had been absent.

The Governor of Izmir stated that the then army commander in the area, General Gürsel, was on leave at the time and only late at night had he succeeded in establishing contact with him, whereupon they had brought army units to Izmir and restored order.

The Prosecution presented witnesses from among the citizens, the police and the army to prove that the riots had been organized by high authority. Several witnesses testified that the Istanbul police had stood idly by, having orders not to intervene. Among the witnesses was the Oecumenical Patriarch, Athenagoras, head of the Orthodox Church. He said he had no personal knowledge that the riots had been inspired by the former Turkish Government, but he did not deny that on 15 Nov 1955 he had addressed a letter to the PM saying that the riots were "clearly organized according to a plan and programme, beginning in a number of different places at a prearranged signal."

The trial on this charge continued until the end of 1960, without being concluded. (For more details on the demonstrations described at the trial, see: *Turkish Press*; *Times*; *NYT*, 19, 20, 22, 25, 26 Oct, 2, 4 5 Nov, 14 Dec)

[Professor Köprülü, a former Deputy PM, was one of the founders of the DP and until 1956 served first as FM and then as Deputy PM. In 1956 he left the party and returned to Istanbul University to lecture on Turkish History. His arrest at the beginning of Oct surprised diplomatic circles, as it was thought that the case against him had been dropped. Nine professors of Turkish and Islamic studies in US universities appealed to the Turkish Government to pay special attention to the case of Köprülü, who was "a scholar of world-wide reputation and unquestioned integrity." (*Times*, 4 Oct; *NYT*, 16 Oct)]

**Oct-Nov: The "Baby Case" Against Menderes.** On 31 Oct the Court began the trial of Adnan Menderes and Dr Fahri Atabey, chief surgeon in the Zeynep Kamil Hospital, Istanbul, on the charge that on Menderes' instructions Atabey had killed the illegitimate child born in 1953 to an opera singer, who had been Menderes' mistress in 1951-1955.

The indictment stated that the SI Committee had decided not to proceed with the charge for lack of evidence, but on being asked by the NUC to reconsider the matter it reversed its decision.

Menderes acknowledged that he was the infant's father, but denied that he had given instructions to have it killed to avoid a scandal. Atabey testified that the baby had died of natural causes six hours before he reached the mother's house in Ankara. This was confirmed by the mother herself and two Ankara doctors who had attended her during and after the birth.

On 22 Nov the court announced the acquittal of Atabey, and withdrew the charge against Menderes. (*Cumhuriyet*; *Times*, 1, 2, 23 Nov; *NYT*, *NY*, 1 Nov)

**Nov: Former Finance Minister Accused of Misusing His Position.** The trial of the former Finance Minister, Hasan Polatkan, on charges of misusing his position to obtain exceptional bank credits for two commercial companies, and of having personally profited from his connection with them, began on 4 Nov. With Polatkan in the dock were two shareholders in the companies and a broker, who was accused of having acted as a go-between. All pleaded not guilty.

Several bank officials testified that credits to one of the firms concerned had been increased on Polatkan's demand.

The case was completed on 26 Nov. The verdicts were not announced but were linked with the charge of violation of the Constitution, the main count against all the leaders of the former regime. (*Cumhuriyet*, 8, 17, 27 Nov; *Times*, 5, 8, 28 Nov)

**Nov-Dec: Two Former Commerce Ministers Accused of Embezzlement.** The fifth case at Yassi Ada was opened on 8 Nov against two former Ministers of Commerce, Hayrettin Erkmen and Zeyyad Mandalıncı, on a charge of misuse of state funds. On his return from an official trip to the US, Mandalıncı had accounted for only \$672 out of \$2,128 he had received from the Central Bank for expenses. When he later resigned, his successor, Erkmen, paid the missing \$1,456 from public funds. Mandalıncı claimed that he had received an allocation of only LT90 (\$10) a day instead of LT200 (\$ 22.22) a day, which was his due.

On 4 Dec Mandalıncı was acquitted but remained under arrest on other charges. The verdict on Hayrettin Erkmen was linked to the charge of violation of the Constitution. (*Cumhuriyet*; *Times*, 9 Nov, 5 Dec)

**Nov: Former Minister of Agriculture Accused of Making Illegal Profits.** On 11 Nov the case against Nadim Ökmen, the former Minister of Agriculture, began. He was charged with forcing the Türkiye İş Bankası (a commercial bank) to buy at a high price a parcel of land belonging to his wife. Ökmen denied the charge, but witnesses for the Prosecution confirmed it. On 26 Nov the Court ruled that the verdict would be linked to the case of violation of the Constitution. (*Cumhuriyet*, 12, 17, 27 Nov; *Times*, 28 Nov)

**Nov-Dec: Six Former Ministers Accused of Irregular Currency Deals.** A seventh trial was opened on 15 Nov against Menderes, Zorlu, Polatkan, Erkmen, Medeni Berk (former Deputy PM), Sebati Ataman (former Minister of Coordination), Nihat Ucuncu (former head of the Turkish Economic Mission in New York—who had remained in the US), and Ali İpar, a shipowner. According to the indictment İpar had bought three ships in the

US in 1959 without having an allocation of foreign currency, paying from his funds abroad. Later Menderes, under Zorlu's pressure, changed the import regulations to fit this purchase, and İpar was allocated foreign currency to replenish his deposits abroad. Moreover, he had paid £162,500 for the ships—and not £282,142, as he claimed, for which the Treasury reimbursed him. All the accused pleaded not guilty. (*Cumhuriyet*; *Times*, 16 Nov) [The trial had not been completed by the end of 1960.]

**Nov-Dec: Alleged Attempt to Murder İnönü.** In mid-Nov Bayar, Menderes and 58 DP supporters were tried for an attempt to assassinate İsmet İnönü as he entered Istanbul, on 4 May 1959, after a political tour. All pleaded not guilty.

According to the witnesses—all members of the RPP—İnönü's car had been blocked by a police car, and a crowd of DP members had battered it with sticks and stones with the intention of killing him. Only the intervention of an army officer had saved the RPP leader.

The Prosecution alleged that this had been an attempt to assassinate İnönü, organized by the DP. It presented records of conversations between police officers to prove that İnönü's movements after leaving the plane in Istanbul airfield had been followed. (*Cumhuriyet*, 16 Nov, 29 Dec; *Times*, 14 Dec) [The trial had not been completed by the end of 1960.]

**Nov-Dec: The Case of the Flour Mill Deals.** On 18 Nov the former Minister of Industry, Sıtkı Yırcalı, and the owner of a macaroni factory came before the court on charges of irregularities, involving state institutions in the purchase of a flour mill from a British firm.

On 28 Nov the prosecutor asked the court to drop the case on the ground that the statutory limit within which it should have been tried had been exceeded. On 3 Dec the court agreed; the factory owner was released, and Yırcalı remained in detention on other charges. (*Times*, 19, 29 Nov, 5 Dec)

**Nov-Dec: Koraltan and Polatkan Accused of Misuse of Foreign Currency.** On 21 Nov the prosecution opened the case against Refik Koraltan, the former President of the Assembly, and Hasan Polatkan, the former Finance Minister. Polatkan was accused of having allocated \$500 in foreign currency to Koraltan to import medical equipment for his paralytic wife; instead, Koraltan had brought over, as a nurse for his wife, a 24-year-old German beauty who became his mistress.

Koraltan claimed that he had been advised by his doctors to bring in a nurse for his wife after applying for permission to import medical equipment. He had consulted his secretary, who was of the opinion that the allocation could be used to engage a nurse from abroad, as this was serving the same purpose.

The secretary claimed, however, that he had advised that this was not proper. Koraltan admitted that the girl was not a professional nurse, but she knew how to take good care of his wife. Asking whether his wife spoke German, Koraltan replied: "No, but I do."

The defence counsel claimed that there was no evidence that the girl's presence in the house was for any but purely medical purposes. Koraltan's daughter, who acted as attorney for her father, said: "My father has always been devoted to his family and spent night after night at my mother's bedside."

On 21 Dec the trial was completed and the court



decided that the case would be linked to the verdict on the charge of violation of the Constitution. (*Cumhuriyet*, 22 Nov, 22 Dec; *NYHT*, 2 Nov; *Times*, 22, 28 Nov, 23 Dec)

**Nov-Dec: Menderes Accused of Misuse of Secret Fund.** On 25 Nov the trial of Menderes and his Under-secretary, Ahmet Salih Korur, began on charges of misusing the PM's secret fund. They were accused of using over LT24 million, out of the money allocated under the budget for the PM's secret fund, for private and DP expenses, payments to opposition members, and payment of the gambling debts, amounting to eight million French old francs, of the late Numan Menemencioglu, former Foreign Minister and one-time Ambassador in Paris.

Menderes said that this sort of thing was done by governments in many countries; his allowance as PM was insufficient to pay for entertainment, and some of "the expenses were justified. He had paid back part of the money he had used for private matters and part he "had forgotten." He admitted that he had paid Menemencioglu's debts, but claimed that he had done so at the request of the Foreign Ministry. (*Cumhuriyet*, 26 Nov, 6 Dec; *Times*, 26 Nov, 2, 9 Dec) [This case had not been completed by the end of 1960.]

**Nov-Dec: Charge of Misuse of State Radio.** On 29 Nov the twelfth trial began against Menderes, six former Ministers, who had at one time or another been in charge of the Press, Radio and Tourism Department; Zorlu, Mükerrrem Sarol, Emin Kalafat, Celal Yardımcı, Abdullah Aker, Halûk Şaman, and Altemur Kılıç, the Director of the Department. They were accused of misusing the state radio as an organ of DP political propaganda.

The accused admitted the charges. Menderes claimed that the radio had been his government's only means of replying to the heavy attacks of the opposition, and especially of its Press. The others said that Menderes had taken a close personal interest in the radio and had often dictated propaganda features.

On 8 Dec the Prosecution asked the Court to punish Menderes and the six Ministers, and to acquit Kılıç as he had no authority to stop these broadcasts. On 26 Dec the court decided to acquit Kılıç; the charges against the others would be considered in conjunction with the charge of violating the Constitution, as abuse of the state

radio was a form of such violation. (*Ulus*, 30 Nov; *Times*, 30 Nov, 6, 28 Dec; *R. Ankara*, 8, 26 Dec-BBC, 10, 29 Dec; *Cumhuriyet*, 27 Dec)

**Dec: The Çanakkale Case.** On 27 Dec the trial of Menderes and three DP leaders of the town of Çanakkale (in the Dardanelles) began on charges of preventing two RPP Assembly members from conducting a propaganda campaign in the area in Sept 1959 by encouraging DP members to attack their car.

Menderes claimed that according to information obtained the two RPP deputies had gone on an "incitement tour" without the permission of their party's leadership, but admitted that there had been no legal justification for preventing them doing so. (*Cumhuriyet*, 28 Dec) [The trial had not been completed by the end of 1960.]

## JULY-DEC: OTHER DEVELOPMENTS DURING THE TRIAL

**Deaths and Suicides Among the Yassi Ada Detainees** (see also p 435). During Sept-Nov three detainees in Yassi Ada died of heart attacks: Zakar Tarvar, former DP member of the Assembly (19 Sept); Faruk Oktay, former head of Istanbul Police (30 Sept); and Yusuf Salman, former DP member of the Assembly (28 Nov). (*Cumhuriyet*, 21 Sept; 2 Oct; *Ulus*, 29 Nov)

One detainee, Cemil Keleşoğlu, former Governor of Konya, committed suicide on 14 July. (*Cumhuriyet*, 15 July)

Celal Bayar, the former President, tried to commit suicide on 25 Sept, but was prevented by the guards. (*R. Ankara*, 26 Sept-BBC, 28 Sept)

**Dec: Menderes' Defence Counsel Arrested.** On 24 Dec the two defence counsel for Menderes, Burhan Apaydın and Talât Asal, were arrested. In a statement issued by the military authorities, they were accused of preparing and distributing a one-sided pamphlet setting out the case for the defence.

Orhan Apaydın took his brother's place but was rejected by the President of the Court because the power of attorney had not been amended.

On 28 Dec a new defence counsel, Ertuğrul Akça, began to represent Menderes. (*Cumhuriyet*, 25 Dec; *Times*, 28, 29 Dec)

## OPPOSITION AND NUC COUNTER-MEASURES

### OPPOSITION ACTIVITIES

[Though official sources insisted that there was unanimous support for the coup d'état, opposition against the new regime, both overt and covert, was in evidence almost immediately, and continued until the end of the year.]

General Gürsel, speaking at Izmir on 18 Aug, referred to "underhand propaganda" in the country, and said: "The snake is not dead and raises its head when it gets the chance."

The *Times* said that reports on such activities did not always find their way into the Turkish national Press, which seemed to exercise some sort of self-censorship. (*Times*, 30 June, 20 Aug)

Following is a list of published reports, details were generally lacking. (For other opposition to the NUC see: The Rural Population; Adverse Public Reaction to the

Trial of the DP leaders (p 456) and to statements of NUC "radicals" (p 437; the Press.)

**June: Various Incidents.** On 3 June the Mufti and the Imam of Isparta, Western Anatolia, were arrested for denouncing the coup d'état. On the same day six members of the DP and relatives of DP Deputies were also arrested in that town. (*Cumhuriyet*, 4 June)

On the same day the inspector of the schools in Budur, western Anatolia, was arrested on charges of denouncing the coup. (*Cumhuriyet*, 4 June)

On 4 June 11 persons were arrested in Çanakkale, Dardanelles, for demonstrating against the new regime. (*Cumhuriyet*, 5 June)

On 17 June the mayor of Uzunköprü and the chairman of the DP in the town were arrested after leaflets against the revolution had been found in their homes. (*Cumhuriyet*, 18 June)



On the same day DP members clashed with RPP members in the town of Nazilli; 17 persons were detained. (*Cumhuriyet*, 18 June)

**June-July: Opposition in Izmir.** At the end of June it was reported that the DP supporters in the Izmir province, one of the political strongholds of the former PM Menderes, who was born there, were preparing for public meetings and demonstrations on 2 and 3 July. Special codes were issued for the purpose in some quarters of Izmir town. These preparations followed a students' demonstration against the RPP in a village east of Izmir on 28 June.

On 29 June the Governor of Izmir province issued a statement warning that these meetings would be prevented by force and the organizers prosecuted. In a second statement he accused "some ill-intentioned persons" of propaganda "completely at variance with the aim and purpose of our national revolution," and instructed the people not to listen to this "negative propaganda" but to believe the official communiqués.

It was reported that about 60 DP members, suspected of subversive activities, were arrested in Izmir at this time. (*Cumhuriyet*; *Times*, 1 July)

On 3 July the cadets of the Military Aviation School in Izmir demonstrated to warn DP members not to demonstrate against the new regime. (*Ulus*, 4 July)

On 4 July eight more arrests were made in Izmir province. (*Cumhuriyet*, 5 July)

**July-Dec: Acts of Opposition and Arrests.** On 8 July a journalist was arrested in Mersin, southern Anatolia, for denouncing the coup d'état. (*Cumhuriyet*, 9 July)

On 10 July a member of the Nurcu [extreme Muslim] sect was arrested in a village in Konya province for propaganda against the coup d'état. (*Cumhuriyet*, 11 July)

On 11 July 25 DP members tried to attack the municipal building in the town of Boztepe, central Anatolia, shouting slander against the government. Six were arrested, including the former mayor and the head of the DP in the town. (*Cumhuriyet*, 12 July)

On 12 July 29 persons were detained in Tire, northern Anatolia, and charged with subversive activities. They included two former mayors, members of the Municipal Council and the head and members of the town's DP committee. (*Cumhuriyet*, 13 July)

On 1 Aug about ten students, allegedly members of the Nurcu sect, made speeches against the coup d'état in the Istanbul University students' canteen. They clashed with other students and the police were summoned, but no arrests were made. (*Cumhuriyet*, 2 Aug)

At the beginning of Aug, several persons carrying explosives were arrested in the gas and power stations in Ankara. (*Monde*, 5 Aug)

On 4 Aug 49 persons were arrested in Bergama, western Anatolia, for activities against the new regime. (*Times*, 6 Aug)

On 12 Aug six persons, including the Imam and the Muezzin, were arrested in Karamüsel, north-western Anatolia, for disseminating leaflets in Arabic script against the regime. (*Cumhuriyet*, 14 Aug)

On the same day three persons were arrested in Izmir for denouncing the coup d'état. (*Cumhuriyet*, 13 Aug)

On 19 Aug the Istanbul Martial Law Command announced that a number of people had been arrested for "attempts to sabotage the spirit of the revolution and activities unfitting to the Turkish national character." No details were given. (*Cumhuriyet*, 19 Aug; *Times*, 20 Aug)

At the beginning of Oct, four persons were arrested for painting pro-Menderes slogans on traffic signs on the Izmir-Aydin highway. (*NYHT*, 9 Aug)

In the second half of Oct, 13 persons were arrested in the eastern provinces of Turkey for activities against the regime. (*Cumhuriyet*, 28 Oct) According to *Le Monde* there were about 295 persons under detention in Sivas, eastern Anatolia, on charges of activity against the revolution. Twenty-five of them, mainly religious functionaries and journalists, were released at the beginning of Nov after undertaking to withdraw from politics. (*Monde*, 8 Nov) [The majority of the Sivas detainees were the Ağa of the eastern provinces (see p 450).]

At the beginning of Nov a man was arrested in Sarikamish, eastern Anatolia, for pro-Menderes propaganda. He had stated that Menderes was a descendant of the Prophet and therefore could not be brought to trial. (*Monde*, 8 Nov)

On 25 Dec a teacher in the village of Karapinar, Dardanelles, tore down Atatürk's picture and his letter to Turkish youth, displayed in the school, and in their places wrote slogans praising the old regime. (*Cumhuriyet*, 26, 27 Dec)

**Dec: Clandestine Opposition in Ankara.** During the first half of Dec, leaflets threatening General Gürsel, İsmet İnönü and members of the NUC, and also attacking the May revolution, were placed under the doors of houses in Ankara. They were signed by a hitherto unknown organization calling itself the "National Saviours."

The Ankara Garrison Commander forbade the publication of these facts. Copies of two Ankara newspapers, *Öncü* and *Yeni Gün*, which disobeyed, were seized by the police (13 Dec) and they were closed for three days. (*Times*, 14 Dec)

On 25 Dec the Military Governor of Ankara stated that several persons had been detained for conducting propaganda against the Constituent Assembly with a view to sabotaging its establishment. (*Cumhuriyet*, 26 Dec) On the following day the official NUC spokesman announced that 65 persons, members of the DP and "reactionaries," had been detained for disseminating leaflets and "systematic activities against the state and members of the NUC and the Constituent Assembly." They would be tried by the revolutionary courts (see below). The accused were two university professors, six lawyers, three housewives, eight small merchants, seven minor clerks, two army sergeant-majors, six workers, five servants and 26 craftsmen. (*Cumhuriyet*, 27 Dec; *Times*, 28 Dec) The names of 62 persons were given two days later; the other three, including the two professors, had been released. (*Cumhuriyet*, 29 Dec)

#### GOVERNMENT COUNTERMEASURES

**July: General Gürsel's Warning.** In a speech in Istanbul on 4 July, General Gürsel issued a stern warning to those who hoped for a restoration of the former government: "I hear talk and gossip to the effect that that man will come out again and will take the lead again. I tell you clearly, no force can turn us aside. So far, we have acted bloodlessly, but if the need arises we shall make it flow in flood." (*Cumhuriyet*, 5 July; *Times*, 6 July)

**June-Aug: Police Empowered to Hold Suspects Indefinitely.** On 29 June the Provisional Government issued two laws, approved by the NUC acting as the legislative, to suppress political factional fighting or any attempt at counter-revolution. One empowered the police,

with the approval of the provincial Governor, to hold without charge for 30 days anyone suspected of disturbing the peace or endangering the security and stability of the state, or if there was sufficient evidence that he might do so. This law was to be abrogated not later than a week before the beginning of the election campaign for the new Parliament.

On 12 Aug the NUC cancelled the 30-day clause and decided that the suspects would be held as long as necessary.

Another law tripled the ordinary penalties for those not complying with the order to surrender all unlicensed firearms, subject to a 30-day amnesty (*Ulus*, 30 June; *NYT*, 1 July; *Cumhuriyet*, 13 Aug)

**Aug: Establishment of Revolutionary Courts.** At the beginning of Aug the NUC passed a law on "the establishment of revolutionary courts with wide powers at places where they may be deemed necessary." The NUC Secretary explained that some malicious persons, "whose interests were adversely affected by the activities of the NUC and the government are openly or secretly adopting a negative attitude and spreading false rumours and lies in an attempt to confuse public opinion." (*R. Ankara*, 3 Aug-BBC, 6 Aug)

Each court was to consist of a president, two other members and a prosecutor, all appointed by the NUC from a list of candidates nominated by the Council of Ministers. The courts were to be set up as the need arose and would be either mobile or fixed, according to circumstances. Their jurisdiction derived partly from the penal code relating to offences against "the personality of the state" and public order. Other offences included: "attacks by word and deed against the Chief of State, members of the NUC and the Ministers" and "propaganda or inspiration of any sort adverse or harmful to the national revolution and its principles." *The Times* commented that the vagueness of this last article "will clearly provide the new rulers with the weapon they need to discourage any hardy malcontents under the military regime."

The courts would have the power to impose from five to fifteen years' imprisonment or the death sentence.

Their verdicts were to be final, but the accused or the prosecutor could appeal to the same court, within three days of the judgment, to review the verdict. (*Cumhuriyet*, 19 Aug; *R. Ankara*, 19 Aug-BBC, 22 Aug; also *Times*, 20 Aug)

Turkish Press comment was favourable. *Cumhuriyet* wrote that the law constituted an important phase in the transitional regime. "The revolutionary rulers are trying, without resorting to harshness, to prevent their fellow-countrymen from harbouring hatred and spite against each other," it added. *Vatan* wrote that the revolutionary courts "will constitute a strong barrier against reactionary forces," and that after much bitter experience "no one wants to be caught unawares again and allow our national destiny to drift at the mercy of circumstances." (*R. Ankara*, 5 Aug-BBC, 8 Aug)

**No Revolutionary Courts Established.** The first demand for the establishment of a revolutionary court came on 30 Aug from the courts of Balıkesir, a town in north-western Anatolia. Two persons were accused of "speaking against the national revolution" and the local courts stated that the alleged offence did not come within their jurisdiction. (*Milliyet*, 31 Aug; *Times*, 1 Sept)

[Up to the end of 1960 there were no reports available that a revolutionary court had been actually established.]

**Dec: Execution of Long-Standing Death Sentences.** In Dec the NUC suddenly confirmed the death sentences of 13 convicted murderers, some of whom had committed their crimes as much as ten years before, and ordered their execution on 27 Dec in the main squares of the principal cities. Hundreds of thousands of people watched the executions.

This followed the blowing up of the Atatürk statue in Iskenderun (see p 532) and the arrest of 65 persons in Ankara for subversive activities (see above).

*The Times* commented that this step was "a measure intended to strike terror into the populace, as it can hardly fail to do." The paper added: "No such events have taken place in Turkey within living memory." (*Cumhuriyet*, 27 Dec; *Times*, 28 Dec)

# THE UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC

(Al-Gumhuriyah al-Arabiyah al-Muttahidah)

## INTERNAL AFFAIRS

### SYNOPSIS AND ECONOMIC SURVEY

#### SYNOPSIS

In the UAR at large the year under review was marked by a process of political and economic institutionalization. Whereas, however, in the Egyptian Region this process went ahead without any overt opposition, there was growing political unrest in the Syrian Region.

The main features of this process in the political field were the final establishment of the National Union (NU) in both Regions, the convention of the National Assembly (NA), and the introduction of a new system of local government.

The establishment of the NU had been foreseen in the Egyptian Constitution of 1956. In its general conception it was a second edition of the unsuccessful Liberation Rally (*Hay'at al-Tahrir*) set up following the revolution in 1953 to replace the parties and rally the people in one single political body in support of the ruling group of officers. Additional aims of both organizations were to activate the masses in support of the social and economic development of the country and produce leadership cadres. Only members of the NU were eligible for membership of the NA and the majority of appointments to the local government councils.

Like its predecessor, the NU was set up without any written ideology (though the need for this was felt), in keeping with the pragmatic approach of the regime. In 1960 the NU's ideological aims were defined as to carry on the threefold revolution—political, Arab and social—and to realize the Social Democratic Cooperative Society.

The first practical steps to set up the NU were taken in 1957, but its establishment was held up by the Egyptian-Syrian merger, and later by political difficulties in Syria. The elections to the "Popular Base" of the pyramidal structure of the NU were held in 1959. According to plan, the upper levels of this structure—the provincial, regional and general UAR bodies—should have been set up by the end of 1959 and the General Congress convened in Jan 1960, but again, as President Abdel-Nasser himself stated, political difficulties in Syria were the main factor which disrupted this schedule. The Regional Congresses convened finally in June and the UAR Congress in July.

The NU was organized in such a way as to ensure complete government control. The Regional and the UAR Congresses were constituted wholly by appointment. All the members of the Supreme Executive Committee and the majority of the members of the Regional Executive Committees were Ministers. Various regulations also ensured control at the lower levels, and special controls were introduced for the Syrian R.

These controls, however, did not preclude some measure of free discussion, and there were instances of criticism, direct or implied in all three Congresses, though all resolutions were unanimously adopted.

The real test of the NU's effectivity as a means of mobilizing the masses in the political and social fields lay in its day-to-day activities. These consisted of: attending to citizens' requests and complaints, of which there was a seemingly endless stream; the holding of "popular conferences," where Ministers explained government policy and resolutions in support of it were adopted, and the planning, execution or taking over of various social, cultural and economic tasks, projects and enterprises. The latter category of activities—at the village and town level—was perhaps the most important. The reports available, however, indicated only the large extent and variety of such activities, but not their effectivity. Criticism of the lower-level Executive Committees, on which the effectivity of the NU depended, indicated that political and other rivalries played no mean part in these bodies, while positive activities were said to be limited. One of the Egyptian critics remarked that what the committee members really wanted was to be regarded as government officials, and they were still looking to the government for instructions.

The UAR legislature, the National Assembly (NA), was first convened on 21 July. It was scheduled to convene in Jan, but as its members were to be chosen from the members of the UAR Congress of the NU, its establishment had to be postponed owing to the delays in the organization of the NU. The NA replaced the National Assembly of Egypt and the Syrian Chamber of Deputies, both of which had been disbanded following the establishment of the UAR. All the NA members—200 from the Syrian R and 400 from the Egyptian R—were appointed by the President. In its first annual session (3 Oct–15 Nov) the NA passed some bills of secondary importance, as the major legislation of the year—the 1960/61 budget, the Five-Year Development Plan and other bills relating to economic matters—had been enacted by presidential decree shortly before the NA was convened. In the NA—as in the NU Congresses—there was some criticism of government policies and actions. There was also criticism of the NA's conduct of affairs, especially the "apathy" of its members.

The Local Government Law was promulgated by the President on 26 Mar; its major aims were given as decentralization and greater participation by the citizens in local government. The new system entrusted the supreme authority in the provinces to the Governor, who is appointed by the President, assisted by a Director of Security, also appointed by the President, and by an appointed Council consisting of representatives of Ministries and NU members. Appointed councils were to be set up also in the towns and villages. The councils could be dissolved by presidential decree.

In 1960 the law was applied only in the Egyptian R. Towards the end of the year, new Governors took up their duties and the provincial Councils were set up.

It was expected that the establishment of the new system at all levels would take five years to complete.

In the political-economic sphere, the year was marked by nationalization on a wide front in the Egyptian R. In Feb the National Bank of Egypt and the Misr Bank—a holding company for 22 industrial concerns—were nationalized; in May, the Press, which was transferred to the NU, and the public transport companies in Cairo followed; in July the pharmaceutical trade was taken over by a Supreme Authority for Pharmaceuticals, and the tea packaging and distribution business was confined to companies belonging to the Economic Organization. Towards the end of the year, plans were drawn up for government-subsidized consumer cooperatives which, it was assumed, would compete with all retail traders. The general government explanation was that these measures were taken in fulfilment of the policy of establishing the Social Cooperative Democratic Society, in the case of the banks it was also said that nationalization prevented the seizure of power with the aid of capital. Foreign observers suggested an additional reason: the government's determination to divert all domestic funds to industrialization. The nationalization of the Press was accompanied by accusations on the part of the President that it had failed in its duty to the new society.

All these innovations in the Egyptian R took place in an atmosphere of at least outward political quiet, though nationalization caused some uneasiness. The amnesty for politicians and officials of the former regime was presented as evidence of this state of tranquillity. There were no drastic changes in the ruling group; significant developments were the widening of the responsibilities of Kamāl ad-Dīn Hussein, one of the original members of the Revolutionary Council, and the appointment as Governors of army officers who may be regarded as belonging to the second rank of the ruling group.

In contrast, developments in Syria were marked by growing political unrest. President Abdel-Nasser regarded Syria as the vulnerable part of the UAR, where its enemies at home and abroad were concentrating their efforts to undermine the regime (p 515).

Ever since the establishment of the UAR, the political and economic integration of Syria had been President Abdel-Nasser's main internal problem. Syrian political life, with its strongly entrenched parties and its free-enterprise economy, was the diametrical opposite of the established regime in Egypt. As a condition for union, Abdel-Nasser had demanded the dissolution of the parties, and they had formally complied. The actual liquidation of the parties started with the suppression of the Right through agrarian reform and with the aid of the Left—the Ba'ath Party and the Communists. This, however, led to an increase in the power of the Left. The second stage was reached in the autumn of 1958 when a largely successful drive was launched, after the Iraqi revolution, to suppress the Communists in Syria.

The Ba'ath, which had aided the government in this drive, now remained on the scene as the only organized independent political power of any significance. It was the main factor holding up the organization of the National Union, for it tried to dominate it, while the Egyptians were determined to eliminate independent political forces altogether and to bring into the NU all elements which were prepared to support them, including the Right. In the struggle which followed, the Egyptians were helped by the decline in public support for the Ba'ath—owing to the diminishing popularity of the Egyptian-Syrian union, in the establishment of which the party had played so dominant a role—as well as by Colonel Abd

al-Hamid Sarraj, Minister of the Interior and head of the security services. In the election to the "Popular Base" of the NU in July 1959, the Ba'ath suffered a signal defeat. Its influence declined further when in Oct 1959 Field-Marshal Amer was despatched to Syria as the President's special representative to organize the NU and the economy according to the policies of the Central Government. In Dec 1959 Abdel-Nasser accepted the resignation of the Ba'ath Ministers, at the same time expressing his determination to put an end in Syria to what he termed disruptive party activities. Thus by the beginning of 1960 all direct party influence had been eliminated from the government; at the same time the last vestige of organized civilian support for the regime in Syria had also disappeared and the party which had been instrumental in bringing about the union had gone into—for the time being silent—opposition. In May Abdullah ar-Rimāwi, the former leader of the Jordanian branch of the Ba'ath—who had been expelled from the party in 1959 and was living as a political exile in Damascus—set up a rival Ba'ath Party, purporting to represent the party branches in all Arab countries except the UAR, where it officially did not exist. It was obvious that he could not have taken this step without the approval of the government.

Dissatisfaction with the regime was not confined to the Ba'ath, however. Business circles, used to a system of free enterprise, were opposed to the trend of ever-widening state control over the economy and were afraid that the wave of nationalization sweeping over the Egyptian R would soon reach Syria. The government's public assurances that private capital had been accorded an important role in the Five-Year Development Plan for the Syrian R, and that no wholesale nationalization in the Region was contemplated, did not seem effective in lulling these apprehensions.

The workers enjoyed more protection under the new regime, but this was probably offset by the general deterioration of the economic situation. The 1959 Unified Labour Law, which was applied in Syria during the year, aroused the opposition of the trade unions because it subjected them to strict government control and deprived them of the right to strike—though there was appreciation of the social benefits conferred upon the workers. In Aug this resentment found expression in the resignation of the council of the only remaining trade union federation (it was replaced at the beginning of 1961 by a new federation set up according to the Labour Law), and in Dec labour unrest was shown by a strike, accompanied by violence, in Damascus.

The peasants had ostensibly benefited by the agrarian reform, but according to observers its implementation was largely ineffective; moreover, any possible immediate benefit had been offset by the third consecutive year of the union. Thus while the reform had led to dissatisfaction among the landowners, the actual plight of the peasants was now probably worse than on the eve of the establishment of the UAR.

The educated youth was also reported to be disillusioned: "The right-wing, authoritarian rule of the army under Egyptian control is not the goal for which this generation has been demonstrating in the streets these last ten years," an observer remarked.

Most important for the future of the UAR was perhaps the dissatisfaction with the regime reported to have spread in the Syrian (Second) Army because of the preponderance of the Egyptian Army (but perhaps also for political reasons).



In autumn several explosions occurred in Syria which were attributed to the activities of Syrian political émigrés in Lebanon working in conjunction with the Jordanian Government, and collaborating with opposition elements in Syria, including the Ba'ath leaders and army officers. The Communists openly declared their hostility to the UAR, calling on the Syrians to fight the "Egyptian dictatorship," and Syrian Communists in Lebanon were reported to be active in attempts to undermine the regime. Though all these activities were on a small scale, they probably contributed to a feeling of insecurity and instability.

To counteract this unfavourable trend of affairs, President Abdel-Nasser visited Syria twice during the year. In Feb, in what was described as a "triumphant" tour of the provinces, he expounded the following main themes in his numerous speeches: he praised the people of Syria as the pioneers of Arab nationalism; emphasizing the people's sovereignty, he said that it was the people who had willed the union; he explained that the UAR embodied the only true Arab nationalism and mentioned historical precedents of Egyptian-Syrian unions (Salāh ad-Dīn, Baybars) which had vanquished the enemy and brought glory to the Arab nation; he said that Arab nationalism was engaged in an eternal struggle with the imperialist enemy from without and traitors within; he declared that to conquer these enemies the people must unite and parties must be eliminated, as they were divisive forces which served foreign interests; lastly, he laid stress on the economic development programme on which the government was engaged.

Economic questions also played an important part in the President's administrative activities in Syria; the Economic Organization was established and a special LS15 million development programme was approved.

Abdel-Nasser paid a surprise visit to Syria in Sept, a week after his return from New York, where he had attended the UN General Assembly. This was generally explained as having been prompted by the mounting difficulties in the Region; the President took care to anticipate and reject such interpretation in his speeches during the visit.

Replacements for the Ministries vacated by the Ba'ath leaders in Dec 1959-Jan 1960 were appointed only in Mar, at the end of the President's visit to Syria, while the posts of Syrian UAR Vice-President and Central Minister of Justice, vacated by Hurāni, and Central Minister for Culture and National Guidance, vacated by Bitār, remained unfilled. Of the seven new Ministers, four were army colonels, thought to be supporters of Abd al-Hamīd as-Sarrāj, with no known party affiliations.

The resignation of another two Syrian Ministers—Colonel Ahmad Abd al-Karīm and Major Amin an-Nafūri—was announced in May, though rumours of their resignations had appeared in Feb. It was alleged in foreign Press reports that they had contacted the American Intelligence with a proposal to work for the liquidation of the union. The resignation of Bashīr al-Azamah, Central Minister of Health, was officially confirmed in Aug—two months after reports of the resignation first appeared.

In July Nūr ad-Dīn Kahālāh was appointed UAR Vice-President. In Sept, before he left for New York, Abdel-Nasser appointed Abd al-Hamīd Sarrāj to the Presidency of the Syrian Executive Council, and a number of Ministers of the Syrian Executive Council to posts in the Central Government, leaving them in possession of their former portfolios. Sarrāj's appointment was generally interpreted as an admission that the attempt to rule

Syria directly from Cairo through Field-Marshal Amer had failed.

Amer had returned to Egypt in July and it was reported that a struggle had developed between him and Sarrāj during his stay in Syria. It was now assumed that in view of the mounting difficulties and opposition, which Amer had failed to overcome, Abdel-Nasser had no choice left but to rely on Sarrāj to suppress the opposition and rule the country with the aid of the security services, and that he had in fact granted him and the other Syrian officers in the government a considerable measure of autonomy. It was suggested, however, that Sarrāj had reason to be loyal to Abdel-Nasser, as he lacked a public following of his own in Syria. The fact remained, however, that in face of the growing discontent, with the NU not yet having proved itself as an efficient political vehicle and all the former political parties being in—at least latent—opposition, Sarrāj had become the kingpin of the regime in Syria, and his removal—one way or another—could have the severest repercussions.

As the year neared its end observers of the Syrian scene, describing the syndrome of unrest, were inclined to believe that some change was inevitable, but thought that the chances were that the union would continue.

### SURVEY OF THE EGYPTIAN ECONOMY

(NOTE: During 1960 the Egyptian and Syrian Regions of the UAR remained largely separate economic units, officially and in fact. E.g., each had its own currency. The economy of each Region is therefore reviewed separately.)

The year 1960 was in most respects a favourable year for the Egyptian economy. Development was vigorously pushed forward, additional domestic capital resources were mobilized, and the government was successful in raising very substantial foreign credits and economic assistance from both world blocs, and the foreign trade balance showed a marked improvement. The year was also distinguished by the rapid growth of the public sector, as the result of a series of nationalization decrees and a legislative policy deliberately aimed at utilizing all economic resources for the social, political and economic aims of the state.

**Nationalization Decrees.** The National Bank of Egypt and the Misr Bank were nationalized by republican decrees issued on 11 Feb, ownership being transferred to the state and shares being converted into debenture bonds, on the basis of the Stock Exchange closing rates on the same day, redeemable over 12 years with 5 per cent interest. The National Bank, originally a commercial bank founded in 1898, with its head office in London, was Egyptianized in 1951 and established as Egypt's Central Bank. The Misr Bank was founded in 1920 as a commercial bank, but since the early thirties it played a major role in economic life, controlling 22 large companies.

Commenting on the decrees, the UAR Minister of the Economy pointed out that private ownership of the National Bank was hardly consistent with its functions as the State Bank. As for the Misr Bank the Minister stated that it had contravened the Banks and Credits Law of 1957, which forbids commercial banks to hold more than 25 per cent of the paid-up share capital of any joint-stock company. In effect, the principal factor seems to have been the government's desire to gain direct control of the large and concentrated economic power of these two institutions, and to harmonize this economic power with the social and economic aims of the state.

The nationalization decrees were a psychological blow to the private business community, which had been under

the impression that the trend was toward greater encouragement of private investment. The news, combined with uneasiness about future government policy, caused an immediate adverse effect on an already bearish stock market.

By decrees issued in June and Nov, the government placed under municipal ownership and control the local transport systems owned by the Cairo Electric Railways, the Heliopolis Oasis Company and the Cairo Tramway Company, thus terminating the remaining important foreign (mainly Belgian) control over Egypt's municipal transport. Official reasons given were "mismanagement" and "failure to comply with concession agreements." Another complaint was that the services were inadequate.

Government control over the economy was further extended on 17 July with the nationalization of the importing of, and wholesale trade in medical supplies, and tea. The Ministry of Supply was entrusted with the wholesale trade in medical supplies and a new government committee was set up to arrange for necessary imports. Only companies associated with the government's Economic Development Organization were permitted to import and pack tea. Retail distribution was reserved to cooperatives. The purposes as stated were to prevent overpricing of medical products and adulteration of tea or other interference with its quality.

In May the Egyptian Press was nationalized and transferred to the control of the NU. (See p 508-9)

By a series of republican decrees issued on 1 Dec, the UAR Government nationalized a Belgian bank and placed most other Belgian interests in Egypt under state custody. This action followed the expulsion of the UAR Ambassador from the Congo, which the Egyptian Press and radio denounced as Belgian-inspired. In effect the action served to further the regime's policy of mobilizing domestic resources to the maximum for economic development and to diminishing foreign influence in the economy.

**Five-Year Development Plan.** A Five-Year Development Plan (1960/61-1964/65) went into effect as of 1 July. The plan, covering all branches of economic and social activity, will require an investment of LE1,697 million. Funds were to be raised from local sources (68 per cent) and through "unconditional" foreign loan and credit facilities (32 per cent). Distribution of investment among the various sectors was as follows:

	<i>Investment in millions of LE</i>	<i>Percentage of Total</i>
Aswan High Dam	47	23.1
Agriculture	225	
Irrigation and Drainage	119	
Electricity (including electrification of Aswan High Dam)	140	34.1
Industry	439	
Transportation	237	
Suez Canal	35	16.1
Housing	175	
Public Enterprises	49	
Services	111	6.5
Increase of Stocks	120	7.0
<b>Total</b>	<b>1,697</b>	<b>100</b>

Other highlights of the plan were: (1) Estimated total production by the end of the first five years was to reach LE3,601 million, an increase of LE1,706 million over 1959; (2) National income was expected to rise from the present estimated LE1,284 million to LE1,706 mil-

lion at the end of the plan, an increase of 40 per cent, more than half of the additional income to be derived from industry and electricity; (3) An increase in the volume of consumption from LE878 million in the first year of the plan to LE1,088 million in the final year, an increase of 24 per cent; (4) The population was expected to increase from 25.4 million to 28.4 million and the labour force from 7.5 million to 8.4 million. The average wage of the salaried industrial worker was to rise by 19.7 per cent, and that of the average agricultural worker and farmer by 8.2 per cent; (5) The contribution of industry and construction to the national income was to increase from 25 per cent to 33 per cent and that of agriculture to decrease from 31 per cent to 28 per cent; (6) Domestic saving was to rise from 14.8 per cent to 20.8 per cent of the national income.

#### *The 1960/61 Budget*

The 1960/61 budget (July to June) showed a total expenditure of LE700,065,050, an increase of nearly LE200 million over the estimates for 1959/60. The breakdown is as follows:

	<i>1959/60 LE</i>	<i>1960/61 LE</i>
Ordinary Budget (including contribution to UAR unified budget)	293,800,000	301,010,900
Development Budget	98,051,400	285,845,000
Annexed Independent Budgets (posts, institutions, etc.)	132,327,350	176,906,371
	<b>524,178,750</b>	<b>763,762,271</b>
Less: Contribution of Ordinary and Development Budgets to Annexed Budgets	13,124,850	63,697,221
<b>Total</b>	<b>511,053,900</b>	<b>700,065,050</b>

Comparisons between the two years, however, can be misleading, because of the introduction of a new budgetary system whereby many current development expenditures previously included in the ordinary budget were transferred in 1960/61 to the development budget. This somewhat exaggerated not only the great increase in development expenditure, but also the significance of the surplus of revenue over expenditure in the ordinary budget, estimated at LE69,869,000 for 1960/61.

**Foreign Trade.** The foreign trade deficit for 1960 amounted to LE33.4 million, a marked improvement over the previous figures of LE60 million in 1959 and LE74 million in 1958. Imports increased by only LE6 million as compared with 1959, reaching LE125 million. This was due to a deliberate government policy of limiting imports to capital goods and essential consumer goods, and to the growing capacity of Egyptian industry to produce goods formerly imported. Principal supplying countries, in order of importance, were the US, Western Germany, the USSR and the UK.

Exports increased by LE37 million compared with 1959, reaching a total of LE191.6 million. Seventy per cent were raw cotton exports, most of which went to the Eastern bloc. Egypt's main customers during the year, in order of importance, were the USSR, People's China, India, and Czechoslovakia.

**Agricultural Crops.** The 1959/60 cotton crop was 9,925,000 kantars, and the 1960/61 crop was expected to be about 10 per cent higher. Exports for the 1959/60

year ending 31 Aug were very satisfactory at 8,557,327 kantars, compared with 7,298,720 during the previous year. Domestic consumption continued to increase, rising from 2.4 million kantars in 1958/59 to 2.5 million in 1959/60.

Rice and corn production in 1960 was somewhat below the 1959 levels, but there were small increases in wheat and barley. In recent years Egyptian agricultural production has not been keeping pace with population growth.

**Industrial Production.** The year 1960 witnessed a continuing growth in Egypt's industrial capacity. According to statistics given by the UAR Minister of Industry, the 1960 index of industrial production was 240, as against 201 in 1959 (1952 equals 100). The annual gross value of industrial output in 1960 was LE1,078 million, almost twice that of agriculture.

The Egyptian Chemical Industries Company (Kima) plant in Aswan started the first of its four production lines at the beginning of May. Three remaining lines were in various stages of construction or testing. The plant will eventually have an annual capacity of 600,000 tons of 20 per cent concentrated ammonium nitrate fertilizer.

The Iron and Steel Company at Helwan, using 250,000 tons of iron ore blended to about 45 per cent iron, produced 118,000 tons of pig iron in 1960. Output of the Thomas converters was 90,000 tons of steel ingots. In the latter part of June, the second blast furnace at Helwan was fired; plans called for it to reach a daily output of 400 tons.

The Helwan motor vehicle factory, built by the West German firms of Magirus and Kloeckner-Humboldt-Deutz, began production at the end of July. It was expected to assemble the Deutz line of trucks and buses at the rate of 2,500 annually. The production of stationary diesel engines, tractors and marine engines was under consideration.

In early Oct the UAR and a Japanese firm signed a contract for the expansion of the SEMAF railroad car factory at Helwan, to enable it to build railway passenger coaches by 1963.

The Misr Chemical Company's caustic soda plant in Alexandria began test production in the latter part of 1960. The largest of its kind in Egypt, it was designed to produce 20,000 metric tons of caustic soda annually, and was expected to have a somewhat larger yield of chlorine.

**The Aswan High Dam Project.** Although work continued or was started on numerous development projects in industry, communications and other branches of the economy, the outstanding development feature of the year was the starting of work on the first stage of the Aswan High Dam in Jan. Activity at the site centred on the completion of various preparatory works, such as roads, housing and electric power facilities. A beginning was made with the excavation of the diversionary canal, and Egyptian contractors were invited to bid for various items of the construction work. Soviet engineers supervised the work in accordance with the 1958 Soviet credit agreement for the construction of the first stage. Soviet construction equipment continued to arrive at the site.

On 18 Jan it was announced that the Soviet Union had agreed to finance and construct the entire project, instead of only the first stage. The agreement was signed in Aug, when the Soviets agreed to extend a credit of 900 million roubles (LE78.4 million) to finance the foreign exchange cost of the second stage. (See p 524 ff.)

**Foreign Aid.** In addition to the above, Egypt received many credits and other forms of economic assistance from both world blocs. (For details see pp 52-4)

### SURVEY OF THE SYRIAN ECONOMY

Nineteen-sixty was a very difficult year for the Syrian economy, reflecting the third continuous year of drought and the vagaries of UAR government policy on the integration of the traditionally liberal Syrian economy with the more centralized Egyptian economic regime. While influential Syrian economic circles wanted an essentially liberal economy to be maintained, allowing for a measure of government intervention in specific spheres, the Cairo authorities were determined to bring about a full economic union between the two Regions, based wholly upon the Egyptian pattern.

It was generally agreed that this could only be achieved step by step, if at all, in view of the vast structural differences in the two economies. Thus various measures taken during the first two years of the Union were intended to achieve a certain degree of similarity in the economic framework of the two Regions as a basis for economic unity. For example: banking and insurance legislation in Syria was reframed on the Egyptian model; the patterns of the two regional administrations were made almost identical, oil affairs were centralized, and plans were set under way for a unified customs classification.

**Economic Development Organization.** On the occasion of President Abdel-Nasser's six-week visit to the Syrian R in Feb and Mar 1960, further decrees were promulgated to facilitate the eventual goal of economic union. The most important decree set up a body in Syria called the Economic Development Organization, on the model of the institution of the same name already in existence in Egypt. Its capital was to consist of the government's shares in existing or future companies, and concerns such as the railways and the oil refinery. The statutes of the Organization empowered it to set up new companies, thus furthering the economic plan with state funds. The Organization, and therefore the government, would have dominating representation on the Boards of Directors of these companies, its representatives being appointed by the President of the UAR and directly responsible to him. Although private capital was actively encouraged to cooperate with EDO in the setting up of new companies, in effect it generally refrained from doing so during the year under review.

**Five-Year Development Plan.** As in Egypt, a Five-Year Development Plan (1960/61-1964/65) for Syria was published in mid-year, with effect from 1 July. The total expenditure envisaged was LS2,720 million—75 per cent to be raised from domestic sources (in equal portions from the private and state sectors) and the remaining 25 per cent from foreign aid.

LS830 million (30.5 per cent) were allocated to irrigation and land development schemes; LS270 million (9.9 per cent) to agriculture; LS509 million (18.7 per cent) to industry, power development and oil exploration; LS537 million (19.7 per cent) to transport and communications; and LS574 million (21.2 per cent) to social and public services.

The allocation to industry, power and oil development was subdivided as follows: 47 per cent to oil and geological surveys; 12.4 per cent for electric power projects; 26 per cent to the chemical industry, mainly for fertilizers; 6.1 per cent for engineering; and 8.5 per cent to



other industries. No allocation was made to the textile industry, relatively very important in Syria.

The Syrian budget for 1960/61 (the financial year was previously changed to July-June to conform with the Egyptian system) included a very much enlarged development budget, amounting to LS254 million, representing the state's contribution to the first year of the Development Plan. This was 37 per cent larger than the development budget in the previous year. However, part of this increase was artificial, as, following the pattern introduced in the Egyptian R, many current expenditures for development and expansion, previously included in the ordinary budget, were in 1960/61 included in the development budget. Thus expenditures on social services, education and health were for the first time included in the Syrian development budget. The first-year development allocations of the Five-Year Plan were mainly devoted to agriculture and irrigation (32 per cent) and transport (25 per cent).

The ordinary budget (including the Syrian allocation to the UAR budget) amounted to LS512 million, an increase of 7 per cent compared with 1959/60. Fifty-one per cent was allocated to the War Ministry compared with 48 per cent in the previous budget.

**Poor Year for Agriculture.** Nineteen-sixty was a poor year for Syrian agriculture. Although the cultivated area was expanded, agricultural production was lower than in the previous year. While the continued drought was mainly responsible for this situation, the growing indebtedness of the agricultural sector, the lack of adequate credit facilities, and the dislocation caused by the Agrarian Reform Law, further aggravated the plight of the Syrian farmers.

The Agrarian Reform Law (promulgated in Sept 1958) disrupted agricultural production because no efficient substitute had been found for the productive function previously performed by the land-owners who were displaced under the Law. Expropriation and redistribution of agricultural lands were carried out at a slow pace. By the end of 1960 about 600,000 hectares had been expropriated out of 2.9 million hectares included in the scope of the Law and only about one-fourth of the expropriated area had been distributed among 7,500 families.

Overall agricultural production was 12 per cent lower than in 1959. Cereal crops (wheat and barley) were particularly hard-hit, but there was an increase in industrial crops (cotton, tobacco and sugar beet).

**Shortage of Financial Resources.** Industry continued to suffer throughout the year from a chronic shortage of the financial resources needed for basic investment and working capital, though there was some expansion of bank credit offered to industry. High production costs and lack of suitable foreign markets added to the difficulties. Nevertheless, there was a marked increase in the output of electric power, cement and food products.

The monetary position during 1960 was distinguished by its extreme sensitivity, owing to the unusual nervousness of the private sector over the fate of bank deposits and other savings likely to be affected by new government decrees. Rumours, such as that of an impending unification of the Egyptian and Syrian currencies, were sufficient to cause a panic withdrawal of bank deposits and a marked flight of capital.

The delicate problem of the introduction of a unified currency for both Regions, touched on from time to time since the formation of the Union in Feb 1958 but always postponed, was again prominent during 1960. It was raised, for instance at the NU Congress in Cairo in

July, when the Syrian Minister of the Economy stated that his Ministry was actively studying the question of introducing a unified currency. However, up to the end of the year no concrete steps had been taken in this direction.

The unstable atmosphere caused a sharp rise in the prevalent interest rate and encouraged the multiplication of speculative enterprises. Bank credit was in general short supply. Most credit took the form of short-term advances to commercial firms.

There was an increased demand during the year for foreign exchange, mainly owing to the desire of merchants to increase their stocks of imported goods for fear of impending government control over foreign trade. This was the principal reason for increased prices of many goods, affecting wide sections of the population.

**Record Deficit in Balance of Trade.** There was a record deficit of LS415 million in the balance of trade, imports totalling LS820 million and exports LS405 million. Imports were 22 per cent higher than in 1959, and exports 5 per cent lower. The main suppliers were the US, West Germany and France, while the principal customers were Egypt, Lebanon, France and West Germany. There was a relative increase in Syria's imports from the Western bloc, and also in her exports to the West owing to increased shipments of cotton. Industrial exports (especially textiles) fell in comparison with previous years.

Trade with Arab countries (not including Egypt) maintained the same level as in 1959. Trade with Egypt increased, but Syria's trading surplus with Egypt fell from LS26.6 million in 1959 to LS7.5 million. Syria increased her exports to Egypt of agricultural products for industry (tobacco, hides and short staple cotton) but her textile exports diminished. Egypt greatly increased her exports to Syria of industrial products, such as rubber goods, iron and textiles.

In the field of development, various geological surveys were executed (especially for oil and for iron ore), and a number of new industries were established (a cement plant, an iron foundry, and a gas processing unit at the Homs oil refinery). Work on the Rastan dam, a part of the Ghab reclamation project, was almost completed by the end of the year.

**Soviet and US Aid.** A protocol amending the Syrian-Soviet loan agreement of Oct 1957 was signed in Moscow on 8 Sept, during the visit of a delegation headed by Kahālah, Chairman of the Executive Council of the Syrian R. It provided for supplies of capital goods and equipment up to a value of LS382 million, though contracts were only signed for part of this amount. These covered the construction of a railway from Latakia to Qamishli, the setting up of a nitrogenous fertilizer factory at Homs, and oil prospecting. Although it was previously reported that the talks were to include the Euphrates dam project, no mention of this major scheme appeared in the published text of the protocol.

Syria also received increased US economic aid, mainly in the form of food surpluses supplied for payment in local currency, most of which was eventually invested in Syrian development projects. (See p 54)

The general economic situation was reflected in statistics on the Syrian national income, which was LS2,123 million in 1960, compared with LS2,133 million in 1959 (both years at 1956 prices). As the population had increased by 2.5 per cent the *per capita* national income in Syria was thus LS466 in 1960 compared with LS483 in the previous year—a decrease of 3.5 per cent.



## IEWS AND POLICIES ON INTERNAL AFFAIRS

### SYNOPSIS

Following is a summary of the views and policies on questions of state, society and economy publicly expressed during the year by President Abdel-Nasser and members of the ruling group.

Abdel-Nasser's approach to these questions is pragmatic: while the lack of a comprehensive ideology is often deplored in Egyptian writing, Abdel-Nasser finds that it has the advantage of leaving freedom for experimentation; the ideology, he says, will be crystallized from the fruits of experience gained by trial and error.

But while there is no comprehensive ideology there is a set of basic ideas, attitudes and aims and a general conception of ways and means to realize these aims.

The nation is depicted as being in the throes of a permanent revolution, which was redefined in 1960 as national, Arab and social. (This definition is an extension of the concept of the two-fold national and social revolution expounded by Abdel-Nasser in his *The Philosophy of the Revolution*, in 1953/54.) To be successful, a revolutionary climate must be maintained. The awareness of the revolution is accompanied by a feeling of destiny, of making history.

Of the "three revolutions," the national and the Arab, i.e. the struggle for complete independence and for an Arab union are predominant. The social revolution has its independent aims, but in the last analysis even the aim of social justice is to protect the nation from imperialist conspiracies. "The motive power," Abdel-Nasser says, "is nationalism."

The revolution is carried on in the face of a permanent struggle against The Enemy: imperialism, Zionism, traitors and reactionaries who are determined to destroy the nation. This struggle provides much of the dynamics needed to carry on the revolution; for it is primarily in its name that the people are exhorted to stand united and to exert all possible efforts to strengthen the nation.

In the political-social field the emphasis is on the complete unity of the nation. The social revolution, says Abdel-Nasser, "has crystallized in the socialist democratic and cooperative theory as a means of social equality."

The meaning of democracy is the abolition of exploitation for private ends in order to pave the way for freedom and a better life for the individual, and the participation of the majority in the process of guiding the nation's destiny. This kind of social democracy is contrasted with the old regime, where special interests, capital and monopolies, in cooperation with foreign interests, deprived the people of its rights. Political parties are divisive forces, serving special and foreign interests, and therefore detrimental to the national welfare. Classes must be abolished, and social equality established both as an end in itself and as a vital contribution to the unity of the nation. All sections of the public, in all their activities—in education, the arts and sciences, mass media, the economy—must conform with the aims of the nation. These are set out by the leader—who has been entrusted with his mission by the people—and by the state, which has a global outlook, in contrast to the individual, who cannot comprehend the general good. Debate is permitted but deviations must be eradicated; opposition represents the enemy. The political vehicle for the establishment of this democracy is the NU, which comprises the whole people; it is not a single party, through which a minority takes hold of the government.

Socialism means, says Abdel-Nasser, that all citizens should cooperate in production and that the benefits derived should be justly distributed. "Cooperation is a means to combine individual and collective efforts in the public interest." Both must be based on social responsibility and solidarity. Socialism is founded on private property without exploitation. It envisages a welfare society, which cannot be realized through the redistribution of the national income alone; it must be based on increased production, for which cooperation is necessary.

Socialism and democracy are interdependent, for there can be no democracy without freedom from exploitation, just as there can be socialism only if the mass of people have the power to implement it, and not under the rule of capitalistic minority interests.

In the economic field, the imperative is speedy development to keep up with the growth of the population, respond to mounting social pressure, lay the foundation for a welfare society and, last but not least, to enable the nation to withstand its enemies and win an honoured place among the nations. The main emphasis is on industrialization.

To realize the economic and social aims there must be a comprehensive state plan from which nobody must deviate. Public capital has a vital role to play in the development effort, for it alone can undertake the large-scale, long-range projects needed. Private capital, however, also has a useful part to play as long as it keeps to the "right path" and does not try to exploit and monopolize the economy. Foreign aid is welcome, but governmental loans are preferred to private investment because they are cheaper for the national economy.

### BASIC ATTITUDES

**Pragmatic Approach.** Abdel-Nasser, Cairo, 21 July: "We reached our ideologies as a natural outcome of our experience. The laws of our movement are a true reflection of our situation . . .

"One of the basic phenomena of our experience of thought and spirit is that we did not indulge in theories in search of our life, but devoted our life to the search for theories. This absolute freedom in facing nature was the best way for us to reach the stage of preparing laws. The freedom of action preceded the ideologies and so the ideologies were the product of nature.

"We extracted our ideologies from the details of the events we passed through and did not permit any ideology to force itself on us. Nor did we borrow them without the support of the facts of events.

"In this way ideologies were put to the service of life, not vice versa, because a social or political ideology is only a pattern and method for the movement, not a goal." (*Eg. Gaz.*, 22 July)

**Building of New Society Based on Pragmatic Approach.** Abdel-Nasser, at Alexandria University, 28 July: [To create a welfare society] "We have to put it into application so that we can find out what is right and what is wrong.

"Once we find out what is right, we can develop it; put it into application and go along towards the achievement of our goals. By finding out what is right, we can also avoid what is wrong. This can only be accomplished through application and practice.

"I am pleased that the universities have now agreed

to this theory with regard to the establishment of the socialist, democratic and cooperative society." (*Eg. Gaz.*, 29 July)

**Nationalism the Motive Power.** Abdel-Nasser, interviewed by Woodrow Wyatt, 2 Sept: Q: "What about the influence of Communism in the Middle East now..."

A: "Well, in the UAR, true nationalism is the motivating power. The people are for nationalism which they observe as their cherished and strongly established ideology."

Q: "But in the other Arab countries?"

A: "Well, I cannot give an exact answer about Communist movements there, but I believe in the Arab people's faith in Arab nationalism." (*Eg. Gaz.*, 4 Sept)

**Socialism and Arab Nationalism.** Kamāl Rif'at: Arab socialism is diametrically at variance with European social democracy, particularly from the practical point of view, inasmuch as our socialism finds its level within societies not as yet fully developed in the political and economic spheres.

"This socialism of ours stands for freedom and independence and the creation of a new pattern of society enjoying justice and social equality not within the shadow of any other social set-up.

"For this reason Arab socialism has very little to do with foreign political ideas. It has, however, much in common with African and Asian socialism with which it is allied by nature, but this does not exclude us from drawing on imported socialist principles at this particular stage through which Arab socialism is now passing.

"On the other hand, Arab socialism goes hand in hand with the essential doctrines of Arab nationalism to which certain socialists are powerfully opposed, because socialism as applicable to all aspects of political, economic and social existence cannot be accomplished without the establishment of national unity throughout the entire Arab world, and because after all the concept of nationalism is basically a social alignment." (*Eg. Gaz.*, 12 Dec)

**Permanent Struggle Against the Enemy.** Abdel-Nasser at NU General Congress, Cairo, 9 July: "Your people's aspirations for a democratic-socialist-cooperative society have become your great responsibility. You must also be the protectors of the marching caravan. It is not enough to march forward, but we must also be cautious, vigilant and ready.

"We must always remember that imperialism, though frequently defeated by the Arab nation, will not abandon its hopes that it may one day regain what it has lost. Imperialism is still around us trying to hinder the progress of history. Some peoples of our nation are still waging battles of life or death. Imperialism realizes that your UAR is the vanguard, base and stronghold of Arab struggle. Its aim will henceforth always be to eliminate this vanguard, destroy this base...

"We should remember always, brothers, that there are in our area reactionary remnants which hope that the course of progress will stop. We must always remember that our role as pioneers in the Arab struggle stipulates that we should sometimes raise our feelings to what appears to be above the capability of mankind. Elements of treason will face us and some weak-spirited people will fall in the area around us because of the achievements of certain interests, or to avoid the hardship of the struggle...

"Brothers, we must always remember the existence of Israel... Israel is a bridgehead for imperialism and an

advanced centre for the ambitions of world Zionism in our homeland...

"We must always remember that the enemy may not employ an obvious weapon but will endeavour to infiltrate and overcome us from behind the scenes. Our enemy will employ spiritual weapons after his material weapons have failed. He may resort to establishing doubts instead of laying mines. He may resort to a lie instead of a bomb. He may resort to rumours to produce the same effect as a shot. He may gain use of agents instead of military bases. Brothers, we must remember always that our doctrines are the harvest of a long struggle whose bitterness our nation has endured.

"The protection of these doctrines which emanate from our souls, and their development and improvement, is a basic duty." (*BBC*, 12 July)

**Permanent Revolution.** Abdel-Nasser at NU General Congress, Cairo, 9 July: "Brothers, we should also realize that our mission is not to preserve present conditions. Any democratic popular organization which believes that its duty is to keep things as they were when they took charge of them ceases to be popular and democratic. We should be naturally aware of the fact that popular organization means the organization and revival of the revolutionary driving force. It also means the continuation of movement within the framework of the national beliefs for the realization of more social justice." (*BBC*, 12 July)

**The Three "Guiding Stars": Social Democracy, National Unity, Mobilization for Development.** Abdel-Nasser at NU General Congress, Cairo, 9 July: "There was many a guiding star... that led our people in their search for the truth. The first was the fact that there is complete integration between socialism and democracy." (For a fuller text on this theme, see below under heading "The Socialist Democratic Cooperative Society.")

"The second... is that national unity is the sole guarantee of the safety and success of national actions in all the walks of life. National unity alone was our weapon for driving occupation out of our land... Moreover, within the framework of enlightened national unity, integration and rapprochement among the various classes can be made in order to avoid the inevitable bloody conflict if wide cleavages and deep-seated dissention continue.

"The third is that mobilization of all national energies is the sole means to step up and push forward quickly and competently development in all walks of life...

"This is how, brother compatriots, we arrived at the idea of the National Union. It is a democracy founded on the widest popular base." (*BBC*, 12 July)

**"God is on Our Side."** Kamāl ad-Dīn Hussein, Alexandria, 26 July: "We had complete faith that so far as God was with us and on our side, we could overcome and combat all obstacles.

"Our belief that God is greater than all, combined with our belief that God was on our side, made us win the Port Said battle. We succeeded in defeating our enemies despite their power, arms and ammunitions. We were able to defeat them through our faith in God Almighty, ourselves and our unity. Our unity enabled us to stand firm in the face of the aggression.

"Our construction battle went on. Our aims and principles were inspired from our belief and faith in God, our civilisation, legacy and history." (*Eg. Gaz.*, 27 July)

[The religious motif often appears in Kamāl ad-Dīn

Hussein's pronouncements; no equivalent is to be found in Abdel-Nasser's speeches in 1960.]

**"We Make History."** Kamāl ad-Dīn Hussein, Cairo, 24 July: "Eight years have passed since the Revolution took place. They did not pass the same way ordinary years pass... We lived them and made their events by our own hands. It was our will after that of God, which made history of the every day events which happened during this period." (*Eg. Gaz.*, 25 July)

**Social Pressure.** Abdel-Nasser at the UN General Assembly, speaking of the "drive towards economic liberation" of the "newly independent countries": "The nature of the circumstances which we live in today makes a long wait unbearable to the peoples. Scientific progress is probably the first aspect of the surrounding circumstances. Any farmer in our country, from the extreme south in Aswan to the extreme north in Kameshly, for example, may, by means of radio and the Press, observe the high standard of living of the ordinary United States citizen, or he may observe the magnificent achievements performed by the people of the Soviet Union. If this farmer should compare his condition with that of others, he would feel a surge in his breast urging him to raise his standard of living to reach the level enjoyed by others. Our peoples may be told that patience is necessary and that other nations had to have it, but allow me to state here that the capacity of any generation for enduring patience is measured according to the circumstances of that generation, and not by the circumstances of others. Those who had the patience to endure crossing the sea in small boats directed by the winds differed completely from those who are able to cross it now in a few hours' time by jet aircraft." (*A/PV*, 873, 27 Sept)

#### PEOPLE AND LEADER

**The People Built the UAR.** Abdel-Nasser, Cairo, 5 Oct: "This is our Republic today. It is the United Arab Republic that you built. It is a Republic which is an expression of every one of you and which stands for all the citizens of this nation." (*Eg. Gaz.*, 6 Oct)

**The People Master of its Destiny.** Abdel-Nasser, Aleppo, 18 Feb: (*BBC Precise*) "The people who imposed their will and took command, allowed no imperialist or Communist agent, or any enemy of the republic or of Arab nationalism, to infiltrate into the country..."

"When the unity [the Egyptian-Syrian merger] was set up, the people demanded that we should work for the establishment of a socialist democratic co-operative society." (*BBC*, 20 Feb)

**The People is Vigilant.** Abdel-Nasser, Aleppo, 18 Feb: "No group can deceive or mislead the people..."

"I am very confident of the future because... the people enjoy such a high degree of vigilance that they have been able to expose the wiles of imperialism... and Communist agents." (*BBC*, 20 Feb)

**The People is Supreme.** Abdel-Nasser, Aleppo, 18 Feb: "It is the people who lead, and not Gamal Abdel-Nasser or any other group. Gamal Abdel-Nasser is only the tool that carries out the will of the people."

"The government is a servant which works to realize the aims of the people." (*BBC*, 20 Feb)

**The People Creates its Leaders.** Abdel-Nasser, Aleppo, 18 Feb: "No leader can create a people but the people can create a leader." (*BBC*, 20 Feb)

**Strong Leadership Reflects Strength of the People.** Abdel-Nasser, Hama, 16 Oct: "On no account can there be leaders feeling strong unless the people themselves are strong. You are strong people and so the leadership you have chosen must inevitably be strong and capable of achieving your aspirations and aims. This strong leadership must inevitably be the real reflection of this strong and heroic people..."

"My fellow citizens, every time I meet you I feel stronger because my strength is derived from yours." (*Eg. Gaz.*, 17 Oct)

Damascus, 16 Oct: "You are always in my heart wherever you may be, in the big centres, in the towns or in the remotest villages." (*Eg. Gaz.*, 19 Oct)

**Abdel-Nasser's Mission.** Abdel-Nasser, Aleppo, 18 Feb: (*BBC Precise*) "I have been entrusted with a great mission by the people. I must defend this mission, I cannot discriminate against any individual of the UAR just because he belongs to any party or group... The task laid upon me is not an easy one; work in this republic is not an easy thing." (*BBC*, 20 Feb)

**The Leader's Alertness.** Abdel-Nasser, Cairo, 13 July: "We have to answer any allegation at any time, morning or night. This necessitates that I should have an information system at home and at the office. I get information all the time."

"El Sayed Abdul Kader Hatim, Deputy Minister for Presidential Affairs, is in continuous contact with me. When he faces any problem that he is unable to handle, he contacts me to have my opinion. The answer cannot wait for one or two days, otherwise it would lose its significance." (*Eg. Gaz.*, 15 July)

**The Leaders Share Responsibility with the People.** Abdel-Nasser, Damascus, 4 Mar: "As I felt that it might be difficult for me alone to select the members of the National Assembly, as laid down in the Constitution, I have been seeking to get the National Union to share with me in appointing members to the National Assembly." (*Ahram*, 5 Mar; *BBC*, 7 Mar)

Abdel-Nasser, Damietta, 9 May: "In my capacity of the President of this Republic, I cannot supervise everything. My colleagues also cannot supervise everything. We cannot undertake all the duties—human power is limited. As members of the National Union you, too, have responsibilities. You can do a lot and you can accomplish great things." (*Eg. Gaz.*, 10 May)

#### THE THREE REVOLUTIONS

**The Three Revolutions: National, Arab, Social.** Abdel-Nasser, addressing NU General Congress, Cairo, 9 July: "You have brought in with you and have, indeed, been brought here by three glorious revolutions... The first, the national revolution in every Arab country fighting colonialism till the latter's banners are trampled under foot. The second, the Arab revolution which urges its nationals to pass the artificial barriers and knock down the hurdles that represent false frontiers invented by intruders who spread dissension and suspicion. And the third, the social revolution, which calls for an honourable living for every member of the Arab society in fulfilment of social equality which is the mainstay of every national structure." (For source, see below.)

**"We Must Shoulder the Responsibilities of the Three Revolutions"** (continued). "It is up to you, as representatives of the supreme authority in this Arab Republic,



to translate the immense spiritual energy of these three revolutions into a living actuality... This living actuality should be the beacon for similar struggles in other Arab countries...

"We do not have to perform miracles to fulfil our responsibilities and duties towards history and the future of our country. We have only to work with unflinching determination and under vigilant guidance. We must shoulder the responsibilities of the three revolutions." (For source, see below.)

**Interdependence of the Three Revolutions (continued).** "Our nation has witnessed these three revolutions taking place simultaneously..."

"Our battle for independence took place alongside our battles for Arab unity and social justice... The triumph of the national revolution spelt the defeat of our enemies in the battle for unity, and also marked the culmination of the social revolution, which took place to ensure social justice. The conquest of those who attempted to cause disunity, and of feudalists and exploiters, marked the triumph of the social, national and Arab revolution." (For source, see below.)

**The Meaning of the Three Revolutions (continued).** "The national revolution has developed into a faith in positive neutrality and non-alignment as the road to universal peace. The Arab revolution has culminated in the concept of Arab nationalism as a means to Arab national unity. The social revolution has crystallized in the socialist democratic and co-operative theory as means to social equality..."

"Our nationalist revolutionary experience against imperialism made of us advocates of peace; our Arab revolutionary experience against division made us advocates of unity; our social revolutionary experience against exploitation made us advocates of justice." (*Eg. Gaz.*, 10 July)

#### THE SOCIALIST DEMOCRATIC COOPERATIVE SOCIETY

**The Social Revolution: Towards Social Equality.** Abdel-Nasser, Cairo, 9 July: "The social revolution has crystallized in the socialist democratic and co-operative theory as a means to social equality." (*Eg. Gaz.*, 10 July)

**The Meanings of Democracy, Socialism and Cooperation.** Abdel-Nasser, Damietta, 9 May: "Democracy means that no one should be given an opportunity to exploit the people for personal interest. Socialism means that all sons of the nation should participate in work and production, and that the benefits derived therefrom should be distributed among them in a just manner. Cooperation is a means to combine individual and collective efforts in the public interest." (*Eg. Gaz.*, 10 May)

**Organic Tie Between Democracy and Socialism.** Abdel-Nasser at NU General Congress, Cairo, 9 July: "There is complete integration between socialism and democracy. Without socialism—which basically aims at liberating the individual from exploitation—there can be no democracy. Likewise, without democracy—which basically means that every individual should participate in the process of guidance—there can be no socialism. How could democracy survive if feudalism and capital had the upper hand and if the fate of every individual were predetermined by his inherited position? And how could socialism be realized if the minority—which has the opportunities—dominated, and if the majority was kept from deciding

on matters and drawing up policies and plans? There is therefore, brothers, an organic association between socialism and democracy. It therefore becomes logical to say that socialism is the democracy of economy, and that democracy is the socialism of politics." (*BBC*, 12 July)

#### DEMOCRACY AND THE NATIONAL UNION

**Meaning of Democracy: Freedom of the Individual and a Better Life.** Abdel-Nasser, interviewed by Woodrow Wyatt; 2 Sept: "What are the democratic bases? The democratic bases are the bases which give the individual freedom and a better life. We, through the National Union, are giving the individual freedom and a better life, and putting an end to exploitation. This is a question of fair distribution. We are trying to redistribute the income of the country, through the developing of production and ensuring equal opportunities to all." (*Eg. Gaz.*, 4 Sept)

**Prerequisite for Democracy: Removal of Domination by Foreign and Local Factors.** Abdel-Nasser, Cairo, 21 July: "This desire for democracy made us remove all the effects of influence in all its forms, so that every citizen could command a free will."

"And in order to have every citizen exercise free will, every aspect of domination had to fall: the domination of feudalism and local capital, and the foreign domination which supports both of them so that in turn they would support it. In this way this interwoven chain was broken." (*Eg. Gaz.*, 22 July)

Abdel-Nasser at a Press Conference, Bombay, 9 Apr: "In his own country, President Abdel-Nasser said, he was determined to restore 'democratic society.' But he said the people of the UAR must be prepared for democracy."

"A man facing insecurity and starvation is unable to practice true democracy, he said. His first task is to 'free the farmers from the instability of the old feudal system.'" (*Eg. Gaz.*, 10 Apr)

**Parties Serve Foreign Interests.** Abdel-Nasser, Latakia, 15 Feb: "The National Union is not a single party whereby a handful of people take hold of the government alone. It differs too from the multi-party system whereby the enemies of our people exploit those parties. A party of reactionaries establishes contact with the imperialists, or a Communist party establishes contact with the Communist countries, and in the midst of the turmoil raging between these outside powers, the nationalists are lost and the basic goal of the people is lost." (*Ahram*; *Eg. Gaz.*, 16 Feb)

**Parties Serve Special Interests; NU Serves the Whole People.** Abdel-Nasser, Damietta, 9 May: "Basically the first aim of the National Union is unity, in order to be able to achieve the people's aims and eliminate the personal or party interests of the past. Every party in the past contrived to serve its own interests, to remain in office for the longest period possible, and to exploit the people."

"But through unity we intend to eradicate opportunism and exploitation and achieve our objectives without class distinction and the possible danger of bloodshed." (*Eg. Gaz.*, 10 May)

**National Union a Monolithic Organization.** Abdel-Nasser, Damascus, 4 Mar: "The National Union is the organization which enables us to destroy political exploitation. There can be no grouping within the National Union to serve a foreign state, or to work for an aim conflicting with the republic's or the people's aim." (*Ahram*, 5 Mar; *BBC*, 7 Mar)



**Debate Permitted—Deviations to be Eradicated.** Abdel-Nasser, Damietta, 9 May: "Disputes over various subjects are expected to take place in the National Union. Points of view differ, and it is only natural that such disputes will arise..."

"However... there is a difference between contradiction and deviation. We do not accept deviation. We consider deviation as being against the will of the whole nation..."

"There is a possibility that certain adverse elements may be found among members of the National Union. This is only natural... It is the duty of the National Union and its members to be righteous. It is also their duty to work to reform any bad elements. If they fail to reform such elements, the latter must be eradicated." (*Eg. Gaz.*, 10 May)

**Opposition Represents the Enemy.** Abdel-Nasser, Damascus, 16 Oct: "When we look around us and hear a voice which is out of tune attack this Republic, we immediately know that this is the voice of hatred and envy of the stooges and the enemies of this Republic." (*Eg. Gaz.*, 19 Oct)

**The State Plans for the General Good—the Individual Must Comply.** Abd al-Latif al-Baghdadi, 10 July: "If the state, after its planning studies, decided that he who can judge and has a global outlook should direct investments or advocate that savings be used in one way or another, the citizens should understand this well and respond to it at the first call, since this must be for the general good..."

"The individual cannot comprehend the extent of the good sought and its effects if he views it from a narrow perspective and with biased mind." (*Eg. Gaz.*, 11 July)

**National Union Must Prepare New Leaders.** Abdel-Nasser, Damietta, 9 May: "Eight years have passed since the Revolution took place. We must prepare new leaders to take over. The country needs new leaders. It needs leadership built on steady and sound bases, so that there will be no deviation in the future. Such leadership must come out from among members of the National Union." (*Eg. Gaz.*, 10 May)

## SOCIALISM AND COOPERATION

**Social Justice a Safeguard Against Imperialism.** Abdel-Nasser, Cairo, 16 July: "There should be social justice so that we may reduce the difference between classes and get over the contradictions which our society had inherited, through sound means, free from hatred and animosity. This is the duty of every one of you; it is the duty of the worker as well as the factory owner; it is the duty of both Government and people. It is the duty of all of us so that we can preserve national unity and be able to build our Fatherland, and protect it from the conspiracies of imperialism and their agents." (*Eg. Gaz.*, 17 July)

Abdel-Nasser, Damietta, 9 May: "There can be no justice if the standard of living of a small group of people is raised at the expense of others." (*Eg. Gaz.*, 10 May)

**Social Responsibility.** Abdel-Nasser, at a NU meeting, Damascus, 16 Oct: "We have a tremendous duty towards the less fortunate members of society. We are responsible to ourselves, to our conscience, to God Himself for the well-being of these members."

Abdel-Nasser, speaking to Egyptian journalists, Cairo,

28 May: "The average annual *per capita* income in the Southern Region is LE45, and those who receive more take the difference from others. All of us here are living on more than LE4 a month, and I think that imposes upon us an obligation towards the others. Our duty is to do for them at least what is worth the difference. That is the fair price we must pay for the opportunity we have and which they have not." (*Eg. Gaz.*, 31 May)

**Socialism Based on Increased Production and Just Distribution of Income.** Abdel-Nasser, Cairo, 21 July: "The structure of our socialism is based on increasing production; and on fair distribution of the national revenue." (*Eg. Gaz.*, 22 July)

**A Society of Proprietors.** From the Resolutions of the NU General Congress, Cairo, 16 July: "Our socialism stems from the conscience of our nation and the development of its social consciousness. Such socialism is a practical application of social solidarity and is based on the right of every individual to own property and to enjoy the fruit of the national income." (*Eg. Gaz.*, 17 July)

**The Meaning of Cooperation.** From the Resolutions of the NU General Congress, Cairo, 16 July: "Cooperation is the concentration of efforts on working and building and multiplying production in the interest of all citizens. Such cooperation is a picture of our democracy, and is a means for raising the standard of living of the people, realising their objectives and protecting them from exploitation and monopolies." (*Eg. Gaz.*, 17 July)

**Eliminating Inequalities and Conflicting Interests.** Abdel-Nasser, Cairo, 28 May: "What we care about is the economic anomalies in our society: the fact that a person has a house and another has not; or a person enjoys certain privileges of which another is deprived. This is the sort of anomaly which leads to class strife and which we should try to minimise by peaceful and progressive means and in stages..."

"There is some inconsistency in our society, but why? Because we have two courses before us: class strife, or the creation of an integrated and balanced society by peaceful means. The National Union will, therefore, unavoidably suffer from inconsistency because it is the expression of our present life which is still somewhat inconsistent. It is our duty to try to liquidate inconsistencies in gradual stages."

"We cannot, of course, distribute State money among all people, but we must work to increase State income and to provide jobs for all..."

"There is bound to be such a conflict... and there will also be deviations, of course. For example, if doctors demand restrictions on the admission of students to the Faculty of Medicine or if chemists demand that medicines should not be sold through co-operatives because this would bring down their prices... such demands would involve contradictions because we want medicines to be as cheap as possible. But such contradictions can still be eliminated by peaceful means." (*Eg. Gaz.*, 31 May)

**Eliminating the Class Struggle.** Abdel-Nasser at the NU General Congress, Cairo, 16 July: "In your decisions you said you did not recognize struggle between classes. But there are classes in our society, and we have to bring these classes closer so that there is no struggle amongst them. If we do not do so, a struggle will be inevitable." (*Eg. Gaz.*, 17 July)

Abdel-Nasser at Alexandria University, 28 July: "We are developing ourselves within the framework of a sort of a co-existence between all the sons of the nation. This is something which we, perhaps, have succeeded in realising for the first time in modern history.

"There are classes, but these classes are cooperating and collaborating with one another in order to bring about a social equilibrium and to remove the social barriers and enable every citizen to obtain the kind of life he wishes for himself and for his sons.

"We realised this goal as well as another greater goal, the national unity which never existed in the past because of the class war. Such a war always destroyed the national unity and the internal exploitation gave way to the external one and enabled it to enter into our land and to dominate us.

"The class war, 80 years ago, enabled the British imperialism to dominate us... Imperialism always worked towards the existence of class war and dissensions between the sons of the one nation." (*Eg. Gaz.*, 29 July)

### SOCIAL QUESTIONS

**Emancipation of Women.** From Resolution of NU General Congress, Cairo, 16 July: "The Congress recognizes with the utmost appreciation the contribution made by the Revolution towards full emancipation of our women folk, and affirms that the responsibility of women in the Arab social structure is commensurate with that of men." (For source, see below.)

**Women to "Uphold Arab Personality"** (continued). "Woman shall uphold her Arab personality and retain her appearance, Arab tongue and conduct and national bearing." (*Eg. Gaz.*, 17 July)

**Family Basis of Society.** Abdel-Nasser to UAR pressmen, Cairo, 28 May: "The true face of our country is to be found at the village...

"The society we aspire to build is not at all the society of clubs or the society figuring in the small gossip items in the papers... Stories such as that of an oriental millionaire who elopes with a married woman... such talk badly affects our society—it harms the family system which is the basis of our society...

"The society we are living in is wholesome and chaste and such illustrations as I have given represent perversity." (*Eg. Gaz.*, 31 May)

**State to Regulate Family Affairs "According to Muslim Code."** From Resolution of NU General Congress, Cairo, 16 July: "The State shall ensure a greater measure of protection and welfare for the family with a view to bringing about stable family life, and shall review existing legislation on questions pertaining to divorce, marriage to more than one wife, nurseries, wife's forcible obedience and so on with intent to achieve stability according to the terms of the Muslim Code..." (*Eg. Gaz.*, 17 July)

**Care of Children.** Abdel-Nasser at a NU Committee, Cairo, 12 July: "I wanted very much to make an allocation in the budget for [the supply of meals to school children]. But as I said it would cost the state LE8 millions in the Southern Region only...

"I am sure that this problem can be solved in some way by the National Union...

"Psychologically speaking we should develop in the children the feeling of self-dignity and prestige. Children should not feel humiliated." (*Eg. Gaz.*, 13 July)

**Labour Given New Rights.** Abdel-Nasser at a NU Committee, Cairo, 13 July: "I would like to say once more that labour is the foundation of the State, and that the new society gives workers their rights.

"Since 1953, labour has obtained new rights. Every worker is entitled to express his views freely. No one can dismiss him from his job or persecute him. He feels secure about his present and future. It is our duty to promote cooperation between employers and employees, because both work in building the new society." (*Eg. Gaz.*, 14 July)

**Social Security Legislation.** Dr Qaysūni, Central Minister of Economy, Cairo, 2 July: "The Insurance and Unified Pensions Law for Government Employees and Workers... is in furtherance of the policy of socialism to give the employees and workers security for their future and themselves and their families. Private industry has also been subjected to legislation in this field.

"One of the most important aspects of this law is that it guarantees an adequate standard of living for many citizens and their dependents in the event of loss of earning power." (*Eg. Gaz.*, 3 July)

**Low National Income Limits Social Advancement.** Abdel-Nasser, Damietta, 9 May: "Our wealth, or national income, is not sufficient to meet all the demands of every individual for happiness and prosperity. We must work hard to develop the resources of our country so as to be able to increase our national income and ensure a higher standard of living and happiness for every individual...

"We have still a long way to go to reach the high standards of living in the United States and the Soviet Union.

"The exploitation of our country's resources needs time. Thus, we cannot except all the demands of the people to be granted in one day." (*Eg. Gaz.*, 10 May)

Abdel-Nasser, Damietta, 9 May: "We can attain the requirements of the people only within the limits of the budget. There are certain problems and things which can be solved by the people. With a little effort and through co-operation of the people, some of the latter's problems can be solved.

"We cannot open additional secondary and industrial schools throughout the Republic at this stage. There is no budget for all this. The budget, of course, is met from the taxes paid by the people...

"There is no justification for additional taxes, hence we can provide only part of the requirements of the people, and not all the requirements." (*Eg. Gaz.*, 10 May)

Abdel-Nasser, Cairo, 28 May: "What happens is that 5,000 villages are calling on the government to do everything for them, both big and small. The government cannot possibly do all that for the simple reason that everything needs money." (*Eg. Gaz.*, 31 May)

### EDUCATION, ARTS AND SCIENCES

**Human Goals of UAR Education Contrasted with "Barbarous" Results of Western Education.** Kamāl ad-Dīn Hussein, Central Minister of Education, Cairo, 15 Dec: "We intend to advance in learning and by learning to see to it that our academic achievements are confined to doing good for somebody and will not serve as stimulus to aggression, domination...

"The dreadful and savage massacres which are being practised by France in Algeria, by Belgium and its stooges in the Congo and by Britain and its allies in various

parts of Africa and Asia represent an image of the barbarous aspect of education which we repudiate wholeheartedly.

"It is an image of the misleading education whose sons missed the point and deviated with the education and exploited it for purposes other than those given by Almighty God." (For source, see below.)

**Education to be Based on Belief in God and on New Arab Civilization** (continued). "The real education is the knowledge of the universe, the knowledge of God and, meanwhile, the awareness of the human conscience. Education without belief resembles a brain without a conscience. Belief in God represents the conscience of humanity, which delivers it from deviation from the truth, animal-like recklessness and selfishness, which destroy all human principles and ideals..."

"We want education based on two supports, the spirit and the substance. We want a kind of education similar to the one which we had in the past—an Arab civilisation which will be developed with time and which will follow the development of the people..." (Eg. Gaz., 16 Dec)

**Education to Safeguard Independence.** Abdul-Nasser at Dacca University, Pakistan, 13 Apr: "Those [the new imperialism] who monopolise knowledge will use it to dominate the others. Therefore, we have to develop education and learning in our countries to avoid being dominated..."

"Without development and education, the independence of our countries will be shaken." (Eg. Gaz., 14 Apr)

**Art and Science Manifestation of Liberty.** Abdel-Nasser, Cairo, 15 Dec: "Art in its real essence is a manifestation of freedom and science in its real essence is a demonstration of liberty."

"Art is man's upsurge to discover himself, and science is man's upsurge to explore the universe around him. Freedom in art and science is a complete orbit that gives and takes, acts and reacts and animates and is animated. For the feeling of freedom motivating the artist to artistic creation is later transformed into a driving force towards a greater measure of liberty and free thought. Thus freedom is a prelude to art and science and an inevitable result of them. Each is complementary to the other in the struggle of the nation." (For source, see below.)

**Art as Weapon Against Imperialism** (continued). "Art has become one of the strongest weapons in the battle for political freedom against imperialism and exploitation. Later comes the role of education as a major weapon in the battle for economic and social freedom... The word of the mouth was as powerful as the bullet in our struggle and the song and the touch of light and colour on paper was the same." (For source, see below.)

**Role of Art and Science in Political, Economic and Social Struggle** (continued). "The role of art is always more pronounced in the moral mobilisation which is necessary to push forward the political struggle, while science is more pronounced in the material mobilisation for pushing forward the economic and social struggle. Yet science has a great role in keeping the enlightened awakening to ensure of the political struggle, just as art has a great role to play in creating the human feeling which is necessary for the success of the economic battle." (Eg. Gaz., 16 Dec)

**Artists and Scientists to be "Inspired by National Legacy."** From resolutions of NU General Congress, Cairo, 16 July: "To encourage writers, literary men, scientists and artists throughout the Arab fatherland to be inspired by our national legacy in their works and in tackling national subjects." (Eg. Gaz., 17 July)

#### PRESS AND OTHER MASS MEDIA

**Mass Media Must Conform with National Objectives.** From resolutions of NU General Congress, Cairo, 16 July: "To promote national awareness of world events and the dangers of imperialism and Zionism."

"To draw up a code of ethics for all those engaged in all information media so that all their efforts and energy should be devoted to serving the national aims."

"To make sure that all means of information, namely the press, broadcasting stations, theatres, cinemas, general libraries, etc. conform with our principles and national objectives..."

"The cinema industry and those in charge of it should play an effective role in realising the objectives of the National Union with regard to the creation of the socialist, democratic and cooperative society." (Eg. Gaz., 17 July)

**History to be Rewritten.** From resolutions of NU General Congress, Cairo, 16 July: "To rewrite the history of the Arab nation in such a way as to display conspicuously the present and future civilising role of the Arab nation, the various great deeds achieved by the Arabs and their heroic struggle against Imperialism." (Eg. Gaz., 17 July)

**Mission of the Press.** Abdel-Nasser to Egyptian pressmen on nationalization of press, Cairo, 28 May: "I consider the press to be more of a mission than a commodity or a piece of merchandise..."

"You have been dealing with the problems of the society in which we have been living in the past. But... you have not crystallised the society in which you want to live. Everyone has been criticising..."

"The society we want to build up is definitely not the Cairo society, or that of the National Club or the Zamalek Club... The true face of our country is to be found at the village of Kafr El Battikh or any village for that matter..."

"Once, I said it was impossible for you to expect me to give you a picture of our society, and my opinion was that it was you, every one of you, who should bring to light the character of society and offer solutions for our real problems. The villages—how can we reform our villages?..." (For source, see below.)

**Too Much Sex Talk and Political Advertisements** (continued). "Why do we have to keep talking about sex? I don't think that a clean society encourages sex talk. The papers keep hammering away on sex..."

"Such illustrations [sex cartoons] may sell half a score more copies, but their destructive effect on society is certain..."

"Why do we find papers publishing political advertisements?... Profit has become the sole aim and criterion to the extent that advertisements of the various foreign embassies have become a fixed item of income to the papers. Is that right?..." (For source, see below.)

**Constructive Criticism Required** (continued). "The 'Village Corner' [a newspaper column] has every day some demands to make and constantly calls for plans. I really



want to do all that for our countryside but we will require some 100 billion pounds to dry up all marshlands in the villages, to set up a school in each, and to build a hospital...

"The constructive approach to such a problem would be to tell the people of the villages what they can do and what the government can contribute...

"We can criticise, but at the same time we must state solutions. But I should repeat that criticism in all its forms is permitted..."

"The society we wish to build is not a society of crime. No attention should be given to crime... I do not say that crime should not be treated, but that its treatment should have an aim..." (For source, see below.)

**Press Should Criticize Economic Anomalies and Unmask Corruption.** "What we care about is the economic anomalies in our society: the fact that... a person enjoys certain privileges of which another is deprived. But such contradictions can still be eliminated by peaceful means. That is why I say that the press has a very wide field to deal with such [social inequality, social conflict and] contradictions and to offer solutions. [See full passage above under heading of "Socialism and Cooperation."]

"It is also the duty of the press to unmask corruption. There is bribery [and] the possibility of deviationist elements in every society. All this exists in the country and I cannot get rid of these elements all by myself..."

"Another point is the practice of writing defamatory articles about artists. Artists have a mission just like the press..." (For source, see below.)

**Faith in "Democratic, Cooperative, Socialist Society."** "To sum up, we want to promote the press as a mission. You, as pressmen, are mobilised in the service of the country and not for any particular group of people. He who does not believe in the democratic, socialist, co-operative society should speak up and say so, and I am prepared to give him a pension and let him go home. But those who continue working must have faith in the democratic, socialist, cooperative society we are striving to build." (*Eg. Gaz.*, 31 May)

## PLANNING AND ECONOMY

[On 1 July 1960 two separate five-year general development plans for the Egyptian and Syrian Regions were inaugurated. They were designed to increase the national income by 40 per cent in five years and double it in ten years.]

**Planning for a Welfare Society.** From Resolution of NU General Congress, Cairo, 16 July: "The adoption of a planning policy can be taken as a point of departure for the establishment of a welfare society based on social efforts to develop economic resources, to provide social equality and prestige. It means the marshalling of all services, to increase national income and to give opportunities for able members of the community to work and prosper..."

"The plan is not merely a set of figures, projects and principles. It is, first and foremost, an expression of the rebirth of the material and moral energy inherent in the Arab nation..." (For source, see below.)

**Plan for Agriculture (continued).** "In agriculture, the plan stands for an increase of produce, promotion of the farmer's standard of living, reclamation of barren lands, transformation of wage earners to property owners, improvement of rural environment, introduction of techni-

cal methods of production and the establishment of co-operatives to protect the interests of the local farm workers." (For source, see below.)

**Plan for Industry (continued).** "In industry, the plan is mainly directed toward manifesting the real characteristics of the Arab industrial structure, moving us from stagnation and impotence of the colonialist regimes to free thinking and doing under the shadow of this revolutionary administration.

"Natural resources are to be exploited, heavy industries set up, industrial wares and commodities increased, oil produced and industrialised and many industries established to make our society a prosperous and industrial one." (For source, see below.)

**Plan for Social Services (continued).** "The plan asserts socialist principles in rehabilitation and housing and in public amenities, education, culture and social and health services, and provides citizens with the opportunity to do useful work.

"It gives due regard to adequate distribution of development among projects for increase of national income and agricultural and industrial output on the one hand and projects for services and social development on the other." (*Eg. Gaz.*, 17 July)

**National Capital and Foreign Loans Preferred to Foreign Private Investment.** Abdel-Nasser, interviewed by West German journalists, Cairo, 25 Jan: "We give preference to national capital. In our dealings with foreign capital we prefer to obtain loans and subsequently we can discuss private investment..."

"I will tell you the reason why. Before the nationalization of the Suez Canal we used to transfer to foreign capital interest estimated at £20 million. This sum was transferred abroad in the form of foreign currency. Following the Egyptianisation of certain British and French establishments after the Suez war, the foreign capital profits transferred abroad dropped to £2 million. We have thus saved our country £18 million.

"What will be the result if we now open the door to foreign investments? The result would be that every year we would be giving them large sums of money in form of profits, moreover in foreign currency, while if we obtain loans we will repay such loans and will not continue payments indefinitely. However, should there be large foreign investments we would have to pay interest for ever... However, we welcome foreign capital in industries for which we need technical assistance or technical consultations requiring research which we have no opportunity to carry out here, so that we can benefit from such research." (*BBC*, 28 Jan)

**Egyptianization and Public Investment Used to Further Social Justice.** Abdel-Nasser at NU General Congress, Cairo, 9 July: "The object of the plan is not merely to increase the national income, but to see that this increase leads to opportunities being given to the deprived, and to enable those who have lived all their lives as hired persons to own property. This naturally demands that public investment should play a vital role in industrial development, and co-operate in agricultural development... Following the Egyptianization of this property, which dominated key points in our economy, our policy was to regard it as an extension of public investment in the national economy, and to expand its productivity..."

"To sell this Egyptianized property to companies or individuals who already carried on similar activities..."



## THE UAR GOVERNMENT

would have meant deviation from the socialist development which our circumstances have made inevitable... The inevitable result would have been to give those who already owned property the opportunity to own more property... That was not the logic of justice. The logic of justice was to permit those who had never owned property in their lives to own the property. Hence, brothers, the necessity for public investment, the property of the whole people... the existence of public investment does not mean that the government owns the property; it is the people who own the property through their government." (For source, see below.)

**Vital Role of Public Capital in Development Plan** (continued). "The object of the plan—in fact, a guarantee of the success of the plan—was to increase the scope of such public investment... It would not be possible to continue with the comprehensive plan to double the national income within ten years—in view of the great efforts demanded and the great social objects involved—unless public capital played its vital role..." (For source, see below.)

**Private Capital Useful If It "Keeps to Right Path"** (continued). "We do not doubt that private capital has played its role in the results which we have so far achieved. Furthermore, private capital has a prominent role to play in the comprehensive plan. We will also give it all the guarantees necessary to ensure its productivity. For when private capital keeps the right path, without showing a desire to exploit and monopolize, it is exactly like public capital—a national treasure, which we must safeguard.

"A hopeful sign for our development is that harmony which exists between public capital and private capital. This has been clearly manifested in many big projects which have been carried out with the co-operation of public and private capital. That is what we call a mixed economy..." (For source, see below.)

**Integrated Economic and Social Planning** (continued).

"There could have been no economic plan without a social aim. In fact the plan would have achieved adverse results if attention had been paid only to the economic aspect of the plan while the social side had been neglected. The plan in this case would have only increased the wealth of the wealthy and the poverty of the poor and subsequently would have widened the gap which separated those who owned the riches by inheritance and those who by inheritance owned nothing but poverty. Thus the only national stability—namely social justice—would be lost..." (For source, see below.)

**Development Must Keep Pace with Population Growth** (continued). "We should always remember, brothers, that our circumstances allow no hesitation or waiting. The plan for doubling the UAR national income in ten years must succeed. Other plans should follow it successively, redoubling the national income every ten years or less.

"We should realize a long-range outgrowth which should in advance achieve the development to meet the expected growth in population. All our objectives will be paralyzed if the population increase moves faster than economic and social development." (BBC, 12 July)

**Individuals Must Not Deviate from Plan.** Abd al-Latif al-Baghdādi, 10 July: "The first and most important duty is to respond to the directives of the authorities which seek to enable the country to reach the objectives by the shortest route. The public administration will in all its actions follow the plan. Yet, in our Republic, the private sector is large and some of its individuals might deviate in furtherance of a private interest or gain. This would seriously harm the nation..."

"We should understand that planning always strives for big future objectives which require certain sacrifices.

"Another thing not to be overlooked is that in the age of planning each citizen should consider that his income is 'planned' and so should use it in the best manner and try to reduce his consumer spending to the minimum." (Eg. Gaz., 11 July)

## THE UAR GOVERNMENT

President: Gamāl Abdel-Nasser

	1 Dec 1959	Changes during 1960	31 Dec 1960
Vice-Presidents	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Abd al-Latif al-Baghdādi (Egyptian)</li> <li>2. Abd al-Hakīm Amer (Egyptian)</li> <li>3. Akram al-Hurāni (Syrian)</li> </ol>	<p>Resigned 30 Dec 1959; Nūr ad-Dīn Kahālāh (Syrian) appointed 19 July 1960</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Abd al-Latif al-Baghdādi (Egyptian)</li> <li>2. Abd al-Hakīm Amer (Egyptian)</li> <li>3. Nūr ad-Dīn Kahālāh (Syrian)</li> </ol>

## CENTRAL GOVERNMENT

Ministry			
Foreign Affairs	Dr Mahmūd Fawzi (Egyptian)	—	Dr Mahmūd Fawzi (Egyptian)
War	Field-Marshal Abd al-Hakīm Amer (Egyptian)	—	Field-Marshal Abd al-Hakīm Amer (Egyptian)
Interior	Zakariya Muhi ad-Dīn (Egyptian)	—	Zakariya Muhi ad-Dīn (Egyptian)
Justice	Akram al-Hurāni (Syrian)	Resigned 30 Dec 1959; Fākhīr al-Kayālī (Syrian) appointed 20 Sept	Fākhīr al-Kayālī (Syrian)

UAR: INTERNAL AFFAIRS

	<i>1 Dec 1959</i>	<i>Changes during 1960</i>	<i>31 Dec 1960</i>
Planning	Abd al-Latif al-Baghdadi (Egyptian)	Nūr ad-Dīn Kahālāh appointed Central Minister of Planning for the Northern R 20 Sept	Abd al-Latif al-Baghdadi (Egyptian) Nūr ad-Dīn Kahālāh (Syrian)
Social Affairs and Labour	Hussein ash-Shāfi'i (Egyptian)	—	Hussein ash-Shāfi'i (Egyptian)
Education	Kāmāl ad-Dīn Hussein (Egyptian)	—	Kāmāl ad-Dīn Hussein (Egyptian)
Finance	Dr Abd al-Mun'im al-Qaysūni (Egyptian)	—	Dr Abd al-Mun'im al-Qaysūni (Egyptian)
Economy	Dr Abd al-Mun'im al-Qaysūni (Egyptian)	—	Dr Abd al-Mun'im al-Qaysūni (Egyptian)
Public Works	Ahmad Abduh ash-Sharbāsi (Egyptian)	—	Ahmad Abduh ash-Sharbāsi (Egyptian)
Culture and National Guidance	Salāh ad-Dīn al-Bitār (Syrian)	Resigned 30 Dec 1959; Thābit al-Arīs (Syrian) appointed 20 Sept	Thābit al-Arīs (Syrian)
Communications	Amīn an-Nafūri (Syrian)	Resigned 2 May 1959; Muhammad al-Alim (Syrian) appointed 20 Sept	Muhammad al-Alim (Syrian)
Health	Dr Bashīr al-Azamāh (Syrian)	Resigned 18 Aug; Dr Nūr ad-Dīn Tarrāf (Egyptian) appointed 20 Sept	Dr Nūr ad-Dīn Tarrāf (Egyptian)
Municipal and Rural Affairs	Ahmad Abd al-Karīm (Syrian)	Resigned 2 May; Tu'mah al-Awdat Allah (Syrian) appointed 20 Sept	Tu'mah al-Awdat Allah (Syrian)
Supply	Dr Kamāl Ramzi Astino (Egyptian)	—	Dr Kamāl Ramzi Astino (Egyptian)
Industry	Dr Azīz Sidqi (Egyptian)	—	Dr Azīz Sidqi (Egyptian)
Agriculture	Sayyid Mar'i (Egyptian)	—	Sayyid Mar'i (Egyptian)
Agrarian Reform	Sayyid Mar'i (Egyptian)	—	Sayyid Mar'i (Egyptian)
Minister of State for Presidential Affairs	Ali Sabri (Egyptian)	—	Ali Sabri (Egyptian)
Minister of State for War Affairs	General (Fariq) Muhammad Ibrahīm (Egyptian)	—	General Muhammad Ibrahīm (Egyptian)
Minister of State	Kamāl Rif'at (Egyptian)	—	Kamāl Rif'at (Egyptian)
Minister of State	—	Abd al-Qādir Hātīm (Egyptian) appointed 20 Sept	Abd al-Qādir Hātīm (Egyptian)
Minister of State	Fākhīr al-Kayālī (Syrian)	Appointed Central Minister of Justice 20 Sept	

EXECUTIVE COUNCIL OF NORTHERN REGION

	<i>1 Dec 1959</i>	<i>Changes during 1960</i>	<i>31 Dec 1960</i>
President	Nūr ad-Dīn Kahālāh	Appointed UAR Vice-President 19 July. Abd al-Hamīd as-Sarrāj appointed President of Council 20 Sept; he continued to hold his other portfolios	Abd al-Hamīd as-Sarrāj
Interior	Abd al-Hamīd as-Sarrāj	—	Abd al-Hamīd as-Sarrāj
Justice	Nahād al-Qāsim	—	Nahād al-Qāsim

THE UAR GOVERNMENT

	<i>1 Dec 1959</i>	<i>Changes during 1960</i>	<i>31 Dec 1960</i>
Planning	Nūr ad-Dīn Kahālah		Nūr ad-Dīn Kahālah
Social Affairs and Labour	Abd al-Ghani Qanūt	Resigned 30 Dec 1959; Akram Diri appointed 18 Mar	Akram Diri
Education	Amjad at-Tarābuli	—	Amjad at-Tarābuli
Finance	Abd al-Wahāb Humad	—	Abd al-Wahāb Humad
Economy	Khalīl al-Kallās	Resigned 30 Dec 1959; Husni as-Sawwāf appointed 18 Mar	Husni as-Sawwāf
Public Works	Nūr ad-Dīn Kahālah	Appointed Vice-President of UAR on 19 July and Central Minister for Planning 20 Sept, Jādu Izz ad-Dīn appointed 20 Sept	Jādu Izz ad-Dīn
Culture and National Guidance	(Riyād al-Māliki resigned on 14 Sept 1959)	Thābit al-Arīs appointed on 18 Mar	Thābit al-Arīs
Communications	Muhammad al-Alim	—	Muhammad al-Alim
Waqfs	Abd al-Hamīd as-Sarrāj	Holding portfolio temporarily; Yūsuf Muzāhim appointed 18 Mar	Yūsuf Muzāhim
Health	Shawkat al-Qanawāti	—	Shawkat al-Qanawāti
Municipal and Rural Affairs	Tu'mah al-Awdat Allah	—	Tu'mah al-Awdat Allah
Industry	Wajīh as-Sammān	—	Wajīh as-Sammān
Supply	—	Ministry formed 18 Mar	Jamal as-Sufi
Agriculture	Ahmad al-Hājj Yūnis	—	Ahmad al-Hājj Yūnis
Agrarian Reform	Mustafa Hamdūn	Resigned 30 Dec 1959; Ahmad al-Hunaydi appointed 18 Mar	Ahmad al-Hunaydi

EXECUTIVE COUNCIL OF SOUTHERN REGION

	<i>1 Dec 1959</i>	<i>Changes during 1960</i>	<i>31 Dec 1960</i>
President	Nūr ad-Dīn Tarrāf	Appointed Central Minister of Health 20 Sept. On the same day Kamāl ad-Dīn Hussein appointed President of the Council. Continued to hold his other posts in the Central Government and Executive Council	Kamāl ad-Dīn Hussein
Interior	Abbās Radwān	—	Abbās Radwān
Justice	Ahmad Husni	—	Ahmad Husni
Social Affairs and Labour	Tawfiq Abd al-Fattāh	—	Tawfiq Abd al-Fattāh
Education	Ahmad Nagīb Hāshim	—	Ahmad Nagīb Hāshim
Local Government	—	Ministry formed 11 Sept	Kamāl ad-Dīn Hussein
Finance	Hasan Salāh ad-Dīn	—	Hasan Salāh ad-Dīn
Economy	Hassan Abbās Zaki	—	Hassan Abbās Zaki
Public Works	Mūsa Arafah	—	Mūsa Arafah
Culture and National Guidance	Tharwat Ukāshah	—	Tharwat Ukāshah
Communications	Mustafa Khalīl	—	Mustafa Khalīl
Waqfs	Ahmad Abdullah Tu'aymah	—	Ahmad Abdullah Tu'aymah
Health	Muhammad Mahmūd Nassār	—	Muhammad Mahmūd Nassār

	1 Dec 1959	Changes during 1960	31 Dec 1960
Municipal and Rural Affairs	Muhammad Abu Nusayr	—	Muhammad Abu Nusayr
Industry	Dr Aziz Sidqi	—	Dr Aziz Sidqi
Agriculture	Ahmad al-Mahrūqi	—	Ahmad al-Mahrūqi
Agrarian Reform	Hasan Baghdādi	—	Hasan Baghdādi

## THE NATIONAL UNION (NU)

(Al-Ittihad al-Qawmi)

### HISTORY AND FORMATION OF NU

#### HISTORY OF NU UP TO 1960

**Plan for NU Included in 1956 and 1958 Constitutions.** The NU was envisaged in the Egyptian Constitution of 16 Jan 1956. Article 192, Chapter VI: "Transitory and Final Provisions," says: "The citizens form a National Union in order to realize the objectives for which the Revolution was started, and to concentrate the efforts to build the nation (as a) sound structure in the political, social and economic fields. The NU will nominate the candidates for membership of the National Assembly. The method for forming this Union is to be decided by the President of the Republic." (Translated from the Arabic Text—*al-Matba'ah al-Amiriyah, Bulaq, 1956.*)

A paragraph to the same effect (with only minor verbal changes) was included in the UAR Provisional Constitution of 1958 (Article 72). (*UAR Yearbook 1960, p 20*)

**1956–1958: Delays in Organization.** The first decree on the establishment of the National Union was not issued until May 1957. It nominated the President of the State as President of the NU. Its basic constitution was published only in Nov 1957, and at the same time Anwar as-Saadat, who had been appointed SG of the NU, announced the start of its organizational activity. A beginning was made with the establishment of the branches. Consequently, the Liberation Rally (*Hay'at al-Tahrir*), which was founded in Jan 1953 as the military regime's first attempt to establish a mass political organization, was dissolved on 25 Jan 1958, and its property and premises transferred to the NU.

In Jan 1958 the Supreme Executive Committee (Exec Com) of the NU, its highest executive authority, was established under the presidency of Abdel-Nasser. As a first step Exec Coms in the provinces of Egypt were set up, but the formation of the organization was held up on the establishment of the UAR because of political difficulties in the Syrian Region.

**1959: The General Elections.** On 10 July 1959 general elections were held for the "Popular Base" (*Qā'idah Sha'abiyah*) of the NU, i.e. the Exec Coms of the villages, district capitals and quarters of governorates (i.e. town quarters).

**1959: Organizational Progress:** In Oct 1959 President Abdel-Nasser nominated Abd al-Hakim Amer and Kamāl ad-Din Hussein as inspectors of the NU, the former in the Northern [Syrian] and the other in the Southern Region. (*Ahram, 22 Oct, 1959*) [Anwar as-Saadat, who was appointed SG of the NU in 1957, was thus in effect deprived of executive authority.]

**1959: Headquarters Organized in Southern R.** Kamāl ad-Din Hussein announced in Oct 1959 the formation of a regional HQ for the Southern R composed of 13 members, to aid him in guiding the Exec Coms of the NU. Most of the members were army officers. Following are their names and the offices for which they were responsible:

Salāh ad-Dasūqi	Youth
Khālid Fawzi	Labour and Workers
Fu'ād Galāl*	Trade Unions
Fātimah Anān	Women's Leagues
Anwar ash-Sharīf	Chambers of Trade and Industry
Yūsuf as-Sibā'i	Associations of Arts and Literature
Abd as-Sālam Badawi	Economic Affairs and Production
Ahmad al-Baltagi	Administrative Office
Muhammad Fahmi as-Sayyid Abd al-Bāqi	Legal and Legislative Affairs
Ahmad Shahīb	Proposals
Muhammad Hāshim	General Affairs
Sa'īd Qadri	Social and Public Affairs
Sa'ad ad-Dīn Zā'id	Local Government
* From 27 May 1960, Dr Hussein Khallāf. ( <i>Ahram, 4 Nov 1959; 27 May 1960</i> )	

#### PRINCIPLES AND AIMS OF THE NU

[The NU was not founded on any written prior articulate ideology. In a book on the subject by Anwar as-Saadat, published in the middle of 1958, which was the first attempt to formulate the principles of the NU, the author said that the organization should be the connecting link between the Revolutionary Command and the masses, which he called the "Popular Base" (*Qā'idah Sha'abiyah*). Such a link was lacking, he said, after the 1952 Revolution, but its place was filled by the "absolute



confidence" of the masses in the Revolutionary Government. Since this confidence could not "always remain hanging in the air," it was essential to preserve it in an organizational framework. If parties were formed, they might have views opposed to those of the Revolutionary Command in matters of internal and foreign policy. Nor would it be possible to permit the existence of parties which would act solely within the framework of the Revolutionary Command's policies. It would be folly for the constitution to grant freedom to the parties while at the same time shackling them in the formulation of their programmes. The NU "is not a party or an abstract constructive idea"; it "is a way of protecting the spirit and there is no other way... It is not an expedient freely adopted, but a necessity forced upon us, dictated by our new conditions and our new responsibilities." Independence, Arab nationalism, positive neutralism, freedom and peace were common interests of all sections of the people. These interests were in danger and the NU must safeguard them. Like the Re-

volution, the NU must spring from the people and not be imposed on it from above. (According to *Ruz al-Yusuf*, 12 May 1958. The last point was repeatedly emphasized.)

The aims of the NU were defined by Abdel-Nasser on various occasions. In the field of foreign policy: faith in Arab nationalism as an established fact and a growing and positive movement with a concrete goal; respect for the right of nations to self-determination, and devotion to the UN Charter and the Bandung Principles. These three points composed the aim; the means were positive neutralism and non-alignment with either of the blocs. In the field of home policy, the goal was the creation of a welfare society. The means for the achievement of this aim was the establishment of a Cooperative Socialist Democratic Society. The NU would achieve these aims by stages, without the use of force. (*Ruz al-Yusuf*, 15 Aug 1958)

During 1960 Abdel-Nasser defined the task of the NU on many occasions. (See Views and Policies pp 470-71.)

## STRUCTURE AND ORGANIZATION OF NU—1960

### GENERAL ORGANIZATION

[The structure of the NU is pyramidal, beginning at the village, district capital or town quarter level, and going up, through the province or governorate, to the regional congresses and the UAR congress. The NU organization in each region is headed by an Inspector-General or Controller (*Mushrif-Amm*). The highest authority of the NU is the Supreme Exec Com (*Al-Lajnah at-Tanfidiyah al-Ulyah*) presided over ex officio by the President of the UAR, Gamāl Abdel-Nasser.

There is one main horizontal dividing line: between the provincial and the regional congresses. The provincial congresses and lower units are mainly concerned with local issues while the bodies above the dividing line represent the NU on national issues.]

**Organizational Changes in 1959-1960.** This structure took shape mainly in the spring of 1959, during the preparations for the general elections to the NU (see above). But the organizational pattern of the NU was completed only during the last stages of its establishment, in the spring and summer of 1960. The organization of the various bodies was actually fixed only in the Inspector's decrees convening them. (See, e.g., as-Sarrāj's decree on the composition of the Gen Coms and the summoning of the Governorate Congress (*Ahram*, 16 May 1960) which was similar to a decree issued in the Southern R at the end of 1959). (*Ahram*, 18 Dec 1959)

At the end of 1959 the Regional Congresses were not yet established, and there was mention only of the General Congress. (*Ahram*, 4, 10, 14, 19, 29 Nov 1959) It was only in Mar 1960 that reports of Regional Congresses began to appear. (*Ahram*, 6 Mar)

**Membership.** "Membership of the NU is open to all citizens not less than 16 years of age. Such members are entitled to express their opinion and make suggestions to the different bodies of the Union, they may also participate in the activities of these bodies. Active membership however is confined to those members who believe in the principles of the NU and undertake such activity as is deemed necessary to the realization of the principles of the Union. Members must be of good reputation, possess qualities of leadership and administration, and

must not have been convicted of any criminal offence. Active members pay membership fees; they participate in the deliberations of the committee of which they are members and in which they have also voting rights." (*Ahram*, 9 Nov 1959; *UAR Yearbook 1960, English Ed.*, p 27)

Only the Supreme Exec Com has the right to dismiss members from lower Exec Coms. (*Ahram*, 16 Nov 1959)

**Budget.** The financial year of the NU starts on 1 July. Its income is derived from four sources:

1. Membership fees of at least 20 Ml per month, paid by the active members (*Ishtirāk*);
2. "Aid" (*Fanāt*);
3. Contributions (*Tabarru'āt*) the acceptance of which has been agreed upon by the Exec Com;
4. Other sources, such as income from cultural or other events organized by the Exec Com and from its enterprises.

Eighty per cent of the income of the Exec Com of the basic unit is used to finance its activities; ten per cent transferred to the Exec Com of the district, five per cent to the province or governorate and five per cent to the headquarters of the NU. The treasurer of the Exec Com is responsible for financial affairs. The Exec Com of the governorate or the province supervises the books of the committees at the lower levels. (*Ahram*, 16 Nov 1959; *Musawwar*, 5 Feb 1960)

### ORGANIZATION OF THE "POPULAR BASE" AND PROVINCIAL ORGANS

**Parallel to Structure of Local Government.** [The structure of the NU up to the province level is parallel to that of local government. The changes in local government carried out in 1960 (see p 493 ff) did not affect the administrative divisions, but the term *mudiriyyah*—rural province—was abolished, and since July 1960 the term *muhāfazah*—governorate—is used for the provincial division throughout the UAR.

The organization of the NU was completed in 1960 when the old terms were still in use. Below, in a general outline of the organization of local government, both the old and the new terms are given. In all further references

the old terms are used, in accordance with the sources of reference.]

**Outline of Local Government Structure.** The Southern Region was divided into city governorates (*muhāfazah*), e.g. Cairo, Alexandria, Port Said, and rural provinces (*mudiriyah*). Since July 1960 the rural provinces have also been called governorates (*muhāfazah*).

The governorates (i.e. the cities) are divided into quarters—*qism*-pl: *aqsām*—with subdivisions called *hayy*-pl: *ahyā*.

Some of the provincial capitals (*al-bandar āsimat al-mudiriyah*) are divided into quarters. The country area of the province is divided into districts (*markaz*-pl: *marākiz*).

The district consists of sub-districts (*andar*-pl: *banādir*). The district may or may not have a district capital (*al-bandar āsimat al-markaz*).

The sub-districts consist of villages (*qaryah*-pl: *qura*). Some of the former are directly subordinate to the province (*al-bandar ghayr at-tābi lil-markaz*).

The Northern R is divided into governorates (*muhāfazah*), each of which has a capital town (*āsimah*).

The country area of the governorate is divided into districts (*mintaqah*-pl: *manātiq*), each of which consists of a district capital (*markaz al-mintaqah*) and villages.

#### STRUCTURE OF NU UNITS: THE "POPULAR BASE" AND THE PROVINCIAL LEVEL

**Basic Structure of NU Units.** In each of the above administrative units an NU unit was organized, consisting in each case of:

(1) An Exec Com (*Lajnah Tanfidhiyah*), which is headed by (2) an Executive (*Hay'at Maktab*) and aided in its tasks by (3) Sub-Committees for Action (*Lijān Far'iyah lil-Nashāt*). All the activities of the NU unit are to be coordinated by (4) the General Committee (*Lajnah Ammah*).

The province or governorate also has a Congress (*Mu'tamar*).

The Exec Com represents the NU unit and expresses the opinion and interests of its citizens in both general and local affairs. It submits the proposals approved by the General Committee to the governmental or local authorities concerned for study and has the right to ascertain whether the local governmental bodies fulfil their duties in the public interest (*UAR Yearbook 1960, English Ed.*, p 28; *Ahram*, 16 Nov 1959) The Exec Com meets at least once a fortnight.

The membership of the Exec Com at the lower levels (village, quarter, district capital) varies from three to ten, all elected. At the higher levels, its composition is fixed by special decrees but may not exceed thirty (see chart). (*UAR Yearbook 1960, English Ed.*, p 28) The members of the Exec Com take part in the local government councils (see pp 493-4). The Exec Com conducts independent activities, and also carries out the orders of the Exec Com of the next higher level, to which it submits a report every three months. (*Ahram*, 27 Oct 1959)

**The Executive.** Every Exec Com has an Executive, consisting of two to eight officers, which meets at least once a week and conducts the activities of the Exec Com according to permanent regulations. (*Ahram*, 16 Nov 1959; *Ayyam*, 23 Mar 1960) "The President represents the Exec Com in its relations with outside bodies." (*UAR Yearbook 1960, English Ed.*, pp 28-29)

**The Subcommittees.** The duties of the subcommittees are "to implement the social, cultural and co-operative plans and programmes of the NU, within the broad outlines laid down by the Exec Com and in accordance with the system accredited by the appropriate committees and bodies of the NU." (*UAR Yearbook 1960, English Ed.*, pp 29-30)

[Each sub com consists of: (1) A *rappporteur* (*muqarrir*), elected by the Exec Com from among its members and responsible to it for the activities of his sub-committee (2) active members of the NU chosen by the Exec Com; (3) representatives of public and private bodies, institutions and trade unions.

Subcommittees vary in number, composition and scope according to the economic and social circumstances prevailing in the village, quarter, etc. (*Musawwar*, 5 Feb, 1960)

**The General Committees.** The Gen Com which meets at least once a month, "follows up the activities of the subcommittees and co-ordinates their efforts. It studies the issues and proposals submitted to it by the Exec Com or its subcommittees, particularly the plans which require co-ordination with governmental or local authorities." (*UAR Yearbook 1960*, p 31; *Ayyam*, 27 May)

**The Provincial or Governorate Congresses.** The Congress (see chart) convenes at least twice a year. The Exec Com of the province or the governorate decides the dates of the sessions and prepares the agenda (see below).

#### NATIONAL ORGANS OF THE NU

##### (a) Regional Congresses

The national bodies of the NU are: (1) Regional Congresses of the Southern and the Northern Regions; (2) the General Congress of the UAR; (3) the Headquarters; (4) Inspectors-General and Secretary; (5) the Supreme Executive Committee and (6) the President.

**Regional Congress—Basic Organization.** The General Congress of the Region (*al-Mu'tamar al-Amm lil-Iqlim*) convenes once a year at least 15 days before the UAR Congress convenes. The Regional Congress comprises (1) a General Assembly; (2) Functional Committees; (3) a General Committee; (4) an Exec Com headed by (5) an Exec. In addition it has a (6) Preparatory Committee (*Lajnah Tahdiriyah*).

**Membership of Regional Congress.** The basic composition of the Congress, which is identical in both Regions, was fixed by presidential decree. (*Ahram*, 12 June) Two-thirds of the members belong to the Congress by virtue of posts they hold as elected members of the NU. One-third are nominees from various institutions, associations, trade unions, teaching bodies of the universities, religious minorities, government officials, etc. (For composition of Congress, see chart.) (*Ahram*, 26 May, 16 June)

**Functions of Regional Congress.** (a) Adoption of resolutions on the policy and programme of the NU in the Region, with a view to submitting the resolutions dealing with general policy to the UAR General Congress. (b) Submission to the Gen Com of resolutions in line with the policy established by the UAR Congress. (c) Examination of the annual report submitted by the Gen Com of the Congress.

**Functional Committees.** In each Regional Congress there are 17 functional committees (*Lijān Fanniyah*):

1. Youth (*Lajnat ash-Shabāb*);
2. Labour and Workers (*Lajnat al-Amal wa-al-Ummāl*);

3. Women's Activities and Family. (*Lajnat an-Nashāt an-Nisā'i wa-al-Urah*);
4. Culture and Education (*Lajnat at-Tarbiyah wa-al-Ta'alim*);
5. National Guidance (*Lajnat at-Tawjīh al-Qawmi*);
6. Social Services (*Lajnat ash-Shu'ūn al-Ijtima'iyah*);
7. Health (*Lajnat ash-Shu'ūn as-Sihhiyah*);
8. Suggestions (*Lajnat al-Iqtirahāt*);
9. Public Services (*Lajnat al-Marāfiq al-Ammah*);
10. Local Administration (*Lajnat al-Idārah al-Mahal-liyah*);
11. Cooperation (*Lajnat at-Ta'āwun*);
12. Agriculture (*Lajnat az-Zirā'ah*);
13. Trade (*Lajnat at-Tijārah*);
14. Financial Affairs (*Lajnat al-Malliyah*);
15. Industry (*Lajnat as-Sinā'ah*);
16. Art and Science (*Lajnat al-Funūn wa-al-Ulūm*);
17. Legislative Affairs (*Lajnat ash-Shu'ūn at-Tash-rīyah*).

**The Functional Committees, Composition and Function.** These committees are composed as follows: (1) The *rapporteurs* of the subcommittees of the governorates, provinces, districts, district capitals and quarters; (2) Representatives of various institutions, organizations, trade unions and universities nominated to the Congress; and (3) Directors of departments in the Regional HQ, acting as secretaries to the committees of the Congress parallel to their departments.

Each of the Congress committees appoints a *rapporteur* from among its members at its first meeting, who conducts the sittings and controls the deliberations. The committees discuss statements made by the Ministers to the Congress. Members of the committees may submit questions to the Ministers through the *rapporteur*, who has the right of veto, and may disallow questions at his discretion. (*Ahram*, 12 June)

**General Committee: Composition and Function.** The Gen Com is also composed of two-thirds elected members and one-third nominees; it meets at least three times a year. Its function is "to make the arrangements necessary to carry out the plans and decisions laid down by the Regional Congress, and to examine other matters referred to it by the Congress or submitted to it by the Regional Exec Com." (*Ahram*, 12 June)

**Executive Committee.** (For composition, see chart.) The Exec Com of the Region convenes at least once in two months. Its function is to carry out the policy, plans and recommendations of the General Congress and the decisions of the Gen Com. (*Ahram*, 12 June)

**Executive.** (For composition, see chart.) The Regional Exec Com is headed by an Executive, which directs its activities.

**Preparatory Committee: Composition and Functions.** The Gen Com meets as a Preparatory Committee (*Lajnah Tahdiriyah*) at least a week before the Regional Congress convenes. The Regional Exec submits to the Preparatory Committee the plans and bills that will be submitted to the Regional Congress, so that its recommendations and the decisions of all the Exec and Gen Coms and the Provincial and Governorate Congresses may be taken into account when considering the plans and bills. The Preparatory Committee decides on the rules for instituting the functional committees of the Congress (see above), and determines their powers and procedures. (*Ahram*, 12 June)

Special Preparatory Committees were formed and convened before the first Regional Congresses which convened in 1960.

## NATIONAL ORGANS OF THE NU

### (b) General Congress of the UAR

**Organization.** The General Congress of the UAR (*al-Mu'tamar al-Amm Lil-Gumhuriyah al-Arabiyah al-Mut-tahidah*) convenes once a year when summoned by the President. (*Ahram*, 6 June) It consists of: (1) The General Assembly; (2) Functional Committees; (3) The General Committee; (4) A Preparatory Committee.

The organization, membership and functions of these bodies were fixed by decrees of President Abdel-Nasser. (*Ahram*, 15 May, 6, 12 June, 7 July)

**Membership.** The members of these bodies are all chosen by the government from the elected and nominated members of the Regional Congresses and their organs. (*Ahram*, 19 June, 3 July)

**Functions.** *Al-Ahrām* defined the General Congress of the UAR as one of "the three pillars upon which the political organization [of the country] rests: the General Congress—the highest popular authority in the country, the National Assembly—representing the legislative authority, and the government—which exercises the executive authority." (*Ahram*, 14 May) It is the task of all these to carry out the aim of the cooperative democratic socialist society, which is to double the national income. (Abdel-Nasser's speech, *Ahram*, 25 June. See also Views and Policies, pp 470-1)

The Congress represents the people and lays down the general policy of the Republic, without going into details.

The recommendations of the Regional Congresses are submitted to it for discussion, and those approved by the General Congress become resolutions which are referred to the National Assembly (see p 489 ff) for legislative action. (*Ahram*, 24 June, 3 July)

It was also stated that the Congress lays down the policy and plans of the NU, and adopts decisions and recommendations on the suggestions and plans submitted to it in the annual report of the Gen Com. (*Ahram*, 6 June)

**The Functional Committees.** The members of the UAR Congress were divided by NU HQ (*Ahram*, 8 July) into 21 functional committees. Seventeen of these committees have the same functions as those of the Regional Congresses (see above). The others deal with (1) Arab Affairs (*Shu'ūn Arabiyah*); (2) Planning (*Takhtit*); (3) Defence (*Difā'*); (4) Foreign Affairs (*Shu'ūn Kharijiyah*). (*Ahram*, 17 July)

**General Committee.** The Gen Com convenes once in four months, at the President's summons, "to make the necessary arrangements for implementing the resolutions of the General Congress. It also considers matters referred to it by the Congress or submitted to it by the Supreme Exec Com." (*Ahram*, 6 June)

**Preparatory Committee.** The Gen Com convenes as a Preparatory Committee at least a week before the session of the UAR Congress. The Supreme Exec Com submits to the Prep Com its plans for action, and the proposals and resolutions to be submitted to the General Congress, so that the recommendations and resolutions of the Regional General Congresses and Committees may be taken into account when decisions are made. The other func-



tions of the Prep Com are parallel to those of the similar bodies in the Regional Congresses. (*Ahram*, 6 June)

#### NATIONAL ORGANS OF THE NU

(c) Headquarters; (d) Inspectors-General and Secretary; (e) Supreme Exec Com; (f) The President

**The Headquarters.** At the end of 1960, the Headquarters of the NU (*al-Maqarr ar-Ra'isi*) consisted of 16 offices (*maktab*) headed by directors (*mudir*). The directors were nominated by Kamāl ad-Dīn Hussein at the end of 1959 (*Ahram*, 4 Nov) and in 1960 (*Ahram*, 27 May) (see above, History of the NU). At the end of 1960 Kamāl ad-Dīn Hussein nominated 18 permanent functional committees (*laynah faniyah lil-nashāt*) equivalent to those of the Congresses. These have presidents (*ra'is*) and secretaries (*amin sirr*), who were nominated by Kamāl ad-Dīn Hussein. (*Ahram*, 21 Nov, 1 Dec)

The functions of these committees were defined as: assistance in the implementation of the resolutions of the NU Congresses; the preparation of the General Congresses [by presidential decree this task was allotted to the general committees (see above, p 481)], and the studies of plans submitted to them by ministries and the committees of NU. (*Ahram*, 22 Nov) [The functional committees which form part of the headquarters are permanent, while their equivalents in the NU congresses are formed *ad hoc* and meet only during the Congress sessions.]

**Inspectors-General and Secretary.** The NU has two Inspectors-General: (1) for the Southern R. Kamāl ad-Dīn Hussein; (2) for the Northern R. Abd al-Hakīm Amer. Both were nominated by the President on 21 Oct 1959.

In the Northern R. Amer appointed Abd al-Hamid as-Sarrāj as Secretary of the NU (*Amin Sirr*) on 12 Jan 1960. (*Ayyam*, 15 Jan) [It was as-Sarrāj who organized the formation of the high-level committees of the NU in the Northern R. He was in charge of all affairs connected with the NU in the Northern R.]

**Supreme Executive Committee.** The Supreme Exec Com, whose members are nominated by Abdel-Nasser, is the highest executive authority of the NU. It is responsible to the UAR Congress. (*Ahram*, 19 May, 6 June) Its functions include the implementation of the plans and recommendations of the General Congress and the decisions of the Gen Com. (*Ahram*, 6 June) It also has "to notify the executive and the National Assembly of these decisions," and carries out "the supreme function of aiding the President in the choice of members of the National Assembly." (*Ahram*, 22 June)

**The President.** Gamāl Abdel-Nasser nominated himself President (*Ra'is*) of the NU when he issued the first decree for its formation on 28 May 1957. (*Ahram*, 29 May 1957)

#### CONNECTION BETWEEN THE NU AND THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY

The internal regulations of the National Assembly include a provision for the establishment of a liaison office to co-ordinate the work of the NU and the National Assembly. (*Akhbar*, 21 July) [No information about the formation of such an office was published during 1960.]

The NU organized two Parliamentary Authorities (*Hay'ah Barlamaniyah lil-Ittihad al-Qawmi*), one consisting of all Syrian members of the NA, the other of all the Egyptian members.

A 56-member Exec Com of the Parliamentary Authority of the Southern R was formed, consisting of

the presidents of the NU Governorate Exec Coms, the presidents of the National Assembly committees, and directors of the regional headquarters offices (list of names: *Akhbar*, 22 Oct). Its duty would be to encourage members of the NA to pursue NU aims and comply with NU resolutions. (*R. Cairo*, 26 Sept-BBC, 28 Sept)

*Al-Ahrām* announced that a UAR Parliamentary Authority, comprising the members of the two regional parliamentary authorities, would be formed. (*Ahram*, 20 Nov) [No reports of the formation of such a body were noted up to the end of the year.]

#### GOVERNMENT CONTROL OVER NU

**1959: Control of Elections to Popular Base.** Originally it was planned to screen the candidates for election to the Popular Base with the aid of an official screening committee. The screening committee was ultimately dissolved before the elections, but only on the day the lists of candidates were closed. (*Ahram*, 25 June 1959)

Candidates were allowed to withdraw their candidacies, so that in many instances, especially in the Southern R, there were in the end no more candidates than vacancies, and they were returned unopposed. In the Southern R this was the case with 11,952 candidates out of 29,919 elected, and in the Northern R with 1,400 out of 9,445. (*Ahram*, 9 July, 24 Nov 1959; *Ayyam*, 18 July 1959; *NYT*, 10 July 1959)

For illiterates [who were estimated at 75% of the population over the age of five], the names of the candidates were inscribed on the ballot by the chairmen of the election committees [who are government officials].

**Selection of Members of NU Institutions.** [The system of internal and indirect elections is in force from the district up to the provincial levels and from the town district up to the level of the government—see chart.]

[The national bodies of the NU, from the Regional Congresses upwards, are constituted wholly by appointment, either by name or *ex officio*, although the free choice of appointees is nominally restricted. The majority of the members of the Exec Coms of the regions, as well as all the members of the Supreme Exec Com, are Ministers.]

**Special Controls for Syrian Region.** [In the Northern R control was more severe than in the South.] While in the Southern R "members will not be appointed [but elected] to committees" (*Ahram*, 27, 30 Oct 1959), in the Northern R the government may nominate up to a third of the Exec Com members. (*Ahram*, 15 Nov 1959) [However up to the end of 1960 there were no reports that the government had made use of this prerogative.] In addition, two out of six executive officers in the districts or quarters in the Northern R are nominated by the government—they may be members of the Exec Coms or others (see chart.). (*Ahram*, 15 Nov 1959)

The authorities decide which members of these executives are to fill the various posts (*Ayyam*, 15 Nov 1959), [and can thus ensure the promotion of those favoured by them to the higher NU institutions, which are largely composed of members from the lower levels appointed *ex officio*.]

**Comment:** *The Economist* commented: "It is small wonder that President Abdel-Nasser felt able to abolish the screening committee and to order his officials to observe strict neutrality in the electoral battle," as "from the constitutional angle the subservience of the NU to the government seems assured from the start... The laborious processes involved seem to preclude any



## THE NATIONAL UNION

chance of a hostile NA." (*Economist*, 18 July 1959, p 163)

### THE NATIONAL YOUTH UNION

#### *Ittihad ash-Shabab al-Qawmi*

The establishment of the National Youth Union (NYU) was announced on 28 May, at a conference of the *rapporteurs* of the governorate and provincial NU youth subcommittees. (*Ahram*, 17, 29, 30 May)

**Aims.** The aims of the NYU were defined as: closing the ranks of Arab youth; support for the struggle of the Arab nation; the defence of its victories; the realization of the aims of the revolution of 23 July; the strengthening of friendships with the world's youth in order to preserve the peace and the high ideals of humanity.

In pursuance of these aims, the NYU is to arrange lectures to explain the basis and the true philosophy of the Socialist Democratic Co-operative Society, provide the youth with a true religious education founded on the belief in God and the homeland, take part in organizing the participation of youth in international youth congresses, sport events and popular conferences which will be held by the NU Exec Coms. For the benefit of the youth and in order to encourage them to serve their country, the NYU will recruit them for public service projects. It will also provide young people with vocational training (*Ahram*, 29 May)

**Membership.** Active membership of the NYU is open to boys or girls aged at least 16 or attending secondary or equivalent schools. (*Ahram*, 21 Aug) Membership fees are two piastres a month. (*Ahram*, 2 Sept)

**Organization.** The pyramid-like structure of the NYU starts at the bottom with: (1) the Group (*jam'ah*), going up through, (2) the Family (*usrah*), (3) the NYU of the sub-quarter (*shiyakhah*) or village (*qaryah*), (4) the NYU of the quarter (*qism*) or district (*markaz*), (6) the NYU of the governorate (*muhafazah*) or province (*mudiriyah*) and ending at the top with (7) the NYU of the Southern R.

[Only two of these, the Group and the Family, are youth formations—all higher units consisting entirely of staff.]

1. The Group consists of 5–15 young people led by a head (*ra'is*) elected from among its members.
2. The Family comprises several Groups. It has a Council (*Majlis*) consisting of the Heads of the Groups and a President, elected from among them.
3. The heads of the Families in every sub-quarter or village form a Council of the NYU (*Majlis Ittihad ash-Shabab*) which elects an Executive (*Hay'at Maktab*) consisting of a President, a Deputy (*Wakil*) and a Treasurer (*Amin Sunduq*).
4. The Execs of every quarter or district form a Council of the NYU, which elects an Exec consisting of a President, a Deputy, a Secretary and a Treasurer.
5. The Execs of the quarters or districts form a Council of the NYU in the governorate, which elects an Exec consisting of a President, First and Second Deputies, First, Second and Assistant Secretaries, and Treasurer.
6. The Execs of the governorates, together with 21 members of the General Union of the Students of the Republic, of the Southern R (*al-Ittihad al-Amm li-Tullab al-Gumhuriyah*) form the Council of the NYU.
7. This Council elects an Exec Com (*Lajnah Tanfidhiyah*) consisting of 36 young people which constitutes the supreme leadership of the youth in the Southern R. (*Ahram*, 29 May, 21 Aug)

[These sources do not mention the Syrian R.]

The organization of these bodies was to be completed in the Southern R by the end of Feb 1961 and in the Northern R by 23 July 1961. (*Ahram*, 3 Oct)

**Sept–Oct: Various Activities.** Muhi ad-Din Rajab, Deputy Director of the Youth Office in the Southern R HQ of the NU, advised the *rapporteurs* of the NU Youth Subcommittees to use the schools and their sports equipment after school for youth activities. (*Ahram*, 2 Sept) Towards the end of 1960, seven youth centres were opened in Cairo (*Ahram*, 4 Sept) and NYU conferences were held. (*Ahram*, 15, 19 Sept, 3 Oct)

## THE NU IN 1960

### JAN–FEB: COMPLETION OF NU STRUCTURE IN SYRIAN REGION

[In the Southern R the establishment of the organization up to the provincial level was completed in Dec 1959. In the Northern R this stage was reached only in Feb 1960 because of political and administrative difficulties.]

**Dec. 1959–Jan 1960: The Four-Minister Committee.** On 30 Dec 1959, Amer appointed four Ministers of the Syrian R to assist him in the organization of the NU there. They were Abd al-Hamid as-Sarrāj (Interior), Ahmad al-Hajj Yunis (Agriculture), Tu'mah al-Awdat Allah (Municipal and Rural Affairs) and Amjad at-Tarabulsi (Education). Their special tasks were: appointments to posts in the various offices in the executive, and the supervision of the activities of the committees and their executives. (*Ahram*, 31 Dec 1959). [The committee completed its task at the end of Jan 1960 or in Feb 1960.]

**Jan: As-Sarrāj—SG of NU in Northern R.** On 12 Jan Amer appointed as-Sarrāj Secretary General of the NU in the Northern R. (*Ayyam*, 15 Jan)

**Jan–Feb: Composition of Exec Coms in Northern R Completed.** The composition of the Exec Coms of the Northern R was completed between 30 Jan and 14 Feb.

First, the names of the elected and nominated members of the district and quarter committees were published. (For full list, see *Ayyam*, 30 Jan)

Afterwards, Amer published a decree on the composition of the Exec Coms of the governorates (see chart). (*Ayyam*, 2 Feb)

A day later, the names of the members of these committees were announced. (*Ayyam*, 3 Feb) They elected their executives on 10 Feb (except for Idlib governorate where elections were postponed to 14 Feb because of lack of a quorum). (*Ayyam*, 11 Feb) Thus in mid-Feb, this stage had been completed in the Northern R.

## APR-JUNE: REGIONAL CONGRESSES OF THE NU

**Delay in Setting up of NU National Institutions.** [After the organization of the Exec Coms in both regions had been accomplished, preparations began for setting up the national institutions; the Regional Congresses and the General Congress of the UAR. According to plan, the General Congresses should have been convened in Jan and the National Assembly in Feb (*Ahram*, 4, 10, 19, 29 Nov 1959), (but owing to the delays in establishing the NU in the Syrian R, the setting up of the national institutions was delayed until the summer of 1960)]

**Apr-May: Preparations for Convening Congresses.** In preparation for the congresses, "popular conferences" were held in the Southern R in Apr-May. (For particulars see below, p. 486).

Kamāl ad-Dīn Hussein in the South and as-Sarrāj in the North met NU officials to discuss the organization and co-ordination of the various NU committees, consulting each other on the co-ordination of activities in the two regions. (*Ahram*, 21 Apr, 12 May, 2, 13 June)

On 15 May Sarrāj announced the formation of the congresses of the governorates (*Ahram*, 16 May), which convened on 16 June. (*Ayyam*, 27 May, 16, 17 June)

**20-24 June: Regional Congresses.** The Regional Congresses assembled on 20 June.

The Southern R Congress, in Cairo, ended its session on 23 June; and that of the Northern R. in Damascus, on 24 June. The first two days were taken up mainly by speeches and statements by Ministers on the activities and plans of their Ministries. (*Ahram*, 20-25 June)

**Definition of NU Aims.** Kamāl ad-Dīn Hussein said in his address to the Congress of the Southern R (20 June) that the unity of the homeland was represented by the NU, and that the Congress was "government of the people by the people." (*Ahram*, 21 June)

Amer and as-Sarrāj addressed the Congress of the Northern R. Amer defined the aims and tasks of the NU as follows: (1) to realize Arab unity; (2) to establish the Social Democratic Cooperative Society; (3) to unify the efforts of the people; (4) to give the people a share in government; (5) to establish justice among the people and raise the standard of living. He denounced imperialism for trying to divide the Arabs, surveyed Arab nationalism and its fight against imperialism, and finally explained that the function of the Congress was to represent the people in dealing with all subjects submitted to the committees and to lay down lines of policy for the future.

As-Sarrāj devoted his speech to a description of the advantages of the establishment of the UAR; externally, in the strengthening of the power and political standing of the Arabs, and internally, in the unification of the people's forces for one aim: the achievement of a better future. (*Ahram*, 21 June)

**Work of Committees.** After the addresses the Congresses divided into committees according to lists of names issued by Kamāl ad-Dīn Hussein and Amer. The committees met on 20-23 June and their recommendations were submitted to a Coordination Committee (*Lajnat Tansiq*) consisting of the *rapporteurs* of all the (Congresses) committees, of both Congresses which prepared the final texts of the recommendations for adoption by the Congresses. (*Ahram*, 23 June)

**Criticism of Government Actions at Northern R Congress.** Some criticisms of the regime were uttered in

the course of discussions in the committees of the Northern R Congress. In the Local Government Committee there was criticism of the practice of exiling persons endangering the security of the state, on the ground that it was wrong to use "medieval methods in a democratic republic."

In the Finance Committee there was a heated discussion on taxation between the Minister of Finance and members of the committee. Amer, who came in during the debate, assured the members that "the government has no intention of imposing any new taxes that will burden the citizens."

Control of the Press was also discussed. In reply to a question from a member of the Committee on National Guidance, who asked how the committee would take over control of the Press, as-Sarrāj replied that the transfer of the Press to the NU was still under consideration. There was a demand that the Cairo papers should not publish special editions for the Northern R. As-Sarrāj said that he was convinced that the newspapers would do their best to publish a single edition for the regions. (*Ahram*, 23 June)

**685 Resolutions and Recommendations Adopted.** On 23 June the Congress of the Southern R adopted 178 recommendations and resolutions out of 250 proposed. On 24 June the Congress of the Northern R adopted 507 out of over 800. (*Ahram*, 24-25 June)

[The resolutions of foreign affairs at both congresses were in complete accordance with the views and policies of the UAR leaders.]

**Resolutions on Internal Affairs.** Political questions were not mentioned in the resolutions and recommendations on internal affairs. These dealt in considerable detail with economic, social and cultural matters, e.g.: the expansion of vocational education; support and encouragement for tourism; the opening of "national libraries"; the expansion of health insurance; the development of the book publishing industry; intensification of efforts to find raw materials; the establishment of more agricultural experimental stations; expansion of cooperation between the UAR and other Arab countries; fostering of youth centres; unification of departments and authorities engaged in the generation of electricity.

**Critical Resolutions.** Some of the resolutions had critical implications, e.g.: a demand for the simplification of processes connected with imports and exports to facilitate the rapid execution of orders; recommendations on steps to lower prices so as to reduce the burden on the consumer; a recommendation for the abolition or reduction of taxes and duties on raw materials and components imported for industry; a demand that the Ministry of Supply should speed up the simplification of orders and regulations; a demand for the supply of food on easier terms and the organization of the import of pharmaceutical products. (For the full text of the resolutions of the Southern R. Congress, see *Ahram*, 24 June; for the Northern R. see *Ahram*, 25 June)

**Enactment of the Resolutions.** *Al-Ahrām* wrote that the State would do all in its power to carry out the recommendations and resolutions of the regional congresses even before the meeting of the UAR Congress, through three bodies: (1) The government would carry out most of the decisions; (2) Members of the NU committees would carry out some of them; (3) The rest, requiring the issue of special legislation, would be submitted to the National Assembly. (*Ahram*, 22 June)

**JULY: THE UAR CONGRESS OF THE NU**

**May-July: Appointments and Preparations.** Between 9 May and 12 June, a series of decrees issued by Abdel-Nasser were published, dealing with the composition of the various bodies of the UAR Congress. (*Ahram*, 10, 15 May, 6 June)

Abdel-Nasser also appointed the Supreme Exec Com (see above) and the Preparatory Com which consisted of the following Ministers: Kamāl ad-Dīn Hussein, Ali Sabri, Kamāl ad-Dīn Mahmūd Rif'at, Abd al-Hamid as-Sarrāj (Syrian R) and Amjad at-Tarābulsi (Syrian R). (*Ahram*, 12 June)

On 3 July a Presidential decree concerning the composition of the UAR Congress was published as were the names of the members, according to their membership in the 21 Functional Committees. (*Ahram*, 3 July)

On 3-4 July decrees on the Budget for 1960/61 and the Five-Year Development Plan were published. (*Ahram*, 4, 5 July)

On 5 July the Preparatory Com met under the chairmanship of Hussein, and the Supreme Exec Council convened under the chairmanship of Abdel-Nasser. (*Ahram*, 6 July)

**July: UAR Congress Session.** The UAR Congress convened on 9 July. On the same day Abdel-Nasser ordered the distribution of 4,000 tons of flour in those areas of the Northern R where the crops had suffered in 1960. (*Ahram* 10 July)

There were numerous guests at the plenary sessions, including diplomats, Press representatives (*Ahram*, 10 July) and as observers, a delegation from the Palestine NU. (*Ahram*, 3, 8 July)

Abdel-Nasser made the opening address, speaking of the "three revolutions"—national, Arab and social (see *Views and Policies*, pp 469-70). He surveyed the principles guiding UAR policy; its international status; the achievements of the "Egyptian people," such as the building of the High Dam and the nationalization of the Suez Canal; and the great achievement of the "Syrian people" in gaining its independence from France. He reviewed the country's economic and social position: the rise in production, national income and standard of living; the Egyptianization of industry and the civil service; and the development of agriculture. (*Ahram*, 10 July)

On 10-11 July the Congress heard a statement from al-Baghdādī on development programmes, especially those of the Southern R. Kahālāh made a statement on the development programme for the Northern R, and Mahmūd Fawzi on the UAR's foreign policy. (For text of their speeches, see *Ahram*, 11, 12 July.) Amer also spoke (on 11 July) on security and military questions (*Ahram*, 12 July). (For significant points of these speeches, see *Views and Policies*, p 467 ff.)

**The Committees.** The Presidents of the governorate and provincial Exec Coms chose for each of the Congress committees an Executive (*Maktab*) consisting of first and second secretaries, first and second *rapporteurs*, and four other members. (*Ahram*, 10 July)

The committees met on 11-13 July to hear and debate statements by Ministers. (*Ahram*, 14 July)

**Abdel-Nasser in Committee Discussions.** The Health Committee discussed the high prices of pharmaceutical products (see *Nationalization*, pp 463-4), and the problem of importing them. When one member proposed the exemption of these products from taxes to bring down the prices, Abdel-Nasser, who was present, said: "Set up

cooperative pharmacies and we will exempt you from taxes."

In another committee Abdel-Nasser condemned the whispering campaign taking place at the time about impending wholesale nationalization (see pp 463-4). He contended that "capital is free" in the UAR "so long as it works for the general good." Bank Misr had been nationalized because it constituted a large part of the national economy, but it was not true that houses, shops and cars were to be nationalized as well. (*Ahram*, 14 July)

The resolutions of the 21 committees were coordinated on 14-15 July by a General Coordination Committee consisting of 89 members: the five members of the Preparatory Committee (all Ministers) and all the *rapporteurs* and secretaries of the Congress committees. It was divided into three subcommittees. (*Ahram*, 14-16 July)

Abdel-Nasser spoke at the closing session of the Congress. (For text see *Ahram*, 17 July.)

**The Resolutions of the Congress.** The Congress adopted 500 resolutions. [These may be regarded as representative of UAR policies in all walks of life, as well as of some special problems occupying the attention of certain sections of the population. As the text cannot be reproduced here, a general outline is given below. However, the full text of the resolutions is of great interest. It may be found in Arabic in *al-Ahrām*, 17 July; the English text, in *The Egyptian Gazette* of 17 July, covers less than 400 resolutions.]

The resolutions open with foreign affairs, including inter-Arab relations and the "Palestine Question." In general, these represent the views and policies of the UAR leaders (see pp 116 ff, 171 ff, 514 ff). The resolutions "to take all formal and popular measures to ensure restoration of the province of Alexandretta" (see also pp 531-2) attracted particular attention abroad.

The main themes of the resolutions on internal affairs were the interdependent aims of building the Socialist Democratic Co-operative Society and raising the standard of living. Guiding principles or general statements were set out on planning ("point of departure for the establishment of a welfare society"), trade, industrialization ("decisive phase in the evolution of our economic and social development"), cooperation ("the ideal way of strengthening the socialist democratic spirit in society"), women's and family affairs ("the responsibility of women in the Arab social structure is commensurate with those of men"), legislation ("must conform to evolution"), national guidance ("to rewrite the history of the Arab nation so as to display conspicuously the... civilizing role of the Arab nation").

The resolutions also went into detail on such matters as: "to attach more importance to preparation of modern survey maps," "to draft copyright legislation," "to establish a special library to record the development of films."

Many resolutions showed the influence of various special interests, or touched on special problems, such as: to assure state supply of gypsum for agriculture and reduce its price and transportation costs; to facilitate and expedite measures for (the obtaining of) construction licences; to increase efforts to combat malaria, to reduce customs duties on imported pharmaceutical products (most of the 17 resolutions regarding health services are of this kind); to improve living conditions for teachers, etc. Special interests in the Northern R found their expression in such resolutions as the request for the "encouragement of the establishment of joint-



stock companies with low-priced shares." (*Ahram*; *Eg. Gaz*, 17 July)

## JULY-AUG: IMPLEMENTATION OF THE RESOLUTIONS OF THE CONGRESS

A UAR source spoke of three ways to carry out the resolutions of the Congress: government action, direct action by the Popular Base of the NU, and legislation in the National Assembly. (*Ahram*, 22 June)

**Assurances Given of Execution of Resolutions.** The day after the Congress closed the UAR Press gave much publicity to efforts to carry out the resolutions. The Ministries were reported to be studying them in order to issue decrees for their execution and to prepare bills for submission to the National Assembly.

Abdel-Nasser declared that he would be the first to work for the execution of the resolutions.

Kamāl ad-Dīn Hussein announced the formation of a permanent committee to convey the resolutions to the Ministries concerned and prepare for the next NU General Congress. He also said that the Exec Coms of the NU would follow the execution of the resolutions. (*Ahram*, 18 July)

**Ministries Announce Execution of Resolutions.** During the following months, Ministries began to announce the execution of various resolutions. (*Ahram*, 21, 25 July, 6, 22 Aug)

The Ministry of Communications announced, for example, that various categories of railway fares had been reduced, and that it was trying to arrange early delivery of newspapers to the more distant areas. (*Ahram*, 21 July)

The Ministry of Health announced that EL50,000 had been allocated for immunization; a committee had been formed, with NU participation, to study the solutions of health problems, and it had been decided to increase the number of pharmacies and physicians. (*Ahram*, 25 July) A month later it was reported that the Ministry had established a committee to study the execution of the NU resolutions, and prepared reports on health insurance and other questions. (*Ahram*, 22 Aug)

**Controls.** Permanent functional subcommittees were formed at the NU HQ to study the execution of the resolutions (see above—Organization, p 482).

The committees of the National Assembly were also to study the resolutions of their equivalents in the NU General Congress, in order to enact the laws required. (*Ahram*, 2 Sept)

## ACTIVITIES OF NU

**Routine Activities.** During 1960 the activities of the NU, apart from organization and the convening of the congresses, consisted of: attending to citizens' requests and complaints; the holding of "popular conferences," and the planning, execution or taking over of various tasks, projects and enterprises.

**Requests and Complaints.** These dealt with, e.g.: irrigation problems (*Ahram*, 12 May); the building of cheap housing (*Ahram*, 4 Feb); a bridge (*Ahram*, 21 Feb); and, in Aleppo, an international airport and a tourist hotel (*Ayyam*, 2 Mar); and the lack of a children's doctor in Port-Said. (*Musawwar*, 23 Dec)

Requests and complaints were submitted directly to Abdel-Nasser by delegations coming to Cairo (*Ahram*, 13 Jan) or during his tours, especially in the Northern R

(see p 501), and to the inspectors—Kamāl ad-Dīn Hussein and Abd al-Hamid as-Sarrāj (*Ahram*, 13, 18 Jan, 17 Dec; *Ayyam*, 2, 21 Mar), during their visits to the governorates and provinces. (*Gumhuriyah*, 16 Jan; *Ahram*, 21 Jan, 4, 5, 11 Feb, 12 May, 17 Dec) After Abdel-Nasser's second visit to the Northern R, Ministers, headed by as-Sarrāj, toured the Region to discuss regional problems (see p 506).

**Jan-May: Complaints and Requests Attended to by Executive Organs.** These requests and complaints were attended to by the NU organs and the government.

At the end of 1959 it was decided that the Attorney General would arrange for the investigation of citizens' complaints submitted to the NU "Complaint Offices." (*Ahram*, 17 Dec 1959)

In Jan 1960 Kamāl ad-Dīn Hussein ordered a reply to be sent to every complaint or proposal within a week of receipt. (*Ahram*, 5 Jan) He also instructed NU HQ to have its doors open 15 hours a day, and to receive the public's complaints and requests, so that no citizen should enter its doors at any hour without finding someone to receive him and to consider his affairs. (*Ahram*, 20 Mar)

The Exec Com of the Southern R discussed hundreds of complaints and the replies of Ministries to complaints and requests. (*Ahram*, 28 Jan, 4 Feb, 4 Mar; *Gumhuriyah*, 2, 7 Mar; *Ayyam*, 7, 8, 11 Mar)

The Central Economic Committee, under the chairmanship of Abd ad-Latif al-Baghdādī, also discussed complaints and requests and made some decisions. (*Ahram*, 8 Feb)

On 20 Apr a meeting of the presidents of NU governorates and provincial committees, presided by Kamāl ad-Dīn Hussein, studied the action taken in response to citizens' requests. (*Ahram*, 20 Apr) A special conference, attended by Mūsā Arafah, Minister of Public Works, was held to study requests concerning the supply of irrigation water. (*Ahram*, 7 May)

[From early summer 1960 Press reports on the NU concentrated on the national organs, the convening of the congresses, etc. Towards the end of the year Ministers of the Syrian Exec Com touring the region again received complaints and requests directly (see p 501).]

**"Popular Conferences."** These were mostly headed by Kamāl ad-Dīn Hussein, with other Ministers also attending. They were held in the governorates and provincial centres of the Southern R during the first half of 1960 as a preparation for the meeting of the national organs of the NU, and again from Aug to the end of 1960. (*Ahram*, 19 Aug)

A Syrian NU member attending such a conference described it as a way of learning the wishes of the public without administrative routine. Kamāl ad-Dīn Hussein told him that they increased the confidence of the public in the administration. (*Ayyam*, 28 Jan)

At these conferences the Ministers reviewed the policy of their Ministries, announced regional development projects, and discussed regional problems. (*Ahram*, 2, 3, 10 Feb, 14 Mar)

They usually concluded with resolutions of a fixed character, including a renewal of the Oath of Loyalty (*Bay'ah*) to Abdel-Nasser; a pledge of full support for his policies (*Ahram*, 22, 30 Jan, 2 Feb, 7, 14 Mar); thanks to Abdel-Nasser for the High Dam (*Ahram*, 22 Jan) and other economic development projects (*Ahram*, 23 May); and thanks to the Ministers for their presence and their attention to requests. (*Ahram*, 22, 30 Jan, 7



(Mar) The resolutions always covered foreign affairs, in accordance with the current policies of the UAR. (See e.g. *Ahram*, 22, 30 Jan, 2 Feb, 7, 14, 21 Mar, 2 Aug)

Special popular conferences were also held on "Algeria Day," in Cairo and Damascus (*R. Cairo*, 1 Nov-IMB, 2 Nov), and on the occasion of the visits to Cairo of Ayub Khan and King Zahir Shah (see pp 537, 540). Ministers also used these occasions to meet the NU Exec Coms at various levels. (*Ahram*, 22 Jan, 16 Feb, 7, 14, 16 Mar)

**Plans, Tasks, Projects and Enterprises.** [These were of both general and local importance, some being carried out by the NU itself and others in cooperation with other bodies. The activity of the NU was not confined to specific undertakings; there was a trend to broaden its participation in public life as far as possible. The following are some examples.]

The Press was nationalized and transferred to the NU (see pp 508-9).

The Cairo municipality announced that NU members would participate in the management of hospitals. (*Ahram*, 16 Jan)

In Isma'iliyah, the NU discussed the setting up of an agricultural cooperative to ameliorate 50,000 feddans of soil. (*Ahram*, 9 Jan)

The Ministry of Education proposed that the NU should cooperate in financing school-building in the Southern R. (*Ahram*, 11 Jan)

In Daqhaliah the NU organized a cooperative society to collaborate with the Ministry for Social Affairs and Labour to build houses in a village which had burned down. (*Ahram*, 14 Jan)

At a NU assembly in Port Said, the establishment of new industries in that city was discussed. (*Ahram*, 25 Jan)

The NU was entrusted with the task of recruiting the youth for the campaign against illiteracy. (*Ahram*, 26, 27 Jan)

The NU was to take part in a committee formed by the Alexandria municipality to allocate flats in a popular housing scheme. (*Ahram*, 28 Jan)

Kamāl ad-Dīn Hussein stated that the NU Exec Coms were responsible for all government institutions in the villages and towns and it was their task to watch them. Hussein also proposed that the NU should assume the responsibility for feeding the children in schools. (*Ahram*, 4 Feb)

The NU organized pilgrims for the Hajj, the annual pilgrimage to Mecca (*Ahram*, 14 Feb), and prepared a plan for attending to the needs of the pilgrims of the Southern R. (*Ahram*, 16 Apr)

The NU recruited engineers and students to drain swamps in the vicinity of Isma'iliyah. (*Ahram*, 18 Feb)

The Government Information Department asked the NU to take charge of propaganda at home, so as to leave it free for propaganda abroad. (*Ahram*, 4 Mar)

The NU Exec Com in Luxor requested the Ministry of Works to build a mosque there. (*Ahram*, 6 Mar)

The NU donated 3,000 Syrian pounds to the government and private schools in Kamishli. (*Ayyam*, 11 Mar)

The NU decided to send a mission of Christian members on a pilgrimage to the Old City of Jerusalem (*Ahram*, 12 Apr), but the Jordanian authorities were reported to have refused permission. (*Ahram*, 15 Apr)

The NU and the authorities in Daqhaliah prepared a plan for the development of the province. (*Ahram*, 8 May)

The NU requested the Attorney General to investigate the case of a doctor in Upper Egypt who had been absent for a week without prior notice. (*Ahram*, 25 July)

The NU was also allotted important functions in the field of labour (see Labour, p 502).

**The NU and Foreign Affairs.** On the occasion of Africa Day (14 Apr), Kamāl ad-Dīn Hussein issued a proclamation in which he expressed the NU's adherence to the principles of Afro-Asian solidarity and its support for the Africans' struggle against imperialism. (*Ahram*, 15 Apr)

The NU declared its support for the struggle of the Congo against the "plots of the imperialists." (*Ahram*, 17 July, 15 Sept)

Leaders of South African parties who had fled the country were invited by the NU to visit Cairo. (*Ahram*, 11 May)

In Oct the NU decided to demand the release of Jomo Kenyatta of Kenya. (*Ahram*, 18 Oct)

(On foreign affairs at the "popular conferences," see above.)

### CRITICISM OF THE LOWER-LEVEL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEES

**1959-1960: Committee Members and Authorities Blamed for Inactivity.** At the end of 1959, Ihsān abl al-Qadus, editor of *Ruz al-Yūsuf*, criticized the NU members in an article entitled "The NU Members Ask: What Are We to Do?": When the NU members submitted their candidacies, he said, they had given no thought to their tasks; all they wanted was to be regarded as government officials, and after they had been elected, they still looked to the government for instructions. (*Ruz al-Yusuf*, 19 Oct 1959)

Ahmad Bahā ad-Dīn [the well-known leftist journalist] said that the NU committees had no experience in routine work, and that it was unreasonable to expect them to form the basis for elections of the NU's higher organs in future. There was strife inside the committees as a result of the election campaign. Some of them had not yet met. (*Akhbar al-Yawm*, 24 Oct 1959)

Both journalists said that the members of the NU did not know what they were to do and how to start their work. [The regulations for the work of the NU committees in the Southern R were issued only on 16 Nov 1959, four months after the election of the "Popular Base" (see above).]

In Jan 1960, after the announcement of the regulations, *al-Masā'* criticized the NU committees for their inactivity, declaring that they had not yet started work. The members of the NU in Suez were accused of regarding their positions as honorary, and of not having started work at all. (*Masā'*, 22 Jan)

In Jan, Kamāl ad-Dīn Hussein announced that prizes and medals would be awarded to committees especially active in public service. (*Ahram*, 19 Jan)

**Mar: Foreign Observer: "Little Gets Done."** In an article entitled "Slowly Spinning," *The Economist* commented that the NU "has done singularly little since the time it was established. The idea of weaving, from the outer edge inward, a spider's web of committees reaching to Cairo at the centre could be attractive and even useful. It is an experiment roughly similar to that being tried out by General Ayub Khan in Pakistan; it has the advantage of keeping the government in touch with the villages... The trouble in the UAR is that

little gets done, and even less is understood by the people concerned. Thus the villages, called upon to vote, voted for the same families who have always been dominant, and the web breaks off long before it reaches the centre." (*Economist*, 12 Mar)

Oct: Soviet Criticism of NU. See p 80.

Nov-Dec: UAR Leaders' Criticisms. [During 1960, the activities of the NU committees became more or less a matter of routine.] However, as late as Nov 1960 Kamāl ad-Dīn Hussein discussed with members of the NA measures to stimulate the activities of the NU committees. (*Ahram*, 14 Nov) At a meeting with the NU Parliamentary Authority he said that there were complaints that the Exec Coms were not being convened regularly and that many of their members were absent from the meetings.

Members of the NA pointed to the personal quarrels among the members of the Exec Coms, especially in the towns, which had intensified after the formation of the governorate Councils, [probably because of the competition for seats in these councils—see below.] One member proposed to introduce educated persons into the Exec Coms.

A question was asked at this meeting about the composition of some of the governorate Councils, whose membership did not accord with the wishes of the NU Exec Coms. [The NU Exec Coms submit names of NU members for appointment to the local governorate councils.] Hussein answered, "I think that we carried out 90 per cent of the wishes and nominations of the Exec Coms." (*Ahram*, 24 Nov)

At the end of the year Abdel-Nasser, addressing local government and NU members in Port Said (23 Dec), enlarged on this point: "After the governorate Councils were formed there were people in the NU who were annoyed... All of us know this. But if this is the aim of our activities then our intentions are not pure. The object of our membership in the NU is not our nomination to the governorate Councils or to other offices. This is a proof that the sentiments of the past still cling to some people. Every one of us has a task to perform in the service of the public... wherever and in whatever capacity this may be." (*Ahram*, 24 Dec)

NU Members Accused of Misusing Status. At the end of 1960, *al-Musawwar* accused members of NU committees in the countryside of misusing their status for the sake of some citizens and against others. The editors had received complaints that some members had asked the police to question citizens about certain matters. The weekly commented that the NU members might be excused, because their authority had not yet been defined. (*Musawwar*, 23 Dec)

#### LEADING POSTS IN THE NU

President: Gāmal Abdel-Nasser

Inspectors: Southern R: Kamāl ad-Dīn Hussein

Northern R: Abd al-Hakim Amer

Secretary General: Northern R: Abd al-Hamid as-Sarrāj

Supreme Exec Com

*Egyptian Ministers*

1. Abd al-Latif al-Baghdādi
2. Muhammad Abd al-Hakim Amer
3. Anwar as-Saadat
4. Zakariyah Muhi ad-Dīn
5. Hussein ash-Shāfi'i

6. Kamāl ad-Dīn Hussein
7. Nūr ad-Dīn Tarrāf
8. Ahmad Abduh ash-Shabāsi
9. Abd al-Mun'im al-Qaysūni
10. Kamāl Ramzi Astino
11. Ali Sabri

*Syrian Ministers*

12. Kamāl ad-Dīn Mahmūd Rif'at
13. Nūr ad-Dīn Kahālāh
14. Abd al-Hamid as-Sarrāj
15. Tu'mah al-Awdat Allah
16. Amjad at-Tarābulsi
17. Jamāl as-Sūfi
18. Ahmad Hunaydi (*Ahram*, 12 June)

Executive of the Exec Com of the Southern R

*Ministers*

1. Kamāl ad-Dīn Hussein
2. Kamāl Ramzi Astino
3. Azīz Sidqi
4. Sayyid Mar'i
5. Kamāl ad-Dīn Mahmūd Rif'at
6. Hasan Abbās Zaki
7. Tharwat Ukāshah
8. Abbās Radwān
9. Abd al-Qādir Hātīm

*Presidents of Governorate and Provincial Exec Coms*

10. Muhammad Fu'ād Galāl
11. Muhammad Wajīh Tawfiq Abāzah
12. Muhammad Hamdi Ashūr
13. Al-Laythi Abd an-Nāsir [the President's brother]
14. Muhammad Fu'ād Hussein Abū Hamilah
15. Hasan Ali Amir
16. Ibrahim as-Sayyid Uthmān

Executive of the Exec Com of Northern R

*Ministers*

1. Abd al-Hamid as-Sarrāj
2. Tu'mah al-Awdat Allah
3. Jādu Izz ad-Dīn
4. Akram Diri
5. Thābit al-Arīs
6. Yūsuf Muzāhim (also President of a Governorate Exec Com)

*Presidents of Governorate and Provisional Exec Coms*

7. Ahmad Abu Sālih
8. Abd as-Sattār as Sayyid
9. Rātīb al-Husāmi (*Ahram*, 12 June)

Presidents of Exec Com of Northern R Governorates

President	Governorate
1. Yūsuf Muzāhim	Damascus
2. *	Idlib (governorate and city)
3. Abd al-Hamid Khalīl	Der'a
4. Amīn Abbūd Afshat	Suweida
5. Rātīb al-Husāmi	Homs
6. Abd al-Latif ash-Shutta	Hama
7. Ahmad Muhammad abu Sālih	Aleppo
8. Abd as-Sattār as-Sayyid	Latakia
9. Abd as-Samal al-Kufayh	Deir ez-Zor
10. Abd al-Azīz al-Musdiq	Hasake

\* Elections in Idlib were postponed. The Governorate of Rashīd did not exist at the time the Exec Coms were formed.)

**Permanent Functional Committees of the Headquarters.** Kamāl ad-Dīn Hussein established the offices of the Headquarters at the end of 1959 and during 1960.

The names of the directors of the offices at the time when they were set up are given on p 478. The follow-

ing are the names of the presidents and secretaries of the permanent functional committees which were established in the Headquarters at the end of 1960 (see above p 482).

Committee	President	Secretary
1. Social Services	Sayyid Zaki Abd al-Hādī	Yahya Darwīsh
2. National Guidance	Abd al-Qādir Hātim	Muhammad Sa'īd al-Aryān
3. Suggestions	Hasan Muhammad Sa'adāwī	Ahmad Shaib
4. Labour and Workers	Dr Husni al-Hakīm	Khālid Fawzi
5. Communications	Amin Anwar ash-Sharīf	Muhammad Sa'īd Qadari
6. Public Utilities	Amin Anwar ash-Sharīf	Muhammad Sa'īd Qadari
7. Industry and Electricity	(Not announced)	(Not announced)
8. Co-operation	Amir Muhammad Amir	Muhammad Bahjat Ramadān
9. Youth	Shawqi Abd an-Nāsir Hussein	Mindi Mukhaymar
10. Finance and Commerce	Muhammad Rushdi	Abd as-Salām Badawi
11. Supply	Sa'ad Abd al-Hamīd Shalabi	Ahmad Salah ad-Dīn Afīf
12. Agriculture	Hasan Fahmi Tammām	Zaki Jum'ah Mukhaymar
13. Local Administration	Fu'ād Hasanayn Abu Hamliyah	Galāl Zaki
14. Legal Affairs and Justice	Muhammad Fahmi Mahmūd ash-Sharkāwī	Ali Kāmil
15. Health	Muhammad Hasan Sharīf	Muhammad Sa'īd Qadari
16. Arts and Sciences	Tāha Hussein	Yūsuf as-Sibā'i
17. Women's Activities	Karīmah Ahmad as-Sa'īd	Fātimah Anān
18. Education	Muhammad Yūsuf	Muhammad Wāsif Hums

(*Ahram*, 21 Nov, 1 Dec)

## THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY

(*Majlis al-Ummah*)

### PREPARATIONS FOR SETTING UP THE ASSEMBLY

**General.** During 1960 the National Assembly (NA) of the UAR was organized, its members nominated by the President, and its first sittings held.

The 350-member Egyptian National Assembly (*Majlis al-Ummah*), elected in 1957, and the last Syrian Chamber of Deputies (*Majlis an-Nuwāb*), elected in 1954, with 142 members, were dissolved after the establishment of the UAR. Since then all legislative power was in the hands of the President of the UAR.

**The NA in the Provisional Constitution of the UAR.** Following is a summary of the main points dealing with the NA in the Provisional Constitution of the UAR, proclaimed on 5 Mar 1958:

The number of members and the method of choosing them are determined by presidential decree. At least half must have been members of the Syrian Chamber of Deputies and the Egyptian NA (Art 13).

The seat of the NA is Cairo (Art 16). The President of the Republic convokes and adjourns the Assembly. Meetings otherwise convoked are null and void (Art 17, 18). The President has the right to dissolve the NA; a new Assembly must be formed and convoked within 60 days thereafter (Art 38).

**Legislative Power Shared Between NA and President.** No law may be enacted unless approved by the Assembly (Art 22). The President has the right to propose, reject or promulgate laws (Art 50). A bill passed by the NA becomes law if not rejected by the President within 30 days. A bill rejected and referred back to the NA during the prescribed period, but passed a second time by a two-thirds majority of its members, is considered

law and promulgated (Art 51-52). While the NA is in recess, the President may enact decrees having the force of law or take decisions which must be submitted to the NA at its first sitting; if rejected by a two-thirds majority they are no longer effective (Art 53). [Art 53 obviously overrules Art 22, at least in practice.]

**Financial Functions.** No impost may be established, other tax or duty levied, or monopoly granted, except by law (Art 27, 30). The budget must be submitted to the NA for examination and approval, but the Assembly may not introduce any amendments without government approval (Art 32). Governmental loans and projects which would be a burden on the treasury over one or more years must have the approval of the NA (Art 29).

**Political Functions.** The NA has the right of "control over the Executive as prescribed by this Constitution" (Art 14). Every member may address questions or interpellations to Ministers (Art 24). Any twenty members may initiate a debate on the government's policy (Art 25). The NA may submit its wishes and proposals to the government on general questions (Art 26). Under certain conditions it may withdraw confidence from a Minister, in which case he must resign (Art 39). Treaties must be ratified by the NA before they become effective (Art 56).

**Members of the NA** must be not less than 30 years old (Art 15). They receive remuneration (Art 43), enjoy parliamentary immunity during the sessions (Art 26), and may not be deprived of their mandates except by a two-thirds majority of the NA.

(For full text see *The UAR Yearbook 1960, Arabic*, pp 23-32, *English Ed.*, pp 11-20.)

**Constitution "Confused."** Commenting on the clauses of the Constitution on the establishment of the NA, *The Economist* says that they were written "in terms so confused that even Egyptian lawyers quail at the thought of interpretation." (*Economist*, 12 May)

**Jan-Mar: Possibility of Separate Legislatures for Syrian and Egyptian Regions Discussed.** [In the Proclamation of the UAR (1 Feb 1958), it was expressly stated that "the legislative authority shall be vested in one Legislative House." This intention also emerges from the 1958 constitution quoted above.] As late as the beginning of 1960 there were rumours afloat that separate houses would be set up for the Egyptian and the Syrian Regions. (*Hayat*, 5 Jan) In Jan 1960 Abdel-Nasser said, in reply to a journalist's question whether there would be special parliaments for each Region or a unified parliament for the UAR, that the matter was still under consideration. (*Ahram*, 27 Jan) Some days later, Abd al-Hamid as-Sarrāj answered a similar question by quoting this reply. (*Ayyam*, 31 Jan) In early Mar however, Abdel-Nasser said in a speech in Damascus that in order to strengthen the Union one Assembly only would be set up. "Under no circumstances will there be an Egyptian Assembly or a Syrian Assembly," he added. "There will be an Arab Assembly representing the people." (*Ayyam*, 6 Mar)

**Jan-May: Setting Up of NA Postponed.** In 1959 the convocation of the NA was planned for the Day of the Union in Feb 1960, and this date was still mentioned at the beginning of Jan 1960. (*Ahram*, 23 July, 12 Sept, 10 Oct 1959; *Nasr*, 8 Jan 1960). However, because of the delays in the organization of the NU, from whose members the NA was to be chosen, the formation of the NA had to be postponed. (See, e.g., Abdel-Nasser on this topic, p 501).

In May Abdel-Nasser announced that the NA would be formed before the Day of the (Egyptian) Revolution (23 July). (*Ahram*, 5 Mar)

### JULY: FORMATION OF THE NA

On 18 July the composition of the NA was announced, and on 20 July it was summoned by presidential decree for its inaugural session, which opened in Cairo on the next day and lasted until 31 July. During this session the NA's internal organization and provisional rules were decided upon.

**Duration.** The NA was to continue in office until a new constitution was prepared and approved by plebiscite. (*Ahram*, 26 May).

**Number of Members.** On 18 July Abdel-Nasser published a decree containing the names of the 600 members of the NA. The number was fixed, according to as-Saadat, on the basis that each member should represent approximately 50,000 citizens. (*Ahram*, 19 July; *Ruz al-Yusuf*, 7 Nov)

**Composition.** The members were chosen by Abdel-Nasser together with the Supreme Executive Committee of the NU (see p 482), from among the members of the NU General Congress. (*Ahram*, 22 June)

The Syrian R was represented by 200 members and the Egyptian R by 400. [The Syrian R was thus over-represented.] The members were mentioned in the decree according to governorates. (For a full list see *Ahram*, 19 July.) All the former members of the Egyptian NA and the Syrian Chamber of Deputies who were elected to the "Popular Base" of the NU and became

members of its General Congress were nominated to the NA. (*Ahram*, 15, 18 July)

The number of former members of Parliament in the NA was given as 345; 299 out of the original 350 members of the former Egyptian NA and 46 members out of the 142 former members of the Syrian Chamber. (*Hindu, Madras*, 18 Jan 1961) The rest were nominated from NU members who were elected to the "Popular Base" and joined the national institutions of the NU. (*Ahram*, 26 May)

Seven of the members were women. (*Ahram*, 19 July)

**Former Ministers in the NA.** Ministers may not be members of the NA. (*Ahram*, 15 July) There were seven former Ministers in the NA. Three were Egyptians: Anwar as-Saadat, former Minister of State; Muhammad Fu'ad Galāl and Fathi Radwān, both former Ministers of National Guidance and Culture. Four were Syrians: Ali Būsu, former Minister of the Interior; Muhammad Ra'if al-Mulqi, former Minister of Education; Abd as-Samud al-Fatih, former Minister of Agriculture; and Rashād Barmada, former Minister of Defence. (*Ahram*, 19 July)

### INTERNAL ORGANIZATION AND REGULATIONS

**The Presidium.** The NA is headed by a Presidium (*Hay'at Maktab*, which may be translated as Executive), consisting of a President (*Ra'is*), two Vice-presidents (*Wakil*) and eight Secretaries (*Amin Sirr* or *Sicritir*). Its members are elected by the NA from its own membership by secret ballot. The President and his deputies remain in office for the duration of the Assembly, while the Secretaries are elected at the beginning of each annual session. (*Ahram*, 24 July; *Akhbar*, 29 July) [The election of a President and two Vice-presidents was laid down in the Provisional Constitution; a "Presidium" and the Secretaries were not mentioned.]

**The Secretariat** is headed by a Secretary-General and his deputy, appointed by the President of the Assembly. (*Ahram*, 3 Aug)

**Twenty-five Committees.** The number of the NA committees (*Lijān*) was first intended to be 22. (*Ahram*, 18 July) Later the NA fixed it at 23 (*Ahram*, 26 July), and in the end there were 25.

According to the draft regulations of the NA, each committee should have not less than 15, and not more than 31 members. But at the plenary session of 30 July, this was opposed and it was decided not to limit membership. The committees were then constituted according to applications by the NA members. As a result, the membership of the Agriculture and Irrigation Committee reached 131. (*Ahram*, 27, 29, 31 July)

In consequence it was found necessary to reorganize the committees and some were subdivided; e.g. separate committees were set up for Agriculture and Irrigation. Thus the final number was fixed at 25. (*Akhbar*, 5 Oct)

Each committee had an office (or Presidium) (*Hay'at Maktab*), consisting of a President (*Ra'is*), a Deputy (*Wakil*), and a Treasurer (*Amin Sunduq*) (*Ahram*, 27 July), who were elected by the committee members from among their own number in Oct. (*Ahram*, 5, 6, 12, 13 Oct)

**The Twenty-five Committees** are as follows: (1) Planning; (2) Defence; (3) Arab Affairs; (4) Foreign Affairs; (5) Finance, Commerce and Economic Affairs; (6) Youth; (7) Family, Women's Activities and Social



Services; (8) Health; (9) Labour and Workers; (10) Local Administration; (11) Internal Security; (12) Legislative Affairs and Justice; (13) Suggestions and General Affairs; (14) National Guidance; (15) Culture and Education; (16) Art, Science and Literature; (17) Constitutional Affairs and Internal Regulations; (18) Industry and Electricity; (19) Agriculture; (20) Irrigation; (21) Co-operation; (22) Supplies; (23) Public Utilities and Communications; (24) Accounts of the Assembly; (25) Budget. (*Ahram*, 26 July, 11, 12 Sept, 5 Oct)

It was also decided to establish a Protocol Committee which would receive visiting delegations. (*Ahram*, 31 Oct)

**Provisional Regulations of the NA.** The preparation of the Regulations, which contained 240 clauses, was completed on 26 July by as-Saadat, Gālāl, Husami, Abduh and an-Nahlāwi. (*Ahram*, 26, 27 July)

Members of the NA would enjoy immunity in regard to opinions expressed at Assembly sittings. A member would be entitled to delete questions from the agenda. The Regulations laid down procedures for submitting questions or motions for legislation and other matters. It was resolved that the Regulations be approved by the Plenary Session and submitted to the Committee on Constitutional Affairs and Internal Regulations.

The Regulations authorized the President of the NA to call in experts for consultation when technical subjects were discussed. The NA would normally sit four times a week, unless further meetings would be called for by members. Ministers might answer questions in writing with the agreement of the member concerned. Otherwise, the Minister must read out his answer at the Assembly. (*Ahram*; *Eg. Gaz.*, 27 July)

Members were allowed to carry arms without licence. (*Ahram*, 17 July)

To save time, votes were taken by a show of hands. Ministers might delegate senior officials or other Ministers to reply on their behalf. (*Ahram*, 26 Aug)

Members of the NA might not serve for remuneration in any other capacity, or occupy any public post, in local government councils, etc. (*Ahram*, 18 July, 1 Aug; *Ruz al-Yusuf*, 12 Dec) A member's resignation must be confirmed by the President of the UAR. This regulation was laid down following the resignation of a Syrian member, who wished to continue in his previous post. (*Ahram*, 4, 13 Oct)

#### OFFICERS OF THE NA

**The Presidium.** The President and his deputies were elected on 21 July.

President: Anwar as-Saadat, Egyptian, elected unanimously. (He was an original member of the Junta and a deputy in the former Egyptian NA. From Nov 1957 until 1959 he was SG of the NA. He was also SG of the Islamic Congress.)

Vice-presidents: Muhammad Fu'ād Galāl, Egyptian, 536 votes (Member of first government after the revolution, was active in Liberation Rally; director of an office at the NU HQ); Rātib al-Husāmī, Syrian, 514 votes. (President of the NU Exec Com of Homs governorate; member of Northern R NU Exec Com). Another Syrian candidate, Muhammad al-Kassār, received 75 votes. (*Ahram*, 22 July)

All the Secretaries were returned unopposed. They were:

**Egyptians:** Muhammad Hamid Mahmūd (former director of office of Minister for Presidential Affairs; later director of office of General Inspector of NU in the Southern R); Sayyid Zaki (graduate of Army College,

1940, left army to participate in election campaign of 1956; former NA member, active member of NU youth organization); Shākīr Tawfiq ad-Darawī (member of the Supreme Advisory Council for Workers Affairs); Muhammad Abd al-Mun'im Tāhir (from Alexandria).

**Syrians:** Muhammad Tāha Haddād (from Deir az-Zor; son of Abd al-Rāziq Haddād; former member of Syrian Chamber of Deputies; teacher and school inspector; did not belong to any political party); Dr Muzhir ash-Shurbaji (director of Aliens Department of Syrian police); Qawdat Karākish (lawyer, member of Foreign Affairs Committee in UAR General Congress of NU); Mar'i al-Hayrāt (from Der'a; member of Foreign Affairs Committee in UAR General Congress of NU). (*Akhbar*, 29 July)

The Secretariat was appointed by as-Saadat: Ahmad Labib Abduh (formerly SG of Egyptian NA) became SG; and Fāiq an-Nahlāwi (formerly SG of Syrian Chamber of Deputies) became Deputy SG. (*Ahram*, 3 Aug)

#### JULY: INAUGURAL SESSION OF NA

The NA convened for its first Plenary Session on the morning of 21 July.

**Important Laws Enacted by Decree on Eve of NA Session.** On 20 July, one day before the opening of the NA, five important laws were enacted by presidential decree. They dealt with: The Five-Year Plan for the Development of the UAR; the Organization of the National Economy According to Plan; Granting Abd al-Latif al-Baghdādi Supervisory Authority over the Execution of the Plans; Definition of the Jurisdiction of the Ministerial Committee for Planning; Establishment of an Institution for National Planning. (*Ahram*, 20 July) [The budget for 1960/61 went into effect on 1 July 1960. Neither it nor the above laws were submitted to the NA.]

**21 July: Opening Session.** When the NA met on the morning of 21 July, members took the oath of allegiance, under Art 19 of the Provisional Constitution, and the Assembly elected its President and his deputies. The NA reconvened the same evening to hear Abdel-Nasser swear allegiance. (*Ahram*, 22 July)

**28 July: Second Session.** On 28 July, following the celebration of the eighth anniversary of the Revolution, the NA discussed and, after some debate, passed the Internal Regulations (see above). It also elected the secretaries of the Presidium (see above). The session was opened with an invocation by as-Saadat: "In the name of God and in the name of the people."

**First Resolution.** Dr Mahmūd Fawzi, the Foreign Minister, then informed the NA of the severance of diplomatic relations with Iran (see p 217).

A resolution was passed unanimously denouncing the Shah's recognition of Israel, supporting Abdel-Nasser's policy on the matter, calling on all Arab states to break off diplomatic, economic and cultural relations with Iran, proposing that the government convoke the Arab League as soon as possible, denouncing the hostile attitude consistently adopted by the US, Britain and France towards the Arabs and Arab nationalism, and expressing greetings to the Iranian people who had no part in "the crime." (*Ahram*, 29 July)

**30 July: Third Session.** The NA confirmed the minutes of the previous meeting, with various amendments, such

as: "The Arab people in Palestine" instead of "Palestinian people," and the deletion of the word "State" before Israel. It was decided not to publish in the Official Gazette verses of poetry included in the minutes.

The "Parliamentary Party" was then set up in accordance with the rules of the Inter-parliamentary Union, and the NA broke up for its annual recess until its reassembly on 3 Oct. (*Ahram*, 31 July)

#### OCT-NOV: FIRST ANNUAL SESSION OF NA

The recess after the inaugural session of the NA was utilized to prepare for its first regular session. Government officials were busy preparing proposals for legislation. The secretariat received written questions and motions from members, from which an agenda was prepared. (*Ahram*, 2, 3, 24, 28 Aug, 9, 11, 12, 22, 26, 27 28 Sept, 2, 3 Oct)

The first session of the NA's Annual Session commenced on 3 Oct and closed on 15 Nov. It was devoted to: (1) Debate on matters of procedure and organization (see above: Regulations). (2) Reading written questions and answers aloud. (3) Discussion of proposals submitted to the NA. (4) General Debates. (5) Resolutions on political matters and (6) Legislation.

**The Proceedings of the Plenary Session.** The meeting was generally opened with the reading of letters of apology for non-attendance, confirmation of the minutes of the previous meeting, reading of letters of greeting, etc. to the NA. (*Ahram*, 4 Oct) It also dealt with members' questions and Ministers' replies, reports on the discussions of the NA's committees, and conducted debates on general problems or on motions for legislation which were before the House. Present at the meetings were Cabinet Ministers of the Central Government and of the Executive Councils of both countries. In some instances, a meeting was devoted to one subject only, e.g., the death, in Jordan, of the Syrian pilot Adnān al-Madani (see p 153), when Jordan was bitterly criticized; the Algerian problem (*Ahram*, 9, 11 Nov) and others.

Resolutions were sometimes carried by applause, as when a cable of greeting from the NA to Abdel-Nasser at the UN was read or when the Republican Decree was read covering the change in composition of the governments of the UAR in September; or when the House was presented with the motion calling for support for the Congo and denouncing imperialist actions there. (*Ahram*, 4, 5 Oct)

**Questions addressed to Ministers.** These were partly devoted to general matters of foreign or internal policy, such as: Jordan's military concentrations on the borders of the UAR (*Ahram*, 4 Oct); the death of Adnān al-Madani in Jordan and the steps the government proposed taking in the matter; the reasons for the failure of the UAR Olympic team in Rome; how many tourists were visiting the UAR and what was being done to attract tourism; postponement of military draft of youth with academic training; the problem of beggars. (*Ahram*, 5, 9, 10, 12, 18, 25, 26 Oct) Many of the questions, however, dealt with local problems, of which the following are a sample: the traffic crisis in Alexandria; the reasons for delays in putting up a bridge in al-Minya; the problem of water and electricity supply in the Isma'iliyah district; railway and public services in Helwan; parcellization of land in Dera; sewage in Alexandria; problems of irrigation in al-Buhayra governorate; why the Minister of Transport was so slow in carrying out the paving of the highway between Port Said and al-Matriya (*Ahram*, 2, 4, 12, 18, 19, 25 Oct, 8 Nov);

and the problems connected with the building of a hospital in Port Said. (*Ahram*, 2 Nov)

**Proposals Submitted to the NA.** The following were some proposals submitted by Members of the House and by the public: to establish an Institute of Higher Learning for the study of co-operation (*Ahram*, 4 Oct); to impose ceilings on rents and to take measures to ease the housing crisis (*Ahram*, 2 Nov); to abolish the death penalty and to substitute for it life imprisonment with hard labour. (*Ahram*, 14 Nov)

Other proposals advocated that the *Umdah(s)* (Village-Chiefs) who had been appointed in the past should be dismissed and that they should be replaced by members of the NA; that working hours for government officials be increased (an 8-hour day, instead of a 6-hour day); that medical services be nationalized and the period of compulsory military service be reduced to 18 months. (*Ahram*, 4 Oct, 2, 10, 14 Nov) (Many of these proposals were referred to the "Proposals' Committee" or to the Ministry concerned.)

**General Debates.** These could be held at the request of a minimum of 20 members, as laid down by the Constitution. Debates were held on foreign and internal affairs; on the situation in the Congo (*Ahram*, 5 Oct); on Israel's division of the waters of the Jordan (*Ahram*, 25 Oct, 1 Nov); on the proposed law which permitted the granting of loans to government clerks (*Ahram*, 18 Oct); on the statement of the Minister of Agriculture concerning his Ministry's plans for cotton and for the elimination of cotton pests. (*Ahram*, 12 Oct) Below are a few examples of these debates.

**Debate on Development in the Syrian Region.** A debate was held in connection with an announcement by Nūr ad-Dīn Kahālāh regarding the economic agreements concluded with the USSR (see p 84). He was asked why the route for the proposed railway line between Aleppo and Latakia had been changed by the new agreement and whether those towns which needed it would be served by the railway. One of the members requested that railway tracks produced by the Helwan Iron and Steel Works be used for construction of the railway. Kahālāh was also asked if the new agreement nullified previous agreements such as the plan for damming the Euphrates and why the government proposed to set up a fertilizers' factory in Homs, when Aleppo would be more satisfactory for this purpose. Kahālāh replied that the reason for diverting the railway tracks was an economic one; that the steel production of Helwan would be insufficient; that the new agreement in no way abrogated earlier agreements; as regards the factory for fertilizers, the necessary raw materials were to be found in Homs. (*Ahram*, 12 Oct)

**Criticism of the Educational System.** The Minister of Education and Culture of the Northern R reported on the policy and activities of his Ministry. During the debate, members of the NA claimed that the number of classrooms had declined in proportion to school children, that there was a dire lack of schools, that 80 per cent of school-age children could not be accepted at primary schools for lack of space, and that in the Northern R 34,000 could not be accepted, while in the Southern R the number was 264,000. (*Ahram*, 10 Nov)

**Debate on Taxes.** There was a lively debate on the assessment of urban property for purposes of taxation. Egyptian members severely criticized the injustice of

these assessments and demanded that the question be brought before an Investigation Committee. Members opposed proposals that the debate be wound up. A motion was finally presented to transfer the matter to an Investigation Committee, and that in the meantime all confiscations and sale of property should be suspended. The proposal was transferred to the Finance and Economic Committee. (*Ahram*, 25 Oct)

**Political Resolutions.** The NA passed a resolution of support for Abdel-Nasser's policy and sent him their good wishes for his success at the UN (*Ahram*, 4 Oct); expressed its support for the Congo and denounced the acts of the "imperialists" there. (*Ahram*, 5 Oct) A motion was also passed that Sudanese working in the UAR should be accorded the same status as citizens of the UAR. (*Ahram*, 1 Nov) (See also UAR-Sudan, p 156.)

**Bills Passed.** A week after the opening of the first annual Assembly the government presented 20 bills to the NA. (*Ahram*, 9 Oct) The following are some of the bills that passed: A bill amending the Constitution of the Stock Exchange; a bill granting a loan of £30 million to the Ministry of Agrarian Reform in the Northern R (*Ahram*, 18 Oct); a bill which empowered the government to grant loans to officials (*Ahram*, 26 Oct); and a bill establishing a university in Aleppo and another one in Damascus. (*Ahram*, 15 Nov)

**Nov-Dec: A Recess.** The recess which started on 16 Nov continued into the new year. It was limited to the Assembly, as the committees continued to function. The Committee for Arab Affairs met during the recess with five leaders from "Southern Yemen" to "study the British attack on Southern Yemen." (*Ahram*, 23, 28 Nov, 2, 4, Dec)

The executive of the NA together with the executive of the Committee for Arab Affairs also met to discuss the Algerian problem. (*Ahram*, 19 Dec)

#### CRITICISM OF THE ACTIVITIES OF THE NA

The NA was criticized on many aspects of its activities. *Al-Ahrām*, for example, carried a column together

with an account of the debates of the NA, in which these sittings were described. This column criticized the apathy of members of the NA; the fact that they left the House while the debates were in progress; the chattering during sessions and the lack of a quorum which precluded the taking of a vote. Also criticized were the lack of clarity of the Internal Regulations and Procedure; the length of the sittings; and the delay in opening the sittings. The paper claimed that many members were not familiar with the purpose of parliamentary questions and that their questions covered a problem in its entirety, instead of being explicit and dealing with its essential point. (*Ahram*, 18, 20, 25 Oct, 2, 8, 16 Nov)

In an interview between Anwar as-Saadat, Chairman of the NA, and a correspondent of *Ruz al-Yūsuf*, criticism was levelled at members of the NA. *Ruz al-Yūsuf* repeated some of the above complaints and added that it understood that there were committees of the NA which had not met at all; that the committees of the NA met only when the House was sitting, which increased the difficulties, and that some members of the House served both as members of the NA and in other public capacities. The correspondent wrote that many questions were put to the NA concerning local problems, whereas it had been hoped that the NA would deal with unification of the laws and procedures between the two constituent countries of the UAR. The reporter accused deputies of ignoring their electors. He criticized the rumour of an alleged intention to hold NA sessions in the Northern R (on such rumours see *Ahram*, 17 July, 18 Oct, 6, 17 Nov and also later see *Ahram*, 2, 21, 26 Dec) and stressed that Parliament should be convened in the capital. As-Saadat concurred with the reporter's view. In reply to a question as to the period of incumbency of the NA, as-Saadat stated that this would end with the framing of a new constitution for the UAR. The reporter, on asking when the NA would commence its work on the new constitution, was informed that this would be done as and when requested by the President of the UAR. (*Ruz al-Yūsuf*, 7 Nov)

The NA was scheduled to convene on 9 Jan 1961 for its second session. (*Ahram*, 27 Dec)

### REORGANIZATION OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT

#### LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW

**Mar-Sept: The LG Law.** The Local Government Law (*Qanūn Nizām al-Idārah al-Mahalliyah*) was promulgated by Abdel-Nasser on 26 Mar. (Full text in *Ahram*, 27 Mar; for summary in English, see *The Scribe*, Aug, pp 39-42.)

Executive Regulations (*al-Lā'ihah al-Tanfidihiyah*) relating to the LG were issued by Abdel-Nasser on 12 Sept. (*Ahram*, 13 Sept) These were drawn up by the office for LG at the NU Headquarters. (*Ahram*, 18, 26 May) (For summary of the regulations see *Ahram*, 13 Sept.)

**LG Only in Southern Region.** The new LG system was at first to be established only in the Southern R, and only later extended to the Northern R by a special law. (*Ahram*, 27 Mar) At the end of 1960, the Executive Council of the Northern R formed a committee to discuss the matter (*Ahram*, 7 Nov), and in Dec it was announced that the new system would be established there in 1961. (*Ruz al-Yūsuf*, 12 Dec)

#### AIMS OF THE NEW LG SYSTEM

**Democracy and Decentralization.** According to the NU General Congress (see p 485), the task of the new LG system was to act as "the final stage in laying the foundations of democracy and in the building of the socialist cooperative society." (*Ahram*, 17 July) Decentralization was given as another aim; *Rūz al-Yūsuf* said that the citizen "will no more have to go to Cairo or from Tanta to al-Mansurah" if he had any business with the authorities, but would be able to approach them in his own locality. (*Ruz al-Yūsuf*, 11 Apr)

Kamāl ad-Dīn Hussein described the LG system as "giving the people an opportunity to rule itself for its own advantage," and as enabling them to solve their problems in their own localities. (*Ahram*, 18 Sept)

**Connection Between National Union and LG.** The connection between LG and the NU was stressed by UAR newspapers.

*Al-Ahrām* calculated that 7,000 NU members would



serve on LG institutions: 800 in governorate councils, 2,500 in town councils and 3,500 in village councils. At the end of five years, when the system was completed, over 20,000 NU members, i.e. two-thirds of the NU Exec Coms members in the Southern R, would be involved. (*Ahram*, 27 June) Kamāl ad-Dīn Hussein compared the connection between the NU and the LG councils with that between the NU and the executive authority. (*Ahram*, 18 July) (A series of articles explaining the principles of LG, by Uthmān Khalīl Uthmān, appeared in *Ahram*, 18, 21, 22, 26 Sept.)

### CENTRAL BODIES ADMINISTERING LG

(The names of the functionaries are given below.)

**Ministry of LG.** The new system was organized in the Southern R by Kamāl ad-Dīn Hussein, who was nominated Minister of LG on 11 Sept (*Ahram*, 12 Sept). A Ministry of LG was formed (see below, p 495), with limited jurisdiction, so as to leave the powers of local administration in the hands of the governors. (*Ahram*, 17 Sept)

An Advisory Committee (*Lajnah Istishariyah lil-Idārah al-Mahalliyah*) was to be set up to assist the Minister. (*Ahram*, 17 Nov)

**Supreme Authority of LG** (*Hay'ah Ulyah lil-Idārah al-Mahalliyah*). The LG Law provides for the establishment, by presidential decree, of this authority, which consists of a central committee and a regional committee for each of the two regions. (*Ahram*, 27 May)

**LG Central Committee** (*al-Lajnah al-Markaziyah lil-Idārah al-Mahalliyah*). This was a committee of Ministers, nominated by Abdel-Nasser on 11 Sept.

The Central Committee was made responsible for implementing the LG Law gradually within five years in both regions; and recruiting the officials needed; it was authorized to transfer power from the Ministries to LG bodies and to arrange for credits to finance their activities. (*Ahram*, 27 Mar) It was also authorized to determine the policy of the LG councils within the framework of general state policy. It was to be consulted about projected decrees and legislation dealing with LG before submission to the President of the Republic. (*Ahram*, 13 Sept)

**Regional Committee for LG in the Southern R** (*al-Lajnah al-Iqlimiyah lil-Idārah al-Mahalliyah*). This was also a committee of Ministers, nominated by decree of the President. (A regional committee for the Northern R was not formed until the end of 1960.)

The committee was entitled "to give its opinion" on all the resolutions of the LG councils in accordance with the LG executive regulations (*Ahram*, 13 Sept), and to discuss each stage in the implementation of the LG Law. It also had financial jurisdiction over the council's budgets and was entitled, together with the Minister of LG, to approve the imposition of local taxes. (*Ahram*, 27 Mar, 4 Oct)

### ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISIONS OF THE SOUTHERN REGION—COUNCILS AND SENIOR OFFICIALS

**Main Division of the Southern R.** The LG Law provided for a new administrative division of the UAR (carried out in 1960 only in the Southern R). These divisions are: governorates (*muhāfazah*), towns (*madinah*) and villages (*qaryah*), each of which is recognized as a legal person and is represented by a council (*majlis*).

The boundaries of these units are delineated and their councils constituted by presidential, ministerial or governmental decree respectively. (*Ahram*, 27 Mar, 13 Sept)

**The Governorates.** The UAR is divided into 36 governorates (*muhāfazah*), 25 in the Southern R and 11 in the Northern R. From 19 July the term "province" (*mu-diriyyah*), which was used in the Southern R for a rural province, was replaced by "governorate." (*Ahram*, 19 July)

**The Southern R Governorates:** (1) Cairo; (2) Alexandria; (3) Port Sa'id; (4) Ismailiya; (5) Suez; (6) al-Qalyubiya; (7) ash-Sharqiya; (8) ad-Daqhaliya; (9) Damietta; (10) Kafar ash-Shaykh; (11) al-Gharbiya; (12) al-Manufiya; (13) al-Buhayra; (14) al-Giza; (15) al-Fayum; (16) Bani Suef; (17) al-Minya; (18) Asyut; (19) Sawhaj; (20) Qina; (21) Aswan; (22) Sinai; (23) as-Sahra al-Gharbiya (the Western Desert); (24) as-Sahra al-Janubiya (the Southern Desert); (25) al-Bahr al-Ahmar (the Red Sea).

LG institutions, however, were set up only in the first 21 of these governorates. The last four—the "border governorates" (*muhāfazāt al-hudūd*)—are administered, as before, by the Ministry of War. [They are predominantly desert areas populated mainly by Bedouins.] The establishment of LG bodies was postponed in these governorates "until the proper time comes." (*Ahram*, 27 June)

**The Northern R Governorates:** (1) Damascus; (2) Aleppo; (3) Latakia; (4) Homs; (5) Hama; (6) Deir ez-Zor; (7) al-Hasake; (8) Idlib; (9) Der'a; (10) as-Suweida; (11) ar-Rashid; [formerly the Qaza of ar-Raqa on the Euphrates—it became a governorate on 18 July]. (*Ahram*, 19 July)

The governorates of the Southern R are administered by Governors (*Muhāfiz*), and are represented by governorate councils (*majlis al-muhāfazah*). (*Ahram*, 27 Mar) The governorate council consists of ten permanent committees (*lajnah dā'imah*) made up of NU members. (For details see *Ahram*, 1 Oct.)

The larger cities of the Southern R (e.g. Cairo, Alexandria) constitute governorates and are represented by governorate councils. (*Ahram*, 27 Mar) They are divided into quarters (*hayy p ahyā'*), with councils set up by the governorate council (i.e. the city council). (*Ahram*, 1 Nov, 18 Dec)

**The Governor.** The Governor is nominated or dismissed by presidential decree. His term of office ends with the expiry of that of the President of the Republic. He represents the executive authority; his task is to see to it that the state's general policy is carried out, and to supervise the branches of the Ministries in his governorate.

Ministers may transfer some of their powers to the Governor, who has to report to them on all matters connected with his duties.

The Governor is the President (*Ra'is*) of the governorate council. He supervises the activities of town and village councils, and has to ratify certain decisions of the latter, as specified in the executive regulations of LG.

Salaries, pensions and seniority of the Governors are covered by the same regulations as apply to Deputy-Ministers (*nā'ib al-wazir*). In other matters they are covered by the same regulations as apply to Under-Secretaries (*wakil al-wizārah*). (*Ahram*, 27 Mar, 13 Sept)

**Directors of Security.** The director of security (*mudir al-amn*) is also nominated by presidential decree. He is



the representative of the Ministry of the Interior in the governorate council (*Ahram*, 6 June), and presides over it when the Governor is absent. (*Ahram*, 27 Mar) Abbās Radwān, Executive Minister of the Interior, said that, as LG was established for the benefit of the public, the directors must believe in the aims of the Law and work, in every way, for the successful realizations of its aims. He called for full cooperation between the directors and the Governors. (*Akhbar*, 20 Sept)

### LG COUNCILS

**Membership of the Councils: General.** The councils consist of three categories of nominees: representatives of the Ministries, nominated by the appropriate Ministers; elected members of the NU Executive Coms in the governorates, nominated by the Inspector-General of the NU (Kamāl ad-Dīn Hussein); and active members of the NU, selected by the Minister for LG (also Kamāl ad-Dīn Hussein). (*Ahram*, 29 Oct) [It would seem that in certain cases the Governors act on behalf of Kamāl ad-Dīn Hussein—see below.]

Council members remain in office for a period of four years, half retiring each two years.

A member nominated to the council must meet the same conditions as a candidate for the National Assembly: he must reside in the area and be over 25 years of age. Resignations have to be submitted to the President (*Ra'īs*) of the council and be approved by him. (*Ahram*, 27 Mar)

**The Governorate Council.** The governorate council consists of: (1) The Governor—President (*Ra'īs*); (2) Members representing Ministries; (3) three to five active members of the NU nominated by the Governor, provided they are not members of town or village councils; (4) four elected members from NU Exec Coms in every district (*markaz*) or town quarter (*qism*) within the governorate. The elected members must constitute a majority of the council; for this purpose, if need be, the quota for each district or town quarter may be raised from four to six. (*Ahram*, 27 Mar, 13 Sept) In selecting NU members, priority is to be given to members of the Exec Coms, followed by defeated candidates for the committees in the order of votes polled, and lastly by those most active in the NU. (*Ahram*, 28 Oct)

The councils of governorates for a single city (e.g. Cairo, Alexandria, etc.) differ in their composition from other governorates. (For details see: *Ahram*, 6 29 June)

Within the framework of the state's general policy the council establishes and manages local services and works. It supervises the town and village councils, and manages government projects and services in the area. It also undertakes projects for the public welfare, encourages the exploitation of local sources of wealth, promotes agriculture and industry, and aids the authorities responsible for the preservation of security within its jurisdiction. (*Ahram*, 27 Mar, 13 Sept)

**The Town Council.** The town council consists of: (1) a maximum of six members representing the Ministries; (2) two to three active members of the NU nominated by the Governor; (3) a maximum of 20 NU members, chosen from among those elected to its Exec Coms in the towns.

The elected members must constitute the majority of the council. The President of the Republic will nominate one of the council members as its President (*Ra'īs*). (*Ahram*, 27 Mar) There will also be town quarter councils. (*Ahram*, 27 Mar)

The town councils will have six permanent (func-

tional) committees (*lajnah dā'imah*) for details see: *Ahram*, 1 Oct)

The town council administers public services and may make recommendations to any Minister concerning the general needs of the town. (*Ahram*, 27 Mar)

A hundred and twenty town councils were to be formed during 1960/61. (*Ahram*, 6 June, 4 July)

**The Village Council.** The village council represents one village or a group of neighbouring villages. It consists of: (1) Villagers nominated by the Governor; (2) Not more than 12 NU members elected to the NU village Exec Com; (2) The Minister responsible may nominate two active members of the NU in addition.

The President (*Ra'īs*) of the council is also nominated by the Minister responsible (*Ahram*, 27 Mar) Village councils were to be established in 350 villages during 1960/61. (*Ahram*, 6 June)

The council is in charge of all public services, and manages the "combined unit" within its jurisdiction. (Combined units (*wahadāt mujamma'ah*) are rural centres in the Southern R of the UAR, rendering educational, medical, social, economic and cultural services. Their number in mid-1960 was reported to be 250, serving 1,000 villages.) (*Scribe*, Aug 1960, p 74)

**Dissolution.** All councils may be dissolved by presidential decree promulgated in accordance with the recommendations of the Minister responsible, and in agreement with the NU.

A general dissolution of governorate, town or village councils by a comprehensive decree is not allowed. A council may not be dissolved twice for the same reason. (*Ahram*, 27 Mar)

### APPLICATION OF THE LAW

**Jan-Feb: Reorganization of Municipal Councils in Southern R.** At the beginning of 1960, Muhammad Abu Nusayr, Executive Minister of Municipal and Rural Affairs, reorganized 279 municipal councils (*majlis baladi*). He formed "provisional administrative authorities" (*hay'ah idariyah muwaqqatah*), consisting of officials of the former municipal councils and elected members of the NU committees, the latter constituting a majority. (*Ahram*, 30, 31 Jan, 1, 7, 8, 9, 17, 18, 19 Feb)

**Sept: Formation of Ministry of LG.** In Sept, the Ministry of LG was formed and the major appointments made.

On 11 Sept President Abdel-Nasser appointed Kamāl ad-Dīn Hussein as Minister of LG in the Southern R. He continued to be in charge of education and kept his post as Inspector of the NU. (*Ahram*, 12 Sept)

After this appointment, some of the powers of the Ministries of the Interior and of Municipal and Rural Affairs were transferred to the Ministry of LG. (*Ahram*, 18, 25 Sept) It was also decided that the "combined units" would belong to the new Ministry. (*Ahram*, 17 Nov)

On the same day Abdel-Nasser announced the establishment of the LG committees (see above: p 493). (*Ahram*, 12 Sept) Kamāl ad-Dīn Hussein also formed an advisory committee (see above p 494). (*Ahram*, 17 Nov) These committees then discussed the following items: the mobilization of the manpower needed for administration; the establishment of 100 new combined units (*Ahram*, 11 Oct); the raising of the budgets of the councils (*Ahram*, 3, 9 Oct, 28 Nov); the implementation of the LG law, etc. (*Ahram*, 27 Nov, 23 Dec)

**Sept: Nomination of Governors and Directors of Security.** This was announced by Abdel-Nasser on 12 Sept (*Ahram*, 12 Sept) although it had been expected in June or July (*Ahram*, 26, 30 June, 18 July). The Governors held a series of meetings with Kamāl ad-Dīn Hussein and other Ministers, to discuss the organization of LG institutions and councils. (*Ahram*, 17, 18, 20, 22 Sept, 7 Oct)

On 8 Oct the Governors and Directors of Security officially took up their duties. (*Ahram*, 8, 10 Oct)

**The Administrative Division of the Southern R** was prepared by a special committee which considered proposals submitted by the provinces and governorates on the demarcation of administrative units. (*Ahram*, 11 May) In Nov a presidential decree for the administrative division of the Southern R was issued. (*Ahram*, 19 Nov)

**Oct-Nov: Formation of Governorate Councils.** Between 28 Oct-13 Nov, Kamāl ad-Dīn Hussein issued decrees calling for the establishment of governorate councils (*Ahram*, 29, 31 Oct, 1, 13 Nov), and the councils held their first sessions (e.g. *Ahram*, 5, 11, 13, 14, 17 Nov). Some members of the NU criticized the composition of the councils (see p 488).

It had been expected that the decree calling for the establishment of town councils would be published before the end of Oct (*Ahram*, 21, 28 Dec), but it was postponed to 1961.

In fulfilment of the aim of decentralizing the admini-

stration, the responsibilities of Ministries in certain fields were transferred to LG councils. (*Ahram*, 20 June, 10, 22 Dec)

## MEMBERS OF THE LG INSTITUTIONS

### Central Bodies Administering LG

*The Minister of LG.* Kamāl ad-Dīn Hussein  
*SG of Ministry of LG.* Lieut.-Coloney Fawzi Yūnis, nominated by the Minister on 16 Nov. (*Nasr*, 16 Nov)

*The Advisory Committee to the Minister of LG*

1. Muhammad Abdullah al-Arabi
2. Uthmān Khalīl Uthmān
3. Ahmad Zandu
4. Sulaymān at-Tamāwī
5. Abd al-Azīz Higazi
6. Shākīr Abu Karam (*Ahram*, 17 Nov)

*Central Committee for LG.* All of its members are Central Ministers (see *Ahram*, 12 Sept).

*Regional Committee for LG.* All of its members are Executive Ministers (see *Ahram*, 12 Sept).

### Governors and Directors of Security

About half of the newly appointed Governors were former army officers. All the Directors of Security were police officers with the rank of Liwā (Major-General). Earlier, it had been reported that generally the posts of Governor would go to Presidents of the NU governorate Exec Coms and the posts of Director of Security to former Governors and Mudirs. (*Ahram*, 12 May)

<i>Governorate</i>	<i>Governor</i>	<i>Biographical Details</i>	<i>Director of Security</i>
Cairo	Salāh ad-Dasūqi	Army officer, Major, Secretary of the Central Government	Abd al-Hamīd Khayrat Abd ar-Rāziq
Alexandria	Saddīq Abd al-Latif	Hakīmdār (Director of Security) of Alexandria	Abd as-Salām Khafāgi
Port Sa'id	Imād ad-Dīn Ibrahīm Rushdi	Mayor of Port Fu'ad	Ahmad Fathi Ragab
Ismailiya	Hasan Abd al-Latif	Army officer, Lt.-Gen. Commander of Canal Zone	Mustafa Salfm al-Badan
Suez	Mahmūd Ta'at	Police officer, Maj.-Gen.; Governor of Suez	Abd al-Hamīd Fu'ad
Al-Qalyubiya	Abd al-Hafiz Abu Ghanimah	Police officer, Maj.-Gen., Hakīmdār of Kalyubiya	Muhammad Sādiq al-Kurdi Hatūt
Ash-Sharqiya	Abd al-Azīz Ali	Deputy Director for Security Affairs in Ministry of Interior	Muhammad Labīb Nūhi
Ad-Daqhaliya	Isma'il Farid	Army officer, Lt.-Col.; Military Attaché in Prague	Abdullah Muhammad Ghabārah
Damietta	Muhammad Hamdi Ashur	Army officer, Lt.-Col., SG of the Palace of the Republic	Muhammad Abd al-Bāri Ibrahīm
Al-Manufiya	Muhammad Amin Mutawalli Mūsa	Lecturer in Faculty of Humanities (Cairo University) SG of General Council of Universities	Munīr Muhammad Sālih
Al-Gharbiya	Umar Muhammad Sa'afan	Jurist, President of the Libyan Court of Appeals	Abd al-Azīz Dasūqi
Kafar ash-Shaykh	Ahmad Ubayd	Army officer, Col., member of NA	Muhammad Mukhtār al-Matbūli
Al-Buhayra	Muhammad Wajih Tawfiq Abāzah	Former Air Force officer. Member of board of directors of at-Tahrīr publishing house, President of NU of Sharkiya province	Tāha Muhammad Zaghlūl
Al-Giza	Muhammad Ahmad al-Baltagi	Army officer, Lt.-Col., Director of Office for Presidential Affairs	Abd al-Latif Mahmūd Sharīf
Al-Fayum	Muhi ad-Dīn Ahmad Abu al-Izz	Army officer, Major, Director of President's Office for Internal Affairs, member of NA	Muhammad Mahmūd Jawdat

## LOCAL GOVERNMENT

<i>Governorate</i>	<i>Governor</i>	<i>Biographical Details</i>	<i>Director of Security</i>
Bani-Suef	Abd al-Muhsin Abu an-Nūr	Army officer, Maj.-Gen., Deputy Commander of UAR First Army	Muhammad Abd ar-Rahmān Tal'at
Al-Minya	Abd al-Fattāh Ali Hasan Fu'ād	Army officer, Maj.-Gen., Commander of National Guard	Muhammad al-Hādī Diyāb
Asyut	Isām ad-Din Muhammad Hasūnah		Ahmad Ra'fat an-Nahhās
Sawhaj	Ahmad Khurshīd	Director of Security in Port Sa'id	Mahmūd Riyād
Qina	Abd ar-Ra'uf Asim	Police officer, Maj.-Gen., Director General of Prisons	Hasan Abu as-Sa'ūd
Aswan	Muhammad Sa'ad ad-Din Zāid	Army officer, Lt.-Col., Military Attaché in Khartoum, Sec to Executive Council of Southern R	Zakariya Abd al-Fattāh Fahmi

(Source: *Ahram*, 12 Sept. The biographical details are supplied by the editor.)

## SYRIAN REGION

### THE BA'ATH PARTY

(*Hizb al-Ba'ath al-Arabi al-Ishtirāki*)

**Background Note.** The Ba'ath leaders, who were the main supporters of the Egyptian-Syrian union, took part in its government following the establishment of the UAR, hoping to become the only local political force in Syria.

When the political parties were disbanded in Mar 1958 the Ba'ath Party officially ceased to exist, but it continued to function; in fact, it flourished, partly because many of its members held key positions in the administration and protected its interests.

Before long, however, disappointment with the union began to grow, and the Ba'ath, as the chief initiator of the union, began to lose public favour. Its members' behaviour while in office was also a contributory factor.

The Egyptians were also interested in the weakening of the party, firstly because, as an independent political force, it was an obstacle to the centralization of power, and secondly, because the Egyptians were interested in gaining the collaboration of right-wing elements with an eye to the establishment of the NU.

The party was further weakened by internal dissensions, mainly because of its relations with the Egyptians.

A general convention of the party leadership took place in Beirut between 27 Aug-1 Sept 1959 with the participation of delegates from all Arab countries where branches existed. The convention approved the cessation of the party's activity in the UAR and cooperation with the Government of the UAR. A new National Command (*Al-Qiyādah al-Qawmiyah*) was elected but no names were published. At the same time Abdullah ar-Rimāwi, SG of the party in Jordan and member of the National Command, was deprived of his posts and summoned before the latter for interrogation. A spokesman for the National Command stated that the party had decided to purge opportunistic elements; it had deposed Rimāwi because of his attempts to disrupt the party and his refusal to appear before the leadership for an investigation of the grave charges against him. (There were rumours of financial irregularities.)

On 6 Sept 1959 Rimāwi and Abu Gharbiyah, a leader of the Jordanian branch who lived in exile in Damascus, issued a statement declaring the resolutions of the party convention null and void and denying the charges levelled at Rimāwi.

The deterioration of the party's power became appa-

rent in the elections to the NU in June 1959, when not more than 200 out of 9,445 elected representatives were Ba'ath members.

The first of the Ba'athist Ministers to be relieved was Riyād al-Māliki, the Minister of Culture and National Guidance of the Syrian Executive Council, on 14 Sept 1959. (*Ayyam*, 15, 16 Sept 1959)

The appointment of Field-Marshal Abd al-Hakim Amer as Abdel-Nasser's representative in the Syrian R in Oct 1959 caused a further deterioration in the Ba'ath's relations with the central government, as the centralization of authority in Amer's hands deprived its Ministers of any real power.

**The Rift Between the Party and the UAR Government.** Following the resignation of the Ba'ath Ministers in Dec 1959-Jan 1960 (see above) there were several reports indicating opposition to the Government on its part.

According to a [pro-UAR] Lebanese paper, Akram Hurāni did not visit Abdel-Nasser during the latter's visit to Hama, Hurāni's home town, in Feb. This was a disappointment to those who had thought that Hurāni put Arab nationalism before party interests, the paper said. (*Hawadith*, 25 Feb)

Abdullah Rimāwi sent congratulation to Abdel-Nasser on the anniversary of the UAR (*Masa'*, Cairo, 23 Feb) [Apparently, no Ba'ath Party branches sent such congratulations.] In Lebanon, party members organized celebrations but refrained from displaying pictures of Abdel-Nasser. (*Nahar*, Beirut, 27 Feb)

In Apr it was reported that the entry into Syria of *as-Sahāfah*, the Lebanese Ba'ath organ, had been forbidden. (*Bina'*, Beirut, 21 Apr)

In Apr a [pro-UAR] Beirut paper alleged that Michel Aflaq, the Ba'ath leader, was paid by King Hussein and the British, and was working against the UAR. (*Beirut*, *al-Masa'*, 29 Apr) A spokesman for the party denied the accusation. (*Sahāfah*, 5 May)

A rift in the party branch in Tripoli [the centre of the party's power in Lebanon] on the question of the attitude to Abdel-Nasser was reported in Apr. (*Hayat*, 22 Apr)

**May: Rimāwi Establishes Rival National Command in Damascus.** At the beginning of May a spokesman for the Ba'ath National Command warned that an attempt

to employ Rimāwī and his collaborators against the party was bound to fail ignominiously. (*Sahāfah*, 5 May)

On 19 May the Rimāwī group declared, in a statement issued in Damascus, that a convention of branch representatives from all the Arab countries except the UAR had appointed a temporary command consisting of Rimāwī, Abu Gharbiyah, Sulaymān al-Hādī, Shaykhūn Habūsi and Hāfiz Abd al-Hādī [all exiled Jordanians in Damascus]. (*Nasr*, 19 May)

In Aug the Rimāwī group announced in Damascus that a second party convention had decided to formulate a new party programme, and that a new "National Revolutionary Command had been elected." No names were published. (*Hayat*, 23 Aug)

On 28 Aug the Rimāwī group published a policy statement declaring the UAR the fortress of Arab nationalism, denouncing King Hussein, Qassim and Mahdāwī of Iraq, and Bourghiba of Tunisia as enemies of Arab nationalism, and expressing support for the UAR's policies. (*Orient*, 29 Aug)

**Aug-Oct: Syrian Ba'ath Leaders in Lebanon(?)**. In Aug it was reported that Akram Hurāni, Salāh ad-Dīn al-Bitār and Michel Aflaq had come to Lebanon and that the first two had asked for political asylum. The Lebanese and Syrian authorities had denied that Hurāni had gone to Lebanon. (*Monde*, 5 Aug; *Hawl al-Alam*, 18 Aug; *Hayat*, 20 Aug) Another report said that Hurāni and Bitār had gone to Lebanon in secret and met a Syrian Communist leader who was plotting to overthrow the regime in Syria (see below: Subversive Activities).

*As-Sahāfah* denied that the leaders had asked for asylum and said they had the same right as anyone else to visit Lebanon; these rumours had been spread in order to cause difficulties between the Lebanese Government and the Ba'ath leaders. The paper added that on resigning from the government the Ba'ath leaders had stated that this had not been caused by any differences whatsoever, and that they would continue to support the UAR in every way. (*Sahāfah*, 8 Aug)

In Oct it was reported that Hurāni had come to Lebanon for a medical examination. On 4 Oct, the Lebanese authorities denied that he had asked for political asylum. (*Hayat*, 5 Oct)

### THE NATIONAL SOCIAL PARTY

(*Al-Hizb al-Qawmi al-Ijtimā'i*)

[This party is better known by its former name, the Syrian Nationalist (or Popular) Party—*Al-Hizb al-Qawmi as-Suri*. Its central idea is the existence of a Syrian nation populating the territory of Syria, Jordan, Israel and Iraq, which should be united in a single Syrian state. The party is anti-Nasser. Its stronghold is Lebanon, where it played a considerable role in fighting the Muslim pro-UAR insurgents in 1958. It was outlawed in Syria in May 1955.]

During his visit to Syria in Feb-Mar, Abdel-Nasser attacked the party as imperialist agents (see p 501). Denunciations of the party appeared also in the UAR Press. A Cairo paper published a copy of "an original document" proving that it had plotted in 1957 to overthrow the regime in Syria with American aid. (*Gumhuriyah*, 8 Mar)

In Sept it was reported that a man held in Lebanon for planting a bomb in the UAR embassy in Beirut was a member of the party. This the party in Lebanon officially denied. (*Jaridah*, 20 Sept; *Nida'*, 23 Sept)

### THE SYRIAN COMMUNIST PARTY

[The Syrian Communist Party went underground following UAR Government action against it in the autumn of 1958, when Khālīd Bakdāsh, its leader, left the country.]

At the beginning of 1960 a number of personal statements were published in the Syrian Press declaring that the person concerned had no party ties—especially not with the Communist Party—and expressing support for Abdel-Nasser. [The text of the statements seemed standardized.] (*Ayyam*, 1, 21, 23, 28 Jan; 29 Feb, 10, 11 Mar)

Rafiq Rida, said to be a former member of the Central Committee of the Syrian CP, published anti-Communist articles in a Damascus daily in Jan. (*Ayyam*, 6, 23 Jan)

During his visits to Syria (as well as on other occasions) Abdel-Nasser denounced the Syrian Communists as foreign agents and traitors to Arab nationalism whom the people had cast out. He attacked Sofia as the centre of the Arab Communists, as did the UAR Press (see p 86).

**Communist Calls to Revolt.** Communist opposition to Abdel-Nasser and the continued existence of the Egyptian-Syrian union found expression in international Communist publications.

In the spring Khālīd Bakdāsh published an attack on Abdel-Nasser in an American Communist periodical, and called for the formation of a united national front to save Syria from his dictatorship and from chaos.

A CP appeal denouncing "Egyptian rule" in Syria and calling on the Syrians to fight it appeared in the *World Marxist Review* in Aug. It was said to have appeared in the "underground organ of the Syrian CP *Nidāl ash-Sha'ab*," and been distributed in Syria. The authorities were reported to have failed to arrest the distributors and therefore started a wave of terror (see p 81.)

**Anti-UAR Activities by Syrian Communists in Lebanon.** There were a number of reports on activities by Syrian Communists in Lebanon.

In Jan a Syrian Communist of Armenian extraction was arrested in Lebanon, where he had been distributing anti-UAR literature. (*Hayat*, 30 Jan)

In Aug it was reported that a Communist group plotting to overthrow the regime in Syria had been uncovered in Lebanon; they had also been in contact with the Syrian Ba'ath leaders (see below: Subversive Activities).

In Dec the Lebanese security authorities uncovered a "dangerous Communist cell" headed by a Syrian student, who had been active among Syrian and Jordanian political refugees and had been in contact with an "important" Arab Communist in East Germany by the name of Abu Abbās al-Gazā'iri. (*Jaridah*, 21 Dec)

### CHANGES IN SYRIAN REPRESENTATION IN GOVERNMENT

(See also List of Government, pp 475-8)

**Dec 1959-Jan: Resignation of Ba'ath Ministers.** (For background see above, The Ba'ath Party.) On 30 Dec 1959 the resignation of the following Ba'ath Ministers was officially announced: Akram Hurāni, UAR Vice-President and Minister of Justice; Salāh ad-Dīn al-Bitār, Minister of Culture and National Guidance (in the Central Government); Mustafa Hamdūn, Minister of Agrarian Reform, and Abd al-Ghani Qanūt, Minister of Social Affairs and Work (in the Northern R Executive Council). Their resignations were accepted by Abdel-



Nasser on 25 Dec 1959, during their stay in Cairo. (*Ahram*, 31 Dec) The five returned to Damascus. (*Hayat*, 5 Jan)

Several days later, on 3 Jan, another Ba'athist, Khalil al-Kallās, Minister of Economy in the Northern R Executive Council, was relieved of his post. It was reported that he had tendered his resignation together with the other Ba'ath Ministers, but publication of its acceptance was delayed owing to the discovery of irregularities in his Ministry. (*Hayat*, 1, 5 Jan; *Ayyam*, 4 Jan)

**New Appointments.** The posts of Syrians in the Central Government remained vacant. In the Northern R Executive Council, Abd al-Hamid as-Sarrāj was temporarily appointed Minister of Social Affairs and Work. (He was then in charge of the Ministries of the Interior and of Waqfs.) Mustafa Hamdūn's portfolio was given to Colonel Tu'mah al-Awdat Allah, then Minister of Municipal and Rural Affairs. (*Ahram*, 1 Jan) Khalil al-Kallās's portfolio remained vacant.

The control of economic affairs was transferred to Amer, who immediately summoned to Syria Dr Abd al-Mun'im al-Qaysūni, Central Minister of Economy, to consult with him on acute economic problems. (*Hayat*, 10 Jan, 13 Feb)

**Jan: Students' Unrest in Damascus.** On 1 Jan one student was killed and another seriously injured in a violent clash at Damascus University, attributed to the resignation of the Ba'ath Ministers. (*Bilad*, *Baghdad*, 2 Jan; *Orient*, 4 Jan) A Syrian source reported that the clash grew out of a discussion on literature. (*Ayyam*, 4 Jan) On 12 Jan further outbreaks occurred, in which 15 persons were injured. (*Jaridah*; *Orient*, 13 Jan)

**Comments on the Resignations.** *Al-Hayāt* said that the resignations were a result of: (a) The pruning of the Ba'ath Ministers' authority following the arrival of Amer, and their belief that to continue in office in such circumstances would seriously damage their reputation in the eyes of the Syrian public; (b) the slowing down by Amer of the agrarian reform project in order to gain the support of right-wing elements was regarded by the Ba'ath as a blow to their socialist principles; (c) the Ba'ath opposed Abdel-Nasser's conciliatory policy in inter-Arab relations. (*Hayat*, 31 Dec 1959, 1 Jan 1960)

**Mar: Nomination to Northern Region Executive Council.** The appointments to the vacant Ministries were officially announced two and a half months after the resignation of the Ba'ath Ministers.

After consultations which lasted up to the morning of the day of appointment and meetings with Shukri al-Kuwatly and Sabri al-Asali (last Syrian Premier before the unification with Egypt and former UAR Vice-President), Abdel-Nasser nominated seven Ministers to the Northern R Executive Council. (*Hayat*, 18, 19 Mar; *Ahram*, 19 Mar) Two new portfolios were added: Ministry of State for Presidential Affairs and Ministry of Supply, one Minister was nominated to the portfolio of Waqfs, which was then under as-Sarrāj, and four Ministers were nominated to the Syrian Executive Council Ministries vacated by the Ba'ath leaders.

The new Ministers were: (1) Dr Husni as-Sawwāf—Economy (at first Dr Izzāt at-Tarābulsi was nominated to this post, but he declined on the grounds that his position as President of the Administrative Council of the Bank of Credit (*al-Bank al-Masrafi*) was more important at the time) (*Hayat*, 19 Mar); (2) Yūsuf Muzā-

him—Waqfs; (3) Colonel Jādu Izz ad-Dīn—Minister of State for Presidential Affairs; (4) Colonel Ahmad al-Hunaydi—Agrarian Reform; (5) Colonel Akram Dirī—Social Affairs and Work; (6) Colonel Jamāl as-Sūfi—Supply; (7) Thābit al-Arīs—Culture and National Guidance.

The posts of Hurāni and Bitār in the Central Government remained vacant.

On 20 Mar the new Ministers took over their offices. (*Ahram*, 29 Mar) They told their subordinates that they would take no action against officials who had belonged to certain political parties. The Agrarian Reform Minister, Ahmad al-Hunaydi, said that certain biased persons had recently spread rumours that the new Minister would punish certain people and harass others, but, he declared, the career of an employee depended on the performance of his duties at present and in the future, not on his past. Akram Dirī and Jādu Izz ad-Dīn made similar statements to their staffs. (*ANA*, 22 Mar—*BBC*, 24 Mar)

**Comments on Appointments.** All the new Ministers were army officers or civil servants. The officers were all graduates of the Damascus Military College who had studied in France and fought in the Palestine War. (*Ahram*, 19 Mar)

In Cairo it was explained that these appointments were an expression of the policy of utilizing the younger non-party elements after it had become apparent that the former Ministers had been unable to sever their party ties. (*Akhbar*, 19 Mar)

At one stage it was suggested, *The Times* wrote, that after dropping the Ba'athist left-wing, Abdel-Nasser would cooperate with veteran right-wing politicians, and had put out feelers to them; but later it was said that he would avoid such an embarrassing shift by appointing technicians with no party background. (*Times*, 19 Mar)

**Feb–May: Resignations of Ahmad Abd al-Karim and Amin an-Nafūri.** In Feb it was rumoured that three other Syrians had resigned from the UAR Central Government: Dr. Fākhīr al-Kayālī, Minister of State, a former member of the National Party (*Al-Hizb al-Watani*); Major Amin an-Nafūri, Minister of Communications, and Colonel Ahmad Abd al-Karim, Minister of Municipal and Rural Affairs, both former supporters of ex-President Shishakli's Liberation Movement. These rumours were denied in Damascus. (*Falastin*, 5 Feb)

According to *The Times*, these Ministers wanted to resign at the time several Ba'athists wanted to leave the government, but the Ba'athists, who were discontented for different reasons, declined to be associated with them. (*Times*, 6 Feb)

On 1 May the Cairo Press still mentioned Abd al-Karim and an-Nafūri as Ministers (*Ahram*, 1 May) [*The Times* had reported on 6 Feb that the Cairo and Damascus newspapers no longer mentioned the three men]. A day later, however, Abdel-Nasser confirmed their resignations. (*Ahram*, 3 May) Al-Kayālī, however, remained in charge of his office until Sept, when he was given charge of another office (see below).

**Comments on the Resignations.** Press reports alleged that the two Ministers had contacted the American intelligence with a proposal to work for the liquidation of the union. (*Jaridah*, 10 May; *Nida'*, 11 May)

A British paper said that the two Ministers had not been brought to trial on this count because of Abdel-Nasser's reluctance to create yet another crisis with the

US so soon after the shipping boycott incident, or to antagonize still further other officers and Ministers who belonged to the Nafuri-Karim group. (*Sunday Times*, 15 May)

**July: Nūr ad-Dīn Kahālāh Nominated UAR Vice-President.** On 19 July it was announced that Nūr ad-Dīn Kahālāh (Syrian), President of the Northern R Executive Council and Minister of Planning, had been appointed UAR Vice-President in place of Akram Hurāni (the two other Vice-Presidents were Abd al-Hakīm Amer and Abd al-Latif al-Baghdādī (Egyptians).) He accordingly ceased to be President of the Northern R Executive Council. (*Ahram*, 19 July) [The appointment of Kahālāh was announced without comment.]

**June-Aug: Resignation of Bashīr al-Azamah.** On 12 June a report appeared that Dr Bashīr al-Azamah, Minister of Health in the UAR Central Government, had resigned. (*Nida'*, 12 June) His resignation was officially confirmed by Abdel-Nasser on 17 Aug. (*Ahram*, 18 Aug)

**Sept: Reshuffle of Syrian Central and Executive Ministers.** On 20 Sept, before he left for New York to attend the UN General Assembly, Abdel-Nasser announced a reshuffle of the UAR Central Government and the Syrian Executive Council. No new Ministers were added and there were no resignations. The appointment which aroused the most comment was that of as-Sarrāj to the Presidency of the Syrian Executive Council.

**Syrian Ministers appointed to Central Government:** (1) Nur ad-Dīn Kahālāh—Planning (he continued as UAR Vice-President); (2) Tu'mah al-Awdat Allah—Municipal and Rural Affairs; (3) Muhammad al-Alim—Communications; (4) Thābit al-Aris—Culture and National Guidance (the last three continued to hold the equivalent portfolios in the Northern R Executive Council); (5) Fakhir al-Kayālī—Justice (formerly Minister of State).

**Appointments to the Syrian Executive Council:** (1) Abd al-Hamid as-Sarrāj—President and Minister of State (he continued as Minister of the Interior); (2) Jadu Izz ad-Dīn—Public Works [in Mar he was nominated Minister of State for Presidential Affairs.] (*Ahram*, 21 Sept)

Ministers serving on both the Central Government and the Syrian Executive Council would permanently reside in Damascus but would go to Cairo to attend to the affairs of their Ministries and participate in the ministerial committees of the Central Government. (*Ahram*, 25 Sept)

**Comments on the Reshuffle.** *The Financial Times* commented that the changes suggested that Abdel-Nasser wished to strengthen Syrian participation in the government of the two Regions, which had been dangerously depleted since the resignation of the Ba'ath Ministers. This opinion was shared by *The New York Times*. The enlargement of as-Sarrāj's responsibilities in the Syrian Executive Council was especially emphasized. *The Financial Times* commented that Abdel-Nasser "probably feels the need for a Syrian strong man controlling Syrian affairs during a period of acute Syrian-Jordanian tension" [a reference to the assassination of PM Majālī of Jordan and its aftermath—see pp 151 ff, 504-6]. (*NYT*, 21 Sept; *Financial Times*, 22 Sept) Another comment regarded this development as a sign that "Syria today retains a strong measure of independence and local autonomy, and apparently... Abdel-Nasser has recognized this as inevitable. But he did so reluctantly, after a last

attempt this year to strengthen Cairo's hand in the region came to nought." (*NYHT*, 22 Nov) According to *The Economist*, Abdel-Nasser's act pointed to the fact that he had confidence in as-Sarrāj, and that a considerable measure of *de facto* autonomy was enjoyed by the half-dozen young officers led by him. (*Economist*, 15 Oct)

*Al-Jaridah* commented that as-Sarrāj's real achievement lay not in his appointment to the Presidency of the Syrian Executive Council, the value of which was only symbolic, but in the fact that he continued as Minister of the Interior, and as such continued to control the security services. The paper claimed that ever since Amer's arrival in the Northern R in Oct 1959 there had been a continuous struggle for power between him and as-Sarrāj. The latter, however, had gained the upper hand because Abdel-Nasser had decided to use his services in suppressing the growing opposition in Syria. (*Jaridah*, 22 Sept)

## FEB-MAR: PRESIDENT ABDEL-NASSER IN SYRIA

The seat of the President of the UAR is in Cairo. Before 1960, he visited the Syrian R twice, in Feb 1958 and Feb 1959.

His third visit lasted from 14 Feb to 19 Mar 1960, the first ten days being dedicated to a tour of the Region. From 25 Feb he stayed in Damascus.

**Feb: The Tour.** Abdel-Nasser's tour included: the Jazira and the Euphrates province (Kamishly—15 Feb; Hasake—15 Feb; Deir ez-Zor—16 Feb), where this was his first visit; Aleppo—17-19 Feb; the Central Plain (Hama—20 Feb; Homs—21 Feb); Damascus—22-23 Feb; the Hauran—(Der'a, 24 Feb) and the Jabal ad-Druze (Suweida—25 Feb). His entourage included Abd al-Hakīm Amer, Abd al-Hamid as-Sarrāj, Nūr ad-Dīn Kahālāh, Ali Sabri and General Jamāl Faisal, Chief of Staff First Army.

The routine of the tour included speeches at public rallies and other occasions, sometimes several a day, meetings with the local NU bodies, and appearances at public functions, mainly the dedication of new buildings and institutions, the laying of cornerstones, etc. In Aleppo, for instance, he dedicated the building of the Physicians' Association, laid the cornerstones for a youth centre and a Carmelite convent, attended the inauguration of work on the Aleppo-Latakia railway, and personally distributed ownership certificates of a popular housing project. (*Ahram* 18, 19, 20 Feb) In Damascus he personally distributed ownership certificates in the framework of the agrarian reform. (*Ahram*, 24 Feb)

**The Welcome.** The UAR Press said that Abdel-Nasser received a rousing welcome everywhere, and described the enthusiasm of the people as a spontaneous public referendum in support of the union. (*Akhbar al-Yaum*, 20 Feb; also *Ahram*; *Ayyam*, 18 Feb and others) A foreign correspondent in Beirut described Abdel-Nasser's tour of the provinces as "triumphant." Jordanian and Iraqi sources, on the other hand, alleged that anti-Nasser demonstrations had taken place in various localities. (*Hawl al-Alam*, Jordan, 18 Feb; *R. Baghdad*, 24 Feb-*IMB*, 26 Feb; *Glasgow Herald*, 21 Mar)

Placards carried by demonstrators welcoming Abdel-Nasser described him as "Leader of the Awakening," "Commander of the Union" and "Liberator of Palestine." There were also political slogans, such as: "From the Indian Ocean to the Atlantic," "We want an Arab Union, neither Eastern nor Western but Positive, and

Communism Shall Perish." (*Ahram* 15, 16, 23 Feb; *Ayyam*, 22 Feb)

**Abdel-Nasser Praised as Son of the People and the Salāh ad-Dīn of Modern Times.** Members of Abdel-Nasser's entourage who appeared with him at the public rallies dedicated a considerable part of their speeches to praising the leader. Amer emphasized that he was a son of the people and closely attached to it. Abdel-Nasser, he said, forgave those who had injured him personally, but never those who injured the people; the people were the blood which flowed in Abdel-Nasser's veins; all the sons of the people were his brothers, his sons; Abdel-Nasser's face was the most beautiful in the world because it was the face of the people, etc. (*Ahram*, 16, 18, 19 Feb, etc.)

Jamal Faisal compared Abdel-Nasser to Khālīd Ibn al-Walīd [conqueror of Syria and Palestine in 634-35], Nūr ad-Dīn [who conquered Damascus in 1154, created a single state in Syria, and was famous as an opponent of the Crusaders], and Salāh ad-Dīn [founder of the Ayyubid dynasty in Egypt, who united Syria with Egypt; he was the most famous adversary of the Crusaders, whose Kingdom of Jerusalem he destroyed at the battle of Hittin, and controlled a large part of what are now the Arab countries of the ME].

**Abdel-Nasser's Speeches:** Following are the main themes in Abdel-Nasser's speeches during his visit to Syria.

Strongly worded attacks on "The Enemy of Arab Nationalism," i.e. the West, Western Imperialism, Iraq, Jordan and Israel, took up a large part of the speeches (see UAR Views and Policies on international relations). "Die in your fury and say what you will, for the Arab Revolution will continue its sacred march," he declared, apostrophizing his adversaries.

All the speeches were full of compliments to the people, whose "countenances show strength, determination, hope and faith." He depicted them as the source of the "motive power" which had brought about the union, provided the basis of the drive for the realization of the democratic-socialist-cooperative society and given him inspiration and strength to go on with his task of leadership.

These general compliments were amplified by references to Syria as "the heart of Arabism" and special mention of local history, such as the Druze initiative in the uprising against the French in 1925 or the prominent part played in it by the inhabitants of Hama.

The UAR was presented as embodying the aspirations of the Arab nation, and its people and the army as the "pioneers in the sacred march" (*tafi'at az-sahf al-Muqaddas*) of Arab nationalism, which was gloriously led in the past by the "Arab" leaders of Syria and Egypt: Nūr ad-Dīn, Salāh ad-Dīn and Baybars, who had united the nation and conquered the enemy.

Promises were also given of speedy and large-scale development for Syria as a whole and the various provinces in particular (see also below—Decrees).

**Abdel-Nasser on the Political Situation and the Parties.** A recurrent theme was the organization of the NU as an expression of the unity of the people, a means to preserve this unity in the face of attempts by foreign powers and their local collaborators to sow dissension, and a method of institutionalizing truly democratic processes of government. The political parties, on the other hand, were represented as divisive forces serving special, mainly foreign, interests; they were usually associated

with foreign agents, traitors, etc. The Syrian Nationalists (*Al-Hizb al-Qawmi al-Ijtima'i*) and the Communists were singled out for special mention in this context.

[The following passage, from Abdel-Nasser's speech at a NU conference in Damascus on 4 Mar, may be understood, however, as referring mainly to the Ba'ath party]: "We all know how the NU was fought in this region, and temporarily prevented from standing on its own feet. There were attempts to stop the formation of the NU. The intention behind these attempts was to allow partisanship to continue functioning for the benefit of certain people who had already declared that they had decided to dissolve partisanship and their parties. They saw in the NU a disaster which would destroy individualism and opportunism."

"Matters were then suspended; for I have always endeavoured to bring this people together, in all their groups—men and women..."

"I thought I would be able to form the National Assembly this month; but I also thought that the NU would have been established before this month. The National Assembly cannot be formed before the NU is formed... We must organize the NU during the next few weeks. And when that is completed we shall turn to forming the National Assembly... and thus we shall consolidate the union. There will not be an Egyptian Assembly and a Syrian Assembly, but an Arab Assembly... which represents this people." (*Eg. Gaz.*, 15-26 Feb; 4, 5, 8 Mar; see also BBC during the period; *Ahram*, 5 Mar-BBC, 7 Mar)

**Feb-Mar: Abdel-Nasser in Damascus.** From 25 Feb until he left for Cairo on 19 Mar, Abdel-Nasser stayed in Damascus, wide publicity being given to his activities. He visited the city and its environs, received delegations—including Muslim and Christian clergy, Alawi notables, and members of the NU and of women's organizations—dealt with requests and suggestions from the public, published a series of decrees, and appointed new Ministers to the Syrian R Executive Council. (*Ayyam*, 10, 11, 13, 16 Mar)

During his tour Abdel-Nasser had received various requests and suggestions from the public and the local NU institutions, and during his stay in Damascus he ordered that these should be submitted to him day by day and be dealt with immediately. (*Ahram*, 20 Feb) He convened the Executive Council, according to the Press, in order to deal with these requests, and the decrees he issued were said to have been the consequence. (*Ahram*, 3, 9, 10, 12 Mar; *Ayyam*, 7, 13 Mar)

**Presidential Decrees.** The following were among the decrees issued: The Agricultural Bank was enjoined to foster village industries. A five-year plan was issued to ensure a sufficient number of physicians for the government hospitals, and another for the development of the universities of Damascus and Aleppo. (*Ayyam*, 18 Mar) The Ministry of Social Affairs was ordered to deal with the problem of persons affected by tuberculosis and to devise means to support their families if needed. (*Ahram*, 7 Mar) On 13 Mar Sarrāj published details of 94 decrees concerning requests made by the public in the various provinces. Some days later Abdel-Nasser decreed that LS1.5 million of the Syrian budget be allocated to the various projects in the provinces. (*Ahram*, 17, 18 Mar; *Nasr*, 18 Mar)

There were decrees on the appointment and wages of civil servants. The Arab Refugee Institution was allo-



cated LS25,000. The Ministry of Finance was ordered to guarantee a loan of LS10 million for the Housing Institution of the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labour. (For these and other decrees, see *Ayyam*, 8, 16-18 Mar)

Regarding economic affairs, Abdel-Nasser discussed with the Syrian Ministers the five-year development plan for the region. During his visit a special budget of over LS15 million for development projects in the Region was published. The most important decree in this field concerned the establishment of the Economic Organization in the Region on 16 Mar. (See p 465; *Ahram* 3, 9, 11, 21 Mar)

Abdel-Nasser's last action during this visit was to make appointments to the Ministries vacated by the resignation of the Ba'ath leaders (see above.)

**Evaluation of Results.** *Al-Ahrām* emphasized the economic aspects of the visit, saying that Abdel-Nasser had studied the conditions of the Syrian R and himself supervised the devising of the general outlines of the social and economic development plans. (*Ahram*, 19 Mar)

A foreign observer, commenting on the economic plans and the setting up of the Economic Organization, which were represented as the tangible results of the visit, said: "These plans require that the fabric of the state be strengthened by more reliable cement than simple loyalty to the person of President Nasser." Abdel-Nasser's central problem in the Syrian R, namely the problem of giving a concrete constitutional and practical basis to the union remained unsolved, the observer continued, referring to the postponement of the creation of the National Assembly because of the lack of interest shown by the Syrians in the organization of the NU. (*Glasgow Herald*, 21 Mar)

### TRADE UNIONS

**Background Note.** Until the establishment of the UAR there were three TU federations in Syria:

(1) The General Federation of TUs in Syria (*Al-Ittihad al-Amm lil-Niqabat al-Ummāl Fi Suriyah*); (2) The Federation of the United TUs of Syrian Workers (*Ittihad an-Niqabat al-Muttahidah lil-Ummal as-Suriyin*); (3) The Progressive Federation of Syrian Workers (*Al-Ittihad at-Taqaddumi lil-Ummāl as-Suriyin*).

In the first there was a measure of Ba'athist influence, while Communist influence was predominant in the latter. During the purge of the Communists from Syrian political life in 1958/59, the two latter federations were abolished. Ba'athist elements were purged from the first in 1959, but it continued to exist during 1960. Its president was Khālid Hakīm.

On 7 Apr 1959 a new Unified Labour Law came into force in the UAR. While giving the workers more protection and providing for additional social benefits, it tightened government control over the workers and the unions, and in effect outlawed strikes. It provided for the reorganization of the TUs as prescribed in the Law or according to decrees to be issued by the government, which was also to decide which trades would be organized into a single general TU, of which there would be no more than one in each Region. The general TU would have provincial branches and workers' committees in factories, offices, etc. with 50 workers and over. The general TUs would form a federation in each Region, and the regional federations would form the General Federation of the UAR. (*Al-Jaridah ar-Rasmiyah*, 7 Apr 1959)

Following the publication of the Law, the UAR au-

thorities issued a series of decrees for its implementation during 1959/60.

**June-Dec: The Reorganization.** On 9 June Abd al-Hakim Amer published a decree on the implementation of the Unified Labour Law of 1959 in the Syrian R.

The Minister of Social Affairs and Labour stated that the Law would apply to all workers employed under labour agreements—written or oral—in trade and industry; while the Agricultural Relations Law of Sept 1958 would apply to agricultural workers. He said that the reorganization would have to be carried out within five months. (*Ahram* 2, 10 June; *Ayyam* 10 June)

An official source in the Ministry announced that every worker belonging to a TU, or wishing to join one, must apply to the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labour, which would forward his application to the TU concerned. If the latter turned it down, it would be considered by a special committee, whose decision would be final. The committee would consist of a representative each of the TU, the NU and the General Trades Authority (*Al-Hay'ah al-Ammah lil-Mihnah*), the latter to be chosen by the other two, with a representative of the Ministry as legal advisor. (*Ayyam*, 22 Aug)

An official source announced that the reorganization would be carried out in four phases:

1. A factory, office, etc. employing 50 workers would elect a council (*majlis idārah*), which would send two of its members to the general meeting of the provincial branch of the union concerned (*al-Jam'iyah al-Ammah lil-Niqabah al-Far'iyah*).
2. A provincial branch would elect an eleven-man council, which would elect two representatives of the national general meeting of the union [*niqabah ammah*].
3. The general [i.e. national] union would elect a council of 22, which would send two representatives to the general meeting of "the General Federation of TUs" in the Syrian R.
4. The General Meeting of the federation would elect a council and representatives to the General TU Federation of the UAR. (*Ayyam*, 29 Aug)

On 20 Sept the elections for the workers' councils began in the provinces of Damascus, Hama, Der'a and Suweida. The elections in the provinces of Hama and Latakia, Aleppo and Deir ez-Zor were scheduled for Oct. (*Ahram*, 21 Sept)

At the end of Nov the Minister for Social Affairs and Labour announced that 160 union branches (in the provinces) and 28 general unions had already been established; the rest would be set up by the beginning of Dec. (*Gumhuriyah*, 28 Nov)

The new General Federation of Trade Unions in Syria was established in Jan 1961. Forty-two general TUs were represented at its first general meeting, which elected a council and the officials of the central bureau. Tal'at Taghlabi was elected chairman of the council and Yūsuf Amadi deputy chairman. [Amadi was the chairman of the dissolved Progressive Federation of Syrian Workers.] (*Nasr*, 10 Jan 1961)

**Jan-Aug: Criticism of Labour Law.** Sa'īd Suwās, President of the General Union of Mechanical Workers, expressed his opinion of the new law in a Press interview as follows: The law had advantages over the previous [Syrian] labour law, it gave the unions authority, eliminated control by government departments over the unions and entrusted to the courts the decision in labour conflicts between the government and the unions



The law protecting the rights of agricultural workers was also advantageous.

This did not mean, however, Suwās continued, that the new law was ideal and the answer to all the workers' demands. These were loopholes in it, some of its paragraphs were obscure, and it forbade the declaration of strikes. On the other hand, Suwās added, the State was taking a full interest in the problem of unwarranted dismissals. "We suggest that Abd al-Hamid as-Sarrāj, the Minister of Social Affairs and Labour, amend the decrees that separated unions which should have remained united and united unions which should have been left separate." These decrees, he said, had created conditions which had "destroyed the TU organization, distorted the Law, opened opportunities for exploitation and created discontent and misery among the workers." Suwās expressed the hope that the Minister would encourage a fair, conscientious and free TU organization, coordination between the TUs and other institutions in the social sphere, and the establishment of a cultural institution for workers. He hoped that the Minister would issue the necessary decrees and regulations which would warrant the workers joining the unions. (*Ayyam*, 5 Feb)

At the beginning of Jan it was reported that a meeting of TU leaders in Damascus adopted some "highly important resolutions" on the amendment of the Unified Labour Law, which were submitted to the authorities to acquaint them with the truth about the movement, its constructive aims, and the tasks of its leaders. The meeting also discussed the strengthening of ties between the two Regions of the UAR and expressed their loyalty to Abdel-Nasser and their support for Amer [who was Abdel-Nasser's special representative in Syria]. (*Ayyam*, 4 Jan)

In Aug the Ba'ath organ in Lebanon, *as-Sahāfah*, reported that at a convention of TU leaders in Damascus in Dec 1959 [the same as above?] the following demands were voiced:

(1) The right to declare legal strikes; (2) Equality in wages (?); (3) The stoppage of unwarranted dismissals; (4) Protection of union leaders; (5) Authorization of family compensation (?); (6) The raising of minimum wages by ten per cent. (*Sahāfah*, 8 Aug)

At a TU convention at Homs in Jan, with the participation of Khālid Hakīm, chairman of the General Federation of TUs, delegates expressed their support for a memorandum submitted by the federation to Abd al-Hakīm Amer concerning changes in the United Labour Law [containing the demands detailed above?], Hakīm said that Amer had ordered the appointment of a committee to study the memorandum. A decision was also adopted to take an active part in the UAR anniversary celebrations. (*Ayyam*, 28 Jan)

**Aug: Resignation of Council of the General Federation of TUs.** At the beginning of Aug the Council of the General Federation of TUs in Syria [chairman—Khālid Hakīm] tendered its resignation to the Minister for Social Affairs and Labour in the Syrian R. In a letter to Abdel-Nasser the Council explained that it had been compelled to take this step as it found itself unable to continue its legal activities on behalf of the workers' aims.

*As-Sahāfah* added that, as was known, a deadlock had been reached between the administration and the federation on the question of the independence of the TUs. The organ of the federation, *Kifāh al-Ummāl*, had written that the organization of the working classes in an

atmosphere of freedom would constitute a guarantee of workers' support for the aims of the Arab liberation movement and the UAR, would protect the progressive movement and further the UAR's economy. (*Sahāfah*, 8 Aug)

**Dec: Strike in Textile Factory.** It was reported that a strike had broken out at the end of Dec in the factory of the Sharikah al-Khumasiyah in Damascus [the largest textile corporation in Syria]. On 25 Dec a number of employed of the factory had been arrested on charges of anti-state activities. One of them was a member of the workers' committee, which had been dissolved earlier by the authorities, and replaced by a committee under the authority of the NU. The same day the employees went on strike, demonstrating in the factory grounds for the release of their fellow-workers and for the promulgation of a law defending the workers from unwarranted arrest; they also raised economic demands. The authorities did not release the detainees, but made even more arrests. The workers decided to strike until the releases were effected. In clashes between police and workers on 29 Dec, about 40 workers were injured and the number detained was estimated at 300-350. [The report does not make it clear whether the strike continued.] (*Akhbar, Lebanon*, 8 Jan 1961)

In Dec the mechanical weaving industry workers in Homs presented a petition to the President of the Syrian Executive Council including demands for the protection of the industry, such as the banning of the import of machinery before additional outlets for its products had been found. (*Nasr*, 31 Dec)

#### SEPT: RELEASE OF SYRIAN POLITICAL PRISONERS

In Sept, several days after the Cabinet reshuffle, and before Abdel-Nasser left for New York, he ordered the release of 17 Syrian political prisoners. They had been sentenced in Jan 1957 by the Syrian State Security Court, headed by Colonel Afif al-Bizri, for participating in an "Iraqi plot" in 1956, and in Dec 1957 by a Military Court headed by Colonel Jamal Feisal, for participating in an "American plot" to overthrow the regime.

Among those released were Adnān al-Atāsi, Hā'il Sarūr and Lieut.-Colonel Hussein at-Hākimi, former members of the Chamber of Deputies (who had been given death sentences, later commuted by President Shukri Kuwatli), a number of junior army officers, and others. They were released on condition that they lived only in Cairo. (*Hayat*, 30 Sept; and background information)

Earlier it was reported that these prisoners had declared a hunger strike at the beginning of 1960 and Abdel-Nasser had then decided to grant them an amnesty. (*Hayat*, 24, 25 Jan)

According to *The Times* correspondent in Beirut, observers interpreted this as a conciliatory step "aiming, on the one hand, to secure quiet in Syria in his [Abdel-Nasser's] absence, and on the other to offset any fears which might have been caused by giving Syria's strong man, Abd al-Hamid as-Sarrāj, wider powers as President of the Syrian Executive Council, especially as these men faced trial as a result of the machinations of Sarrāj's Deuxième Bureau." (*Times*, 29 Sept)

#### PRIVATE ENTERPRISE

[The policy of state intervention in the Syrian economy and indications of a further extension of this policy in 1960—especially the establishment of the Syrian Eco-

nomic Organization in Feb and the proclamation of the Five-Year-Plan in July—largely contributed to a feeling of insecurity and unrest in Syrian business circles.

This state of affairs found some expression in the Syrian and the foreign Press.]

The economic system prevailing in most Syrian enterprises, wrote a Lebanese paper in Feb, where the capital was in the hands of a single owner, or a limited partnership at best, was incompatible with the nature of the economy in the Egyptian R, which tended towards concentration of capital. The authorities, the report went on to say, were trying to promote concentration by urging industrialists to form corporations within the different branches of the economy. Their aim was to create a single corporation for every branch, the capital of which would be distributed in accordance with the contribution made by each of the participants. The government reportedly threatened to set up government companies, which would offer severe competition to private concerns, if this plan were rejected by private owners.

Economic circles in Syria reacted to this proposal with hostility, regarding it as a step towards total nationalization. Syrian industrialists greatly feared, the report continued, that government policies were making their position precarious, as in the effect of land reform on agricultural capital. (*Orient*, 12 Feb)

The Syrian economic regime in the UAR was discussed at a series of colloquiums in Damascus under the auspices of the Damascus publishing house *Centre d'Etudes et des Documentations, Damas*. The discussions were attended by Syrian business men and economists, and by Syrian and Egyptian senior government officials.

It was contended that private business must be consulted in the process of economic planning. The responsibility of carrying out the plan had to be vested in the private as well as the public sector, provided that the latter did not infringe on the activities of the former. (*EFSPA*, May)

In a further colloquy it was pointed out that while the public sector's resources were limited, private enterprise commanded almost "unlimited" sources of capital, both national and international, as well as of technology and management. It was argued that if the government fully backed public enterprise in the case of competition between the two sectors, the private sector might withdraw from national schemes and withhold investment. The duty of the state, it was argued, was to protect and assist the private sector. (*EFSPA*, July)

In a third colloquy, it was said that the question of foreign private investment was directly connected with the role of private capital in the economy, especially in Syria, where no restrictions were imposed on capital transfer. It should be understood that foreign capital had a vital contribution to make in economic development, and it should not be suspected of unfriendly interests. Only in an atmosphere of mutual trust could efficiency and profitability be realized for both sides. (*EFSPA*, Oct)

In July it was reported that Fakhri Barūdi, a former member of the Syrian Parliament, had sent a letter to Abdel-Nasser, which was also circulated among members of the Syrian Executive Council. Barūdi had stated that it was a grave mistake to try to impose a uniform economic regime on both parts of the UAR, as each of them had characteristic economic and social conditions of its own. While land reform was an acute necessity in Egypt, where a feudal regime had prevailed, conditions in Syria made it a futile mistake. The same applied

to the socialization of industry; it was valid in Egypt, where the major part of industry was "a state creation," but inconceivable in Syria, where industry was in its early stages of development and almost exclusively privately owned. For the Syrians, restriction of their freedom was a new phenomenon, he continued, unheard of even in the times of the French Mandate. (*BAPP*, 22 July)

A French source said in Dec that all the proposals for the unification of Egyptian and Syrian currency had been systematically rejected by the Syrian authorities. [No uniform currency was introduced during the year.] (*BAPP*, 2 Dec)

It was feared in Syria that nationalization in Egypt would be followed by similar measures in Syria. Vice-President Nūr ad-Dīn Kahālāh repeatedly stated that the government did not intend to carry out nationalization in Syria and would do so only in specific cases vital for the protection of the national economy. (*Eurafor Press*, 14 Dec)

#### AUG-SEPT: SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES AGAINST THE UAR SYRIAN REGION

**Aug: Reported Communist Plot Against UAR.** According to *an-Nahār*, four members of a Communist group, who were involved in a plot to overthrow the regime of the UAR (in Syria), were arrested by Lebanese security forces. The group planned to assassinate Syrian leaders, stir up dissension in the UAR First (Syrian) Army, organize sabotage, create terror, and co-operate with opposition groups, in organizing public demonstrations. (*Nahar*, 28 Aug) The head of the group was Daniel Nu'mah, also known as Jabakār Fādīl Laqmān, an advocate who was in close contact with Khālīd Bakdāsh, leader of the Syrian Communist Party. (*Nahar*, 3 Sept)

The investigation revealed, it was further reported, that in 1959 Nu'mah had organized the disturbances in Jordan against King Hussein. He had been in the USSR and in other Communist countries, where he studied the political situation in the UAR and ways to overthrow the regime in Syria, and had met senior Syrian officers, the Ba'ath party leaders, Akram al-Hurāni and Salāh ad-Dīn al-Bitār, who had come to Lebanon in secret, and other known Syrian opponents of the UAR regime. When Nu'mah learned about the arrest of his four collaborators, he escaped from Lebanon (20 Aug) to another Arab country, using a false passport supplied to him by an Arab embassy in Beirut. (*Nahar*, 21, 28 Aug, 3 Sept)

**Aug: Reported Plot of Syrian Officers and Politicians.** The Syrian authorities were reported to have discovered in Aug a plot between Syrian ex-officers living in Lebanon and Syrian politicians spending the summer season there, who had also contacted officers in Syria. An officer of the Syrian "Deuxième Bureau" was sent to Lebanon, where he joined the plotters and, while participating in their activities, uncovered their plans and names, including those of active Syrian officers. The information he gathered led to 75 arrests in Syria. (*Nahar*, 1 Sept)

**Oct: The Shishakli-Barāzi Plot.** [On the night of 25 Oct, three bombs exploded in Damascus, causing minor damage but no casualties. The security authorities arrested in Homs a Syrian from Hama, Mahmūd Muḥammad al-Bustāni, and two Jordanians, and said they had uncovered collusion between Jordan and Syrian exiles to undermine the regime in Syria (see p 154).]

At a Press conference arranged by the security authori-

ties, al-Bustāni said that Salāh ash-Shishakli (brother of the Syrian ex-President Adīb ash-Shishakli and, like him, under sentence of death in Syria) and Hāshim al-Barāzi, "a murderer sentenced to death in absentia by a Syrian court," had tried to instigate him—while he was in Lebanon—to plant explosives in Homs. They paid him LS100 in advance, and promised to pay LS1,000 for every bomb he planted in Syria, he said, and offered to send him to a Jordanian camp for training in sabotage. They said they had collaborators in Homs, Hama and Damascus. [The Shishakli and Barāzi families belong to Hama.] They asked him to plant bombs in the governorate of Damascus during a visit by Abdel-Nasser, and promised that they would help him afterwards to settle in Lebanon. They gave him a bomb to plant in Homs, which he handed to the Syrian authorities on his arrival in Hama. (*Ahram* 28, 29 Oct; *Mid. Mirror*, 29 Oct)

*Al-Ahrām* reported that documents were found in the possession of the two Jordanians, which proved the existence of two networks of espionage and sabotage, one connected with the Jordanian Court, and the other with Israel. The two were said to have stated that they went from Damascus to Lebanon and to Jordan through Israel and then returned through Lebanon to Syria to organize sabotage. (*Ahram*, 28 Oct)

**British Accused of Involvement in Plot.** UAR sources claimed that the acts of sabotage were backed by a foreign imperialist power, which coordinated the activities of the Jordanian Government and the anti-Syrian forces in Lebanon, as a part of the imperialist campaign against Arab nationalism. (*Ahram*, 28 Oct, 1 Nov)

Later, Britain was openly accused of giving orders to King Hussein on his visit to London (9-19 Oct), to organize terror in Syria. (*Ruz al-Yusuf*, 31 Oct)

**Lebanese Measures Against Plotters.** Immediately after the explosions, the Lebanese authorities tightened security measures against the Palestinian refugees and Syrian political exiles, who were warned to refrain from political activity. (*Ahram*, 29, 30 Oct, 4, 5 Nov; *Hayat*, 30-31 Oct, 1 Nov; *Mid. Mirror*, 29 Oct, 5 Nov)

Syrian exiles suspected of connection with plots against the UAR including Farzat al-Mamlūk, a former member of the Syrian Parliament, were expelled. *Al-Ahrām* reported that they all left for Jordan by way of Paris and Ankara. (*Ahram*, 3-4 Nov; *Falastin*, 3 Nov; *Mid. Mirror*, 12 Nov)

**Lebanese-Syrian Collaboration Against Subversive Elements.** Meetings between Syrian and Lebanese security authorities took place in Damascus on 27 Oct. According to Tawfiq Jalbūt, the Lebanese Director of General Security, reported by an official source in Damascus, it was understood that the plotters were in Lebanon, but that the security authorities there could do nothing about it without orders from higher authorities. The Syrians supplied the Lebanese with full details, including names, dates and Lebanese identity cards found on detainees. (*Ahram*, 29 Oct) Following the meeting, Jalbūt discussed the question with PM Sa'ib Slām. (*Ahram*, 29 Oct) There were further Lebanese-Syrian meetings and exchanges over the issue. (*Ahram*, 5, 6 Nov; *R. Cairo*, 9 Nov-*IMB*, 10 Nov)

The Syrian Army Attorney-General announced that Syria would demand that Lebanon should extradite the Syrian exiles accused of plotting against their country. (*Ahram*, 1 Nov)

**Lebanese Act Against Salāh ash-Shishakli.** After the Slām-Jalbūt meeting, the Lebanese police raided Salāh ash-Shishakli's house in Falugha (25 miles from Beirut), and found, according to *al-Ahrām*, documents connected with the plots against Syria, and a store of arms and dynamite. More arms were found in the house on 12 Nov. Salāh ash-Shishakli left for Amman before the police came to his house, but one of his men, Munir al-Mulāzi, was arrested there. The UAR suspected a connection between Shishakli and a bomb which exploded in the UAR embassy in Beirut. (*Ahram* 31 Oct, 1, 2, 3, 9 Nov; *Hayat*, 1 Nov)

On 23 Dec a bill of indictment against Salāh ash-Shishakli and his accomplice, al-Mulāzi, was published in Lebanon. Shishakli was accused of planning sabotage and terror in Syria during 1960 in order to cause a deterioration in the relations between Lebanon and a foreign country, and of forging identity cards and passports. It was decided to issue warrants of arrest against ash-Shishakli and his collaborators, in order to bring them to trial. (*Jaridah*, 24 Dec)

According to information from Jordan quoted by *an-Nahār* Salāh ash-Shishakli was under house arrest there and was accused of receiving large sums of money and using them for his private purposes. He was said to have come to Amman, together with al-Barāzi, at the beginning of 1960. They told Bahjat-at-Talhūni, then Chief of the Royal Cabinet, that Syria was ripe for revolt, and asked him for money to pay tribal leaders in Syria to overthrow the regime. They promised to send some of them to Amman to receive instructions. They then left for Beirut where they met Syrian political exiles, mostly workers, whom they told that they had found them work in Jordan and sent them there. They then told the Jordanian authorities, that they had sent the "tribal leaders." In Jordan, these workers were sent to a camp, where Jordanian officers trained them in the use of arms, and sabotage. When they protested, the Jordanians understood Shishakli's ruse, and when he reappeared in Jordan, they put him under house arrest. (*Nahar*, 28 Dec)

**Adīb ash-Shishakli Accused of Involvement in Plot.** Adīb ash-Shishakli, the former Syrian President, was also accused by the UAR of scheming to overthrow the regime in Syria. *Al-Ahrām* claimed that he was not living in Brazil, as rumoured, but in Jordan, where he was supervising subversion against Syria. (*Ahram*, 28 Oct)

On 15 Nov Shishakli was held under temporary arrest at Khartoum airport, when his plane landed there en route to Brazil, and left for Rome by another plane. (*R. Baghdad*, 16 Nov-*IMB*, 17 Nov) A Cairo source said he was using a Saudi Arabian passport. (*Ahram*, 17 Nov) A Saudi Arabian communiqué said that on Shishakli's arrival at Jedda, King Saud had ordered him deported and his Saudi Arabian passport withdrawn. Shishakli was given a visa and left for Asmara on 16 Nov. The communiqué emphasized that he did not meet King Saud. (*Ahram*, 24 Nov) From Beirut it was announced that the Lebanese authorities had taken measures to prevent Shishakli's entry under cover. (*Sawt al-Arab*, 29 Nov-*IMB*, 30 Nov; *Akhbar*; *Ahram*, 30 Nov)

**Interrogation of al-Mulāzi.** Al-Mulāzi, Salāh ash-Shishakli's accomplice, revealed, according to UAR sources, that the Shishakli brothers had met Syrian political exiles in Lebanon, Turkey and Cyprus, in order to plan a military coup to separate Syria from Egypt. (*R. Cairo*, 1 Nov-*IMB*, 1 Nov; *Ahram*, 1 Nov) Al-Mulāzi was found to have helped to forge Lebanese identity cards which



were used by the plotters to enter Syria. (*R. Cairo*, 9 Nov-*IMB*, 10 Nov) Al-Mulāzi admitted that he had visited Jordan and Turkey three times. (*R. Cairo*, 11 Nov-*IMB*, 13 Nov)

As a result of the interrogation of al-Mulāzi Lebanese police arrested more Syrian political exiles. (*Ahram*, 1-3 Nov) Later it was revealed that he had left Syria at the beginning of summer 1960 for Jordan, where he agreed to organize a group to work against the regime in Syria if Jordan supplied the money. On his return to Lebanon, he submitted his plan to Salāh ash-Shishakli, who agreed, went himself to Amman, and brought back money and promise for more whenever needed. Both of them began to negotiate with Syrian exiles living in Lebanon, and sent some of them to Jordan, where they were trained in sabotage and returned to Lebanon ready for action. (*Siyasah*, 22 Dec) On 23 Dec the bill of indictment was issued against al-Mulāzi and ash-Shishakli. Apart from the accusations given above, al-Mulāzi was accused of working for the banned National Social Party. (*Jawidah*, 24 Dec)

**Nov-Dec: Arrest of Muhammad al-Fadl.** At the end of Oct Muhammad al-Fadl, former Minister and member of the Lebanese Chamber of Deputies, was arrested. (*Hayat*, 16 Nov) UAR sources described him as the link between the plotters against Syria and the Jordanian Military Attaché in Beirut, as belonging to the Shishakli group and as a spy for Israel. (*Ahram*, 16, 17 Nov; *R. Damascus*, 17 Nov-*IMB*, 18 Nov) (See: Jordan-UAR relations.)

When investigated, al-Fadl—who tried to commit suicide in jail—reportedly pleaded that political personalities in Lebanon—stronger than himself—were behind the espionage and sabotage and that they had received considerable sums from the Jordanian Government. (*Ahram*, 19, 26 Nov)

Some 25 arrests were reportedly made in southern Lebanon as a result of al-Fadl's evidence. (*Ahram*, 16, 19, 20 Nov)

One more arrest in Lebanon in connection with activities against another Arab country was reported in Dec. (*R. Cairo*, 13 Dec-*IMB*, 14 Dec)

#### OCT: ABDEL-NASSER'S SECOND VISIT TO SYRIA

On 13 Oct, eight days after his return from New York, where he had attended the UN General Assembly, Abdel-Nasser left Alexandria by sea for Latakia, starting his second visit to Syria during the year. On 19 Oct he returned to Cairo by sea.

[This visit came at a time when there was sabotage in the Northern R (see above) and reports were spreading of growing discontent because of political conditions, economic hardships and the economic policy (p 507).]

There were no prior reports on Abdel-Nasser's departure, which was made public only on 14 Oct, after his arrival in Syria.

He was accompanied by Abd al-Latif al-Baghdādi, Field-Marshal Amer and Nūr ad-Dīn Kahālāh, Vice-President; Zakaria Muhdi ad-Dīn, Central Minister of the Interior; Kamāl ad-Dīn Hussein, Chairman of the Executive Council of the Southern R; and Ali Sabri, Minister for Presidential Affairs. (*Eg. Gaz.*, 14 Oct)

He visited Latakia—14 Oct, Aleppo—15 Oct, Hama, Rustan and Homs—16 Oct, and Damascus—17-19 Oct.

On arrival in Latakia he said that he had intended the visit to take place in Sept, but had had to postpone it owing to his journey to New York.

His main activities were a series of public speeches

and meetings with NU bodies and various delegations; twice he visited Shukri al-Kuwatli, who was indisposed, and he met the Ministers of the Syrian R Executive Council. It was reported that he conveyed to them the requests he had received from the public during his visit and instructed them to tour the country themselves (which they did in Dec—*Hayat*, 6 Dec) and to report to him in Feb 1960. (*Ahram*, 17, 18, 19 Oct)

**Abdel-Nasser's Speeches.** The major themes brought up during his earlier visit (see above) recurred: the enemies—Western imperialism, its Arab stooges and Zionism, fearing the power of a united Arab nation and therefore scheming to injure it; the people of the UAR, and especially of Syria—"the beating heart of the Arab nation"—standing steadfast in the eternal battle and defeating the enemy again and again; the determination of the people to stand united and to carry their revolution to fulfilment.

The attack on the external enemy centred this time on the regime of King Hussein, who was accused of conducting a subversive campaign in Syria in the service of his imperialist masters (see p 154). While the everlasting struggle with the scheming enemy was very heavily emphasized, social, economic and ideological themes received less attention than during the former visit—though the slogan of the threefold revolution, Arab, political and social, was voiced by Abdel-Nasser on this occasion for the first time in Syria (see Views and Policies).

Abdel-Nasser demanded that the NU members should play their part in the development projects of the provinces, and said the government was prepared to allocate sums equal to those mobilized by the NU for such purposes. He stressed the need for patience; the fruits of development could not be expected to materialize immediately. (For sources see below.)

**Political Crisis Denied.** An outstanding feature was Abdel-Nasser's recurrent denials of political unrest in Syria, especially in his first speeches in the provinces. On his arrival in Latakia he immediately took issue with the "imperialist radio stations and Press" who, he said, in reporting his visit, would resort to their "lying methods" and speak of opposition and difficulties in Syria: "When someone comes to Syria—they say—there must be a calamity—as if we have no celebrations," Abdel-Nasser declared ironically, denouncing Israel and Jordan especially, but American broadcasts as well, for such tactics. Imperialism was trying to sow the seeds of dissension in the UAR and the seeds of suspicion abroad, but there was no truth in their stories; the people stood united and strong in its convictions and faith. (*Ahram*; *Eg. Gaz.*, 14-20 Oct; see also BBC for the period.)

**UAR Comment Denies Difficulties in Syria.** Sarrāj declared in an interview that the aim of Abdel-Nasser's visit was to meet the people of the Syrian R, whom he loved and longed to see, not to demonstrate that the people still supported him and the union, as hired papers and radio commentators said. (*Ahram*, 5 Nov)

However, a Cairo paper described the "tremendous welcome" which met Abdel-Nasser everywhere as an arrow in the heart of his enemies; the tour would put an end to nonsensical reports, it said. (*Akhbar*, 16 Oct)

A Cairo weekly said it was the President's right to visit every part of the country, and denied that his aim had been to suppress opposition. (*Ruz al-Yusuf*, 24 Oct)



## THE SYRIAN REGION

**Arab Reports on Opposition.** The Jordanian radio and Press [which were at the time engaged in a propaganda contest with the UAR] said that the crowds welcoming Abdel-Nasser had been hired, that leaflets had been distributed during the visit calling the people to prepare for "Zero Hour," and that arrests had been made before, during and after the visit. Similar reports appeared in Lebanese papers. (See *BBC*, *IMB* for period of visit; *Jihad*, 15 Sept, 17 Oct; *Manar*, 19 Sept; *Hawl al-Alam*, 20, 27 Oct; *Falastin*, 2 Nov (all Jordan); *Akhbar (Beirut)*, 11 Sept)

(For foreign comment see next section.)

### OCT-NOV: EVALUATION OF THE SITUATION IN THE SYRIAN REGION

**Economic and Political Sources of Opposition.** "Pressure within Syria appears too strong to be dissipated without some significant change" wrote H. B. Ellis in *The Christian Science Monitor*. There was a struggle between those Egyptians and Syrians who wanted to keep Syria in the UAR and "disillusioned" Syrians who wanted to weaken the ties and possibly even dissolve them.

The sources of dissatisfaction were to a large part economic: most serious was the hardship caused by three consecutive years of drought; the inept land reform had embittered the landowners but not yet truly benefited the peasants; the businessmen were resentful of interference with private enterprise.

Syrian army officers, resentful of the ascendancy of the Egyptian Army, were also disaffected. But perhaps most disturbing to Cairo was the reported resolve of the Ba'ath party—angry over its exclusion from the government and Abdel-Nasser's refusal to socialize Syria speedily—to work for the dissolution of the union in collaboration with the Communists. (For sources see below.)

**The Youth "The Real Centre of Revolt."** An *Economist* correspondent also regarded the drought as a major source of discontent and mentioned the "silent" opposition of the Ba'ath, and the anti-UAR propaganda published abroad by the Communists, who had gone underground. But possibly the "real centre of revolt" was the educated and half-educated youth, who had been moulded into rival instruments of political action by the Ba'ath, the Communists and the Syrian Popular Party in the 15 years since the war. "Their revolt was never wholly, or even essentially, political: it was rather an attack on a much broader front against the whole social system and their varied frustrations were harnessed by the parties for political ends. Today, the parties have been dissolved but the frustrations remain. Suitable jobs, especially for those educated abroad, are not to be

found; the sexual and social *moeurs* of the country are cramping and repugnant to them; readers of the short stories and poems now being produced are few; the cultural milieu in which these young people aspire to live does not exist... The right-wing, authoritarian rule of the army, under Egyptian control, is not the goal for which this generation has been demonstrating in the streets these last ten years." (For sources see below.)

**"Full Union Remote as Ever"—Autonomy of the Sarrāj Group Seen.** Ellis said that the stresses and strains had reportedly convinced Abdel-Nasser that the Syrians must be given a greater role in running their country, and there had been talk of concessions to be announced in Feb 1961, on the third anniversary of the union. Observers assumed, he said, that the main reason for Abdel-Nasser's campaign against King Hussein was his conviction that once Hussein was out of the way Jordan would join the UAR with a federative status, which would enable him to give Syria a similar status while appearing to have gained a victory.

On the other hand, *The Economist* correspondent, as well as Joe Alex Morris, *The New York Herald Tribune* ME correspondent, writing from Damascus, thought that Syria had already been given a greater degree of autonomy by the withdrawal from Damascus of Abd al-Hakim Amer, Abdel-Nasser's "proconsul" in Syria since Oct 1959, and the appointment of Sarrāj to the presidency of the Syrian Executive Council, together with the appointment to ministerial posts of young officers loyal to him. While Morris thought that this development had made the union a façade, *The Economist* believed that Sarrāj's lack of extensive support at home powerfully reinforced his loyalty to Abdel-Nasser. (For sources see below.)

**Syria Expected to Remain in UAR.** Morris said the Egyptianization of Syria had ground to a halt or even gone into reverse in the political field, Abdel-Nasser having accepted Sarrāj as his "straw boss" on his own terms, while in the economic field Egypt and Syria were still separate entities. But to Abdel-Nasser the most important thing was to preserve unity in name.

*The Economist* correspondent thought that the Syrians were still loyal to the ideal of Arab unity, and though there was dissatisfaction and opposition they would do nothing that might endanger the union itself. It was on this, and not on his popularity, which had suffered, that Abdel-Nasser's strength now rested. Ellis also thought that, though some significant changes must be expected, the chances were "overwhelmingly in favour of Syria remaining in the UAR." (*Economist* 15, 22 Oct; *Christian Science Monitor*, 25 Oct; *NYHT*, 22 Nov)

## EGYPTIAN REGION

### CHANGES IN EGYPTIAN REPRESENTATION IN GOVERNMENT

(See also List of Government, pp 475-8)

[In contrast to the wholesale changes among Syrian Ministers in the Central Government and the Syrian Executive Council, there were only promotions and adjustments among the Egyptian Ministers. An outstanding development was the additional responsibilities conferred upon Kamāl ad-Dīn Hussein.]

On 8 Jan Dr Hasan Abbās Zaki, Chairman of the

"Committee for the building of the High Dam" (*Lajnat Binā' as-Sadd al-ʿAlī*), was granted the personal rank of Minister. (*Ahram*, 9 Jan)

In Mar the Chiefs of Staff of the armed forces were granted the personal rank of Ministers. They were: Lieut-General Ali Amer, Chief of Staff, Second (Egyptian) Army; Jamāl Faisal, Chief of Staff, First (Syrian) Army; Sulaymān Izzāt, Chief of Staff, Naval Forces (an Egyptian); and Muhammad Sīdqi Mahmūd, Chief of Staff, Air Force (an Egyptian). (*Ahram*, 28 Mar)

The reason for this step was, according to a Lebanese Press comment, that junior officers in Syria had become Ministers and therefore senior in rank to Jamāl Faisal, their former commander. (*Nahar*, 31 Mar)

In May Abdel-Nasser transferred to Zakariya Muhi ad-Din, Central Minister of the Interior, his responsibility for all the financial aspects of the High Dam project. (*Ahram*, 22 May)

In Sept, with the setting up of the new local government organization, Kamāl ad-Din Hussein was appointed Minister of Local Government in the Southern R. (*Ahram*, 12 Sept)

On 20 Sept, before leaving for New York to attend the UN General Assembly, Abdel-Nasser announced the following changes in the status of Egyptian Ministers (in addition to changes among Syrian Ministers—see: Political Developments—Syrian R.):

Kamāl ad-Din Hussein became President of the Southern R Executive Council in place of Nūr ad-Din Tarrāf. (He continued as Central Minister of Education, Minister of Local Government, Southern R, and Inspector of the NU, Southern R.)

Nūr ad-Din Tarrāf became Minister of Health and Abd al-Kādir Hāim Minister of State, both in the Central Government [his former post was Deputy Minister of State for Presidential Affairs].

On 1 Nov Abd as-Salām Badawi was nominated Secretary to the Central Government. (*Ahram*, 1 Nov)

#### PARDON FOR POLITICIANS OF THE FORMER REGIME AND POLITICAL PRISONERS

**Feb: Politicians of the Former Regime Pardoned.** On 6 Feb Abdel-Nasser published a decree granting an amnesty to 20 leaders of the former regime who had been sentenced by the Revolutionary Court and the Court of Treason. The decree also annulled the decision of the Revolutionary Council of 14 Apr 1954, depriving of their political rights members of the Wafd, Sa'adist and Liberal-Constitutionist parties who were Ministers from 6 Feb 1942 until the revolution. (23 July 1952)

Following is a list of former Ministers whose political rights were restored (an asterisk signifies that the person designated was sentenced by one of the two courts):

**Former Ministers of the Wafd:** Mustafa an-Nahhās, Ali Zaki al-Urābi, Abd as-Salām Fahmi Gum'ah, Makram Ubayd [al-Kutlah al-Wafdiyah], Ahmad Nagīb al-Hilālī, Muhammad Fu'ād Sarraj ad-Din\*, Mustafa Nasrat, Ahmad Hamza, Abd al-Hamid Abd al-Haqq, Abd al-Majid Abd al-Haqq, Muhammad al-Wakil, Abd al-Fattāh at-Tawīl, Uthmān Muharram\*, Muhammad Salāh ad-Dīn, Mahmūd Sulaymān Ghannām\*, Hussein al-Jundi, Abd al-Fattāh Hasan, Ibrahim Faraj\*.

**Former Ministers of the Sa'adist Party:** Ibrahim Abd al-Hādi\*, Mahmūd Ghālib, Mamdūh Riyād, Ali Ayyūb, Abd ar-Rāziq as-Sanhūri, Ahmad Marsi Badr, Abd al-Majid Badr, Nagīb Iskandar.

**Former Ministers of the National Constitutional Party:** Muhammad Hussein Haykal, Riyād Abd al-Aziz Sayf an-Nasr, Abd al-Majid Ibrahim Sālih, Ali Abd ar-Rāziq, Ahmad Ali Alūbah.

**Persons Sentenced by the Revolutionary Court and the Court of Treason:** Ahmad Nasif, Mustafa Shahin, Karīm Thābit [ex-King Faruq's Press secretary], Ahmad Muhammad an-Naqīb, [ex-King Faruq's physician], Muhammad Kāmil al-Qawish, Ahmad Abd al-Ghaffār, Abbās Halim [a nephew of ex-King Faruq], Zaynab Abd al-Wāhid al-Wakil [the wife of Mustafa an-Nahhās], Muhammad Hasan as-Sulaymāni, Muhammad Mustafa Khalifah, Mustafa Fahmi [former Royal Chief Architect].

**Al-Ahrām** explained that the former Ministers had been deprived of their political rights not because of the wish to take revenge on the parties but as a preventive measure for the general good. Now that the political and economic situation had changed, this measure could be dispensed with. (*Ahram*, 30 Jan, 7 Feb)

**June—July: Amnesty for Civil Servants.** On 11 June a presidential decree was issued providing that "convicts discharged on medical grounds shall be excused the remainder of the sentences passed on them by the People's Court" (*Mahkamah ash-Sha'ab*).

Public servants sentenced by the People's Court were allowed to return to their previous posts or to hold other posts, subject to certain conditions regarding the execution of the sentence. (*Ahram*, 12 June; *BBC*, 14 June)

On 2 July a list of some 200 officials, dismissed on conviction by the Revolutionary and People's Courts, who were pardoned by Abdel-Nasser on 11 June, was distributed among the Ministries so that they might choose candidates to fill vacancies. (*Ahram*, 3 July)

**July: General Nagīb Released from House Arrest.** At the end of 1960 it was reported that on 23 July Abdel-Nasser had ordered the release from house arrest of General Nagīb, first President of the Republic, whom he had deposed in 1954. (*NYT*, 1 Dec) Nagīb continued to live in the villa of the former Wafd leader, Mustafa an-Nahhās, at Al-Mary, a Cairo suburb, and a bodyguard was assigned to him. An official explained: "General Nagīb has been popular with the Egyptian people and the figurehead who led the revolution... His release means that Colonel Nasser and he have settled their differences and that everything between them is friendly." Nagīb's release was not reported in the UAR Press. (*Daily Telegraph*, 1 Dec)

(A report in Oct had said that Nagīb was "still under guard," adding: "Considering the restrictions under which he still lives, it seems apparent that the government is not yet convinced that General Nagīb is no longer a potential danger. The passage of time should take care of this, however, and undoubtedly the country's present rulers are counting on just this.") (*NYHT*, 29 Oct)

#### MAY: NATIONALIZATION OF THE EGYPTIAN PRESS

[For nationalization in the economic field, see Economic Survey.]

**Nationalization Decree.** On 24 May a presidential decree was issued whereby: (1) All newspapers and periodicals were nationalized and placed under the control of the NU; (2) The same applied to publishing houses not hitherto under official control (four major concerns were named: Al-Ahrām; Al-Akhhār; Al-Hilāl and Ruz al-Yūsuf); (3) Persons holding executive positions in the nationalized publishing houses would not be permitted to continue in that capacity without the authorization of the appropriate board of directors, which the NU would appoint for each concern; (4) All journalists would be required to obtain a licence from the NU, after a proper application; (5) Former owners of nationalized publications would receive compensation in the form of 3 per cent government bonds redeemable in 20 years, in amounts to be decided by a three-man committee.

An explanatory note said it was one of the main objectives of the Egyptian revolution for the establishment of genuine democracy that private capital should not dominate information media, because any deviation

would have dangerous effects on the security of the country and society. Ownership of such media by the people was the only protection against deviation and the sole guarantee of genuine freedom of the Press, and the attainment of the objectives of a socialist, cooperative, democratic society. (*MENA*, 24 May-BBC, 25 May)

**Papers Exempted.** The Syrian Press and some Egyptian foreign-language papers (one in French, three in Greek and two in Armenian) were not nationalized, but their owners were requested to apply for new licences from the NU. (*Ahram*, 25 May)

**New Boards of Directors.** On 24 May President Abdel-Nasser, as President of the NU, appointed the new boards of directors as follows. Al-Ahrām and Al-Hilāl Publishing House (main publications: *Al-Ahrām*, *al-Musawwar*, *Al-Hilāl*): Fikri Abāzah (chairman), Muhammad Hassanein Haykal, Na'ūm Bahri and Tawfiq al-Hakīm.

Al-Akhbār Publishing House, owned by Ali and Mustafa al-Amīn (publications: *Al-Akhbār*, *Akhbār al-Yawm*, *Akhir Sā'ah*): Muhammad at-Tābi'i (chairman), Siddiq Abu an-Naja, Muhammad Zaki Abd al-Qādir, Ahmad Baha ad-Dīn, Jalāl ad-Dīn al-Hamamsi and Amīn Shākīr.

Ruz al-Yūsuf: Ihsān Abd al-Qaddūs (chairman), Yūsuf as-Sibā'i, Fathi Ghānim and Kamāl Ghārib.

At-Tahrīr Publishing House, originally owned by the NU (main publications: *Al-Gumhuriyah*, *Al-Masā'*, *La Bourse Egyptienne*, *The Middle East News Agency*): Salāh Sālīm (president), Taha Hussein, Muhammad Wajih Abāzah and Kāmil ash-Shināwī. (*Ahram*, 25 May)

**Reaction in UAR.** On 29 May President Abdel-Nasser told the editors and the members of boards of directors that the Press had failed to do its duty to the new society (for details, see pp 473-4).

The UAR Press supported the nationalization. *Al-Ahrām* said that the Press had actually only been reorganized. The NU did not own the newspapers in the real sense of the word; it owned them morally but not materially. The benefits would go to the staff, the editors and the writers, who according to the Press Law, would obtain half of the profits, while the other half would be used for expanding and improving the newspapers. (*Ahram*, 3 June) Articles justifying the nationalization appeared also later in the year (e.g.: *Musawwar*, 8 July; *Ruz al-Yusuf*, 31 Oct).

**May: World Press Reaction.** In New York, the International Federation of Newspaper Publishers denounced the takeover of "the last of the country's Arabic-language newspapers and periodicals," describing it as "an intolerable and truly unbearable violation of the freedom of the Press." (*Times*, 25 May)

## UAR: INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

### SYNOPSIS

**Objectives of the UAR's Foreign Policy.** During 1960, no basic changes were discernible in the main objectives of the UAR's foreign policy. These objectives, which had been progressively formulated under President Abdel-Nasser's leadership, might be classified as follows:

1. To secure and preserve complete independence for the UAR, which is understood to include freedom of action in international affairs and freedom to receive unconditional aid from both East and West;
2. To win for the UAR an honoured place among the nations;
3. To establish a union of Arab countries led by the UAR (pp 116-8);
4. To establish UAR positions of influence in Africa;
5. To weaken Israel in preparation for the attempt to eliminate her. (See Synopsis, pp 169-71).

The policies designed to achieve these ends were subsumed under the general doctrines of "Positive Neutralism" and "Arab Nationalism."

**Arab Nationalism**, as expounded by the UAR, aims at bringing about a union of the Arab states led by the UAR. It is based on the claim that the Arabs constitute an indivisible unity; that there is a general will to turn this unity into a political union; that the establishment of this union is prevented only by imperialism and its local hirelings; and that legitimate Arab nationalism is personified by the UAR.

Beginning in 1955, Egypt evolved a policy of overt and covert subversion designed to contribute to the overthrow of "imperialist-dominated reactionary" Arab governments. The advance of the UAR along these lines was checked in 1958 in Iraq, Jordan and Lebanon. In 1960 the UAR continued, in word and deed, to pursue this objective, but no advance was discernible. On the contrary, all Arab governments opposed the UAR's aspirations and ranged themselves on the side of the status quo. Instead of union, they advocated unity and cooperation in matters of common interest, while condemning interference in each other's affairs. There was evidence that the UAR, while by no means giving up her aspirations, and while still maintaining the policy of direct action—especially where Jordan was concerned—was beginning to accommodate herself to the idea of working, for the time being, within this framework of the Arab League. (For a detailed synopsis, see pp 115-6.)

**Positive Neutralism.** Positive Neutralism, originally designed to secure "effective independence" (see p 519) as defined above, is also intended to make a positive contribution to the preservation of peace in the world at large, and it is this aspect of it which is primarily stressed. The active or "positive" participation of the UAR in world affairs, however, was also utilized to serve other principal objectives: to achieve for the UAR

a place of honour in the world; to use the prestige gained in order to establish positions of influence in the Arab countries and in Africa; and to use the bargaining power thus achieved to isolate Israel. Special attention was paid during the year to Africa, where, through her attitude to the Congo conflict, the UAR became most deeply involved in world affairs. She also made a serious effort for the first time to strengthen her ties with Latin America.

**Western Countries.** Abdel-Nasser repeatedly insisted that the policy of the UAR was neither pro-East nor pro-West, but pro-UAR and pro-peace. In practice, the attitude towards world affairs remained generally anti-Western in 1960, as it had been since 1955, for reasons to be presently enumerated. At the same time there was a continuation of the trend, which became discernible in 1959, towards a normalization of relations with Western countries. Both sides were interested in this improvement; the UAR was in dire need of economic aid and expanding trade; the West was interested in minimizing the UAR's dependence on the Eastern bloc and regaining some foothold in the country; and individual Western countries were interested in expanding economic relations for their own sake.

There were historical as well as topical reasons for the UAR's anti-Western policies. First, to become "effectively independent" Egypt had had to get rid of special ties with the West, and in her subsequent struggle with the West since 1955, she sought and obtained the aid of the Communist bloc. Secondly, Abdel-Nasser owed his position of leadership in the Arab world, including the Syrian-Egyptian merger, largely to his anti-Western policies and successes, which responded to the deep-seated resentment of the Muslim Arabs against the encroachment of the West. Thirdly, he owed much of his popularity inside the UAR to the same factor.

These factors continued to be effective in 1960. Anti-imperialism—which in all cases meant opposition to Western imperialism only—continued to be the main plank in UAR propaganda in the Arab world. Inside the UAR, Abdel-Nasser continued to use nationalist motives, mainly that of the struggle against imperialism and its "stooges," in order to stimulate the dynamism of the political, social and economic revolution which he was conducting (p 467 ff).

Further, anti-imperialism played a major part at the Bandung Conference, which had an important influence on the formulation of Abdel-Nasser's foreign policy, and continued to be a major factor in Afro-Asian solidarity.

The UAR's claim to leadership among these countries was based on her achievements in the anti-imperialist struggle for freedom and independence. In many cases, moreover, this anti-Western attitude played a major part in bringing about an understanding between the UAR



and neutralist leaders. During 1960, the latter aspect emerged most clearly in Africa, and it also began to be apparent in Latin America.

Lastly, there was Abdel-Nasser's contention (also upheld by most other Arab leaders in the ME) that Western imperialism had planted Israel in the midst of the Arab world and continued to aid it with the intention of injuring or destroying Arab nationalism. During 1960 UAR-US relations especially were influenced by the Israeli theme.

In 1960 a new variation of the anti-imperialist theme was propagated by the UAR. Following the attainment of independence by most of the colonies of France and Britain, Abdel-Nasser expounded the theory that a new imperialism was emerging to take the place of the old, and was using subtler, more indirect means, such as economic domination and the "monopolization of knowledge," to maintain its ascendancy over the now formally independent countries. The granting of independence, it was argued, was no more than a tactical retreat, a stratagem.

**Communist Countries.** As with the Western countries, there were two aspects to the UAR's relations with the Communist bloc. Her pursuit of anti-Western policies for reasons of her own suited the Soviet Union; on the other hand, she needed the most powerful support to succeed in these policies. Thus Soviet support and cooperation between the UAR and the Communist countries continued. However, UAR cooperation did not preclude continued suppression of Arab Communists as enemies of Arab nationalism, and Communist support did not extend to backing UAR aspirations in the Arab world, Abdel-Nasser being regarded as the most entrenched Arab representative of the "nationalist bourgeoisie." This pattern was illustrated in 1958, when the USSR hesitated to support the Egyptian-Syrian merger, and later, when the Iraqi Communists supported Qassim against Abdel-Nasser and his Iraqi followers. When Abdel-Nasser suppressed the Syrian Communists in 1959, a crisis ensued between him and the USSR on the theme of "Communism versus the nationalist bourgeoisie." The outcome of the crisis was that Soviet Russia refrained for the time being from further direct criticism of Abdel-Nasser's regime; the UAR refrained from broadcasting criticism of Communism as such, and cooperation continued between the two in the international field.

Abdel-Nasser declared that he was not afraid that his continued close cooperation with the Communist countries would lead to Communist penetration of the Arab world. Arab nationalism was stronger than communism, he claimed, pointing as proof to the suppression of the Syrian Communists.

Following is a survey of the main events in the UAR's foreign relations during the year.

**USSR Aid for Aswan High Dam.** In Jan, Abdel-Nasser requested financial and technical aid for the second stage of the Aswan High Dam project, although various—if not definite—Western offers had been made. Russia responded favourably, and an agreement for aid was signed in Aug. Thus the main pillar of Egypt's economic development plans was now based entirely on Russian aid, just as the mainstay of the UAR's political regime and security system—the armed forces—was founded on Soviet equipment and training.

There was tension between the UAR and Bulgaria at the beginning of the year, mainly because the latter harboured Syrian Communists.

**UAR-Israeli Relations.** During Jan, serious tension developed on the Israeli-Syrian border, culminating on 1 Feb in an Israeli raid on the abandoned village of Ta-wafiq in a demilitarized zone. The UAR claimed a victory and, expecting another Israeli attack to "erase the shameful defeat," concentrated its forces near the Israeli border. Warlike tension thus mounted during Feb, but subsided by the end of the month. During the remainder of the year Israeli-UAR border relations reverted to the normal pattern of sporadic incidents (pp 190-94, 197 ff).

When the UK, the US and France reaffirmed the Tripartite Declaration in Feb, during the period of tension, Abdel-Nasser declared that it had been "buried at Port Said." Power relations had changed, he insisted, and any Western declaration on Arab affairs was "meaningless" to the UAR (pp 93-4, 516).

Throughout the year, the UAR continued to wage a cold war against Israel, in the fullest sense of the term, concentrating on an attempt to isolate Israel on the international scene (see p 177 ff). Here relations with the US, as stated above, were appreciably influenced by issues related to Israel, and the Israeli angle was seldom overlooked in her diplomatic activities. Israeli themes were utilized in her relations with the Arab countries.

**UAR, US and Israel.** In Mar, Apr and May, a series of issues arose connecting the US with the Arab-Israeli conflict, which led to outspoken attacks by the UAR on the US. These were:

PM Ben-Gurion's visit to the US in Mar (pp 291-2); the picketing of the UAR freighter *Cleopatra* by New York longshoremen in Apr-May in protest against the blacklisting by the UAR of US ships trading with Israel and an Arab counterboycott of American shipping organized by the UAR (p 41 ff); the "Douglas amendment" passed by the US Senate in Apr, authorizing the President to withhold aid from countries enforcing boycott (p 106). Later in the year, US election campaign declarations of friendship with Israel, or favouring peace between Israel and the Arab countries, provoked another prolonged attack by the UAR (and to a less extent by other Arab countries) on the US (p 108 ff).

**The Struggle for Jordan.** During the spring months the UAR was also busy on the Arab front, in Latin America and in the neutralist camp.

In Mar UAR attacks on the regime of King Hussein of Jordan were renewed. On the other hand relations with Iraq began to improve starting in Apr. Iraq had for a long time shown interest in a normalization of relations, and the UAR now responded. Consequently the UAR concentrated her efforts in the Arab world on the attempt to overthrow King Hussein's regime—and this continued until the end of the year. In his stand against Abdel-Nasser Hussein was supported, directly or indirectly, by all the forces favouring the status quo: the Arab countries helped him by their generally negative attitude to UAR aspirations; the West supplied economic aid and political support; and Israel made it clear that for the sake of her vital security interests she could not remain indifferent to a change of the status quo in Jordan. Thus the UAR found herself faced in her quest for supremacy in the Arab world with what she termed the forces of Arab reaction and treason, imperialism and Zionism. The USSR, as stated, did nothing to encourage the UAR's aspirations in Jordan.

**Latin America.** The UAR's interest in Latin America found expression in the visit of a UAR goodwill mission during Mar-May. Its aim was to bring about Arab-Latin American cooperation, which—according to UAR sources—imperialism had tried to frustrate. Joint efforts were proposed to obtain unconditional aid from East and West alike, and it was suggested that the UAR could become the connecting link between Latin America and both Africa and Asia. All through the year, especially close relations were developed with Cuba, who was assured by Abdel-Nasser of support in her struggle for freedom. There were reports of anti-US activities by the staff of the UAR embassy in Panama, possibly in coordination with Havana.

**CENTO Countries.** Abdel-Nasser had always opposed CENTO and its predecessor, the Baghdad Pact, both as a Western alliance dangerous to Arab nationalism and as a factor making for increased international tension.

In July the UAR broke off relations with Iran, after accusing her of renewing her recognition of Israel, and conducted a virulent propaganda campaign against the Shah, denouncing him as a stooge of imperialism and inciting his people to rise against him. All the UAR's wrath against the Baghdad Pact found expression in this campaign, led by Abdel-Nasser himself.

The UAR welcomed the coup d'état in Turkey in May, especially the deposition of ex-Premier Adnan Menderes, one of the originators of the Baghdad Pact. The new government announced its desire to improve relations with the Arab countries, especially the UAR, but relations were overshadowed during the second half of the year by the demand, first voiced at the UAR National Union Convention in July, for the "recovery of Iskenderun" [Alexandretta or Hatay Province].

Improved relations between the UAR and Pakistan were reflected by the exchange of state visits between Abdel-Nasser (who went to Pakistan in Apr) and Ayub Khan (who visited the UAR in Nov). Both similarities and differences in outlook were publicly discussed at these meetings (the differences almost only by Ayub), and the joint communiqué issued in Nov stated that the friendly relations between the two countries were based on respect and understanding, taking into consideration "the fundamental facts of the policy of each country."

**Positive Neutralism in World Affairs.** The main developments involving the UAR in world affairs started in May with the failure of the Summit Conference. Abdel-Nasser and his fellow-neutralists claimed that the uncommitted nations must now play a growing part in world affairs in order to safeguard peace, which the great powers alone had shown themselves incapable of doing. The function of the neutralists was to restrict the area of conflict between the rival world powers by enlarging the area controlled by uncommitted countries, where neither East nor West would be able to exercise a decisive influence. Though the neutralist nations were short of wealth and military power, it was argued, they commanded moral force, derived from their unselfish devotion to peace, which, if applied in a concerted effort, would prove stronger than material power. This attitude was publicly expressed when Abdel-Nasser met Nehru (in Apr in New Delhi and in May in Cairo) and Tito (in June in Belgrade). At the meeting with Tito, the two leaders endorsed the Soviet disarmament proposal.

In Sept, following on PM Khrushchev's appeal to leading statesmen to attend the UN General Assembly, Abdel-Nasser was in contact with neutralist leaders and

the Assembly provided an opportunity for further meetings between them. The UAR played a part in the neutralist attempt to intervene in the struggle between the world powers by co-sponsoring the five-nation resolution calling for a meeting between the US President and the Soviet Premier (pp 11-12).

In the context of this attempt at active participation in world affairs, there was a tendency on the part of the UAR to claim for herself—and for Abdel-Nasser personally—a central place in world leadership. The people of the UAR and their leader were depicted as the trail-blazers of positive neutralism and the vanguard in the struggle for freedom and world peace. When Abdel-Nasser attended the UN General Assembly, it was explained that he was doing so in order to shoulder this new responsibility, and the UAR Press claimed that on this occasion he was actually representing the majority of mankind (pp 5-6).

**The Congo Crisis.** The UN General Assembly took place under the shadow of the Congo crisis, which was also the subject of an emergency assembly on the eve of the General Assembly (see pp 37-8). This crisis, which played a major part in the world conflict, also became for the rest of the year the dominating factor in the UAR's foreign policy. The UAR extended all-out support to Lumumba, and later to Gizenga's Stanleyville Government. She vigorously attacked the West for the policy of "new imperialism" in Africa in general and in Congo in particular. The UAR's relations with Belgium deteriorated sharply, leading at the end of the year to the confiscation of all Belgian property in the country.

The Congo crisis also resulted in the UAR adopting a hostile attitude towards the UN and its SG. In speeches by the leaders and in Press and radio comments the UN was presented as an instrument of Western imperialism in the Congo and, after recurrent clashes with the UN Command in the Congo, the UAR contingent of the UN force was finally withdrawn early in 1961 (p 25 ff).

The line adopted by the UAR on the Congo ran parallel with Soviet policy. There were reports of co-ordination with Communist countries in the support of Lumumba and the supply of material and political aid to the Stanleyville Government. However, although the UAR's attacks on the UN SG resembled those of the Communist countries, she did not follow the Russian lead in demanding his resignation and the setting up of a three-man Secretariat. This was in line with the attitude of the other neutralists.

**Africa.** Another significant consequence of the Congo crisis concerned the UAR's relations with African countries in general.

During 1960 the achievement of independence by 17 African countries drew the UAR increasingly into the African circle. She could now establish numerous direct and official contacts with African countries, whereas in the past most of her African activity had been centred in Cairo.

Until the Congo crisis the UAR's African policy and activities continued, on the whole, to follow well-established lines. The UAR and Abdel-Nasser were represented as the leaders of Africa, and Cairo continued to serve as a centre for African nationalists. In mid-1960 it housed some ten offices of African groups in exile, representing nationalist movements from various countries, and the centres of three inter-African organizations.

UAR broadcasts to Africa were extended. The main

themes were: support for nationalist movements, incitements to revolt against the colonial powers; denunciation of the West and of African leaders cooperating with the West; pro-Muslim and anti-Christian propaganda. More scholarships were offered to students from Africa, and it was stated that African studies were to be introduced in UAR universities.

The UAR usually supported the more extreme anti-Western factions of the nationalist movements, as has been noted in regard to the Congo, the prime example of this policy. She continued to support Felix Moumie of Cameroun, who organized terrorist activities against the government of his country, and still maintained an office in Cairo even after diplomatic relations had been established between the UAR and Cameroun. UAR spokesmen attacked as an hireling of imperialism Tom Mboya, the Kenya labour leader of the Kanu party, whose East African Labour Federation was affiliated to the ICFTU, while supporting Odinga, a leader of the same party, who was thought to be a more extreme nationalist, having connections with Communist China. Similarly, the UAR opposed the proposal of Nyerere, the moderate nationalist leader of Tanganyika, for the creation of an East African Federation.

In the Horn of Africa the UAR supported the territorial claims of newly independent Somalia, with which she had succeeded in establishing very close relations. These claims affected Ethiopian territory, which was one reason for some underlying tension in relations with Ethiopia, though the latter professed a policy of neutralism.

The UAR played a prominent part in African and Afro-Asian conferences. At the non-governmental Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Organization conference in Conakry in Apr, differences developed between the UAR and the Communist countries—especially China—which had cooperated in sponsoring the organization. The differences concerned control, which was mainly in Egyptian hands, and the proposed resolutions, which "bore a Marxist imprint." Later, compromise was reached: the UAR was left mainly in control of the organization and the Communist-sponsored resolutions were adopted (pp 22-3).

These policies in themselves, however, did not bring about an alignment of African countries based on positive neutralism, which the UAR tried to achieve in order to assert her leadership in Africa. A breakthrough in this respect ultimately came about as the result of the Congo crisis and two other developments.

The Congo crisis brought Ghana into the neutralist camp, thus facilitating cooperation between the UAR, Ghana and Guinea; secondly, the Republic of Mali joined the neutralists after the break-up of the Mali Federation; lastly, the dispute over Mauritania (pp 163-4) brought Morocco closer to the neutralist states. At the beginning of 1961 the political cooperation between the countries, the UAR and the Algerian Provisional Government culminated in the Casablanca conference (not reviewed in this volume). Though the UAR played a prominent part in this realignment, there was no evidence that Abdel-Nasser was accepted as the leader of this group—on the contrary, there were signs of rivalry among the various leaders; nor was it yet clear whether any special UAR interest was served, apart from some anti-Israel gestures.

**Relations with Western Countries.** Although UAR policies on international issues were mostly opposed to Western interests, and the UAR had clashed with the

US over Israeli questions, there was at the same time an improvement in direct relations between the UAR and Western countries.

The US granted to the UAR during the year loans amounting to \$136.2 million. Of special importance were the American wheat surpluses supplied to Syria, which had suffered badly from consecutive years of drought. The State Department made every effort to support the case of the UAR in the *Cleopatra* incident. Abdel-Nasser met President Eisenhower while attending the UN General Assembly, and defined the meeting as a "constructive step... to enable the Arab and the American peoples to form friendly and stable relations."

Relations with the UK also improved. They were dominated by prolonged negotiations over the re-establishment of full diplomatic relations, which had been severed in 1956 during the Suez campaign and re-established at the level of *Chargés d'Affaires* in Dec 1959. One reason for the repeated delays was the UAR leaders' conviction of Britain's hostility towards Arab nationalism. Another was Britain's reluctance to permit the opening of UAR consulates in British-protected areas in East Africa and the Persian Gulf, where she held positions which the UAR had incessantly broadcast its intention to eliminate. The exchange of Ambassadors was finally agreed upon in Jan 1961 (pp 517, 534 ff). There were also other measures to normalize relations and efforts by both sides to develop trade ties.

Diplomatic relations with France, which had also been severed in 1956, were not renewed. The UAR continued to attack her on the grounds of the Algerian issue, her relations with Israel, and the nuclear tests in the Sahara.

The German Federal Republic and Greece were the NATO countries with the closest relations with the UAR. The GFR provided her with increasing economic and technical aid, and over 5,000 UAR citizens were studying in West Germany.

The continued friendly relations between the UAR and Greece were underlined by Abdel-Nasser's state visit to Greece in June—his first to a European non-Communist country.

There were no major developments in the UAR's relations with the NATO countries not mentioned.

Diplomatic relations with Australia, which had been severed in 1956, were re-established in Mar 1960.

**Direct Relations with the Communist Countries.** While direct relations between the UAR and Western countries thus improved, there were also further favourable developments in the relations between the UAR and Communist countries, in addition to the understanding on international issues already discussed.

There was an attempt to patch over the 1959 crisis mentioned above. Since the arms deal in 1955, Abdel-Nasser declared, the Soviet Union had never attempted to interfere in the UAR's affairs. After his discussions with Premier Khrushchev in New York in Oct, during the UN General Assembly, he stated that the 1959 crisis between the two countries had been overcome, and that the UAR was sparing no effort to consolidate her friendly relations with the Soviet Union, which "constitute an ideal example in strength and social systems."

Czechoslovakia, Hungary, East Germany and the USSR granted the UAR new loans during the year to the amount of \$293.2 million, including the Russian loan of \$231.4 million for the High Dam project (p 52 ff). Practically all the UAR's arms imports continued to come



from the Communist bloc, as had been the case since autumn 1955. (For relations with Communist countries see p 80 ff.)

**Change in UAR Policy Methods.** There were some indications of a gradual change in the methods of UAR foreign policy, though the aims remained the same.

There was a shift of emphasis, perhaps as the outcome of changing circumstances rather than out of choice, from direct action in the Arab and African countries to diplomatic action on the international scene, especially in neutralist forums, where the UAR was trying to build up a position of strength.

## VIEWS AND POLICIES: THE UAR IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

### THE THREE REVOLUTIONS

[On the theme of the UAR's "three revolutions"—national, social and Arab—see pp 469–70. The national revolution, says Abdel-Nasser, aims at ridding the Arab nation of imperialism, and it has further developed "into a faith in positive neutralism... as the road to universal peace..."]

### THE UAR'S ROLE IN THE WORLD

**UAR—Great Power in the Making.** Abdel-Nasser, Hama, 16 Oct: "On the day the United Arab Republic was proclaimed I said I saw that a great power was appearing in the East. I meant what I said because I was looking at this great strong people who for the first time in modern history have created a Republic with their own hands—the United Arab Republic." (*Eg. Gaz.*, 17 Oct)

**Challenge to World Powers—Based on Strength of UAR's People.** Abdel-Nasser, Damascus, 16 Oct: "When we declared our autonomous position and made it clear that the rights we had secured should remain unmolested, some people said, 'Why all this challenge? Why this defiance of great world powers? We are not sufficiently strong to defy these powers, the big imperialist powers which intend to place us within their sphere of influence... We ought to pursue a more understanding line of diplomacy...'"

"By saying so they served the interests of colonialism. We refused to listen to them. When we 'challenge,' as they say, we feel confident we are working with a strong Arab people that believes firmly in its right to freedom and worthy existence. There are 30 million people in the United Arab Republic.

"This is the secret behind the power and the strength of our Republic." (*Eg. Gaz.*, 19 Oct)

**UAR's Moral Power.** Abdel-Nasser, Cairo, 25 Apr: "Our country may not be a great power with frightening weapons, but we possess strong moral powers and are positive in facing problems and can make our voice heard and respected." (*Eg. Gaz.*, 26 Apr)

**Example to Fighters for Freedom.** Abdel-Nasser, Alexandria, 24 June: "The UAR mission which went to all countries in Latin America notices how the people there look upon you with great respect and admiration for you rely on yourselves, your faith and on God. They admire your struggle for you do not rely on atomic weapons or on gigantic navies..."

"All the peoples who are fighting for their independence and freedom are following the example set by our good people..."

"All the countries [of Africa] copy your example in their struggle for the winning of their liberty and independence." (*Eg. Mail*, 25 June)

**UAR as Vanguard in World Struggle for Freedom.** Abdel-Nasser, Cairo, 15 Dec: "Our people have to

shoulder the responsibility of their being the vanguard for freedom; and the UAR has to comply with its responsibilities as the base for freedom..."

"If imperialism in Algeria is striking at liberty and freedom by power and might then it is our duty here to work towards more power so that our power might become a strong support to liberty..."

"And if imperialism in the Congo is trying to impose ignorance, then it is our duty to destroy the blockade imposed there by imperialism with a view to letting the light of liberty enter into the heart of the African continent..."

"It is with this consciousness that we defy ignorance and darkness of spirit and resist myriads of colonialist forces with all our might to help truth prevail and elements of evil to be vanquished.

"It is with this consciousness that we raise high the banner of freedom over the world.

"May God bless this country, which began as a staunch adherent to liberty and has now become its foremost champion." (*Eg. Gaz.*, 16 Dec)

**The Arabs as Teachers of Mankind in Past and Future.** Kamāl ad-Din Hussein, Alexandria, 26 July: "The struggle of this country has been regarded as an ideal example for others in different parts of the world..."

"The horizon before us is only matched by that immortal civilization which the Arabs had in the past. We want to reach what we had in the past and this is not difficult and we can even do more. History will repeat itself and we will again be the teachers of the nations in freedom, peace, brotherhood and the application of social justice." (*Eg. Gaz.*, 27 July)

**Success of Internal Development Needed to Assure Respect of the World.** Abdel-Nasser, Cairo, 16 Apr: "We consider that we have a great duty... to consolidate our independence and the independence of those states which recently... acquired independence [or] which have not yet attained independence.

"We also have a big responsibility towards ourselves for we should work to develop and double our income in ten years. Then the world will look to us with respect. The nations of the world follow our plans and the struggle of this people which is determined to lead a life of dignity and freedom and to work to attain this life." (*Eg. Gaz.*, 17 Apr)

**Abdel-Nasser's Role as a Leader in World Affairs.** See p 6.

### THE ENEMY: WESTERN IMPERIALISM

**Western Imperialism Goes Back to the Crusades.** Abdel-Nasser, Mansura, 7 May: "The battle of Mansura [the Muslim victory over the Crusaders in 1250]... represents one of the battles we are still fighting even now in all parts of the Arab nation..."



"As we review the imperialist conspiracies, and as we recall our history, we see that our present battle against imperialism is not a new one. It is an old battle; for imperialism at all times tried to crush Arab nationalism..."

"The Crusades were, in fact, a battle between imperialism and Arabs; religion had nothing to do with it..."

"Since that time, brethren, names have changed, but the goal remains the same—the goal is imperialism and domination. The battles were always similar and the goals were also similar. The aggressors were always the same and the purpose of the aggression was the same, that is, to destroy Arab nationalism and to restore imperialism and domination..."

"In Oct 1956, we received a Franco-British ultimatum from the descendants of the invaders of 1250. This ultimatum was sent to us by Eden and Mollet—war criminals..."

"They wanted to annex Port Said, Ismailia and Suez in just the same way as Louis IX wanted to take Mansura and Cairo in 1250..."

"General Giraud, after arriving in Damascus, entered the tomb of Saladin (Salāh ad-Dīn) and said 'Here we are, back, Saladin.' General Allenby, in World War I, occupied Jerusalem. The day he occupied it he announced that 'today, the Crusade War, which began 800 years ago, has come to an end'." (*Eg. Gaz.*, 8 May)

**Imperialism Attacks Arab Unity.** Abdel-Nasser, Aleppo, 15 Oct: "When imperialism, the imperialistic stooges, the agents of London and Paris, and the other agents who get dollars from the US, attack us and work against the interests of our country we only tell them that we are aware of their methods."

"When imperialism and its 'dogs' attack our call for Arab nationalism and Arab unity, and when imperialism and its 'dogs' attack our unity and our republic, we feel satisfied because we understand that our historical development is advancing on the right road..."

"Imperialism believes that by causing harm to Arab nationalism and unity, it can safeguard its existence here. In order to harm and hurt the call for Arab unity and nationalism imperialism has been attacking the UAR." (*Eg. Gaz.*, 16 Oct)

**Imperialism Concentrates its Attack on Syria.** Abdel-Nasser, Hama, 16 Oct: "Imperialism believed that if it were to destroy Syria, cut it to pieces, destroy Arab nationalism in it, and establish various nationalisms there instead of Arab nationalism, it would destroy Arab nationalism in its entirety." (*Eg. Gaz.*, 17 Oct)

Abdel-Nasser, Damascus, 16 Oct: "When I see imperialism focussed its attack on Syria, I feel that it is making a hopeless effort to untie the knot which has prevented imperialism from spreading its influence in this area of the world." (*Eg. Gaz.*, 19 Oct)

**Israel Created by Imperialism to Destroy Arab Unity.** Abdel-Nasser, at the UN General Assembly, 27 Sept: "The logic of imperialism, as manifested in its crime against the people of Palestine, has been to break the geographical unity of the Arab world, on the one hand, and, on the other, to create for itself in the very heart of the Arab world a base from which to threaten the Arab peoples. I believe no stronger proof of this could be given than the conspiracy which led to the tripartite aggression against us in 1956." (*A/PV*, 873, 27 Sept)

[For more on Israel and Zionism, see pp 171-3.]

**Treachery Always Overcome by the People.** Abdel-Nasser, Aleppo, 15 Oct: "Treacheries have followed one another

for hundreds of years, but the Arab people have always emerged victorious and treacheries were trampled underfoot. Similarly there existed many stooges of imperialism in our midst for many hundreds of years, but they were all eradicated by our people. Such was our past and such is our present. And such, with God's will, will be our future..."

**Traitors Torn to Pieces** (continued). "Conspiracy took place in Palestine... What has become of the traitors? What has happened to King Abdullah and Abdul Ilah and others who sold Arab territory to Zionism? The Arab peoples refused to pardon their vile crime; killed them and trampled them underfoot, and even cut them to pieces and threw them to vultures and dogs." (*Eg. Gaz.*, 16 Oct)

[For more on the theme of Arab traitors, see pp 116-18.]

## THE NEW IMPERIALISM

**Suez Campaign—End of Military Imperialism.** Abdel-Nasser, at the UN General Assembly, New York, 27 Sept: "Four years ago the African continent witnessed the end of one era of colonialism, and today the African continent witnesses a new form of imperialism. The aggression on Suez was the end of unmasked imperialism, and its graveyard. The real meaning of Suez to liberation movements in Asia and Africa was that an era had gone forever, an era in which imperialist forces were able to possess and mobilize armies and launch fleets to strike deadly blows at the liberation movements. The Suez war has proved that the victim of aggression has its own armies and that freedom has its supporters everywhere in the world... As a result, the imperialist tide withdrew from our shores and was defeated. Its defeat marked the end of armed ambitions, after which it was necessary for imperialism to look for other means to achieve its aims." (For source, see below.)

**From Suez to Congo—the Period of "Imperialist Vacillation"** (continued). "Thus after Suez we witnessed what may be called the period of 'imperialist vacillation.' It was a period in which imperialism stood perplexed in the midst of its designs and ambitions, and the strongholds of freedom—the various liberation movements—were able to strengthen themselves. Its ambitions summoned it to strike, and strike boldly, the realities of life told it to refrain."

"This period of imperialist hesitation was clearly apparent during the revolt of the people of Iraq... We saw imperialism seething in anger, mass its armies and organize its fleets... Following the first hour of anger, we saw imperialism awakening to the realities, finding itself uncertain, not knowing what to do with the armies and the fleets... (For source, see below.)

**Congo—The New Imperialism Unmasked** (continued). "The recent events of the Congo... showed us how imperialism had tried to benefit from the Suez lesson... We saw the tide of Belgian imperialism in the Congo fail to meet with force the African wave of liberation; on the contrary, we saw Belgian imperialism confront this liberation movement not with hesitation but with a quick withdrawal—or, rather, an outward show of a quick withdrawal..."

"As proven later by events—it was a manoeuvre to strike at freedom, and to strike at it from behind. Imperialism thought that the surge of freedom was but an emotional eruption, which sooner or later was bound to consummate itself, become exhausted and die away..." (For source, see below.)

**New Imperialism Exploits UN (continued).** "However, the greater danger that confronts the people of the Congo, a danger which we ourselves share, is that imperialism is trying to take the UN as a mask to conceal its designs. This imperialist manoeuvre today has two victims: the people of the Congo and the UN..." (*A/PV*, 873, 27 Sept)

**The New Economic Imperialism.** Kamāl Rif'at, Dec: "The European powers are in urgent need of new permanent markets for their immense production to maintain their peoples' standard of living. For this reason Europe is earnestly thinking of developing backward colonial territories to enable them to absorb as much European merchandise as possible, and the only way to do this is to grant the African colonial territories a sham independence while retaining economic control over them..." (*Eg. Gaz.*, 12 Dec)

Abdel-Nasser, New Delhi, 31 May: "Our peoples also have to work hard in order to face economic blocs, monopoly trends and the clear continuing manoeuvres aimed at reducing prices of raw materials at a time when attempts and manoeuvres are made to increase prices of industrial manufactured goods." (*Eg. Gaz.*, 1 Apr)

**New Imperialism Attempts to Monopolize Science.** Abdel-Nasser, New Delhi, 31 Mar: "Our peoples have to be ready to face the desire to monopolize science as means to master the world. It is no exaggeration to say that science monopoly will become the new method of imperialism." (*Eg. Gaz.*, 1 Apr)

Abdel-Nasser, at Aligarh University, India, 2 Apr: "The great challenge facing our nations lies in the field of learning... the monopoly of science will be the new imperialism. Our universities in Africa and Asia, therefore, are the bastions in the battle of freedom and development." (*BBC*, 2 Apr)

#### RELATIONS WITH THE WESTERN POWERS

**"Free World" Enemy of Freedom.** Abdel-Nasser on "Algerian Day," Cairo, 1 Nov: "The so-called free world is in fact the enemy of freedom and independence. This is what we witness in Algeria. The blood of one million Algerians does not only fall on the shoulders of France. Those million Algerians were killed by French forces and French weapons and also by the weapons and money which the Western states supplied to France..." (*Eg. Gaz.*, 2 Nov)

**Improved Relations with West Due to West's Accommodation to UAR's Policy.** Abdel-Nasser in an interview with a Canadian correspondent, Cairo, 8 Feb:

Q: "It seems that the West's policy towards the UAR has improved during the past few months. To what do you attribute this change?"

A: "Our concern is the fact that our own policy has not changed. From the beginning we announced that we would follow an independent policy and that any pressure aimed at obliging us to change this policy would not mean a thing. We have proved to the world the virtue of the independent policy."

"If the West has begun to improve its policy towards us, as you say, then the only reason to which such a change could be attributed would be the fact that the West has begun to understand the facts of our policy and the extent of our determination to follow it." (*Eg. Gaz.*, 9 Feb)

**Great Powers' Failure—Arabs Will Ignore Them.** Abdel-Nasser, Alexandria, 24 June: "The UAR managed... to

emerge triumphant against the Anglo-French aggression. The great powers which imagined that they could dominate this people... have in fact destroyed their own reputation as first class world powers." (*Eg. Mail*, 25 June)

Abdel Nasser, Hama, 20 Feb: "The statements [on the Palestine question] made by certain circles in Britain, the US and France are meaningless to us."

"We declare to the entire world that we shall regain our rights with our own hands..."

"The time has gone when the great powers ignored us and regarded our people as good for nothing but words." (*Eg. Gaz.*; *Ahram*, 21 Feb)

**Tripartite Declaration "Buried at Port Said."** Abdel-Nasser, Damascus, 22 Feb: "Where was the tripartite declaration when Britain and France launched aggression against Egypt?..."

"The Tripartite declaration, brethren, was... buried under the blood of the martyrs of Port Said. This declaration is gone for good. We do not choose to be under the influence of any big or small country." (*Eg. Gaz.*, 23 Feb)

**Western Economic Aid Welcome.** Abdel-Nasser in interview with a Canadian correspondent, Cairo, 8 Feb: Asked whether the West might still share in the construction of the High Dam, the President answered that this project was already being carried out with the aid of the USSR. "However," he added, "the UAR development policy includes many projects other than the High Dam, in the fields of industry, power and agriculture. We welcome any move to help us carry out the great programme aimed at developing our country." (*Ahram*; *Eg. Gaz.*, 9 Feb)

**Improvement of UAR-US Relations Hampered by US Ties with Imperialism and Zionism.** Abdel-Nasser, Cairo, 9 July [after speaking of the UAR's cooperation with the Soviet Union]: "At the same time, it was a matter of great regret for us that the hand we extended to the US for cooperation did not receive the desired response, on account of the relationship between American policy and that of the imperialist powers from which we suffered."

"Similarly, the ties between US policy and world Zionism have always been an obstacle to our attempts to come to an understanding with America."

"It was also a matter for regret that the US could not appreciate the ever-growing force of the Arab peoples and that, therefore, American policy in our area found itself at sea, achieving no purpose beyond its connection with imperialism, Zionism and certain stooges and reactionaries."

"In fairness to the US, we should place on record its attitude during the aggression against Egypt in 1956, regardless of the fact that American policy soon after the aggression attempted to carry out the same aims of the aggression by different means..." (*Eg. Gaz.*, 10 July)

**Towards Understanding with the US.** Abdel-Nasser in interview with American journalists, 21 Mar: "We always desire to be bound to the US by mutual understanding based on mutual respect. I believe that, during the past three years, our relations have begun to enter a stage which can be described as the stage of improvement in relations. However, ... there has always been a barrier constantly preventing the establishment of better relations between our countries... your support of Israel

against the Arab countries. (*Ahram*, 22 Mar; *BBC*, 24 Mar)

Abdel-Nasser reporting to the NA on his attendance at the UN General Assembly, Cairo, 12 Oct: "My talks with the President of the US took place in a cordial atmosphere, and were based on frankness and directed to finding a suitable foundation for a proper understanding between our two peoples."

"I regarded that meeting as a constructive step towards finding a solid foundation for constant and stable friendship between the Arab and American peoples." (*Eg. Gaz.*, 13 Oct) (See also p 12 on Abdel-Nasser-Eisenhower meeting.)

**On American Aid.** Abdel-Nasser, Mansura, 7 May: "Today we hear a wonderful line in imperialistic and western broadcasting [and] newspapers. This line is that unless Abdel-Nasser allows Israeli ships to pass through the Suez Canal, American aid and wheat would cease to be given to the UAR. These people are raving..."

"It would be a profound mistake on the part of these [American] Senators to think that they can dominate us. They should learn lessons from past events. At the same time they must know that on no account would we accept any conditional assistance. We are honest people. We buy wheat and pay its price in full and we take loans and refund them plus four per cent interest." (*Eg. Gaz.*, 8 May)

**United Kingdom Opposes Arab Nationalism.** Abdel-Nasser in interview with W. Wyatt, Sept: "We feel that the UK is working in the Middle East against Arab nationalism. We feel also that the UK until now looks at Arab nationalism as a menace..."

Q: "In what way are we working against you, as you say, in the Middle East?"

A: "Well, through the agents of the UK in the Middle East, who are using some people in the Middle East against the UAR and against Arab nationalism; some feudal and reactionary elements upon whom Britain depends..."

Q: "But do you think we can stop this somehow and really get through to real friendship, or not?"

A: "Well, for instance, take the broadcasts of the BBC beamed to the Arab countries. If I find in them things that are hostile to Arab nationalism and hostile to the UAR, what must be my impression of your policy? Then, if I look at your friends or your agents in the Middle East and watch their behaviour, I must see in the combination that your behaviour in the Middle East is hostile. What must be my impression? How could I put an end to that? The initiative is in your hands..." (For source, see below.)

**UAR and Britain in Africa (continued).**

Q: "Why do you attack the British, Mr President, in Africa... about our colonial rule? I thought most of you could agree that we're doing quite well on the whole—the independence of Ghana and Nigeria, the talks on Kenya and Nyasaland and so on."

A: "Well, we don't attack you. We attack colonialism. We are against colonialism..." (*Eg. Gaz.*, 4 Sept)

**European Common Market Harmful to the UAR.** Abdel-Nasser in interview with West German journalists, Cairo, 25 Jan:

Q: "Do you consider the European Common Market harmful to the Arab economy?"

A: "You well know what effect the Great Powers' eco-

nomie grouping may have: for example, the admission into such groups of certain colonialist countries like France, and consequently, the opportunities open to them to obtain raw materials such as cotton from their colonies and the facilities obtained by the colonialist countries based on the colonialist status itself. This naturally will have its effect upon us." (*R. Cairo*, 26 Jan; *BBC*, 28 Jan)

Baghdad Pact and CENTO. See p 520.

## THE UNITED NATIONS

**Complete Acceptance of UN Charter and Resolutions.** Abdel-Nasser at UN General Assembly, New York, 27 Sept: "I say that there is no... problem for whose solution we are not ready to accept the Charter of the UN and its principles, the resolutions of the UN and its recommendations for a just settlement, with the best of goodwill..." (For source, see below.)

**The UN Criticized (continued).** From this hope in the United Nations, from this unrestricted readiness to co-operate within its framework, we derive our absolute right fearlessly to confront the circumstances that lately surrounded the work of the UN...

"Imperialism [in the Congo] is trying to use the UN as a mask to conceal its designs..." (For a fuller quotation, see pp 515-6.)

"In our part of the world, the Arab East, the UN has forgotten its Charter and disregarded its responsibilities towards the rights of the people of Palestine..."

"One of the extremely important matters is that the UN should not forget itself. It should not forget its Charter and it should not forget its resolutions. Otherwise, we would be encouraging those who tried to disregard the UN and ignore its existence."

"We have before us the shocking and flagrant example of this ignoring in the policy of France towards Algeria..."

"We sometimes feel that there is an attempt on the part of some big Powers to look upon the UN as a tool they can use in the cold war." (*A/PV*, 873, 27 Sept)

**UAR Must Safeguard UN Against Imperialist Machinations.** Abdel-Nasser, Alexandria, 24 June: "On speaking of the UN Charter we profoundly think of the imperialist powers which use that Charter as a means to the fulfilment of their aims... and when we speak of the principles of the United Nations we feel that we have a great task to perform and remain ever vigilant so that the colonialist powers may not use the UN Charter to further their own ends." (*Eg. Mail*, 25 June)

## COMMUNISM AND RELATIONS WITH COMMUNIST COUNTRIES

**Soviet Economic Aid.** Abdel-Nasser, Damietta, 8 May: "We remember today... that we signed a treaty of economic cooperation with the Soviet Union early in 1958 and negotiated a loan of nearly LE65 million with the Soviet Union in Jan 1958, to help industrialization and economic development. Today, we are opening a mill which is the fruit of this agreement. An agreement was reached with the Soviet Union for the construction of factories worth LE40 million from Jan 1958 until now." [For source, see below.]

**Soviet Aid Unaffected by Political Differences (continued).** "I take this opportunity to thank the Soviet Union, which is cooperating with us to develop our economy and



has faithfully and truly implemented the economic agreement in spite of the apparent and clear differences between us over social principles, and in spite of the clouds which for some time hung over our relationship." (For source, see below.)

**Soviet Policy Praised** (continued). "The economic agreement was not affected, and at no time did we hear the Soviet Union threaten an economic boycott or make fun of us because it was giving us economic assistance and a loan to industrialize our country. I must, therefore, express our admiration of the noble policy which the Soviet Union adopted at that time." (*Eg. Gaz.*, 9 May)

**No Soviet Interference in UAR Affairs.** Abdel-Nasser asserted at a Press conference on 10 June that there was no Communist penetration whatsoever in the UAR, and said that "the Soviet Union made no effort to interfere in our affairs."

Since the first commercial contacts with the Soviet Union in 1955 (the arms deal), "there was no single instance of an attempt at penetration or infiltration." The Soviet technicians working in the UAR were "nothing but technicians." (*Eg. Mail*, 11 June)

**UAR-USSR Understanding on International Questions.** Abdel-Nasser on his meetings with PM Khrushchev in New York, Cairo, 12 Oct: "I also had two meetings with Mr. Nikita Khrushchev, PM of the Soviet Union. These meetings enabled us to renew an old friendship based on mutual respect for the viewpoints and ideologies of the other."

"The first meeting was devoted to the international situation, its developments, and the probable outcome of the proceedings of the UN General Assembly. I felt Mr Khrushchev's sincere desire to find a basis for peaceful co-existence. I also felt his deep regret of the circumstances which caused the failure of the Paris Conference, which he was the first to propose and was most enthusiastic about."

"We also discussed, at our meeting, various other important issues, including disarmament and political and economic freedom in Africa and Asia." (*Eg. Gaz.*, 13 Oct)

**UAR Backing for Soviet Disarmament Proposals.** Abdel-Nasser, Alexandria, 24 June: "We demand cessation of atomic tests and banning of nuclear weapons, hence our backing of the Soviet memorandum [on disarmament]. We demand liquidation of aggressive military bases and military pacts. We stand for complete disarmament and for the setting up of an all-embracing system of arms inspection to ensure proper disarmament. These views are contained in the Soviet proposals and therefore we declared that we support these proposals on the grounds that they facilitated arrival at the constructive settlement of the disarmament issue so that peace might prevail in the world." (*Eg. Mail*, 25 June; *BBC*, 27 June)

[NOTE: The mention of aggressive military bases refers especially to Western bases in the ME and Mediterranean. Abdel-Nasser referred in the same speech to the Malta and Cyprus bases from which "in 1956 the attacks were lodged" in the Suez campaign.]

**1959 Crisis Overcome, Friendship Firm.** Abdel-Nasser on his meetings with PM Khrushchev in New York, Cairo, 12 Oct: "The second meeting dealt mainly with direct relations between the Soviet Union and the UAR. Following the pattern of frankness which constitutes the base of our international relations, it was necessary that

we should discuss the crisis which occurred in relations between our two countries in 1959.

"Although that crisis was ended by our attempt to have mutual understanding of the attitude of one another, it was necessary that we should discuss the developments of that crisis with utmost frankness, in order to consolidate the foundation of friendship between the two countries. We are sparing no effort to consolidate and strengthen this friendship because we confidently believe our friendly relations with the Soviet Union constitute an ideal example of relations between countries regardless of differences in strength and in social systems."

"These relations provide outstanding evidence of the independent policy adopted by the UAR..." (*Eg. Gaz.*, 13 Oct)

Abdel-Nasser, Damietta, 8 May: "We feel that the friendship which brought the Soviet and Arab peoples together is strong and firm, and clouds which appear over the relationship of our two countries over social and political doctrines can in no way affect this friendship." (*Eg. Gaz.*, 9 May)

**International Communism Opposes Arab Nationalism.** Abdel-Nasser said in Bombay on 9 Apr that international Communism was "carrying on large propaganda against Arab nationalism." (*Eg. Gaz.*, 10 Apr)

**Arab Nationalism Will Prevail Over Communism.** Abdel-Nasser, Athens, 10 June [in answer to a question about rumoured Communist penetration in the Arab world]: "All our peoples are politicians and they are smart." (*Eg. Mail*, 11 June)

In interview with American journalist, 25 Apr:

Q: "Do you feel that the Middle East has nothing to worry about?" [referring to the possibility of volunteers from Communist China joining the forces of the FLN in Algeria].

A: "I am certain that no Communist elements will, whatever happens, influence Arab nationalism in the Arab countries, including Algeria. On the contrary, the ideas of Arab nationalism will finally prevail and will always prevail..." (For source, see below.)

**No Fear of Communist Infiltration in Spite of Communist Assistance** (continued): "Look at the Algerian problem as the case of the Algerian country and the Algerian nation. Since the Algerian revolution started, one million Algerian people were killed, which means that one tenth of that nation met its fate. That is why I believe if the Algerian people receive assistance it will save one million sons of that nation from death."

"As to my opinion of Communist infiltration please look as an example to Egypt and Syria. Where is that Communist infiltration? The American Press was saying for a long time that we are under Communist influence, and kept repeating that we face the danger of Communist infiltration as a result of the arms deals which we concluded with the Communist countries and because of our economic relations with those states." (*Eg. Gaz.*, 26 Apr)

**Sofia Sheltering Syrian Communists, Enemies of Arab Nationalism.** Abdel-Nasser, Aleppo, 18 Feb: "Where now are the Communist leaders who, in the past, used national slogans and then betrayed their nationalism and Arabism?"

"They are now in Sofia, living on foreign funds and foreign assistance. They are trying to fight the principles in which you have faith." (*Eg. Gaz.*, 18 Feb)



## POSITIVE NEUTRALISM AND NON-ALIGNMENT

**UAR's Policy is Pro-UAR.** Abdel-Nasser in interview with W. Wyatt, Sept: "We are not pro-Russian or pro-American or pro-UK. We are pro our people; whatever we say is pro our people." (*Eg. Gaz.*, 4 Sept)

**Aim of Non-Alignment Policy to Safeguard Independence.** Abdel-Nasser, at Press conference, Bombay, 9 Apr, praised the policy of non-alignment in world politics. He said this policy was not aimed at exploiting differences between the two cold-war blocs but at preserving his nation's independence. (*Eg. Gaz.*, 10 Apr)

**Non-Alignment Safeguards Independence and Conducive to Peace.** Abdel-Nasser at UN General Assembly, New York, 27 Sept: "The UAR believes in the policy of non-alignment... It ensures its independence on the one hand, and is conducive to the preservation of lasting peace on the other. In spite of all pressure we refused to become tools in the cold war." (*A/PV*, 873, 27 Sept)

**UAR's Policy for Achievement of Peace.** Abdel-Nasser, Cairo, 21 July: "Our direction to peace is through the preservation of our independence, through fighting military blocs and easing the tension of cold war, through the consolidation of the UN Charter, through strengthening the Afro-Asian solidarity, through resisting racial discrimination, through attempting to narrow the gulf between the industrially developed countries and the countries still looking forward to such development, and through facing domination over the prices of raw materials and of manufactured goods based on the policy of economic fanaticism." (*Eg. Gaz.*, 22 July)

**Against Military Pacts.** Abdel-Nasser, in interview with American journalist, Cairo, 25 Apr: "We are against military pacts. We feel that any military organization which includes a big power will enable such a power to control the small nations, especially since the small nations cannot stand on equal footing with big powers in such military pacts or organizations."

"Furthermore, we do not believe that military pacts are the right method of maintaining peace." (*Eg. Gaz.*, 26 Apr)

**Moral Force.** Abdel-Nasser, upon his return from India and Pakistan, Cairo, 16 Apr: "If I had to choose between possessing atomic bombs and enjoying the support of moral force emanating from faith and determination, I would choose moral force, which is represented by the will of this people and that of friendly countries."

"The possessor of atomic bombs cannot protect himself from destruction, but the possessor of moral force can. Moral force in all countries represents the world conscience of which we today are in need." (*Eg. Gaz.*, 17 Apr)

Abdel-Nasser, at Press conference, Bombay, 9 Apr, asked whether in view of the fact that Egypt used military strength to repel Anglo-French-Israeli aggression in 1956 he would advocate the use of force by India to meet Chinese aggression: "I do not really believe in armed action and I believe we have to solve these questions by peaceful means. We have to use moral force."

What was the end of the armed action of the three powers in Egypt? he continued. "They had to withdraw." (*Eg. Gaz.*, 10 Apr)

**Responsibility of the Non-Aligned Countries for World Peace.** Abdel-Nasser, Alexandria, 24 June: "After the collapse of the Paris Conference, the countries adopting the policy of positive neutralism and non-alignment, as well as the countries which do not come within the framework of the cold war camps, should face their full responsibilities for easing international tension and the maintenance of peace." (For source, see below.)

**Small Nations Must Maintain Independence at UN** (continued). "It is up to small nations which haven't entered the cold war zone to try to maintain their independent status and abstain from voting at the United Nations at the discretion of big powers... If the small countries choose to be an implement of voting in favour of big powers they would not be able to face their responsibilities or play the part assigned to them by their own peoples—the independent part for the sake of international equality in international relationship and for the sake of world peace." (*Eg. Mail*, 25 June)

**UAR Must Give Lead to Neutralist Countries.** Abdel-Nasser, Alexandria, 24 June: "It is our task as exponents of positive neutrality and non-alignment to invite all countries outside the framework of the cold war to play the role of constructive states which work for peace and justice as the fundamental basis for international relationship and which endeavour to secure a solution of the question of disarmament and of peace." (*Eg. Mail*, 25 June)

**No Neutralist Bloc.** Abdel-Nasser, Athens, 10 June, asked whether it was possible or advisable to form a neutralist bloc, said that this would be unwise, and added: "We then will have to apply our policy of non-alignment to all three blocs..."

"We are looking forward to a world without blocs." (*Eg. Mail*, 11 June)

**Favourable Results of Positive Neutralism.** Joint Abdel-Nasser-Sukarno statement, Cairo, 26 Apr: "In reviewing the result of the foreign policy pursued by each of the two countries, i.e. the policy of positive neutrality and of effective independence, the two Presidents noted with great satisfaction that this foreign policy serves to develop real nationalist independence and national dignity. [They] were most happy to note that their outlook on foreign affairs contributes positively to peace and rapprochement between the conflicting international blocs." (*BBC*, 28 Apr)

## AFRO-ASIAN COUNTRIES

**Appeal to Afro-Asian Solidarity.** Joint communiqué by President Abdel-Nasser and King Muhammad V of Morocco: "Both sides appeal to the African and Asian peoples to endeavour to strengthen the ties existing among them and to continue with their solidarity and struggle so as to safeguard their freedom and independence. They also extend their hands to those who want their friendship and co-operation in accordance with the principles of the UN and the Bandung resolutions. They endeavour to support the causes of freedom and national liberation." (*Ahram*; *BBC*, 20 Jan)

**UAR to Work for Afro-Asian Solidarity.** Abdel-Nasser, Cairo, 16 Apr: "I take this opportunity to announce that we will continue to work for Afro-Asian solidarity so as to develop the moral forces which supported us in 1956, and to make ourselves a moral force which will support the Afro-Asian peoples and any people which

might face aggression the way we faced it." (*Eg. Gaz.*, 17 Apr)

**African Countries Should Follow Independent Policy.** Abdel-Nasser in interview with Canadian correspondent, Cairo, 8 Feb:

Q: "The UAR has a truly independent policy towards both the East and the West. Do you think, Mr President, that the new African nations will follow a similar policy?"

A: "The people of these nations have the first and the last word in determining their own policy."

"If we were to give an opinion in the light of our experience, we would say that an independent policy would be the best for the new African nations to follow..."

"The new African nations, which went through a long period of political struggle towards their independence, should now look forward towards development. These nations should feel that they are racing against time, and that they must double their efforts in order to accomplish the goals of their people."

"An independent and unbiased policy would be the only way to obtain means of rapid development from all sources." (*Ahram; Eg. Gaz.*, 9 Feb)

**UAR Supports African Peoples' Struggle for Freedom.** Abdel-Nasser, Alexandria, 26 July: "Looking around us, we find death in Kenya, death in Rhodesia and death in South Africa. We tell those peoples who are fighting for their freedom that the people of the UAR are with them for the sake of their freedom and independence." (*Eg. Gaz.*, 27 July)

**Baghdad Pact and CENTO.** Interview with American journalist, Cairo, 25 Apr:

Q: "What is your opinion of the former Baghdad Pact, now known as CENTO...?"

A: "... We refused to join it from the beginning and then attempts were made to force us to join it. This, as you know, reached the extent of a blockade in all its forms and also led to the aggression."

"I discussed the question of this pact with President Ayub Khan and spoke to him about all the plots of the pact against us... President Ayub Khan assured me that nothing of this sort will happen in the future... and that present policy of the states of the pact is to use it only as a defence pact and not as an instrument for any hostile action."

"If the new organization, that is, the pact which comprises Turkey, Pakistan and Iran, is a defence organization and has no hostile policy towards the Arab countries, then the question of the pact will become the domestic matter for its signatories, and we will continue to maintain our opinion about pacts in general." (*Eg. Gaz.*, 26 Apr)

**Against Alignment Based on Religion.** Abdel-Nasser at a NU Committee, Cairo, 12 July: "If there were an Islamic pact, a Christian pact and a Buddhist pact, etc., there would be too many pacts. The large powers, or some imperialistic powers, would exploit such pacts to serve their purpose. Religion must be kept separate from politics, so that it cannot be exploited by imperialistic powers..." (*Eg. Gaz.*, 13 July)

**Islamic Unity.** Abdel-Nasser, Cairo, 25 Oct: "It is not a new friendship that links us with Afghanistan. It is a prolonged friendship which goes hand in hand with the call for Islamic unity." (*Eg. Gaz.*, 26 Oct)

## POSITIVE NEUTRALISM AS POWER POLITICS

[The following article was published by the "Egyptian Economic and Political Review" in summer 1960. Headings and subheadings are given as in the original. The English has not been corrected. Deletions are indicated.]

### STRATEGIC DISARMAMENT THROUGH EXPANDING NON-ALIGNMENT

*A correspondent here gives an Arab viewpoint on disarmament and its relations to the problem of Arab Security. Though his views are his own this does not mean that they do not represent a widely supported Arab point of view.*

#### Arab Non-Alignment or the Strategy of Positive Neutrality

The UAR has a foundation of its foreign policy the doctrine of positive neutrality. This doctrine can be described as non-alignment or cooperation with the military potential of nations or groups of nations practising intensive military preparations on the excuse of defense. To be effective such a policy must withdraw from the logistical calculations of either of the Big Power blocks, Arab strategic and economic resources which might affect the balance of armed force on either side.

As envisioned by the UAR this policy must follow a staged progression towards general disarmament and the consolidation of world peace, it represents an effective Arab contribution to the work of the United Nations, and seeks ultimately to vest in that body sufficient international means to maintain peace.

#### The Objective of Policy

##### Basic Considerations Behind UAR Policy

The basic military and political consideration affecting the UAR's position with regard to the outside world resides in the "avoidance of a third world war." The reason for this is self evident, if such an event were to occur the armed forces would be compelled to face the full brunt of immensely superior nuclear armed powers seeking to secure the important strategic Arab territories for their military operations. The Imperialist would be given a magnificent excuse to reestablish his occupation, and the Israelis whose ability to take advantage of international disruption for their own interests might well secure their objective of consolidating still further the position that they have already attained. It is therefore clear that in formulating foreign policy the Arabs had to bear in mind the vital necessity to do everything possible to prevent major war.

#### The Means of Application

Though small countries like the UAR may apparently lack sufficient power or international weight to affect the fortunes of the world, a rational analysis of their position reveals that it is possible for a small power to play an effective part in world scale disarmament. Though militarily weak the Arabs occupy territories of immense strategic significance to global warfare.

If these territories and their resources could be withdrawn or neutralised as areas of great power military preparation then a strategic disarmament of the great power position in the area could be imposed upon them which would it is calculated reduce zonal tension, and doing so strengthen Arab security.

#### Danger Factors in the Middle East

In Cairo it was considered that one of the factors causing the greatest tension in the Eastern Mediterranean and

Middle East stemmed from the excessive military preparation of the NATO position in Anatolia. Turkey by 1952 had been so strengthened and presented so complete a picture of military preparation that the Western powers in their efforts to build the defense of the Eastern Mediterranean had seriously upset the balance of forces in the Black Sea, and were giving the Russians cause for anxiety for the security of the vulnerable South Russian territories of the Crimea and the Caucasus. It was well known however that so long as Turkey could not rely on secure communications through the Arab territories of Syria and Irak, with the West, then Asia Minor could never be more than a highly developed defensive position facing a potential advance from the North. The attempt initiated by the Western powers in 1954 when Irak joined and created the Baghdad pact to involve the Arab territories in the Anatolian position was a direct threat to the security of the Arabs and of world peace. Had the Western powers succeeded through the Baghdad military pact in integrating Syria into their military camp, then the Arab world would have supplied the West with one of its most valuable and most important strategic areas. The Turkish position would have assumed such threatening proportions that the Soviet Union would have been compelled to undertake elaborate military precautions in the Caucasus thereby extending the threat of war to the whole Middle Eastern area, and plunging it into one of the worst international crises of the post war era. It is not surprising if under the circumstances it was felt in Cairo that the time had come to disarm or neutralise the Western position in the Arab territories.

### The Stages of Application

#### Strategic Disarmament

##### "First Stage"

[Brief omission.]

The first stage of the strategic disarmament of the Western position in the Middle East was consolidated with the foundation of the United Arab Republic. The Union of Syria and Egypt placed in the hands of a centralised and strong Arab control the most vital communications links in the area. It effectively cut off Turkey from any appreciable land liaison with the West, and by making most of the strategic movements of petroleum and shipping between the Gulf and the Mediterranean dependent on Arab communications, the UAR completely neutralised the Middle East as a dangerous base for the eventual attack on the Soviet Union. It furthermore withdrew the ME from the tactical planning of the West and neutralised its strategic value.

The successful achievement of this first stage in Western disarmament pointed to the effectiveness of Arab Unity as a foundation to Arab security. Were it not for the close union of Egypt and Syria it is possible that the Western powers working through their creatures in the Hashemite countries, might have succeeded in isolating Egypt from the rest of the Arab world and proceeded with the systematic take over of Syria, leaving them to the tender mercies of reactionary and regressive systems based on old fashioned dynastic demagogues, serving the military requirements of their imperialist patrons. One need only reflect on the consequences were the Hashemites to have succeeded in creating a Greater Syria under their hegemony.

##### The Second Stage

One of the consequences of the successful conclusion of the first stage of ME disarmament, was that a great

part of the military potential reserved for a possible 3rd war with the Soviet Union, was turned against the Arabs. There has been a persistent misuse of NATO facilities in the direction of the Arabs. Indeed whatever active actions NATO weapons have undertaken, in recent years these have been directed solely at Arab forces.

It would be irrational for the Arabs to assume that the Western powers will stand idly by while a disarmament of their position is imposed on them, for this reason the second stage of disarmament, namely the consolidation of Arab unity in the whole of the Arab Peninsula is already encountering strong resistance.

The events of the Suez War and the creation of the UAR, as well as the collapse of the Western position in Irak uncovered the grave weakness of the Western position in the Arab Peninsula, the British virtually eliminated from the Mediterranean areas of the Middle East were painfully aware that the Southern approaches via the Indian Ocean and the Arab Gulf were already threatened by the rapid expansion of Arab nationalism and its successes. To counter these reverses new policies have been devised on the following probable lines.

[The writer proceeds to expound his opinions on the Western policy to secure political influence and/or military bases in the South of the Arabian peninsula, the Persian Gulf, Iraq, Kenya, and Libya as well as military cooperation with Israel. For a precis of the deleted passages, see p 534.]

To say therefore that the strategic disarmament of the great power position in the Middle East is complete would be highly inaccurate. It naturally follows that as long as the Western powers retain their ambitions to consolidate and expand their military bases in the Arab world, the area's security can never be assured. Too many Arab resources are still in Western hands, too many military bases, too many strong points of aggression in the Arab Gulf, in Southern Arabia, in Aden, and in Libya. The British proceed unremittingly with military preparations in all these places. Military positions of value only to them as potential bases for attacks against Arab nationalists are being built and armed. Military forces of a type and of a character that makes them destined for use only against the Arabs are being trained. Under the circumstances it is natural that the Arabs should do their utmost on behalf of disarmament. It is against this background that the present resentment felt in Cairo against Arab rulers who allow this British abuse of their position can be assessed. If such persons are regarded as traitors, the appellation is richly deserved for they are allowing the intrusion into the Middle East of European power politics with all their consequences.

It will therefore surprise no one to learn that the objectives of the second stage of strategic disarmament in the Middle East must be the disarming of all bases in the Arab territories which could be used against the Arabs to eventually reestablish a Western military position of danger to the Arabs and beyond them to world peace.

##### Securing the Second Stage:

The problem confronting Arab statesmen in their desire to secure the full withdrawal of Western military bases from the Arab areas, is a complex one which calls for great efforts on the diplomatic and political level. Summarised the objectives can be listed as follows:

- (a) The creating of confidence in the bona-fide nature of Arab peaceful intentions.
- (b) The countering and eventual defeat of the false



anti-Arab indoctrination that the Western powers have been subjected to since the Palestine war, and in consequence of their successful bid to neutralise the Western military position in the Middle East.

- (c) The proposing of a system of stability and security which can replace successfully in the eyes of the intelligent European the existing system based on military strength. This being essential to the countering of the militarist argument that the use or the threat to use force is the only means whereby security can be protected.

### The Role of the Army in Arab Strategy

To successfully promote the above objectives, the Arabs must possess sufficient military potential of their own to discourage adventuring on the part of their opponents, and it is in this context that the role of UAR armed forces can be situated. Thanks to the considerable military potential of the UAR and the known existence there of strong modern naval, air, and land forces, the Army is able to exert a deterring role on would be aggressors. In any case the favourable conditions enjoyed by British, French and Israeli aggressors in 1956 are not likely to repeat themselves in any future adventure. Indeed the difficulties experienced by the British at the time of Suez with regard to the unsuitability of Maltese and Cypriot bases, have now been considerably increased as a consequence of the attitude of the Cypriot and Maltese peoples.

Israel alone remains as a reliable base for aggression on the UAR, a base which is available to any country contemplating an attack against Arab nationalism. The recent heavy military assistance given to Israel must suggest that certain Western circles are still not convinced that military operations are futureless against the Arabs, and still believe in the value of maintaining a tension in the area.

One may therefore conclude from the above that the role of the UAR armed forces consists in supplying a deterrence to would be aggressors, and a defensive shield behind which Arab diplomacy can peacefully negotiate with the assistance of other peace seeking nations, the means whereby the United Nations can fulfil its task of promoting and maintaining security in their part of the world.

Such a role must of necessity support the theory that war cannot under any circumstances be considered as a method of solving political issues. Having discarded war as a factor of policy, the army then becomes largely an instrument of diplomacy, and in consequence closely coordinates its activity with the role it is required to fill.

### The Diplomatic Approach

Since the first task of the diplomat is to counter indoctrination, and promote a confidence in Arab motives, a certain sophisticated approach is necessary. Apart from the normal task of diplomacy which consists in representing and explaining policy, a seeking out of those elements in the world community whose tendencies and convictions represent liberal rather than authoritarian attitudes, is necessary. In all countries nowadays the proportion of peace-minded and peace-desiring citizens, heavily outnumber those of the militarists. Where democratic forms of government effectively operate, it is these communities who in the long run decide that policies of peaceful negotiations must prevail. In Britain, for instance, a strong liberal and highly vocal opposition exists facing the militarists whose decline proceeds steadily. The same can be said, though to a lesser degree of France, other

powers of magnitude such as Germany and Italy, can also be expected to support doctrines of peaceful negotiation, and taken all in all the general state of mind of the former colonialist Europeans does not present as black a picture as the European militarists, who still conserve a certain measure of power, are ready to give.

It can further be said that the doctrine of positive neutrality, has already been accepted as a suitable compromise alternative to alliance with one or the other power blocks. The resumption of assistance directed to the UAR from various Western countries is a confirmation of this acceptance. What is lacking, however, is a discernable lack of confidence in Arab motives which often emerges in the attitudes of various influential elements in the West. Almost all of these can be traceable to the concentrated anti-Arab propaganda which is such a feature of the International press reporting on this area. Since Senator Fulbright's courageous expose of the extent of Zionist influence in the United States, few honest statesmen can be unaware of the prevailing conditions; an article recently published in the "Spectator," gives a remarkably accurate picture of the process whereby the Zionists exert a considerable influence on Western thinking. There is an accumulation of evidence that in fact a much greater awareness of the extent and effect of Zionist propaganda on the thinking in the West now exists. Here too the Arabs can expect an increasingly sympathetic appreciation of their situation.

### The Appeal to Reason

A successful countering of hostile indoctrination must of necessity be followed by rational, accurate, and straightforward presentation of the Arab case. There is nothing unreasonable or difficult to understand in the Arab viewpoint. The desire to disarm the Western position in the Arab World is not motivated from a spirit of vindictiveness, rather is it the result of a logical appreciation of the situation from all its aspects, motivated by a concern for Arab security and beyond it to the general move towards a structure of world security. It is in this context that the theory of Strategic Disarmament through expanding non-alignment can be advanced.

### The Theory

Of recent months a number of highly publicised schemes for disarmament have been put forward by the great powers. Fruitless discussions have been taking place in the UN and in Europe, on disarmament, proposals of varying degrees of radicality have been advanced and theories of total disarmament whose practicability is far outstripped by its excessive optimism have been broached. The fact remains that disarmament cannot be affected from positions of strength, national pride, or national fears. Until an acceptable settlement of the German problem has been reached in Europe talk of disarmament is bound to be fruitless and short sighted, an evasion from the main problem.

Unless an alternative to Great Power disarmament can be applied then it is likely that the world waiting upon the Great Powers to settle their differences will wait indefinitely. The Arabs however believe that there is an alternative to Great Power disarmament. To begin with the term itself must be analysed.

### Disarmament

If disarmament is considered as a discarding for peace of the weapons of war, then the withdrawing of strategically important areas from the war potential of a military block is an essential process in that disarma-



ment. The Great Power complexes both possess excessive authorities, in small countries who supply them with a military assistance in terms of bases and strategic services far exceeding their size and their role of influence in policy making. In some cases compelling them to follow policies of which they are often the first victim.

Small powers, by their economic or military weakness are apt to underestimate their political bargaining position. This is illustrated forcibly by the Turkish position where because she is a minor partner of NATO the Western powers have neglected Turkey's internal economic requirements, allowed the political party with whom they were completely associated a variety of opportunities whereby the Turks suffered considerably. It can be said that Turkey's strategic position astride the passages in and out of the Black Sea have been completely unexploited as a result of her too close association with the West.

Another case in this connection is that of France who until the emergence of the strong and competent leadership of General de Gaulle tended to be regarded as a second rank partner in NATO. It was de Gaulle's insistence on a French control over NATO bombers, that imposed a new respect for France in the NATO club. In the latter case a French threat to secede from a certain level of association with the two great Western powers of Britain and the USA, was a threat of strategic disarmament of a NATO sector. The French success is a confirmation of the efficacy of such manoeuvres, as well as a demonstration of a method whereby a lesser power is able to put effective pressure on the policies of considerably great ones.

This leads one into a dissertation on the quality and value of the different levels of military power. It is obvious that power whether in weapons, force potential, strategic, logistics, and an infinity of other factors cannot be subjected to a priority nomenclature.

The value of any type of power is dependent upon factors that are frequently imponderable. The most powerful weapon is of no value if it cannot be used. In the complex system of world balance at present prevailing, it frequently happens that small countries enjoy a much greater freedom of action than large strong ones. A case in point is that of Israel in 1956 who was able to start a large scale war against Egypt when though they were ready and waiting for it neither Britain nor France, who might conceivably have claimed as much reason for attacking, were able to take the initiative.

Although a small power can start a minor local war with impunity and limited consequences, a greater power because of its infinitely wider commitments, by its very nature must exercise caution and restraint. Far ranging considerations exceeding any local priorities must be taken into account, and the cost of error can be tremendous.

Few small powers particularly if they occupy areas of strategic importance, do not have a great power champion, who is ready and willing to intervene on their behalf whenever a rival great power is in conflict with them.

This fact often considerably affects the balance of power in a given political situation, as has been demonstrated on many recent occasions. What a small power may lack in actual strike weapons, and logistic stamina, can be and often is compensated by greater freedom to use available weapons, greater freedom of action, as well as a great reserve supplied by the friendly great power.

This leads us into developing the theory that "the

relative weakness in weapons and strike power of a small country with regard to a much greater and more powerful one is in no way relevant to the actual effective usable power of the two adversaries. In many cases the smaller can be the more powerful one in a specific situation, because in addition to the natural advantages that it may possess, unless the great power aggressor can impose a rapid solution calculable in hours, he may find himself confronted with much greater forces and more dangerous situations. A good example of this resides in the strategy adopted by the United States armed forces in the Lebanon in 1958, although that country and its Arab neighbours, could put comparatively minute fire power into use against the landings, the Americans engaged what was unquestionably the greatest striking force in world history, to support these landings. Apart from the Sixth Fleet which possessed nuclear possibilities, a major, air borne operation carried the flower of the American Pentomic divisions to Middle Eastern bases, violating the airspace of neutral countries in the process and plunging the whole of Europe into a war atmosphere which took several weeks to dispell.

It may be argued that fear of a major war caused these precautions, yet basically and officially they were brought about by a political conflict in a very small country, whose entire armed forces might have had difficulty resisting a half regiment of marines with modern weapons.

We may therefore conclude that two types of power can actually exist, effective usable power and what for a better word we must term latent power usable only in conjunction with a world war implication. This second form of power is that at present possessed by the United States, the Soviet Union and other major forces and it is our suggestion that at this stage in the cold war, and providing that the stage of cold, not hot war prevails, the small nations do possess greater effective power than the large ones.

### The Small Nations

In addition to possessing a greater freedom of action, the smaller powers also enjoy the enviable distinction of controlling between them most of the major strategic areas in the world. Indeed it is debatable whether the great powers could go to war without the assistance of the smaller ones. As the world proceeds thanks to the nuclear deadlock, towards a more orderly and disciplined acceptance by nations of UN directives, the position of the smaller powers who make up a majority of the voting strength of the General Assembly improves. With this improvement comes greater responsibility and with responsibility must come a greater freedom of action and right to engage in high level discussions. The exclusion from the Summit conferences of all but the great powers can only mean that the smaller nations have not taken advantage of their effective strength and in consequence have not been able to seize opportunities available to them, and have not exploited their resources.

And since the small powers particularly those in the underdeveloped world have greater cause to seek peace, and face greater danger from its absence than the great powers it is probable that disarmament measures proposed by these can be more effective than the futile manoeuvres of the great powers now deadlocked over Germany.

### Strategic Disarmament

It can be said that a certain measure of strategic disarmament has already started to take place as a con-

sequence of the shift in emphasis from military to economic conflict in the cold war.

As more and more states in Afro-Asia attain independence and doing so adopt neutralist attitudes the ends of strategic disarmament are progressively served.

This type of disarmament as far as the small states practising it are concerned, in no way implies a reduction of their weapons of defense, indeed the contrary could well be the case, it should mean however that their strategic position and military potential is withdrawn from association with a power group's military machine, and placed at the disposal of the UN machinery where their resources are available if necessary for a collective action for peace, through the General Assembly. With the emergence of new small nations in Afro-Asia, as well as with a growing self assertiveness of the small nation front the UN General Assembly will increasingly reflect third group thinking.

It therefore follows that as the non-alignment front expands in the UN there is occurring a progressive expansion of the area of strategic disarmament. What is here lacking is undoubtedly a planning whereby the process can be rendered into an effective expression of defense doctrine.

The UAR has perhaps gained the most experience from the process, its policy as we have already seen is fundamentally peaceful, though continually threatened by powers possessing latently aggressive tendencies. Stimulated by its consciousness of this and determined to do everything possible to avert war, the UAR pursues policies that are fundamentally opposed to the formation of blocks that have succeeded in dividing the various states members of the UN and as a consequence have encouraged the spread of a war anxiety in the world. If it feels that small nations will ultimately find their main guarantee of safety in the UN, it is because first

of the small powers it has experienced an effective UN intervention on its behalf.

In conclusion it is suggested here that the successful neutralising of the great power position in the Arab world, by a small country is a step in the direction of general disarmament. That such disarmament should start by a withdrawing of strategic areas from the military planning of great power groups, and should through the United Nations become the expression of a small power doctrine of disarmament which the minor powers are able to fulfil and promote. It is suggested that strategic disarmament is an essential preliminary to tactical and weapons disarmament, and that its implementation in the Arab world of the Middle East is proof of its effectiveness as a peace measure. Since the collapse of the Baghdad Pact there has been a marked reduction in the tension in the area, and a considerable improvement in the economic conditions of its peoples.

It is also suggested that as continental Africa slowly liberates itself from the control of Europe, the move towards strategic disarmament is gaining impetus, and becoming more and more an expression of a majority viewpoint of the Afro-Asian communities. Described by Indian thinkers as the theory of an expanding area of peace, by the Arabs as positive neutrality the process can accurately be defined as a theory of Strategic Disarmament through expanding non-alignment.

Although the Afro-Asian peoples on no account seek to negotiate military or political strategies with their neighbours, there is no doubt that they would welcome the initiation of a serious debate amongst the committed small nations, especially those occupying important strategic positions in the Mediterranean, in Eastern Europe, in which they can examine the desirability of strategic disarmament. (*The Egyptian Economic and Political Review*, July-Aug, 1960)

## AGREEMENT BETWEEN UAR (EGYPTIAN REGION) AND USSR ON CONSTRUCTION OF ASWAN HIGH DAM

### BACKGROUND NOTE

The High Dam is being built 6 km. south of the present Aswan Dam. It is to be 110 m. high, just over 5 km. long, 1,300 m. wide at the base and over 30 m. wide at the top. The artificial lake to be thus created will stretch upstream for over 500 km. and will make it necessary to displace some 80,000 people, now living mostly in the Sudan. (The division of Nile water between the Egyptian Region and Sudan, as well as the compensation payable to the latter for the flooding of Wadi Halfa, was settled in a special agreement signed in 1959.) The lake (three times as large as what is now the largest man-made lake at the Hoover Dam) will hold up to 130,000 million cu.m. of water. The Nile's annual flow varies from 40,000 to 150,000 million cu.m. The hydro-electric power plant of the project will have an output of 10,000 million kw-h per year.

Originally, the Dam and the power plant were to be built in two stages together taking ten years: the first comprising the erection of the two coffer dams and the diversionary channels; the second was to include the building of the High Dam itself and the installation of eight generating units, as well as part of the land reclamation work. A six-year supplementary stage was to complete the hydro-electric plant and the land reclamation.

As will be seen, the two agreements concluded between the UAR and the Soviet Union in 1958 and 1960 led to the integration of the first two stages into one, while the execution of the third stage was left to be decided upon later.

The total cost of the first two stages is variously estimated at LE200-250 million, including LE115 million in foreign currency, and that of the third stage at LE150 million.

**Economic Significance.** While the present Aswan Dam can regulate the Nile flow during one yearly cycle of flood and low water only, the High Dam will enable it to be evened out as between a number of years of greatly varying flow. This will expand Egypt's arable area from 6 to some 7.3 million acres, and enable another 700,000 acres, now irrigated only at the height of the Nile flood, to be irrigated all the year round. Flood losses will be avoided and Nile navigation improved, while cheap electricity will facilitate industrialization. Per capita electricity consumption is to rise from 60 to 400 kw-h, and the completion of the project is to raise national income in the Egyptian Region by 25 per cent.

**Agreement on First Stage.** Under a provisional agreement reached in 1956, the World Bank was to lend Egypt

\$200 million for the first stage, and Britain and the US were to grant \$70 million. The US withdrew its offer in July 1956 because of Egypt's increasingly close association with Russia and the Soviet bloc, as later admitted by authoritative US sources, and Britain at once followed suit. Thereupon, the World Bank also withdrew its offer, which had been conditional on the US-British grant.

In Nov 1958, the Soviet Premier announced his government's willingness to finance the first stage of the project and to participate in its construction. An agreement with the UAR for a loan of 400 million rubles (approx. \$100 million at the then official rate of exchange) was signed on 27 Dec 1958. The loan was to be repaid in 12 annual instalments (in Egyptian currency and goods), to begin one year after completion of the work covered by the agreement, with interest of 2½ per cent. The agreement also provided that "the implementation of the work will be entrusted to contractors in a manner to be agreed upon by the two sides on the basis of the use of Soviet equipment and Soviet experts and technicians." "The Soviet organization will be responsible for the technical aspects of the projects and their completion." (For full text, see: *Ahram*, 28 Dec 1958.)

The Soviet side proposed several important technical changes in the original Western blueprint, also involving the first stage. The blueprint was subjected to technical discussions between Egyptian, Soviet and Western experts in summer 1959. These experts eventually approved the Soviet plan for the first stage.

## THE SECOND STAGE, 1959-1960: SYNOPSIS

Towards the end of 1959, the question of outside aid for the second stage of the project became acute. Offers came from various Western countries. West Germany proposed a loan of DM200 million; other offers came from Britain, Italy and Japan, though none of these offers seem to have been put in concrete form. Towards the end of the year, the Cairo Press dwelt on the interest shown by the West, which it described as a result of the UAR's policy of Positive Neutralism. At the close of the year, Soviet and Western chances for participation in the second stage seemed, to outside observers, fairly balanced.

On 13 Jan 1960 President Eisenhower still spoke of the possibility of US aid for the project. Five days later, on 18 Jan, it was announced that the Soviet Union had agreed, at the UAR's request, to participate in the construction of the second stage of the High Dam. This was followed by USSR-UAR technical talks, and in July a team of Soviet experts, headed by Professor Komzin, arrived in Egypt, to prepare the blueprints. Later, the UAR Minister of Public Works, Mūsa Arafah, visited Moscow, and on 27 Aug the agreement on Soviet participation in the second stage was signed.

By the end of 1960 it appeared that the blueprints had not yet been completed and there were allegations of delay in the work. These were denied by the UAR authorities, which maintained that work was proceeding as scheduled.

## UAR REACHES DECISION ON SECOND STAGE

5 Jan: UAR Statements on Offers for Second Stage. At a Press conference on 5 Jan, Mūsa Arafah, the UAR Minister of Public Works, was asked by foreign correspondents about UAR plans for the second stage of the dam. He replied that the decision would be taken, "we hope, in 1960." Offers to help with the project, he said, had come from West Germany, Japan, Italy, the US and Great Britain. Some had come from governments, and

others from private companies; none were complete and some were not even in writing. The one definite offer by a government was from West Germany. He said he was not prepared to be specific about these offers. Russia had "not yet" offered to continue help through the later stages, he added.

"As a neutral country we will take the offer most to our benefit," he declared. "Politics will have nothing to do with it."

The correspondents reported that observers expected a Soviet offer soon. (*NYHT*, 8 Jan; *NYT*, 7 Jan, quotations from the *NYT*)

5 Jan: Arrival of Russian Power Station Minister. I. Novikov, USSR Minister of Power Stations, headed a delegation to attend the foundation-stone laying ceremony for the Aswan High Dam, and met President Abdel-Nasser on 7 Jan. (*NYHT*, 8 Jan; *R. Cairo*, 7 Jan-*IMB*, 8 Jan)

9 Jan: Ground-breaking Ceremony at Aswan. The ground-breaking ceremony at Aswan on 9 Jan brought the question of foreign participation in the second stage to public attention. The ceremony was given wide publicity by the UAR and was extensively covered by the world Press. Among the many guests was King Muhammad V of Morocco. The meeting was addressed by President Abdel-Nasser, Mūsa Arafah, and Novikov of the USSR.

The President stressed the political significance of the project, not only for the UAR but also for Arab nationalism and the peoples of Africa and Asia.

He dwelt on the victory Egypt had finally won in her long and bitter struggle to build the High Dam. She had been victorious, he said, thanks to her iron determination and her readiness for self-sacrifice. The most important thing about the dam was that it was the result of the unflinching will of a people which had chosen the hardest way, knowing it was the best.

"We see in the High Dam a monument to the Arab struggle and to the forward drive of Arab nationalism striving to fulfil its historic and human mission. It is a monument which, in its size and usefulness, is worthy of the might of the nation which built it."

Abdel-Nasser went on to say that the High Dam would serve as an example to nations all over the world. It would serve to remind the peoples of Asia and Africa that "small nations, even if poor in destructive atomic armament, can still undertake the greatest development projects... We are not one of the strongly armed nations, nor are we rich in money, but we have succeeded in beginning the highest dam in all the world and of all times," in spite of armed intervention and economic warfare against her. "Today we turn into fact what we thought about in 1956: the High Dam—the mighty dam which gives expression to the victory of your will. Thus has the people helped itself and in doing so has extended a helping hand to many other peoples in Asia and in Africa." The President then stressed that all the Arabs, from the Persian Gulf to the Atlantic, had helped the UAR. "Every Arab feels today that the dam is his personal victory."

He went on: "It is our duty to name the country which agreed to help us... [Russian] aid is friendly and unconditional; it is the result of the friendship between the Arab and the Soviet peoples." He concluded by thanking the Soviet Union for its help and by expressing his appreciation for the Soviet technicians in Egypt and their friendly cooperation.

Mūsa Arafah, after elaborating on the technical side



of the project, praised the Russians for having faithfully fulfilled all clauses of the 1958 agreement. He also paid tribute to the Western experts for their work in preparing the original plans.

Novikov enlarged on the benefits the dam would provide for Egyptian agriculture and industry. Thousands of workers in the USSR were toiling to supply the equipment and machines needed to build the dam—the greatest in all Africa. (*Ahram*, 10 Jan)

**10 Jan: Abdel-Nasser's Letter to Khrushchev.** According to *The New York Times* Abdel-Nasser wrote a letter to Khrushchev on 10 Jan which several days later brought Khrushchev's reply offering to participate in the construction of the second stage of the Aswan Dam. (*NYT*, 20 Jan)

On the same day (10 Jan), *The Times* correspondent, reporting the Aswan Dam ceremony, quoted Egyptian sources as saying that the financing of the second stage was still a "difficulty." Where the West is concerned, these sources said, "there is a big difference between talking about help and getting it done." The correspondent added that the idea of joint efforts by East and West, however attractive to the Egyptians who wanted to adhere to their "positive neutrality" economically as well as politically—"may not be viewed kindly by the Russians, who are well aware of the value of the dam to their prestige in Africa." (*Times*, 11 Jan)

**13 Jan: President Eisenhower on US Aid for Dam.** Asked at a Press conference whether he was considering offering US help to Egypt in the further stages of the Aswan Dam, President Eisenhower said: "We are trying to do that now... through the World Bank... For example, you will remember when we were with the Aswan business... we at that time had the World Bank as the central affair. We were... to put in a certain amount of money; Britain was to put in a certain amount of money, and so we have gone pretty well on that theory: that they have got a very fine engineering exploratory service and then, of course, this special fund of the UN is doing a very fine job in what you might call the pre-exploratory efforts; and, all in all, I would say we would look at the Aswan Dam in the same way we would anything else on that basis... from that basis." (*NYT*, 15 Jan) Reporting on reactions to this statement, *The Times* stated that the Egyptian public "undoubtedly welcomes the idea of Western help." (*Times*, 16 Jan)

**15 Jan: USSR Agrees to Participate in Second Stage.** On 19 Jan Moscow Radio broadcast a message from Khrushchev to President Abdel-Nasser dated 15 Jan, saying: "The Soviet Government has considered your message... and expresses its willingness to take part in the building of the second stage of the Aswan High Dam on the basis agreed upon with regard to the first stage." (*R. Moscow*, 19 Jan—*BBC*, 20 Jan) [But according to Novikov this message reached Abdel-Nasser only on 17 Jan, see below.] The same day (15 Jan) in Cairo, Novikov referred at a Press conference to the Soviet Government's recent decision to reduce its armed forces. The economies thus effected would be used both to raise the standard of living of the Soviet peoples and to furnish peaceful aid to states needing it. Soviet engineers had submitted new proposals to further reduce the cost and shorten the construction period of the High Dam, he continued. A change from Soviet to Western aid between the first and second stage was a practical possibility, although there might be "some difficulties on the technical side." Only the UAR would decide whether there should

be a Soviet-Western partnership in financing the second stage, he said.

He concluded by stating that he, personally, believed that "Moscow may take a favourable view of the idea of the USSR sharing in the second stage." (*Ahram*; *Times*, 16 Jan)

According to *al-Gumhuriyah* Novikov had informed Abdel-Nasser (on 15 Jan) of Russia's intention to participate in the second stage. (*Gumhuriyah*, 16 Jan)

**17 Jan: Abdel-Nasser's Reply to Khrushchev.** President Abdel-Nasser's reply to Khrushchev's message was dated 17 Jan and released for publication in Cairo on 20 Jan. He expressed gratitude for Russia's agreement to take part in the project, which, he said, was proof of the Soviet Union's "positive action and disinterested aid" and her "contribution to peace... and friendship towards the UAR." (*Ahram*, 21 Jan)

**18-20 Jan: Announcement of Agreement.** On 18 Jan Abd al-Qādir Hātim, Deputy UAR Minister for Presidential Affairs, announced officially that the UAR and the Soviet Union had agreed on Soviet participation in the construction of the second stage of the High Dam, on the same terms as the first stage. (*R. Cairo*, 19 Jan—*IMB*, 20 Jan)

On 19 Jan, Moscow Radio published Khrushchev's reply to Abdel-Nasser's letter [his first letter has not been published] and on 20 Jan Abdel-Nasser's answer was released (see above).

**Novikov Describes Sequence of Events.** In an interview published some time later in the Soviet weekly *New Times*, Novikov described the events leading up to the Egyptian decision, stressing the UAR's initiative in asking for Soviet help. Novikov stated: "It was at first planned to build the Aswan Dam in two stages. The agreement signed by the USSR and UAR on 27 Dec 1958, provided for Soviet technical and financial assistance only in the construction of the first stage.

"The division of the construction project into two stages was not a very good solution. President Gamal Abdel-Nasser pointed out that this was artificial and was decided upon in difficult conditions, when the UAR was threatened with isolation and economic blockade."

**"Abdel-Nasser Requests Assistance."** Novikov went on: "The situation has changed now. At one of our meetings, President Abdel-Nasser officially requested Soviet assistance in the construction of the second stage. His request was considered without delay by the Soviet government, and a reply was soon received from Premier Khrushchev, saying that his government was ready to grant such aid.

"On 17 Jan, the USSR Ambassador... and I called upon President Abdel-Nasser, handed him the reply and discussed arrangements. That same evening, the President sent N. S. Khrushchev a message thanking the Soviet Government for its friendly act on behalf of the people of the UAR."

**"One-shot" Construction.** Speaking of the engineering aspects of the plan, Novikov went on: "As an engineer, I think that building the dam in one shot is more rational. Going over the first-stage construction plans drawn up by the Egyptians together with a British firm, Soviet specialists made several proposals that substantially improved them. The Soviet changes were endorsed by the UAR Government after it had consulted prominent foreign experts. Here is what they boil down to:

"Instead of seven underground tunnels for letting the



water out of the reservoir there will be one open canal about 2 km. in length. The new Aswan Dam is to be built on a sand foundation. And since the stress on the dam will be pretty heavy, the Soviet specialists proposed improved methods of compressing sand to make the foundations more reliable. These methods have been successfully used in building the Kremenchug Hydro-power Station.

"They also proposed locks of different design, making them stronger than those provided for by the original plans.

"These and other proposals will add to the reliability of the dam, cut the expenditure on the first stage by 15 per cent and substantially reduce construction time.

"With construction work on both sections proceeding simultaneously the economy will be greater still and the entire project will be completed quite a bit ahead of schedule, which at present has been set for 1970.

"The Soviet Union has assigned a group of highly qualified specialists for the job. As construction gains momentum, their number will increase to approximately 150. The group is headed by Prof. I. V. Komzin, who built the Volga Hydropower Station.

"It gives me great pleasure to note that our specialists have established very friendly and businesslike relations with their Arab colleagues.

"Soviet equipment—bulldozers, compressors, drilling machinery, powerful Uralmash excavators, etc.—is pouring into Aswan. Courses have already been started to train local specialists in handling Soviet machinery." (*New Times*, No 6, Feb)

#### BACKGROUND OF AGREEMENT

**Did Russia Plan Ahead?** According to one source Russia was actively planning ahead for the complete High Dam project even at a time when the UAR had not yet made its decision. In a report submitted to the US Congress on 4 Jan, American observers, who had visited Russia in Sept–Oct 1959, pointed to the fact that generators for Aswan (which were not included in the existing agreement for the first stage) were being designed in Leningrad. They concluded: "Doubt as to who is to control the vast Nile constructions is limited in Moscow." (*Moss Committee report on "Relative Water and Power Development in the USSR and the USA,"* 4 Jan, p 133.)

Similarly, *The Times* wrote: "For the past six months it has been obvious that as a result of their extensive alterations to plans for the whole dam, the Russians were putting themselves into a position where on technical grounds alone an offer by Moscow to undertake the second stage was inevitable." (*Times*, 19 Jan)

**UAR Explains its Decision.** Two leading articles in *al-Ahrām* listed the following factors as having influenced Egypt's decision:

Soviet engineers were already building the first stage; they knew the site and its problems from practical experience;

The first and second stages were part of one whole;

The Russians had proved loyal partners in all their undertakings regarding the first stage;

Soviet terms were fair, interest was low, and no political strings were attached to the Soviet offer. (*Ahrām*, 19, 20 Jan)

**Russian Comment: No Political Strings.** The last argument was given particular prominence in Russian broadcasts in Arabic. Moscow Radio said that the West had tried to use the High Dam as a means to put pressure on Egypt, while the Soviet Union had proved once

more that it did not use aid as a means of pressure. (*R. Moscow in Arabic*, 19 Jan–BBC, 20 Jan)

**Western Appraisal: Russia Playing for Political Gain.** *The New York Times* took the view that Russia had now succeeded in assuring herself of close ties with the UAR for at least the next decade. (*NYT*, 22 Jan) *The Economist* argued: "Having decided to put large amounts of money in a project that collects only 2½ per cent in interest, the Russians would be poor investors if they did not extract the fullest possible political returns." (*Economist*, 23 Jan)

*Le Monde* stressed the connection between the High Dam project and Russia's wider African interests. "To the Russians, Nasser appears as a forerunner, difficult but unavoidable, of their influence in Africa." (*Monde*, 11 Jan)

At the same time, Western observers felt that the UAR might now wish to demonstrate its neutrality by inviting increased Western aid for other major projects. (*Times*, 19 Jan; *NYHT*, 21 Jan)

#### TECHNICAL TALKS, FINAL AGREEMENT, WORK ON PROJECT

**July: Technical Talks.** Mūsa Arafah announced on 1 July that the final plans for the first stage of the High Dam had been adopted by the UAR Government and approved by President Abdel-Nasser. He added that the Soviet plans had been found best both economically and technically. The savings effected would be approximately \$17.5 million for the first stage and a similar sum for the second stage. (*Pravda*, 3 July)

Following the approval of the plans, Professor Komzin, head of the team of Soviet experts, arrived in Cairo on 10 July, bringing, it was reported, the final blueprints. (*R. Cairo*, 10 July–*IMB*, 11 July). Later reports denied that Komzin had brought the blueprints, saying that they were expected later. (*Akhbar al-Yawm*, 23 July) Following talks in Cairo with UAR Government representatives, Komzin went on to Aswan on 14 July, after telling the Press that the Soviet Government had set up a special department for the High Dam and that he had been able to obtain a shortening of the delivery times for Soviet equipment and machines. These would be ready in Nov. (*Ahrām*, 10 July; *ICM*, 15 July)

**July–Aug: Delays and Lack of Co-operation Denied.** At a Press conference just before Komzin's arrival, Mūsa Arafah denied that the modifications in the plans would delay operations; since Jan work at the site had concentrated on the excavation of the diversionary canal and this would be ready in 1962 as planned; the modifications referred to other parts of the project. The Minister also denied reports that Arab workers had refused to accept the guidance of Russian experts. He said that Russians and Arabs had been cooperating fully all along and added that the Russians had praised the efforts of the Arab workers. (*Ahrām*, 10 July)

**15–29 Aug: Final Agreement Signed.** When his imminent visit to Moscow (see immediately below) was announced, Arafah again denied that there were any delays in the work; the Cairo talks with Komzin had settled all major points regarding the blueprints; the Moscow talks would deal with more detailed points. (*Ruz al-Yusuf*, 1 Aug)

The next stage of talks on the implementation of the agreement took place at Moscow, when a UAR delegation headed by Mūsa Arafah arrived there on 15 Aug. (*R. Damascus*, 16 Aug–*IMB*, 16 Aug)

On 23 Aug, Arafah met with the Soviet Deputy Premier, Mikoyan, at Arafah's request. (*R. Baghdad*, 23 Aug-IMB, 24 Aug)

The signature of the formal agreement on Soviet participation in the second stage was announced in Moscow on 27 Aug. It provided for a Soviet loan of 900 million rubles (LE81 million at the official rate of exchange), thus raising total Soviet participation in the project to 1,300 million rubles (LE117 million). As in the agreement regarding the first stage, repayment is to be made in 12 equal annual instalments, in Egyptian currency or goods, to begin one year after completion of the work. The interest rate is 2½ per cent. (*NYHT*, 30 Aug)

Before leaving Moscow on 29 Aug, Arafah told reporters that his talks with the Soviet leaders had met with full success; the Dam would be completed in 1968 and the power stations in 1970. He added that the High Dam would be an eternal symbol of Soviet-UAR friendship. (*R. Cairo*, 29 Aug-IMB, 29 Aug; *R. Moscow* in Arabic, 29 Aug; *R. Cairo*, 30 Aug-IMB, 30 Aug)

**Sept: Equipment Prices Agreed.** An additional agreement, on the prices of building equipment to be supplied by Russia for the first stage, was signed in Cairo on 8 Sept. The first shipment was to reach the UAR in Nov. (*R. Cairo*, 8 Sept-IMB, 9 Sept)

**Nov: Reports on Slow-Down in Dam Work.** Several times during the year, the UAR denied reports of insufficient progress in the actual work at Aswan (see above). In Aug *The Times* had written: "Work on the dam during

recent months has been largely preparatory, extending the railway up to the site, moving in the Russian heavy constructional equipment, and building accommodation for the engineers and workers." (*Times*, 29 Aug)

A more extreme version of what were basically the same facts appeared in Nov. (*Daily Express*, 8 Nov)

**UAR Denials of Slow-Down.** Several UAR spokesmen again denied any undue delay.

Anwar Saadat, answering a question in the National Assembly, stated that the setting up of the technical and administrative staffs and the erection of the workshops and stores had been completed; the excavations were continuing and work connected with the power station had begun. (*R. Cairo*, 14 Nov-IMB, 15 Nov)

Arafah stated on 26 Nov that since the inauguration in Jan, work on the dam had been carried on and considerable progress made. By the end of Dec, half a million tons of granits would have been excavated. Most of the preliminary work, such as roads, railways and workers' accommodation, had been completed. At present, 65 Soviet and 265 Arab engineers were employed on the project, as well as 300 workmen. As work went on, their numbers would increase many times. (*R. Sawt al-Arab*, 26 Nov-IMB, 27 Nov) At about the same time, Ruz al-Yusuf stated that "work done since Jan, when the project was started, has been of a preliminary nature only." (*Ruz al-Yusuf*, 21 Nov)

In the same month the UAR Press stated that the blueprints were "expected next month." (*Gumhuriyah*, 7 Nov) (Previously the final blueprints had been reported to have arrived in July—see above.)

## NATO COUNTRIES

### BELGIUM

[For the greater part of the year Belgium-UAR relations were dominated by the Congo question (see p 26 ff).]

**Dec: Nationalization of Belgian Firms as a Direct Result of the Congo Crisis.** See p 31.

### CANADA

(Apr-May: Picketing of UAR vessels in Canadian ports. See p 41.)

**May: Canadian Cadets Visit the UAR.** On 2 May the Canadian Ambassador in Cairo introduced to Abdel-Nasser a party of seven Canadian cadets. They were later to visit the agrarian reform areas and meet with the Arab League's SG. The cadets "expressed their admiration of the complete candour with which the President had dealt with UAR problems, which are largely similar to Canada's." (*R. Cairo*, 2 May-BBC, 5 May)

### THE GERMAN FEDERAL REPUBLIC

**Jan: GFR Minister of Economy Visits the UAR.** On 24 Jan Dr Erhard arrived in Cairo as the head of an economic mission and accompanied by a 15-man journalists' delegation. (*R. Cairo*, 24 Jan-IMB, 25 Jan) Dr Erhard declared, after an audience with President Abdel-Nasser, that the purpose of the visit was to bring about economic cooperation between the UAR and West Germany. (*BBC*, 27 Jan). In an interview with the German journalists, Abdel-Nasser expressed his hope that the GFR would help Egypt with the construction of a power station

near Qattarah, as a part of the industrialization programme to which he hoped it would contribute (*BBC*, 28 Jan)

On 29 Jan the mission arrived in Damascus, and "fruitful discussions" were conducted there, including "talks on the balance of payments situation between the Syrian Region and West Germany; German technical assistance to the Syrian R, and the participation of West Germany in other cultural and technical institutions in Syria." (*R. Damascus*, 31 Jan-IMB, 31 Jan) The visit was interrupted on 31 Jan owing to the illness of Dr Erhard. (*Hayat*, 31 Jan; *Ahram*, 1, 2 Feb)

Dr Hermann Reinhard, the head of the Technical Assistance Division of the West German Foreign Ministry, and a member of the mission, declared that it had been agreed that German experts would be sent to Egypt to study the geological structure and the subterranean water possibilities of the Qattarah depression, preparatory to the conclusion of an agreement to grant technical aid and facilities for the electrification project. (*Akhbar*, 28 Jan)

**Jan: Abdel-Nasser: Relations with East Germany Should Not Affect UAR-West German Relations.** In an interview with German journalists on 25 Jan, Abdel-Nasser assured them that the opening of an East German consulate in Cairo was "not aimed by the UAR at the interests of West Germany." However he did not answer a direct question as to whether the UAR intended to establish a UAR Consulate in East Berlin. (*Ahram*, 27 Jan; *BBC*, 28 Jan)

## NATO COUNTRIES

**Mar: UAR Radio and Press Overlooked the Ben-Gurion-Adenauer Meeting.** Ben-Gurion's discussions with Dr Adenauer in New York were totally ignored by the UAR's radio and Press. (*IMH*, 24 Mar) [Otherwise UAR leaders, Press and radio vigorously denounced Ben-Gurion's visits to the Western capitals throughout Mar-Apr.]

**UAR Citizens Studying in the GFR.** On 26 Apr, two UAR oil experts were sent to West Germany for further specialization. (*Ahram*, 28 Apr)

A delegation of graduates of the Agricultural College made a two months tour of West Germany. (*Musawwar*, 27 July)

A delegation of eight teachers was sent to West Germany to learn the German language. (*Gumhuriyah*, 1 June)

There were more than 5,200 UAR students studying in West Germany during 1960. (*Ahram*, 8 Aug 1960, 10 Jan 1961)

On 17 Aug a group of 50 UAR teachers left for Germany to complete a training course in German technical institutions. (*Ahram*, 27 Aug)

On 12 Sept a group of 31 UAR teachers concluded in the GFR their two-year course in the German language. (*Akhbar*, 12 Sept)

**GFR Economic Aid.** It was reported in the UAR Press that West Germany would help to set up a building materials factory in the UAR. It was further reported that the GFR would help the UAR to import the most up-to-date agricultural implements, machinery for irrigation, drainage and electricity projects, as well as equipment for transportation. (*Akhbar al-Yawm*, 3 Sept; *Akhbar* 6 Sept, 24 Oct; *Ruz al-Yusuf*, 3 Oct)

**May: The Lufthansa and Misr Air Signed an air agreement between the two countries.** (*R. Cairo*, 7 May-BBC, 9 May)

**July-Aug: UAR Ministers Visit GFR.** On 17 July the UAR Central Minister for Municipal and Rural Affairs, Tawfiq Abd al-Fattah, concluded a seven-day official visit to West Germany. (*R. Cairo*, 17 July-IMB, 17 July) During the last week of Aug Dr Mustafa Khalil, the UAR Executive Minister of Transport in the Egyptian Region, paid an official visit to West Germany. (*Ahram*, 24 Aug)

**Sept: UAR Entry Visas for Germans Abolished.** On 11 Sept the UAR Minister of the Interior issued an order exempting citizens of the GFR from the need to obtain UAR entry visas, on condition that UAR citizens were accorded similar privileges by the GFR. (*BBC*, 13 Sept)

**1-11 Dec: UAR Cultural Mission to West Germany, GFR Technical-Educational Assistance.** On 1 Dec a UAR Cultural Mission headed by the UAR Minister of Education, Kamal ad-Din Hussein, left for Bonn following an official invitation to visit West German cultural institutions. (*R. Damascus*, 1 Dec, IMB, 2 Dec) *Al-Ahram* reported that as a result of Hussein's discussion an agreement had been concluded between the UAR and West Germany whereby the latter would participate in the establishment of a 3,000-student polytechnic college in Cairo. West Germany would supply 250 teachers and lecturers for five years, while some 50 UAR teachers would be sent for 15 months of training in West Germany. These teachers were to form the core of the institute's teaching staff. Construction was to begin in the

spring of 1961 and would be finished by 1962; Bonn would give Egypt \$3.3 million towards meeting the costs. (*Ahram*, 4 Dec) *The Times* reported that Hussein had requested GFR assistance in the development of atomic energy for peaceful purposes. The request, it was reported, would be the subject of further discussions in the Federal Government. (*Times*, 5 Dec)

In the joint communiqué issued on 11 Dec it was stated that the two countries would strengthen their cultural relations, by encouraging the exchange of experts, students and scientists. The GFR would offer 100 scholarships to UAR students and the UAR would offer 20 scholarships to German students. The GFR would also participate in the establishment of a polytechnic college in Helwan, near Cairo. (*Ahram*, 12 Dec)

**Dec: UAR Minister of Economy Invited to GFR.** On 10 Dec Cairo Radio reported that Dr Erhard had invited the UAR Minister of Economy, al-Qaysuni, to visit West Germany. (*R. Cairo*, 10 Dec-IMB, 11 Dec)

## GREECE

**May: Cultural Agreement.** In Apr-May, a UAR Cultural Mission paid a ten-day official visit to Greece. A cultural agreement was concluded whereby Greek lecturers would teach the Greek language in UAR's universities while Arab lecturers would teach the Arabic language and lecture on Islamic civilization at Greek universities. It was also agreed to facilitate the exchange of sport teams and students, and to promote granting of scholarships and the opening of cultural centres in Athens and Cairo. (*Ahram*, 3 May)

**May: Greek-Arab League Established in Cairo.** On 25 May the establishment of the Greek-Arab League was celebrated at the Greek club in Cairo with the participation of Zakariyah Muhi ad-Din, UAR Minister of the Interior and President of the League. (*Ahram*, 26 May)

**7-11 June: Abdel-Nasser's Visit to Greece.** On 7 June, the UAR President, accompanied by UAR Ministers and by his family, arrived in Piraeus harbour on a three-day official visit to Greece as the guest of King Paul of the Hellenes. He spent another two days sightseeing and left on 11 June for Yugoslavia. (*Ahram*, 7-12 June)

(He was preceded on 2 June by Zakariyah Muhi ad-Din, the UAR Minister of Interior, who made the arrangements for the visit.) (*R. Damascus*, 2 June-IMB, 3 June)

The programme included a series of talks with the Greek Premier Constantine Karamanlis; an exchange of decorations; a Press conference in Athens and the publication of a joint communiqué. The UAR President was also made an honorary citizen of Athens at a public ceremony. (*Ahram*, 7-10 June)

**Joint Communiqué.** In the talks the general international situation was discussed "in a spirit consistent with the UN Charter..." The importance of the "deep-rooted" friendship between Greece and the UAR and their "co-operation in all matters relating to the Arab world" was stressed and also the fact that "the [differing] international attitudes of the two countries did not hinder the progress of strong ties between them." Economic and technical cooperation was discussed, and mutual trade was to be encouraged. The UAR President "expressed his appreciation of the loyalty and sincerity of the Greek communities in the UAR and of their participation in the development of the UAR's economy" and he "asserted his government's concern for the progress and pros-



perity of this group." (*Ahram*, 10 June; *BBC*, 11 June) [The Greek community in Egypt numbered about 70,000.]

**Comments on Arab-Greek Friendship.** Cairo Radio and UAR Press commentaries praised the Greek people for their hospitality. They explained that the purpose of the visit was to strengthen UAR-Greek friendship and dwell on Arab-Greek ties and relations since early times. Emphasis was laid on Greece's stand during the Suez Canal dispute in 1956 [when the Greek Government refused to participate in the London conference of Canal user-nations], and on its "non-recognition of Israel" [Greece has recognized Israel *de facto*]. The UAR's support for Greece on the Cyprus question was also recalled. (*IMB*, 5-10 June, *IMH*, 14 June)

Commenting on the visit, *The Times* wrote that though the two countries have gone their separate ways internationally, their governments have been careful, for solid reasons, never to offend each other. Greeks have for long formed one of the most important foreign communities in Egypt: "The Egyptian Government has always in theory differentiated between Greeks and other, more suspected foreigners, though in practice there is a good deal of doubt about their future." On the other hand, the Egyptians were worried about the British base in Cyprus, Israel "penetration" into the island and the failure of the Summit Conference—"Thus indeed Cairo is clearly feeling exposed." (*Times*, 9 June)

A correspondent for *The Economist* wrote from Athens: "The practical aspect of Greek-Arab friendship embraces the Greek aspiration to turn this country into a 'bridge' between the West and the ME... Greek leaders are convinced that their country could become Nato's point of contact with the pro-Nasser group in the ME, just as Greek-Yugoslav friendship assures the West of a link with Marshal Tito."

**Sept:** Hasan Abbās Zaki, the Executive Minister of Agriculture in the Egyptian Region, arrived in Athens on 14 Sept on a two-week official visit to Greece. (*Ahram*, 13, 17 Sept)

## FRANCE

**Background Note.** [Diplomatic as well as economic and cultural relations between the UAR and France broke down in Oct 1956 in the wake of the Suez Canal crisis. President Nasser ordered the nationalization of French properties (including five banks, 15 insurance companies, and several French enterprises) or their sequestration (including 750 enterprises owned by French nationals; 15 shipping companies, 200 houses; and 2,240 hectares of land). On 26 Aug 1957, negotiations between France and the UAR to settle their differences, were opened in Geneva and continued intermittently for a year. On 28 Aug 1958, the talks ended with the signing of an agreement in Zurich which provided for the waiving of mutual reparations' claims; payment by UAR of compensation (totalling about LE14 million) for French nationalized property; freeing of sequestered French nationals' property; reopening of French cultural institutions; permission for displaced French and Egyptian nationals to return to their respective countries and to reestablish themselves; the resumption of French purchase of Egyptian cotton; the conclusion of a payments and commercial agreement in the near future; and the granting of French credit of LE10,500,000 for three years to finance UAR imports of French industrial equipment. However no reference was made to the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries.]

**UAR: No Diplomatic Relations.** The UAR Press reported France's endeavours to renew diplomatic relations with the UAR. The papers emphasized that the UAR would not meet the French request so long as French policy in Algeria remained unchanged. (*Akhbar*; *Ahram*; *Gumhuriyah*, 10 Dec 1959; *Musawwar*, 15 Jan; *Ayyam*, 22 Feb; *Ruz al-Yusuf*, 6, 13 June; *Nasr*, 14 July, 3 Aug)

**Propaganda Campaign Against France.** The UAR radio and Press conducted a severe propaganda campaign against France throughout the year, with Algeria providing the main topic for recrimination. (*IMH*, 19, 27 Jan)

In Feb and Apr, huge demonstrations were staged in Cairo and Damascus to protest against the French nuclear tests in the Sahara on 13 Feb and 1 Apr.

The UAR Press warned against France's "Folie de Grandeur" and appealed to the UN to declare France "Non Compos Mentis" (of unsound mind). (*Ahram*, 14 Feb; see also *Ahram*, 15, 16 Feb; 3, 8 Apr; *Gumhuriyah*; *Akhbar*, 13, 15, 16 Feb) *Al-Ahram* wrote: "France's crime is the greatest any nation can commit against humanity." (*Ahram*, 14 Feb; *IMH*, 4 Mar) A Foreign Ministry spokesman said the UAR would contact other Afro-Asian delegates on the question of a unified stand against France. (*Ahram*, 15 Feb, 3 Apr)

The close ties between France and Israel provided another almost permanent topic for UAR attacks on France; special occasions, like Ben-Gurion's visit to France, evoked special propaganda outbursts. (*IMH*, 10, 17, 24 Mar)

**Mar: French Scholarships to Syrian Students.** The Syrian daily *an-Nasr* reported that the French Government had offered ten post-graduate scholarships to Syrian students. (*Nasr*, 1 Mar)

**May: Ban Removed on the Entry of French Nationals into Syria.** On 2 May the UAR authorities ended the ban on the entry of French nationals into the Syrian Region of the UAR, imposed by the Syrian Republic at the time of the Suez crisis. (*Ayyam*, 3 May)

## ITALY

**Jan: Italy and Arab Nationalism.** On 16 Jan the UAR Ambassador to Italy, Hasan Ragab, declared in Cairo that official circles in Italy saw in Arab nationalism a natural development of the Arab struggle for freedom and independence. However, he said, Zionist propaganda was very active in poisoning Italian public opinion and especially in depicting Arab nationalism as an anti-Western movement. (*Gumhuriyah*, 18 Jan)

**May: Italy's Interest in UAR's Industrial Development.** Cairo Radio reported that the Commercial Attaché at the Italian embassy in Cairo had informed the UAR Central Minister for Industry of the increased interest taken by the leading Italian industrial firms in the UAR's five-year industrialization programme and of Italy's desire to participate in the implementation of this programme. (*R. Cairo*, 28 May-*IMB*, 30 May)

It was reported that the Italian Minister of Industry had accepted an invitation to visit the UAR. However, no date was set. (*Akhbar*, 19 Nov)

**Dec: Agreement for Producing Four Joint Italian-Arab Films.** The UAR Minister of Education and National Guidance said on 10 Dec, that on his recent visit to Rome, he had signed an agreement for the production of four joint Arab-Italian films. (*Akhbar*, 11 Dec)



## THE NETHERLANDS

**Aug: UAR Denounces Dutch "Imperialism."** Following the Dutch-Indonesia dispute regarding Dutch New Guinea, Cairo Radio denounced Dutch "Imperialism" and pledged support to Indonesia in its "just struggle". (*R. Cairo*, 17 Aug; *IMB*, 18 Aug)

On 23 Aug the UAR assumed responsibility for the protection of Indonesian interests in the Netherlands following the severance of diplomatic relations between the two countries. (*Ahram*, 25 Aug)

**Nov: Dutch Commercial Mission in the UAR.** During the first half of Nov a Dutch commercial mission visited the UAR. The mission discussed with the UAR authorities the possibilities of the Netherlands supplying the UAR with railway locomotives and spare parts. (*Gumhuriyah*, 14 Nov)

**Dec: A Cultural Agreement between the UAR and the Netherlands** was concluded in the Hague on 8 Dec. Professors and student missions were to be exchanged between the two countries. (*R. Cairo*, 8 Dec-*IMB*, 9 Dec)

## NORWAY

**Sept: UAR Foreign Minister Visits Oslo.** On 11 Sept Dr Mahmūd Fawzi, the UAR Foreign Minister, arrived in Oslo on a state visit to Norway. (*BBC*, 13 Sept) On 16 Sept a joint communiqué was issued in Oslo saying that views had been exchanged with the Norwegian authorities on international problems and on the strengthening of UAR-Norwegian trade relations. (*R. Cairo*, 16 Sept-*BBC*, 19 Sept)

## TURKEY

**Border Incidents.** Throughout the year there were reports of incidents along the Syrian-Turkish border, caused mainly by the pursuit of smugglers and by clashes with them. On 22 Mar four Turkish smugglers were killed by a Turkish land mine in Turkish territory. (*BBC*, 26 Mar) On 4 Apr four men and three women, all Turks, were arrested in Syria for illegal entry. (*BBC*, 6 Apr) On 5 Apr a Syrian shepherd and four goats were killed by a Turkish mine explosion on the border. (*BBC*, 7 Apr) On 9 Apr a Turkish patrol fired and killed a Syrian shepherd in the Afrin area along the border. (*BBC*, 11 Apr) On 14 Apr an exchange of shots took place between a group of three Turkish smugglers and a Syrian patrol. (*IMB*, 15 Apr) On 4 May Syrian security authorities arrested four Turkish infiltrators. (*IMB*, 5 May) On 10 May a Syrian patrol exchanged fire with 12 Turkish smugglers trying to cross the border into Turkey. They got away, leaving behind three sacks of coffee they were trying to smuggle into Turkey. (*BBC*, 13 May) On 12 July Syrian security forces arrested nine Turks, including four women, in northern Aleppo for illegally entering Syria, and confiscated smuggled cloth found in their possession. (*BBC*, 14 July) On 18 July the Syrian authorities complained to the Turkish authorities about repeated incidents in which Turkish soldiers had fired on Arab farmers cultivating their land inside UAR territory. (*BBC*, 20 July) On 26 Oct the Syrian authorities arrested ten Turks for entering Syria illegally. (*Ayyam*, 28 Oct) On 13 Nov an exchange of fire took place between Turkish soldiers and an unidentified group of smugglers. (*Ayyam*, 16 Nov) On 23 Dec the Syrian authorities arrested a group of six smugglers and confiscated large quantities of commercial goods. (*Ayyam*, 26 Dec)

**Meetings on Border Incidents.** On 27 Jan a meeting was held in Aleppo between the Turkish Director General of National Defence and the Syrian Minister of the Interior. They discussed border incidents along the Turkish-Syrian frontier and the means to reduce them. (*Ahram*, 12 Feb) On 18 Apr a conference of Syrian and Turkish governors of border districts was held in Gazi-Antep, in Turkey, where such border problems as smuggling, Turkish mines along the borders, and the transport of agricultural crops across the borders, were discussed. (*BBC*, 6, 29 Apr)

**Mar: The UAR Urged the Arab League Council** to take decisive measures against Turkey for its close economic relations with Israel (see p 187).

**May-June: The UAR Welcomed the Revolution in Turkey.** The UAR radio and Press extensively reported the developments following the revolution in Turkey. A Cairo Radio commentator expected that a change for the better would take place in Turkey's attitude to the Arab world. (*R. Cairo*, 29 May-*IMB*, 30 May) Another comment denounced the policy of the old regime in Turkey and recalled Menderes' attitude during the Sinai campaign. (*R. Cairo*, 2 June-*IMB*, 3 June; see also *Ahram*, 29 May, 5 June; *Gumhuriyah*, 29 May; *IMH*, 3 June)

**June: Turkey Ready to "Open New Page."** On 13 June the Turkish Ambassador in Cairo said in a Press interview that the new Turkish Government had officially instructed him to announce its readiness to "open a new page of good relations and cooperation with the UAR." (*Ahram*, 14 June) In an interview with the correspondent of *Akhbār al-Yawm*, General Gürsel declared that his government was working for closer economic and political relations with the Arab world, especially with the UAR, and that Turkey would continue to support the Bandung principles and the Afro-Asian group in the UN. (*Akhbār al-Yawm*, 13 Aug-*IMB*, 14 Aug)

**July: UAR National Union Calls for "Recovery of Alexandretta."** On 16 July, the General Congress of the UAR National Union resolved "to take all official and popular steps to ensure the recovery of Iskenderun Province (Alexandretta-Hatay) and all the usurped parts of the Arab homeland." (*Ahram*, 17 July; *BBC*, 20 July)

**July: Strong Turkish Reaction.** On 23 July came the Turkish reply. Colonel Atakli, a member of the Committee for National Union, declared at Antakya, the capital of the Hatay Province: "We consider the demand being put forward by certain discordant voices for the annexation of the Turkish Hatay an incredible blunder. We shall never tolerate the exploitation of our centuries-old unity, friendship, neighbourliness and good wishes by those who indulge in blunders, corruption, and vain illusion... The Hatay is the soul of Turkey and the Turks. We covet no one's land. We shall never allow anyone to covet an inch of our land." (*R. Ankara*, 23 July-*BBC*, 26 July)

Ankara Radio strongly criticized the UAR for its "untimely and disrespectful" raising of the Hatay question. It added that the UAR had probably raised the question now because persons planning to form a political party wished to direct the people's attention from internal affairs. (*R. Ankara*, 22 July-*BBC*, 25 July)

**UAR Demand for Internal Consumption Only?** According to Amman Radio, Abdel-Nasser instructed his Ambassador to explain to the Turks that "such talk was

not serious" and that the resolutions were designed for "internal consumption." (*R. Amman*, 2 Aug-BBC, 4 Aug)

On 1 Oct President Abdel-Nasser met with the Turkish Foreign Minister in New York. The Turkish Minister declared after the meeting that he had discussed with President Nasser international and regional problems including UAR-Turkey relations. (*R. Cairo*, 2 Oct-IMB, 2 Oct)

**Nov: Turkish Espionage in Syria Charged.** The UAR General Prosecutor demanded life imprisonment with hard labour for four Syrian citizens accused of having worked for the Turkish intelligence services in Syria. The accused reportedly confessed that they were engaged by the Turkish Intelligence Services to report on the movement of military vessels in Syrian ports, on the activities of Syrian political parties, and on general public reaction to internal and international problems. (*Akhbar* 5, 14 Nov) (No further news was reported.)

**Dec: Turkey Protests Against UAR's Animosity.** London Radio, quoting Ankara Radio, reported that the Turkish Ambassador in Cairo had been instructed to lodge a protest with the UAR Government in connection with the Syrian Press and radio campaign against Turkey regarding the Alexandretta issue. [This campaign is not mentioned in the sources available.] It also reported that President Gürel had stated that "his government feels the issue to be a very delicate one and will not permit the UAR to whip up hostility against Turkey on account of the Syrian claim to Alexandretta." (*BBC* 3 Dec-IMB, 4 Dec)

**19 Dec: "Arab Nationalist Extremists" Held Responsible for Attempted Destruction of Ataturk's Statue in Iskenderun.** On 19 Dec unknown persons placed explosives at the foot of Ataturk's statue in Iskenderun, wrecking its marble base. (*R. Ankara*, 19 Dec; *Ha'aretz*, 21 Dec) The attack on the statue aroused Turkish public opinion. On 20 Dec public rallies were staged in Iskenderun, Ankara and other Turkish towns. (*BBC*, 21, 22, 23 Dec) The daily paper *Ulus* suspected "some Arab nationalist extremists" to have perpetrated the assault and added: "Had the incident not coincided with the irresponsible support by neighbouring Arab states of all manner of provocations against Turkey, no one would have thought of seeking the source of the assault abroad." (*Ulus*, 21 Dec) In a special message to the citizens of Hatay, General Gürel emphasized that "those wretched people who dare to attack immortal Ataturk or use foul language against him shall be drained without fail." (*R. Ankara*, 20 Dec-BBC, 22 Dec) [No further news was reported in this regard, and the UAR radio and Press refrained from commenting on the issue.]

# USA

(For synopsis see p 510 ff; for US-UAR trade see pp 57-8; for further references see below.)

**Jan: Question of US Financing of Second Stage of Aswan High Dam.** Several days after President Eisenhower's announcement of the US's readiness to support World Bank financing for this project, a UAR-USSR agreement on this project was announced. (For particulars see p 524 ff.)

**Jan: New US Ambassador to the UAR.** During the last week of Jan the US Congress approved the appointment of Reinhardt G. Fredrick, a senior official in the State

Department, as the US Ambassador to the UAR. (*R. Cairo*, 27 Jan-IMB, 28 Jan)

**Jan: American Trade Mission in the UAR.** On 16 Jan a trade mission consisting of American manufacturers and businessmen arrived in Cairo for a six-week visit, to "investigate the possibilities of strengthening the economic and commercial relations between the two countries." (*IMB*, 17, 20, 21 Jan) On 12 Feb the head of the mission, E. Paul Hank, said the talks had shown that there was plenty of room for cooperation between Arab and American companies. This could be achieved by the establishment of Arab-American companies, participation in bidding for various projects and the granting of concessions to Arab companies to manufacture American products locally. (*BBC*, 15 Feb) The UAR Press received with satisfaction the possibility of an inflow of American loans and financial aid to the UAR. (*IMH*, 19, 27 Jan).

**Feb-Mar: Attacks on the US.** [In Feb, Abdel-Nasser sharply attacked the US (together with Britain and France) on the reaffirmation of the Tripartite Declaration (see p 94). In Mar, in the wake of PM Ben-Gurion's visit to the US, he denounced the US as an Israeli colony. (*Ahram*, 5 Mar) The UAR Press and radio followed up these attacks throughout Feb-Mar.]

**Mar-Sept: US Loan and Surplus Farm Products Agreement with the UAR.** See pp 52-4.

**13 Apr-8 May: Picketing of s/s Cleopatra in New York Port.** A severe crisis in UAR-US relations developed over this incident (see p 41 ff).

**28 Apr-3 May: Douglas Amendment Curbing US Aid to the UAR is Adopted.** On 28 Apr Senator Paul H. Douglas and 29 co-sponsors introduced an anti-UAR amendment to the Foreign Aid Bill, giving the President discretionary authority to withhold aid from nations that obstructed free navigation in international waterways or engaged in economic warfare against any other nation that would benefit from the Aid Bill. (*NYT*, 29 Apr) Senator Fulbright introduced an amendment to neutralize the above amendment, but the Senate finally approved the Douglas amendment on 2 May (see p 106). President Abdel-Nasser, in a public speech at Mansurah, accused the US of arming Israel secretly; called the American Senators Zionist agents who seek to deceive the American people; declared that "Zionism in America is trying to enslave the American people, dominate America and appoint itself as a power above the American Constitution"; charged that the "fight against Algeria depends on American weapons and the killing of the Algerian people is killing by American weapons." In response to the possibility of a cut in US Aid to the UAR, President Nasser declared: "It is impossible for us in any case to accept conditional aid... we do not take wheat from America as charity or as aid, but purchase this wheat in local currency." He concluded that "all the wheat, maize, cinema films and everything which belongs to America will not turn us from our freedom and will not draw us from our nationalism." (*Ahram*, 8 May; *BBC*, 10 May) The UAR Press and radio followed suit with severe denunciations and abuse of American congressmen. (*IMB*, *IMP*, 29 Apr-10 May; *IMH*, 11, 18 May)

**11-16 May: Senator Fulbright Visits the UAR.** On 11 May Senator Fulbright, the Chairman of the US Senate

## NATO COUNTRIES

Foreign Relations Committee, arrived in Cairo on a five-day visit to the UAR. He was greeted enthusiastically by the UAR Press which refrained throughout the visit from attacking the US. (*Gumhuriyah*, 11, 14 May; *Akhbar*, 11, 13, 14 May, *IMH*, 18 May (see also pp 106-7).)

**UAR and the U-2 Incident.** The shooting down of a US military aircraft (U-2) on a photographic mission over Soviet territory received wide comment in UAR news bulletins. (*IMB*, 7-11 May) *Al-Gumhuriyah* mocked US officials for trying to disclaim responsibility for the incident. (*Gumhuriyah*, 10 May) Cairo Radio strongly criticized the small countries for extending military bases to Western imperialist countries. (*R. Cairo*, 23 May-*IMB*, 24 May)

**May: UAR and Failure of the Paris Summit Conference.** [UAR comments ascribed the blame for the failure of the Summit Conference mainly to the US. There was also comment on the US' declining power position vis-à-vis the USSR (see pp 3-4).]

**June: Postponement of President Eisenhower's Visit to Japan.** The UAR radio and Press gave prominence to the postponement of President Eisenhower's visit to Japan. (*IMB*, 15-19 June) The Japanese Government had been forced to submit to the will of the public; the "moral behind the Japanese people's victory" was that the friendship and support of peoples were of far greater value than military pacts and bases. (*Akhbar*, 16 June) Sawt al-Arab Radio described the cancellation as a resounding defeat of the imperialist foreign policy of the US, which, while pretending to assist economically backward countries, actually used them to further its military interests. (*Sawt al-Arab*, 17 June; *BBC*, 20 June) Cairo Radio predicted that the Japanese demonstrators' success, which had proved that pacts and bases could not be imposed on peoples against their will, would encourage other states to revolt against foreign influence. (*BBC*, 20 June-*IMH*, 23 June)

**July-Aug: Conference of "Arab Expatriates" in Cairo.** On 21 July an American Arabs' delegation arrived in Cairo, on a two-week visit to the UAR. It also attended a conference of Arab Expatriates which took place between 24-28 July. (*Voice of the Arabs*, 21 July-*IMB*, 22 July; *R. Damascus*, 29 July-*IMB*, 30 July) On 27 July President Abdel-Nasser addressed the conference. He compared past attempts by the US and present attempts by the UAR, to achieve independence and prosperity, described the flight of the Palestinian refugees; criticized pro-Israeli statements by Republican Party spokesmen and complained that Zionist activity was obstructing good Arab-US relations. (*R. Cairo*, 27 July-*IMB*, 28 July)

At the conclusion of the conference, the Arab expatriates issued several resolutions dealing with cultural, economic and political affairs. They called on the US and the UAR to strengthen cultural exchanges between them and on American students, teachers and scholars to study Arabic and Islam in the UAR. They urged the US to extend unconditional aid to the UAR. The resolutions "paid tribute to the flourishing of Arab nationalism." They stressed the participants' intention to convey to the American people a "true picture of the leadership of President Abdel-Nasser and his desire to strengthen relations between the two countries," as well as his desire for the establishment of peace and prosperity for mankind." (*MENA*, 30 July-*BBC*, 31 July) *Al-Ahrām* reported that a committee had been set

[During this campaign the US party platforms and the up in the UAR "Passport and Nationality Department" to issue "Resident Expatriate" certificates to Arab expatriates not holding Arab citizenship. This certificate would entitle its bearer to enter the UAR without entry visa; to reside there, and to practise the free professions, as well as commerce and manufacturing. (*Ahrām*, 27 July)]

**July-Aug: UAR Sides with Cuba Against US.** See UAR-Cuba Relations, pp 542-3.

**July-Nov: UAR and the Election Campaign in US.** pronouncements of the US leaders on the Arab-Israeli conflict and on friendship for Israel were systematically denounced in the UAR (see p 108 ff.)]

**July-Dec: The UAR—The US and the Congo Crisis.** [During the Congo crisis the UAR's policy on the issue became increasingly hostile to the UN and US (see p 25 ff.)]

**Aug: US Secretary for Agriculture in Cairo.** Ezra Taft Benson, the US Secretary for Agriculture, said on his arrival in Cairo on 9 Aug for a two-day visit, that he was "most gratified" by the increasing level of trade between the US and the UAR. The increase bore witness to the growing confidence and trust between the two countries, he declared. (*Ahrām*, 10, 11 Aug)

**Sept: Dr Mar'i, Central Minister of Agriculture and Agrarian Reform, left Cairo on 2 Sept for a two-month tour of American agricultural centres.** (*Ahrām*, 3 Sept)

**Sept: State Department Delegation.** At the beginning of Sept a 30-man delegation of the State Department's Institute for Foreign Research visited the UAR on a study mission. On 7 Sept the delegation paid a visit to the Gaza strip. (*Ahrām*, 8 Sept; *R. Cairo*, 7 Sept-*IMB*, 8 Sept)

**Sept: President Abdel-Nasser Confers with President Eisenhower in New York.** See p 12.

**20 Sept-15 Oct: UAR Minister of Economy Visits US: More US Aid Expected.** During 20 Sept-15 Oct the UAR Minister of the Economy, Dr Abd al-Mun'im al-Qaysūni, visited the US. (*R. Cairo*, 21 Sept-17 Oct-*IMB*, 21 Sept, 17 Oct) According to *al-Gumhuriyah* the visit was highly successful. The American authorities "had agreed to offer the UAR a \$30 million loan to improve and enlarge the telephone services in the UAR." (*Gumhuriyah*, 11 Oct) Back in Cairo, Dr Qaysūni declared that the American Government was studying a UAR request for a \$40 million loan to build silos in the Egyptian Region. (*R. Cairo*, 17 Oct-*IMB*, 17 Oct)

**Nov: American Senate Delegation in UAR.** On 22 Nov a Senate delegation consisting of two Senators arrived in Cairo to prepare a report on the economic relations between the UAR and the US, as well as on UAR development projects. (*Ahrām*, 24 Nov)

**Nov: Cairo Rejects US Plan to Solve the Arab-Israeli Conflict.** See p 111.

**Dec: An Agreement Between the UAR and the US to Avoid Double Import Taxes** was concluded on 21 Dec. (*R. Cairo*, 22 Dec-*IMB*, 22 Dec)



## NATO COUNTRIES: THE UNITED KINGDOM

## BACKGROUND NOTE AND SYNOPSIS

The UAR had severed diplomatic relations with Britain at the time of the Suez campaign in 1956. In Dec 1959 relations had been partially re-established by the appointment of Chargés d'Affaires in the two capitals. This was expected at the time to lead in a short while to the full normalization of relations, but more than a year passed before the exchange of Ambassadors was agreed upon.

While the UK appeared interested in the resumption of full relations at an early date, the UAR seemed to be reluctant.

The agreement was apparently delayed partly by UAR distrust of British policies and intentions in the ME and partly by a dispute over the number of consulates to be opened by both sides. The UAR demanded the right to open consulates not only in the UK, but also in British or British-protected areas in Africa, the Persian Gulf, and the Far East, but Britain regarded these claims as unjustified.

A UAR trade mission to Britain in June was interpreted as a sign that the UAR wanted better relations with the West. Further negotiations were stalled, however, and only received a new impetus through personal meetings between Abdel-Nasser and Macmillan in New York in Oct during the UN General Assembly. After further negotiations, the exchange of Ambassadors and the location of the consulates were eventually agreed upon on 15 Jan 1961. A day later, the National Assembly condemned Britain for "barbarous acts" committed in Southern Arabia.

## UAR ATTITUDE

**UAR Analysis of British ME Policy.** The following is a representative UAR view of British policies in the ME, from an article in *The Egyptian Economic and Political Review*, entitled "Strategic Disarmament through Expanding Non-alignment" (see p 520 ff). The section dealing with Britain took as its starting point the situation created by the Suez campaign: "The British, virtually eliminated from the Mediterranean areas of the ME, were painfully aware that the southern approaches via the Indian Ocean and the Arab Gulf were already threatened by the rapid expansion of Arab nationalism."

To counter these reverses, the British were said to have decided on the reinforcement of the base at Aden and the formation of a large mobile striking force there, capable of air-supported desert warfare, for which a "crash training programme" had been initiated in 1959. Behind this shield, preparations were going on to form a federation of the British-controlled areas of Southern Arabia, which would eventually be linked to Britain by a treaty.

The Persian Gulf protectorates were then to be organized in a similar federation. The author hinted that the Saudi-Arabian area of Dahrán was also to be included.

In Iraq, Britain was said to be contemplating a counter-revolution aimed at bringing to power a group of pro-British officers.

Kenya was being prepared as the main military base to support the securing of the above objectives.

Libya continued to be "occupied by Britain" and to serve her as an air link with Kenya. British troops there could "present the Arab command with diversionary concentrations as was the case in ... 1956."

"In the pattern of Western military preparation in

South Arabia, Israel occupies an immensely important military role": she pinned down Arab forces and was ready to embark on diversionary action "when British requirements elsewhere in the Arab world demand." British arms supplies to Israel revealed "a pattern of assistance and cooperation."

In all these places, the British "proceed unremittably with military preparations" and the building of bases "of value only ... for attacks against Arab nationalists." This was the background for Cairo's "resentment against Arab rulers who allow this British abuse of their position." The author concluded that the UAR's aim must be "the disarming of all bases in Arab territories which could be used against the Arabs." (*Egypt. Econ. & Pol. Review*, July-Aug 1960)

A similar view was expressed in an article in *Ruz al-Yusuf*, based on a conversation of its editor with a British diplomat. It stated that UAR relations with Britain were conditional on British relations with the Arab world as a whole. Britain could not respect the independence of one part of the Arab homeland while acting against the independence of another part. The editor stressed that UAR observers were convinced that King Hussein would never have dared "to attack Arab nationalism" without Britain's "instigation and help." (*Ruz al-Yusuf*, 7 Nov)

President Abdel-Nasser also expressed during the years his views on Britain's enmity towards Arab nationalism. (see p 517).

**UAR Incitement Against Britain in Africa and Cyprus.** In its Swahili and Somali programmes to Africa as well as in its "The Voice of the Arabs" broadcasts the UAR radio attacked British imperialism in Africa and in Cyprus. The general themes in these broadcasts were: that "the UK would never offer independence to these countries unless the national patriotic elements in every place stage a tireless, bloody revolt to chase it out"; that the UK was trying to split the national forces, and victory could be achieved only through unity under nationalist leaders; that the only true nationalist leaders were those who fought imperialism, suffered imprisonment and rejected all conciliation. (*BBC*, 16, 21, 28 Jan, 3, 16, 22, 27 Feb-IMH, 21 Feb)

**Feb: Britain's Reaffirmation of the Tripartite Declaration and Abdel-Nasser's hostile reaction.** See pp 93-4.

## FEB-AUG: TRADE MISSIONS; FINANCIAL SETTLEMENTS; VARIOUS CONTACTS

**Feb: British Mission in Cairo.** On 23 Feb a British trade mission arrived in Cairo for a ten-day visit to Egypt. The mission met various UAR Ministers and "gained the impression that there was a general desire to increase trade with the UK." (*Report of the UK Trade Mission to the Egyptian Region of the UAR*, London, HMS Office, Mar 1960, pp 4-5; *Financial Times*, 22 June)

[No publicity was given to the visit in the UAR Press.]

**Mar: Compensation for British Property Nationalized by the UAR.** On 1 Mar it was announced in Cairo that the UAR had paid the UK £24 million as full compensation for British property nationalized during the Suez crisis in 1956. The settlement was made in accordance with the UAR-UK financial agreement of 1 Mar



1959, which provided that compensation totalling £27 million would be paid in two instalments—the first of which (£3 million) was paid on the day of signature. (*Ahram*, 2 Mar) *Al-Akhbar* reported that out of 2,919 de-sequestration applications accepted so far, British properties had been released in 2,107 cases. (*Akhbar*, 28 Apr)

**Apr: Release of British Embassy's Bank Account.** On 26 Apr, the authorities released the British embassy's bank account amounting to some £169,200. (*Ahram*, 27 Apr)

**June: UAR Trade Mission in Britain.** A UAR trade mission headed by Muhammad Rushdi, President of the Federation of Egyptian Chambers of Commerce and Chairman of Bank Misr, left Cairo on 13 June for a ten-day visit to Britain. Most of the members represented state-owned or state-controlled organizations. Its object was to seek ways to correct the imbalance in British-Egyptian trade relations. (*Times*, 13 June; *Daily Telegraph*, 14 June)

Some British observers also attributed political significance to the mission. An editorial in *The Times*, headed "Egypt Looks Westwards," said that "fear of becoming too dependent on the Communist bloc" was among the main reasons for the UAR's desire for closer trading links with the West. (*Times*, 14 June)

**June: British-UAR Friendship Committee.** On 28 June the formation of a British friendship committee of English MPs of all parties was announced in London. Its aims were: to establish better relations between the UAR and the UK, to arrange general discussions on ME subjects, and to further closer political cooperation between the two countries. (*Ha'aretz*, 29 June)

**July: Failure of Talks on Civil Aviation Agreement.** In July talks in Cairo on a civil aviation agreement between the two countries failed because, according to a Cairo source, the UAR refused to allow UK airplanes to carry passengers between Cairo and Arab airports. The British side was ready to permit UAR airplanes to utilize London airport on the North America route in return for similar facilities for British airplanes on the London-Khartoum or London-South Africa routes. (*Ruz al-Yusuf*, 26 Sept)

**Aug: Dr Qaysuni's Visit to UK.** On 2 Aug Dr Abd al-Mun'im al-Qaysuni, the UAR Central Economy and Treasury Minister, left Cairo for Britain and Rumania on a one-month visit. (*R. Cairo*, 2 Aug-BBC, 4 Aug) He intended to conduct talks in London for the purpose of developing commercial relations. (*R. Cairo*, 2 Aug-IMB, 3 Aug)

**Aug: President of UAR National Assembly Visits UK.** On 4 Aug Anwar as-Sa'adat, President of the UAR National Assembly, left for a month's private visit to the UK. (*MENA*, 4 Aug-BBC, 6 Aug)

**1,200 UAR Students in UK.** *Al-Akhbar* reported that there were 1,200 students attending English universities during the academic year 1959/60, 200 of them being Syrians. (*Akhbar*, 4 Sept)

#### SEPT 1960-JAN 1961: NEGOTIATIONS FOR RE-ESTABLISHMENT OF FULL DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS

**UAR Reluctant.** During the first half of the year, there were no reports of negotiations for the exchange of Am-

bassadors. In Sept it was reported that Colin Crowe, the British Chargé d'Affaires in Cairo, had been unable to meet Abdel-Nasser for talks on the subject. The report deplored Abdel-Nasser's belief that the British Government was invariably hostile to Arab nationalism. (*Economist*, 24 Sept)

[The UAR continued to show reluctance to establish full diplomatic relations until the end of the year (see below).]

**Apr 1960-Jan 1961: Question of Consulates.** One of the main obstacles delaying the exchange of Ambassadors was disagreement on the number and location of consulates to be opened by both sides.

In Apr a Damascus paper reported that the UAR was making the re-opening of British consulates in Damascus, Alexandria and Port Said conditional on the establishment of UAR consulates in British territories in Africa and the British-protected areas in Arabia. (*Nasr*, 22 Apr) In Dec *al-Ahram* stated that the UAR wished to open consulates in Singapore, Hong-Kong, Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait, Aden, Dar as-Salam and other towns in Tanganyika and Kenya. The paper added that most of these areas would soon be independent and would then agree to the opening of consulates without needing British approval. It also pointed out that Israel already had consulates in many of these places and was using them for her political and economic activities. (*Ahram*, 17 Dec)

*The Economist* described as "unjustified" UAR demands for consulates in areas where there were neither UAR subjects nor trade interests to look after. (*Economist*, 24 Sept)

*The Sunday Times*, calling them "unreasonable," thought they aimed at the political penetration of areas under British influence. (*Sunday Times*, 6 Nov)

[On the consulates eventually agreed upon—see below.]

**Oct: Abdel-Nasser-Macmillan Meetings in New York.** Fresh impetus was given to the negotiations by British-UAR contacts in New York at the UN General Assembly. These included two meetings between Abdel-Nasser and Macmillan in Sept-Oct (see p 13), as well as a meeting between Mahmūd Fawzi, the UAR Foreign Minister, and Lord Home, the British Foreign Secretary, on 7 Oct.

It was reported that Macmillan had rejected Abdel-Nasser's demand that Britain should end the sale of military supplies to Israel. The British demanded an assurance that Abdel-Nasser would not take violent steps against Hussein's regime in Jordan. Abdel-Nasser also presented his claims on the consulates and demanded the cessation of British Press attacks on him. (*Glasgow Herald*, 24 Oct; *Jew. Obs.* 28 Oct)

The discussions between Abdel-Nasser and Macmillan (on 3 Oct) were described as "at times heated," and no definite decision was reached, but the Fawzi-Home talks, conducted "in a calmer atmosphere," achieved some progress. (*Sunday Times*, 23 Oct) Official British sources said that much remained to be done to reach full understanding on the question of diplomatic relations and compensation for British interests affected by the aftermath of Suez. (*Daily Telegraph*, 8 Oct)

**Oct: Agreement Reported Imminent.** Following these talks, both British and UAR papers reported that agreement on the exchange of Ambassadors was imminent. The normalization of relations was forecast for the middle of Nov. (*Sunday Times*, 23 Oct; *Ruz al-Yusuf*, 24 Oct)

The British Foreign Office refused to comment on these reports. Foreign circles pointed out that Britain regarded the question of the consulates as separate from that of the Ambassadors. (*Glasgow Herald*, 24 Oct)

**Oct: Britain "Conspiring with Jordan."** Two days later, however, *The Times* reported that UAR official circles appeared convinced that King Hussein's latest campaign against the UAR had "full British blessing" (see p 153). The paper added that an article in *al-Gumhuriyah* of 25 Oct was regarded in Cairo as tantamount to an official denial of the reports of imminent agreement. The article accused Britain of conspiring with Hussein and said that major obstacles still blocked the exchange of Ambassadors. (*Times*, 25 Oct)

**Nov-Dec: Delay over Question of Consulates.** The announcement of the appointment of Ambassadors was expected to take place on 15 Nov (*Times*, 1 Nov), but at the beginning of Nov the UAR asked for a postponement to 1 Dec. The reason was disagreement over the question of the consulates: the UAR had asked for ten, while the UK wished each side to establish only three. (*Sunday Times*, 6 Nov)

On 8 Nov, after the delay had become known, Macmillan said in Parliament that the exchange of Ambassadors between Britain and the UAR was "now under discussion" and that he hoped a "satisfactory solution" would soon be reached. (*Reuter*, 8 Nov)

The exchange of Ambassadors did not materialize on 1 Dec either. [In London at this time the state of affairs was apparently not quite clear.] On 1 Dec the diplomatic correspondent of *The Times*, reporting a request by the UAR Chargé d'Affaires for an interview with the British Foreign Secretary, said that this had given rise to speculation that he was about to propose the exchange of Ambassadors. A UAR source said, however, that since Cairo had received no official news from Britain on the question of the consulates by 1 Dec, the UAR had informed the British Chargé d'Affaires in Cairo on 2 Dec that she wished to postpone the event for a further 15 days. Contacts continued during this period. (*Ahram*, 16 Jan, acc. to BBC, 17 Jan 1961)

In mid-Dec a UAR journal summed up its view of the UAR Government's attitude: "The UAR does not mind if the exchange of Ambassadors is put off for another year." (*Ruz al-Yusuf*, 19 Dec)

On the other hand, *The Times*, at the beginning of Jan 1961, described the British Government as being "ready... to restore full diplomatic relations at any time." (*Times*, 7 Jan 1961)

## JAN 1961 FULL DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS ESTABLISHED

**Jan 1961: Ambassador-Designates.** Only at the beginning of 1961 did a solution begin to emerge. On 15 Jan 1961 the British Chargé d'Affaires in Cairo officially informed the UAR Foreign Minister that the proposed UK Ambassador was Harold Beeley, and was informed that the UAR had named its present Ambassador in Moscow, Muhammad al-Kuni, to be Ambassador in London. At the same time it was announced that Britain would open consulates in Alexandria and Damascus and the UAR in Liverpool, Freetown (Sierra Leone), Hong-Kong and Singapore. (*Times*, 16 Jan) The establishment of a UAR consulate in Kuwait was agreed to in principle by the Sheikh of Kuwait. (*BBC in Arabic*, 16 Jan-IMB, 16 Jan 1961) [Previously, Britain had had consulates in Cairo, Port Said, Suez and Aleppo as well.]

The agreement was described as an "interim arrangement," which would not preclude the opening of further consulates later on. (*Guardian*, 24 Jan)

**16 Jan 1961: UAR National Assembly Condemns British "Barbarous Acts."** While the normalization of UK-UAR relations was thus imminent, the UAR National Assembly adopted a resolution condemning "barbarous acts" committed by "British occupation forces" in Southern Arabia and asking for support for the South Arabian fighters. It appealed to the parliaments of friendly countries to do likewise. (*R. Cairo*, 16 Jan-IMB, 17 Jan 1961)

**18-26 Jan 1961: Official Announcement of Exchange of Ambassadors.** On 18 Jan 1961 Britain notified the UAR of the acceptance of Al-Kuni as Ambassador in London, and on 22 Jan the UAR notified Britain of the acceptance of Beeley. (*BBC*, 21 Jan; *Jer. Post*, 23 Jan 1961) On 26 Jan, the British Foreign Office officially announced the restoration of full diplomatic relations and the appointment of Harold Beeley, welcoming the exchange of Ambassadors as a basis for further improvement in the relations between the two countries. (*Jer. Post*, 27 Jan 1961) On the same day Al-Kuni's appointment was announced in Cairo. (*R. Cairo*, 26 Jan-IMB, 27 Jan 1961)

**The New Ambassador.** Muhammad al-Kuni was described as "one of the most polished" UAR diplomats "without any particular ideological commitments." He was contrasted with the previous Chargé d'Affaires, Kamal Khalil, who was "a much more violently nationalist figure." (*Scotsman*, 27 Jan 1961)

Sir Harold Beeley joined the Foreign Service in 1946. As to his experience of Middle Eastern questions, until 1948 he was a Foreign Office expert on Palestine. He served in Baghdad from 1950-1953 and in Jedda from 1955-1956. From 1956-1958 he was Assistant Under-Secretary in charge of ME questions at the Foreign Office and then became deputy British representative at the UN. (*Jer. Post*, 26 Jan; *Times*, 27 Jan 1961)

**Jan: British Press Comment.** The British Press generally paid considerable attention to the event. *The Observer* called it "a new start" and the "end of a long bitter chapter," although the paper did not believe that it would lead to an appreciable change in relations. (*Observer*, 29 Jan) *The Guardian* similarly stated that an improvement in UAR-British relations depended on the solution of many complicated problems in the ME, but the exchange of Ambassadors would create at least the possibility of bridging the gap. (*Guardian*, 24 Jan) *The Scotsman* called the exchange "a victory for patience and commonsense," and hoped for a "gradual decline" in UAR anti-British propaganda. (*Scotsman*, 16 Jan) *The Daily Express*, on the other hand, condemned the British Government's "folly" in giving in to Abdel-Nasser over the question of the UAR consulates, which would only serve as bases for anti-British intrigue and mischief. (*Daily Express*, 17 Jan 1961)

**Jan: UAR Press Comment:** *Al-Gumhuriyah* commented that the event should be regarded solely as a step to renormalize diplomatic relations with Britain. Relations would not become really friendly unless Britain developed genuine comprehension of the UAR. Imperialism was still hatching plots in the Arab countries and in many of the Afro-Asian ones, to the aid and defence of which the UAR was committed. The event had again proved

## ASIAN COUNTRIES

the sincerity of the policy of the UAR, which shunned the friendship of no one who offered it "on the honest basis of mutual respect and desire to exchange benefits, while finally discarding his old habit of sugar-coating his ugly imperialist aims and concealing them in lucid and deceptive guises which can no longer deceive our ever-

growing national enlightenment." (Quoted in *BBC*, 18 Jan 1961)

Other UAR comment on the event was careful to point out that the agreement had come about only after British concessions regarding the consulates. (*Ahram*, 16 Jan, quoted in *BBC*, 17 Jan 1961)

## ASIAN COUNTRIES

### GENERAL

**Jan-Apr: Economic Mission.** On his return to Cairo, Mahmūd Badawī Ash-Shayātī, head of a UAR economic mission to the Far East, declared on 27 Apr that during the previous three months his mission had visited Cambodia, Vietnam, Afghanistan, Pakistan, China, Burma and the Philippines. His mission had concluded trade and payments agreements with Cambodia, Vietnam, Afghanistan and Pakistan. (*Ahram*, 23 Apr)

### AFGHANISTAN

**Aug: Afghanistan Looking After UAR's Interests in Iran.** Following the UAR's decision to break off diplomatic relations with Iran early in Aug (see p 216 ff), the Afghan Government, acting on the UAR's request, instructed its embassy in Tehran to look after the interests of UAR nationals in Iran. (*Ahram*, 7 Aug)

**Oct: State Visit of the King of Afghanistan to the UAR.** In response to the invitation of President Abdel-Nasser, extended on 16 Aug (*BBC*, 18 Aug), King Muhammad Zahir Shah of Afghanistan, accompanied by his Deputy PM and other high officials, arrived in Cairo on 22 Oct, for a ten-day state visit to the UAR. (*Ahram*, 23 Oct) He had several meetings with the UAR President "to exchange views on matters of interest to both countries, the Palestine and the Algerian problems and international questions" (*IMB*, 23 Oct) and attended various military and other functions. (*Ahram*, 23-29 Oct)

On 23 Oct, a telegraphic service connecting Cairo and Kabul was inaugurated to commemorate the Afghan King's visit. (*R. Cairo*, 24 Oct-*IMB*, 24 Oct)

**"Common Policy."** On 25 Oct, at a mass rally organized by the National Union in honour of the guest, Abdel-Nasser said that close ties existed between the UAR and Afghanistan, based on the common faith in Islam, a common policy of positive neutrality and non-alignment in the cold war. He thanked the King for Afghanistan's support of the Arabs against "Zionist aggression." (*Ahram*, 26 Oct)

**Oct: Joint Communiqué.** On 31 Oct, a joint communiqué was issued. It stressed the desire of both leaders to foster the bonds of friendship between their countries; reaffirmed their adherence to the principles of the UN Charter, the Bandung Conference and the policy of "effective and positive neutrality and non-alignment" and opposition to the "military groupings of various countries." The two leaders expressed "great concern" at the situation in the Congo caused by "the intrigues of the imperialists"; and announced their "full support for the recovery of the rights of the Palestinian people under the resolutions of the UN." They denounced France for its "genocidal war in Algeria" and called for self-determination for the Algerian people under the auspices of

the UN; condemned the policy of racial discrimination and supported international aid to underdeveloped countries. Abdel-Nasser accepted the King's invitation to visit Afghanistan. No date was set for the visit. (*Ahram*, 1 Nov; *BBC*, 2 Nov)

### BURMA

**Dec: Burmese Military Mission in the UAR.** On 11 Dec an eleven-man Burmese military mission headed by the Naval Chief of Staff, Commodore Than Pe, arrived in Cairo for a two-week visit to the UAR. (*R. Cairo*, 12 Dec-*IMB*, 12 Dec) They were received by President Abdel-Nasser (on 27 Dec) and by Field Marshal Amer (on 14 Dec) and toured various military installations in Egypt and Syria. (*R. Cairo*, 12-27 Dec-*IMB*, 13-28 Dec, *Ayyam*, 20 Dec)

On 14 Dec, the head of the mission declared that the purpose of the visit was to see the progress made by the military officers' regime in the UAR, in the economic, industrial and social fields. He added that the Burmese Government was fostering policies similar to those of the UAR in strengthening positive neutrality and peaceful co-existence. (*R. Cairo*, 14 Dec-*IMB*, 15 Dec) The mission left Cairo on 30 Dec. (*R. Sawt al-Arab*, 30 Dec-*IMB*, 1 Jan 1961)

### CEYLON

**Feb-Dec: Economic and Cultural Relations.** *Al-Ahrām* quoted the Ceylonese Ambassador in Cairo as saying that "efforts are being made to strengthen the existing ties between Ceylon and the Arab countries, mainly the UAR." (*Ahram*, 13 Feb)

On 26 Nov the Ceylonese Minister of Education, Mr Badi' ad-Din Mahmud, arrived in Cairo for a five-day official visit to the UAR. (*R. Damascus*, 27 Nov-*IMB*, 27 Nov) The Minister held several meetings with the UAR Central Minister of Education and was received for a private talk by President Abdel-Nasser. (*R. Cairo*, 1 Dec-*IMB*, 1 Dec; *Ayyam*, 2 Dec) He left Cairo on 2 Dec. (*Ahram*, 3 Dec)

On 10 Dec a UAR commercial mission left Cairo for Colombo. The mission, it was announced, would conduct "important talks" and would negotiate a new commercial agreement with the Ceylonese authorities. (*R. Damascus*, 11 Dec-*IMB*, 12 Dec; *Akhbar*, 12 Dec)

**UAR Hails Ceylon's Decision to Withdraw Accreditation of Envoy to Israel.** The UAR Press and radio hailed with great satisfaction the decision of the Ceylonese PM, Mrs Bandaranaike, to withdraw the accreditation of the Ceylonese non-resident Ambassador to Israel (see p 180). (*IMP*; *IMB*, 22-30 Aug)

### CAMBODIA

**July-Aug: Vice-President of Cambodia in Cairo.** On 18 July Mr Nhiek Tiouloung, First Vice-President of Cam-



bodia, arrived in Cairo on an official visit. He was accompanied by the former Cambodian Minister of Labour and the Director General of Planning and Education in Cambodia. (*BBC, 21 July*) The Cambodian visitors left Cairo on 3 Aug. (*R. Cairo, 3 Aug-IMB, 4 Aug*)

**Aug-Nov: Commercial Ties.** *Al-Ahrām* reported that an agreement had been concluded between the UAR and Cambodia, whereby the UAR would export 40,000 tons of refined petroleum and 10,000 tons of crude oil. (*Ahrām, 8 Aug*)

On 5 Nov a commercial mission headed by Dr Ahmad Abu al-Alā' left Cairo for Cambodia. The mission was to conduct negotiations to strengthen the economic ties between the two countries, and to investigate the possibility of establishing a joint Cambodian-UAR bank in Cambodia. (*Ahrām, 6 Nov*) [No further information was available.]

## INDONESIA

**Apr: President Sukarno Visits the UAR.** On 23 Apr President Sukarno, accompanied by a 31-member entourage, arrived in Cairo on a three-day official visit to the UAR. He had "many meetings" with the UAR President, visited various installations, received an honorary Ph.D. degree from al-Azhar University and met members of the Indonesian community in Cairo. (*Ahrām, 23-26 Apr*)

**Joint Communiqué: The Favourable Results of the Policy of Positive Neutralism.** The joint communiqué, issued on 26 Apr, stated: "In reviewing the results of the foreign policy pursued by each of the two countries, i.e. the policy of positive neutrality and of effective independence, the two Presidents noted with great satisfaction that this foreign policy serves to develop real nationalist (Arabic: *qawmi*) independence and national dignity. The two Presidents were most happy to note that their outlook on foreign affairs contributes positively to peace and rapprochement between the conflicting international blocs."

The two Presidents welcomed the progress made with regard to disarmament and the banning of atomic weapons and tests. They expressed regret at "the afflictions visited on the Palestinian Arabs." They denounced "Israel's endeavour to shatter Afro-Asian solidarity in an attempt to act as a spearhead serving the new imperialism." They deplored the bloodshed in Algeria and called for a solution recognizing the Algerians' rights to self-determination and independence. They voiced their strong hope for a just solution of the problem of West Irian, "taking full account of the Indonesian people's rights and everyone's duty to struggle and eliminate all traces of imperialism" and "they denounced the Dutch government's decision to send warships to Indonesian waters." They expressed regret at France's explosion of an atomic bomb in Africa; at the policy of racial segregation practised by the government of the Union of South Africa and "agreed on the need for destroying this policy on the spot." They "discussed in detail all facts and prospects of economic development and social progress, particularly in newly developing countries. They "affirmed that every effort must be made to bolster and support the bases of close economic and cultural relations between the two countries. "To this end, they made important decisions which will become a beacon for the near future." "At the same time, liaison committees will be formed in Cairo and Jakarta to keep a check on the rate of economic and cultural advance by the two countries." Abdel-Nasser accepted an invitation to visit Indonesia. (*BBC, 28 Apr*)

**Aug: Indonesian Minister of Basic Industry and Mining in Egypt.** On 8 Aug Khayrat Salih, Indonesian Minister of Basic Industry and Mining in the Field of Reconstruction, (*sic, BBC, 10 Aug*) concluded a week's visit to the UAR. A joint statement issued by him and the UAR Minister of Industry said that he had invited the Minister to visit Indonesia in order to exchange experiences, discuss industrial development in the two countries, and review the possibility of expanding economic relations between the two countries, in conformity with the joint statement issued during Sukarno's visit to the UAR in Apr (see above). (*BBC, 10 Aug*)

**Aug: UAR Assumes Protection of Indonesian Interests in the Netherlands.** Following the severance on 16 Aug of diplomatic relations between Indonesia and the Netherlands [as President Sukarno explained, it was because of the "persistent refusal" of the Dutch to transfer West Irian (Dutch New Guinea) to Indonesian sovereignty—(*NYT, 16 Aug*)] the UAR assumed as of 23 Aug responsibility for the protection of Indonesian interests in the Netherlands. (*Ahrām, 25 Aug*)

**Sept-Dec: UAR-Indonesian Cooperation at the UN.** See pp 11-12.

**Dec: Indonesian Army Officers Visit the UAR.** On 3 Dec six officers from the Indonesian Army HQ arrived in Cairo for a one-day official visit. (*Ahrām, 4 Dec*)

**Dec: In a Joint Communiqué on the Congo issued in Cairo and Jakarta,** following intensive diplomatic consultations, Presidents Nasser and Sukarno called on the Afro-Asian countries to urge the UN to stabilize and regulate the situation in the Congo. They sharply denounced Belgian policy in the Congo and in Africa and expressed regret at the unsuccessful intervention of the UN. (*Ahrām, 13 Dec*)

## INDIA

**Mar-Apr: Abdel-Nasser's Visit to India.** On 29 Mar, the UAR President, accompanied by the Foreign Minister, Mahmud Fawzi, Minister for Presidential Affairs Ali Sabri and the Syrian Region Minister Tu'mah al-Awdatallah, arrived in New-Delhi for a 13-day official visit. (*R. Cairo, 29 Mar-IMB, 30 Mar*) He was welcomed by President Prasad and Premier Nehru and cheered by large crowds lining the roads along the 12-mile route from the airport to the city. (*Ahrām, 30 Mar*)

Abdel-Nasser had talks with Premier Nehru on international problems. Among the problems discussed but not specifically mentioned in the joint communiqué were, according to UAR sources, the situation in Iraq and the conflict between India and China. Abdel-Nasser addressed the Indian Parliament, toured the country and attended various receptions in his honour. He also attended a diplomatic conference of UAR Ambassadors to South East Asia and the Far East. (*Ahrām, 30 Mar, 10 Apr*)

**Abdel-Nasser Hailed as All-Arab Leader.** In a speech at a reception given by the Indian President, the latter hailed his guest's "inspiring leadership." He said that President Nasser "symbolises the spirit of awakening in the Arab world." (*NYT, 30 Mar*)

On 31 Mar, in a joint session of both houses of the Indian Parliament, its President, welcoming Abdel-Nasser said: "You visited India for the first time in 1955 as a President of the Republic of Egypt, and now as Pre-



sident of two Arab countries; the next time you visit India you will be a President of all Arab countries." (BBC, 5 Apr) (There was an Iraqi protest regarding this statement, see pp 145-6.)

In his speech Abdel-Nasser thanked India for her moral and diplomatic help to Egypt during the Suez crisis in 1956, denounced the government of South Africa and referred to the question of Arab refugees. He emphasized the wisdom of the non-alignment policy pursued by India and the UAR, and warned that the real challenge to the under-developed countries was to face the danger of "the monopolization of science as a means of domination—imperialism's new style." (*Ahram*, 1 Apr)

Abdel-Nasser's Offer of Mediation on the Kashmir Question was made at a Press Conference on 2 Apr and was repeated at a Press Conference in Bombay on 9 Apr. (*Ahram*, 3, 10 Apr) Mr Nehru, however, told Parliament on 13 Apr that President Abdel-Nasser had not mentioned his offer during their talks and this was confirmed by Abdel-Nasser himself on 14 Apr. (*Keesing's Contemporary Archives*, p 17444, 28 May-4 June)

The Joint Communiqué, issued on 10 Apr, stated that the two leaders had "reiterated their faith in the policy of non-alignment and their resolve to maintain friendly relations with all countries." International assistance was welcomed for the development of newly independent countries of Asia and Africa, but "there should be no interference in their internal affairs." They welcomed the trend towards a relaxation of international tension and the forthcoming Summit Conference. They regretted that "nuclear bombs have recently been exploded over a region in Africa [i.e. by the French in the Sahara] against the wishes of the people affected" and expressed the hope that such tests would be discontinued. They regarded progress in disarmament as essential and expressed the hope that the UN disarmament committee would achieve positive results.

The two leaders welcomed the awakening among the peoples of Africa and expressed the hope that dependent countries "would achieve their freedom without further delay." They deplored "racial discrimination" in some parts of Africa and expressed "their sense of shock and profound regret at the recent large-scale killing of innocent people in the Union of South Africa..." They re-affirmed their view that "the question of Palestine should be solved in conformity with the provisions of the UN Charter, resolutions of the UN and the principles unanimously adopted at the Bandung Conference of 1955 for a peaceful settlement of the Palestine question" and that "the right of the Algerian people to self-determination and independence should be recognized and fully implemented." They agreed that it would be to the advantage of under-developed countries to cooperate on problems of economic development, and looked forward to continued cooperation between India and the UAR in all fields. They noted with pleasure the ever-growing friendship and cooperation between India and the UAR. (BBC FE, 14 Apr)

Apr: An Agreement Between the Indian Government and "Misr" Industrial Co.—a government agency—was signed in the first week of Apr. The agreement provided for the utilization of 40 million Rupies, the value of 100,000 tons of Egyptian rice sold to India. In exchange the UAR would import tea to the value of R10 million of jute; R10 million of agricultural products and R10 million of unspecified products. (*Ahram*, 12 Apr; *Commerce du Levant*, 14 Apr)

Mr Nehru Visits the UAR. In May, following the termination of the London Conference of Commonwealth Prime Ministers, PM Nehru visited the UAR, Turkey and Lebanon, before returning to Delhi. During a three-day visit to the Southern Region of the UAR (17-20 May), Nehru held conversations with Abdel-Nasser; visited Luxor, the site of the Aswan High Dam, and the Gaza Strip where he inspected refugee camps and met with Indian troops of the UN Emergency Force. (*Ahram*, 18-20 May) (There was an aerial incident involving PM Nehru's plane and Israeli military aircraft, see pp 193-4.) On 27-28 May, PM Nehru visited the Syrian Region of the UAR. (*Mid. Mirror*, 29 May)

The joint communiqué issued on 20 May dealt entirely with the failure of the Paris Summit Conference. It said that the collapse of the meeting had come as a "shock" and expressed apprehension that "it may lead to intensification of the cold war and even more active concentration on armaments." It stressed that while responsibility for keeping the peace falls particularly upon the big states, "it is equally shared by all peoples and states." The two leaders "appealed to all leaders and nations of the world to stand firm against any deterioration in the international situation and to spare no effort in the service of the noble cause of peace."... "To this great cause we dedicate ourselves anew and pledge the support of our countries." (BBC, 23 May)

June-Sept: Various Visits and Contacts. On 2 June three members of the Indian Parliament arrived in Cairo for a three-day visit as official guests of the UAR National Union. (*Akhbar al-Yaum*, 4 June)

On 3 June, a UAR-India Society was established, to strengthen the ties of friendship between the two countries. (*Gumhuriyah*, 4 June)

On 8 July the Indian Minister of the Treasury, Mr Murarji, arrived in Cairo on a four-day official visit to the UAR. Cairo Radio reported that the discussions between the Indian Minister and the UAR Central Minister of National Economy included economic, financial, and commercial relations between the two countries. Development projects both in the UAR and India were also discussed. (*R. Cairo*, 9 July-IMB, 10 July)

In the first week of Sept, the Indian Deputy Minister of Defence visited the UAR. (*Ruz al-Yusuf*, 12 Sept)

Sept: UAR-Indian Cooperation in the UN. See pp 11-12.

28 Oct: New Indian Ambassador in Cairo. On 28 Oct a new Indian Ambassador to the UAR, Mr Muhammad Azim Hassin, arrived in Cairo. This was the first time that a Muslim Indian represented his country in an Arab capital. (*Musawwar*, 28 Oct)

## JAPAN

Jan-Mar: Japanese Commercial Missions in the UAR. Between 13-20 Jan and 15-23 Mar two Japanese commercial missions representing Japanese commercial corporations visited the UAR to investigate the possibilities of strengthening economic and commercial relations between the two countries. (*Ahram*, 14, 21 Jan, 16-24 Mar)

Feb: Japanese Ambassador on Cooperation with the UAR. On 13 Feb the Japanese Ambassador to the UAR, Mr Yutaka Tsuchida, declared that Japan wanted to cooperate in strengthening the ME economy. Japan was trying to increase its imports, especially of cotton from the UAR.

The cultural agreement between the two countries had

led to an increased exchange of students and professors. (*Ahram*, 14 Feb)

**Apr: UAR Minister for Presidential Affairs Visits Japan.** On 17 Apr the UAR Minister for Presidential Affairs, Ali Sabri, arrived in Tokyo on a ten-day official visit to Japan. He was received by the Emperor, the Premier and the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, of Commerce and of Finance. (*R. Cairo*, 18-26 Apr-*IMB*, 19-27 Apr)

On his return he declared that his visit had yielded good results in the political, economic and commercial fields. He had invited some Japanese Ministers and officials to visit the UAR. Political cooperation with Japan could be expected, he declared, in Afro-Asian affairs and on the question of the prohibition of atomic tests. (*Ahram*, 30 Apr)

**Sept: Japanese Mission in Syria.** On 7 Sept a nine-man Japanese mission representing posts, telegraph and broadcasting systems arrived in Damascus for a five-day visit. The mission conducted talks on the possible expansion of technical cooperation in telecommunications between the two countries. (*Ahram*, 8, 10 Sept)

#### MALAYA

On 6 Jan Prince Uthman Ibn Ahmad, the first Malayan Chargé d'Affaires to the UAR, arrived in Cairo. (*Gumhuriyah*, 7 Jan)

On 25 May, the Malayan Minister of Labour arrived in Cairo on a three-day visit. (*BBC*, 27 May)

#### PAKISTAN

**Apr: Abdel-Nasser Visits Pakistan.** On 10 Apr Abdel-Nasser, having concluded his state visit to India, arrived in Karachi, where he was welcomed by President Ayub Khan and a large crowd.

Abdel-Nasser held discussions with Ayub in Karachi and Peshawar, and toured the country. (*Ahram*, 11-17 Apr)

**Joint Communiqué.** A joint communiqué said that the discussions had been held in an atmosphere of "the greatest cordiality and understanding" and that cultural and trade agreements had been concluded. The two Presidents expressed full support for the great powers' efforts to seek a relaxation of international tension, but "it was imperative for lasting peace to ensure the elimination of causes which compel nations to seek armaments." They reaffirmed their faith in the principles of non-intervention in the internal affairs of other countries, and advocated the solution of the Palestine question in accordance with the UN and Bandung resolutions. The communiqué expressed grave concern about the situation in Algeria and urged that Algerian independence be achieved by peaceful methods. It also denounced the policy of apartheid in South Africa.

**Pakistani-UAR Economy and Political Institutionalization Compared.** Finally, the two Presidents were "convinced that educational reforms, land reforms, and industrialization are essential before newly developed countries can become prosperous and strong," and had discussed "the methods of economic development and the nature of the political institutions which they were introducing in their respective countries." Ayub accepted an invitation to visit the UAR. (*R. Cairo*, 16 Apr-*IMB*, 17 Apr, see also *IMH*, 15 Apr; *Akhbar*, 16 Apr)

**14 Apr: Abdel-Nasser Against Muslim Bloc.** On 14 Apr at a Press conference Abdel-Nasser was asked whether

he favoured the creation of a Muslim bloc. He replied that an association of nations on the basis of religion would give rise to fanaticism and would not aid world peace; rival blocs of Christians, Jews, Hindus and members of other religions would suffer at the hands of religious fanatics. (*Eg. Mail*, 16 Apr)

**Apr: Abdel-Nasser Offers Mediation on Kashmir Question.** See p 539.

**Apr: Trade Agreement.** On 15 Apr the UAR and Pakistan negotiated their first trade agreement. The two countries agreed to accord each other most-favoured-nation treatment. Pakistan was to export jute and tea to the UAR in return for long-staple cotton, textiles, onions and other commodities. The agreement was concluded for one year, extendable for another year. (*Ahram*, 16 Apr)

**Nov: Visit of Ayub Khan to the UAR.** On 5 Nov the President of Pakistan, Muhammad Ayub Khan, arrived in Cairo for a seven-day official visit to the UAR. He had several talks with Abdel-Nasser and attended several functions held in his honour; toured Egypt and Syria; and addressed a National Union Rally. (*Ahram*, 5-13 Nov)

**Abdel-Nasser: Ayub Endeavours to Overcome "Artificial Estrangement."** On 7 Nov, the Pakistani and UAR Presidents addressed a National Union Rally in Cairo University.

Abdel-Nasser thanked Ayub for his initiative in eliminating "the artificial estrangement created by imperialism between our two countries before the outbreak of your revolution," and for his declaration of support for all Arab causes, especially opposition to Zionism and Israel. This attitude reflected also the determination of the Pakistani people—who at the time of the Suez invasion "shed blood in support of our cause"—"to put things right." Nothing could make them forget the bonds of religion.

**Abdel-Nasser on Islam and Arabic Nationalism.** Continuing, Abdel-Nasser spoke of ancient Crusader and modern imperialist attempts to "annihilate Arab nationalism." However they failed because of the national unity of the Arabs: "We are Muslims, but we are Arabs first who have always lived with our Christian Arab brothers as one indivisible nation."

**Ayub on Pakistani-UAR Mutual Disappointments Over Attitude to Suez and Kashmir Conflicts.** Speaking after the UAR President, President Ayub referred to Abdel-Nasser's mention of the Suez campaign. He said that at the time he had approached the Pakistani Government, declaring that the Suez Canal belongs to the people of Egypt and a settlement assuring the rights of all must be achieved and the danger of invasion prevented. [Notwithstanding Abdel-Nasser's compliment to the Pakistani people on its attitude during the Suez war, Ayub went on to say:] "Maybe some of our representatives were clumsy..." and declared that he well understood Egyptian complaints: "...When people are under pressure they get hurt if they do not get the support from friends... they think their due." However Pakistan also had things to complain about. It was involved in a "gigantic struggle" with India over Kashmir. "We have been subjected to pressure which you cannot really comprehend." Speaking of the refugee problem in Pakistan he added: "Just imagine what nine million refugees mean when you consider the problem... of a million... re-

tugees from Palestine." "It is only natural that our people should at times complain and expect open and substantial support from their Muslim brethren all over the world."

**Ayub: Nationalism, Not Religion, Today's Motive Power.** Continuing, Ayub said that although he understood such expectations, one has to be a realist. "Whether one likes it or not religion today is no longer the motive power that it used to be. It is national territorialism which is the motive power." So Pakistan had to solve its problems itself.

**Pakistani Support Against Israel.** Continuing his speech, Ayub said that Pakistan had always supported the Arab cause against Israel and would continue to do so. Pakistan expected nothing in return except recognition of its attitude.

**Ayub Exhorts to Inter-Arab Understanding.** Further, Ayub expressed his hope that all inter-Arab differences would be settled "so that your resources, which are very badly needed for development and progressive work, may not be divided into negative things..."

**Ayub on Islamic Crisis and Remedy.** Continuing, Ayub spoke of the crisis of Islam. Islam is a progressive religion "that encourages the use of reason (and) should help us to move forward with the time..." yet the Muslim communities are "the most backward... uneducated... stagnant. The task of every thinking Muslim is to find the reason in order to put matters right" and he should have the moral courage to say openly what is wrong and how it should be put right... "If we do not move with the time, recognise our defects and remove them, we shall go back again to slavery."

**Ayub on Similarity of Political Regimes.** The Pakistani President then spoke of the similarity between the UAR and Pakistani approach to political institutions. The essential requirement of newly emerging nations was development and social betterment, for which political stability was needed. Western parliamentary democracy did not work in Pakistan and the UAR. This was not the fault of democracy. "I say to myself it is our fault. We are not yet ready." Political stability required institutions which people can understand and use. To build such institutions "we must get down to our fundamentals instead of repeating borrowed ideas." (BBC, 9 Nov)

**Ayub Khan's Speech at Cairo University.** On 9 Nov, at a ceremony in which an honorary Ph.D degree was conferred on the Pakistani President, he delivered a speech in which variations on most of the above-mentioned themes appeared. He spoke at greater length on the crisis in Islam and on Pakistan's political institutions and educational reforms. However, on this occasion his remarks on the effectiveness of Islamic ties in international relations were different. He spoke of loyalty to Islam as "this greater loyalty which, in spite of all external discord and political dispute between the governments, binds the Muslim people everywhere in the world in unbreakable and invisible ties of good will and sympathy."

He also hailed the UAR for its constructive social and economic achievements. (Full text in BBC, 12 Nov)

**Ayub: Afro-Asians' First Task to Achieve Peace Among Themselves.** Answering a question at a Press conference in Cairo on 10 Nov, President Ayub declared that his government did not intend to recognize the Algerian Provisional Government. Asked what the Afro-Asian states could do to settle the dispute between the Great Powers, Ayub Khan stated: "First, they could achieve peace among themselves, and not disturb each other's tranquillity. Then they could work together to bring the two great blocs together. The Afro-Asians are not all angels." (BBC, 14 Nov)

**Joint Communiqué.** The joint communiqué issued on 12 Nov said that talks were held between President Ayub and President Nasser "in an atmosphere of accord, fraternity and friendship which is based on mutual respect and understanding and which takes into consideration the fundamental facts of the policy of each country." They agreed on "the necessity to adhere to the principles and Charter of the UN and the Bandung conference resolutions in the desire to bring about world peace, world justice and respect for human rights." They welcomed the newly independent states in Africa and other continents which had recently joined the UN; denounced the policy of racial discrimination pursued by certain African countries and agreed to take practical steps to strengthen the economic relations between the two countries. (Ahram, 13 Nov)

**Dec. A Civil Aviation Agreement.** According to *al-Anwar* (Beirut) a Civil Aviation Agreement had been initialled between the UAR and Pakistan. The agreement was to be ratified shortly. (Anwar, 15 Dec; IMB, 14 Dec)

## LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES

### GENERAL

**Mar-June: UAR Goodwill Mission.** On 4 Mar, a UAR good will mission left Cairo on a three-month tour of 15 Latin American countries. The mission was headed by Deputy Foreign Minister Hussein Dhu-al-Fiqr Sabri and included as its members the Director of the Agrarian Reform Administration, the Director of South America Department, the Director of Emigrants' Department at the UAR Foreign Ministry; and representatives of the Ministry of Trade and Commerce. (Ahram, 2, 5 Mar)

The mission visited Cuba, Venezuela, Colombia, Panama, Costa Rica, Honduras, El Salvador, Mexico, Ecua-

dor, Bolivia, Chile, Brazil, Uruguay, Argentina, and Paraguay. (Ahram, 9 June)

**The Mission's Aims: Political Cooperation.** The purpose of the mission was "to woo Latin America into firmer and friendlier ties with the Arab world." (Time, 9 Mar; also Akhbar, 3 Mar) *Al-Ahrām* commented: "the UAR believes that common efforts should be undertaken by the UAR and the Latin American countries in order to receive unconditional aid from the East and the West alike... The mission will explore the possibilities of such cooperation." (Ahram, 24 Apr) *Al-Gumhuriyah* felt that the mission was "of great significance because the UAR,



which is considered the connecting link between Africa and Asia, can also become a connecting link between Latin America and both Africa and Asia on account of the cultural ties existing between them." (*Gumhuriyah*, 14 Apr)

Back in Cairo Sabri declared that the object of the mission had been to consolidate economic, cultural and political relations with Latin American countries and the tour was a successful beginning of the long-term policy to be followed by the UAR. He also said that imperialism had persistently attempted to isolate the Arab world from Latin America but "now it is mandatory for these countries to cooperate." (*Ahram*, 9 June, also 5 Apr)

**Another Aim: "To Smash Israel's Plots."** Speaking about his mission's activities "to smash Israel's plots" Mr Sabri said that Israel had launched "a venomous propaganda campaign to influence public opinion in Latin America" and that he was compelled to dedicate all his efforts "to denying this false propaganda." (*Ahram*, 9 June; *BBC*, 10 June) In another context, however, he claimed that he took no notice of Israeli propaganda because "dogs bark and the caravan goes on." (*Ahram*, 5 Apr, 9 June)

**Cultural Agreements.** Mr Sabri added that his mission had concluded cultural agreements with Mexico, Colombia, Brazil and Chile, and that he had, on behalf of President Nasser, extended invitations to the Presidents of the countries he had visited, to visit the UAR. (*BBC*, 10 June; *Ahram*, 9 June, also *Ahram*, 5, 13, 28 Apr; *Gumhuriyah*, 12 Apr, 2, 9 June)

The mission had also attended functions organized by Arab immigrants in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico and Venezuela, where the members of the mission were questioned on UAR economic development; Arab nationalism and Israel-Arab relations. (*Ahram*, 5, 13 Apr; 8, 14 May; 3, 9 June)

## ARGENTINA

**May-July: Various Contacts.** In May the UAR goodwill mission (see immediately above), headed by Dhu-al-Fiqar Sabri, represented the UAR at Argentina's 150th Independence Day celebrations. The head of the mission handed a personal invitation from the UAR President to the Argentine President Frondizi to visit the UAR. (*R. Cairo*, 29 May-*IMB*, 30 May; *Ayyam*, 22, 28 May)

On 12 July an Argentine UN Representative arrived in Cairo for an official visit. The guest's itinerary included: meetings with Dr Fawzi, UAR Foreign Minister, visiting the Gaza strip and touring refugee camps, meeting President Nasser and Field Marshal Amer, flying to Syria and visiting cooperative farms. (*R. Cairo*, 16 July-*IMB*, 17 July; *Ahram*, 13-21 July)

## BRAZIL

**Jan: Abdel-Nasser Invited to Brazil.** On 8 Jan Damascus Radio announced that the UAR President had been invited to pay a state visit to Brazil. No date was announced for the visit. (*R. Damascus*, 8 Jan-*BBC*, 9 Jan)

**Aug: Brazilian Army Chief in Cairo.** On 10 Aug General Lima Brayner, Chief of the Brazilian General Staff, arrived in Cairo from Beirut for a one-week official visit. He was received by Abdel-Nasser and visited army installations and armament factories. (*Gumhuriyah*, 13, 15 Aug; *BBC*, 13 Aug)

## CUBA

**Jan: Cuban Foreign Minister in Cairo.** On 6 Jan, Mr Raul Roa, the Cuban Foreign Minister arrived in Cairo. He declared that he had come to participate in the ceremony inaugurating work on the High Dam, and to conduct talks on Cuban-UAR political, economic, and cultural relations, including negotiations for a cotton agreement. (*Ahram*, 7 Jan; *BBC*, 9 Jan)

**Jan: Abdel-Nasser Accepts Invitation to Visit Cuba.** On 14 Jan Mr Roa said that the UAR President had accepted PM Castro's invitation to visit Cuba and had in turn invited the Cuban Premier to visit the UAR. (*R. Cairo*, 14 Jan-*BBC*, 15 Jan) Later in the year the Cuban invitation was repeated. (*Ahram*, 27 July) [In 1960 no date had as yet been set for the visit.]

**Mar: "UAR Ready to Supply Military Aid to Cuba."** On 10 Mar, the Cuban President Dorticos and PM Dr Fidel Castro received the UAR goodwill mission to Latin American countries. (*R. Cairo*, 11 Mar-*BBC*, 14 Mar) [See above] At a Press conference the head of the mission, Dhu-al-Fiqar Sabri, the UAR Deputy Foreign Minister, described Dr Castro as a truly patriotic man, and said that the UAR would vote for Cuba's nomination to a temporary seat on the UN Security Council. He added that his government was "ready to discuss the possibility of dispatching aid in the form of men and arms to Cuba." (*BBC*, 17 Mar)

**Apr: Cuba Did Not Ask for Defence Weapons—Abdel-Nasser Declared.** In an interview with American newsmen in Cairo on 25 Apr, President Abdel-Nasser declared that Cuba did not ask for defence weapons from the UAR. He added: "If the Government of Cuba asks us for such a thing we will then consider the matter and study the request." (*Eg. Gaz.*, 26 Apr)

**Raul Castro in Cairo.** On 24 July the Cuban Minister of the Armed Forces Raul Castro, brother of PM Fidel Castro, accompanied by a delegation of 25 members, arrived in Cairo after paying an official visit to the USSR and Czechoslovakia. (*Ahram*, 25 July) He met with President Nasser, and toured the country, including the Gaza strip. (*Ahram*, 25-30 July) In a public speech in Alexandria on 26 July (at the celebration of the anniversary of Egypt's nationalization of the Suez Canal) Castro accused the US of having dominated Cuba ever since the country had been liberated from Spain and of having installed Batista. He then reviewed Cuba's struggle against foreign monopoly interests, and imperialist aggression against the Cuban people and the "generous assistance offered by the socialist countries led by the Soviet Union." He accused the US of trying to isolate Cuba as it had tried to isolate Egypt in 1956. He asked for the support of the UAR. (*BBC*, 28 July)

**July-Aug: Abdel-Nasser: UAR Support for Cuban Struggle.** Following Raul Castro's speech, President Abdel-Nasser declared "we—the UAR people—support the cause of freedom everywhere, and support the cause of freedom in Cuba. We support the struggle of Fidel Castro, because we, brothers, have faced hard times during which we were exposed to threats and pressure... we found support from free people everywhere... for this reason, we believe that we ought to support the cause of freedom in every part of the world." He then went on to attack the Shah of Iran, imperialism, the US and others. (*BBC*, 28 July)

The UAR Press sided with Premier Castro in his con-



flict with the US. *Al-Akhbar* denounced "the acts of economic aggression of the imperialist US" and pledged "hundred per cent support to our brethren the Cubans." [In July the US cut the import quota of Cuban sugar.] (*Akhbar*, 8 Aug, see also *IMH*, 14 July, 15 Aug)

Following the acute shortage of refined oil in Cuba (as a result of the decision of the oil companies working in Cuba not to refine any crude oil bought in Russia) the UAR authorized the dispatch of 16,000 tons of petrol to Cuba in Arab tankers. (*Ahram*, 2 Aug)

**Sept: Abdel-Nasser-Castro Meetings in New York.** Abdel-Nasser and Dr Castro met twice while participating in the UN General Assembly (see p 13).

**Oct: UAR Minister of Economy Visits Cuba.** Early in Oct, Abd al-Mun'im al-Qaysuni, the UAR Central Minister of Economy, paid a one-week official visit to Cuba. Back in Cairo, Mr Qaysuni declared that cordial conversations had been held with the Cuban authorities which would bring closer economic ties between the two countries in the near future. (*R. Voice of the Arab*, 1, 17 Oct-*IMB*, 2, 18 Oct)

**Nov: UAR Experts to Cuba.** On 3 Nov five UAR experts in Rural Affairs left Cairo for Cuba to work in the service of the Cuban Government for two years. (*Ahram*, 4 Nov)

## COLOMBIA

On 24 Mar a cultural agreement was concluded between the UAR and Colombia; negotiations leading to the agreement were conducted between the UAR goodwill mission to Latin America and the Colombian authorities in Bogota. (*R. Damascus*, 25 Mar-*IMB*, 25 Mar)

On 21 Dec the Colombian Ambassador in Cairo presented to President Nasser a high Colombian decoration offered to him by the President of Colombia. (*R. Cairo*, 21 Dec-*IMB*, 22 Dec)

## MEXICO

**Exchange of Missions.** On 14 Mar a Mexican Parliamentary mission, led by Senator Don Manuel Moreno, arrived in Cairo on a six-day official visit. On 21 Mar President Nasser had a three-hour talk with the mission on cultural and economic relations. An invitation by the mission to President Nasser to visit Mexico was accepted, but no date for it was set. (*BBC*, 17 Mar; *Ahram*, 22, 23 Mar)

A UAR goodwill mission (pp 541-2) arrived in Mexico City on 8 Apr. The next day a cultural agreement was concluded between the two countries. (*R. Cairo*, 8, 9, 11 Apr-*IMB*, 9, 10, 12 Apr) The head of the delegation invited the Mexican President to visit the UAR. The invitation was accepted. (*R. Cairo*, 13 Apr-*IMB*, 14 Apr)

On 8 Sept a UAR Parliamentary delegation left Cairo for Mexico to attend the Mexican National Day Celebrations. (*R. Cairo*, 8 Sept-*BBC*, 10 Sept)

## PANAMA

**Mar: UAR-Cuban Anti-US Activities in Panama Reported.** A *New York Times* correspondent reported from Panama that the UAR Ambassador, Mr Muhammad at-Tābi'i (a former army officer), and the Cuban Ambassador had established close contacts with anti-US elements. The envoys were "promoting the idea of pan-Arab Latin American cooperation, with the Abdel-Nasser revolution ... on the one hand and the Castro revolution on the other." At-Tābi'i's contacts with Panamanians and Canal

Zone officials, included Mr Acquilino Boyd and Professor Ernesto Castellero, "whose acts helped to lead to anti-US riots on the Canal Zone borders last fall." The UAR delegation of four diplomats and several Panamanians—was "considered to be large for a country of a million people, with few Arab residents and virtually no Arab commercial interests." The UAR Ambassador in an interview denied both intervention in US-Panamanian affairs and the fostering of anti-Semitic acts which had taken place recently in Panama and the Canal Zone. (*NYT*, 14 Mar)

*Time* pointed out the following activities of the UAR Ambassador in Panama: the issuing of a monthly Spanish-language bulletin, "full of success stories about Nasser's operating of Suez"; regularly lending documentary films on the new Egypt, donating Egyptian books to prominent Panamanians and to the Panama University; offering four post-graduate scholarships for Panamanians to study in Cairo and giving "endless cocktail and dinner parties."

The Cuban and the UAR Ambassadors gave no evidence that they were coordinating a common campaign to stir up Panamanian anti-US nationalists. However, the magazine assumed that this coordination was carried out in Havana and mentioned in this connection the Dhu-al-Fiqr Sabri meeting with Castro there [see above]. (*Time*, 28 Mar)

**Mar: Panamanian Foreign Minister in Cairo; Problem of International Waterways Discussed.** On 11 Mar Mr Miguel Moreno, the Panamanian Foreign Minister, arrived in Cairo for a four-day official visit. After paying an extensive visit to Suez Canal installations in Port Said and Ismailiyah, the Panamanian Minister discussed with the UAR Foreign Minister problems connected with navigation in international waterways and other international problems. (*Ahram*, 24 Feb, 11 Mar; *Ayyam*, 14 Mar) In a Press conference Mr Moreno denied that Cairo was inciting Panamanians to make trouble over their Canal Zone. "We are fully aware of our demands," he said, "we do not need any country to incite us." (*Times*, 16 Mar)

**Mar: Cultural Agreement.** On 14 Mar the Panama Foreign Minister signed on behalf of his country a cultural agreement with the UAR. (*Ahram*, 15 Mar)

**Mar: UAR Goodwill Mission.** The UAR goodwill mission to Latin America, headed by Dhu-al-Fiqr Sabri, UAR Deputy Foreign Minister, visited Panama during the first week of Apr (see pp 541-2).

**Apr: Diplomatic Representation Raised.** An official announcement, published in Cairo on 10 Apr, stated that the governments of the UAR and Panama had decided to raise their diplomatic representation to the level of embassy. (*R. Voice of the Arab*, 10 Apr-*IMB*, 11 Apr)

**June: Panama Minister of Agriculture in Cairo:** On 16 June the Panamanian Minister of Agriculture arrived in Cairo for a four-day state visit to the UAR. At the end of the visit he expressed his admiration of the UAR's economic and social progress, and revealed that full-scale negotiations were under way to conclude a commercial agreement between the UAR and Panama. (*Ahram*; *Gumhuriya*, 20 June) [No further news on such an agreement were reported.]

**June: UAR Offers Four Scholarships to Panamanian Students,** to complete their graduate studies in the UAR. This was termed a first step towards closer cultural ties with Panama. (*Ahram*, 20 June)

## NON-ARAB AFRICA

## THE UAR'S ROLE IN AFRICA

[The UAR Press and radio dwell extensively upon their country's claim to leadership in Africa. Several elaborations of this theme are given below.]

**UAR Awakened African Nations.** "The nations of Africa awoke at the roar of our drums and at the voice of the trumpet with which we announced the new renaissance." (*Akhbar al-Yawm*, 19 Mar)

"From Cairo the call for freedom has risen in all the African languages and dialects. Cairo has always been the lair of free people persecuted by tyrants and expelled by imperialism. We have fought in all the battles of freedom in Africa..." (*Akhbar al-Yawm*, 3 Dec; BBC, 5 Dec)

**Abdel-Nasser—Africa's Liberator and Hope.** In a demonstration honouring Abdel-Nasser placards were carried with the slogan "Abdel-Nasser—Liberator of Africa." (*Gumhuriyah*, 17 Apr) [For a cartoon depicting Abdel-Nasser as foremost among African leaders see *Ruz al-Yusuf*, 1 Aug.]

A Conference of Muslim youth, held in Cairo in Aug, resolved that Abdel-Nasser was "the hope of the nations of Asia and Africa struggling against imperialism." (*R. Cairo*, 17 Aug—IMB, 18 Aug)

**UAR's Interest in Africa Compared to US's in America.** The editor of *Ruz al-Yusuf*, Ihsān Abd al-Qadūs, wrote that the UAR's interest in Africa was similar to that of India in Asia and the US in America. "The UAR bears on her shoulders a heavy burden, being the first African country which has attained full and true liberation from imperialism and has become a centre for spreading nationalism in Africa." (*Ruz al-Yusuf*, 1 Dec)

(See also Views and Policies, pp 519–20.)

## THE UAR AS CENTRE FOR AFRICAN NATIONALISTS

**Aug:** African Bureau at Ministry of Presidential Affairs. In Aug, a bureau for African Affairs was established within the Ministry for Presidential Affairs. (*Ahram*, 25 Aug) [The bureau is parallel to the Bureau for Arab Affairs in the same Ministry. There was also an African Division at the UAR Foreign Ministry.]

**Jan–Nov:** African Offices in Cairo. [Since the 1952 revolution Egypt, and subsequently the UAR, played an increasingly important role as a centre for exiled African nationalists. The UAR financed their offices in Cairo and their political and propaganda activities, and put its mass media—particularly the radio—at their disposal. By the end of 1959, exiles from Cameroun, Equatorial Africa, Nigeria, Uganda, Kenya, Somalia, Eritrea and Mauritania had offices in Cairo.] New offices were opened in 1960—by exiles from Zanzibar, Northern Rhodesia and South Africa. (The other existing offices were listed by *al-Hayāt* as follows: Kenya, Uganda, Cameroun, Nigeria, Somalia and Equatorial Africa [*al-Hayāt* failed to mention those of Eritrea and Mauritania].) (*Ahram*, 18 Aug; *Hayat*, 24 Aug; *Gumhuriyah*, 25 Aug)

A Southern Rhodesian Office was opened in Cairo in Nov. (*Ahram*, 3 Nov)

On Abdel-Nasser's departure for the UN General Assembly the leaders of the African offices in Cairo gathered

to express their satisfaction at his voyage. (*Ahram*, 19 Sept)

**UAR Control of African Organizations in Cairo.** Charles Arnot, a journalist, reported from Cairo that three of the African organizations under the UAR's control were located in the Cairo suburb of Zamalek. These were the Africa League, the Africa Association and the Pan-Africa division of the Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Congress. All three had rent-free accommodations, did not pay for the use of the powerful Cairo Radio for their regional broadcasts, and were given other free communications facilities. The Secretary of the Africa Association was an Egyptian, Dr Abd al-Aziz al-Hajj, and the SG of the Afro-Asian Permanent Secretariat another Egyptian, Yūsuf as-Sibā'i. Spokesmen for the three organizations said they received plenty of encouragement and plenty of money from Egypt and from voluntary contributions. They added that they had been offered financial help from Communist sources, but had not accepted in view of Egypt's generosity. (*Jer. Post*, 26 Feb)

**Feb:** Meetings of African Nationalist Leaders. In Feb several African nationalist leaders, returning from the All-African Peoples' Conference in Tunisia, held meetings in Cairo. The participants included Felix Moumie of Cameroun, Joseph Kiwanuka of Uganda, Joshua Nkomo of Rhodesia and Kuluhik [sic], a Kenya nationalist. (*Ahram*, 14 Feb)

## UAR AS CENTRE OF AFRICAN STUDIES

[The UAR regards the spread of its culture in Africa as one of its principal missions in the continent. It is carried out by:

Giving African students numerous opportunities to study in the UAR, principally at al-Azhar;

Establishing UAR cultural centres in African countries;

Sending teachers (principally of Arabic) to African countries.]

**Apr:** 5,000 African Students in UAR. There were reportedly 5,000 students from Africa in the UAR; half of them at al-Azhar and the remainder at other universities and schools. *Akhbar al-Yawm* demanded that the emphasis in granting scholarships to Africans should be shifted from al-Azhar to medicine, engineering and science. (*Akhbar al-Yawm*, 23 Apr)

**Mar–Nov:** African Studies in the UAR. *Al-Ahram* criticized the neglect of African studies in the UAR, and demanded that they be extended and encouraged. (*Ahram*, 11 Mar)

In Sept it was reported that the teaching of African languages would be introduced as of that year in a special school. Asian and African affairs would be included in the curriculum of the Institute of Social Sciences at Alexandria University. (*Ahram*, 22 Sept; *Akhbar*, 26 Sept)

On 15 Nov an institute of African and Asian languages for graduates of al-Azhar was due to be opened in Cairo. LE5,000 had been assigned for its establishment. (*Hayat*, 4 Nov)

**1,100 Scholarships for Africans in 1960.** It was reported in Oct that during 1960 the UAR had granted 1,100 scholarships to Africans, most of them Sudanese (1,710

scholarships had been granted to Asians). The scholarships included a monthly grant of LE9.5 to each university student and LE8 to secondary school students. (*Ahram*, 28 Oct) Of these scholarships 220 went to Somalia, 78 to Zanzibar, 61 to Chad, 17 to Senegal, 11 to Ghana, 16 to Nigeria. (*Europe-Orient*, 218, 9 Nov)

[For cultural relations, see entries for UAR's relations with each African country.]

#### UAR BROADCASTS TO AFRICA

[Broadcasts to Africa were one of the UAR's principal instruments of policy in the continent. The UAR broadcast to Africa in Arabic, Somali, Swahili, Amharic, Hausa, Sudanese dialects, English and French.

The principal themes of these broadcasts were:

Support for African nationalist movements in their struggle for liberation;

Denunciation of the colonial powers and incitement to rise against them;

Attacks on African leaders cooperating with the West and support for those acting against the West;

Muslim propaganda and anti-Christian incitement.

The broadcasts went out over Cairo Radio and the "Voice of Free Africa." The latter was not officially acknowledged by the UAR, though the themes of its broadcasts were almost identical with those of Cairo.]

**Jan: Broadcasts Extended to West Africa.** In Jan broadcasts from Cairo to West Africa were inaugurated, in Arabic, English and French. They were directed at the Ivory Coast, Somalia, Senegal, Mauritania, French Sudan [Mali], Nigeria, Gabon, French Congo and Ubangishari. (*Ruz al-Yusuf*, 4 Jan; *BBC* for 1960)

**Example of Broadcasts.** The following is a typical excerpt from broadcasts by the "Voice of Free Africa." [For more excerpts, see pp 27-30]:

"The French imperialist swine are building up their military strength and are using NATO and American arms to try to force the people of Algeria to believe that they are French and that their country is part of Metropolitan France. The Portuguese imperialists in Angola and Mozambique are killing thousands of Africans every day for having the courage to demand their independence, and the Dutch and British bastards in South and East Africa are committing atrocities against the African people that would have shocked Hitler and Mussolini..." (*Cairo "Voice of Free Africa"* in Swahili, 28 July; *BBC*, 30 July)

**"Voice of Africa" Station to be Established.** In Oct it was reported that in view of the success of Cairo Radio's broadcasts to Africa, the UAR Government had decided to establish a special station named "The Voice of Africa Broadcasts," which would broadcast in African local dialects. (*Haqiqah*, 20 Oct)

#### UAR ECONOMIC ACTIVITY IN AFRICA

[During 1960 the UAR attempted to strengthen its economic relations with the countries of Africa and commercial and air agreements were signed with several of them. However, most of its economic activities in Africa were still exploratory. See also the UAR's relations with individual African countries under separate headings.]

**UAR Economic Missions to Africa.** During 1960 several UAR economic missions made tours of Africa. In July, an economic mission headed by the Director of Economic Affairs in the Ministry of the Economy visited Ghana, Guinea, Liberia and Togo. (*Ahram*, 6 July). An eco-

nomic mission representing the Internal Commerce Company left the UAR in mid-Sept on a tour of West African countries and a second left for Sudan, Somalia and Ethiopia. (*Ahram*, 12 Sept)

**UAR Exports to Africa.** Among the possible items of export from the UAR to African countries the following were mentioned, during 1960: cement (*Ahram*, 2, 20 Nov), "Al-Qāhirah" jet aircraft, manufactured in the UAR (*Gumhuriyah*, 19 July), refrigerators (*Akhbar*, 30 June), textiles (*al-Ahram* reported that "one African country [Nigeria?] could absorb all the UAR surplus textiles, which amounted to 30,000 tons" (*Ahram*, 2 Nov), rice, canned fruit and vegetables. (*Akhbar*, 23 Aug)

**Shipping Line to Africa.** Three new UAR ships went into operation in shipping lines between Arab and African ports. (*R. Cairo*, 16 Sept-*IMB*, 18 Sept) In Nov the inauguration of additional shipping lines to East and West Africa was discussed, in order to facilitate the export of UAR products. (*Ahram*, 17 Dec)

#### THE UAR AT AFRO-ASIAN AND AFRICAN CONFERENCES

See pp 22-5

#### CAMEROUN

**Background Note and Synopsis.** [Cameroun politics were dominated by the dispute between the two factions of the Union des Populations Camerounaises (UPC), of which the pro-Communist faction had been declared illegal. Before 1960 the UAR lent its support to the latter led by Dr Felix Moumie, who established a Cameroun office in Cairo. Moumie transferred his headquarters to Conakry after Guinea had become independent (he died of poisoning in Geneva later in the year), but the Cameroun office in Cairo maintained its activities. The establishment of an independent Cameroun, on 1 Jan 1960, posed to the UAR the problem of which side to support in the civil strife that was still going on. UAR policy was to recognize the Cameroun Government, but to continue its support of the Cameroun Office in Cairo.]

**Jan: UAR Recognizes Cameroun—Cameroun Office to Continue.** When Cameroun became independent on 1 Jan, it was reported that the UAR was studying the internal situation there in order to determine its position vis-à-vis the regime. (*Ahram*, 2 Jan) Subsequently the UAR recognized Cameroun and was represented at the independence celebrations, despite "many obstacles created by the French." (*Gumhuriyah*, 13 Jan)

It was reported that the Cameroun exiles in Cairo would nevertheless continue their activities and their status would not be impaired. (*Ruz al-Yusuf*, 18 Jan)

**Sept 1960-Jan 1961: Exchange of Ambassadors.** In Mar the UAR appointed Nagib as-Sadr [then its Ambassador in Guinea] as Ambassador in Cameroun. (*Ahram*, 29 Mar) He was due to present his credentials in Oct. (*Ahram*, 24 Sept) Cameroun's first Ambassador arrived in Cairo in Jan 1961. (*Gumhuriyah*, 6 Jan 1961)

**Oct: Cameroun PM: Terrorists Trained in UAR.** At a Press conference in Western Germany, the Cameroun PM, Ahidjo, stated that the [UPC] terrorists operating in Cameroun were trained in Moscow, Peking and Cairo. (*R. Brazzaville*, 30 Oct-*BBC*, 1 Nov)

**Nov: Cameroun Regime Criticized.** On the occasion of Dr Moumie's death, *Ruz al-Yusuf* extolled him as an



African leader who had worked for the freedom and independence of his country, and attacked the Cameroun regime which was collaborating with the French. (*Rus al-Yusuf*, 21 Nov)

### THE CENTRAL AFRICAN FEDERATION

[The UAR opposed the Central African Federation as such. It supported the African nationalist movements of Northern Rhodesia, Southern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, all of which maintained offices in Cairo.]

**June: Kenneth Kaunda in Cairo.** Kenneth Kaunda, the leader of Northern Rhodesia's National Independence Party, visited Cairo at the beginning of June, and met Abdel-Nasser and other UAR leaders. According to *al-Ahram*, he said he had been deeply impressed by Abdel-Nasser's views and the depth of his understanding of Africa's problems. (*Ahram*, 5, 6 June)

At a Press conference in Cairo Kaunda attacked the Central African Federation, in which a European minority ruled over an African majority. He praised Abdel-Nasser, who, he said, had told him that "all causes of liberty in Africa are one" and that "all the African peoples should unify their efforts in their common struggle against imperialism." (*Eg. Gaz.*; *Ahram*, 7 June)

**July-Nov: Rhodesian Office Opened in Cairo.** Following Kaunda's visit, a Northern Rhodesia Office was opened in Cairo, headed by Robert Kamanga, a National Independence Party leader. (*R. Cairo*, 30 June, 24 Aug-BBC, 4 July, 26 Aug; *MENA*, 5 Dec-BBC, 7 Dec)

On 2 Nov a Southern Rhodesia office was opened in Cairo, headed by Silundike, SG of the Dominion's National Democratic Party.

At a Press conference Silundike thanked Abdel-Nasser for making it possible to open the office and called him "the most important leader of all the freedom fighters in Africa." (*Ahram*, 3 Nov; *MENA*, 2 Nov-BBC, 4 Nov)

**Mar: Nyasaland Nationalist Party Secretary in Cairo.** The Secretary of the Malawi Congress Party, Kanyama Chiume, visited Cairo in Mar to explain the attitude of the Nyasaland nationalists and to seek aid. He met several Egyptian leaders, including Hasūnah, the SG of the Arab League, who promised him all possible aid, and Fu'ād Galāl, the Deputy Chairman of the National Assembly.

On 27 Mar Chiume spoke at a meeting of the National Union in Cairo. He praised Abdel-Nasser for his anti-imperialist attitude and predicted that the day would come when Dr Hastings Banda, the leader of his party, would stand side by side with Abdel-Nasser, Nkrumah and Sekou Touré in their efforts to establish a free and strong Africa. (*Akhbar*, 28 Mar)

### ETHIOPIA

**Synopsis.** The UAR's relations with Ethiopia were strained, mainly because of the UAR's support for Somali claims over part of Ethiopia (see below). A visit by Abdel-Nasser to Ethiopia, which was scheduled for Nov to reciprocate the Emperor's visit to the UAR in 1959, did not take place.

**Abdel-Nasser's Projected Visit to Ethiopia Does not Materialize.** In Mar the Ethiopian Ambassador in the Sudan said that the Emperor had sent Abdel-Nasser an official invitation to visit Ethiopia. The time of the visit had not yet been decided. (*Ahram*, 29 Mar) The Emperor renewed his invitation in June. (*Ahram*, 17 June) In Aug

it was announced that Abdel-Nasser's visit would begin on 25 Nov, after his forthcoming visit to Sudan, and would last five days. (*Ahram*, 23 Aug, 2 Sept) [The visit did not take place. No official statement or Press comment appeared.]

**Apr: Ethiopian Cultural Mission in Cairo.** An Ethiopian cultural mission arrived in Cairo in Apr to visit educational and cultural institutions. (*Ahram*, 18 Apr)

**Oct: Cairo Radio's Call to Somalis in Harrar.** In a broadcast in Somali on 19 Oct, Cairo Radio said that all Somalis living in the Horn of Africa were of one religion, language, culture and race. The Somalis of Harrar [a province of Ethiopia], Wajir [Northern Kenya] and Djibouti—who all lived under "imperialist" rule—must therefore unite with their brethren in Somalia, who had gained their independence. (*R. Cairo*, 19 Oct-BBC, 21 Oct. See also UAR's relations with Somalia, pp 549 ff.)

**Oct-Dec: Coptic Pope Visits Ethiopia.** The Coptic Pope, Cyrillius VI, visited Ethiopia for a fortnight from 26 Oct to 7 Nov and held talks on the strengthening of ties between the Coptic Church in Egypt and the Ethiopian Church. (*Ahram*, 26 Oct, 5, 6, 8 Nov)

An article in *Akhbār al-Yawm* in Dec noted that, despite the ancient and close relations between the two churches, the relations between the two states were not always normal. (*Akhbar al-Yawm*, 12 Dec)

**Dec: UAR and Abortive Ethiopian Revolt.** When a revolt broke out in Ethiopia on 14 Dec, the UAR Press and radio generally refrained from comment and confined themselves to news agency reports. (*R. Cairo*, 15 Dec-BBC, 17 Dec; *Ahram*, 15 Dec)

There were outside attempts to connect the UAR with the revolution. Brazzaville Radio maintained that, "according to reports from Paris," the rebels were "supported by Abdel-Nasser, who had pressed Prince Asfa Wassan to take his father's place." (*R. Brazzaville*, 15 Dec-BBC, 17 Dec) The presence at Addis Ababa airfield of a UAR aircraft, which had landed there on the eve of the revolt, also gave rise to speculations on the UAR's role in the affair. (*Ahram*, 23 Dec) The aircraft was released by the Ethiopians after a thorough investigation. (*Ahram*, 28 Dec) [No substantiated report of any UAR connection with the revolt has been forthcoming.]

[Following the suppression of the revolt, some notes of criticism crept into the UAR Press.]

**UAR Anti-Israeli Activities in Ethiopia.** See p 184.

### GHANA

**Synopsis.** Both the UAR and Ghana aspired to play a leading role in Africa. While in preceding years there had been reports of personal rivalry between Abdel-Nasser and Nkrumah, the Congo crisis brought them somewhat closer politically. There were normal relations between the two countries in the economic and cultural fields. One of the UAR's principal objectives in Ghana was to obstruct Israel-Ghana cooperation in various fields.

**Jan: Ghanaian Medical Students in Cairo.** A first group of nine Ghanaian medical students began their studies at Cairo University in Jan. (*Gumhuriyah*, 29 Jan)

**Apr: Ghana Requests UAR Experts.** The UAR Ministry of Agriculture agreed in Apr to Ghana's request to send



agricultural experts and engineers to instruct Ghanaians in agrarian reform, irrigation, drainage and plant protection. Veterinaries would also be sent. (*Akhbar*, 25 Apr)

A group of doctors and engineers was due to leave for work in Ghana in June. (*Masa'*, 29 May; *Musawwar*, 3 June) [There were no reports that such a group arrived in Ghana.]

**July: UAR-Ghana Economic Talks.** Talks were held at Accra in July between a UAR economic mission, headed by the Director-General of the Ministry of Commerce, and the Ghana authorities, to amend the economic agreement between the Egyptian Region and Ghana. (*Ahram*, 5, 6 July)

In addition, talks were held on the establishment of an airline between the UAR and Ghana. (*BBC in Arabic*, 9 Aug-*IMB*, 10 Aug)

**Aug: UAR-Ghana Air Agreement.** An air agreement between the UAR and Ghana was signed on 29 Aug in Cairo. It provided for the establishment of regular services between Ghana and the two regions of the UAR. There were to be two airlines: one taking the northern route through Tripoli, Tunisia and Northern Nigeria, and the other taking the southern route through Khartoum, Lagos, Accra, with an extension to Congo and South Africa. (*Ahram*, 1 Sept; *R. Cairo*, 29 Aug-*BBC* 31 Aug)

**Aug: Second UAR Cultural Centre in Ghana.** Ghana gave its consent to the opening of an Arabic Cultural Centre at Komassi, capital of the Central Province, in addition to the existing centre in Accra and decided to open a government institute for the study of Arabic. (*Gumhuriyah*, 25 Aug)

The Arab Cultural Centre in Accra was to be enlarged to include a sizeable Arab library. (*Ahram*, 29 Oct)

**Aug: Abdel-Nasser Invited by Nkrumah.** President Nkrumah renewed his invitation to Abdel-Nasser to visit Ghana. (*Gumhuriyah*, 25 Aug)

**Sept: Ghana Nationals Exempt from UAR Visas.** The UAR Government agreed to a draft law enabling Ghanaian nationals to enter the UAR without entry visas, provided Ghana extended identical facilities to UAR nationals. (*Gumhuriyah*, 4 Sept)

**Oct: Ghana's Arabic Broadcasts.** The Ghanaian broadcasting service decided to present a daily two-hour Arabic programme, on short and medium wavelengths, intended for Arabic-speaking listeners in Ghana and neighbouring countries, starting in 1961.

The Cairo broadcasting service would supply its best announcers for this programme, and would supervise the training of Ghanaians to man it. (*Gumhuriyah*, 29 Oct)

**Dec: UAR Flight Controllers Replace Israelis in Ghana.** Ghana requested the UAR to send three civilian flight controllers to replace Israelis whose contracts had terminated. The three left for Ghana in Dec. (*Ahram*, 2 Nov, 6, 19 Dec)

**Dec: UAR-West Africa Shipping Line Inaugurated.** A UAR-West Africa shipping line was inaugurated on 1 Dec by the UAR ship *Helwan*, carrying 2,600 tons of Egyptian cement to Ghana. (*Eg. Gaz.*, 2 Dec)

(UAR and Ghana's Proposal for an African Command. See p 25.)

**UAR and Ghana in the Congo Crisis.** The UAR and Ghana were brought politically closer by their policy over the Congo dispute. See p 33.

[See also Israel-Ghana, p 311 and Arab anti-Israel activities in Ghana, p 184.]

## GUINEA

**Synopsis.** Although both countries practised positive neutralism, concrete relations between them were confined to UAR assistance in sending some Arabic teachers to Guinea, and an economic agreement apparently involving loose obligations. Sekou Touré's visit to the UAR at Abdel-Nasser's invitation was put off several times and did not take place. Both countries cooperated in holding the second Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Conference at Conakry in Apr. Political collaboration between the two countries was strengthened as a result of the Congo crisis, on which they followed similar policies.

**Sekou Touré's Projected Visit to UAR.** In Feb it was reported that Sekou Touré would visit Cairo in Apr for his first meeting with Abdel-Nasser. (*Sudan al-Jadid*, Khartoum, 4 Jan) In Apr the UAR Ambassador at Conakry arrived in Cairo to prepare the visit, but later a UAR source said that Touré had postponed the visit on account of the Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Conference, which was held at Conakry in Apr. (*Ahram*, 20 Apr)

In Aug it was reported that Touré's visit had been postponed to Sept owing to the situation in Congo. In Sept it was announced that the visit had been postponed again, because Touré had to go to New York for the UN General Assembly. In the same month, however, he visited Saudi Arabia. Sekou Touré said he hoped to meet Abdel-Nasser in New York, but the meeting there did not take place and Touré subsequently expressed the hope he might meet the UAR President soon. (*Ahram*, 10 Aug, 2, 15, 26 Sept, 7 Oct) [The meeting ultimately took place in Jan 1961, at the Casablanca Conference.]

**UAR to Assist Arabic Studies in Guinea.** In Jan it was reported that a group of 15 UAR teachers of Arabic and several al-Azhar Ulama' would soon arrive in Guinea. (*Sudan al-Jadid*, Khartoum, 4 Jan)

Subsequently, Guinea requested the UAR Ministry of Education to provide curricula for the teaching of Arabic, in the primary and secondary stages, in Guinean schools. (*Gumhuriyah*, 22 Mar)

In Apr it was reported that Guinea had requested the UAR to send 15 teachers of Arabic, in view of her decision to include Arabic as an additional language in the school programmes. (*Gumhuriyah*, 20 Apr)

In July the Guinean Minister of Information visited the UAR and discussed with the authorities the proposals to send Arabic teachers to Guinea. He said Guinea would also send officials to the UAR to study information techniques and propaganda. (*Ruz al-Yusuf*, 8 Aug)

**Apr: AAPSC in Conakry.** The UAR and Guinea collaborated in holding the second Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Conference at Conakry (see pp 22-3).

**July: Economic Agreement Signed.** An economic agreement between the UAR and Guinea was signed in Conakry in July. The agreement did not specify the extent of the trade between the two countries. (*Hayat*, 27 July)

Previously, the Guinea Minister of the Economy had stated in a Press interview that Guinea wished to streng-

then economic relations with the UAR. She was prepared to export coffee, pineapples and bananas, and import cotton from the UAR. (*Ahram*, 25 Apr)

**UAR and Guinea in the Congo Dispute.** The UAR and Guinea were brought politically closer by their common policy over the Congo dispute (see p 33).

### KENYA

**Synopsis.** The main activities of the UAR in regard to Kenya consisted of supporting the Kenya Office in Cairo and of broadcasts against British colonial rule. Although the UAR generally supported the principal African party—the Kenya African National Union—(KANU)—its propaganda machinery attacked Tom Mboya, one of KANU's main leaders, for cooperating with the West.

**Themes of Broadcasts to Kenya.** [Cairo broadcasts to Kenya in Swahili, the *lingua franca* of East Africa, from Cairo Radio, and the Voice of Free Africa, which does not state its location, but whose broadcasts are nearly identical with Cairo Radio's, although generally more violent in tone.]

The following themes recurred during 1960: (1) Support of Jomo Kenyatta. (2) Support of KANU against KADU. Cairo Radio supported KANU and attacked its leading rival, the Kenya African Democratic Union (KADU), describing the latter's leaders as traitors and "stooges employed by the whites." These themes were emphasized before the elections to the Kenya Legislative Council. (3) Attacks against Mboya. Despite its support of KANU, Cairo Radio attacked Tom Mboya, one of its principal leaders, accusing him of being a hireling of imperialism and of attempting to replace Kenyatta as leader of Kenya. (4) Attacks against British Imperialism. (For excerpts see *BBC summaries*, e.g.—2 Apr, 4, 7 June, 4, 21 July, 1, 15, 22, 29, 31 Dec)

**Oginga Odinga Visits Cairo.** Oginga Odinga, one of the more extreme leaders of KANU and an opponent of Mboya, visited Cairo twice during the year—in Apr and in Oct—and met Abdel-Nasser. After his first visit he stated that Abdel-Nasser had pledged his support for the Kenya independence struggle. (*Ahram*, 5 May, 18 Oct; *Times*, 12 Oct)

In Nov, Cairo Radio broadcast a statement by Odinga, expressing, *inter alia*, opposition to Nyerere's plan for an East African Federation. [Nyerere was first PM of Tanganyika.] (*R. Cairo*, 29 Nov—*BBC*, 1 Dec)

[Odinga visited China in Aug. Mboya was in close contact with the US trade union movement.]

**Britain, Imperialism and NATO Attacked.** In Mar the Kenya office in Cairo published a statement attacking the British Defence Minister for having reportedly stated that British bases in Kenya would be under NATO supervision. (*Gumhuriyah*, 30 Mar)

On 20 Oct a demonstration and a rally were held in Cairo, to mark the eighth anniversary of "the imperialist war against the Kenya nation." The demonstration was organized by the Secretariat of the Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Conference and the African Association.

The rally, which denounced "imperialist plots" against Kenya, demanded the immediate release of Jomo Kenyatta, independence in 1961, and the elimination of "NATO bases" in Kenya, "which threatened the security of Africa." (*Ahram*, 21 Oct)

**Nov: Participation in Lancaster House Conference Denounced.** In Nov "some of the" African leaders of Kenya

were attacked over Cairo Radio for their participation in the Lancaster House Conference in London [held in Feb]. They had returned without having secured Kenyatta's release and Kenya's freedom. (*R. Cairo*, 15 Dec, *BBC*, 17 Dec)

### LIBERIA

**Synopsis.** The UAR established a diplomatic representation in Liberia in 1958. Relations between the two countries developed during 1960 in the economic and cultural fields. Politically, they followed different courses.

**Jan: Liberia Proposes African Business Conference in Cairo.** The director of the Liberian National Bank visited Cairo in Jan and submitted to the UAR Government a proposal for holding a conference of African businessmen in Cairo under Abdel-Nasser's patronage. The Conference would discuss the establishment of a permanent African economic centre, an African bank, and joint African companies for commerce and economic affairs. (*Ahram*, 12 Jan; *Sahafah*, Beirut, 13 Jan) [A preliminary meeting of the Conference of African Businessmen was held in Monrovia in Aug]

**June: UAR offers Naval Scholarships.** On the occasion of the visit of a UAR training ship to Monrovia in June, the Director of the Alexandria Naval College offered the Liberian authorities scholarships for naval training in the UAR. (*Liberian Age*, Monrovia, 13 June)

**June: First Liberian Ambassador in Cairo.** Liberia's first Ambassador to the UAR, James Dennis, who had formerly served as economic adviser to President Tubman, arrived in Cairo in June. At a Press interview he said there were many possibilities for the development of commercial relations between Liberia and the UAR. Liberia needed Egyptian rice, which was the staple food of its population, as well as salt, textiles and agricultural machinery. He said that Abdel-Nasser had invited President Tubman to visit the UAR and the visit might take place before the end of the year. (*Ahram*, 3 July)

**July: Abdel-Nasser Decorated by Liberian Foreign Minister.** The Liberian Foreign Minister, Momulo Dukuly, arrived in Cairo on 10 July. He presented Abdel-Nasser with Liberia's highest decoration, and the latter reciprocated with a high UAR decoration. He left the UAR on 11 July. (*Ahram*, 7, 11, 12 July)

At a subsequent Press conference the Liberian Ambassador said that Abdel-Nasser was the first President of a foreign country to receive the highest Liberian decoration. The citation for the decoration noted that it was given in honour of his services to the African nationalist movement and to positive neutralism. (*Ruz al-Yusuf*, 15 Aug)

**July–Sept: Cultural and Economic Relations.** The Liberian Government ordered Arab films from the UAR, including *Jamilah Buharid* [on a heroine of the Algerian nationalist movement], to be shown at Liberia's largest cinema for three months. (*Akhbar*, 21 July)

A UAR economic mission visited Liberia in Aug and conducted talks with the authorities. (*Ahram*, 10 Aug) [The mission had previously visited Ghana, see p 586.]

The Liberian Deputy Minister of Education visited Cairo in Sept. He said that two agreements had been signed between Liberia and the UAR: the first a cultural agreement, for the mutual exchange of teachers, pupils and scholarships, and the second a commercial agreement, under which the UAR would buy rubber,

fats and grains from Liberia and would export to Liberia cement, iron, and cotton products. (*Ahram*, 15 Sept)

Oct: Liberian Parliamentary Mission in UAR. A Liberian Parliamentary Mission visited the UAR in Oct, at the invitation of the UAR National Assembly. (*Ahram*, 12 Oct)

#### FEDERATION OF MALI REPUBLIC OF SENEGAL REPUBLIC OF MALI

**Synopsis.** The Federation of Mali, consisting of Senegal and the former French Sudan, became independent on 20 June. On 20 Aug the Federation broke up into two separate states—Senegal and Mali. The UAR delayed somewhat its recognition of the two new states, and subsequently worked towards the establishment of normal relations with both.

**May: Senegalese Leaders Meet Abdel-Nasser.** Three Senegalese leaders, on their pilgrimage to Mecca, met Abdel-Nasser in Cairo. The three were Abdullah Inas, Chairman of the Supreme Muslim Council in Senegal, Ibrahim Mahmoud and Sherif Haidar. Haidar had lived in Cairo for several years. (*Ahram*, 30 May, 2 June)

**June: UAR Recognizes Mali Federation.** On 22 June the UAR recognized the Mali Federation. Subsequently, the Deputy UAR Foreign Minister, Hussein Dhu-al-Fiqr Sabri, visited Mali, to extend to it the UAR's greetings. (*Ahram*, 23 June, 6 July)

Later, the UAR and the Mali Federation agreed on the establishment of embassies. Yahya Hasan was appointed UAR Ambassador to the Federation. (*Ahram*, 26 July)

**Aug: Cultural Agreements.** The Director of the Cultural Department in the Egyptian Region of the UAR visited Mali while on a tour of African countries and met the Premier and other Ministers. Cultural agreements were signed which provided for the exchange of cultural missions. The UAR President's Adviser on Press Affairs also visited Dakar, where he met Muslim leaders and gave several lectures. (*Hayat*, 18 Aug)

**Aug: UAR Opposed to Break-Up of Federation.** When the break-up of the Mali Federation took place at the end of Aug, the UAR Radio supported the Sudanese leaders who opposed the split. Cairo Radio attributed the split to Senegalese "collaborators" with the French. (*R. Cairo*, 27 Aug—BBC, 29 Aug)

An article in *Akhir Sa'ah* praised the Mali PM, Modibo Keita, as one of "Africa's giants"; at the same time it attacked Mamadou Dia, the PM of Senegal, and Leopold Senghor, its President, describing them as French puppets. (*Akhir Sa'ah*, 12 Oct)

**Aug–Nov: Delay in Recognition of Split.** Only on 21 Oct—two months after the break-up of the Federation—did the UAR accord recognition to the two separate states. (*R. Cairo*, 21 Oct—IMB, 23 Oct) In the meantime, the departure of the UAR Ambassador had been delayed "until the clarification of the situation." Subsequently, it was announced that Hasan Yahya, formerly appointed as UAR Ambassador to the Federation, would serve as Ambassador in Bamako [capital of Mali], while another embassy would be established in Dakar [capital of Senegal]. (*Ahram*, 13 Nov, 24 Dec; *Ruz al-Yusuf*, 12 Sept; *Hayat*, 12 Nov)

In Nov it was announced that Shaykh Ahmad Tijani, one of Senegal's spiritual leaders who spoke Arabic, had been appointed Ambassador in Cairo. (*Hayat*, 1 Dec)

#### MAURITANIA

See pp 163–4.

#### RUANDA-URUNDI

A Ruanda-Urundi Office was established in Cairo by exiles from that country, and started working against Belgian rule. (*Ruz al-Yusuf*, 6 Jan)

#### SIERRA LEONE

**UAR Representation in Sierra Leone.** The UAR's wish to open a Consulate General in Freetown was one of the issues in the negotiations which preceded the re-establishment of full diplomatic relations between Britain and the UAR. Britain gave its consent (see p 534 ff).

A UAR Foreign Ministry counsellor visited Sierra Leone for three months, ending in Nov, for an on-the-spot study. It was reported that as soon as Sierra Leone became independent in Apr 1961, the UAR would establish an embassy there. (*Ahram*, 29 Nov)

#### SOMALIA

**Background and Synopsis.** The UAR devoted greater efforts to Somalia than to any other non-Arab African country in the attempt to bring it under its influence.

It supported the twin demands of Somali nationalists for the independence and unity of territories inhabited by Somalis. The latter demand included, besides the Italian protectorate and British Somaliland—which on 1 July became the independent Republic of Somalia—French Somaliland, the Northern District of Kenya, and the province of Harrar in Ethiopia. The UAR's support of these demands brought it into conflict not only with France and the UK but also with Ethiopia, whose rule over Harrar was described by the UAR radio as "black imperialism."

Before independence, a Somali Office operating in Cairo served as a political platform for Somali exiles; Cairo Radio supported the cause of Somali nationalism; and the UAR assisted Somalia in the fields of education and religion, mainly by sending teachers and Ulama.

Throughout, the UAR emphasized the "Arab-ness" of Somalia, which was described as belonging simultaneously to Abdel-Nasser's three circles—the Arab, the African and the Muslim.

When Somalia became independent, it turned to the UAR for assistance in economic affairs, defence and culture. By the end of 1960, agreements were reached in all of these fields.

Notwithstanding its growing ties with the new republic, the UAR was apparently involved in smuggling arms to extreme nationalist elements in former British Somaliland. The Somali Office in Cairo, which was staffed by elements opposed to the ruling parties in Somalia, also continued to exist unhindered.

**Apr: UAR View on Somalia.** The UAR representative at the UN Trusteeship Council, Dr Muhammad Hasan az-Zayāt, speaking of the UAR's interests in Somalia, said that it was an African country and all Africa was one body. It was the nearest country through which the UAR could spread light to other African countries. Somalia lay within the three circles described by Abdel-Nasser in his "Philosophy of the Revolution"—the Arab, the Muslim and the African. Its original culture was



Arab, and missions of students from that country continued to gravitate to Cairo. All Somalis of all parties strove to liberate their country from imperialism, and were operating according to the same principles as the UAR. All parties and leaders in Somalia were grateful to Abdel-Nasser for the attention he devoted to them. (*Akhbar*, 15 Apr)

**Jan: Somali Leaders in Cairo.** The President of the Greater Somalia League, Muhammad Hussein, and the President of the Somali National Union Party visited Cairo for a week at the end of Jan. (*R. Cairo*, 21 Jan-BBC, 22 Jan) [The Greater Somalia League is the most prominent of the extreme nationalist parties in Somalia, reportedly having the strongest links with the UAR.]

**Apr: Arabic an Official Language in Somalia.** The Constituent Assembly in the Somalia Protectorate decided that Arabic would become an official language in the country. Commenting on this decision, Cairo Radio said in a broadcast to Somalia that Arabic was the only language which could unite and integrate Somali culture and bridge over the differences between Somalis. (*R. Cairo*-1 Apr, BBC, 4 Apr)

**UAR Supports Somali Territorial Claims.** In Mar UAR broadcasts called upon the Somali nation to draft its constitution in a way which would emphasize its unity in all the regions which it inhabited. (*R. Cairo*, 16 Mar-BBC, 18 Mar) [This referred to the "five regions" over which Somali nationalism had claims: the Somali Protectorate, British Somaliland, French Somaliland, the Harrar Province of Ethiopia and the Northern District of Kenya.]

In its broadcasts to Somalia, Cairo Radio attacked Ethiopia, whose rule over Harrar it termed "black imperialism." (*R. Cairo*, 27 June-BBC, 29 June) (See also p 546.)

In May, Cairo Radio reported in a broadcast to Somalia that Somali *Fida'iyyūn* were operating in French Somaliland, and declared that they should serve as an example to all Somalis. (*R. Cairo*, 13 May-BBC, 16 May) [For note on *Fida'iyyūn* see p 327.]

In May, Mahmūd Harbi, a former PM of French Somaliland, broadcast on Cairo Radio against the French, praising the UAR's aid. In 1958 Harbi had opposed French Somaliland's remaining in the French Community. He subsequently fled to Cairo and joined the Somali nationalists in preaching the unity and liberation of the five parts of Somalia (see above). He urged action for the immediate union of all parts of Somalia and reported that he had visited Moscow and Peking, where he had been promised help. (*R. Cairo*, 25 May, BBC, 27 May)

[Cairo Radio repeated on many occasions the call to the population of French Somaliland to demand immediate independence and fight French imperialism. See, for example, BBC, 20 Aug, 23, 30 Dec.]

At the beginning of June Harbi met Abdel-Nasser and thanked him for his help. (*R. Cairo*, 3 June-BBC, 7 June) [He subsequently died in an air crash.]

**UAR Representation in Somalia.** In Feb it was reported that the UAR would open a consulate in Mogadishu as soon as Somalia gained its independence. (*Ruz al-Yusuf*, 1 Feb) [After Somalia became independent the UAR Press referred to the "UAR embassy" there.]

A Chargé d'Affaires for the UAR embassy in Somalia arrived in Mogadishu in Aug. (*R. Cairo*, 21 Aug-IMB, 22 Aug)

In Nov it was reported that the UAR would open a consulate at Hargeisa [former capital of British Somaliland, where in the past the UAR had been denied representation]. (*Ahram*, 6 Nov)

In Dec it was reported that the UAR was about to appoint its first Ambassador to Somalia. (*Gumhuriyah*, 13 Dec)

**July-Oct: Exchange of Delegations.** A UAR delegation took part in the Somali Republic's independence celebration on 1 July. Its leader reported that the delegates had been received with unusual enthusiasm by the Somalis, who danced and cheered on seeing them and sang *Allah Akbar*, a cry which had become the symbol of liberation. (*Ahram*, 8 July)

An official Somali delegation, headed by the Finance Minister, Ahmad Da'alah, visited the UAR and took part in its Anniversary of the Revolution celebrations. (*Hayat*, 27 July) [The delegation also visited Iraq (see p 263).]

A Somali parliamentary mission visited the UAR in Oct at the invitation of the National Assembly, and was received by Abdel-Nasser. (*Ahram*, 12 Oct)

**Jan-Sept: Somali Military Students in UAR.** The first Somali graduate of the UAR Military College returned to Somalia in Jan to join the Somali Army. (*R. Cairo*, 15 Jan-BBC, 18 Jan)

On 10 Sept, several Somalis arrived in Cairo on UAR scholarships: five to join the Military College, and five the Air College. (*R. Cairo*, 9 Sept-BBC, 12 Sept)

**Aug-Nov: Illegal Arms Traffic from UAR?** *The New York Times*, citing the Aden paper *al-Kifāh*, reported in Aug that two UAR ships had been detained in Berbera harbour and searched for arms and ammunition. A Somali source in Aden denied this report. (*NYT*, 20 Aug)

In an address to the National Assembly in Nov, the Somali PM, speaking on internal security, said that some irresponsible elements had recently tried to smuggle arms into the Northern Region of the Republic but the attempt had been foiled by the authorities. A ship had been involved in the incident. No arms had been found, but it was suspected that the vessel had dumped its consignment at sea. The Premier warned that if any other illegal attempt was made to land arms in the Somali Republic, the persons responsible would be tried and, if convicted, severely punished. (*R. Hargeisa*, 4 Nov-BBC, 7 Nov)

**Nov: Information Agreement.** The Somali Minister of Information, Ali Muhammad Hirave, visited Cairo in mid-Nov and concluded an agreement on the exchange of visits and the exchange of radio programmes in the social, cultural and religious domains. The UAR promised to assist Somalia in the fields of radio and information. (*Ahram*, 17 Nov; *MENA*, 17 Nov-BBC, 18 Nov; *R. Mogadishu*, 2 Dec-BBC, 5 Dec)

**Oct-Dec: Economic Agreement.** In Oct the UAR Government decided to establish a commercial centre in Somalia. (*R. Cairo*, 6 Oct-IMB, 7 Oct)

During Nov-Dec talks were held between Somalia and the UAR which resulted in the signing of an economic agreement.

A UAR mission first went to Somalia, where it offered to buy animals and bananas at good prices. (*R. Hargeisa*, 4 Nov-BBC, 7 Nov) A Somali economic mission, headed by the Minister of Commerce and Industry, visited the UAR in the same month and continued the

negotiations. Two draft agreements were prepared. (*Ahram*, 21, 23, 28 Nov) Discussions continued in Dec, during the visit of the Somali PM (see below).

An agreement to be in force for a year, which was signed on 10 Dec, provided that the UAR would import from Somalia 8,000 tons of bananas, as well as animals, fish, hides, and agricultural products, and would export to Somalia textiles, sugar, cement, rice, books, films and various finished products. Most-favoured-nation treatment would be granted. (*Ahram*, 11 Dec)

**Cultural and Islamic Ties.** In Jan thirty Somali students were reported to have been granted scholarships in Egypt by the UAR Government. Ten had already arrived. (*Ruz al-Yusuf*, 4 Jan)

In May a Somali mission on visiting the UAR met the Minister of the Wakfs, Abdullah Tu'aymah, and discussed with him Muslim institutions in Somalia. (*Ahram*, 2 May)

In July, Cairo Radio reported that Abdel-Nasser had promised that the UAR would assist the Somali Republic to establish new schools and cultural centres and would also establish a religious institute, under the supervision of al-Azhar University. (*R. Cairo*, 1 July-BBC, 4 July)

An Islamic Cultural Centre, established by the Islamic Congress of Cairo, was opened in Mogadishu in July. (*MENA*, 6 July-BBC, 8 July)

In July a UAR cultural mission visited cultural institutions in Mogadishu and Hargeisa. The dispatch of Arab teachers to Somalia was discussed. The Chairman of the al-Azhar mission to Somalia, who was also a member of the cultural mission, said he had left several Arab teachers at Hargeisa. He would also arrange for a cultural centre to be established under the supervision of the mission, and have several Ulama' assigned to former British Somaliland, whose population was in urgent need of them. (*Ahram*, 1 Aug; *Hayat*, 6 Aug)

Somalia asked the UAR to send teachers and experts to replace the British who had left Somaliland. UAR embassy officials in Somalia expressed their confidence that the UAR would be able to fulfil these requests. (*R. Damascus*, 9 Aug-IMB, 10 Aug)

In Aug a mission from the UAR Education Ministry arrived in Somalia to open the country's first secondary school. (*Gumhuriyah*; *Ahram*, 10 Aug)

The Somali Education Ministry decided to change the "imperialist" school programme. Many teachers from the UAR, according to Cairo Radio, would soon fill the posts left vacant by the Italians and the British. (*R. Cairo*, 19 Aug-BBC, 22 Aug)

A Somali Education Ministry Mission visited the UAR in Aug (*R. Cairo*, 12 Aug-BBC, 15 Aug), and the Somali Minister of Education, Ali Garid Jama, visited the UAR in Dec 1960-Jan 1961 at the invitation of the UAR Government.

A cultural agreement was signed on 7 Jan 1961. (*R. Cairo*, 7 Jan-IMB, 8 Jan 1961)

**Nov-Dec: Somali PM Talks with Abdel-Nasser.** The PM of Somalia, Abd ar-Rashid Sharmark, visited Cairo on 27 Nov-1 Dec, and held official talks with Abdel-Nasser. A joint communiqué, published on 3 Dec, stated that:

Both sides valued the importance of cultural cooperation; it was therefore decided to expand the cultural agreement between them by increasing the exchange of teachers and experts.

Both sides decided to work towards the signature of

an agreement which would regulate trade between them and increase mutual economic and technical aid.

Both sides agreed on the early dispatch of a UAR economic mission to Somalia, to study possibilities of cooperation between the two countries.

The UAR also expressed its readiness "to participate in the development of the economy and industry in Somalia and to offer a loan for the construction of economic and industrial projects." (*Ahram*, 4 Dec) The Somali PM announced that Somalia's first Ambassador to the UAR would arrive in Cairo in Jan 1961. (*R. Cairo*, 2 Dec-BBC, 5 Dec)

**Dec: UAR to Render Military and Economic Assistance.** Following his visit to the UAR, the Somali PM stated in a speech at the Somali National Assembly that Abdel-Nasser had agreed to his request to supply arms to Somalia. (*R. Cairo*, 10 Dec-IMB, 11 Dec)

*Al-Ahram* subsequently reported that according to Somali circles in Cairo it had been agreed, in the talks between Abdel-Nasser and Sharmark, that:

The UAR would give Somalia military assistance needed for the organization of the Somali Army. This would include light arms for 5,000 soldiers, several armoured cars and lorries, and two aircraft to form the nucleus of the Somali Air Force. All these would be presented as a gift by the UAR.

The UAR would give Somalia a loan of LE5 million, payable over seven years at an interest of 2½ per cent. The loan would be utilized for buying goods and equipment in the UAR. (*Ahram*, 15 Dec)

**Somali Office in Cairo.** [The Somali Office in Cairo, staffed by Somali political exiles, was active during the first half of the year. (See, for example, *R. Cairo*, 15 Jan-BBC, 18 Jan; *R. Cairo*, 9 Mar-BBC, 11 Mar.) No report of its disbanding after Somalia became independent on 1 July was available.]

## SOUTH AFRICA

[In Mar the African National Congress was declared illegal by the South African Government, following the Sharpeville shooting, in which police shot dead 67 Africans campaigning against the Pass Law.]

**May: UAR Supports South African Nationalist Exiles.** The Arab Press reported that exiled South African nationalist leaders had been invited to Cairo by the NU. The leaders invited included Oliver Tambo of the African National Congress and Yusuf Dadoo of the South African Indian Congress. The exiles would open in Cairo a South African Office for the dissemination of "correct information on South Africa and for action against racial discrimination." (*Hayat*, 10 May; *Ahram*, 11 May)

**May: South African Leaders in Cairo.** Seven South African exiled leaders arrived in Cairo in May. Among the seven were Tambo and Dadoo. The SA leaders were received by Abdel-Nasser. They also held a Press conference in which Sibā'i, the SG of the AAPSC, participated. They described Cairo as their "second homeland." Sibā'i said that the UAR regarded the struggle of nationalists in South Africa as part of its own struggle. From Cairo, the SA leaders proceeded to other parts of Africa. (*Ahram*, 25 May)

**May: South Africa Office Opened.** In their talks with the UAR authorities the exiles obtained agreement for

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the opening of the South Africa Office in Cairo, which would be headed by Tambo. (*Ahram*, 25 May)

### TOGO

**Establishment of UAR Embassy.** The UAR Ambassador in Guinea, Nagīb as-Sadr, led the UAR delegation at Togo's independence celebrations on 27 Apr, and held talks with the Togo Government on the exchange of diplomatic representation. (*Ahram*, 10, 30 Apr, 16 May)

In Sept the UAR appointed Muhammad Yahya Hasan, its resident Ambassador in Mali, as Ambassador (non-resident) in Togo and also a Chargé d'Affaires. (*Ahram*, 20 Sept)

### UGANDA

[The UAR maintained close contact with the Uganda National Congress Party, which operated the Uganda Office in Cairo. The Office came to represent only a certain extremist faction, consisting of the UNC's former chairman, Joseph Kiwanuka, and John Kale, who headed the office until his death in Aug.]

**Activities of Uganda Office.** In June the Office held a Press conference at which independence for Uganda in 1961 was demanded. At another Press conference, in Aug, with the participation of Kiwanuka [see below] and as-Sibā'i, the SG of the Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Conference, the Uganda representatives expressed their opposition to the "secessionist" policy of the Kabaka of Buganda [who sought to establish a state independent of Uganda]. (*Ahram*, 14 June, 14 Aug)

In Aug Kale died in an air crash in the USSR, and was replaced as head of the Uganda Office by Ali Omar. (*Ahram*, 22 Aug; *R. Cairo*, 4 Dec-BBC, 6 Dec)

**Kiwanuka Meets Abdel-Nasser.** During 1960, Kiwanuka met Abdel-Nasser three times—in Aug (on his way for

talks in London with the British Colonial Secretary), Nov and Dec. After the Nov meeting Kiwanuka stated that the UAR Government had expressed its opposition to the "secessionist" policy of the Kabaka of Buganda. A delegation sent by the Kabaka had been refused entry to the UAR. Kiwanuka also said in Cairo, that Abdel-Nasser was the bearer of the torch of freedom in all of Africa, not only in the Arab world. At the Dec meeting Kiwanuka expressed support for the UAR's policy in the Congo. (*Ahram*, 14 Aug, 19 Nov; *R. Cairo*, 4, 5 Dec-BBC, 6, 7 Dec)

### ZANZIBAR

**Background Note.** [The UAR maintains contact with the Zanzibar National Party (ZNP), which is supported mainly by the Arab population (40,000 out of 300,000). The leader of the party is Ali Muhsin. A Zanzibar Office operates in Cairo and is headed by Ali Sultān.]

**Contacts with the ZNP.** Ali Muhsin visited Cairo in Feb and discussed with the authorities the commercial relations between the two countries. (*Ruz al-Yusuf*, 22 Feb)

A ZNP delegation visited Cairo in Aug. It was met by the deputy chairman of the National Assembly, Galāl, who explained parliamentary organization in the UAR. (*Ahram*, 29 Aug)

**US and Britain attacked over Zanzibar Policy.** Cairo Radio attacked the US for planning the establishment of a missile base in Zanzibar, and Britain for introducing a new constitution which aimed at perpetuating imperialist rule in Zanzibar. (*R. Cairo*, 7, 8 July-BBC, 9 July)

In Dec Cairo Radio declared that the British in Zanzibar were suppressing the nationalist movement and jailing its members. (*R. Cairo*, 1 Dec-BBC, 3 Dec)

## OTHER COUNTRIES

### AUSTRALIA

**Mar-Dec: Reopening of the Australian Legation in Cairo.** [Diplomatic relations between the two countries were broken off during the Suez campaign, late in 1956.] It was announced in Canberra on 8 Mar that the Australian Legation in Cairo had been reopened and that a Chargé d'Affaires had been appointed. (*Keating's*, p 17354) On 21 Dec the Australian Chargé d'Affaires, Mr John Paul Quinn, presented his credentials to President Abdel-Nasser. (*R. Cairo*, 21 Dec-IMB, 22 Dec) [No UAR representative was appointed in Canberra until the end of the year.]

**Oct:** [Abdel-Nasser severely criticized Australia for its sponsorship of an amendment to the "five-nation resolution" co-sponsored by the UAR in the UN General Assembly. (See p 12).]

### AUSTRIA

**June: A Trade and Payments Agreement.** On 1 June a trade and payments agreement was signed in Cairo between the UAR and Austria, according to which mutual import of goods would be facilitated and payment could henceforth be effected in free currency as well as in bilateral set off. (*Gumhuriyah*, 2 June)

### REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS

(A central issue in the relations between the UAR and Cyprus was the problem of Cyprus-Israel relations. (See pp 181-2.)

**Sept: Ambassador to Cyprus.** On 5 Sept President Abdel-Nasser appointed Mustafa Lutfi as the first UAR Ambassador to Nicosia. (*Akhbar*, 6 Sept) Lutfi arrived in Nicosia on 10 Jan 1961, and submitted his credentials on 14 Jan 1961. (*Ahram*, 15 Jan 1961)

**Commercial Agreement.** It was announced in Nicosia on 29 Sept that a commercial agreement had been signed between the UAR and Cyprus which aimed at strengthening the commercial and economic ties between the two countries. (*R. London*, 29 Sept-IMB, 30 Sept; *Ha'aretz*, 23 Oct)

### IRELAND

**July: UAR Foreign Minister's Visit.** On 14 July Dr M Fawzi, the UAR Foreign Minister, arrived in Dublin on a three-day official visit to Ireland. (*R. Damascus*, 15 July-IMB, 16 July) The establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries was to be discussed.



(*Ruz al-Yusuf*, 18 July) On 17 July Dr Fawzi invited Ireland's Foreign Minister, Mr Aiken, to visit the UAR. The invitation was accepted, but no date was fixed. (BBC, 20 July)

On 19 Aug it was announced in Cairo that the two countries had decided to exchange diplomatic representatives. (*Ahram*, 20 Aug) [Until the end of the year no further development was reported.]

#### MALTA

In the second half of Apr the leader of the Maltese Labour Party, Dominic Mintoff, visited Cairo. On 27 Apr he declared in Cairo that President Abdel-Nasser had pledged the UAR's full support of the Maltese people's struggle for independence. (BBC, 29 Apr)

#### SPAIN

Sept: Abdel-Nasser-Franco Meeting. On his way to attend the UN General Assembly in New York President Abdel-Nasser stopped on 23 Sept at Barajas Airport outside Madrid, where he met General Franco and talked with him for an hour and a half. (*Ahram*, 24 Sept) They discussed the international situation in general, the situation in Africa and Algeria, and the economic relations between the two countries. (*Akhbar*, 24 Sept) The meeting was given great prominence in the Spanish Press, and "special articles praised Abdel-Nasser's statesmanship and emphasized the close understanding between Spain and the Arab world." (*Economist*, 29 Oct)

#### YUGOSLAVIA

Jan: Yugoslav Firm Builds Port in Syria. On 7 Jan a contract was signed between the UAR and a Yugoslav firm to build a new port at Tartus on the Mediterranean at a cost of £3.2 million. The port was to be completed within five years. (*R. Damascus*, 7 Jan-*IMB*, 8 Jan)

Jan: A Yugoslav Educational Delegation in the UAR. In the second half of Jan a Yugoslav cultural and educational mission visited the UAR. (*Ahram*, 15, 24, 29 Jan)

May: The Yugoslav Foreign Minister "en Passage" in Cairo. On 1 May the Yugoslav Foreign Minister, Koca Popovic, arrived in Cairo on his way back from India and stayed until 8 May. According to a communiqué published in Cairo on 8 May he was received by Abdel-Nasser and Amer and had a series of meetings with the UAR Foreign Minister. The international situation had been reviewed with particular reference to the two countries and to matters connected with their areas. Both sides were in agreement on the present international situation and probable developments and on the strengthening of relations and co-operation between the two countries in all fields. (*R. Cairo*, 8 May-BBC, 10 May)

June: Information Exchange Agreement. On 6 June, in Belgrade an agreement to provide full facilities in the exchange of news and information was concluded between the UAR and Yugoslavia. (BBC in Arabic, 6 June-*IMB*, 7 June)

June: Abdel-Nasser Visits Yugoslavia. On 13 June, following his state visit to Greece, the UAR President, accompanied by UAR Ministers, high officials and his family arrived in Pula, Yugoslavia. This was his third state visit to Yugoslavia (the former visits took place in 1956 and 1958) and his seventh meeting with President Tito. (*Ahram*, 13, 14 June) On 14 June President Abdel-

Nasser and Tito started talks on Brioni Island; they interrupted their talks for a three-day tour of Croatia and Slovenia before returning on 18 June to prepare their final statement. (*Ahram*, 15-20 June)

Tito and Abdel-Nasser on Task of Uncommitted Countries in World Crisis. At a luncheon in Brioni, on 14 June, President Tito urged greater activity by "uncommitted" countries "because the big powers had shown they were unable to solve world problems," and it was thus the duty of the "uncommitted countries" to intervene. He emphasized that he was not proposing the creation of a third world bloc "which would only be a further mistake," but he urged that the "uncommitted countries should seek to strengthen those forces which are for peace and against the use of modern weapons of annihilation." In his reply President Nasser stated the basic agreement between the two countries on non-alignment and peaceful co-existence. [However this source (quoting Reuter) does not mention any specific support by Abdel-Nasser of Tito's approach to the current crisis.] He stressed his belief that world problems could be solved only in a peaceful way and that all countries had a responsible part to play in "this crucial period of world history" and concluded: "We shall therefore express the hope that the big powers will have a new opportunity to meet and to eliminate their differences." This would better help the advancement of under-developed countries. (*Eg. Gaz.*, 15 June)

Abdel-Nasser and Tito Discuss Proposal for a "Neutralist Summit Meeting." On 15 June the Indian Ambassador to Yugoslavia arrived at Brioni and was received separately by Abdel-Nasser and Tito. It was believed that the Ambassador's sudden call at Brioni was connected with Tito's proposal that neutralist nations must act following the failure of the Paris Summit Conference. (*Eg. Gazette*, 16 June)

On 16 June *al-Akhbar* reported that the two leaders had thoroughly discussed an Indonesian proposal for a "neutralist summit meeting." (*Akhbar*, 16 June)

Khrushchev Message. On 16 Jan *al-Ahram* reported that Abdel-Nasser had received a message in Brioni from PM Khrushchev, on the question of disarmament and on the situation which had arisen from the failure of the Summit Conference. The newspaper added that the two leaders would give special attention to this message. (*Ahram*, 16 June)

Joint Communiqué: Steps for Increased Co-operation: "All" Nations Exhorted to International Activity. On 20 June a joint communiqué was issued. It was agreed to set up a mixed Ministerial Committee to study and develop economic, technical, commercial and industrial co-operation between the two countries. The two Presidents were of the opinion that world peace was not the exclusive responsibility of the great powers but "is also the responsibility of all nations of the world" which should make efforts "to put an end to the cold war, to create a better atmosphere in international relations, and to oppose any policy based on the threat to resort to force." Urging efforts for disarmament, the two Presidents considered that the latest Soviet disarmament proposals contained "constructive elements" and facilitated the reaching of an agreement. They emphasized the importance of the talks on the cessation of nuclear tests. They stressed the necessity of respecting the UN Charter in solving outstanding international problems. They em-

phasized the Bandung resolutions and called for "evolution" in the undeveloped countries, without political conditions attached. Furthermore, the two leaders called for the end of the Algerian war by negotiations based on the right of self-determination, and condemned the policy of apartheid. Both Presidents were "convinced that the Palestine problem should be settled in accordance with the terms of the UN Charter, and in terms of the previous resolutions passed by the UN for solving the Palestine question on a sound basis." (*Eg. Gaz.*, 21 June)

**June-Aug: Exchange of Youth Delegations.** On 29 June, a Yugoslav Youth Delegation left Cairo after a ten-day stay during which it visited youth organizations in Egypt and had talks with officials on youth problems. An agreement for exchange visits by youth groups was signed. (*MENA*, 29 June-BBC, 1 July)

An Egyptian youth group left for Belgrade on 17 Aug to join Yugoslav labour camps. A Yugoslav youth group arrived in Cairo the same day to join labour camps in Egypt. (*MENA*, 18 Aug-BBC, 19 Aug)

**July: UAR Students in Yugoslavia.** It was reported that there were 80 UAR students receiving practical training in Yugoslav factories while another 70 students were working on Yugoslav agricultural settlements. (*Akhbar al-Yawm*, 2 July)

**Aug-Nov: Exchange of Visits and Missions; Economic Co-operation Plan.** On 4 Aug the Yugoslav Minister for Industry, Hassan Brkic, and the Director of the African Affairs Department at the Yugoslav Foreign Ministry arrived in Cairo from Madagascar for an eight-day visit. They discussed Yugoslav participation in the UAR's second five-year plan and the conclusion of an economic agreement. (*R. Cairo*, 4, 8 Aug-BBC, 6 Aug, *IMB*, 9 Aug) At the conclusion of these talks the Minister said that Yugoslavia could provide the UAR with machinery for the textile and chemical industry and could contribute to the mining industry, and that a committee of

experts would continue discussions in Cairo and in Yugoslavia. (*R. Cairo*, 11 Aug-BBC, 13 Aug)

On 23 Sept Mūsa Arafah, the Labour Minister of the Egyptian Region arrived in Belgrade on a seven-day official visit. He was expected to discuss Yugoslav participation in the UAR five-year development plan, especially in irrigation projects. (*R. Damascus*, 24 Sept-*IMB*, 25 Sept)

On 4 Nov a Yugoslav Parliamentary Mission concluded its four-day visit to Cairo. A UAR Parliamentary Mission was invited to Yugoslavia; the visit was to take place early in 1961. (*Ahram*, 6 Nov)

**Dec: Yugoslav Vice-President Visits the UAR.** On 10 Dec Mr Edward Kardelj, the Yugoslav Vice-President arrived in Cairo on a nine-day official visit. (*R. Cairo*, 10-11 Dec-*IMB*, 11 Dec) He was accompanied by Kiro Gligorov, Secretary of the Federal Executive Council for General Economic Affairs; Anton Vratosa, Under-Secretary of State in the Federal Executive Council and Nikola Milicevic, Minister Plenipotentiary in the Foreign Secretariat. (*BBC*, 21 Dec) He handed the UAR President a message from Tito and discussed with him world affairs in general and the situation in Africa and the Middle East in particular as well as economic relations between the two countries. (*Ahram*, 12-14 Dec) With Abd-al Latif al-Baghdadi they discussed agricultural development in the two countries. (*R. Cairo*, 18 Dec-*IMB*, 19 Dec) The guests also toured the country.

In a joint communiqué issued on 19 Dec the "two governments expressed their joint resolve to develop all their potentialities, to prevent the return of imperialist domination to the Congo, bring to an end the bloodshed in Algeria, enabling the Algerian people to practise their legitimate right of self-determination without delay and checking foreign interference in the affairs of countries struggling for independence." It also stressed the desire of both sides "to strengthen the co-operation between the two countries in their common interests and those of world peace." (*R. Cairo*, 19 Dec-BBC, 21 Dec)

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Aden P. — Aden Protectorate  
E — Egypt  
F — France  
GDR — German Democratic Republic  
GFR — German Federal Republic  
I — Iraq  
Ir — Iran  
Is — Israel

J — Jordan  
K — King  
L — Lebanon  
Li — Libya  
M — Morocco  
P — President  
PM — Prime Minister  
S — Syria  
Sa — Saudi Arabia

Su — Sudan  
T — Turkey  
Tu — Tunisia  
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Aden P. — Aden Protectorate  
E — Egypt  
F — France  
GDR — German Democratic Republic  
GFR — German Federal Republic  
I — Iraq  
Ir — Iran  
Is — Israel

J — Jordan  
K — King  
L — Lebanon  
Li — Libya  
M — Morocco  
P — President  
PM — Prime Minister  
S — Syria  
Sa — Saudi Arabia

Su — Sudan  
T — Turkey  
Tu — Tunisia  
UAR — United Arab Republic  
UK — United Kingdom  
USA — United States of America  
USSR — Union of Soviet Socialist Republics  
Y — Yemen

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